

SOCCER AND SOCIAL IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY GERMAN FILM AND MEDIA

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# SOCCKER AND SOCIAL IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY GERMAN FILM AND MEDIA

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University of Pittsburgh, 2014

This dissertation analyzes a selection of German soccer films that construct and imagine social realms of German cultural interaction. Together these films channel imaginations of Germany through the populism and simplicity of soccer and posit forms of German social identity. These expressions of German identity do not revert to nostalgic, static social identities based on the exclusivity of national or ethnic heritage. Instead, these films frame German identity in the twenty-first century circumstances of cultural exchange, cosmopolitan empathy, and pan-European social movements. I argue that examining the social theories and movements of hooliganism, ultra culture, multiculturalism, and feminism provides for a more contemporarily informed reading of the connection between soccer-related media and social identity than reverting back to historical forms of German social identity and misreading German soccer fandom as the reemergence of xenophobic nationalism.

The intersection of soccer and film produces a particular sort of social commentary. Soccer functions as a filmic narrative tool that guides social commentary to a simplified world of dualities: winners vs. losers, us vs. them, or the political right vs. the left. I describe the narrative structure of soccer, film, and social commentary with *statement theory*: a structuralist method of examining “statements,” which are the culmination of the filmic form, socio-cultural context,

and utopic or dystopic visions of society. I argue that the filmic soccer narrative dictates social commentary into utopic or dystopic statements; statements of idealism that necessarily project a social wish or fear into the future, even if that utopia or dystopia is cinematically depicted in an imagined now. The *multicultural*, *post-multicultural*, *dystopic*, and *post-dystopic* statements are short forms of narratively and visually mediating social identity.

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## **1.0 INTRODUCTION: SOCCER, STATEMENTS, AND GERMAN IDENTITY BEYOND THE SUMMER FAIRYTALE**

This dissertation analyzes a selection of German soccer films that construct and imagine social realms of German cultural interaction. Together these films channel imaginations of Germany through the populism and simplicity of soccer. This selection of films posits forms of German identity. These expressions of German identity do not revert to nostalgic, static social identities based on the exclusivity of national or ethnic heritage. Instead, these films frame German identity in the twenty-first century circumstances of cultural exchange in the era of globalization, cosmopolitan empathy, and pan-European social movements. I argue that examining the social theories and movements of hooliganism, ultra culture, multiculturalism, and feminism provides for a more contemporarily informed reading of the connection between soccer and social identity than reverting back to historical forms of German social identity and misreading German soccer fandom as the reemergence of xenophobic nationalism.

I argue that the intersection of soccer and film produces a very particular sort of social commentary. Soccer functions as a filmic narrative tool that guides social commentary to a simplified world of dualities: winners and losers, us versus them, or the political right versus the political left. While the starkness and simplicity of filmic soccer narrative is not self-evident (since there do exist German soccer films that eschew binary narrative structures), the selection of films in this dissertation follows a narrative structure that produces limited kinds social commentary. I describe the narrative structure of soccer, film, and social commentary with

*statement theory*: a structuralist method of examining “statements,” which are the culmination of the filmic form, socio-cultural context and utopic or dystopic visions of society. I argue that the filmic soccer narrative dictates social commentary into utopic or dystopic statements; statements of idealism that necessarily project a social wish or fear into the future, even if that utopia or dystopia is cinematically depicted in an imagined now.

### **1.1 SOCIAL IDENTITY IN GERMAN SOCCER FILM**

My analysis could be read as an accusation that these specific German filmmakers knowingly or unknowingly allow soccer to seduce them into overly simple narrative strategies that compact the nuance, plurality and epistemological insolubility of things and ideas in the enormous realm of “culture” into two impossibly obvious, uniform and knowable categories (such as winners and losers). While these soccer films are narratively simple, predictable and even conventional, their expressions and imaginations of German social identity within soccer are decidedly unconventional and look beyond many familiar, historical forms of German social identity.

My analysis of German social identity via the phenomenon of soccer is made possible by the narrative tendencies of German soccer film itself. German soccer films are *never* just about soccer. As spectacular as athletes are in corporeality and physical ability, once sport is transformed into film narrative, the technicalities of sport as an athletic spectacle quickly take second place to social commentary. Germany’s earliest soccer films like *Die Elf Teufel* (Korda 1927) or *König der Mittelstürmer* (Friesler 1927) offer a clear example. Consider that in the silent film *Die Elf Teufel*, the wealthy professional soccer club “International” attempts to seduce star midfielder and captain Tommy away from his modest amateur club “SC Linda.” Sex,

money, and prestige are ultimately not enough to force Tommy's betrayal of his teammates, his humble but loyal fiancée, and his working class roots. This film is notable for its innovative use of montage sequences of soccer playing, but narratively it is not fueled by the sport of soccer but instead by notions of community and social allegiance, class struggle and the social threat posed by the professionalization of sport (Berg 202). Soccer provides the context but not the narrative of *Die Elf Teufel*.

As Germany's national sport, soccer is simply ubiquitous. Soccer fans can attend games in Germany's professional and amateur stadia ten months out of the year and watch games on television all year. Film contributes very little to Germany's obsession with soccer. Therefore, filmmakers do not make the mistake of attempting to recreate soccer for the big screen. Instead, soccer becomes the means through which filmmakers observe society and precisely because soccer is so ubiquitous, its societal breadth can be vast if filmmakers need it to be. As a mass cultural phenomenon, soccer functions as a user-friendly artistic device to examine and imagine the ever-changing confines of the German cultural realm. The simplicity and populism of the sport make its use in imagery and narrative immediately intelligible and thus allows for the innate human drama of soccer to encompass almost effortlessly socio-cultural issues beyond the sport.

As the example of *Die Elf Teufel* suggests, German soccer film has always endeavored to say something about the social circumstances in which the actual game is played. Examining German soccer film for expressions of "German" social identity, however, has largely only become possible in the twenty-first century. The social messages derived from soccer in film have rarely been "German" in content. From the Weimar Republic to the first decade of the Berlin Republic, whenever soccer film did present forms of social identity, these forms rarely

accorded with a German national identity. Soccer films have focused on issues such as gender roles in fandom and sport, the cult of sport celebrity, and socially destructive fandom in such films as *Derby* (1999), *Fußball ist unser Leben* (2000), *Der Ball ist verdammt Rund* (2001), *Die Katze von Altona* (2002) and many others. These films make no attempt to link the world of soccer and soccer fandom to German national identity. “German soccer film” has truly been, for most of its existence, simply “soccer film made in Germany” without any socio-political agendas of German nationalism or patriotism. With the exception of several documentary films from Germany’s two state television stations about the men’s national team, most soccer films do not even focus on German national soccer at all.

The men’s 2006 FIFA World Cup hosted in Germany changed this. It changed the face of German soccer fandom, changed the direction of German soccer film and other soccer media, and changed the relationship between German soccer film and academic scholarship. The German men’s national team had already accumulated three World Cup titles in 1954, 1974 and 1990. Yet hosting the FIFA World Cup inspired more enthusiasm and more patriotic display than German soccer fandom had ever produced. Not since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and before that not since the political rallies of the National Socialists, had Germans come together in such numbers to participate in what looked like unapologetic German patriotism. The sheer mass of jubilant, flag-waving soccer fans who occupied Germany’s cities and towns for the summer of 2006 forced discussions of German social identity into the realm of soccer. While scholars are still trying to understand the patriotic displays of fandom that appeared then, many filmmakers made their own interpretations of the fandom spectacle and introduced German social identity into soccer film in ways far more manifest than soccer film had previously ever dared. The

artifacts up for analysis in this dissertation reflect this conceptual turn towards German social identity.

## 1.2 A WORD ON “FUßBALLFILM”

The term “Fußballfilm” appears in German film scholarship and sport sociology without much attention given to its aesthetic or generic confines as a category of film. In its common usage, “Fußballfilm” refers to a thematic and not any specific cinematic aesthetic. While there exists a German canon of “Fußballfilm” that has been lexically catalogued (see Jan Tilman Schwab’s *Fußball in Film – Lexikon des Fußballfilms*), the films in this canon do not display any homogenous set of cinematic techniques. Any film that narratively and visually incorporates soccer to some significant degree is, for better or worse, a “Fußballfilm.” Hannes Stöhr’s *One Day in Europe* (2005) is a “Fußballfilm,” despite the sport occupying the margins of the film’s four narratives. The children’s film series *Die wilden Kerle* (2003-2008), installments one through five, likewise qualify as “Fußballfilme.” Needless to say, “Fußballfilm” is a highly imprecise, but nevertheless convenient, term that I employ in full awareness of its imprecision.

I restrict my examination in this dissertation to German soccer films. The world of “sport film” is exponentially larger than “soccer film” and, beyond being unwieldy for the task at hand, includes everything from “Bergfilme” to car racing films. While it is often efficacious to incorporate sport films into my analysis of soccer film, my analytical restriction to soccer film is theoretically grounded in the populism of soccer and as such soccer’s ability to depict a wide array of cultural modes of existence. Especially regarding German social identity, it is soccer above all other sports in Germany that has the ability to inspire large and colorful displays of

enthusiastic fandom, whether that enthusiasm is in the name of the nation, the province, the town, the club, or the social group. Track and field, motor sport or Olympic rowing simply do not have the power of pathos that soccer does. Soccer film is a more concentrated field of investigation for expressions of German social identity.

### 1.3 WHY “PATRIOTISM” INADEQUATELY DESCRIBES TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SOCCER FANDOM IN GERMANY: THE FILMS OF SÖNKE WORTMANN

Only in the twenty-first century did German soccer films appear that made bold statements about *German* social identity. Instead of lowbrow, low budget sport films, in the first decade of the new millennium, at a time when discussions of globalization and post-nationalism dominated European discourse, two films appeared that seemed nationally oriented: they seemed to say something about “Germanness.” The soccer films in question are the work of German director Sönke Wortmann: *Das Wunder von Bern* (2003) and *Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen*<sup>1</sup> (2006). These two financially successful soccer films seemed to capture the excitement and cultural spectacles of mass soccer fandom in the German public sphere directly before and during the men’s 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany.

*Das Wunder von Bern* is a narrative feature and high-budget period piece depicting the underdog victory of the West German men’s national team at the 1954 FIFA World Cup

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<sup>1</sup> The title alludes to Heinrich Heine’s verse-epic *Deutschland. Ein Wintermärchen* of 1844, a poetic satyr of Prussian militarism, state-sponsored censorship and the regressive politics of the Metternich Restoration. Beyond the title, Heine’s epic is neither directly nor indirectly referenced in Wortmann’s documentary. Without giving this literary allusion more weight than it deserves, we can interpret the reference as an antonym suggesting a winter Germany worthy of scorn versus a summer Germany worthy of praise.

tournament in Switzerland. *Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen* is a documentary intimately following the men's national team during the 2006 FIFA World Cup tournament. Both films together form a filmic project of German national identity formation. *Das Wunder von Bern* depicts postwar mourning and the recovery of a German collective identity, grounding the drama of German soccer in images of historical pathos and legitimating German patriotism as a natural consequence of the circumstances. *Sommermärchen* leaves German history behind and depicts the affective results of a soccer nation in full euphoria. The film presents the embodied objects of soccer patriotism, namely the soccer players and coaching staff themselves, in a sympathetic team character study. The backdrop is the German soccer nation as it unproblematically supports its national heroes.

Wortmann's films served as bookends to the mass fandom of 2006 and all together seemed to suggest a surprising but likewise always anticipated social phenomenon: German patriotism. The definitions of the terms "patriotism" and "nationalism" are infinitely debatable, but given Germany's turbulent twentieth century history of totalitarianism, these terms are often conflated. Any strong sentiment of social identification with the German *patria* or the German *nation* is often regarded with suspicion. Many German leftists and "zealous American intellectuals" were quick to denounce the sight of patriotic affect in 2006 as the "reemergence of authoritarian nationalism," thus denying the difference between the two isms (Koepnick "Public Viewing," 66-7). While successful at the box office, Wortmann's films were likewise denounced in film scholarship as propagandistic, heavy-handed stories of German nation building (Uecker, Taberner).

Despite the critique, it is legitimate to wonder if the Wortmann films stand as a cultural marker for a shift in German patriotism and patriotic display in the public sphere. Did Wortmann

capture the reawakening of the long repressed German patriotic spirit? Were all the taboos since the fall of the National Socialist regime set aside so that Germans could once again rejoice in all things “German”? Could Germans, like the French, Americans, and English, indulge their patriotic “natural” drives and express a love of country without shame (Schediwy 83-4)? These questions cannot be examined until a more fundamental question is explored, namely, exactly what kind of German patriotism did Wortmann envision in his films?

The patriotism of *Das Wunder von Bern* is contextualized in a family melodrama. The working class Lubanski family welcomes home father Richard after nine years of Soviet imprisonment. Richard struggles to regain control of his wife and three children. As the story progresses, the wife and daughter of the family gradually disappear from the narrative, the eldest son flees to communist East Germany, and Richard slowly but surely reestablishes himself as a trustworthy father to his youngest son Matthias through a mutual love of soccer (Hochscherf and Laucht 284). Meanwhile, the incorrigible German national team striker Helmut Rahn (whose goal earns West Germany its first World Cup title) gradually learns the value of discipline and team spirit, while German coach Sepp Herberger gradually learns how to train his team like a patient but firm father. The film ends with victory on the field, a joyful and united German soccer nation, and the parental order returned to its “natural” state.

*Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen* at once glorifies and normalizes the soccer celebrities of the men’s national team. While the viewers can revel in the voyeurism of watching nude celebrity athletes in the locker room, listening in on halftime pep talks, and intruding into the hotel bedrooms of the players, the viewers also receive a humanizing depiction of their soccer heroes. In the now familiar reality-TV format, through fly-on-the-wall filmic documentation of the team, the abstraction of “German nation” is given sympathetic faces and personalities.

Otherwise untouchable celebrity players like Bastian Schweinsteiger, Lukas Podolski, and Michael Ballack become our friends. We rejoice with them after victories and mourn with them after defeats. The images of swells of fans from all sectors of society – from giddy teens jostling for autographs to Bundeswehr soldiers and policemen waving German flags as the team bus rolls by – seems reasonable and unproblematic. Any and arguably all of the historical and discursive complications of patriotic display in postwar and reunified Germany do not intrude into the blissful, collective spirit of the German soccer nation.

These films created a model of German identity that was exclusively national, loyal, forgiving, unashamed, and conspicuously masculine. Soccer became a means through which the German nation is celebrated and all that is complicated in German national history is conveniently forgiven and forgotten while Germany's long-standing patriarchal culture is reaffirmed. This sort of German patriotism is not without precedent. In 1994, a collection of essays entitled *Selbstbewusste Nation* had summarized the vision of Germany's intellectual right or the "Neue Rechte." In attempting to resituate the hitherto marginalized political convictions of the right into the societal mainstream, twenty-eight authors – including Ernst Nolte, Botho Strauß and Hans-Jürgen Syberberg – argued for the end of Germany's culture of obsessive historical guilt and the beginning of a self-confident embrace of the German fatherland (Kämper 65).

Similar to the famous "Historikerstreit" of 1986,<sup>2</sup> the intellectual right attempted to relativize and normalize the responsibility of the Holocaust in the context of other genocides outside of Germany (68). Germans were portrayed not as perpetrators, but as actual victims of fascism (Wiegel 67). Multiculturalism was rejected as cultural nihilism, a negation of the natural and just inequality of human beings, particularly the naturally dominant white male figure. The

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<sup>2</sup> Ernst Nolte represents the conservatives in both debates.

“post-68er” society, by introducing such concepts as cultural pluralism, gender emancipation, self-realization (Selbstverwirklichung), and political correctness, had feminized Germany’s once robust, masculine, fearless, and collectively oriented society (Kämper 68). Now that the burden of history had fallen with the Berlin Wall in 1989, the time had come to reconstruct a strong national identity, a liberated national consciousness (Wiegel 66-67), and a manly rejection of feminine morals (“eine mannhafte Absage an die Frauenmoral”) (Doerry 242).

Wortmann’s filmic project of German identity formation came almost a decade after the controversy of the *Selbstbewusste Nation*, and there is no direct evidence suggesting that Wortmann is affiliated with the “Neue Rechte.” His images of soccer and German patriotism share many conceptual traits with their vision, however. Wortmann’s Germany of 1954 and 2006 is peopled with masculine heroes: fathers, coaches, players, priests, doctors, and even young boys, Germany’s future. Mothers and daughters are just insufficient placeholders for fathers and sons. The only useful woman in *Das Wunder von Bern* is the wife of a soccer journalist, a “Fräuleinwunder” of West Germany’s “republic of miracles” who is pregnant at the film’s end (Bühler 5), proving herself of service to the nation via procreation. Wortmann’s Germany is a land of selective history. Wortmann’s West Germany has no time for discussion of the National Socialists or the Holocaust, and Germany’s soldiers are not portrayed as perpetrators, but as victims, of the war e.g. Richard’s long Soviet imprisonment. Embodied in the working class Lubanski family trying to make ends meet in the smoke and soot of the “Ruhrgebiet” is a German culture of victimhood.

The Germany of *Sommermärchen* is almost an ahistorical Germany. The soccer nation of 2006 is hermetically sealed, protected from historical debates, leftist naysayers, or any cultural disharmony at all. Wortmann does not even allow Chancellor Angela Merkel’s appearance in the

film to redirect the narrative towards the political. Her congenial chat with the team is not a formal visit from a head-of-state but instead a nice drop by from a friend in the neighborhood. “German patriotism” is ultimately softened by the all-too-human faces of the national team and traded in for a cult of personality. The always-troublesome “German nation” is replaced with “elf Freunde,” coach Jürgen Klinsmann’s motivational mantra.

Perhaps the least obvious, yet most important, trait shared is a methodological one. Both the “Neue Rechte” and Wortmann did not present their versions of German patriotism with careful, academic historiography or scholarly analysis. Instead, they chose the road of populism and pathos. While the intellectual right’s fiery language attempted to exploit a white populist dissatisfaction with multiculturalism and political correctness, Wortmann presented his German patriotism in a Hollywoodesque sport film in the case of *Das Wunder von Bern*, forging historical revisionism, pop culture movie clichés, and a sympathetic portrayal of Germans as victims into a slick, high-budget propaganda film for the German nation (Hochscherf and Laucht, Uecker, Taberner). *Sommermärchen* escaped the critique of journalists and scholars, perhaps due to the “objective” format of documentary film, yet its expression of German patriotism is even bolder than in *Das Wunder von Bern*. *Sommermärchen* makes no attempt at all to justify its patriotism. It makes no apologies and gives no socio-historical contextualization for its images of untroubled, unquestionable German patriotism. Such a blunt and unreflexive film could not possibly come from the same culture that spent seventeen years deliberating on and designing Berlin’s “Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas.” Yet the film ends with images of coach Klinsmann kicking soccer balls into a sea of fans between the “Denkmal” and the Brandenburg Gate.

It is hard to imagine that such conservative and exclusionary conceptions of German national identity could describe the crowds of 2006; young fans of many skin colors and many cultural backgrounds wearing black-red-and-gold afro wigs, hugging strangers, and chanting soccer songs with each German goal scored. The German press worked hard to avoid these associations. Seemingly embracing the chance afforded by the FIFA World Cup to better Germany's global image, newspapers offered many positive and few negative assessments of the mass fandom, a selective reportage not just from boulevard newspapers like *Bild*, but also from "important" newspapers like the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Der Spiegel* (Schediwy 91). The press used a host of terms to describe the fandom on the streets: "Love-Parade in Schwarz-Rot-Gold," "Spaßnationalismus," "Partyotismus," or "unverklemmter, weltoffener Patriotismus" (82). These terms attempted to modernize or "re-brand" the German image, representing national team fandom as less an expression of patriotism and more the will to party. And in all cases, fandom was represented as emotively and political unrelated to the nationalism of the NS-era (82-6).

By rooting and legitimating patriotism in Germany's immediate postwar history, Wortmann's *Das Wunder von Bern* in particular argues that there is more to the link between soccer and identity than just the will to party. Triumph over adversity, collective suffering, even the "we-pulled-ourselves-up-by-the-bootstraps" motif is indicative of the German national spirit. Wortmann's 2003 film revises and necessarily distorts history, but what Wortmann fails to do is revise the role of patriotism and German social identity. His depiction of patriotism is dependent on an antiquated understanding of the German nation as an exclusive geographic and cultural territory, inwardly fixated to the point of self-absorption. Wortmann's Germans are licking their wounds and waiting for the inner greatness of the German spirit to rise again. The World Cup

tournament gives Wortmann's Germany a metaphorical space in which to regain its status as a European power, not through victory on the battlefield, but through victory on the pitch, not through international cooperation or any sort of cultural exchange but through individual determination and an isolationist resolve.

Wortmann's West Germany reflects a social identity belonging to the politics of the Cold War in which West Germany sought to strengthen itself quickly in preparation for an anticipated war with the Soviet Union. But *Das Wunder von Bern* premiered in 2003, as Germany was just finishing preparations to host the world. By *repatriating* the excitement of German national soccer fandom back into the 1950s, Wortmann assumes that contemporary fandom has its roots in a traditional relationship between people and nation. Attributing conventional patriotism to today's soccer fandom, however, fails to recognize the twenty-first century circumstances of German soccer, German social identity, and Germany's place in an increasingly interconnected, globally minded world.

By contrast, the films under discussion in this dissertation display forms of German social identity oriented inwardly and not outwardly oriented. In either positive or negative constellations, these forms of identity include more than they exclude, and they thereby expand social identity beyond Germany's geopolitical borders, the white German majority, and Germany's traditional Christian religious communities. Unlike Wortmann's link between German patriotism and German national soccer, these films focus on the most consistent loci of social identity formation in the realm of German sport: club soccer.

#### 1.4 GERMAN SOCIAL IDENTITY BEYOND THE PATRIA

The soccer club inspires the most loyal, and often the most radical, forms of social engagement in Germany. And yet the filmic focus on the club and its fans is not a focus on the provincial or on a limited cultural realm. Club soccer and the social identities derived from it display the various forces that push and pull social affiliations in the contemporary world, blurring the ideological borders between the national, provincial, rural and global. Club soccer in film allows for an investigation of the socially big and the socially small.

In positive statements, the tradition of humanism and cultural plurality combined with soccer narratives form social identities that are nevertheless aware of their German origins. In negative statements, soccer and social identity form a volatile mix of extreme ideology and devout solidarity to that ideology. “German soccer” becomes synonymous either with the second coming of German fascism or a diseased fan mentality, both potent by virtue of cultural inclusivity and socio-political worldviews anchored in pan-European social movements.

Germany can be a place of cultural and religious tolerance, defining itself not by how it exerts power over other countries, but how it can sympathize and support other countries and peoples. A “cosmopolitan empathy” (see Beck’s *The Cosmopolitan Vision*), a sentimental and humanitarian solidarity with a people beyond one’s political borders, can be ascribed to a social identity nurtured in the educational and social circumstances of a distinctly humanist Germany. In the documentary film *Football Undercover* (2008), German social identity is depicted as a champion of religious tolerance, cultural plurality, and international gender equality. Such a social identity, based on inclusivity, looks to transcend cultural and political barriers.

German social identity can also be depicted as an investigation of multiculturalism. The simple soccer fandom of national colors in 2006 and 2008 (during men’s national soccer

tournaments) can be read as an articulation of the multicultural makeup of Germany's contemporary population. The heavy-handed displays of soccer fandom might seem to invite warlike metaphors of international battle, pitting national fans against each other, but the fandom festivals instead transformed historically burdened national images like flags and colors or seemingly fixed "national identities" into a riotous party of play with the visual alterity of social identity. National identity is transformed into a performative exercise that temporarily sidesteps institutional or ethnic determinations of national belonging and relegates the supposed stability of national identity to the vicissitudes of fandom festival. The Internet-based videos of Turkish-German comedian Tiger "die Kralle von Kreuzberg" reexamine the discourse of multiculturalism as it mixes with soccer in the German public sphere. Through the fulfillment of ethnic stereotypes, Tiger challenges his viewers to examine what constitutes a "German" or a "Turkish" soccer fan.

In these films German social identity is also depicted as something to strive against. Here, "German" social identity is equated with xenophobia and right-wing violence and evidence for an ever-lingering German fascism. Opposing this "Germanness," not through protest but through open violence, forms a new social identity that defines itself by struggle in the particular socio-historical circumstances of Germany, thereby also manifesting a pan-European social identity and movement. *Gegengerade – 20359 St. Pauli* (2011) depicts the fandom subculture of the "ultras," a left-leaning movement of club soccer fandom and selective protest, as the only social identity capable of defending soccer from the German fascist hooligans, the brutal German police state, and heartless global capitalism. *66/67 – Fairplay war gestern* (2009) depicts German social identity in soccer as a purely destructive, unimpeded force. This identity is embodied in an aging and nihilistic hooliganism that, by infecting German society at the social,

institutional and psychological levels, and also by infecting various contemporary German ethnicities, cultures, and orientations, destroys the fabric of the German socio-cultural realm from the inside out.

## 1.5 SURVEY OF EXISTING SOCCER AND SOCCER FILM SCHOLARSHIP

The combination of “German soccer” and “film” has made research a challenge. While German scholarship of soccer as a historical and sociological object is vast, German film scholarship is in general considerably smaller and regarding soccer film in its infancy. Anglo-American scholarship offers much analysis of sport film but few treatments of German sport in film beyond the work of Leni Riefenstahl or the “Bergfilme” of the Weimar era. Sociological and psychological approaches dominate the research on soccer and sports in general. In German academia during the 1970s, neo-Marxist sport sociologists analyzed German soccer and its industry as symptoms of exploitative capitalism and false consciousness. Examples include Theodor Adorno’s “Das Reich der Unfreiheit und der Sport” (1963), Bero Rigauer’s *Sport und Arbeit* (1969), Jac-Olaf Böhme’s *Sport im Spätkapitalismus* (1971) and Gerhard Vinnai’s *Fußball als Ideologie* (1970). These writers treat German sport from a macro perspective and focus almost exclusively on economics and hierarchical structures of sport industry and sport labor. Few words are spent on sport fandom but those few words (especially in Rigauer) relegate fandom to capitalistic sexual repression and misplaced political priorities, a common argument in Frankfurt School theory.

Recent German sport sociology incorporates various theoretical approaches. Cultural theories of social ritual inform works such as Dirk Schümer’s *Gott ist rund. Die Kultur des*

*Fußballs* (1996), Christian Bromberger's *Fußball als Weltsicht und als Ritual* (1998), and Michael Prosser's "Fußballverzückung beim Stadionbesuch. Zum rituell-festiven Charakter von Fußballveranstaltungen in Deutschland" (2002). German soccer, and more specifically soccer fandom, are viewed as vestiges of ritual in post-industrial society and the social organizers of group identities. Markwart Herzog's *Fußball als Kulturphänomen* (2002) gives a well-rounded cultural and medial history of soccer on the continent and in the German-speaking realm, paying special attention to soccer in literary works. Dagmar Schediwy's *Ganz entspannt in Schwarz-Rot-Gold?* examines German fandom specifically for articulations of German patriotism through fans and through the German press, investigating those articulations psychologically and discursively. Christoph Ruf's *Ist doch ein geiler Verein. Reisen in die Fußballprovinz* (2008) provides institutional and socio-political studies of German provincial soccer. Nils Havemann's exhaustively researched *Fußball unterm Hakenkreuz* (2005) is one of the few studies that directly and singularly addresses German soccer during the National Socialist regime.

Concerning fandom subcultures such as hooliganism and the ultra subculture, psychologically informed sociological works such as Hauke Wagner's *Fußballfans und Hooligans: Warum Gewalt?* (2002), Ina Weigelt's *Die Subkultur der Hooligans: Merkmale, Probleme, Präventionsansätze* (2004), Wilhelm Heitmeyer and Jörg-Ingo Peter's *Jugendliche Fußballfans. Soziale und politische Orientierungen, Gesellungsformen, Gewalt* (1988) and Frank Willmann's *Ultras Kuten Hooligans. Fußballfans in Ost-Berlin* (2008) analyze fan subcultures with an emphasis on hooliganism as a pan-European social dysfunction, an endemic social disease to be identified and institutionally corrected. German sport sociologist Günther Pilz's more descriptive research – articles too numerous to mention – carefully charts the social and

demographic confines of ultra culture, paying special attention to its appearance and growth in various European domestic soccer leagues.

