Being Tough Doesn't Always Pay Off:

The Culture of Honour vs. Dignity in Negotiation

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ABSTRACT

Early work on cross-cultural negotiation has focused on East-West differences. In the current study we investigate the negotiation scripts employed by Middle Eastern negotiators, more specifically Iranian negotiators, in an intracultural interaction, compared to North American negotiators. We examine how the Iranian worldviews, beliefs, norms, and social behavior influence their goals and aspirations, negotiation tactics, and ultimately final outcome. We formulated our hypotheses based on the theory of honor-dignity cultures and illustrate how the importance of preserving and maintaining honor influences the Iranian negotiation strategies in business dealings. Our results illustrate that consistent with the culture of honor, Iranian negotiators are more likely to be competitive, express emotions, and employ distributive tactics compared to Canadian negotiators. Moreover, this competitive mindset leaves Iranian negotiators at a disadvantage as the overall joint gain is significantly lower than Canadian negotiators.

Keywords:

Culture of Honor, Middle East, and Negotiation

The Culture of Honour vs. Dignity in Negotiation

Negotiation is a process of social interaction, where interdependent individuals with conflicting goals engage in joint decision making to distribute resources and or resolve conflicts or issues (Carnevale & Isen, 1986). Negotiators however, tend to reach suboptimal outcomes and fail to realize optimal or integrative solutions that could further benefit the parties. Research attributed these suboptimal solutions to cognitive (e.g. Neal & Bazerman, 1991) and social interaction (e.g. Putnam & Wilson, 1989) perspectives (Weingart, Hyder, & Prietula, 1996). In a cross-cultural context, the complexity of negotiation dynamics is exacerbated (Brett, 2000), since culture influences negotiator's goals and motivation (e.g. Gelfand & Realo, 1999), communication styles (e.g. Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001; Semnani-Azad & Adair, 2011), negotiation schemas (e.g. Adair, Taylor, & Tinsley, 2009), and normative behaviors (e.g. Brett & Okumura, 1998). Early research primarily focused on East-West differences in negotiation and research has rarely investigated the negotiation scripts and strategies of Middle Eastern negotiators and the influence of these scripts on final outcomes.

The Middle East region is one of the world's largest oil and natural gas reserves, and World Bank estimates the need for nearly \$3.1billion a year in private investments to realize privatization efforts and infrastructure projects in the Middle East (Tinawi, 1997). Foreign trade and cooperation between North America and the Middle East is a necessary and inevitable part of our future. Middle Eastern and North American markets have come to rely on each other more heavily for many resources and foreign direct investments (Dastmalchian, Javidan, & Alam, 2001). For instance, Iran exported 20 billion US dollars while importing 12 billion US dollars' worth of goods and services in 1996 (Dastmalchian, et al., 2001). Thus, research on Middle Eastern negotiation is necessary since interaction with members of these cultures is unavoidable

in the business world. The purpose of the current study is to examine cultural differences in negotiation scripts, encompassing behavioral and psychological processes, and the effects of those scripts on final negotiation outcomes amongst Middle Eastern (Iranian) and North American (Canadian) negotiators. We develop our hypotheses based on the scripts theory and cultural framework of honor, face, and dignity (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Leung & Cohen, 2011). Our study offers important contributions to culture and negotiation literature by identifying negotiation scripts employed by Honor and Dignity negotiators when in a relational versus a non-relational context, and how these scripts influence goals, processes, and economic outcomes.

Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

Scripts Theory, Culture and Negotiation

Scripts theory proposed by Schank & Abelson (1977), claims that human behavior follows and is a consequence of cognitive scripts. A script is a stereotypical knowledge structure, developed from previous behavioral experiences of events, that is employed for an everyday routine event (Mesoudi & Whiten, 2004). The knowledge representations of these routine events or stereotypical action sequences are hierarchical in nature and encompass several goals and sub goals. At a very basic level for instance, an overall goal of buying coffee would contain more detailed sub-goals such as walking to the coffee shop, ordering the drink, and paying for the coffee. Therefore, a script is a schema that describes an event or behavior appropriate for a particular context, and minimizes cognitive effort involved in performing behaviors in a context when interacting with others (Tooby, Cosmides, & Price, 2006).

Negotiation is a process of social interaction with interdependent others that occurs on a daily basis. For example, people may negotiate with (close) others about simple activities such as

how to spend their free time together, watch movie to watch, or which restaurant to go to. In a more complex business negotiation, a negotiator may have an overarching economic or relational goal with a particular script associated with that goal. For instance, if a negotiator's overall goal is to develop a long-term relationship with the counterpart, that negotiator may enact a script that consists of behavioral sub-goals, such as smiling, engaging in eye contact, communicating warmth in vocal tone, expressing positive emotions, and engaging in conversation about family or hobbies. According to Pruitt & Carnevale (1993), negotiations necessitate collective scripts with "interlocking roles." Working relationship for instance, is an example of a collective script negotiators may hold, where the interaction flows along a predictable, contingent path, with reciprocity as an important subroutine. Moreover, when and how negotiators engage in the working relationship script is thought to be dependent on the strength of the relationship (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000).

A side from the script an individual develops from his or her experience and knowledge, cultural norms and rules are likely to accompany a negotiator's behavioral script (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000). Culture has been shown to influence the development of scripts and the knowledge transmission of those scripts amongst its members (Mesoudi & Whiten, 2004). Culture is defined as an exclusive and unique nature of a social group with regards to values, norms, schemas, and institutions that is different and distinguishable from other social groups (Lytle, Brett, Barness, Tinsley, & Janssens, 1995). Culture influences display rules, cognitive schemas, and normative behaviors people engage in various contexts (Ekman & Friesen, 1975). Past research has examined the meaning and practice of negotiation across cultures (Cohen 1997, Leung 1998, Markus & Lin1998); yet negotiation scripts cross-culturally, have not been examined. In our study we examine negotiation scripts employed by Iranian and

Canadian negotiators. We examine 1) how negotiator's overall goals, measured via self-report aspirations, influences sub-goals in the negotiation process; 2) we examine behavioral scripts associated with sub-goals, by coding negotiator's vocal paralanguage, and psychological scripts, through negotiator's self-report ratings; 3) we will investigate how these goals and scripts influence the final negotiation outcome; 4) and finally we will determine how these goals and scripts influence negotiation process and outcome when negotiators interact in a relational versus a non-relational context.

Honor and Dignity Negotiation Scripts

We developed our hypothesis about the Iranian and Canadian negotiation scripts based on the honor, dignity, face framework (Kim & Cohen, 2010), heavily focused on honor and dignity cultures. In this framework, American and Western European cultures fall under dignity culture, in which a person's self-worth is intrinsically derived and not dependent on others, tends to be stable, and is perceived to be equal to other members of the culture (Ayers, 1984). According to Ayers (1984), dignity is theoretically defined as "the conviction that each individual at birth possessed an intrinsic value at least theoretically equal to that of every other person." This worth is neither conferred bothers nor can it be taken away by them (Leung & Cohen). Dignity is associated with independence and focusing on personal, individual goals (Schwartz, 1992). A person with a sense of dignity is thought to be autonomous, behaves according to his or her own internal standards, is not fixated on the external situation, and is not easily influenced or corrupted by others (Leung & Cohen).

On the other hand, self-worth in an honor culture is externally driven (Pitt-Rivers, 1968), and dependent on the social interactions. Honor manifests in a reputation for toughness in

protecting self and family and not letting others take advantage of you (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Honor cultures are thought to have been developed in regions with unstable economies, for example herding societies (unstable economy and wealth) rather than agriculture with stable wealth (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996), and in societies that lack a strong central government and or a weak rule of law (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997). The culture of honor is very pertinent to the Iranian society in which its members are individualists with strong relational ties (i.e. protecting self and close kin), high level of mistrust of people outside the immediate circles, and lack of trust toward the central government and people of high power (Bar, 2004). In Iran and Middle Eastern societies, status and public reputation, especially those pertaining to strength and courage (manhood) are very important (See Bourdieu, 1977; Gilmore, 1991; Pely, 2011). Popular beliefs associated with mistrust in the Iranian culture include: men are by nature evil, power-seeking, and irrational (mistrust of human motivations); everything is in a state of flux and change (mistrust of stability); acceptance of exaggeration in verbal communication (mistrust of the verbal communication of others); distrust in interpersonal relations; the need for manipulation in the struggle for life (expectation that others will try to manipulate); lack of belief in altruism; hostility towards government as an exploiting enemy; a belief that nothing can change for the better (Bar, 2004; Beeman, 1986). Moreover, because of geographic conditions, modalities of family life, or the despotic structure of all the political regimes that have been in power in Iran, individuals have learned to fend for self and family and not to trust anyone outside of one's intimate circle (Bar, 2004; Javidan & Dastmalchian, 2003).