Works such as Karl Jaspers “Masse und Sport” (1997) and Gabriele Klein and Michael Meuser’s *Ernste Spiele: Zur politischen Soziologie des Fußballs* (2008) mine German soccer for its political potential to influence fans and discourse. Furthermore, German soccer has recently been recognized as a discursive field for ethnic identity and multiculturalism in such works as Diethelm Blecking and Gerd Dembowski’s *Der Ball ist bunt: Fußball, Migration und die Vielfalt der Identitäten in Deutschland* (2010).

The world of women’s soccer in Germany has been documented and analyzed in such works as Ronny Galczynski’s *Frauenfußball von A-Z, Das Lexikon für den deutschen Frauenfußball* (2010), Rainer Hennies and Daniel Meuren’s *Frauenfußball – Der lange Weg zur Anerkennung* (2009), Hannelore Ratzeburg and Horst Biese’s *Frauen Fußball Meisterschaften, 25 Jahre Frauenfußball* (1995), and numerous cultural historical articles for the *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung* from Eduard Hoffmann and Jürgen Nendza. For insight into the world of women’s soccer in Iran, H.E. Chehabi’s “A Political History of Football in Iran” (2002), Jenny Steel and Sophie Richter-Devroe’s “The Development of Women’s Football in Iran” (2003) and Robin Wright’s “Iran’s New Revolution” (2000) are invaluable.

There is a small body of German film research devoted to “Fußballfilm” e.g. Ulrich von Berg’s “Kino-Kicks. Ein Streifzug durch die Welt des Fußballfilms” (2002) Andreas Höfer’s *Doppelpass. Fußball und Film* (2006), and Jan Tilman Schwab’s *Fußball im Film – Lexikon des Fußballfilms* (2006). These are lexical works that, after the Germanist fashion, focus on the material “Entstehungsgeschichten” of films and largely refrain from filmic visual and narrative analysis. From Anglo-American German Studies, Tobias Hochscherf and Christoph Laucht

analyze the retroactive myth of the West German nation of German director Sönke Wortmann's work in "'Every Nation Needs a Legend' – The Miracle of Bern and the Formation of German Postwar Foundational Myth" (2008). Matthias Uecker finds a contemporary and politically problematic form of German nation building in "Fractured families – united countries? Family, nostalgia, and nation-building in *Das Wunder von Bern* and *Goodbye Lenin!*" (2007). And finally Lutz Koepnick analyzes the filmic and visual aesthetics, corporeal poetics, and textuality of soccer in "0-1: Riefenstahl and the Beauty of Soccer" (2008) and "Public Viewing: Soccer Patriotism and Post-Cinema" (2010).

My research benefits from both the macro perspectives provided by sport sociology and the micro perspectives of close textual readings of films. My focus on the mediation of soccer in film, and not solely on the game, does not merely look for the reflection of existing sport circumstances in film. I thus do not approach soccer from a purely sociological framework. My close readings of cultural objects, like those of Hochscherf, Laucht, Uecker, and Koepnick, seek to discern discourses and historical contexts relevant to the particular content at hand. By connecting soccer films and soccer-related media through an investigation into their narrative and visual construction, I argue that these objects are not only related through soccer. They also share narrative methods of imagining social circumstances according to a dualistic logic intrinsic to soccer.

## **1.6 STATEMENT THEORY AND THE SOCCER NARRATIVE**

My dissertation develops an analytic method for examining soccer film called *statement theory*. This theory was conceptually inspired by, but ultimately significantly departs from Georg

Seeslen's analysis of the "pop cultural statement" in the films of Leni Riefenstahl in the article "Blood and Glamour." As with the Frankfurt School, Seeslen analyzes the intersection of fascism, popular culture, and film in Riefenstahl's *Triumph des Willens* (1935) and *Olympia* (1936) and presents a structured examination of "the semiotics of pop" (Seeslen 13-15). I see statement theory as sharing the methodology of structurally examining artistic artifacts of popular culture whose signification is limited and whose narratives lack the conceptual depth of "high" cultural artifacts.

In this work I present a simple binary structure of filmic expressions or "statements" that are the culmination of visual and conceptual artistic content, on the one hand, and pro-filmic cultural discourses and historical developments, on the other. A statement, I argue, organizes various social and cultural themes and condenses them into a mode of artistic expression. The statement neither refers to a certain program of filmic aesthetic choices, nor does it rely on a strict narrative formula. The statement is the sum of its medial parts: a social context derived from images and narration. Statement theory examines how films construct and imagine social relationships between individuals, peoples, and ideas and how soccer dictates these constructions and imaginations.

There are various names for these statements depending on their content and the films in which they are made, but they can be reduced to two broad categories upon which a varied nomenclature rests: one statement posits a goal to achieve, another statement depicts the scenario after a goal has been achieved. In the first statement, something could happen. In the second statement, something has already happened. The ambiguousness of this language leaves the evaluative position of a statement's goal, which is always a social goal, open. This means, a *goal*

to achieve or a goal already achieved can be the mediated articulation of a “positive” or “negative” social force.

When examining any cultural artifact, a scholar must ask him- or herself which is more appropriate: to apply a preexisting theory of analysis or to theorize out of the specificity of the artifact at hand? My development of statement theory does both. On the one hand, the organization of filmic images, content, and their interpretations into the compact linguistic form of the “statement” has precedence in structuralism; the multi-disciplinary mode of analysis that employs linguistics as a model for examining the relationship between the parts of a system. On the other hand, such structuralist analysis responds directly to the visual artifacts in my dissertation, for the particular constellation of film and soccer demands the development of a particular theory. The specificity of statement theory addresses and knowingly embraces many of the conceptual flaws that scholars have identified in structuralist thought.

Structuralism founds its methodology on the relationships between things in a system and reveals the arbitrariness that functions within systemic signification.<sup>3</sup> Post-structuralists claim that identifying the arbitrariness of signification within the parts still does not question the system as a whole as also arbitrary, generating continually deferred signification.<sup>4</sup> Structuralism has fallen out fashion in the academy, at least in its most dogmatic form<sup>5</sup>, due to its rigid, ahistorical tendency to create overly categorized systems within systems and due to an unwillingness to imagine cultural artifacts as functioning outside the parameters of linguistic structure.

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<sup>3</sup> This is exemplified in de Saussure’s seminal work *Course in General Linguistics* in which he discusses the relationship between signifiers and signifieds, language and parole, the diachronic and the synchronic etc.

<sup>4</sup> Jacques Derrida’s discussion of “differance” in *Margins of Philosophy* is here exemplary.

<sup>5</sup> Notably the semiotics of Anglo-American analytic philosophy.

Drawing on the term “statement” responds to the specific content in the visual artifacts at hand by *intentionally applying a system of rigidity and dualism*, a system that remains structural and does not look beyond its own boundaries. This is not a choice to make the work of analysis easier by virtue of simplicity. The term “statement” approaches the rigidity and dualism in the visual artifacts themselves. As already noted, soccer is oriented toward dualisms. The inclusion of soccer in film seems to dictate narrative patterns in either documentary or fictional form. These narrative patterns are often rigid and dualistic.

Soccer itself subsists in rigidity. It subsists in dualism. While devoted soccer fans so often laud the unpredictability of the sport, the truth of the matter is that soccer, like all games of sport, organizes and regulates time, space, physical movement and even cause and effect in a highly systematic way. Soccer thrives on the dualism of athletic competition, namely winning or losing.<sup>6</sup> The duality of athletic competition easily inspires dualities of social roles: winners and losers, heroes and villains, love and hate. This inherent narrative dualism can refer to the individual but more often narratively frames the entire soccer team. The team, more so than the individual athlete, reflects the human being as a “soziales Wesen” in filmic mediation (Schümer 40). Many filmmakers tend to mediate soccer’s rigidity and dualism directly into socially rigid and dualistic terms. The team often stands in for a people or a society. If the team in the film wins, society wins. If the team loses, some societal tragedy surely awaits off the field. Even when complex social issues are interwoven into a soccer narrative, those social issues are often reduced to the simplicity of the game. This will be exemplified in the chapters to come, but for the moment, suffice it to say that the theme of soccer in these films acts as an event horizon from which narratives do not escape to any great degree. These films, great and small, wed social issues to soccer in patterned ways that are discursively and historically informed.

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<sup>6</sup> Soccer fans know that a draw, depending on the circumstances, is always either a win or a loss.

I reiterate that the simplicity of soccer narrative functions in my dissertation's selection of films, although not in the entirety of what could be called the "Fußballfilm" canon. There are soccer films that resist the binary narrative. Hellmuth Costard's documentary film *Fußball wie noch nie* (1970) records the movements of a single English soccer player for the entire duration of a game without an extra-diegetic soundtrack or voice-overs.<sup>7</sup> Hannes Stöhr's *One Day in Europe* (2005) weaves together four different stories in four different European locations, all taking place on the game day of a Champions League final. These soccer films have no abject winners and losers, no programmatic social messages, and through their unconventional mediations they avoid narratives of rigidity and dualism. Such films are in the minority, however. The majority of German feature and short films about soccer depict heroes, villains, and triumph over adversity.

## 1.7 CHAPTER OVERVIEW

The first chapter examines German social identity and soccer fandom in the discourse of German multiculturalism. The relatively recent phenomenon of public viewing – broadcasts of soccer games (and often entire tournaments) in public areas – has brought patriotic German soccer fans out to the streets in enormous numbers. The German press agencies send their photographers out to capture the festival, and the newspapers and websites are soon filled with images of young, attractive, blond women and men wearing black, red, and gold face paint and wielding flags. But just as prominent are images of Germany's contemporary multicultural demographic: a black German woman wearing a novelty black, red, and gold wig; a young Turkish-German man

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<sup>7</sup> The French documentary *Zidane: A 21<sup>st</sup> Century Portrait* of 2006 follows the same filmic formula.

blowing on a German team vuvuzela; or an Asian-German woman in a German soccer jersey cheering in the stadium. These images demonstrate that the ethnic and cultural makeup of the German soccer nation has changed. And yet it would be premature to claim that cultural and ethnic stereotypes have faded away in deference to this demographic change.

Multiculturalism in Germany is, in theory, a mode of acknowledging minorities and minority cultures amidst the majority culture. While intending to forge relationships of cooperation and encourage the integration of German residents of various cultural and ethnic heritages, multiculturalism has not yet managed to remove many stereotypical assumptions regarding race and ethnicity. Social, national, and ethnic identities are still often defined based on appearance; white faces in Germany are still often read as German faces; and brown faces in Germany are still often read as non-German faces. Multiculturalism seeks to morally relativize such simple differentiation, but multiculturalist practice is absolutely on this differentiation nonetheless. Here visual alterity can often recklessly equal national and/or ethnic alterity, and those individuals displaying visual difference from the white German majority become the objects of multiculturalism.

This method of identifying ethnic or national alterity is quickly complicated whenever Germany's soccer fans take to the streets. A photo in the German popular press of brown-skinned soccer fans in Turkish soccer jerseys could include the seemingly innocuous caption: "Turkish soccer fans celebrate in the streets of Berlin." This assumption of national heritage is based on visual appearance. Yet those same brown-skinned fans in German soccer jerseys would not fulfill the equation of determining national heritage so often employed in the popular press. It is this temporary confusion of national origins that has come to inflect Germany's contemporary soccer fandom for the national team.

This national ambiguity on the surface of German soccer fandom is one of the guiding conceptual elements in the ethnic-comedy of Turkish-German web and radio comedian “Tiger die Krallen von Kreuzberg.” Tiger’s low-budget web clips accompanying the 2008 UEFA European Championship employ exaggerated stereotypes of German and Turkish culture, poking fun and celebrating both national identities in the world of soccer. Tiger’s comedy is the embodiment of Germany’s recent soccer identity. It is a social identity functioning performatively according to the ebb and flow of the yearly soccer schedule. From his comedy a form of German social identity can be discerned that employs the conventionally serious and burdened symbols of the nation – national flags, colors, and hymns – in a playful strategy of national identity switching.

The comedy of Tiger is an example of the *multicultural statement*, which didactically aims to entertain and educate the viewer toward a utopic social goal. The social goal of a multicultural statement (“utopic” implying the impossibility of completely achieving an idealistic goal) emphasizes cultural tolerance and coexistence. It is dependent on reductive differentiations and the creation of cultural and ethnic dualisms (Germans vs. Turks) in order to posit a social harmony. Tiger, moving within the narrative confines of soccer, displays the heavy-handedness of the multicultural statement, which sacrifices conceptual and aesthetic complexity for the sake of pedagogy.

The second chapter examines German soccer in global expressions. The 2006 World Cup was not just an important moment in the development of German social identity through soccer fandom. It was also an important moment in the development of German global identity, meaning Germany’s self-portrayal during the most-watched sporting event on the planet as a tolerant, peaceful, fun-loving soccer nation. The German liberal modus of looking outward rather

than inward in order to create a social identity has arguably existed since the Student Movement of the 1960s. This sentiment was rebranded and thrust into pop culture through sporting events. The organizers of the 2006 FIFA World Cup designated the official motto of the tournament as “Die Welt zu Gast bei Freunden,” emphasizing a mood of tolerance and international hospitality. In these cases, its relation to the world defines German social identity.

When Germany once again played host to the world during the 2010 FIFA Under-20 Women’s World Cup and 2011 FIFA Women’s World Cup, it was more than just the spirit of international play that the organizers tried to convey. It was also the spirit of women’s football, a show of support for women’s athletics at the highest level of professionalism and skill and thereby a display of socially progressive conceptions of women in sport. While the men’s international tournaments elicit standard themes in the press – athleticism, patriotism, nationalism, questions of sport industry and economics, fandom etc. – gender roles and equality are rarely included. Women’s soccer, however, especially at the international level, never fails to produce journalistic commentary on the institutional, financial, athletic, and social development of the women’s game, and that development has been used as a barometer to measure the current state of women’s social equality in a particular region.

The analysis of international tournaments often requires a comparative approach. For example, what does the extraordinary athletic ability and level of funding of the German women’s national team say about the role of women in Germany, and what does the low athletic ability and financial neglect of the Iranian women’s national team say about the role of women in Iran? But the discourse of women in sport also plots a gendered point of reference just beyond the concept of the political nation and nation-state. To take pride in Germany’s hosting of

women's international tournaments is the pride of a German social identity that celebrates something pre- and/or supranational: women.

In terms of identity, however, any comparison of the German and Iranian women's national teams is far more complicated than just an analysis of women's sport. Regrettably, it establishes a familiar, diametrical binary of two cultures: the liberated, progressive West and the repressed, traditional Middle East. This binary establishes the West, and in this case Germany, as a model of progressive societal attitudes towards women. It is this trope that frames the feature-length documentary *Football Undercover* (2008), directed by German David Assmann and Iranian Ayat Najafi. The film follows a women's club soccer team in Germany as they attempt to organize an exhibition match against the women's national soccer team of Iran. Here German social identity is articulated as a humanitarian project with cosmopolitan empathy for women athletes in Iran.

*Football Undercover* introduces the *post-multicultural* statement. This statement does not posit a utopic goal to be achieved by using narratively and visually obvious pedagogical methods. The post-multicultural statement creates a picture of a post-multiculture, meaning after the utopic goals of multiculturalism have already been achieved. The post-multicultural statement in *Football Undercover* depicts a multicultural, social harmony in Germany without the heavy-handed pedagogy. The natural appearance of an achieved utopia does not bespeak the actual achievement of the goals of multiculturalism but instead bespeaks a choice in the mediation of the social. The post-multicultural statement of *Football Undercover* builds a harmonious social unit comprised of Germans and Turks, or Christians and Muslims. United, they engage in a cultural dialogue for the sake of women athletes in the Islamic world. By offering a narrative comparison of Muslim women in a theocratic state and Muslim woman in

democratic, largely secular Germany, *Football Undercover* makes a unique contribution to the discourse of European Islam by depicting the positive potential of Islamic practice as it is performed by a particular set of German Muslim women.

Chapter 3 examines the social phenomenon of fandom subcultures. The most infamous fandom subculture in Germany and in Europe is hooliganism. This radical and violent subculture consistently ties German soccer to suspicions of right-wing extremism and xenophobia. Gangs of violent young men wreaking havoc in the name of soccer would seem to be a reification of the fear that Germany has not and cannot exorcise the legacy of racist ideology. The history of German hooliganism has known no border between east and west. Wherever there has been soccer, hooliganism has soon followed.

*66/67 – Fairplay war gestern* (2009) tells the story of a hooligan group in Braunschweig. Yet the social identity derived from the film's hooliganism is not the expected neo-Nazi thuggery. Instead, this hooliganism is a multifaceted movement consisting of Germans, Turks, hetero- and homosexuals, and the working and upper-middle class. Hooliganism is here a negative multiculturalism. The hooligans are in the midst of a transformation. Each member is growing older and finding the hooligan life to be at odds with the adult responsibilities of family and career. By encompassing many walks of life, this hooliganism threatens to destroy German society from within. The hooliganism of *66/67* does not disintegrate with age and reintegrate itself into society, but instead dissipates like a virus, infecting the German social body. Group cohesion out of social plurality forms a social identity of destruction that is to be feared and cannot be stopped.

*Gegengerade – 20359 St. Pauli* (2011) offers a very different picture of fandom subculture. The film narrates a day in the life of three “ultras,” the fans of the pan-European

fandom and protest movement called “ultra culture.” It depicts the ultras on the final day of the soccer season as their beloved club FC St. Pauli is about to win promotion into Germany’s top professional league. The social identity of the ultras is inextricably dependent on conflict. As fans, their loyalty to the club is matched only by their solidarity in protesting “modern soccer.” As they understand it, “modern soccer” is a capitalistic system of corruption, manipulation, and fan repression. Ultras practice ultra culture by provoking the ordinary consumer-oriented fan, the players on the field, the authorities of the sports industry, and by physically fighting anyone who threatens their cause. Their social identity is at once local and pan-European. The radical leftist agenda of the ultras defines itself in opposition to Germany’s history of fascism and racism, but the ultra movement is also an ideological version of fandom spreading throughout continental Europe and, thus, thus creating social identity in a transnational project.

These “fan films” display two kinds of statements conceptually similar to the multicultural and post-multicultural statements. Like the latter statements, the “utopic” is a product of the dualist soccer narrative in conjunction with the social and thus the statements of these films are of a degree and not kind. The fundamental difference in this chapter’s statements is the depiction of German social identities in *dystopic* and not utopic statements. Like the multicultural statement, *Gegenrade* presents ultra culture as a pedagogical object, carefully instructing the viewer how to understand and recognize ultra culture and sacrificing aesthetic and conceptual complexity in the service of a lesson. Ultra culture, however, is also depicted as an endangered species threatened by right extremists and the police state. Ultra culture is presented as the only social force capable of defending soccer, even German society, from the right wing. *Gegenrade* makes a *dystopic statement* by depicting how the world of German club soccer could slip into a social dystopia.

66/67 paints a picture of German soccer and an accompanying social identity after they have already entered dystopia. Like the post-multicultural statement, a scenario is depicted in the afterwards. Pedagogy is left behind and the dystopia is starkly depicted. 66/67 makes a *post-dystopic statement*. This statement does not contextualize the dystopia in a past or give it any social or political origins. Nor does this statement suggest how to prevent the dystopia's fruition. The social dystopia merely exists in the present, bearing witness to the society that produced it but spending no time in charting its genealogy. It can only grow into the future.

## 1.8 TERMINOLOGY

Because this is an American dissertation written at an American university, I use the term “soccer” for what is formally known as “association football.” Australia, Canada, and the United States of America are the only countries that use the term “soccer.” Even though the language and soccer-specific jargon of German films has tempted me to use the word “football,” I use the term “soccer” in order to avoid confusion with “American football.” The two most important organizations of sport governance pertaining to the world of German soccer are the *Deutscher Fußball-Bund*, which governs most if not all amateur and professional soccer activity in Germany, and the *Fédération Internationale de Football Association*, which governs soccer at the global level and organizes both the men's and women's World Cup tournaments amongst others. These organizations will henceforth be called the “DFB” and “FIFA” respectively.

## **2.0 SOCCER PATRIOTISM AND MULTICULTURALISM AFTER 2006**

Soccer stands as an example par excellence of globalization. In its contemporary commercialized, hyper-capitalistic form under the international non-governmental organization FIFA, soccer embodies many of the debates that globalization has ignited. On the one hand, club soccer organizations gather teams of international players under local banners. An example: FC Bayern München's 2009 team roster includes players from ten nation-states, all competing in the Bundesliga (the top German league) under Bavarian colors. It is, therefore, at once cosmopolitan and provincial. On the other hand, FIFA regulates soccer at the international level, and international tournaments are global media events. In a time when the provincial is allegedly fading in deference to the global, the sports industry of international soccer reveals the complexity of contemporary markets and identifications. Soccer continues to allow for the symbolic assertion of the nation. Soccer and conceptions of nationalism remain tightly interwoven, and soccer matches, more specifically the soccer fandom in and outside the stadium, remain vestiges of exaggerated performances of patriotism. It is the performance of patriotism that places the Federal Republic of Germany in an exceptional position.

Needless to say Germany's turbulent twentieth century history complicates the expression of German patriotism in the public sphere. The public display of patriotism has been and remains an exceptional event in Germany because of an increasingly interpretable signification of historically burdened images. Symbols of the nation like the flag or the national

anthem can no longer exclusively signify any one ideology or narrative, despite the deafening roar of the National Socialist or, to a lesser extent, the Cold War years. However, the temporal, political, and generational distance to WWII has not completely dissolved the connection between national symbolism and National Socialism. The NS as persistent referent has dictated the display and performance of patriotism, and, accordingly, patriotic display has generally not been a common sight in the public realm of postwar West and reunified Germany. All the more reason the German press was astounded in 2006 to see jubilant fans in large numbers waving the German flag in support of the men's national soccer team (Kurbjuweit, Krönig, Reker).

The already complicated interstices of patriotism, mass gatherings, and sport became even more complicated in 2008. Turkey's member association in UEFA (Union of European Football Associations) has often placed the Turkish men's national team in direct competition with the German men's national team. This competition is read not merely as a contest between two sovereign democratic nation-states dictated by political geography and the sports industry, but more importantly as a contest between two nations connected by histories of postwar migration. In 2008 during the UEFA European Championship hosted by Austria and Switzerland, Turkey faced Germany in a semi-final match that Germany ultimately won. This spectacle of international sport brought a population out and onto the streets of German cities that proved how ethnically and culturally diverse Germany has become. Images of the flag furling, multicultural masses attracted much attention from journalists, cultural critics, sports sociologists, and theorists of nationalism and patriotism. Not only did the multiculturalist discourse become a dominant theme in German news coverage of the tournament; identity politics – the pesky gadfly of multiculturalism – also entered the discourse, often in order to

discern the “true” allegiances of Turkish, Turkish-German, or German fans (Schnibben, Güßgen, “Die Stunde der Patrioten,” “WM-Fieber. Türken schwenken”).

Amid the multicultural and multi-medial “Fußballfieber” of 2008, Turkish-German comedian Tiger “die Kralle von Kreuzberg” (the claw of Kreuzberg) produced a playful web series about the soccer tournament. “Süper EM-Stüdyo” (Super European Championship Studio) used the games of the UEFA European Championship 2008 as a platform for Tiger’s special brand of ethno-comedy. Initially, the series seemed like just another drop in the sea of German-language soccer-related entertainment, but it gained a fair amount of print and online media attention during the course of the tournament and seemed to capture the spirit of multicultural discourse in Germany: Who cheers for whom? Who waves which flag? And who belongs where? While these questions seem reductive and culturally positivistic, they can serve as a starting point to trace the more complicated phenomenon that Tiger’s Turkish-German ethno-comedy produced: soccer patriotism.

While films by Sönke Wortmann (*Das Wunder von Bern* and *Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen*) depict the German soccer nation of 1954 and 2006 in full euphoria, the comparatively humble Tiger Internet clips capture a different kind of fandom that escapes Wortmann’s big-budget films. Wortmann, who primarily depicts the objects of fan enthusiasm i.e. German soccer players, understands (West) German fandom as divided by social class and generation, but nonetheless united by a national past (*Das Wunder von Bern*). Tiger’s soccer patriotism raises a more fundamental question: What is a German fan? We could use sports sociologist Alan Bairner’s definitions of nationalism to answer this question. According to ethnic nationalism, which links the natural origins of the nation with language and race (Bairner 3), a German fan is ethnically defined i.e. white and/or Germanic. By contrast, according to civic

nationalism, which emerged with the creation of nation-states during the nineteenth century and recognizes citizenship over racial or ethnic determinations (ibid.), a German fan is a legal citizen of the state. Finally, according to sporting or social nationalism, which stresses a shared sense of national identity, community, and culture, but is also available to outsiders who identify with a nation's social characteristic (ibid.), a German fan is an embodied ethos, a sympathetic national soul. But Tiger's ethno-comedy and soccer patriotism suggest an easier way to answer this question: a German fan is anyone who wears a German soccer jersey.

What all these forms of patriotism understate is the performative dimension: soccer patriotism is the will to celebration and spectacle. It plays with national signification and perennially forgets a nation's past and present for the sake of the sporting moment. The festival of the public viewing sites in Germany is pure performance. A fan's soccer nationality is articulated neither through government documents nor skin color, but through revelry and costume. The transitory, perennially, and (historically) forgetful and celebratory power of soccer patriotism is driven by performance. Soccer patriotism in contemporary Germany complicates the concept of "nation," for it further unmoors the "German nation" from essential origins and relegates it to the play and party of performance, at once because of and despite German history.

Along these lines, an analysis of Turkish-German ethno-comedy can serve as an occasion to consider this form of patriotism critically, for the character of Tiger is the quintessential German soccer patriot of the twenty-first century. Tiger's web series is an aesthetic cultural product that ties together the threads of soccer and medially constructed ethnicity into a format of popular culture, and it thereby offers a medial topos for the examination of the performance and reception of soccer patriotism. This chapter describes the ethnic and cultural stereotypes that comprise the Tiger character and argues that Tiger fulfills the role of native informant and ethno-

tour guide for a sympathetic and tolerant German-speaking audience. The exceptionality of international soccer as a media event will be examined as one that called for the identification and construction of reconciliatory images of peaceful “Turkish” / “German” relations and found it in the non-offensive form of the Tiger character.

Tiger’s web series allows for an examination of the idiosyncrasies of German multiculturalist discourse as it shapes and reacts to aesthetic “Multikulti” production. The development of German multiculturalism in the postwar period has often focused on the surface of visible alterity, the accentuation and imagined stability in that alterity, and the resolution of difference through dualistic fusion. Tiger’s contribution to medial multiculturalism in many but not all ways follows this program of multicultural narration. His comedy will be compared with a more critically multicultural expression from the anti-racist and activist group Kanak Attak, who sought to present the displays of patriotic fandom of 2006 in political and conflict-oriented terms.

In addition to framing this chapter’s objects in terms of multicultural theory, production, and artistic reception, I will also argue that both Tiger and Kanak Attak’s representations of soccer are simultaneously expressions of and departures from *the soccer narrative*. The soccer narrative traces a broad trajectory of simplicity and dualism that is often employed to combine soccer and a social realm in visual media. I will use the work of Tiger not only to discuss the performativity of soccer patriotism in post-2006 Germany, but also to exemplify an intersection of multicultural discourse and visual media that I am calling the *multicultural statement*: an artistic creation with relatively simple and highly didactic narratives that seek to visualize the utopic goals of multiculturalism.

## 2.1 TIGER “DIE KRALLE VON KREUZBERG”

The comedy of Tiger “die Kralle von Kreuzberg” or “das Herz vom Kiez” was the project of producer/director/writer Murat Ünal and actor Cemal Atakan. Beginning in December 2006, Tiger’s initial medium was radio. The form and content of Tiger’s radio comedy proved translatable to visual formats: Tiger, in many (but not all) ways the stereotype of the working-class Turkish-German male, directly addresses the audience (either the radio listener or internet viewer) in short monologues about various facets of urban “hood” life or “Kiezleben.” Tiger was broadcast on *Radio Bremen* and *Westdeutscher Rundfunk Köln* in the radio program “Funkhaus Europa” and on Berlin’s now defunct *Radio Multikulti* in the program “Süpermercado.” The success of these radio programs led to the establishment of Desire Media Filmproduktion in 2007 with Ünal as director.

Desire Media’s thematically simple and low-budget digital Tiger clips and the 30-minute length “Süper Tiger Show” thrived in Internet-based formats. The use of media viewing websites like *Youtube* and social media websites like *Myspace* allowed Desire Media to attract viewers in the quickly expanding Internet-based market while avoiding the regulatory and budgetary restraints of mainstream television production. While Desire Media was owned and operated by Turkish-Germans, it was not an example of “ethnoscapes in German media” as described by Ayşe Çağlar in terms of content and intended audience demographic, meaning Turkish-language models of ethnic media that direct their commercial efforts at the specificity of the bilingual Turkish-German communities (52). Because German was the primary language of Tiger productions, Tiger was accessible to Turkish/German bilinguals and German monolinguals, but not to Turkish monolinguals.