Therefore, compared to members of dignity cultures whose self-worth and value is stable and derived internally, the self-worth of honor culture individuals is unstable and dependent on others in the society (thus, external). Moreover, in interdependent interactions, members of

dignity cultures tend to be independent and autonomous, while individuals from honor culture maybe perceived equally in value and status, but this is not stable and so the environment becomes competitive and potentially escalating (Miller, 1993). Based on these cultural differences, we predict that in the negotiation context, Iranian and Canadian negotiators will have very different goals, such that compared to Canadian negotiators; Iranian negotiators will be very competitive and so will more likely set high aspirations prior to negotiation.

Hypothesis1: Compared to Canadian negotiators, Iranian negotiators will be more competitive and therefore will set higher aspirations by setting a higher reservation price (H1a) and indicating higher percentage of deal to claim (H1b).

To date, there is limited research on culture of honor and dignity in negotiation and conflict management. Yet, an important distinction between honor and dignity culture is attributed in behavioral reactions to conflicts. In dignity cultures (e.g. Canada and U.S.) people's reaction to problems and conflicts tend to be direct and issues are explicitly discussed, geared toward problem-solving (Tinsley & Weldon, 2003). In honor cultures (e.g. Iran and Middle East) reactions tend to be direct and may be more aggressive, and individuals tend to be motivated toward protecting or re-establishing honor and reputation (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). In Iran, honor or *gheyirat* (manhood) on the personal level, means that if a person is wrongly accused or insulted, it is considered an affront to his honor and he must express his indignation in a clear and public manner (Bar, 2004).

Most of the prior research on behavioral reactions of individuals from honor culture mainly focused on extreme aggressive reactions involving some level of violence of insults (e.g. Cohen & Nisbett, 1994, 1997; Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008). However, Beersma, Harinck, and Gerts (2003) did examine the influence of honor culture in behaviors in the workplace. In their study, the researchers found that Dutch participants with

high honor values intended to use more distributive negotiation tactics, expressed more negative emotions, and perceived higher conflict when they read a work scenario with an insult compared to one without an insult. According to Bar (2004), when under "attack", Iranian negotiators tend to be in a defensive mode of minimizing losses but not necessarily maximizing gains.

Nonetheless, Iranian negotiators are more likely to employ distributive strategies. Also, Iranian culture allows for expression of extreme emotions – in particular feelings of insult, rage, and personal umbrage, and public demonstrations of emotions such as anger is considered acceptable (Bar, 2004).

Based on cultural differences in goals and motivations and reactions to conflict and disputes, we expect cultural variation in scripts associated with sub-goals pertaining to reaction to conflict. We predict cultural differences in behavioral and psychological scripts in the negotiation process. More specifically, we predict that compared to Canadian negotiators, Iranian negotiators will more likely express emotions in their nonverbal behavior. We examine emotional reaction in the negotiation process via vocal paralanguage, which are nonverbal elements in speech pertaining to variations in voice quality and vocalization (Remland, 2009). Voice qualities include all the characteristics of a person's voice, such as pitch range, rhythm control, tempo and articulation (Vogelaar & Silverman, 1984). We also predict that compared to Canadian negotiators, Iranian negotiator will more likely use psychological mechanisms associated with distributive negotiation strategies. Finally, because Iranian negotiators are more likely to have competitive goals and engage in distributive strategies, we expect that these scripts would limit effective information sharing, thereby lowering chances of realizing value creation opportunities. Therefore, we expect Iranian dyads to have a lower joint outcome compared to Canadian negotiators.

Hypothesis2: Compared to Canadian negotiators, Iranian negotiators will more likely express emotions (behavioral script) (H2a) and engage in distributive strategies (psychological script) during the negotiation process (H2b).

Hypothesis3: Iranian negotiators will not discuss optional issues (H3a) and will have lower joint gains than Canadian negotiators (H3b).

Negotiation Scripts In Relational Context

Although the culture of honor tends to be associated with violence and aggressive behavior, people who live in cultures of honor also exhibit warmth, hospitality, and strong family ties (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2008), and individuals from these cultures tend to be attuned to face-saving, especially when interacting in a relational context. According to Bar (2004), an Iranian is closely knit with relational ties consisting of immediate and extended families and close friends, embodied in the institution of dovreh (circle), serving as social "glue" and a point of reference for the relationships between its members, all of whom consider themselves equal (Beeman, 1986), and providing a mechanism of social mobility and connections (Bar, 2004). In the Iranian culture, giving face to other is just as important as saving one's face and this is demonstrated in the ritual of $t\alpha'$ arof which is defined as the "active, ritualized realization of differential perceptions of superiority and inferiority in interaction (Bar, 2004)". The ritual of $t\alpha'$ arof is also extremely time-consuming; the initial refusal to accept a proposal must be repeated enough to underline the fact that the recipient knows that he is unworthy, but accepts out of deference (Bar, 2004). Since Iranians are more likely to engage in face-saving behaviors (giving face to interacting partner) when in a relational context, we expect Iranian negotiators to give face to the counterpart more that Canadian negotiators in a relational context.

Hypothesis4: In a relational context, compared to Canadian negotiators, Iranian negotiators will more likely employ face-giving scripts.

Prior research shows that negotiators with a relational construal tend to be more accommodating with their reservation points and minimize their own outcomes to maintain relational harmony (Amanatullah et al., 2008; Lin & Miller, 2003). Individuals with a relational mindset are more likely to be attentive to the needs and outcomes of others in decision-making so that both parties will be satisfied with the win-win outcome (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Gore, Cross, & Kanagawa, 2009). Regardless of the strength of the relationship, relationally oriented individuals do not want to risk damaging or breaking-up any relationships as it leads to a considerable amount of distress (Baumeister & Leary, 2000). Due to the anxiety over preserving relationships, negotiators tend to be more accommodating with their reservation points, which in turn lowers joint outcomes (Amanatullah et al., 2008). Although relational accommodation hinders joint economic outcomes, it creates relational outcomes such as feelings of trust and liking for their counterpart (Amanatullah et al., 2008, De Pauw, 2010).

Hypothesis 5: In a relational context, compared to Canadian negotiators, Iranian negotiators will be less competitive, have lower aspirations, and employ cooperative negotiation scripts.

METHODS

Participants

50 Iranian (58% females; mean age = 28.9, SD= 4.8) and 88 Canadian (76% females, mean age = 23.4, SD= 12), undergraduate students from a Canadian University participated in this study in exchange for 1 participation credit in their psychology class. Participants were randomly assigned into two conditions of relational and non-relational, where the relational context was manipulated in the negotiation roles. All Iranian students were Farsi speaking born in Iran, identified primarily with the Iranian culture, and had been in Canada for less than five years. All Canadian participants were Canadian-Caucasians born in Canada, who identified

primarily with the Canadian culture. Participants engaged in an intracultural negotiation with a counterpart of the same gender and culture. All negotiation interactions were video recorded.

Design and Procedure

This study employed a 2 (Culture: Iranian, Canadian) x 2 (Relational Orientation: relational, non-relational) factorial design. The dependent measures in this study were: aspirations, vocal paralanguage, psychological scripts, discussion of optional issue, and negotiation outcome.

Upon arrival, the participants were placed in separate rooms. Participants were then provided with the consent form and information about the study. They were told that this study examined how people made decisions in negotiation. When placed in separate rooms, participants were provided with their negotiation roles, which included background information on their character, their experience, budget, and interests and a pre-negotiation questionnaire that includes aspirations and goals for the negotiation. A pay-off matrix, attached to their role instructions, provided participants with an overview of the four negotiation issues, the options within each issue, and their preferences via a point system. Information about the optional issues was provided in the end of the negotiation roles. A maximum of thirty minutes was allotted for preparation. After the preparation phase, participants were brought into the same room to negotiate. Participants were seated by the negotiation table, across each other. When ready, dvads were asked to start the negotiation task. Moreover, the negotiation interaction was videotaped (without the knowledge of the participants) but at the end of the study participants were made again of the videotape. Dyads were not provided with a negotiation deadline; however dvads that spent more than 30 minutes were instructed to end the negotiation within 5 minutes.