Desire Media provided a synopsis of the Tiger character on their website as a new format that defines anew the borders between fiction and reality (“ein neues Format, das die Grenzen zwischen Fiktion und Realität neu definiert”). Tiger is a man who has his own take on things, but in his own loveable way (“bringt Dinge anders auf den Punkt, als man es so kennt, aber er hat dabei seine eigene liebenswürdige Art”) (Desire-Media.de). These descriptions leave to interpretation if the Tiger character is “real” or staged, if Atakan is merely “being himself” before the camera or acting from a prepared persona and script. While the Desire Media website encouraged what Leslie Adelson calls a “sociological positivist” reception of Turkish-German artistic productions, namely the presumption that such texts reflect “empirical truths” about their Turkish-German creators regardless of fictive, narrative contents (245), elsewhere Ünal claimed that the Tiger character was staged and scripted (“Türkische Fußball-Comedy”).

Tiger attracted its largest audience and greatest press media attention with “Tiger’s Süper EM-Stüdyo,” a series of twenty-four, three to six minute video clips commenting on the games of the UEFA European Championship 2008. The primary mise-en-scène for the series is the back lot of an anonymous building in Berlin-Kreuzberg, a neighborhood known for its large Turkish and Turkish-German population. In allusion to, but also in obvious contrast with, the elaborate and high budget “EM-Studio” of Germany’s second state television station in Bregenz, Austria, Tiger’s “EM-Stüdyo” consists of cheap furniture, a chalk board, various crudely made signs and maps, a large piece of artificial grass with strips of tape signifying a soccer field, wooden toy figures to represent players in tactical explanations, and Tiger’s small glass and saucer for Turkish tea. Clips coinciding with either Turkish or German national team victories do not take place in the “Stüdyo,” but are filmed on the streets of Berlin near public viewing sites. In these clips, the public festival of fandom comprises the bulk of the content. When in the “Stüdyo,”

Tiger assesses the games played according to categories: best player, best move, best car convoy, and best game (“Bester Spieler, Beste Hareket, Beste Autokonvoi, Beste Spiel”). In German, these categories are written approximations of Tiger’s Turkish-German slang, meaning a vernacular of code switching and unconventional standard German grammar.

The unifying features of the “Stüdyo” format are international soccer and Tiger’s worldview. The “Süper Tiger Show,” which began Internet broadcasts in 2009, employed the talk show format, typically featuring local personalities from Berlin as guests. The ethno-comedy, soccer-related humor, and singular source of content, which is anchored in Tiger himself, remained relatively unchanged. While ethno-comedy was certainly nothing new in German-language artistic productions in 2006, Tiger’s unique style of ethno-comedy consists primarily in cultural stereotype and the opposition of Turkish and German cultural stereotypes through metaphors of competition and hierarchy born of competitive sport.

## **2.2 ETHNO-COMEDY AND CULTURAL STEREOTYPES**

Tiger is stereotype, a constructed representation informed by a particular cultural constellation of historical development<sup>8</sup> and of a particular set of cultural assumptions and stereotypes contributing to an imagined Turkish-German male. This representational ethnic construct is informed by an institutional “ethnic logic” and “racial knowledge” (“rassistisches Wissen”) that renders stereotype immediately meaningful and intelligible in society (Terkessidis). The representation also limits reception of the entertainment product, however, for if Tiger is the vehicle of the series, and his persona as Turkish-German is the defining attribute that generates

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<sup>8</sup> This refers to the cultural and socio-economic history of postwar Turkish migration beginning with the guest worker program in 1961.

humor, then that humor is only relevant to viewers familiar with its particular set of stereotypes. Viewers who “get the joke” must have a conception, however reductive, of a city-dwelling Turkish-German male from the working-class, and they must be familiar with the stereotypes of that figure and be able to identify some or all of those stereotypes as constitutive features of the Tiger character. The regular viewer of the Tiger clips, then, is familiar with the cultural context and is most likely sympathetic to multiculturalist practice in some form, espousing cultural tolerance in regards to the kinds of media consumed and their sources.

Tiger’s clips appeared just after Turkish-German ethno-comedy had established itself on the stage and in mainstream television. His work was preceded by the television series of Kaya Yanar (“Was guckts du?!”) and Bülent Ceylan (“Döner for One”) and followed by the Internet and stand-up ethno-comedy of Idil Baydar and Ilka Bessin. This kind of ethnic humor is culturally contextual and, in Tiger’s case, entirely driven by behavior, mannerism, and the play with stereotype, rather than situational or physical comedy. Turkish-German film scholar Deniz Göktürk describes this sort of comedic ethnic role-play as frequently drawing on “crude stereotyping that amounts to little more than blatant racism, where the power of laughter is kept in the hands of the powerful,” but she concedes that “humor can be instrumental in releasing tensions and breaking up encrusted fixations in the way we perceive ourselves and others” (103). Tiger’s “crude” stereotyping, however, contrasts with other Turkish-German comedies. For example, the short-lived television series *Türkisch für Anfänger* (Turkish for Beginners) develops situational humor by undermining stereotypes and features middle-class, “integrated” Turkish-German characters. Similarly, Turkish-German comedian Django Asül bucks the stereotype by delivering his standup routines in neither the stereotypical broken German of the immigrant nor in standard High German but in the Upper Bavarian dialect. Tiger, by contrast,

embraces stereotype. An adequate comparison from the United States is Richard Marin's "Cheech" character, the quintessential working-class, Southern Californian pachuco slang-speaking Chicano of the 1970s. In the sense that Cheech is an amalgamated, hyperbolic Chicano, the Tiger character is an amalgamated, hyperbolic Turkish-German.

Features of the Tiger character that can be identified as stereotypical are his rapid-fire, often grammatically incorrect, Turkish-accented standard German, a macho heterosexual masculinity in the form of advice on how to woo, pacify, and juggle female lovers, and the economically humble, low-tech surroundings that serve as his studio production. Tiger's monologues are often comically didactic, as if he were a tour guide for the culturally curious tourist. This does not mean that he explains the material urban landscape or history of Berlin-Kreuzberg in any way. Instead, Tiger-tours explicate life in the "Kiez," and according to Tiger's stereotype, his life tutorials are limited to the stereotypically imagined spheres of male, working-class Turkish-German existence: sport, women, food, and cars.

The Tiger character does not, however, use all the stereotypes of the working-class Turkish-German male. His behavior is "accented" enough to build a stereotype that indicates his roots in contemporary German society and, with these roots, a set of socio-economic assumptions. Tiger is always the host or entertainer in all productions and is not visually linked to a domestic or work sphere. The viewer never sees his apartment, job, family, or even the often-mentioned girlfriends he struggles to please. The viewer also never sees Tiger in any religious setting. The only clue to Tiger's religious heritage is his occasional expletive utterance "Allah!" which arguably says more about his linguistic than his religious heritage. Otherwise, Tiger remains religiously anonymous, if not manifestly secular. Specific work, religious, and

domestic spheres must then be assumed, meaning preconceived and imbedded in the visual markers of the stereotype.

This lack of manifest social milieu disappoints the stereotype of the Turkish-German street hustler or criminal. Tiger fails to embody the role of young, male, violent street youth or the “Kanaksta.”<sup>9</sup> The figure of the “Kanaksta” was initially and controversially depicted by Feridun Zaimoğlu in his early novels of the 1990s, most notably *Kanak Sprak* (1995), and has since been reproduced in various medial forms by various Turkish-German and German artists. The “Kanaksta” is the disenfranchised Turk living in Germany with a Turkish passport, defiant in the face of German “Fremdenliebe” and “Fremdenhass” (love or foreigners, hatred of foreigners). The “Kanaksta” speaks a fluent torrent of (sometimes creative) obscenities expressing physical and sexual violence and incorporating American hip-hop slang. He is a misogynist and, in the tradition of Turkish fathers, a future iron-fisted patriarch.

Tiger fulfills this role in almost no way. His routines and anecdotes express neither violence nor hatred. While he might seem streetwise and fast-talking, there are no gang-related implications in his behavior and no mention of criminality. The Tiger character might seem womanizing in his references to various girlfriends, but it would be a stretch to label him a misogynist. Bawdy humor of any kind does not exist in his anecdotes. Tiger’s broken “Kiez-Deutsch” is a softened, warm variant of stereotypical Turkish-German youth slang. Tiger’s language, despite its Turkish-German accent and occasional code switching, is direct and understandable to the average German speaker with no familiarity with the Turkish language. Moments of code switching from German to Turkish are brief and normally consist of only a few

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<sup>9</sup> “Kanaksta” is a combination of the words “gangsta” from American hip-hop culture and “Kanak,” a racial epithet in German.

words in a German-language sentence, efficaciously signaling Tiger's ethnic identity and granting his monologues a certain degree of "authenticity."

In a word, Tiger is non-threatening for a majority-German audience. The content and character of Tiger did not directly challenge political practice or conviction in provocative ways. He was not aligned with any activist group, and his clips neither identified with any anti-racist movement, nor did they confront any notion of ethnic or cultural prejudice. Tiger's play with stereotypicality, then, is not that of author Zaimoğlu's, which seeks to "subvert the multiculturalist discourse of identity by devices which include the aggressive over-fulfillment of stereotypical expectations" (Cheesman 187). Tiger's play with ethnic stereotype does not cast a broad social net by, for example, featuring Turkish migrant marginalization or presenting a Kabarett-like routine of edgy cultural commentary.<sup>10</sup> These stereotypical lacks render the character an easily consumable entertainment product that speaks to a particular viewer demographic. The Tiger stereotype is innocuous: it suggests a Turkish-German existence by thematically presenting light-hearted ethno-comedy through the everyman's realm of soccer, and it thereby allows viewers to consume or contribute to a vague multiculturalist practice.

### **2.3 TIGER IN THE GERMAN PRESS: RECONCILIATORY DRIVE**

The German-language media organizations *Tagesspiegel*, *Welt Kompakt*, *TAZ Berlin*, *Blond*, *Bild* and *Spiegel Online* made Tiger the object of light-hearted journalistic reportage in print and online, with the content ranging somewhere between the typical human interest story and celebrity news. This media exposure was not solely won by Tiger's special brand of ethno-

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<sup>10</sup> Such Turkish-German cultural commentary can be found in the autobiographically driven literary humor of Hatice Akyün and Aslı Sevindim, albeit to a very tempered and light-hearted extent.

comedy (which is in and of itself not extraordinarily innovative). In many ways, the media exposure was predetermined and initially had very little to do with the actual content and medial form of the Tiger videos.

Tiger's work was rooted in the soccer fever of the time. International soccer is a media event in much of the world, and certainly in Germany. This is a more complicated statement than it would initially seem. Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz ascribe several attributes to the televised media event that can also be applied to international soccer tournaments. Media events are "interruptions of routine." Not only do they halt everyday activities but they also do so "monopolistically" by suspending and preempting regular broadcasting with "a series of special announcements and preludes that transform daily life into something special" (Dayan and Katz 5). Club soccer is a common television fixture nine months out of the year, including many annual national and international club soccer tournaments.<sup>11</sup> International soccer competitions, however, are interruptions of routine, and like national or religious holidays, which Dayan and Katz call holidays of "civil religion," media events temporarily "propose exceptional things to think about, to witness, and to do" (5). Media events are also characterized by a "norm of viewing in which people tell each other that it is mandatory to view," resulting in communal viewing practices (8-9). The public viewing sites, not just in private establishments, but also in organized television viewing sites in German cities, are the obvious examples in international soccer.

Media events are live, unpredictable, and organized "outside the media," by which Dayan and Katz mean that the events take place outside the studio in "remote locations" and that "the event is not usually initiated by the broadcasting organizations" (5). International soccer

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<sup>11</sup> The most popular club tournaments in the annual schedule are the DFB-Pokal, the Bundesliga Championship, the UEFA Champions League, the Europa League, and the FIFA Club World Cup.

tournaments are indeed broadcast live and therefore the action on the pitch remains unpredictable (if only for ninety minutes). But this live broadcast is also preplanned, announced, and advertised in advance. This advertised and live media event is anticipated and subsequently “presented with reverence and ceremony” (7). Any one game in an international soccer tournament will consist of pre- and post-game ceremony and the reverence of the fans in and outside the stadium is an important part of the pageantry. The reverent and ceremonious presentations as such do not celebrate conflict, even when the media event’s referent consists in conflict directly or indirectly.

The events instead celebrate reconciliation:

This is where they differ from the daily news events, where conflict is the inevitable subject. Often they are ceremonial efforts to redress conflict or to restore order or, more rarely, to institute change. They call for a cessation of hostilities, at least for a moment...(8)

In the case of international soccer, which still tempts some sports journalists and cultural critics to employ military terminology and warlike rhetoric, the conflict on the field is the highly regulated mock battle of team sport. Instead of highlighting conflict, the message remains conciliatory, inviting fans to unite “in the overcoming of conflict or at least in its postponement or miniaturization” (12). Media events “integrate societies” and evoke a “renewal of loyalty to the society and its legitimate authority.” Accordingly, the appearance of integration is hegemonic and quickly “proclaimed historic” (9).

This media theory offers a framework for the examination of the medial representations of soccer patriotism and its multiculturalist discourse. Soccer patriotism expresses the will to celebrate and is, therefore, an inclusive form of patriotism. Whoever dons the appropriate costume and colors may cheer for the nation, regardless of cultural affiliation or ethnicity. Soccer patriotism, however, is also perennial, transitory, and it only temporarily and selectively forgets national, cultural, or ethnic histories for the sake of festival. While a nation’s past is more readily

an object of selective forgetting (e.g. the persistent NS referent of German nation symbol), a nation's present is closer to the temporal and cultural surface and threatens to intrude into the festival.

For the Turkish-German population in all its diversity, this present consists of lingering systemic economic and educational inequalities, restrictive state naturalization policies, and continuing debates over integrative vs. assimilative cultural and political policies. The European Championship of 2008 threatened, in this context, to inject conflict into the fan revelry and divide fans along national and ethnic lines. Despite peaceful celebrations in the tournament up to the semifinal match, a sense of nervousness seemed palpable in anticipation of the contest between Germany and Turkey. Soccer patriotism as an extension of the media event of international soccer, however, seeks reconciliation rather than conflict. Faced with images of German, Turkish, and Turkish-German soccer patriotism, this *reconciliatory drive* sent the German media out in search of Turkish-German representation (“vertreten” not “darstellen”). And the media found its “representative” in the character of Tiger.

The media attention Tiger received rendered him an imagined collective source of cultural reconciliation between Turks and Germans. That is to say, Tiger proved that despite the anticipation of ethnic and nationalist hooliganism (which never came to pass), Turkish and German fans could indeed coexist in a multicultural parade of goodwill. Tiger's role in the press media transcended that of an entertainer, as Tiger became a cultural ambassador. As a softened ethnic stereotype, he not only contributed to this reception but also to his function as a stereotype in popular culture. While Tiger's habitus displays the visual markers of the Turkish-German, both visually and metaphorically he is isolated in the camera frame and in his comedy in general. He is an individual Turkish-German and simultaneously a collective assemblage of ethnic

enunciation (Deleuze and Guattari 18), meaning he “speaks” for his “people” as an isolated individual but is also set a comfortable distance from the “people” for whom he speaks.

Of course, Tiger is a fictive character and a cultural attaché for the actual soccer fans on the street. But this assessment runs the risk of once again misrecognizing variants of nationalism. Soccer patriotism is neither ethnic nor civic nationalism, and its performance, therefore, in no way stems from some true origin of ethnic or national identity. The sporting conflict of the semi-final match pitted Germany and Turkey against each other as two nations, but not nation-states, since neither the Turkish nor German football association is government controlled. In the eyes of the press, however, the fan revelry was often assumed to constitute the ethnic and civic divisions of nation, forbidding the conflation of things Turkish with things German. The press reading of Turkish/German fandom was quintessentially multicultural. It presented the identification, stabilization, and timid celebration, but never the inclusion of social difference. That is to say, it was a decidedly non-dialectic construction that maintained ethnic and cultural binaries.

The multiculturalist, reconciliatory drive to establish Tiger as Turkish soccer ambassador was based upon his use of stereotype. This stereotype is easily recognizable and non-threatening. To emphasize Tiger’s stereotypicality as a source of collective enunciation reveals an epistemological search for the confines of ethnic societal relations, a search Etienne Balibar has aligned with racist practice and its “desire for knowledge.” According to Balibar, racism is not only a way of “legitimizing privileges or disqualifying competitors or continuing old traditions.” It is also an investigation of societal and identificatory limitations:

[I]t is a way of asking and answering questions about [...] why we find ourselves unable to resist the compulsion of violence going beyond the “rational” necessities of competition and social conflict. The answer provided by racism to all these questions [...] is this: it is because we are different, and tautologically, because difference is the

universal essence of what we are – not singular, individual difference, but collective differences, made of analogies and ultimately, of similarities. The core of this mode of thought might very well be this common logic: differences among men are differences among sets of similar individuals (which, for this reason, can be “identified”). (Balibar 200)

It might seem paradoxical to incorporate Balibar’s comments on racism as a universalism in the context of multicultural artistic production. After all, multiculturalism is commonly perceived as an inclusive ethos, granting acknowledgement and a certain amount of positive cultural status to ethnic or racial minorities in a heterogeneous society. But the reception of Tiger in a time of imagined ethnic conflict addressed materialist characteristics of a soccer patriotism that includes the desire for racial knowledge. The journalistic reception of Tiger seeks to understand, perhaps in an act of good intentions. But in the process of understanding, this reception codifies and isolates difference, shrinking the phenomenon that is cultural alterity to a “knowable” quantity, a subjective knowledge that merely reflects preconceptions and resists forming new conceptions. Tiger allowed the press to take the pulse of an imagined Turkish demographic. He allowed the press to ask “how the Turks are feeling” and receive a relatively inoffensive answer of humor, void of accusation or controversy. Tiger’s press coverage is a metaphorical outstretched hand to an ethnic minority through a cultural informant in a time of imagined ethnic and national tension.

## **2.4 SOCCER PATRIOTISM AS A PERFORMATIVE MODALITY**

The performative quality of soccer patriotism unmoors patriotic determination from biology, ethnicity, or law. Soccer patriotism can only be expressed and identified when it is performed. Heritage, citizenship, or social identity can certainly provide the impetus to perform soccer patriotism, but the impetus is visually lost in the mass pageantry and materialism of fandom.

Soccer patriotism is only and can be nothing more than a materialist practice, meaning it is not a mimetic, platonic performance, offering the simulacral material display of an immaterial realm of “true” ethnic and national determinations. Borrowing from Louis Althusser we can thus understand soccer patriotism as an ideology that “always exists in an apparatus, its practice, or practices” and is, therefore, “material” (Althusser 166). While not the material existence of a road or a rifle, its existence nevertheless involves a material physicality that does not refer to an unseen source (ibid.). As a materialist process and, thus, surface, soccer patriotism only exists as performance. Its materialism, furthermore, has no recourse to a legitimate source, nor does it require it. It is inclusive, yet once the performance ends its performative modality renders its inclusiveness ephemeral and entirely dismissible. National affiliations born of soccer patriotism must also die with soccer patriotism, unable to grow beyond the fandom festival into more concrete political spheres. The soccer patriot might win comrades at the public viewing site through the appropriate fandom performance. When the games are done, however, and when the performance of fandom is longer undertaken communally, neither the village nor the halls of bureaucracy can provide the same kind of stage.

Another important factor of soccer patriotism is *forgetfulness*. The performance of soccer patriotism employs national symbolism such as color schemes and flags that immediately convey national content. In the hands of soccer fans, one could ask what such symbols convey. Which aspects of a nation and/or the nation state’s history, policy, or culture are included in the celebration of national team fandom? Fandom of national soccer teams cannot remain wholly apolitical. This fandom cannot disregard political relationships in the world based on geography, economics, culture, and ethnicity. These histories rather comprise the base upon which the superstructure of sport is built, and the very fact of international competition necessarily

introduces some element of the political into the fan's relationship with soccer. But fan revelry is clearly not a form of political activism, nor is it a form of goal-oriented political engagement that strives for legislative or even cultural change. Despite this largely ambiguous relationship to the political, the national flag as signifier does not lose its multiplicity of signification in the fan revelry. Instead, many referents of the signifier are forgotten for the sake of the festival. They remain forgotten only for the duration of sport competition, however. This forgetfulness is, like international soccer, perennial. International competition is sporadic, with weeks or even months between matches, unlike the predictable club Bundesliga season. The fans amass to the sound of the referee's whistle, and then they disappear just as quickly, along with the colorful and boisterous performance of patriotism.

This temporary forgetting of the past is partly Nietzschean in function. In the mode of critical history, the fan who is "oppressed by a present need," namely celebrating the national team, and who wants to cast off the burden of a "history that judges and condemns" at any cost, forgets that history for the sake of the present, or here, for the sake of fandom (Nietzsche, *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen* 72). Forgetfulness in soccer patriotism, however, is not as consistent as forgetfulness in Nietzsche's critical history. All reference to the troubled past is not simply dropped each time the national team takes to the pitch. On the one hand, two of Germany's three World Cup titles were won in pivotal times of postwar history, 1954 and 1990 i.e. in a Germany reconstructed and in a Germany reunified. Certainly the historical situation of these moments was not completely forgotten by German fans. On the contrary, recent historical events arguably lent these victories sensations of bitter sweetness, allowing fans to weave athletic success into a national narrative. By contrast, however, the remnants of the student

protests and the growing RAF crisis did not factor into the soccer fandom and spirit of the 1974 World Cup win.

Generally, such forgetfulness of the past is selective. It drops some referents and retains others. Those referents that are retained (1) do not distract from the festival of fandom, and (2) heighten the excitement and cathartic function of fandom. This selectivity allowed the 1990 World Cup win to stand in dialogue with the collapse of East German communism and the reunification of the two German states. Two narratives of success could compliment each other. And this explains why the student movement and growing domestic terrorism played no part in the general narrative of the 1974 World Cup win. Historical events that divide rather than unite a people can only distract national soccer fans from athletic glory. Such forgetting and retaining of referents allowed fans and sports media to read the display on the streets of 2006 as a new form of jubilant, positive patriotism. It allowed the German fan to wave the flag, temporarily unconcerned with a past that would condemn patriotic display.

The social inclusiveness of soccer patriotism complicates the forgetfulness of historical signifiers. Forgetfulness can be both a passive and active process. When passive, it is not willed but instead a manifestation of time and the fragility of memory. As an active process, by contrast, forgetting is repression. Active forgetfulness would assume that a German fan selectively forgets the nation's past to celebrate in the present, assuming this fan (1) has some relationship to this for-now-forgotten past that renders it worth forgetting and (2) some degree of collective guilt, however faint, that the German fan selectively forgets and represses. Before analyzing the process of fandom forgetfulness in terms of personal neurosis, however, I want to reemphasize the multicultural face of contemporary German fandom.

Must the Turk or Turkish-German also selectively forget Germany's past in order to participate in soccer revelry, even if the Turkish-German has no "hereditary" connection to that past? Must only the white German fan play the critical historian? These questions begin to address the engagement of a fan to a nation's history, but more importantly, these questions carry ethnic connotations. If cultural critics were astounded to see Germans gleefully waving the flag in 2006, they were arguably looking at German-Germans, or whites. Despite the temporal gap between the generally young soccer fans and World War II, it is the white German fan who has inherited a more complicated relationship to German history and German patriotism. The term "German," however, no longer exclusively describes a homogenous ethnic group. If journalists and cultural critics wondered if Germans may be patriotic, this question must be divided to address the current demographic constellation of German society: may white Germans celebrate being German at the risk of celebrating German history, and may Germans with a migration heritage celebrate being German at all?

Tiger seems to answer such questions of historical subject positioning and cultural belonging with no inhibitions. He is the soccer patriot, the performer. In "Süper EM Stüdyo" episode 21, filmed directly after the semi-final match between Turkey and Germany, Tiger wears a half Turkish, half German soccer jersey, reminiscent of the Turkish-German flag prominent in the city during the tournament (the Turkish star and crescent centered on the German black, red, and gold). Tiger is once again in the crowded streets of Berlin with fireworks exploding overhead and masses of cheering fans waving German flags. With the fandom visible behind him, he gives highlights of the game in his exaggerated fashion, mimicking the reactions of the Turkish fandom to every goal and every "haraket" (Turkish: move, maneuver). Although Tiger admits that he is "richtig traurig," he congratulates the German national team, swears his oath to

cheer it on in the final against Spain, and, as the episode ends, rushes off to join in the celebration. This depiction of Tiger as a soccer patriot shows his resiliency and eagerness to continue patriotic revelry, even after his preferred national team has been eliminated from competition.

These are images of soccer patriotism, performance, and the momentary surface. Tiger strategically negotiates symbolic bi-nationalism through the humorous play with stereotype. What makes the comedy format such an effective device to represent symbolic patriotism is its ease in switching sides for the sake of the sustained production of humorous material. Despite the seriousness that national symbols typically convey, in Tiger's hands, these symbols lose their gravitas and float in the realm of play and party. As soccer patriotism, Tiger's "Süper EM-Stüdyo" is exemplary in its avoidance of the socio-economical interests of the sports industry or the rigid identity politics attributable to German or Turkish national signification. While patriotism provides the matrix through which Tiger's comedic commentary on the games finds articulation, it serves pronouncedly as a generator of humor and cause for communal celebration.

It is important to note that the performance of soccer patriotism typically includes an audience, or witness to the festival. From the perspective of the German press, to witness Tiger and his soccer patriotism is also to interpret and translate this performance into knowledge. The formation of Tiger's soccer patriotism into a narrative seeks an explanation for the celebratory images and, more importantly, for the slippage of singular and stabile ethnicity and patriotism. Influenced by the "civil religion" of international soccer, this narrative concentrates on some "central value, the experience of *communitas* and equality in one's immediate environment and of integration with a cultural center" (Dayan and Katz 16).

The patriotic euphoria of soccer, which abandons stable national identities as legitimate sources of articulation, is reduced to the manageable and familiar realm of multicultural reconciliation. The press takes on a multiculturally didactic role reminiscent of “rooted cosmopolitanism,” which according to Domna Stanton is an ethical and pedagogical program of cosmopolitanism to be learned and *mediated* through teachers (629). This didactic interest, moreover, aligns itself with Cheesman’s critique of the Turkish-German multi-culture industry and prioritizes the power of mediation and explication over cosmopolitanism as an actual practice. Tiger, already mediated and a stereotype, is again mediated by the German press and subsequently multiculturalized and “rooted” to singular ethnic and national identities. And this second mediation takes place, even though his embodiment of soccer patriotism is anything but rooted. Tiger’s market appeal as an easily digestible, ethnically non-threatening, soccer-supplementary object can be characterized as the desired product packaging of the multi-culture industry. Yet the stereotypes that comprise Tiger are themselves destabilized when affiliated with the national pageantry of sport. As a representation of the soccer patriot, Tiger’s Turkish-German allegiance to nationality is in a state of flux, neither dogmatic nor extremist.

## **2.5 KANAK TV AND THE SUSPICION OF MULTICULTURALISM**

Tiger’s comedy cannot be characterized as entirely apolitical. The use of Turkish and German stereotypes necessitates a humor based in cultural politics. His multicultural media seems relatively innocuous and tame, however, when placed next to the work of the anti-racist group Kanak Attak. This activist group received much journalistic and academic attention over the course of its history (1998-2010), which Nanna Heidenreich, Vojin Sasa Vukadinovic, and Tom

Cheesman have all fully described. I will be using their accounts to contextualize an analysis of one of the group's film clips produced under the name Kanak TV and available for viewing on the Kanak TV website (Kanak TV). "Schland ist das Land" was filmed during the FIFA World Cup 2006 in Hamburg and comments on the mass fandom that accompanied the spectacle of FIFA soccer. That German citizens or residents of multiple cultural affiliations joined together in displays of soccer patriotism lured Kanak TV into the streets to engage with soccer fans. In comparison with other Kanak TV videos, the attempt to conjure and cajole politically transgressive discourse out of the objects of the clip, here the fans, took an ambiguous turn. Kanak TV's attempt to find false ethnic or migrant consciousness among non-native German soccer fans failed to produce polemics of cultural politics in the form they had intended to elicit.