Once an agreement was reached, both parties completed the "contract form", recorded the options they agreed on, and were asked to calculate and record their overall score. After the negotiation task, participants completed a demographic questionnaire about their gender, age, and cultural background. Upon the completion of the study, all participants were thanked, rewarded, and debriefed about the purpose of the study.

Materials

Relational Prime. The relational prime was included in the pre-negotiation questionnaire, given to participants prior to the negotiation interaction. We developed two relational primes adapted from prior measures (Gardner, Gabriel & Lee, 1999; Trafimow et al., 1991). Participants were presented with the scenario of a 10 year-old boy who noticed a hole in the dyke that protects his town from flooding (see Appendix A). In the relational condition, similar to prior research, the concept for family was activated, where the boy sees his brother (in-group) walking by and asks him for help. In the stranger condition, the boy asks for help from a passerby (outgroup) whom he did not know but had seen before in the town. As a manipulation check, participants were asked to estimate the likelihood (in percentage value) in which the brother or the passerby helped the boy.

Negotiation Simulation. The Sweet Shop, loosely based on Tower's Market (negotiationexercises.com), is a negotiation between the owner of a bakery and the owner of an ice-cream store. Both owners have small shops but would like to move to a larger space in a more upscale area. Their negotiation is over the opportunity to share larger space in a new location. Six quantified issues had to be negotiated to reach an agreement. Four core issues, staffing, temperature, maintenance, and design, had to be resolved to reach agreement. Two other

issues were optional: whether the brother of one will design their website and whether they will share a cold delivery service. Of the four core issues, two (staffing and design) had different weights for the two parties, and could be traded to create joint value. One issue (maintenance) was completely distributive another issue (temperature) was compatible in that both parties preferred colder store temperatures. The two optional issues could bring additional gains to both parties if included in the agreement. The website design issue had a relational element since the ice-cream store owner had already suggested that his/her brother design the website. However the baker preferred to hand over this job to an experienced web designer, even though the economic importance of this issue was small for both parties. Both negotiators received confidential role information about the point value of options associated with each issue. They were also informed that if they could not reach agreement on core issues, they would stay at their current locations and keep looking for alternative space, and that this alternative was worth 4000 points. Both also were told to negotiate as many points as possible for their businesses.

Aspirations. Just prior to negotiating, we asked participants what percentage of the value in the negotiation they expected to claim for themselves. Also, participants were asked to include their reservation price, which is the least favorable point at which one will accept a negotiated agreement.

Behavioral Script (Vocal Paralinguistic). All negotiations were video-taped and the vocal speech of negotiators was observed and coded by six independent female raters of East Asian, Middle Eastern, and North American cultural backgrounds were trained to reliably identify all the behaviours examined in this study. We employed global measures of vocal speech and paralanguage employed by previous researchers (Cocker & Burgoon, 1987; Manusov, 2005) (See Appendix B). We employed the global rating approach where coders were

asked to observe each negotiation interaction, and rate the negotiator on each of the paralinguistic cues on a 7-point scale, capturing the intensity of each vocal cue. For example, when ratings Variation in Pitch, coders were asked to ratings based on the following continuum: 1= target's voice was monotone (no intonation or variation in pitch), versus 7= target's voice contained vocal variability (variation in pitch). Prior to global rating, coders were trained to reliably identify all the vocal cues examined in this study. For all ratings, coders used the neutral confederate as a base point and evaluated participants' deviation of vocal paralanguage from that base point. Because coders were asked to focus on the vocal speech, rather than the nonverbal cues, they were asked to minimize the VLC media player (which played each video-recorded negotiation session), and only attend to the vocal cues. All coders were asked to complete three practice sessions, and for each session, inter-rater reliability was assessed using bivariate correlation. The mean alpha was 0.8, indicating a good inter-rater reliability (Portney & Watkins, 2009). Then, two of the four raters coded every session, rating the occurrence of paralinguistic cues, and we averaged their ratings. Prior to analyses, we categorize the paralanguage items into two categories of "emotional expression" and "fluency" and averaged items within the categories (Appendix B).