Heidenreich and Vukadinovic characterize Kanak Attak's style of anti-essentialist activism and playful intervention as a mix of theory, politics, and artistic practice that gravitates toward the "pop left or cultural left" (134). Notions of performativity and queer studies influenced the group's appropriation of the taboo word "Kanak." This appropriation was an irritation "for self-acclaimed pragmatic, direct, or representational (identity or lobbying) politics as well as for the well-meaning mainstream" (ibid.). The gesture was directly influenced by one of the group's founding members, author Feridun Zaimoğlu. Kanak Attak sought to irritate a well-meaning German mainstream through its polemics against liberal multiculturalism. Kanak Attak's audience and participants historically consisted of white German leftists.<sup>12</sup> Cheesman reports that at the multimedia cabaret show "Kanak History Revue: Opel-Pitbull-Autopot" of 2001, most of the audience of 1,500 consisted of white Germans from Berlin's leftist student-age circles. Berlin's largely working-class migrant youth were "conspicuous by their absence" (Cheesman 192).

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<sup>12</sup> Kanak Attak labeled white Germans, or "German-German," the "Bio-Deutschen."

A major tenet of Kanak Attak's political theory was its stance on the integration debate. Because the concept of integration had been "the guiding principle in implementing racist subordination in Germany" and had served as "the logic that backs the withholding of rights" from migrant populations, Kanak Attak read integration as "the state's response to the struggles of migration" (Heidenreich and Vukadinovic 139). Kanak Attak's tactic was to make no differentiation between integration and assimilation. Their slogan in this regard was simple: "No integration!" Instead the group advocated the "autonomy of migration," a concept which posits migration as not symptomatic of just the global movements of capital (unemployment in the homeland, for example), but also of the migrant's ability and desire to move for many reasons. Autonomy of migration attempts to "foreground the distribution of power" and avoid the focus on "subjectivities," since the subject is neither the "privileged motor of subversion" nor the "vanguard of historical and political change" (142). Kanak Attak saw migration as a social movement and the migrant struggle as "not about trying to become citizens, but rather...showing that migrants already are citizens in their own right" (ibid.).

Prior to the production of "Schland ist das Land" of 2006, Kanak TV videos were filmed in an agit-prop style not interested in taking on complex positions or deploying "any formal sophistication," which would suggest video art. The conceptual aim was to reveal the existence of hidden racism "under the surface of urban normality" (Heidenreich and Vukadinovic 149). In order to unearth the banality of racism (to borrow a term from Terkessidis) the focus was on white German nationals. In the videos "Philharmonie Köln – 40 Jahre Einwanderung" and "Weißes Ghetto," Kanak TV employed a confrontational interview style to extract racist sentiment out of unsuspecting white Germans, thereby establishing rhetorical parameters in which unprepared Germans were coaxed into admitting prejudices. In "Weißes Ghetto," for

example, white Germans are approached on the street by interview teams and asked how it feels to live in the “white ghetto,” an unexpected inversion of the stereotypical conception of the ghetto as the exclusive demographic domain of ethnic minorities. This inverted but straightforward question elicits confusion and irritation in the interviewees. A thoughtful answer is neither possible (given the circumstance of the chance street encounter in which the interviews are conducted) nor desired. The aim is to provoke a reaction for the camera.

Similar questions are often put to white Germans with the interviewer in frame. The presence of the interviewer within the frame allows him or her to form a relationship with the camera, and subsequently the audience, that Randall Halle has termed “the wink.” According to Halle, this gesture consists of a knowing nod or glance at the camera directed toward the politically sympathetic audience, which is thus invited to join in on the joke by watching white Germans struggle to justify or hide their cultural intolerance in reaction to the Kanak TV provocateurs. “The wink” is a visual device dependent upon the interviewer glancing into the camera. The ignorant interviewee thus becomes the butt of the joke with a rhetoric that engenders the circumstantial necessity of the interviewee to either reveal or deny cultural intolerance (Halle 49). Furthermore, the wink assumes an audience that not only sympathizes with Kanak TV’s critique of contemporary liberal multicultural discourse, but also masochistically delights in seeing their fears of German prejudice reified. This audience is simultaneously entertained and dismayed by the confirmation of its fears.

Kanak TV employed an altered approach in the production of “Schland ist das Land.” This ten-minute video features an all female interview team that walks the streets of Hamburg during public viewings of the FIFA World Cup 2006 game German vs. Argentina. Nondescript instrumental hip hop music without text bookends the video, otherwise fading in extra-

diegetically only once during the clip and serving as an audio marker/segue between interview sequences. The camera shots are either medium-close (framing interviewees and the extended arm and microphone of the interviewer) or wider shots (framing both interviewer and interviewee in American full). All interviews with fans are conducted in German.<sup>13</sup>

In contrast to other Kanak TV videos available such as “Philharmonie Köln,” “Weißes Ghetto,” and “Das Märchen von der Integration,” all interviews in “Schland ist das Land” are conducted with non-white German-speakers. The ethnic civilian as the object of interrogation modifies Kanak TV’s methods of confrontation drastically. The ethnic civilian is not conceived as a vessel of hidden racism from which confrontational interviewers can extract unwitting admissions of cultural intolerance. The selection of ethnic civilians here no longer supports Kanak TV’s earlier agenda of unmasking closet xenophobes. Instead, “Schland ist das Land” displays an inversion of their typical practice, offering a survey of “migrant” sentiment concerning soccer patriotism. Instead of eliciting expressions of racism, Kanak TV seems intent on revealing a widespread ethnic and cultural false consciousness at the behest of fan revelry. Ethnic civilians are asked which team they support and why, and those who support the German national soccer team are questioned more intensely.

With the ethnic civilian as the object, the function of the wink also changes. These interviews are conducted with the Kanak TV interviewer now partially or fully out-of-frame, thus spatially preventing the wink from inviting sympathetic viewers to take part in the joke. Even when the interviewer is in-frame, the sly glance into the camera no longer becomes an invitation to rejoice in the discomfort of the interviewee. Instead, he or she is allowed to occupy the frame, speaking without interruption, so that the spatial framing of relatively close shots

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<sup>13</sup> A notable exception is a brief, apparently accidental, meeting with three men from Afghanistan who speak only Persian, a language that the particular interviewer also speaks.

direct the focus of the sequences to verbal and semantic contents rather than to the physical gut-reactions as seen in other videos.

One remaining provocative element of the wink is the concise rhetoric that lures the interviewee into confusion. In “Schland ist das Land” the question posed is: “How does one better integrate oneself, with the German passport or with the German flag?” / “Wie integriert man sich besser, mit deutschem Pass oder mit der deutschen Fahne?” (Kanak TV). In this form the question calls for one of two answers: either legally, through naturalization law (“mit deutschem Pass”) or symbolically, through participation in and consumption of German culture (“mit der deutschen Fahne”). Similar to the question of the white ghetto, the impromptu circumstance of the various interviews forestalls any lengthy and thoughtful response. The interviewees are only given a binary tool to chart integration qualitatively. If they answer using this binary, they have in either case acknowledged both the existence of integration as a culturally positive phenomenon or telos and the possibility of integrating in comparative and superlative ways (“wie integriert man sich *besser...*”).

This provocation stands in contradiction to Kanak Attak’s principle of “No integration.” Though in this form the question resembles previous agit-prop style Kanak TV questions, without the wink it remains unclear if it is intended to bait the interviewees into reductive statements of false consciousness. When accomplished either legally or symbolically, the form, measurement, and delineation of integration remains wholly undefined. The gauge to measure the integrated foreigner – and the “German” contents of its measurement – is not described, nor is the interviewee asked to consider this. When identifying either the passport or the flag as the better means of integration, the interviewees cannot be sure if they are positing the integration of

foreigners into the much debated “Leitkultur” or if they are just using the word “integration” as a gentler synonym for “assimilation,” both negative options according to Kanak Attak’s theory.

Such vagueness burdens the question with contentious cultural politics and establishes the trap of previous Kanak TV videos, a trap that the interviewees fall into, but the will to provoke remains absent. Out of the mouth of a white German, the answer of either “Pass” or “Fahne” could reveal the intolerance of a German citizen who posits integration as a reasonable and compulsory solution to migrant struggles. Out of the mouth of the ethnic civilian, however, it is as if Kanak TV is asking migrants to choose their own alienation, keeping in mind Kanak Attak’s understanding of integration as intrinsically abusive. The result in the video is ambivalence. The interviewees give various answers and attempt to support these answers, at times confusedly, with great uncertainty, or even silence. None of the interviewees answers the question in the straightforward, either/or fashion that Kanak TV intends to elicit.

The second question asked in the video is: “Are you Germany or ‘Schland’?” / “Seid ihr Deutschland oder ‘Schland’?” The word “Schland,” a stadium chant that shortens the word “Deutschland,” is mentioned only twice in the video beyond the title. This occurs first in the form of a question, to which the confused interviewee answers “Deutschland, Deutschland!” as if he were correcting the interviewer’s German. It occurs again when a mixed group of young white and black soccer fans on the street chants the word, almost ignoring the presence of the camera and the interviewer.

Beyond the context of soccer, however, it is difficult to infer what Kanak TV’s use of the word “Schland” intends. Although it is not clearly stated, “Schland” could represent the very situation in which the interviews take place: the temporality of soccer patriotism that ebbs and flows with the soccer seasons and is independent of ethnic or civic nationalisms. As a signifier

for soccer patriotism, the question of “Deutschland vs. Schland” could be a provocative rearticulation of a Kanak TV’s social binary: does a person stand under the signifier of “Deutschland” – with the legal, social, and cultural meanings associated with the nation-state – or under the signifier of “Schland” – the temporary soccer nation and its festival, performativity, all-inclusiveness, and forgetfulness of certain cultural politics. This reductive binary could be used as a device to call the interviewees out, as it were, to question their enthusiastic patriotic display while questioning their nationality in the legal sense and the general tenuousness of patriotic performance. In effect, this is a reformulation of the first question, amounting to the same false possibilities of integration in Germany: through legal means (Deutschland) or symbolic means (Schland).

Even though the term gives the video its name, “Schland ist das Land”, it is unclear if Kanak TV employed it as precisely as they have other terms such as “Integration,” “Ghetto,” or “Bio-Deutsche.” While along with Kanak Attak, Kanak TV was arguably most famous for the appropriation of the taboo word “Kanak,” it is difficult to determine if the group clearly appropriated this populist neologism “Schland” for its own rhetorical purposes. If we read the “Deutschland vs. Schland” binary as synonymous with the binary “deutscher Pass vs. deutsche Fahne,” then “Schland” signals a preference for cultural integration over official, state-sponsored integration. Yet the interviewees do not seem to even understand the term linguistically, much less conceptually, and their answers quickly abandon the confusing rhetoric Kanak TV presents. By returning to the party, the mixed group of black and white soccer fans begin to dance and chant soccer slogans when they are asked this question. Kanak TV’s attempt to realize the potential of new terminology born in pop-cultural discourse or to unearth new understandings of symbolic migrant patriotism has been aborted by fandom revelry.

Thus, Kanak TV's typical confrontational tactics were actually mitigated in recording an event that produced more tolerance than hatred and more cultural identification than alienation. This representation of soccer patriotism conveys a sense of multicultural unity, even if Kanak TV's intention was to complicate or undermine such unity. The energetic revelry ignited by international soccer, then, which temporarily transformed the German urban landscape and allowed for soccer patriotism to populate the public sphere was not Kanak TV's motivation to produce "Schland ist das Land." Rather, it had honed to investigate and make suspect the performativity of soccer patriotism and to investigate the association of "Deutschland" and "Schland" to see if the two were at odds with each other. That said, Kanak TV's depiction of the fandom in 2006 clearly did not engage in the kind of cultural critique that unmasks the "Multikulti" façade. Instead, it surveyed the "migrant" sentiment in an inversion of tactics that produced more ambivalence than conflict and, therefore, presumably engaged an assumed majority German viewers differently. Having once delighted in the masochism of revealing cultural bigotry, that viewer now watches and listens to the "other" attest to the success or failure of cultural integration.

In using Kanak Attak as a comparative cultural object, I would like to note Tiger's affiliation with the now defunct Berlin radio program *Radio Multikulti* aired on *Runkfunk Berlin-Brandenburg*. This placed Tiger politically in line with state-sponsored multiculturalist media production and, therefore, on the wrong side of cultural politics according to Kanak Attak. Tiger's avoidance of political polemics and his multicultural approach to comedy, which emphasized the lighter side of Turkish/German engagement rather than calling to attention the struggles of competing ethnic demographics, aligned his work with the multicultural industry that was the object of Kanak Attak's critique.

## 2.6 THE SOCCER NARRATIVE

This play with the inside and outside, as well as the wink and the standards or common forms of patriotism, suggest that both Tiger and Kanak Attak's representations of soccer are at once expressions of and departures from the classic *soccer narrative*. Soccer is a simple game. The emotional displays it inspires in national team fans are accordingly simple in their performance: intense jubilation and intense despair. This emotional binary accords with the competitive binary of soccer as a sport: winners or losers, success or failure. The artistic artifacts of this chapter accord with the modality of soccer dualism, and this dualism influences the presentation of the socio-cultural circumstances that artifacts seek to explore through soccer and soccer fandom. The presentation of soccer and a social realm in an artistic artifact in dualistic, conceptually simplistic terms is the most common for combining soccer with the social. This is the soccer narrative.

The soccer narrative refers to a broad narrative strategy employed in many, if not most artistic artifacts that make soccer their theme in a social context broader than mere athletics. The key to any soccer narrative is the match, defined by two sides and in the distinction of sides a typical ethical moral distinction: good versus bad, underdog versus favored, newcomers versus champions. The more elaborate soccer narrative typically draws on this distinction and translates its dualism into a visualization of the socio-cultural imagination. The FIFA-sponsored feature length film *Goal!* (2005) is one example: a working class Latino American earns a place on the starting team of Newcastle United in the English Premier League. This rags-to-riches story thrives on a dualist hierarchy: from obscurity to fame, poverty to wealth, loser to winner, prodigal son to beloved child, and a divided to united community. *Goal!* does not greatly differ conceptually or narratively from many sport films. The soccer narrative would describe most popular sport films, from boxing to baseball, or any sport film in which a hero triumphs over

adversity, and such films are legion. A narratological analysis of soccer stories reveals a typical sport film narrative. But we can also distinguish a narrative strategy in which the depiction of a social or class milieu is interwoven into the story of the soccer match. A social realm thus depicted might not find a happy ending as the typical sport film narrative does, but that social realm nevertheless functions dualistically and in relative conceptual simplicity. This produces social realms of extremes.

We can find one such social realm in Sönke Wortmann's *Das Wunder von Bern*. As the West German team is playing the final match of the World Cup in 1954, a montage of scenes depicts Germans from various locations and of various occupations in front of televisions or radios. They are all united in their support of the national team: war veterans in pubs, West German shoppers, Catholic monks in a monastery, even East German communists. All have abandoned their differing political convictions to support the team. The complexities of society are swept away. The World Cup unites German societies (both West and East) like magic. Like the team on the field, this society acts collectively towards a common goal. Social relationships between peoples, socio-economic classes, generations, and political convictions are reduced in the soccer narrative to a limited sphere of predictable, game-like circumstances.

Soccer narratives can also become more complex if the players and the game fade into the background of more significant representations. Importantly, though, any artistic artifact that does not rely on dualism and conceptual simplicity to represent soccer and a social realm not only diverges from the typical soccer narrative, but also actively works against the gravitational pull to imagine the world in the terms of a dualistic competitive hierarchy. One rare example for this is Hellmuth Costard's documentary film *Fußball wie noch nie* (1970), which records the movements of a single English soccer player for the entire duration of a game without any

narrative. This art film actively resists the soccer narrative of dualism and competition. Not only is the function of soccer as a competitive team sport neutralized by focusing on a single player; any social realm functioning mimetically is also forbidden. Another example of this kind of documentary is *Frei: Gespielt – Mehmet Scholl: Über das Spiel hinaus* (2007), a career retrospective of the German soccer player Mehmet Scholl. This film focuses on the biography of a single celebrity athlete without developing a rags-to-riches narrative or presenting any social realm outside the stadium and beyond the lives of sequestered sport celebrities. With such films also in mind, I will use the term soccer narrative to refer to works that examine the depiction of the social world in which soccer is embedded.

Soccer narrative plays a significant role in the work of both Tiger and Kanak TV. Tiger's straightforward ethno-comedy spends much time in the modality of dualism. Tiger not only devotes much time to cheering and belittling the winning and losing teams on the field. He also employs Turkish and German cultural stereotypes in a humor that is largely dependent on fixed and reductive cultural binaries. The use of stereotype suggests that Tiger imagines the world in conceptually simple, dualistic ways. Tiger's World Cup and European Championship videos have been his most successful efforts with respect to viewership. This is arguably due to the narrative frame of soccer, which lends his use of stereotype and cultural binaries a sense of humorous tension in the form of international competition. The humor of the Tiger character is most poignant when presented in opposition to equally hyperbolic German cultural stereotypes. The stereotype "Tiger" is most legible among other stereotypes set in a dualist signification system of intensity (highs and lows, winning and losing, joy and despair etc.). His social world and the cultural interactions between Turks and Germans in society mimic the regulated space of the soccer game on the field.

While Kanak TV focuses more on the socio-political and less on entertainment, the soccer narrative also influences its video. Kanak TV's filmic attempt at consciousness-raising seeks no alternatives outside of a socio-political binary. The opposing pairs "Deutschland vs. Schland" and "Pass vs. Fahne" intentionally reduce the complexity of cultural integration to two simple programs of migration politics: integration through the German state or the German heart. While Kanak TV's method of filmic engagement with an unaware public had already been developed before "Schland ist das Land," Kanak TV's tendency to read cultural activities in the public sphere as manifestations of hierarchical conflict (the disingenuous oppressors and the oppressed) and to present social problems in the starkness of either/or configurations certainly inspired it to seek out and critically engage with the soccer fans of 2006.

The soccer narrative, then, inflects most artistic artifacts in which soccer is made to describe a social realm. The examples from the introduction – silent films like *Die Elf Teufel* or the films of Sönke Wortmann – employ soccer narratives programmatically by including soccer heroes, villains, and a closely mimetic social realm. While the soccer narrative also influenced the work of Tiger and Kanak TV, what makes them exceptional is not the use of soccer narrative, but the subtle *failure* of soccer narrative to absolutely contain the represented social realm.

Tiger constructs a cultural world of dualistic signification. Soccer patriotism allows him to take off one fandom costume and to put on another, as well as to embody both sides of the Turkish/German fandom binary. As a soccer patriot, Tiger does not leave the world of symbolic national dualism. His national fandom switching only has meaning within a dualism of symbols. And yet the ease with which he performs soccer patriotism complicates the soccer narrative, for Tiger's bi-cultural fandom switching also destabilizes the binary by virtue of frequency and performance. Tiger's movement from one fandom performance to the other reveals cracks in the

soccer narrative that run through the tumultuous social activity within the public sphere during international soccer tournaments. While the existence of a Turkish/German fandom binary is reaffirmed, as the agent in this binary, Tiger also reveals it to be arbitrary in its performance and in its embodiment. The signifiers “Turkish” or “German fan” remain intact, yet the performers of national fandom have the freedom to use these signifiers as they please. The performance of soccer patriotism does not then require a specific performer with a specific national or ethnic history, but just any performer at all. Tiger’s half Turkish, half German soccer jersey and his camp switching, which depends on the game at hand, both embraces and undermines the soccer narrative.

Kanak TV’s consciousness-raising imposes cultural binaries onto unsuspecting non-native soccer fans in Germany. Its strategy is to coerce fans on the street into reaffirming the soccer narrative by translating it into socio-cultural politics and by reducing the circumstances and agents of integration and fandom to two camps: Germans and the other, or winners and losers. In Kanak TV’s earlier videos, white German citizens are easily tricked into embodying reifications of oppressive migration politics. For example, the Germans’ shock and confusion when presented with the phrase “weißes Ghetto” confirms an uncritical relationship with charged political terms. They quickly fall into the trap of having to explain that a ghetto, as they understand it, cannot consist of white civilians. The soccer fans in “Schland ist das Land” do not so easily fall into such rhetorical traps. They do not allow themselves to embody one side of the cultural binary, and they do not manifestly reveal a sense of false racial, ethnic, or national consciousness. These soccer fans do not fulfill the role of the oppressed, and they do not manifestly confirm that national soccer fandom is a form of distraction from the more pressing concerns of migration politics.

Kanak TV's restrictive reading of soccer fandom in the public sphere as just another battleground in the German integration debates and as populated by two knowable sets of opponents finds almost no resonance with the fun-loving fans. When the fans fail to affirm Kanak TV's critical understanding of soccer fandom by either ignoring their dualistic questions or sidestepping statements for or against German fandom, they reveal that conceiving of the fan festival in strictly dualist and hierarchical terms does not fully account for fluctuating affiliations of national and emotional content; nor does it account for the sense of community and social openness that the tournaments temporarily engender. The fans deny the power of national fandom to say anything simple and one-dimensional about cultural politics: either that German national fandom is proof of cultural assimilation and an abandonment of one's heritage or that the rejection of German national fandom is proof of failed integration. The soccer patriotism of 2006 escapes Kanak TV's rhetorical and theoretical grasp. The ambiguity of "Schland ist das Land" is the result of the soccer narrative struggling and ultimately failing to restrict the national fandom festival down to a social dualism.

## **2.7 THE MULTICULTURAL STATEMENT**

The relative flatness of signification and conceptual simplicity of Tiger's world is indicative of pop cultural production. Entertainment value has priority. While Tiger gives his viewers more to think about than just soccer, the comedy format disarms the otherwise sensitive topic of cross-cultural interaction. Tiger's comedy represents the socio-cultural intricacies of Germany's contemporary demographical shift in a simplified, easily resolvable construct that offers a picture of "Turks" and a picture of "Germans" and then resolves the tension between them with soccer

patriotism. This is a simple and limited solution to a greatly truncated social “problem.” The anchor of soccer does not let Tiger’s work stray from the everyman’s realm of sport into more sophisticated or provocative representations of Turkish/German interaction.

Tiger’s work thus allows for the examination of soccer patriotism, which subsists in a pop cultural modality of entertainment over reflexivity and conceptual simplicity over sophistication. As an artistic production of pop cultural, Tiger’s work occupies a privileged position to express something not only about multiculturalism in Germany in 2006 but also about an enduring cultural dynamic. Only by virtue of pop culture is Tiger able to say anything multicultural at all. Multiculturalism is an ethos, a program of social policy, and a practice of social interaction. But it is primarily a way of transmitting information: a method of representation in artistic productions. The intersection of pop cultural artistic production and multiculturalism accords with the theoretical and practical goals of multiculturalism. The primary aim of multiculturalism is to establish itself in popular culture and to occupy the mainstream so thoroughly that its ethos is not only consumed as entertainment but also embodied in real world social practice. Multiculturalism is and can only be pop culture. Multiculturalism does not effectively function outside of pop culture. If transmitted through avant-garde or any other conceptually challenging aesthetic, it fails to convey its message of broad-based cultural tolerance to as many sections of society as possible.

A simplified pop cultural aesthetic allows multiculturalism to do its work. This work entails the reduction of cultures and peoples to manageable bits of information and the subsequent positioning of those bits into an easily soluble and resolvable moral constellation that is exemplary. An easily readable moral constellation is crucial. Artistic artifacts that could be labeled “multicultural” require more than the inclusion of the objects of multiculturalism. While

a film or television show may include characters from various cultures, the mere inclusion of cultural and demographic diversity still does not constitute multicultural content. For example, Werner Herzog's *Fitzcarraldo* (1982) depicts an Irishman in Peru who enlists the help of local Amazonian tribes to raise money to build an opera house in the jungle. The narrative posits an absolute cultural and existential gap between Europeans and indigenous Peruvians. Offering fascinating images of an exotic other, the film is anthropological, but by no means multicultural. An artistic artifact of multiculturalism must not only include diversity. It must also contextualize diversity in a moral system that encourages the appreciation and tolerance of diversity. A multicultural artistic artifact launches diversity on a moral trajectory towards the telos of cultural harmony.

Thus far, the dualistic simplicity of Tiger's social world has been attributed to the soccer narrative. This narrative reduces and divides the world into two, a reflection of soccer's form as an athletic contest. The reduction of a social world makes Tiger's work an effective vehicle for multicultural representation. It is not only the specific content of national and cultural stereotypes that makes Tiger's work multicultural. His method of configuring multiculturalism into the visual, medial form conforms to a kind of artistic production: the *multicultural statement*.

A multicultural statement constructs a didactic space out of seemingly life-like, but ultimately fictive, cultural circumstances and carefully manufactured socio-political artistic dimensions in order to *instruct*. As such it has the pedagogical goal of teaching its viewers how to read its images with a specific moral and socio-political conclusion in mind. The entertainment value of an object can serve the multicultural statement, but ultimately, it must not distract from the lesson it seeks to teach. A simple example of the multicultural statement is the short-lived but critically acclaimed situation comedy for German television "Türkisch für

Anfänger” (2006-2008), in which an ethnically white, socially liberal German woman marries an integrated, German-speaking Turkish man. Their teenaged children from previous marriages provide most of the comedy as they struggle to coexist as a bi-cultural family. “Türkisch für Anfänger” instructs its viewers in no uncertain terms: here are Turks and Germans living together, and though their situational comedy makes us laugh at ourselves and the other, their togetherness is possible, desirable, and morally right, even if it is not a part of our actual reality.

The multicultural statement is written in the subjunctive and motored by an imperative: these situations *could exist* and *could apply* to you, the viewer, and most importantly, they *should apply* to you. Because it is subjunctive, its construction does not hide a certain level of fiction. In fact, its ultimate moral conclusion is based on this fiction: a “what if” clause, or more precisely, “given the social situation at hand, what if?” A multicultural statement is then also self-reflexive, insofar as it must examine its foundational elements. In the case above, it asks if Turks and Germans in contemporary society can function as a family and then posits those foundational elements into a matrix of conditioned morality in a desirable future. In order to instruct, the multicultural statement must also inform the viewer, hence the presentation of information about a social class, ethnicity, or cultural practice is crucial.

A multicultural statement intends to convincingly construct a “we” out of seemingly disparate “I’s”. That it must *convince* means that it must implant a desirable future into the viewer’s imagination. Further, *convincing* implies the negation of current notions of society that either do not yet include a multicultural space or still require its reaffirmation and strengthening. A multicultural statement must be based on differentiation and distinction in order to perform its pedagogical function: again, in the example above, the clear distinction between things Turkish and things German. To differentiate cultures is also to solidify, reify, and reduce those cultures to

manageable images or signifiers for the sake of employing a comparative method. In “Against Between,” Leslie Adelson accuses the German media of doing just this i.e. of fostering the illusion of cultural homogeneity and ontological stability in order to place individuals in only one of the two false-camps: German or Turkish. The multicultural statement must also employ this methodology of cultural positivism for the sake of pedagogy.

Of course, the goal of multiculturalism is not just to highlight difference. A multicultural statement must differentiate in order to propose a state of non-differentiation. From two distinct and separate things, one thing can be made. Even when the variables in the last simplified statement are the unwieldy variables of culture, the equation still applies: from two distinct and separate cultures, made distinct and separate by means of reification, cultural reductionism, and over simplification, one culture can be made or sublated. The over simplification and reification of large, unquantifiable concepts such as “culture” are necessary in the multicultural statement, for without a quick and easily recognizable signifier for its variables – that “Turkish culture” or “German culture” actually describe in any satisfactory way respectively whole and undifferentiated phenomena found in the world – the pedagogical aim of the statement cannot be achieved. For the sake of its moral goal, variables of reductionism allow the multicultural statement to conclude: Turkish culture + German culture = multicultural.

Tiger teaches the viewer how to read his own image: the image of the city-dwelling, working-class Turk. Through his anecdotes and routines he sketches the confines of a Turkish figure and an oppositional German figure. The tension between these two figures produces comedy, yet the viewer recognizes the resolution of tension when it takes place and accepts it as morally good: Turkish and German fans celebrating together and fans switching from one camp to the other. Tiger not only plays the role of cultural informant but also the role of pedagogue,

instructing with humor and drawing the line toward the pedagogical goal of harmonious cultural existence. His engagement with fans on the streets of Berlin posits situations that might not be accessible to all his viewers – namely fan revelry amongst fans of many cultures, religions, and ethnic heritages – but as a multicultural statement, the viewer understands that these situations could and should apply to everyone.

By way of contrast, Kanak TV's "Schland ist das Land" does not make a multicultural statement. The goal of cultural harmony and the narrative strategies to instruct towards that goal have been replaced by a suspicion of the diverse soccer fandom of 2006 as either disingenuous or performed under a false ethnic or cultural consciousness. Despite the use of dualistic rhetoric and a preconception of the 2006 fandom based on conflict theory, the multicultural goal in Kanak TV's video is missing. If Kanak TV has a goal in this video, it is not one of tolerance and cultural unity but of division and an awareness of latent conflict. The fact that Kanak TV's intentions in engaging with the soccer fans are not fully clear indicates that this video does not make a multicultural statement. The multicultural statement cannot sacrifice its pedagogy for subtlety, social theorizing, or ambiguity. Its aims must be clearly established in the narrative and the viewer must anticipate their fulfillment.

Even if a multicultural statement ends in tragedy and its goal of cultural harmony cannot be fulfilled, the subjunctive mood of the statement still applies: multiculturalism could and should have been achieved but was not, and that is bad. An example of such a narrative can be found in the television film *Ghettokids – Brüder ohne Heimat* (2002), the story of two young Greek brothers trying to survive through drug dealing and prostitution in Munich and the failed intervention of a social worker and a schoolteacher. The film ends with the death of one brother and the flight of the other back to Greece. The tragedy of the film is that a timely multicultural

solution could not be found to save the two brothers from the ghetto. Their tragic end reaffirms emphatically the need to bring multiculturalism to fruition by visualizing a nightmarish alternative to cultural unity.

## **2.8 THE POST-2006 LANDSCAPE**

A creative and elaborate narratological engagement with the simple soccer narrative makes multicultural statements, which rely on the conceptual simplicity. Such statements require simple objects to create pedagogy, and the soccer narrative can supply them by reducing the social realm to oppositional types and tropes. The intersection of the soccer narrative and the multicultural statement is the product of Germany in 2006. While Germany's migrant populations have existed since the guest worker programs of the 1960s and while Germany has always vigorously celebrated the World Cup tournament every four years, the year 2006 changed the landscape of patriotism, fandom, and multicultural discourse.

The perennial media event of international soccer and the ensuing culturally diverse fandom injects performative patriotism into the German public sphere in ways that no longer strictly adhere to the nationalistic phantoms of the past. Bullish notions of ethnic nationalism can no longer the diverse festival of soccer fandom. As host of the World Cup, Germany put forward a new self for the world to behold. The German press produced images of a fandom that Germany had hitherto never seen in such vibrant colors: a cultural and ethnically diverse soccer fandom united under the German "Schwarz-Rot-Gold." The goals of multiculturalism in Germany did not change to accommodate this new diverse fandom. Instead, fandom gave multiculturalism new characters with which to create narrative variations on a theme. The

example of Tiger “die Kralle von Kreuzberg” efficaciously displays the power of soccer fandom to encapsulate the multiculturalist spirit.

The curious sight of patriotism in the public sphere made Tiger’s contribution to multicultural production a valuable source of informant information for the German press. The reconciliatory drive of international soccer as media event has often petrified soccer patriotism into “authentic” national expression. The media’s persistent separation of fans into two national camps within a single nation strives to depict reconciliation as defined by multiculturalism: the imagined stability and isolation of peoples and cultures in order to posit a cultural dialogue. Tiger’s simple ethno-comedy seemed to fulfill the usual metaphors of Germany’s multicultural society: Turkish and German, major and minor, or indigenous and immigrant. The images of Tiger’s play with national symbolism disarmed the otherwise volatile expression of patriotism in Germany by framing it in a multicultural context and by revealing the emptiness of soccer patriotism as a purely performative praxis.

Kanak TV’s critical voice in 2006 forces a reevaluation of the appropriateness of multicultural discourse. Its theories reject multiculturalism as a disingenuous campaign of pacification, insincere political correctness, and forced cultural assimilation. Kanak TV’s engagement with the soccer fans on the streets does not produce the consciousness raising or admittances of cultural ignorance that they intended to produce yet their engagement raises the question whether contemporary Germany’s immigration state can be more adequately conceptualized in terms of cosmopolitanism, transnationalism, or hybridity, as contentious as these terms remain. While Kanak TV takes exception to soccer fandom, soccer patriotism, and multiculturalism as intrinsically positive phenomena in German society, its medial engagement

with fandom did not escape the narrative structure that soccer as a sport often inspires in the representation of an according social world.

The soccer narrative will reveal itself in most of the objects under examination in this dissertation. We will thus continue to find dualistic representations of social agents and circumstances that narratively and visually present sections of German society in limited, goal-oriented terms. The multicultural statement, however, is not the only means through which multiculturalism is given a medial, visual form. The multicultural statement is not only the most efficient didactic way of teaching the values of multiculturalism; it is also the most obvious and rudimentary means of instruction for an audience that still requires the lessons of multiculturalism. For a society that has newly incorporated the discourse and artistic representation of multiculturalism, the multicultural statement is a necessary means of conveying information and proliferating ideas in the hope of transforming them into lived experience. But in an educated multicultural society like the Berlin Republic, the need to learn the fundamentals of multiculturalism is not as pressing, and the multicultural statement risks redundancy.

Germany's multicultural discourse has existed long enough to be rigorously debated, embraced, rejected, debated and embraced again. Its presence in German society is no longer a novelty. Its continued presence in pop culture allows for a different method of multicultural artistic production, one that does not rely on heavy-handed narrative strategies. In the next chapter, soccer narrative and multiculturalism filmically combine to depict a social realm using *the post-multicultural statement*. In the documentary film *Football Undercover* (2008), soccer is set in relation not to German patriotic fandom but instead to the status of women athletes in German and Iranian cultures. This film endeavors to posit a German society that has fully grown into the multicultural ethos; a German society that has incorporated not only ethnic, but also

religious diversity under the banner of women's equality. Such a depiction of a progressive society celebrates multiculturalism in a post-modality. The German social world of *Football Undercover* subsists in a state of post-multiculturalism or multiculturalism achieved.

The examination of the post-multicultural statement will trace its medial confines and its representational ramifications in the depiction of cultures, values, and worldviews. The use of women's soccer in multicultural artistic production opens up the discussion to encompass Germany's postwar humanitarian values in relation to other cultures. The specificity of soccer patriotism and the symbolism of the nation become small in relation to the universalisms of gender, religion, and human rights that the film explores.

### **3.0 UTOPIA OF THE WOMEN'S GAME – THE CASE OF *FOOTBALL***

#### ***UNDERCOVER***

The Muslim woman has become the source of great anxiety in Western Europe. This anxiety is not only a post-9/11 phenomenon. This anxiety began when immigrants from Muslim majority countries arrived in Western Europe in the postwar period. In West Germany, the guest worker contracts with Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia of the early 1960s initially invited a primarily Muslim and largely male workforce. When these guest workers relocated their families to Germany in the 1970s, and when it became clear that these workers were no longer “guests” but instead permanent residents, the issue of gender politics in the Muslim world became a German concern.

The Muslim woman has become the litmus test through which an imagined Muslim population is assessed. Her status in Europe “proves” the successful or failed integration of an entire community. Her status within her own ethnic, national, or religious community is made to reveal the value system of that community. If a Muslim community is imagined to be anti-democratic, patriarchal, misogynist, or radical, it will be embodied in the wives and daughters. She discursively stands for “the epitome of oppression” and the urgent need for emancipation (Weber 20). Her existence in Europe entails intervention both from the right and the left side of the political spectrum.

The first decade of the twenty-first century brought the legislative intervention of the state. Face covering clothing like the burqa or niqab have been banned in Belgium, France, the

Netherlands, and certain regions of Spain and Switzerland. The headscarf is banned in the French state school system under the law on “secularity and conspicuous religions symbols in schools” of 2004, a law that was supported by many French leftist feminists (Winter 280-2). The 2003 law resulting from the Fereshta Ludin case in Baden-Württemberg bans German teachers as state employees from wearing headscarves (Joppke 318-28). Legislative intervention has even appeared in the governance of soccer. In 2007, FIFA, with its headquarters in Switzerland, enacted a ban on the wearing of hijab in all FIFA-organized women’s soccer games. The ruling affected several countries with Muslim majorities, but the most affected was Iran and its women’s national team, who were forced to forfeit women’s Olympic qualification games. After the global soccer player’s union FIFPro and the United Nations pressured FIFA to overturn the decision, the hijab ban was lifted in 2010 (Associated Press).

At the heart of the Muslim gender politics debate is the concept of “laïcité,” the French term for the separation between state and religion (Joppke 318). The form and implementation of laicity reveals a state’s interpretation of neutrality. The French laicist state enforces neutrality by relegating religion to the private sphere for the “protection” of the public and of the republic (318-27). In order to preserve social and religious unity and foster integration, French laicity allows for religious practice privately by strictly excluding it from the public sphere. In contrast to this prohibitive interpretation of laicity that conceptually stems from the French revolution and its struggle against the Catholic Church, the German interpretation of neutrality in regards to religion has been evolutionary, a secularized product of a certain religious (Christian) tradition (327). German neutrality has tended to reflect a national self-definition centered upon “Christian-Occidental” values (328). By manifestly recognizing cultural and religious roots in Christian traditions, the German state initially hesitated to ban Islamic dress since this also meant

endangering the display of Christian symbols in public (ibid.). By ultimately establishing a secularized “privilegium Christianum” through “considerable legal acrobatics,” anti-veiling laws in Germany exempt Christian and Jewish symbols not as articulations of religious practice but instead as signs of a German historical tradition (334-5). Religious “neutrality” becomes a Muslim responsibility while religious partisanship is retained for the “Christian-Occidental” German. In both French and German circumstances, it is the Muslim woman who seemingly requires regulation.

The “Deutsche Islam Konferenz” of 2006, organized by the German state, marks an instance of intervention not in the form of top-down policy and legislation but in the form of “cultural dialogue” (Amir-Moazami 12). Here was an attempt to transform the various Muslim communities in Germany from within through communal dialogue rather than transforming them externally through controversial, often high profile, and divisive legal measures. At this conference, to which prominent secular Muslim feminists were invited, former Minister of Interior Wolfgang Schäuble discussed the need to transform “Muslims in Germany into German Muslims” (ibid.). This statement captures the spirit of an anxious search for a secularized Islam that inconspicuously occupies a place in Germany’s multicultural society without fulfilling any of the post-911 fears of Islamic radicalism.

I am interested in investigating the cultural turn marked by the Islam Conference more generally in Germany and throughout Europe. “Cultural” intervention takes up the problem of Muslim women in the West and treats it in the realm of cultural activity in which sports and soccer in particular play an important role. An example is the “Kick It!” project of 2008 organized in Leipzig: an international soccer camp focusing on women players from Muslim-majority countries, it intends to create an “exchange across religious and cultural borders” and to

support the development of women's sport in the Islamic world ("Kick it!"). Another example of cultural intervention in film is Iranian film director Jafar Panahi's *Offside* (2006). This film, which premiered in the same year as the Islam Conference, won critical acclaim in the European film festival circuit, particularly at the Berlin International Film Festival. This feature length film depicts young Iranian women who, in defiance of Iranian law, try to enter a stadium dressed in drag in order to watch a men's FIFA World Cup qualifying match between Iran and Bahrain.<sup>14</sup>

The documentary film *Football Undercover* (2008) is also an example of cultural intervention, yet in contrast to the two examples above, which place the problematic socio-political circumstances of the Muslim woman outside of German culture, this film locates the Muslim woman not only beyond and within Germany's borders but also *as* German. Through a very selective representation, the film succeeds in offering a representation of Minister Schäuble's "German Muslim." *Football Undercover's* contribution to the Muslim gender politics debate does not assume the failed integration of Muslim communities in Germany. Quite to the contrary, this documentary depicts a multicultural, multi-religious, and multi-ethnic social harmony in Germany; a utopia so seamless and harmonious that many German viewers might not recognize it. This documentary also employs a comparative method of examining gender politics. The comparison stems from a narrative anchored in cultural and conceptual binaries: Germany and Iran, German women's soccer and Iranian women's soccer, German Muslim women and Iranian Muslim women, and liberation versus oppression. These comparisons achieve a complexity in that they do more than rehearse the familiar dichotomy of the liberated, democratic West and its mission to enlighten the oppressed, anti-democratic Middle East. These

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<sup>14</sup> The film was banned in Iran, earning Panahi a six-year prison sentence for creating "propaganda against the Islamic Republic" (Green Voice of Freedom).

comparisons bespeak a German social identity founded not only in Western notions of humanitarianism and cosmopolitan empathy, but also in religious inclusivity.

*Football Undercover's* religious inclusivity, however, is filmically crafted by a notably laicist method. Religious, visual alterity – reified in the headscarf as the most immediately recognizable symbol of Islamic affiliation – is depicted as a primarily Iranian and not German Muslim practice. The German Muslim women of the film are representations of a secularized Islam whose status grows in cultural value in comparison to the representations of the oppressed, hijab-wearing women of Iran. The documentary's depiction of the German Muslim woman is embedded in an assumed successful and complete integration of Germany's Muslim communities. This integration is depicted in the *post-multicultural statement*. Like the multicultural statement, the post-multicultural statement aims to depict a social utopia, but instead of striving to achieve this utopia through narrative pedagogy, the post-multicultural statement depicts, or medially creates, a utopia already achieved. *Football Undercover* thus uses the figure of the Muslim woman to look beyond German integration, making a positive contribution to the discourse of Islam in the West relative to the fearful and xenophobic voices that comprise the bulk of this growing discourse.

### **3.1 TWO HISTORIES OF WOMEN'S SOCCER MEET**

*Football Undercover* (2008) was directed by David Assmann (German) and Ayat Najafi (Iranian). The film follows Marlene Assmann and her amateur women's club team from the Berlin neighborhood of Kreuzberg as they organize a friendly match against the Iranian women's national team. At the time of filming, the Iranian women's national team of the post-Islamic

Revolution era had never played a competitive match against teams outside of Iran. The documentary constructs a narrative out of two cities, Berlin and Tehran, out of two women's soccer teams, Al-Dersimspor and the Iranian women's national team, and out of the personal biographies of several players from both teams. The biographies of Susu from Al-Dersimspor in Berlin and of Narmila and Niloofar from the Iranian women's national team are the narrative focus of the film. In voice-overs, Marlene describes the successes and frustrations of organizing the game through Iran's soccer authorities. After almost a year of organization, the Al-Dersimspor team is granted permission to enter Iran. The two teams meet on the field before an exclusively female crowd, carefully supervised by Iranian "moral guardians," female security guards and representatives of the Islamic state. All players wear the mandatory hijab. The game ends in a 2-2 draw.

The language of this documentary switches among German, English, and Persian. The typical German filmic practice of synchronizing non-German languages (in lieu of subtitles) is not employed. Additionally, the film DVD offers nine language subtitle options from which to choose. This is congruent not only with the film's international message of gender equality and women's solidarity, but also with its circulation in international film festivals. *Football Undercover* was entered in film festivals across the globe, from high profile film festivals in Germany, France, and the US to smaller festivals, around 36 festival screenings in West and East Europe, North and South America (Chile, Bolivia, Argentina), South East Asia (Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Taiwan), Australia, and the United Arab Emirates. It received "Best Documentary" and the "Teddy Audience Award" at the Berlin International Film Festival, and the "2009 Prix Europa Iris."

The main attributes of soccer narrative immediately reveal themselves in this documentary. The narrative is constructed out of binaries and these binaries are reduced in complexity in order to establish social realms in dualistic conceptual terms. There is the geographical binary of Berlin and Tehran. There is the religious binary of Islam in Iran and Islam in Germany. There is the binary of gender rights in society (Germany as emancipated, Iran as oppressive). And there is the binary of soccer cultures and the divergent developments of women's sport. The filming of this documentary in 2005 in Tehran coincides with important developmental moments in Iranian women's soccer: the reformation of the women's national team in 2005 and the presidency of conservative populist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Several of Marlene Assmann's voice-overs refer directly to Ahmadinejad and the fear that Iran will go to war with the United States, effectively derailing their ambitions to play soccer in Tehran. Ahmadinejad's presidency had already exacerbated international relations in 2005 and domestically renewed social restrictions in Iran's gender segregation policy.

The presidency of Ahmadinejad forced renewed constraints on the women's national team that is depicted in the film, but resistance to women's sport has its seeds in the Islamic Revolution. The existence of women's soccer in Iran as a "Western" phenomenon was an unresolved cultural issue beginning in modernity. British expatriates introduced soccer to Iran in the early 1900s. Reza Shah Pahlavi's sponsorship of soccer through the rapidly expanding military and the public education system turned it into a popular pastime for young people, despite traditionalist resistance to a Western import (Chehabi 383). The Iranian National Football Federation was established in 1947 and soon thereafter joined FIFA.

The Western policies of the Shah influenced the establishment of women's sports in the late 1970s, featuring an Iranian women's national team that played without hijab. *Football*

*Undercover* features one of the former players from the first national team. The viewer learns through the biographical scenes about Iranian national team player Narmila that her mother participated in this team beginning in 1968. Narmila's mother gives a brief history of the Iranian national team in a voice-over while she and Narmila practice soccer in an abandoned lot somewhere in urban Tehran:

We started training in about 1968. At that time, not every country had a women's soccer team. In Germany, for example, there wasn't any women's soccer. Italy established a team a few months before. Iran invited them to a match at the Amjadieh Stadium. We lost 2-0. But it was our first international game. (...) Then the revolution started. The people demonstrated. The clubs were gradually closed. That was a long time ago, and now I'm old. I hope Narmila has more success than I did.

This summary of the Islamic Revolution's effect on women's soccer is truncated but nevertheless accurate. Before the Islamic Revolution, soccer had begun to open doors for the women of the national team, incorporating them slowly into the global community of women's soccer. However, as opposition to the Shah grew, the socially liberal nature of women's sport became the Iranian national team's downfall, for they played without hijab.

The wearing of hijab took on renewed political symbolism in the Islamic Revolution. Iranian sociologist Ali Shariati promoted the concept of the "authentic Muslim women" in Iran. The authentic Muslim woman defied Western cultural imperialism and the westernization of the Shah by rejecting Western fashions and the "Western way of life" (Zahedi 86). By embracing hijab, not only did the authentic Muslim woman defy the Shah but also challenged the Western perception of the female body as a sex object by desexualizing her body through headscarves and loose-fitting clothing (ibid.). The uncovered players of the women's national team became symbols of Western imperialism. Opponents of the Shah alleged that his regime promoted soccer as a means of populist pacification and the proliferation of Western ideals (Chehabi 388).

After the successful overthrow of the Iranian monarchy in 1979, sports considered elite were temporarily eliminated e.g. horse racing, fencing, and bowling. Chess, boxing, and kung fu were forbidden. Only the mass popularity of soccer and the power of populism prevented the state from deinstitutionalizing men's soccer all together (391). Women's athletics, including soccer, were promptly dismantled. With the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War in 1980, most professional and amateur sports were suspended for the duration of the eight-year conflict. Men's soccer expanded in the late 1980s through the support of Iranian television since soccer matches were cost effective and relatively innocuous in regard to the regime's overall agenda. The broadcasting of sport did not go without conservative protest, however. In 1987, the Imam Khomeini settled the matter by issuing a fatwa authorizing the broadcast not only of films "featuring only partially covered women, but also sport events, provided viewers watched without lust" (394). This referred to male athletes and their partial nudity (exposed knees, shins, and forearms), and "partially covered women" meant any woman not in complete compliance with the sharia dress code.

The Islamic state has often exhibited alongside radical social conservatism seemingly progressive policies of gender inclusion, making it difficult to contextualize Iranian women's sport culture. In a progressive role, the Islamic Republic has made education a priority. In the late 1970s, only half of Iran's youth between the ages six and twenty-four were literate; two decades later, the number had grown to ninety-three percent, even though the population had doubled (Wright 134). Iranian women have successively taken a greater role in state governance since the revolution. More than forty percent of the university student population in Iran is female, as is one-third of the faculty (140). At the same time, Islamic revolutionary law reaffirmed aspects of sharia law; the dress code for women became stricter. A woman may have

an equal vote in parliament, but her testimony in an Iranian court only carries half the weight of a man's (143). Women can hold high positions in the business and academic world, but they cannot leave the country without their husbands' written permission (ibid.).

This sociopolitical push and pull between tradition and modernization has at once hindered and fueled the development of women's soccer and sport in general. In 1981, women were officially excluded from attending soccer matches or any athletic competitions with men in attendance.<sup>15</sup> In the early 1990s, a revival of women's sports began through the initiative of Faezeh Hashemi Rafsanjani, the daughter of then Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) (Chehabi 395). Rafsanjani's revival of women's sports was successful because she did not embark on a full program of women's emancipation and therefore did not directly defy the Islamic Republic's overall policy of gender segregation. She reintroduced women's sport in accordance with the state's agenda and has therefore "worked hard to find ways of legalizing women's sports by making them compatible with the Islamic laws" (Steel and Richter-Devroe 316).

Soccer has become the national Iranian sport, yet individual sports like mountaineering or karate are more popular than soccer amongst female athletes (316). The constraints of Iran's Islamic dress code make women's team sport logistically complex due to a lack of full-sized facilities that can be visually screened from passers-by (317). This logistical problem is made apparent in a scene from the documentary in which the German and Iranian teams are playing their long-awaited game. The Al-Dersimspor club president Hüseyin Karaduman, a middle-aged Alevi Turk, has accompanied the team to Tehran. He and all other males are barred from entering the gender-segregated match. In a medium shot, Karaduman stands with his back to the camera, trying to peak through the cracks of the stadium gate in order to watch his team. The

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<sup>15</sup> The ban was briefly lifted in 1994 only to be rescinded within a week.

next shot is from Karaduman's perspective: the soccer field and a few players are visible in a thin vertical strip framed by the black shadows of the gate. The spectators are aligned with Karaduman's gaze, which borders on the voyeuristic. Technically, even though it is the male eye here that invades the gendered space of the stadium, there has been no juridical regulation of the male gaze in Islamic law. Since no laws force men to guard their gaze, women are responsible for creating an appearance that does not invite gazing and temptation (Barlow and Akbarzadeh 91).

Since it is the woman's responsibility to conceal her power of sexual temptation and moral corruption, the participation in sport in the public sphere is particularly problematic. Indoor soccer, or futsal, is a logistically feasible and less controversial alternative. Behind closed doors, women can play against other women in shorts and t-shirts and men can be easily barred from the audience, with only players' (female) family members and the necessary referee staff in attendance. The very institutional existence of the Iranian women's national team in 2005 is a success in light of post-revolutionary history, for the infrastructure to adequately support international competition in accordance with Islamic law did not exist. The Iranian team documented in *Football Undercover* is truly ahead of its time.

In the world of German women's soccer, *Football Undercover* coincides with the rise of the German women's national team through high-profile tournaments and subsequently the sport's increasingly popularity through athletic success. It is important not to assume that the history of women's soccer in Germany is itself without controversy or prejudice. The proliferation of women's soccer in Germany has had to make large strides in a relatively short amount of time. The history of women's soccer in Germany begins in the Bonn Republic. The DFB banned the organization of women's soccer under its authority, declaring in 1955 that the

“weibliche Anmut, Körper und Seele erleiden unweigerlich Schaden und das Zurschaustellen des Körpers verletzt Schicklichkeit und Anstand” (Hoffmann und Nendza, “Damenfußball“). This statement echoes former attitudes about women’s sport in the “Turn- und Gymnastikbewegung” of the Weimar and National Socialist eras in which the emphasis in women’s athletics was ornamentation and “feminine” elegance.<sup>16</sup> Despite the ban, the euphoria of the 1954 FIFA World cup victory inspired the creation of “Damenfußballvereine” in the late 1950s (Hoffmann and Nendza, “Damenfußball”). The women’s game grew in size despite the DFB’s active resistance (Hennies and Meuren 67). This growth was arguably more attributable to economic gains than any sentiments of women’s emancipation. German spectators seemed fascinated by the excitement and taboo of the women’s game and the economic incentives of women’s soccer quickly revealed themselves (Galczynski 84).

By the end of the 1960s, more than 60,000 girls and women were actively playing in DFB member clubs illegally (Hoffmann and Nendza, “Die inoffizielle Weltmeisterschaft”). When athletes began organizing to form their own soccer association outside the administrative confines of the DFB, the DFB finally reacted (Hennies and Meuren 125). In order to avoid the creation of a competitor association, the loss of economic revenue, and the sharing of sport administrative power, women’s soccer was officially sanctioned by the DFB in 1970 (Hoffmann and Nendza, “Der Deutsche Fußball-Bund”). Women’s soccer in East Germany had different adversities. It was never officially forbidden. Since women’s soccer was not an Olympic discipline during the short life of the communist republic, and since FIFA had not yet organized international women’s tournaments before 1990, it could not be used as an instrument of state propaganda on the international stage (Galczynski 97). Women’s soccer was thus considered

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<sup>16</sup> One need look no further than Leni Riefenstahl’s Olympic high-divers in *Olympia* for visual representations of this mentality.

purely recreational. In 1990, the GDR's women's national team came into official existence for a single game before the East German soccer system was absorbed into the DFB (Wörner and Holsten).

1982 saw the first officially sanctioned game of the (West) German women's national team. The women's national team has since won two FIFA Women's World Cups and eight of the ten UEFA European Championships, claiming the last six titles from 1995 to 2013. Despite the athletic success and popularity of the women's national team, attracting spectators for women's club soccer (instituted in 1990) has not been an easy task. Scenes in the documentary exemplify this. When Al-Dersimspor plays a game on its home field in Kreuzberg, there are only a few standing spectators along the sidelines.

The general sentiment in German society seems to be pro-women's soccer. It has become such a permanent fixture in the landscape of sport that most Germans would not even feel that such a sentiment is particularly progressive. But this sentiment of gender equality has not filled Frauen-Bundesliga stadiums. It is one thing to support women's soccer philosophically and quite another to attend games and support a soccer club with time and money. Occupying an amateur level in the German soccer system of promotion and relegation, Al-Dersimspor is typical in its anonymity. Their play is financially supported by a large infrastructure that is in no way endangered by cultural pressures or financial reallocation. Yet the public interest in women's club soccer at any level is utterly lacking with such interest solely reserved for the German women's national team. Al-Dersimspor thus represents the general status of German women's soccer effectively. It embodies the banality of women's athletics. Its existence is culturally and socio-politically unproblematic.

### 3.2 NARMILA, NILOOFAR, AND SUSU AS THE MUSLIM WOMAN

*Football Undercover* uses a comparative method to put two cultures of women's soccer under the microscope. Of course, the culturally and institutionally established system of German women's soccer makes Iranian women's soccer seem developmentally arrested, culturally inhibited, and backward regarding women's equality. While the film could have easily championed Germany's progressive development of women's athletics, the visual and narrative establishment of a hierarchy of national women's soccer cultures is ultimately not the message of this documentary. The comparisons the film makes concern women's sport and women's equality, but ultimately these comparisons emphasize variations of the Muslim woman and the cultures in which these Muslim women live.

More important than depicting the pitiable circumstances of Iranian Muslim women, the film produces subtle, understated, yet timely representations of the German Muslim woman just as the discursive Muslim woman in Europe had become a highly contested figure and just as the once clear ideological borders between conservative and leftist politics had collapsed in the face of the supposedly common enemy of Islam. *Football Undercover* does not join the European debate on gender politics by singling out religious radicalism or even the Islamic tradition as the source of women's oppression. *Football Undercover* champions a form of German Islam that grants its women all the freedoms that the Iranian Muslim women lack. Here is a depiction of Islamic practice that defies the hyperbolic fears of pan-Islamism or "Islamofascism" (Schulze 292). German Islam is presented through the comparison of stories and biographies from the documentary's three most important Muslim women: Narmila and Niloofar from the Iranian national team and Susu from Al-Dersimspor.

Narmila is one of the leaders of the Iranian women's national team. In a scene filmed in her family home, her mother – the very image of a conservative Iranian woman with only her face uncovered by pious black clothing – urges Narmila to put on her headscarf in order to preserve her dignity in front of the filming cameras. Narmila obediently complies. The viewer learns that Narmila's mother was a soccer player for the very first Iranian women's national team. The Islamic Revolution brought an abrupt end to the team, and her marriage brought an end to her athletic career. In an interview Narmila explains:

Before the wedding, my father said she could play soccer. But afterwards he didn't let her play anymore. They were newlyweds. He wanted to spend time with her. That was the reason.

Narmila speaks these words framed in a close-up, looking pensive and apprehensive. The reservations expressed in her face undermine the legitimacy of her father's justification to forbid her mother from playing soccer, yet Narmila does not voice any objection. In these scenes, Narmila behaves as an obedient, begrudgingly tolerant young Muslim woman and daughter. She follows in her mother's footsteps by participating in the culturally sensitive activity of soccer, but she does so strictly within the guidelines stipulated by her family and the Islamic state.