Psychological Script (Negotiation Tactics). The post-negotiation questionnaire asked participants about the tactics used during the negotiation by themselves and by the counterpart. We factor analyzed the self and counterpart questions separately with Varimax rotation. The result was four scales that were reliable across self and counterpart and within each culture: 1) Distributive Emotions (4 items, $\alpha = .7$): "I rejected offers to avoid feeling weak", "I faked anger to put pressure", "I showed frustration", "I rejected offers to avoid appearing weak"; 2) facegiving (2 items, $\alpha = .87$): "I helped the other party preserve his/her honor", "I helped the other

party avoid shame"; 3) Refer to God (3 items, $\alpha = 0.77$): [the other party] "claimed that God would be happy with outcome s/he suggested", "referred to God's will", "claimed that God supports his/her arguments"; 4) Substantiation (5 items, $\alpha = 0.62$): [the other party] "referred to his position of authority", "tried to convince me that my arguments were wrong", "used threat", "gave ultimatum", "tried to persuade by referring to his past achievements".

Information Exchange. We measured information sharing in the post negotiation questionnaire with eight Likert scaled items ($\alpha = .7$). Sample items included "I didn't ask about his priorities, and "We discussed common interests".

Economic and objective outcomes. We used joint gain as the economic dependent variable.

RESULTS

Prior to our analysis, as a manipulation check we examined participants' response to the question about the likelihood that the brother or passerby would help the boy in the village. A univariate general linear model analysis was conducted with culture and condition (relational orientation) as independent measures. The results showed a significant main effect of culture (F (1, 134) = 20.12, p < .01), where overall, Iranians were more optimistic that the brother or stranger would help the boy (M =86.3, SE=2), compared to Canadians (M =75.63, SE=1.3). We also observed a main effect of condition (F (1, 134) = 5.39, p < .05), in which negotiators with a relational orientation were more optimistic that the brother would help (M =83.75, SE=1.68), than negotiators in the stranger condition (M =78.21, SE=1.7). Thus, the manipulation was effective by increasing the level of optimism of relationally primed participants (as opposed to non-relationally primed) that the brother would help.

¹ Results of the factor analysis are available from the authors.

Hypothesis 1. We carried out a series of general linear univariate analyses to test our predictions. We predicted that Iranian negotiators will be more competitive in the negotiation and will set higher aspirations compared to Canadian negotiators by H1a) setting a higher reservation price and H1b) indicating higher percentage of deal to claim. Overall, we found a main effect of culture on both reservation price (F (1, 134) = 5.47, p = .022), and percentage of deal to claim (F (1, 134) = 6.49, p = .013). As predicted, Iranian negotiators were more likely to set higher a reservation price (M =5444, SD=1740) compared to Canadian negotiators (M =4592.86, SD=1238.14); and Iranian negotiators indicated a higher number for percentage of deal to claim (M =62%, SD=9) than Canadian negotiators (M =57%, SD=6). Therefore, Iranians overall has higher aspirations prior to the negotiation interaction which may indicate they were more competitive than Canadian negotiators.

Hypothesis 2. We postulated that Iranian negotiators will be more competitive in the negotiation and engage in distributive negotiation strategies and express more negative emotions than Canadian negotiators. For examining distributive strategies, we examined cultural differences in employment of Distributive Emotion (self-report), Paralanguage (coder ratings), Referring to God, and Substantiation. The results show significant cultural differences in for Referring to God (F (1, 134) = 11.14, p=.001), where in general Iranians were more likely to employ this tactic (M =1.5, SD=.6) compared to Canadian negotiators (M =1, SD=.2). We observed a marginal cultural difference in the employment of Substantiation (F (1, 65) = 3.5, p=.067), where again Iranians were more likely to employ this tactic (M =2, SD=.5) compared to Canadian negotiators (M =1.67, SD=.5). Our results however, do not illustrate cultural differences in use of Distributive Emotion (F (1, 134) = .9, p>.05).