A scene in which Narmila trains best exemplifies her role as a Muslim woman and her approach to women's equality in Iran. A medium-long shot frames her as she trains in a deserted public plaza, running and jumping rope around a dilapidated concrete fountain with no water. She explains in a voice-over that the Iranian women soccer players desperately need playing time in order to progress. She states that maybe there will be leagues for women in thirty or forty years. The latter statement she says with a sense of hope and genuine optimism. Yet the environment in which she trains undermines this hope: going in circles (meaning no where) alone around a crumbling fountain long since abandoned. Still, the fountain remains in the public

sphere. Although it is an eyesore, it is logistically and financially easier to let it exist and ignore it. In a similar manner, the Iranian women's national team exists in the Iranian cultural landscape and is tolerated, but largely ignored. Narmila's hope that women's leagues will be formed in the next thirty to forty years is a pitiable, yet realist, statement. Despite her athletic skill and the possibility of her athletic success in other cultural and infrastructural circumstances, Narmila plays the game without self-gratification and without complaint, hoping to build up women's soccer for future generations. She not only appears committed to something that is before its time in Iranian culture, she also is selfless in her dedication to community building. Narmila wants to build and expand the community of Iranian women soccer players by continuing the Sisyphus-work within the system.

Niloofer takes a bolder and riskier approach to creating women's equality in Iran. Like Narmila, she is introduced into the documentary through a scene filmed in her family home. She sits in front of the television in her living room playing a soccer video game, dressed in a t-shirt and pants without a headscarf. When her mother enters the room and asks her to stop playing, she resists and initially evades the command, although she eventually relents. The seemingly mundane scene describes her tactics in negotiating women's existence in a gender-segregated culture. They are tactics of passive resistance and individual risk just short of definitive rebellion. While she is a dedicated and disciplined soccer player, she risks her participation with the national team by dressing in drag (a baseball cap and a Nike training suit) in order to practice soccer in public parks and fields. She explains this in an interview in broken English:

People think I am a boy, but when they look closer, they see I am girl. My mom always said to me: 'Don't do this! It's against the law.' But I do everything I want.

Just before the game between Al-Dersimspor and the Iranian national team, in a voice-over, the viewer learns that Niloofer has been removed from the team for unspecified reasons. The viewer

can only speculate if the Iranian soccer authorities somehow learned of her clandestine civil disobedience. In any case, her defiance of the compulsory hijab seems to have caught up with her. In contrast to Narmila's obedience and hesitancy to voice any strong opinion against the status quo, Niloofar states in a voice-over as she walks the busy streets of Iran in hijab:

I once read a book about human rights. It said that according to one paragraph of the human rights charter, men and women have equal rights, regardless of race, background, and skin color. That means everyone is equal. But not here.

While Narmila speaks strictly of women's soccer and developing the game, Niloofar connects women's soccer to the larger ideals of human rights, gender equality, and personal liberty. Niloofar's disillusionment is grander and more idealistic than Narmila's realist pragmatism.

Niloofar pushes the boundaries of what is culturally and legally permissible in Iran. She rebels but is not quite a revolutionary, for she acts as an individual and thus exposes herself to individual risk. Her decision to risk imprisonment for the sake of playing soccer in public without the hijab is a personal one. It is an attempt to claim more personal liberty than she has ever had, more personal liberty than any woman has ever had in the Islamic Republic. She does not patiently await the utopia of women's soccer that Narmila envisions. The film presents her as creating a small, fleeting piece of the utopia now by wearing a baseball cap and a training suit. The risk and reward is hers alone. She will not wait for the community. Unlike Narmila, her approach stems from personal frustration and a demand for justice rather than the patience to slowly build community, never to reap the rewards of one's efforts in the present, which also means the repression of personal desires in the present. Niloofar's road to the women's soccer utopia is strategic disobedience.

Narmila and Niloofar's attitudes towards the status of female athletes and the status of women generally in Iran echo the tension between two camps of Iranian feminism that have

grown since the Islamic Revolution. Narmila's obedient and patient approach resembles the theories and practices of the religious-oriented Iranian feminists. These are feminists who identify not the principles of Islam itself as the source of gender oppression but instead the misguided male interpretation of Islam's holy texts and the implementation of this interpretation into law (Barlow and Akbarzadeh 25). Religious-oriented feminists accept the legitimacy of political Islam and work for reform from within while remaining loyal to the Islamic state (27). The women's sport reformer Faezeh Hashemi Rafsanjani is an example of a religious-oriented feminist working to enrich the possibilities of cultural activity for women while embedding this advocacy in the language of pious Islamic practice congruent with state-sponsored gender segregation. Rafsanjani's organization of the "Women's Islamic Games" between 1993 and 2005 is exemplary of religious-oriented feminism, for it created a space for the proliferation of women's sport, yet it shielded women's sport from conservative critique by embedding it exclusively in an Islamic, gender-segregated event (Steel and Richter-Devroe 316).

Niloofar's more aggressive and impatient approach resembles the tactics and theories of Iran's secular-oriented feminists. These are feminists who view the merging of Islam and politics as the central problem facing Iranian women (Barlow and Akbarzadeh 32). Rather than patiently waiting for reform from within, secular-oriented feminists wish to overhaul the political system and separate the state from Islam (39). Like Niloofar, secular feminists do not reject Islam in toto.<sup>17</sup> The secular-feminist camp grew during the presidency of Ahmadinejad. While Niloofar never explicitly espouses a secularist philosophy to justify her civil disobedience, her disobedience nevertheless quietly defies the moral legitimacy of laws implemented by the Islamic state and, by extension, the Iranian juridical interpretation of Islam.

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<sup>17</sup> Proof that Niloofar does not reject Islam entirely can be seen when she plays a soccer video game and calls upon "Saint Imam Hussein" to help her win.

While the religious-oriented feminists have had some success in changing policy, religious-oriented feminism in general has proven unable to achieve lasting change, creating disillusionment amongst younger populations (40). This is exemplified in the film's final scene. In a dusty soccer field somewhere in urban Tehran, Niloofar – covered according to law – practices soccer alone. The camera films her from behind a goal post in a medium-long shot. Eventually some male players invade the frame and gather in order to begin a game. Niloofar wordlessly picks up her ball and walks behind the goal post. The film's last shot shows Niloofar sitting on her own soccer ball with her back to the camera, relegated to the sidelines while the men continue to play. The final scene, then, does not posit much hope in the status quo of women's athletics. Even when dressed in hijab and practicing as a law-abiding Muslim woman, Niloofar must acquiesce to male priority in the use of public athletic spaces. Narmila's investment in the system might be farsighted and interested in lasting change for future generations, but the film ultimately posits Niloofar's individual struggle as the most tragic. Neither Narmila's loyalty nor Niloofar's subterfuge change the form of female identity that is legally forced upon women. State-mandated Islam regulates both of them equally and repressively.

Narmila and Niloofar differ in their approaches to surviving as women in the Islamic Republic, but the documentary ultimately depicts them as the same kind of Muslim woman: the oppressed Muslim woman of a theocratic state. Because this documentary depicts the struggles of Iranian women, Narmila and Niloofar represent the oppressive results of political Islam. No form of terrorism or Islamic pan-nationalism is incorporated into their depictions, however. Instead, Narmila and Niloofar represent Muslim women as they must exist in a fundamentalist interpretation of state-sponsored Islam. *Football Undercover* does not take its narrative into the

realm of theology or comparative religion, but frames the Iranian Muslim woman in the national and institutional circumstances of a police state. According to the documentary's presentation of Iranian Muslim women, this is not a problem of religion, its interpretation and its practice, but a problem of governance.

The individual biographies of Narmila and Niloofar give sympathetic faces to the suffering of the Muslim woman in political Islam. The scenes of the game between Al-Dersimspor and the Iranian national team turn the camera away from the players and onto the spectators, in this case an exclusively female spectatorship. As it is revealed in the women in the stands, the suffering and frustration of living in a gender-segregated society quickly bubbles to the surface, and the game becomes a space for the articulation of gender solidarity and political protest.

Although the Iranian soccer authorities banned all advertisements for the game, the dilapidated Arafat Stadium fills to its capacity of 10,000 spectators. There is a considerable police presence (female officers in black and green hijab) and there are "moral guardians" stationed at every corner of the stadium, female state security guards charged with regulating crowd behavior. Young and old spectators come with noisemakers and Iran paraphernalia (hats, jerseys, and flags). Before the game even begins, the crowd claps, chants, and sings soccer songs supporting both the Iranian and German teams. The mood is joyous and the moral guardians have very little to do. When both teams leave the field during halftime, however, light-hearted soccer fandom turns into political articulation. A series of long panning shots captures the crowd as they continue to sing and dance along with music playing over the stadium speakers. Various shots of the moral guardians from around the stadium show them massing, speaking into each other's ears, and showing signs of nervousness. Suddenly the music is interrupted by the voice of

a moral guardian, who admonishes the women for behaving “improperly” and beneath their dignity. Almost immediately, the content of the crowd chants changes from fandom to women’s rights. As shots zoom closer to the crowd, they chant: “We women have only half our rights!” and “It’s our basic right to come to the stadium!” Some women chant these slogans knowingly into the camera, while others duck or hide their faces as the camera records them. The last chant, of course, refers to law that has existed since the Islamic Revolution forbidding female spectators at most sporting events unless absolutely gender segregated. The fun-loving spectators, enjoying a single afternoon of sport, are demonized as morally indecent and, thus, they are politicized as well. The Islamic Guard unwittingly stokes the flames of women’s solidarity, giving them a platform from which to speak out against their oppressors.

The film’s depiction of Muslim women in Germany establishes a comparison of the political circumstances in which forms of Islam can exist. Narmila and Niloofar provide visual and narrative evidence that an Islam under state control generates oppressive conditions for women. By including German Muslim women into the narrative, *Football Undercover* depicts a liberated form of Islam, reflecting the democratic values of its homegrown political circumstances. This is embodied in the character of Susu. Susu is the charismatic striker and talisman for BSV Al-Dersimspor. Her ethnic heritage is not clearly stated in the film, but she is one of the non-white team members, and she is the only German player who clearly states on camera that she is a Muslim. When Susu identifies herself as a Muslim, her self-identification immediately forbids Islam from being the singular source of women’s oppression, which the film exemplifies in her biography.

In her native Kreuzberg Susu seems comfortable and confident. She is playful, carefree, and even cheeky. In stark contrast to the enforced piety and puritanism of the Iranian Muslim

women, her humor is sarcastic and at times bawdy.<sup>18</sup> Like her teammates, Susu never wears a headscarf in Germany on or off the field and is as uncomfortable with the practice as her teammates, once it becomes compulsory in Iran. In addition to scenes in which she plays soccer with her team, there is a short montage of images in which she plays against men.

Susu embraces the opportunity not only to play soccer against the Iranian national team but also to witness a different Islamic tradition. In an interview she states:

I'm not just going there because I'm all fired up about the match. I want to get to know the people there. It's just different over there. I'm a Muslim too, but the way I live with my family is different. If you look at my family, my father's family is very religious, but my mother's family is very open. And I want to see what it's like over there.

Susu's family life is depicted in a scene filmed in her family's small Kreuzberg apartment. When Susu jokes with her mother that they should find some Iranian men to date, her mother states flatly that Iranian men are "zu streng." In this same scene, her brother loads the laundry machine while Susu watches.

Susu identifies herself as Muslim, yet does not adhere to Islamic dress codes. Her appearance on-screen posits the possibility that a Muslim woman can exist without hijab. Susu's role within her family is not visibly "gendered." She and her brother are shown sharing domestic work, and the world of sport is not restricted to one sibling over the other. The scenes in which Susu plays soccer against men are significant in both the Iranian and German cultural contexts. Such gender-mixed athletics would be strictly forbidden in Iran, but even in Germany the topic of Muslim schoolgirls and their participation in mixed-gender sporting activities in state schools had become a point of debate around the time of *Football Undercover*'s creation (Amir-Moazami 15). Susu's varied and relatively successful participation in women's and gender-mixed sport demonstrates that her self-identity in Islam in no way hinders her. There are no

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<sup>18</sup> When climbing over a chain-link fence at a soccer field, she straddles the top fence pole and jokes that she might lose her virginity.

institutional barriers to her participation in sport, neither in the form of the state nor in the form of a religious or family authority.

*Football Undercover* presents Susu as the German Muslim woman. There is nothing remotely threatening to German secular society in her behavior as a female athlete or as a Muslim woman. Her practice as a Muslim neither manifests itself visually in the public sphere, nor does it demand any special treatment. If Susu did not explicitly state her affiliation to Islam, the viewer could only presume her Muslim heritage, based on ethnic and socio-economic stereotypes.<sup>19</sup> Susu appears to practice her religion as many young white Germans practice Christianity: inconspicuously. The documentary records Susu in mundane situations at home and on the field, none of which include any manifestly “foreign” or “exotic” customs or traditions. She speaks German with her teammates and family alike. The film does not suggest that she speaks Turkish or any second language. Susu is presented not only as fully integrated, but she also appears as fully enculturated in Germany society.

The depictions of these three Muslim women establish two psychological personas: one whole and healthy, the other repressed. Narmila and Niloofar live fractured existences. Their private and public spheres are diametrically opposed to each other, both legally and behaviorally. In the private sphere, Narmila and Niloofar openly and unapologetically embrace Western culture. When Narmila is introduced in the film, she is at home in her room, playing guitar and wearing Nike paraphernalia. Her dress is casual and sporty, and her song is not “exotically” Iranian but instead comprised of a chord progression and vocal melody that should be familiar to the Western ear.<sup>20</sup> Niloofar’s wall is plastered with posters and pinups of European soccer stars,

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<sup>19</sup> The general demographics of Kreuzberg, Susu’s skin color, and her accented “Kiez-Deutsch” fulfill stereotypical characteristics of third or fourth generation urban Turkish-Germans).

<sup>20</sup> Traditional Iranian music and instruments employ a tonal system including half tones and modes that do not exist in the Western twelve-tone chromatic scale.

specifically David Beckham. She plays a soccer video game with commentary in British English, and Niloofar controls the David Beckham of Real Madrid fame.

These visual markers of Western influence are contrasted with images of both Narmila and Niloofar out in public. While practicing soccer in public or while attending classes at the university, both Narmila and Niloofar are covered from head to toe. Their hijabs are black, and amongst other team members or amongst other women on the streets of Tehran, they are hardly distinguishable as individuals. A bi-polar existence is visually constructed. At home these Iranian women look no different than members of Al-Dersimspor. On the streets of Tehran, they are indistinguishable members of the state's social construction of female gender. These images create spheres of individual liberty (and lack thereof) and spheres of Western influence (and lack thereof). The life of Niloofar is split in two: on the one hand, we see her smiling face in her room plastered with European soccer, and on the other hand we see Niloofar walking with seriousness and tension on a sidewalk in Tehran, behind her a wall with anti-American graffiti. The tension that both Narmila and Niloofar convey in their various interviews never resolves itself in the film's narrative.

In the visual logic of the film, this bi-polar existence can be contrasted with the seemingly whole psychological persona of Susu. Out on the field, on the streets of Kreuzberg, or at home with her family, her mischievous sense of humor, casual attitude, and sartorial appearance remain consistent. There is no tension in her behavior and no articulations of inner turmoil. Her activity in society is not demarcated into a set of customs and costumes for the public or the private sphere. By making no visual or behavioral differentiation between public and private personas, Susu's practice of Islam seems hardly noticeable. More important, her Islamic practice seems entirely self-regulated.

The documentary's emphasis on Susu is an expression of religious tolerance. Susu as the German Muslim woman is given a prominent place in the narrative. She is included, and her voice is respected. The film's inclusion and not the rejection or evasion of religious identity in Germany echoes the Germany's response to religious tolerance before the anti-veiling laws of 2004. This response theoretically encompassed the idea of "open neutrality," according to which "the state is to be even-handed in granting public status to religion" (Joppke 314). This approach to religious plurality was multicultural in nature, reserving space for varied religious expression in the public sphere instead of relegating it to the private sphere like the laicist approach of the French state. Germany's retreat to laicist anti-veiling laws charged public religious expression and hijab specifically with powers "political indoctrination" (329).<sup>21</sup> This interpretation not only calls the visibility of religious practice into question but it also undermines the value of religious inclusiveness in Germany society when that value only applies to some and not all religions. The inclusion of Susu into the film does not reject religion's place in society. It instead grants religion a legitimacy of creating social identity. Susu as the German Muslim woman captures the insistence on multicultural, multi-religious representation in Germany society. However, her decidedly secular approach to Islamic practice also captures the post-ban anxiety of the headscarf.

The spirit of European anti-veiling laws would maintain that looking like a Muslim is apparently more controversial than being a Muslim. Susu fulfills the latter and not the former, despite the fact that she wears a bandana over her hair in most of her featured scenes and interviews. While a bandana is Western, hip, and an articulation of style, the headscarf in Europe cannot escape the symbolism of gender oppression, even though it performs the same function as

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<sup>21</sup> The German ban on headscarves was ruled to uphold the school student's "negative religious freedom," namely the freedom not to be indoctrinated by state-employed teachers through the visible politics of the headscarf (Joppke 329).

a bandana. The character of Susu does not give the viewer the opportunity to question her fully integrated and secular persona by including the headscarf. While Susu's Islamic affiliation is not explicitly stated in the film (whether she is Sunni or Shiite, for example), her membership in BSV Al-Dersimspor provides important insight not only into her possible identity as a German Muslim woman, but also into what kind of Islam *Football Undercover* is presenting as congruent with German democratic and multicultural values.

### 3.3 AL-DERSIMSPOR AS ISLAM IN GERMANY

Susu plays for the women's club team organized by BSV Al Dersimspor e.V.,<sup>22</sup> an officially registered DFB soccer club in Berlin's Kreuzberg since 1993. The name "Al Dersimspor" is derived from the combination of two former clubs in the same area of Berlin: "AL-Spor Berlin" and "FC Dersimspor." "Dersim" is an alternate name for Tunceli, a province in central eastern Turkey. Tunceli is the only Turkish province with an Alevi majority. The BSV Al Dersimspor club website manifestly states its geographic, cultural, and religious roots by including web links to various Alevi related sites (BSV Al Dersimspor e.V.). While the team's participation in amateur women's athletics makes it an inappropriate German representative in the world of national team soccer, the cultural and religious demographic of Al-Dersimspor makes the club an exceptional representative of German women's soccer in *Football Undercover*. Not only does the social makeup of Al-Dersimspor include various ethnicities playing soccer in harmony, but it also includes religious diversity; players from Christian and Muslim backgrounds. That Alevism

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<sup>22</sup> "BSV" is "Ball sportverein" / "ball sport club." The initials "e.V" indicate that the club is an "eingetragener Verein," a legally registered club in accordance with the German "Vereinswesen" and under the authority of the DFB. See the discussion of club soccer and the "Verein" in section 4.1.

assumes the role of German cultural and gender-political representation is significant, for Alevism's development of cultural and political liberalism makes it uniquely and controversially suited for the role of German diplomat in *Football Undercover*.

Often interpreted as humanistic with a strong tendency toward Kemalism, Alevis are on the left of the political spectrum of Muslim groups and, particularly in Turkey, are viewed as an oppositional group to Sunni fundamentalists. Alevis are the main allies of the Turkish democratic secularists (Haug et al, 21). In Germany, the Alevis comprise 13% of the Muslim population, making them the second largest group after Sunni (59). This means that the percentage of Alevis in Germany is higher than the percentage in Turkey, due in part to the military putsch during the 1980s and the Turkish government discrimination against Alevis. The relationship between Sunni and Alevi Turks has a long history of antagonism (Karolewski 437). Despite Alevism's distant Shiite origin, many Sunni and Shiite affiliations often label Alevism "heterodox Islam": a deviated faith holding presumably heretical views but remaining within the greater Islamic tradition. The Alevi practice of Islam does not mandate prayer in mosques, fasting during Ramadan, the acceptance of the Qur'an as a source of jurisprudence, the "Hajj" pilgrimage to Mecca, the gender-segregated use of public space, or the adherence to gendered dress codes, including the use of the headscarf (Öktem 5). Since the conservative moral code and religious law of sharia does not play a role in Alevism, questions of constitutional and religious law are not central to the Alevi community, rendering integration into secular German society easier (Gülcicek). Alevis in Germany have not faced the same pressure to assimilate into mainstream Islam, and Alevi activists are more likely to define Alevism outside of an Islamic or Turkish nationalist framework (Dressler 297).

Alevism assumes the role of German Muslim representation in *Football Undercover* while existing theologically and genealogically at the margins of the Islamic world. Alevism's exceptional and controversial practice of Islam arguably makes it a poor representative of Islam as it exists in Germany. Its theological interpretations of Islam are not considered mainstream and by no means represent the majority Sunni population. For the purposes of building a bridge to the world of Iranian women's soccer through documentary film, however, Alevism's exceptionalism makes it the most efficient representational figure in the German context for it produces a German Muslim woman that visually and practically adheres to notions of women's equality as generally understood in Germany.

Alevism is an authentic form of Islamic practice without the immediately recognizable visual markers of religion. There is nothing visually "radical" or fundamental in Alevism that would allow the viewer to equate religious practice and/or religious heritage with social conservatism. Without the headscarf, Alevism has no obvious visual alterity to distinguish its members in the public sphere. The Alevi Muslims in the film cannot be identified as such through sartorial codes or a set of religious practices that are visibly intelligible.<sup>23</sup> The representation (*Vertretung* and not *Darstellung*) of Islam in *Al-Dersimspor* encompasses a liberal-minded set of cultural practices particularly suited to Germany's secular society. Alevism would appear to be the least "Islamic" Islam available in Germany. Without such visual markers like the headscarf, Alevis are no more conspicuous than German Catholics or Protestants. Islam is thus accounted for in the Turkish-German unity of *Al-Dersimspor* in the figure of the Muslim woman.

The ethnic, cultural, and religious unity of *Al-Dersimspor* is a unity of values, specifically values about the place of women in society. "Society," however, is filmically

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<sup>23</sup> The use of prayer beads is also a visibly recognizable practice.

restricted to the only realm in which Al-Dersimspor effectively functions in Germany: the realm of women's amateur soccer. In these limited circumstances, all the women of Al-Dersimspor are first and foremost soccer players. As soccer players they are genuinely equal. Each player has equal access to the participation in sport insofar as each player is a member of BSV Al-Dersimspor. White and non-white members play the game under the same conditions. In an amateur league, no player is valued over the other through financial compensation or player contracts. There is no question that all women, including Muslims, may play soccer and play it without hijab. There is no suggestion in the documentary that these women are breaking any cultural or religious taboos, and there are no patriarchal Turkish fathers or frowning imams preventing the team's Muslim women from playing the game. This depiction of equality amongst women carefully does not expand its filmic "society" beyond amateur soccer, for then the many disparities that often divide German society by ethnicity or migration heritage would necessarily complicate this depicted unity; disparities with which Turkish-Germans often struggle like the disproportionate access to education or decreased mobility within socio-economic classes.

A crucial element in the depiction of Al-Dersimspor is its voice; which members of the team speak on-screen and how does their voice represent the team as a multicultural unit from Germany? The film's main narrator is Marlene Assmann, a white German. Marlene's voice-overs almost exclusively describe the organizational process of staging the game in Tehran. While Marlene has much on-screen time and occasionally complains about Iranian bureaucracy, she refrains from giving any opinions about Islam or Iran's gender segregation policy. The team spokeswoman and administrator Silke, also a white German, takes part in several on-screen conversations but her content is restricted to logistical information about the pending Iran trip without commentary. There are many other white German team members, but the white

Germans are rarely given any speaking time on-screen. Instead we simply see them with their teammates, wordlessly playing soccer or exploring the streets of Tehran in headscarves. The Al-Dersimspor players Safiye, Paros, and primarily Susu – all Turkish-German – give opinions and assessments of Iranian culture, Islam, or women’s rights in Iran. Only Safiye, Paros and Susu make on-screen jokes about Iran’s dress code and general law. While the white Germans give information, the Turkish-Germans interpret culture.

The Turkish-German players of Al-Dersimspor speak from a privileged identity position, a position that the white Germans, including Marlene as narrator, cannot occupy. In the mouths of Turkish-German women, who are either themselves Muslim or have very likely grown up in Muslim families, any remarks about Iran’s conservative interpretation of Islam and its according customs seem innocuous, relativized by the fact that they speak about “fellow” Muslims. Their jokes about Iranian culture are light-hearted and more silly than sinister in nature. For example, when Silke reads aloud a list of Iranian laws applicable to tourists e.g. visitors may not import pork into Iran, Susu jokes: “But I wanted to bring my spare ribs!” Or when the team tries on their headscarves for the first time on the plane to Tehran, it is Safiye, Paros and Susu who laugh and tease each other about their appearance. The same light-hearted jokes and casual remarks about Iranian law and religious practice in the mouths of the white German players would not convey the same sense of play and frivolity. Jokes from the white Germans could quickly evoke not only Germany’s history of institutional racism during the National Socialist regime, but also Germany’s contemporary and contentious debates about immigration and integration. If Marlene makes any statement about the plight of women under the yoke of Islam in Iran, that statement could easily be burdened by the multiple discourses of orientalism, the Western feminist critique of Islam, and colonialism.

The film carefully engineers a white German silence. As members of Al-Dersimspor, the white Germans need not make any verbal statements about Iran or Islam at all. The Turkish-German players take on the role of representation. They represent their soccer club. They represent German Muslim women, and ultimately they represent a “German view” on things Iranian. Here, the multicultural unity that is Al-Dersimspor comes to represent Germany, for the cultural, ethnic, and religious intersections of the team are truncated down to “German” once the team arrives in Tehran. In Tehran all team members are simply “German” relative to the Iranian other. This representation of Germany is nevertheless dependent upon the participation and representational power of the German Muslim woman. If an all-white German women’s team from rural, Catholic Bavaria filmed their travels to Iran, any hopes of creating an international message of women’s solidarity or at least a space cultural dialogue would be completely undermined by the lack of Islam as a common cultural and religious denominator. Without an authentic and fellow Muslim, such a film would likely come close to a colonialist, racist and placating project of Western triumphalism. The integrity of Al-Dersimspor’s multicultural representation functions from the ethnic and religious authenticity of the German Muslim woman.

### **3.4 THE POST-MULTICULTURAL STATEMENT**

The documentary’s depiction of the Iranian women’s national team assumes that the viewer knows little or nothing about either the existence of this particular team, the development of women’s sport in Iran, or the particularities of women’s existence in an Islamic state. The depiction is methodologically similar to the multicultural statement, insofar as narrative devices

are used that primarily instruct. Through interviews with Narmila and Niloofar, the viewer learns about the constraints of Iranian society as it regulates women's soccer and is given clear assessments of women's life in Iran. For example, the documentary teaches the viewer how to read the images of the film's final game and the crowd's political chants about the freedom to attend sporting events.<sup>24</sup> The documentary's depiction of the Iranian women's national team is not a multicultural statement, however. While the narrative and visual methods used are pedagogical, simple, and even at times heavy-handed, the focus on Iran cannot be multicultural from the German perspective. The differences in religious practice, theocratic law and governance, and gender segregation are not societal elements that German society could or would seek to integrate or regulate. They are rather differences in a national culture and a political community beyond the "integratable" jurisdiction of the German state. "Multicultural" ultimately refers to one culture, in this case the German culture, and the various relationships to other cultures that have been introduced to the one culture through migration. The documentary's presentation of Iranian women's soccer is more anthropological, or ethnographic, than multicultural.

The depiction of the German women's soccer team includes a multicultural message, but the methods used to create this depiction are different from those of the multicultural statement. The German team is ethnically and religiously mixed. The documentary includes countless scenes in which white Germans and Turkish-Germans play soccer together, discuss travel plans to Iran in the BSV Al-Dersimspor clubhouse, or share hotel rooms. The team camaraderie seems effortless. The young women talk openly and casually with each other about their expectations and reservations concerning the Iranian soccer game. These scenes are not edited in a narrative-

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<sup>24</sup> In interviews, both Narmila and Niloofar briefly discuss the ban on women's spectatorship at sporting events before the end of the film.

film style, including the shot-reverse-shot technique for dialogues or a smooth mixture of close-up and medium shots to underscore content through the emotional drama of the human face. The scenes are edited down into mostly static shots without pans or zooms. They “document” the team with minimal camera work. Shots often include many or most of the team members (if spatially possible) in the frame; simple shots that resemble the cinematography of television reportage from a hand-held camera. Extra-diegetic music is reserved for transitional sequences.<sup>25</sup> A musical score does not highlight spoken or visual content in the team. No orchestral strings appropriately swell in emotionally intense moments. This amounts to a “documentary” aesthetic that creates the illusion of recording instead of narrating.

The documentary aesthetic presents the multicultural constellation of Al-Dersimspor without manifestly commenting on it or making it into an agenda. Neither in Marlene Assmann’s many voice-overs nor in interviews with the Al-Dersimspor players is any statement of manifest multiculturalism made. The team’s “Miteinandersein” receives no commentary or explanation. This lack of fanfare is significant, for it marks the difference between *multicultural* and *post-multicultural statements* in artistic productions.

To review, the multicultural statement constructs a didactic space out of carefully manufactured socio-political artistic dimensions in order to instruct. The multicultural statement has the manifestly pedagogical goal of teaching its viewers how to read its images towards a specific moral and socio-political conclusion. It employs a methodology of cultural positivism for the sake of pedagogy. *Football Undercover*, however, neither calls attention to Al-Dersimspor’s multicultural membership, nor does it employ didactic narrative or visual devices to craft a message of morality out of Al-Dersimspor. Regarding German multicultural harmony,

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<sup>25</sup> The film’s transitional shots visually segue the narrative back and forth between Tehran and Berlin during travel in airplanes, busses etc.

there is no didactic explanation or contextualization of the cultural and ethnic makeup of the women's team of Al-Dersimspor. While we are presented with images of multicultural objects – white Germans and Turkish-Germans harmoniously living and playing together– its multiculturalism is not presented to the viewer in an overtly moralizing fashion. There is no attempt to convince the viewer that the team's multicultural camaraderie is possible, desirable, or morally right. The images of Al-Dersimspor make a post-multicultural statement because a multicultural ethos qua goal is replaced with an uncommented-on multicultural “reality” that requires no didacticism. The multiculturalism of Al-Dersimspor is so matter-of-fact through the lived experience of the players that it is an ordinary state. Its banality requires no pedagogy. The utopia of a multi-culture has seemingly been achieved.

*Football Undercover* offers the viewer images, but not visions, of multiculturalism. They are images of multiculturalism “achieved.” To bracket “achieved” in scare-quotes, however, is to emphasize the mediation of the post-multicultural statement. The post-multicultural statement is no less fabricated and mediated than the multicultural statement. Both are medial artistic productions, edited and reconstructed to form the visual appearance of a narrative and existential whole. The post-multicultural statement, unlike its counterpart, does not construct in the subjunctive mood. It does not infer from preexisting cultural elements a possible future that is morally desirable. The post-multicultural statement is in the present tense, describing and not prescribing a “now.” As a mode of description and summation, the post-multicultural statement does not call its own stability into question, as the multicultural statement must. It does not pose the multicultural statement's interrogative: “given these elements in society, what if?” It does not perform self-reflexivity for the sake of the viewer. The post-multicultural statement constructs

the appearance of achieved multiculturalism and thus has no need to strive for a utopia it appears to possess already.

The post-multicultural statement does have a goal, however, namely the positing of multiculturalism as a desirable ethos of social practices and attitudes. In this regard, it is no different than the multicultural statement, but its visual and narrative framing of multiculturalism is more advanced. While the multicultural statement's mission is to contribute actively to and foster multiculturalism, the post-multicultural statement depicts a social realm that has gone beyond multiculturalism. The subtlety of this statement runs the risk of illegibility. Because narrative and visual cues do not call attention to its multicultural content, the post-multicultural statement could go unrecognized by certain viewers. The post-multicultural statement is thus dependent upon a certain relationship between the viewer and the discourse of multiculturalism.

The multicultural goal of this statement can only be recognized as such *diachronically*, while the multicultural statement is legible *synchronically*. Here “diachronic” and “synchronic” describe the viewer's discursive relationship to multiculturalism. A diachronic relationship signifies a viewer's familiarity with multiculturalism as a concept and form of social practice with a history of development. A viewer who can read diachronically has already been enculturated by multiculturalism and, thus, can recognize it in rudimentary and advanced forms. A synchronic relationship signifies a viewer's ignorance of multicultural discourse. This viewer has not been enculturated by multiculturalism and, thus, cannot read images of multiculturalism in advanced, or understated, forms.

The multicultural statement posits moral conclusions dependent upon a restricted set of foundational cultural elements to be read synchronically, meaning to be read in a temporally restricted frame and only through the given, visually mediated objects at hand. For example, the

“now” and immediacy of Tiger in his Turkish/German soccer jersey can be read synchronically to signify multicultural harmony. The multicultural message of Tiger in his jersey is not dependent upon the viewer’s preexisting knowledge of multiculturalism as a discourse with a history in Germany society. A multicultural synchronic message requires overstatement and simplicity in order to render its meaning legible without recourse to the development of multiculturalism as a discourse. The viewer does not need to have a familiarity with postwar migration and the cultural development of Turkish/German relations in Germany to read and understand the image of Tiger’s jersey: Turkish + German = harmony and fandom party.

The post-multicultural statement can only be recognized in its post-modality diachronically. It depicts the latest and perhaps the last stage of a genealogy. A “multiculturalism achieved” posits at least the rudimentary development of multiculturalism from an “unachieved” to an “achieved” state. The goal of multiculturalism is no longer merely possible or probable. It has been accomplished, positing a development that culminates in visuals of understatement. Just as etymological meaning is not immediately legible in the moment but refers to a progression of meanings in flux, the post-multicultural statement signifies a stage of meaning in a progression of meanings. It is not immediately legible for viewers without an enculturated understanding of multiculturalism as a discourse or set of various socio-cultural practices and artistic representations. A diachronic understanding of the development of German multiculturalism over time grants the post-multicultural statement its message. This understanding need not be scholarly or critically sophisticated. A diachronic relationship to multiculturalism indicates that the viewer is not only familiar with multicultural discourse, but also either comes from an environment already influenced by it or has already consumed enough multicultural artistic productions to make all heavy-handed pedagogy unnecessary. The post-multicultural statement

thus addresses a possible viewership familiar with multiculturalism by providing an advanced, lived-in representation to reflect values that the viewership probably already shares. Only cultures with an advanced discursive history of multiculturalism can produce post-multicultural statements and only viewers from such cultures can fully benefit from their subtle presentation of multicultural morality.

The word “utopia” applies to the both the multicultural and post-multicultural statements. The “no place” of the multicultural statement always posits its goal beyond the horizon. The “no place” of the post-multicultural statement is no more intangible than it is in the multicultural statement, but the lack of didacticism and the lack of a manifest comparative strategy of representation renders the “present tense” depicted reality as natural. The matter-of-factness in representation would like to ground the “no place” and establish it as familiar ground i.e., as something “real” and existing now. *Football Undercover* subtly calls its German viewers out and assumes that they identify with the cultural, ethnic, and religious unity that is Al-Dersimspor. As a (constructed) unity, German viewers may attach themselves to Al-Dersimspor with a sense of sympathy and feel comfortable in the naturalness of this cultural unity.

The emphasis on the German Muslim woman in the documentary prevents this post-multicultural statement from moral deterioration through the evocation of Germany’s socio-political history. Al-Dersimspor’s multiculturalism gives the viewer no paths that lead back to the Germany legacy of institutional racism. The use of Al-Dersimspor as a device to make a post-multicultural statement is significant, for without the specific cultural matrixes of Al-Dersimspor, *Football Undercover* could not establish the status of women’s sport and women’s rights in Iran as a means of depicting a German-friendly Islam through a lopsided hierarchical comparative. The constructed cultural and religious stability of a limited sphere of German

society allows the documentary to imagine international relationships between women and between soccer players. The cultural dialogue between Iranian and German women that is performed through by playing soccer in the film's final game establishes the parameters of this dialogue in a national context. *Football Undercover* thus articulates a form of social identity and ethos that addresses the German national context insofar as Germany is made to encompass multiculturalism, religious tolerance, and women's equality. *Football Undercover's* project is not merely a statement of women's solidarity that transcends nation and nation-state. Nor is it just a statement about the positive potential within Islam divorced from the theocratic mold. It is also a statement about a German social identity that reflects a German sense of cultural liberalism and outward-looking compassion.

### **3.5 FOOTBALL UNDERCOVER AND SOCIAL IDENTITY**

The combination of soccer film and gender politics is primarily found in films about women's soccer. While a small number of films about men's soccer incorporates gender political issues, these films are in the minority. *KickOff* (2010), *11 Men Out* (2005), and *Männer wie wir* (2004) are sports comedies from the United Kingdom, Iceland, and Germany respectively. Each depicts gay male soccer players who have been driven from their teams by homophobia to form all-gay soccer teams and to take revenge on the homophobes. The short film comedy *Die Katze von Altona* (2002) is exceptional in this regard. It depicts a young heterosexual man whose cross-dressing threatens his father's semi-professional club team. The exceptionality of these films

reflects the greater world of men's professional soccer, which is notoriously intolerant of known homosexual players.<sup>26</sup>

In stark contrast, soccer films that incorporate women's athletics almost always reflect on gender politics and women's social equality. While homosexuality is the theme of several soccer films,<sup>27</sup> the majority of women's soccer films focuses on the more fundamental issues of women's equality and the disparity in popularity and tolerance between the men's and the women's sport.<sup>28</sup> Britta Becker's *Die besten Frauen der Welt* (2008) was conceived as the women's equivalent of Sönke Wortmann's *Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen*. Becker and her camera crews follow the German women's national team during the 2007 FIFA Women's World Cup in the People's Republic of China. Rather than stoke the flames of German soccer patriotism, this documentary highlights the social and economic challenges that individual women soccer players endure to play the sport professionally. HBO's television documentary *Dare to Dream: The Story of the U.S. Women's Soccer Team* (2005) charts the 18-year development of American women's soccer in the face of public apathy and institutional prejudice. Perhaps the most famous soccer film dealing with women's athletics is not a documentary but a narrative film. Gurinder Chadha's comedy *Bend It Like Beckham* (2002) tells the story of a Jess, the 18-year-old daughter of Punjabi Sikhs living in London. For her love of the game, she must overcome cultural prejudices and family traditions that forbid women from participating in sports. In each of these examples, gender politics provides the dominant narrative while soccer provides the cultural context.

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<sup>26</sup> Many male players disguise their sexuality throughout their career or come out after retirement (Cashmore and Cleland 371). An example is German midfielder Thomas Hitzlsperger (retired 2007, came out in 2014). The L.A. Galaxy's Robbie Rogers is one of few openly gay, active players in professional soccer.

<sup>27</sup> An example is the American documentary *Grass Ceiling* (2004) about lesbian players in the top professional league in the United States.

<sup>28</sup> While lesbian athletes still face prejudice, the world of women's soccer in North America and Western Europe is generally more tolerant of homosexuality than the men's game. High profile players like German national goalkeeper Nadine Angerer and American national striker Abby Wambach have come out during their careers.

*Football Undercover* certainly makes a plea for greater women's equality and for the support of Iranian women's soccer. By incorporating mundane scenes in which the Iranian national team practices soccer or in which they speak about the challenges of Iranian women's athletics in interviews, the documentary makes a commitment to educate the viewer about the world of Iranian women's soccer; to show that it does not exist in isolation but is informed by the global activity of soccer<sup>29</sup> and furthermore that it should be incorporated into the global soccer community. While almost any activity in the Iranian public sphere could be fodder for a pro-feminist message, soccer is perfectly suited to this task, for the figure of the Iranian female soccer player is a visual combination of the secular (soccer) and the religious (hijab). The mandate of religious observance in soccer through the headscarf does not render soccer religious. Instead it functions as a logistically complicated additive. The religious specificity of the symbolism that hijab conveys is not enough to erase the global implications of soccer in a national team context. The Islamic state might view the Muslim woman soccer player as a contradiction and feel threatened by soccer's potential to corrupt the authentic Muslim woman. *Football Undercover* shows that soccer will do exactly that, if opening cultural and national doors can corrupt the Iranian woman. The institutional existence of the Iranian women's national team expresses the desire to join the global soccer community. It is tempting to speculate that the Iranian women's national team's official entrance into FIFA-sanctioned international competition in 2005 (shortly after the filming of *Football Undercover*) was inspired and/or necessitated by the game against Al-Dersimspor.

*Football Undercover*'s reception at international film festivals suggests that it was read as more than just a film about women's equality in athletics. The documentary was successful at gay and lesbian film festivals in 2008, winning the Teddy 22 Queer Film Award, the "Audience

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<sup>29</sup> Niloofar's love of David Beckham attests to this.

Award” at the Pink Apple Festival in Zürich, and the “Freedom Award” at the L.A. Outfest for “its inspiring determination, its courage, and its riveting exploration of gender roles and human rights in disparate German and Iranian cultures” (Assmann). The documentary’s project was read as generally congruent with the values of these gay and lesbian film festivals. These awards are prominently featured on the *Football Undercover* website, attesting to the filmmakers’ embracement of issues relevant to the gay and lesbian community. However, no players in the film are clearly identified as lesbian, whether German or Iranian. The camaraderie and friendship of the Al-Dersimspor team produces images of women’s homosocial bonding, but there are no explicit references to the sexuality of the players. The scenes of homosociality seem organic to the social constellation of team sport, regardless of gender.<sup>30</sup>

Niloofer’s act of dressing in drag is contextualized, even “necessitated,” by the legal and cultural restraints on women’s behavior in the Iranian public sphere and is not presented, narratively or visually, as an articulation of sexuality for its own sake or in defiance of hegemonic heterosexuality. It is, in fact, unclear why Niloofer is removed from the Iranian national team before the game. Based on the biography that the film presents, there is not enough filmic evidence to conclude that she is banned because of her sexual orientation. Homosexuality appears concretely in the film only once. In a public park somewhere in Berlin, the Al-Dersimspor team sits in a grass field and discusses the trip to Iran. Spokeswoman Silke reads aloud a list of Iranian laws: homosexual acts, adultery, the importation of pork, and the exporting of Persian rugs older than thirty years are strictly forbidden. The team members do not comment on the law against homosexuality but make various jokes about the laws on pork and rugs.

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<sup>30</sup> Physical affection and homosocial bonding can also be found amongst the players of the German men’s national team in Wortmann’s *Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen*.

Reading this documentary in the context of homosexuality or as a project in the spirit of queer film is both progressive and problematic. The film's exploration of gender roles in two cultures makes a unique contribution to the general project of women's emancipation by contextualizing it all at once in athletic, national, and religious spheres. While the socio-political specificity of queer identity politics is not situated at the forefront of the film's narrative, the decidedly humanist message of combating social, cultural, and legal hindrances to women's participation in sport raises the activity of soccer to the level of universal human rights. The diminishment of social prejudice and the encouragement of accepting social difference is certainly a goal shared by the filmmakers of *Football Undercover* and the gay and lesbian community in general. If viewers would like to assume or imagine the sexual orientation of the Iranian players, then *Football Undercover* becomes an outlet for an oppressed and extremely underrepresented voice in Iran. Arguably, the one demographic even more oppressed than the Iranian woman is the lesbian Iranian woman. If viewers assume homosexuality in the German players, especially the Muslim players, then the film's depiction of the German Muslim woman reveals even more cultural tolerance than before, subtly announcing the overcoming of traditionally prescribed gender roles and negative views of homosexuality within religious communities.

However, interpreting homosexuality into the documentary's characters runs the risk of attributing exclusively conventional gender roles to sport. The intolerance of gay male soccer players in professional leagues around the globe bases itself on traditional conceptions of orthodox masculinity. This masculinity is imagined to fulfill an exclusive correlation between masculine physicality, corporeal and mental strength, heterosexuality, and athletic performance. The homophobic construction of homosexuality as intrinsically effeminate, both physically and

mentally, invalidates the possibility that a successful male athlete could be gay. Gay athletes are seen as a paradox, fulfilling some definitions of orthodox masculinity and violating others, finally threatening sport as a “prime site of hegemonic masculinity and masculine privilege” (Anderson 861).

The reverse prejudice functions in women’s athletics. Conventional femininity is often considered incongruent with athletic prowess. The constructed correlation between athletic ability and conventional masculinity assumes that successful women athletes must have enough, perhaps too many, “masculine” physical and mental characteristics in order to succeed in sport. The figure of the “mannish lesbian athlete” has become a “bogey woman” of sport, hindering the attempt to “rehabilitate the image of women athletes and resolve the cultural contradiction between athletic prowess and femininity” (Cahn 343). To assume homosexuality in the female athlete seeks to fulfill the role of the athlete as an exclusively masculine domain. Lesbianism in sport is thus not only tolerated; it is expected. As the over-fulfillment of masculine athleticism, it blurs the conventional “feminine” qualities of the female athlete, once again reinforcing the notion that athletic talent is an attribute of the masculine body and mind alone. The homophobia that reacts against the lesbian athlete has also paradoxically created possibilities for “lesbian affirmation” in sport by providing the “social and psychic space for some lesbians to validate themselves and build a collective culture” (344).

While there might be lesbian soccer players in *Football Undercover*, and the filmmakers’ acceptance of various gay and lesbian film awards might suggest this, the narrative avoidance of homosexuality in both the German and Iranian teams leaves the film’s conceptual, if not sympathetically ethical, affiliation with gay and lesbian socio-political issues up for speculation. Given the time frame of the documentary in the post-9/11 era and in the midst of heated national

debates and the (often hasty) creation of legislation intended to regulate Islamic practices in Europe, and given the documentary's place of origin in Germany, the most compelling social element in this documentary on soccer is Islam. *Football Undercover*'s inclusion of Islam not only as an Iranian imposition on women but also as an oppressive-free social identity for German women that in no way hinders them from participating in sport, simultaneously includes gender politics and broadens the documentary's message beyond gender politics.

The figure of the Muslim woman in Germany and Iran lends the documentary national significance. Its stark contrast of Islam in two cultures and two political communities offers a way to examine the relationship between religion and place. Certainly Germany and its postwar history of social democracy seems to present a healthier relationship to Islam than Iran. Yet *Football Undercover* does not inject German triumphalism into its narrative or characters. While Al-Dersimspor represents a German athletics organization and thus Germany in Iran,<sup>31</sup> the message that the documentary conveys is not a conventional form of German patriotism.

The women of Al-Dersimspor present Germany as a place of cultural and religious tolerance that does not define itself by exerting power over other peoples, but by sympathizing with and supporting them. Al-Dersimspor shows the spirit of a "cosmopolitan empathy," a sentimental and humanitarian solidarity with a people beyond one's own political borders (Beck 5-6). The "globalization of emotions" that is cosmopolitan empathy inspires more than just pity and guilt (6). It translates itself into concrete action. This emotive outreach is not restricted to social identities tied exclusively to or born exclusively by the nation. People need not first identify themselves socially through the nation in order to "become self-aware and capable of political action" (ibid.). The members of Al-Dersimspor do not state their German intentions to engage with Iran. The team at no point presumes to represent Germany diplomatically or with

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<sup>31</sup> During the game the Iranian stadium announcer refers to Al-Dersimspor simply as "the German team."

any manifest sense of German patriotism. It is not until several days before the game in Tehran, when Marlene and film director Ayat sit at a table with Iranian and FIFA soccer authorities, that their German identity is formally thrust upon them. In FIFA's organization of international sport, there is, indeed, no other identity that Al-Dersimspor could fulfill except "German."

It would initially seem that Al-Dersimspor's activism is primarily motivated by women's equality, a trans- or supranational solidarity in gender politics removed from the specificity of the German political and social realm. Yet investments in women's equality and the wellbeing of peoples beyond Germany's political borders have become part of postwar German social identity in some sections of the population. This is a broad identity nurtured in the educational and social circumstances of a distinctly humanist Germany. But it is also an identity looking to transcend cultural and political barriers. We can say that such an identity is a product of postwar Germany and its project of historical and emotional rehabilitation. The German liberal modus of looking outward rather than inward in order to create a social identity has arguably existed since the Student Movement of the 1960s, in which activists found political identity in support of the Vietcong, for example. This sentiment was tempered, rebranded, and pushed into the world of pop culture with the hosting of the FIFA 2006 men's World Cup, whose official motto was "Die Welt zu Gast bei Freunden," emphasizing a mood of tolerance and international hospitality. Here its relation to the world defines German social identity.

When Germany once again played host to the world during the 2010 FIFA Under-20 Women's World Cup and 2011 FIFA Women's World Cup, it was more than just the spirit of international hospitality and cultural openness that the organizers tried to convey. It was also the spirit of women's soccer, a show of support for women's athletics at the highest level of professionalism and skill, and so also a display of socially progressive conceptions of women in

sport. Germany's pride in hosting these women's international tournaments was a celebration of something supranational and thus global (women) and the German embrace of it. *Football Undercover* continues this sentiment by channeling a cosmopolitan empathy for women athletes in Iran through German social identity articulated as a humanitarian project. This is a social identity born in Germany looking outward with cosmopolitan empathy.

### 3.6 FROM PLAYERS TO FANS

In *Football Undercover*, the game is the space of positive union in the face of oppressive state and religious conservatism. Soccer players act as the agents of social cohesion. With the soccer player as social champion, it is not only the abstraction of "community" that is being represented and supported in the game. It is also the "institution." Soccer players, whatever their social cause off-the-field, can only represent that cause within the institutional, financial, and athletic restrictions of organized soccer. In order to envision a broader societal turn toward gender equality in Iran, the film does not defy, but rather employs, state institutions. The climax of *Football Undercover* is the game. The players are the crucial figures through whom the institution manifests itself. The social is reduced to the relative simplicity of the athletic space, which is organized, administered, and predictable even in its spontaneity. It is a space in which social issues are pushed to precede, and proceed, but never to occupy the moment at the expense of the physical mechanics of the game. While the political bubbles up to the surface during halftime when the Iranian women in the stands chant for the right of spectatorship, the focus returns to sport once the players take the field again. Soccer is, after all, ninety regulated minutes

of the physical exertion of eleven players who work together to place a ball in a goal. Everything else, including any social or historical meaning, is supplementary.

The films for examination in the next chapter are “fan films”: hooligan and ultra films. Fan films rarely depict the game of soccer at all. In fan films such as *The Firm* (1998, United Kingdom), *Und freitags in die Grüne Hölle* (1989, East Germany), or *Fußball ist unser Leben* (2000), scenes of soccer playing are rare and athletes perform minor narrative roles. The two fan films I examine are exceptional, however, in that they include no images of soccer at all. The game as a sport on a field with a ball, goals, and twenty-two players is entirely and conspicuously absent in *66/67 – Fairplay war gestern* (2009) and *Gegengerade – 20359 St. Pauli* (2011). These films do not and cannot include soccer as such, because they find no social champions on the field. Instead, they turn the camera around to observe the fans of soccer, and here the term “fan” is used in full awareness of its etymological root “fanatic.”

These films depict contemporary soccer fandom in its most extreme forms, hooliganism in the former film and ultra culture in the latter. On ideologically opposite poles, these forms of fandom share one characteristic: conflict. There is no climax in the union of the game and there is no union of community. If *Football Undercover* and Tiger “die Krallen von Kreuzberg” make statements by positing a utopia of social possibilities, *Gegengerade* and *66/67* make statements by positing *dystopias*.

#### 4.0 THE DYSTOPIAS OF GERMAN ULTRAS AND HOOLIGANS

Contemporary sport sociology has described in great detail the activities of the sport fan. Consumer-oriented fandom,<sup>32</sup> hooliganism,<sup>33</sup> and ultra culture<sup>34</sup> have all been sociologically plotted and ethnographically studied in terms of social origination, demographic constituency, relationship to state- and privately owned sport institutions, and the fan's psychology. Sport sociologists have spent much time worrying about the fan (Wenner 14). While some researchers seek to reduce fandom's potential to create social unrest,<sup>35</sup> other researchers seek to reveal the fan's status as an unwitting pawn of sport industry economics.<sup>36</sup>

Scholarly worry over fandom presumes that it holds destructive power. In the hands of sport industry authorities, it involves the power to enthrall and to exploit the fan's devotion and emotional attachment to a team in the service of capitalistic expansion. In the hands of the fans themselves, fandom involves the power to transform misplaced moral priorities and primitive sectarian sentiments into unpredictable violence. In either case, fandom is a form of social identity. No sport sociologist would argue with this. Fandom's greatest power is to gather individuals into a collective and grant that collective a name and a set of practices. The power of social identity continues to inspire sport sociology, and the roots of fandom social identity, for better or worse, continue to dig deeper while other institutions granting social identity in

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<sup>32</sup> See Hugenberg's *Sport Mania*.

<sup>33</sup> See Schneider's *Fußballrandale*.

<sup>34</sup> See Gabler's *Die Ultras*.

<sup>35</sup> See Wagner's *Fußballfans* and Weigelt.

<sup>36</sup> See Rigauer, Böhme, and Vinnai.

contemporary Germany, like organized religions or regional cultural traditions, are slowly losing their exclusive hold on identity endowment.

German soccer film has explored the phenomenon of fandom identity in ways that stretch beyond the purely sociological. While there are certainly documentary and narrative films that attempt to represent forms of soccer fandom with sociological and ethnographic accuracy, many filmmakers choose instead to use the figure of the German soccer fan as a vehicle to imagine the social worlds that fandom can create and proliferate. Soccer films give narratives of innately emotional human drama to the sociology of soccer fandom, filling out sociological data with pathos and expanding that data into a broad matrix of societal relevance. Soccer films can take the otherwise sequestered world of intense soccer fandom, which is foreign to Germans who do not spend every weekend in the soccer stadium, and tie it consequentially to various realms of German social life. When filmmakers imagine the world of the soccer fan, this world does not include the exceptions and qualifications about which sociologists debate. The filmic world of the soccer fan is bigger, louder, more intense, and greater in its societal impact.

The films in this chapter offer visions of German soccer fandom in its most radical forms: ultra culture and hooliganism. In many ways, these films follow the standard narrative of the “fan film” subgenre and present fandom subcultures as ethnographic objects. From the safety of our seats, we can bear witness to the force that is radical fandom and observe how it forms bonds of social identity and how it imagines and destroys its opponents. The two films of this chapter, *Gegengerade – 20359 St. Pauli* (2011) and *66/67 – Fairplay war gestern* (2009), are exceptional in their depictions of fandom. While the viewer comes away from them with a better understanding of forms of fandom as a societal “problem,” the films also use the social constructions of fandom to imagine German society in provocative, challenging ways that reach

beyond the limitations of fandom. We have seen that *Tiger* and *Football Undercover* utilize soccer to create German social realms of utopia. *Gegengerade* and *66/67* envision German society in various states of dystopia.

These filmmakers share the anxiety of the sport sociologists about the fan. They present the soccer fan in states of crisis. But because they do not limit their depictions of radical fandom to sociological facts, the breadth of their representational capacity is greater. These films use fandom to challenge the very notion of collective social identities born out of German soccer. They explore not just how such identities form, thrive, and decay, but also how and if such social identities are functional and useful. In contrast to most films governed by the soccer narrative, they present no winners and no winning societies. While the narrative strategy of reducing the depicted society down into easily manageable types and tropes remains, the films emphasize losing, loss, and societal collapse. My previous analysis used the multicultural and post-multicultural statements to describe a discursive and medial intersection in the service of presenting a social utopia. These films make statements to present dystopias: the *dystopic statement* and the *post-dystopic statement*. The sociological, narrative, and visual investigation of these statements about fandom will reintroduce the discourse of multiculturalism; how soccer fans, subcultures, and imagined societies can conform or fail to embody the spirit of multiculturalist practice.

#### **4.1 SOCCER FANDOM IN GERMAN FILM**

The thematic shift towards the fans of soccer in German film is relatively recent. The first “Fußballfilme” to appear in Germany focused exclusively on players. Besides documentary

films, narrative films like *Der König der Mittelstürmer* or *Die elf Teufel*, both silent films from 1927, featured stories about the human drama of soccer players on and off the field. The National Socialist years added *Das große Spiel* (1941) and a short section of Leni Riefenstahl's *Olympia* (1936) to the list of films about soccer players and teams. The turn towards New German Cinema might have altered the aesthetic and narrative depth of soccer film, but even Hellmuth Costard's minimalist soccer documentary *Fußball wie noch nie* (1970) and Wim Wenders *Die Angst des Tormanns beim Elfmeter* (1971) did not stray from the focus on the athlete, although the typical athlete-triumphs-over-adversity story arc was dropped. Throughout the 1970s and 80s, narrative features and television series continued to depict the human drama of soccer players, for example in the West German series *Manni, der Libero* (1982). Sport documentaries also focused on star players and celebrity, for example Franz Beckenbauer's bio-documentary *Libero* (1973) or *Profis – Ein Jahr Fußball mit Paul Breitner und Uli Hoeneß* (1979).