When examining the findings from the vocal speech, we observed main effects of culture on emotional expression (F (1, 134) = 4.4, p=. 04) and fluency (F (1, 134) = 43.5, p<.001). Overall the results show higher level of lower fluency (more interruptions) (M =5, SE=.14) and higher level of emotions (M =5, SE=.11) amongst Iranians compared to Canadian negotiators. Canadian negotiators on the other hand scored higher on fluency in speech (M =6.3, SE=.11) and lower on emotion expression (M =4.68, SE=.01). Therefore, we found that during the negotiation process, Iranian negotiators are more emotional in their vocal cues, and are more likely to employ psychological scripts of substantiation and refer to God compared to Canadian negotiators.

Hypothesis 3. Because we expected Iranian negotiators to have higher aspirations, be more competitive, and employ more distributive tactics, we predicted that these negotiators will less likely discuss the optional issue, and are more likely to conceal information (not engage in information sharing) and thus overall have lower joint outcomes compared to Canadian negotiators. Contrary to our predictions, Iranians were more likely to discuss the optional issue (72%) than Canadian negotiators (55.7%) and this difference was statistically significant (Chisquare value (1, N = 138) = 3.6, p = .05). Yet interestingly and consistent with our prediction, Iranian negotiators had lower joint gains (M =19060, SD=7106) than Canadian negotiators (M =26890, SD=7622), and this difference was statistically significant (F (1, 65) = 19.14, p<.001).

Hypothesis 4. For our fourth hypothesis, we predicted that Iranians although tend to be more competitive, they are more likely to engage in face-saving and give face to partner (rules of politeness) compared to Canadian negotiators, when in a relational context. Again consistent with our expectation, Iranian negotiators were more likely to give face to the counterpart (M =5.3, SD=.9) compared to Canadian negotiators (M =4.68, SD=.9), and this difference was

statistically significant (F (1, 138) = 7.58, p=.008). However, relational context did not influence the level of face-giving Iranians engaged in. Thus, regardless of the relational prime, Iranians were more likely to give face to the counterpart compared to Canadian negotiators.

Hypothesis 5. Finally, we predicted that Iranians although tend to be more competitive in general, in a relational context these negotiators would have lower aspirations and be less competitive than Canadian negotiators. Although we observed a significant Culture x Condition interaction for percentage of deal to claim, a measure of aspiration, (F (1, 138) = 4.5, p=.036), the pattern is incongruent with our prediction (see Figure 1). Contrary to what we expected, Iranian negotiators had higher aspirations than Canadian negotiators, especially in the relational context. Furthermore, the high aspirations of Iranian negotiators in the relational context, predicts their final outcome where overall compared to Canadian negotiators, Iranian negotiators have a lower joint gain, especially in the relational condition (see Figure 2)

Figure 1 &2 about here

DISCUSSION

In our study we examined the negotiation process and strategies of Iranian negotiators compared to Canadian negotiators, and employed the culture of honor and dignity theory to frame our predictions with regards to behavioral reactions in negotiation and conflict management. Because of Iran's geographical location (in the heart of Middle East), its national character, beliefs, values, and social norms, as well as the position of the state and government, we predicted that consistent with the theory of honor culture, Iranians will illustrate behaviors associated with preserving honor by being more competitive and distributive in negotiation,

compared to Canadian negotiators, whose negotiation behavior would be consistent with the theory of dignity culture.

Consistent with most of our predictions, Iranian showed higher level of competitiveness in negotiation compared to Canadians by setting higher aspirations prior to negotiation, and employing distributive tactics through substantiation and displays of distributive emotion.

Although Iranian negotiators did not overtly claim on employing distributive emotions in the self-report ratings, the more objective ratings of coders illustrated that Iranians are more likely to express emotion (and negative emotion) in their tone of voice and paralanguage compared to Canadian negotiators. Moreover, we found that Iranian negotiators are more likely to interrupt their counterpart during the negotiation process, than Canadian negotiators. Interestingly, one of the distributive tactics employed by Iranian negotiators was referring to God and religion – such that God approves of the negotiation outcome or the option chosen in the negotiation. Although Iranian negotiators tend to be competitive and emotional, they were also more likely to be concerned with face-saving, by giving face to the counterpart and help the counterpart to preserve their honor and avoid shame.

Although we find that in general Iranian negotiators had lower economic outcome compared to Canadian negotiators, there may be some benefits with regards to employing face-saving tactics in long-term relationships and negotiations over a period of time – compensating for some immediate economic loss (See Nisbett & Cohen (1996), p.35 for a discussion of how U.S. Southerners' politeness and hospitality may maintain smooth social interactions and keep conflicts from spiraling out of hand). However in this article, we focus on the specific challenges that negotiators from honor cultures (Middle Easterners) may experience relative to those from dignity cultures negotiators (Canadians).

The strengths of the study include its samples, the new simulation that was developed for the study with issues that engaged the relational mindset, the quality of the measurement of constructs. We measured tactics and information sharing through self-reports and coding negotiators behaviors. Furthermore we measured economic outcomes along with three different subjective relational outcomes. Results indicate consistent support for its hypotheses, and the fact that both self-report and behavioral data triangulated on the same general conclusions.

Examining behavioral data, including what negotiators actually said to each other and did during the negotiation, was a major strength of this study and helped us deepen our understanding of cultural differences.

Although both samples were relatively small and consisted of undergraduate students, they were very well matched. With larger sample sizes, we might have obtained support for some results that did not reach conventional levels of significance. Samples that range beyond undergraduate populations in these cultures would increase the generalizability of the findings. One concern with our study could have been that the Iranian participants were expats and lived in Canada for a period of time. Moreover, in order to keep our questionnaires consistent both cultures (Canadian and Iranian), they were written in English. This may have posed a language barrier the Iranian sample as their mean numbers of years in Canada were roughly three years.

Future research can analyze gender differences across cultures on negotiation outcomes. Past research has shown that gender does in fact play influence approaches, expectations, and outcomes in negotiation (Barkacs & Standifird, 2008). Social gender stereotypes portray males as being aggressive and competitive whereas females as empathetic, cooperative, and patient (Barkacs & Standifird, 2008). Potential future research can examine gender as an independent

variable. Based on generalization that males are more competitive, male dyads would reach higher joint outcomes than the female dyads.

For the reason that cross-cultural interdependency is prevalent in today's society for different resources and knowledge, it is important to understand the determinants that influence negotiation. Our research on relational orientation between Canadian and Iranian negotiators can direct future studies into examining other variables (e.g. gender, age) that may influence the success of negotiation.

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APPENDIX A

Relational Condition

This is the story of a 10 year old boy who lived in Ancient Times. His town was located in a river valley. Floods were common in this valley. The boy lived near a dyke that protected the town from flooding. That winter there had been heavy snow and in the spring it began to rain frequently. With snow melt and spring rain the river was almost overflowing and very powerful. One day the boy was walking home on the path by the river dyke. He saw water leaking through a hole in the dyke. The boy, worried about the hole in the dyke, asked his brother who was passing by for help.

Non-relational Condition

This is the story of a 10 year old boy who lived in Ancient Times. His town was located in a river valley. Floods were common in this valley. The boy lived near a dyke that protected the town from flooding. That winter there had been heavy snow and in the spring it began to rain frequently. With snow melt and spring rain the river was almost overflowing and very powerful. One day the boy was walking home on the path by the river dyke. He saw water leaking through a hole in the dyke. The boy, worried about the hole in the dyke, asked a passerby whom he had seen before in the town but whom he did not know for help.

APPENDIX B

Categories of Vocal Paralanguage – Global Rating Adapted from Adapted from Cocker & Burgoon, 1987 (Manusov, 2005)

EMOTION EXPRESSION

Pitch variation	Was monotone (no intonation or variation in pitch)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Contained vocal variability (variation in pitch)
Expressiveness	Was inexpressive (did not incorporate affective or attitudinal expression)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Was animated (incorporated affective or attitudinal expression)
Volume	Soft	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Loud (loudness of talk or intensity of speech)

FLUENCY

Interruptions	A lot of interruptions	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	No interruptions
Turn Taking	Uncoordinated turn- taking	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Coordinated turn-taking

FIGURE 1

Culture by Condition Interaction: Percentage of deal to claim




FIGURE 2

Culture by Condition Interaction: Joint Outcome