Fans and fan culture began to appear in German film in the late 1980s.<sup>37</sup> *Und freitags in die grüne Hölle* (1989) was the first German documentary to focus on fans and fan culture, in this case fans of the East Berlin club 1. FC Union. The television film *Schicksalsspiel* (1993) and the narrative feature film *Nordkurve* (1992) found drama not directly on the field, but in stories about fans on the sidelines and in the stadia, the former more than the latter. The twenty-first century and, more importantly, the buildup to the greatly anticipated 2006 FIFA World Cup hosted in Germany, did not produce the expected national team tributes (Wortmann alone covered this thoroughly) but instead a small body of short films about devoted fans, passive spectators, and social outcasts on the fringe of Germany's national sport, for example *Die Katze von Altona* (2003), *Der Geist von St. Pauli* (2004) and *Wir sind Dir treu* (2005). Today, the “fan

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<sup>37</sup> I would be remiss to neglect the existence of “fan film” in the United Kingdom and Italy, the former the “home” of hooliganism, the latter of ultra culture. A larger comparative study of hooligan and ultra films in various European countries is regrettably beyond the scope of my dissertation.

film” has become a consistent member of the soccer film canon along side the usual historical and celebrity documentaries or player-oriented features.

The focus on fans and fan culture in soccer film is a natural development of soccer culture in Western Europe and particularly in Germany. The fan in Germany was effectively created with the establishment of the “Bundesliga” in 1962. This marks not only the introduction of a domestic soccer system of professional, semi-professional, and amateur leagues, but also the conceptual end of athletic amateurism, whose proponents dominated the discourse on German sport for much of the twentieth century.<sup>38</sup> With the spirit of amateurism relegated to the bottom of a hierarchical system of sport administration (meaning relegated to the level of “hobby”), professionalization quickly established new roles for athletes and spectators. Professional athletes became specialists, and the play of sport became work (see Rigauer’s *Sport und Arbeit*). Professional soccer created an ever-widening social gap of status and prominence between spectator and athlete. As soccer expanded across the globe with the help of FIFA and national associations like Germany’s DFB, international games for club and country became global events in print and visual media, and soccer players became global celebrities. More financial resources were required to maintain an internationally relevant soccer club. Economic pressures forced the German soccer club, or “Verein,” to keep pace with the global soccer market.

The German sport club has an infrastructural history dating back to the early nineteenth century (Hardtwig 11). The German “Verein” is a democratically organized body governed by its membership. At the amateur level of sport, a club’s membership governs democratically and voluntarily. Professional clubs are also theoretically governed by their memberships. The

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<sup>38</sup> Proponents of amateur sport in Germany have represented both the political right and left, particularly during Wilhelminian and Weimar Germany. Conservatives, particularly (Prussian) nationalists, advocated amateur sport as a pedagogical method of education and militarization. Exemplary is Friedrich Ludwig Jahn’s “Turnbewegung.” Liberals, particularly socialists and communists, advocated amateur sport as a pure form of physical and spiritual fitness, free from the corruptive elements of capitalism (Hughes 28).

German Soccer League's "50+1-Regel" protects clubs from investors by forbidding single-entity majority ownership of any professional club<sup>39</sup> (DFB, "Satzung"). With the rise of modern soccer, the democratic powers of club membership have significantly decreased for the sake of economic efficiency. Membership control over professional clubs has been diffused; both delegated to specialists in supervisory positions or partly ceded to serve the interests of club sponsors. Fans with an emotional investment in a club have developed a critical relationship to club soccer based on a nostalgia for democracy; for a time when a soccer club was truly governed by its membership. Fans have largely lost the role of club member and become consumers. The deterioration of power sharing has not pushed fans away from fandom. Instead, they have become either complacent or radicalized.

Soccer fandom in Europe reached its most conspicuous moments with the peak of hooliganism in the late 1980s. The spread of hooliganism and its coverage in the popular press inspired numerous artistic cultural artifacts.<sup>40</sup> The appearance of fandom in film began at a critical time in the history of soccer fandom. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, hooliganism had arguably peaked and would begin its descent into the underground, while ultra culture had spread from Italy and was quickly establishing itself in other fan cultures (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France, Greece, Turkey and others).

The filmic turn towards extreme fandom not only capitalizes on sensational violence (fight and action sequences in such films are of course obligatory). The fan film also seeks to embed such violence of radical fandom in the social context where social identities are formed.

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<sup>39</sup> This stands in stark contrast to corporate sport administrations in England (Barclays Premier League) or the franchise model in the US and Canada (NBA, NFL, MLB, MLS etc.), both based on the private investor majority ownership of teams. American and British fans have no influence over sport administration or governance.

<sup>40</sup> Besides the wave of hooligan and ultra films in England, Germany, and Italy, many hooligan autobiographies appeared in these countries. Two German examples are Damaris Kofmehl's *Der Hooligan* and Alexander Hoh's *In kleinen Gruppen ohne Gesänge*.

The depiction of extreme fandom is the act of film directors holding up a mirror to society to see if that society can recognize itself in the reflection. The possible social trajectories of fandom have long since detached themselves from the elite and untouchable celebrity of athletes on the field. Soccer fandom has become one of the most consistent and popular sources for German social identities. The films in this chapter highlight the potential of soccer to create strong social bonds, perhaps stronger than the social bonds of political groups or religious affiliations. But the potential for violence and turning the inward cohesion of a clique toward the (mis)direction of aggressive energy outwards also exists. Consequently, new forms of identity and social antagonism emerge, including ones based on combating the other.

#### **4.2 GEGENGERADE – 20359 ST. PAULI: A PRO-ULTRA FILM**

*Gegengerade – 20359 St. Pauli* (2011) is a narrative feature film directed by Tarek Ehlail. The latter part of the title is the postal code for St. Pauli, a quarter in the city of Hamburg and home to “FC St. Pauli von 1910 e.V.” “Gegengerade” refers to the parallel stadium sections along the length of the field (as opposed to the curves or *Kurven* and the seats behind each goal). Many of FC St. Pauli’s ultra groups, its most loyal supporters, consistently occupy the “Gegengerade,” making this stadium section synonymous with enthusiastic, even intimidating fandom.

The film’s narrative takes place during an important event for FC St. Pauli: possible promotion into the Bundesliga. FC St. Pauli has played for most of its history in the second and third professional leagues, but in the 2009/10 season it secured its promotion into the top tier of German professional soccer for one unsuccessful year. The plot begins one day before securing promotion. Three FC St. Pauli fans, Kowalski, Magnus, and Arne are preparing for the game.

Kowalski embodies the spirit of the St. Pauli quarter of Hamburg and is the quintessential ultra. He is a young man from the working class who lives and breathes FC St. Pauli. By contrast, Magnus is a child of wealth, living in a mansion with his doting mother, who lavishly supports him financially, despite his inability to reciprocate her love. Violence attracts Magnus to the Pauli fan scene more than fandom itself. Arne is a film student who has befriended Kowalski and Magnus in order to make a documentary film on FC St. Pauli fandom. Like Kowalski, he is native to the St. Pauli quarter with working class roots. In the fan scene he is a relative newcomer, an ultra tourist and even a tour guide for the ultra-ignorant viewer. Scenes framed in Arne's point-of-view from behind the camera do not provide a naïve perspective of ultra culture, however, for even with the camera in hand Arne chants for St. Pauli and joins in on brawls.

Magnus has a disintegrating love relationship with Natascha, a young real estate agent who is increasingly frustrated by his disinterest. Her real estate boss, Koritke, is a caricature of the ruthless free market capitalist. He welcomes the gentrification of St. Pauli and the profit it will generate. Another minor character is Baldu, a local from the white working class and "Imbiss" owner and caterer at St. Pauli's Millerntor Stadium. Baldu's modest fast-food stand in the heart of St. Pauli serves as a meeting point for soccer fans and Hamburg's police force. Baldu is a firmly established fixture of the community, acting as friend and even father figure to the young men in the neighborhood. One of his regular customers is Karl Stiller, a Hamburg state prosecutor and enemy of the ultras. Stiller is on the hunt for an arsonist in St. Pauli. He hatches a plan to catch the arsonist, who is setting cars on fire in the red light district, and to arrest as many ultras as possible through trumped up charges. Stiller's justifies his pursuit of the ultras by equating them with "Politniks" or leftist hipsters: "Dass es Überschneidungen zwischen Politniks

und Ultras gibt, ist unbestritten” (Ehlail, *Gegengerade*). By only identifying the ultra scene as a vague social threat, Stiller reveals the capriciousness of his power.

Despite FC St. Pauli’s promotion to the Bundesliga, the film ends in death and destruction. Stiller’s conspiracy to implicate Pauli’s ultras results in mass arrests after a brutal demonstration of police power. Riot police beat Arne with his own camera. The police set fire to Baldu’s food stand, and he dies of a heart attack. Magnus, who is revealed as the arsonist, successfully frames Kowalski for the arson attacks while he revels in FC St. Pauli’s promotion celebration in the stadium. And finally, the neighborhood of St. Pauli is sacrificed to gentrification, house by house.

*Gegengerade* features punk music, numerous street brawls driven by thumping techno music, red light district prostitutes, excessive drunkenness, and radical soccer fandom in the stadium. Accordingly, the film could be considered a youth culture exploitation film aiming at a relatively young, sympathetic audience. Between scenes of sensational violence, however, the film includes lessons on the practice and ideology of ultra culture. These lessons are in no way encoded or metaphorical, but visually and conceptually simple, intended to be easily received.

The film begins with a photomontage, or more precisely, a slide show of fans from St. Pauli’s past. Not a single photo includes any player or coach from FC St. Pauli. This is a past consisting exclusively of fandom. In a voice over, Kowalski summarizes the ultra culture of St. Pauli:

Gegen den Fußballmainstream, ganz klar, St. Pauli ist die einzige Möglichkeit, denn es ist Freundschaft, es ist wahre Liebe und Leidenschaft. Und das war hier schon so als sich überall noch Schnauzbartröller und Nazis in den Stadien herumdrückten. Ist das euer Fußball? (Ehlail, *Gegengerade*)

Kowalski refers to the three fan subcultures of post-1962, meaning post-professionalization, German soccer. “Schnauzbartröller” (literally translated: mustache proletarians), “Nazis,” and

“St. Pauli” refer to the “Kuttenfans,” “hooligans” and “ultras” subcultures. Kowalski attributes friendship, true love and passion to Pauli fans specifically and to ultras generally. The remaining two categories of fans belong to the “Fußballmainstream” against which ultra culture defines itself.

The “Kutten” and hooligan subcultures historically precede ultra culture and have influenced ultra culture directly. All three fandom subcultures have their socio-cultural genesis in the professionalization and commercialization of German soccer, and all three in various ways measure themselves against the byproduct of professionalization: *consumer-oriented fandom*. Sports sociologists Wilhelm Heitmeyer and Jörg-Ingo Peter describe the consumer-oriented fan as one who wants to watch a competitive, exciting game. For this fan, soccer is one of many entertainment options. The consumer-oriented fan has no emotional investment in the outcome of a game or in fandom and therefore does not identify with a fan group or even as a fan at all (Heitmeyer and Peter 32).

Consumer-oriented fans are attracted to all that professional club soccer offers: a well-organized, increasingly well-funded, highly competitive national domestic league selling the product of athletic spectacle, with star players from Germany and around the globe, in increasingly comfortable stadia at a reasonable ticket price. Fan identity has become a largely commodified, well-calculated package of marketing and advertisement with the emotive connections to a region or geography merely in the service of generating revenue (Wenner 23). Consumer-oriented fans may, but must not choose, to purchase a pre-packaged fan identity.

Professionalization saw the number of soccer fans increase in the 1970s, but “traditional” fans, meaning long-time fans who connect some degree of social identification to a soccer club, sought out methods of distinguishing themselves from consumer-oriented fans (Weigelt 28).

From the moment of its implementation, the professionalization of soccer has at once alienated and inspired fan culture. The relegation to consumerism created new types of fans not content just to consume soccer and financially patronize clubs.

The first way in which fans distinguished themselves from consumers was through clothing. *Gegengerade*'s opening photomontage features images of fans from St. Pauli's past, all wearing what is now immediately recognizable as soccer fan garb: scarves with club colors, jackets with patches, jerseys etc. The first fan clubs in the late 1960s began to design club paraphernalia such as jerseys, scarves, hats, pins, and flags. These fan clubs were not creating additional fan paraphernalia, but the *first* fan paraphernalia. All club-related products were fan-made and redistributed through local sellers until FC Bayern München offered its first official line of consumer products in 1983 (Brüggemeier, "Zuschauer"). The production of consumer sport products quickly spread to all other major and minor clubs. Sport paraphernalia further alienated the fan clubs and drove them to seek other modes of self-identification and differentiation.

The "Kuttenfans," whom Kowalski calls the "Schnauzbartprolls," were the first to emerge as a fan subculture. "Kutte," a colloquial German term, is a blue denim jacket or sleeveless vest upon which various cloth patches are sewn displaying club logos, coats of arms, colors, and fan group affiliations. Kuttenfans display an unconditional passion for their respective club. They are classified as "Fußballzentrierter Fans" or soccer-centered fans: fans who show loyalty to the soccer club, even when the club has been relegated to a lower league, and for whom soccer is not exchangeable with any other pastime. The soccer-centered fan is strongly oriented to a fan group and displays group belonging through sartorial codes. The social belonging and acknowledgement that the group provides is of great importance (Heitmeyer and

Peter 32). The soccer club subsists either as a substitute family (“Ersatzfamilie”) or a religion, requiring a near spiritual level of devotion beyond economic consumption (Pilz). Social identity and self-worth are directly related to the athletic success or failure of the club, inciting most Kutfenfans to defend the “honor” of the club through violence, especially after defeats. The violence of Kutfenfans is relatively straightforward and without manifest political motives. All opponents of the club are the Kutfenfan’s enemies, including fans, players, and referees (ibid.). Kutfenfan violence is sectarianism simplified, driven by the reductive binaries of “us vs. them” and “winners vs. losers.”

Kutfenfans established the tradition of group-orientation and social identification with club soccer that directly influenced the hooligan and ultra subcultures to come. The Kutfenfans are today considered a bygone social phenomenon, as unfashionable and dated as their denim jackets have become. The stereotypical Kutfenfan is a white, working class male whose devotion to his club demands more time and attention than family life or career. The feature-length comedy *Fußball ist unser Leben* (1999) employs these stereotypes, depicting FC Schalke Kutfenfans as crude, mustached, proletarian fanatics, cheering on their team as their family lives slowly erode from neglect.

Kowalski uses the term “Nazis” to describe the second fan subculture to appear in Germany: hooliganism. *Gegengerade* paints a disturbing, one-dimensional picture of the German hooligan as the stereotypical skinhead right extremist. A sequence of the film places Kowalski, Magnus, and Arne in a subway car with three skinhead hooligans. The hooligans are bragging to themselves about an act of violence. A filmic cut presents grainy, black and white images of a young black man lying on a sidewalk, bleeding and beaten; two hooligans are also trying to rape a young white woman as a third hooligan films the event with a handheld camera. Another cut

back to the subway finds the hooligans leaving the subway car. In silent agreement, Kowalski, Magnus, and Arne follow the hooligans into the station, preparing to dispense vigilante justice. When all other passengers are gone, they attack and a brawl ensues. Distant police sirens eventually scatter both groups away from the station.

This scene has important implications for the film's depiction of the ideological differences between ultra culture and hooliganism despite a shared genealogy in fandom. But in general such images of hooligans are quite familiar in the popular press and other artistic artifacts. In its first usage in the United Kingdom around 1900, the term "hooligan"<sup>41</sup> described a drunken, violent man or "rowdy." In the 1960s "hooligan" became a more specific term in the United Kingdom, linking alcoholism, rowdiness, and soccer fandom (Weigelt 14). The popular press today often employs "hooliganism" simply to name general fan violence at soccer games, but the term in sociological use refers to a specific kind of fan violence and subculture that can be found in almost all European countries (Meier 12).

In Heitmeyer and Peter's classification system, hooligans are described as "Erlebnisorientierte Fans" or experience-oriented fans. Here "Erlebnis" refers to the experience of emotionally and physically intense situations in and around the soccer stadium that are specifically evoked by violence. The experience-oriented fan seeks only intense situations to experience. If soccer cannot provide them, then it is an expendable source of entertainment. This form of "Erlebnis" stands in contrast to how "Erlebniskultur" is typically understood in Germany. "Erlebniskultur," or "event culture," signifies an array of cultural activities to experience such as theme parks, museum exhibitions, music festivals, shopping experiences, or sports events (Hügel 32). The "Erlebnis" in "Erlebniskultur" is a consumer product in the form

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<sup>41</sup> One etymological theory claims that "hooligan" is derived from the Irish-Gaelic word "hooley," meaning "drink orgy." Another theory derives "hooligan" from the Irish family "Houliah," an infamous family of violent drinkers and the subject of folk songs (Weigelt 13).

of an event to undertake and experience. The hooligan “Erlebnis” is affectively similar to the experience of danger and intensity in extreme sports such as skydiving, cliff jumping, or free rock climbing except that the intensity of the hooligan “Erlebnis” is created through physical pain. The hooligan “Erlebnis” is not a consumer product.

Like the soccer-centered fan, the experience-oriented fan seeks social acknowledgement from group membership. Unlike the soccer-centered fan, however, the experience-oriented fan’s loyalty fluctuates between club, fan groups, and hooligan cliques (Heitmeyer and Peter 32). The soccer game itself is of secondary importance. The stadium on game day provides the possibility to live out aggression and violence in the anonymity of the stadium mass (Wagner, *Fußballfans*, 24). The loyalty to club and team is ambiguous at best. Professional soccer provides a convenient network of likeminded hooligan groups across Germany and across Europe (35). Hooligan “rumbles” are regulated by an unspoken honor code; hooligans should use no weapons and should not aim to cripple or kill opponents (37). In reality, however, this “honor among thieves” codex is often transgressed. The victims of hooliganism are often not fellow hooligans but ultras, Kutfans, or innocent by-standers, who include, most prominently, non-white soccer fans and spectators.

There is general scholarly agreement that right extremism and neo-fascism are the predominant ideologies of European hooliganism. While Neo-Nazi hooliganism in Germany would seem to be expected, Europe’s problem locales of right extremist hooliganism are by no means restricted to Germany. Neo-Nazi symbolism, paroles, and violence against non-white fans have become fixtures of English, Scottish, Dutch, Polish, Italian, Russian, Serbian, and Ukrainian club soccer, to name only the most high-profile examples. When hooliganism gained wider attention during the 1980s in the United Kingdom as well as on the continent, it was most

often attributed to Neo-Nazism. Scholars have since revised this view. Sport sociologists no longer assume right extremism in German hooligan circles. While some hooligan groups are organized, ideologically consistent, and long-lasting,<sup>42</sup> much hooliganism is far less organized socially and ideologically, eschewing consistent group hierarchies and emphasizing a “fight club” mentality over any socio-political agenda.

Hooliganism in Germany has a fluctuating relationship to right-wing political parties like the NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands). On the one hand, political parties have had limited success in hooligan scenes since active participation in party politics, including participation in party conventions and rallies, does not offer the experience-oriented intensity and adrenaline-inducing thrill that hooligans seek (Wagner, *Fußballfans*, 27). On the other hand, NPD leaders have admitted to seeking recruits in Germany’s hooligan scenes with some success, mostly in the “new” federal states of the former East (Ruf 142).

There have been many hooligan catastrophes in European soccer since the 1960s, but Germany’s history of hooliganism officially begins in 1982 with the death of Adrian Maleika. On October 17, 1982, the Hamburg hooligan group “Die Löwen” attacked a traveling SV Werder Bremen fan group at a Hamburg train station, beating Maleika to death (Freytag). Maleika’s death linked hooliganism to right extremism, but perhaps more importantly, the death of Maleika marks the beginning of hooliganism as a recognized social problem in Germany requiring institutional intervention. The work of “fan projects” – social programs organized by individual soccer clubs and administered by social workers, psychologists, and pedagogy specialists – and stadium security measures have driven hooligans away from the well-monitored and well-policed professional stadia into the lower leagues and minimally funded (often provincial) teams

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<sup>42</sup> The neo-Nazi hooligan firm “Borussenfront” of Dortmund celebrated its 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary in 2012 despite numerous stadium bans and attempts by authorities to social reintegrate its members.

in the Regional League (Ruf 106). Security measures and stadium bans have not eliminated hooliganism but instead forced it out of the stadia and into the streets and even the countryside, the so-called “Wald und Wiesen” rumbles (ibid.). In such instances, hooliganism distances itself almost entirely from club soccer and competitive sport.

The film scene in the subway gives the viewer no emotional option but to sympathize with Kowalski, Magnus, and Arne as they beat down xenophobic, rapist hooligans. Arne does not distance himself and thus the viewer from the brawl through the camera eye, but instead joins in, taking several punches to the face for his efforts. If the cut away scene of violence was not enough to convince the viewer of the hooligans’ social ideology, a second street brawl between hooligans and the film’s three main characters makes it even clearer. Kowalski, Magnus, and Arne are drinking beer at Baldu’s “Imbiss” just hours before the game, when a nameless ultra runs up and announces that a gang of hooligans is beating a fellow ultra. With Kowalski taking the lead, a group of ultras amass to confront a group of skinhead hooligans. The scene is filmed with a handheld camera using hectic pans and zooms and giving the ensuing brawl a dizzying sensation. As the massive street brawl begins, the hooligans make a collective fascist salute shouting in perfect unison: “Sieg heil!” This simple signifier is enough to identify its referent as unabashed fascists. The film’s hooligans are not just xenophobic criminals, but also self-styled neo-Nazis, embodying the ultimate taboo of the National Socialist regime in a single chant.

*Gegengerade*’s one-dimensional depiction of German hooliganism as neo-fascist thuggery serves a very concrete purpose: to posit ultra culture on the ideologically opposite side of right extremism. Of the three fan subcultures, hooliganism has received the most journalistic and scholarly attention, certainly due to the urgency of studying hooliganism sociologically and psychologically in order to find ways of containing and preventing it. As the most conspicuous

fan subculture, many journalists and politicians have carelessly labeled all forms of radical fandom and all fan subcultures as “hooliganism.” As ultra culture expands across Europe, it is often falsely labeled “hooliganism.” *Gegengerade* takes up the task of correcting this perception by presenting a war of fan subcultures in bold colors. The film tells the viewer that these two subcultures are not and can never be united in fandom.

The term “ultra” originates in the fan scenes of Italy in the 1960s. Ultras are particularly passionate, loyal fans self-organized in groups. Like Kuttenfans, ultras are soccer-centered. Their identities are invested in a soccer club and in a particular ultra group. Self-representation and self-celebration are arguably just as important in ultra culture as supporting the club (Pilz and Wölki-Schumacher 14). The most striking element of ultra culture is its presence in the stadium. Ultras create choreography (“tifo” is the original Italian word), wave homemade flags and banners, create and perform songs and chants accompanied by drums and megaphones / microphones, and also use (often illegal) pyrotechnics (5). Ultras pride themselves on consistent stadium attendance at home and away games.<sup>43</sup> Ultras do not understand themselves to be merely fans in a fan club. “Ultra sein” is a “Lebenseinstellung,” a lifestyle; an identity consisting of being “extreme” and taking part in an autonomous youth culture not just on game day but everyday (6). In contrast to Kuttenfans, ultras stem from all social classes, from the working class to university students.

Ultras are typically young males without a migration background. The Kuttenfan and hooligan subcultures are exclusively male. Comparatively, then, the presence of female ultras is exceptional. Relative to the number of male ultras, however, the percentage of female ultras is low despite variations in each ultra scene in Europe. The ultra culture of *Gegengerade* is conspicuously male. Images of women ultras among the ultra groups in the stadium are

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<sup>43</sup> Kuttenfans, by contrast, rarely attend away games en masse.

exceptional. All the women with whom the three main characters interact are eroticized, one-dimensional characters with one exception: Magnus' doting, overprotective mother. Magnus' girlfriend Natascha is introduced to the viewer through full-body shots of her bending over to change her clothes. Kowalski and Magnus talk with half-naked prostitutes on the street. Arne has a drunken one-night stand with a nameless large-breasted woman in a punk club. The film's ultra scene is not only male, but also heterosexual, visually populated with women of heterosexual fantasy.<sup>44</sup>

The presence of such hyperbolically eroticized females renders possible the ultras' homosociality or male homosocial desire (see Sedgwick's *Between Men*). In a scene framed in Arne's camera, Kowalski, Magnus, and Natascha are drinking on a sidewalk in front of a pub. Arne zooms in as Magnus and Natascha kiss, which elicits Kowalski's groan of mock disgust from the off. The shot pulls back and pans quickly to Kowalski, who says to the couple: "Wahre Liebe gibt's nur unter Männern!" (Ehlail, *Gegengerade*). While this and similar statements from Kowalski<sup>45</sup> threaten to disrupt the ultras' homosocial interaction by introducing terms associated with nonhegemonic masculinity identities, namely homosexuality (Bird 121), the film's consistent inclusion of sexually objectified women conceptualizes heterosexual male identity not only as different from but also better than the film's imagined femininity. *Gegengerade's* homosocial world of brothers only allows for its women to be consumed like alcohol or punk music.

*Gegengerade* clearly and didactically explains in words and images the social phenomenon of ultra culture. This instruction is neatly divided into two parts: explanation of ultra culture in the stadium and explanation of ultra ideology. Ultra behavior in the stadium is

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<sup>44</sup> Two members of the film's cast are pornographic actresses.

<sup>45</sup> Kowalski attributes "wahre Liebe," "Leidenschaft," and "wahre Freundschaft" to men in several scenes throughout the film.

presented in a series of similar scenes scattered throughout the film, all featuring a nameless stadium “moderator” sitting behind a desk and speaking directly into the camera (in the film credited simply as “Stadionmoderator”). The moderator delivers lyrical, exaggerated descriptions of the ultras with the controlled rhythmical intonation of a professional announcer. His monologues and voiceovers move back and forth visually from his desk and deadpan face to slow-motion images of the ultras in the stadium. The moderator’s first monologue follows:

Das Stehen im Stadion ist wie der Besuch einer Predigt. Wir stehen gemeinsam wie gläubige Schäfchen vor Gott, nur dass wir eine weltliche Masse sind. Nie im Leben sollte man sich ein Spiel im Sitzen ansehen. (Ehlail, *Gegengerade*)

Almost every soccer stadium represented in the top two leagues of the Bundesliga has a designated fan section, the “Stehplätze,” most often located behind the goal or in the stadium “curves,” or Kurven. These sections have metal bars or barriers to hold or lean on instead of traditional seats. Ultras stand for the entire game. For ultras, the difference between standing and sitting in the stadium is the difference between “Ultra sein” and passive, consumer-oriented fandom. The religious references, “faithful lambs before God,” are typical expressions among ultras. Like the Kuttentfans, ultra culture requires spiritual devotion, and the ultra group provides the sort of community that the “kirchliche Gemeinde” once provided in a now largely secular Germany.

In another monologue, the moderator reports:

In der Schlacht gehen zwei Massen auf einander los. Wir beweisen durch unser Kriegsgeschrei, dass wir die Stärkeren sind. Am Ende werden die anderen verstummen. (Ehlail, *Gegengerade*)

The “war cries” are of course the various chants and songs of the ultras. In comparison to stadium chants in American football stadia, which are often spontaneous and intended to motivate the home team to perform a specific task (for example “DE-FENSE” is chanted only

when the home team is playing defense), a relatively small numbers of ultra chants actually address the events on the field. For example, “FC Pauli, schieß ein Tor!” is a simple soccer-specific song in the ultra repertoire. *Gegengerade*, however, features one particular ultra song throughout the film entitled “Wir sind Zecken”: “Zecken...asoziale Zecken. Wir schlafen unter Brücken oder in der Bahnhofsmmission!” (Ehlail)

The film features this song in the stadium, several times on the street, and in one scene a female opera singer performs the song. The word “Zecke” (tick) was initially used in right extremist circles to describe leftists as social parasites (Wagner, “Zur Auseinandersetzung”). “Zecke” has since been re-appropriated by leftists as a way of self-description, especially in the leftist punk and ultra scenes. This song draws attention to the ultras’ leftism and does not reference the game of soccer. When ultra songs like this are performed in the stadium, the team and the club become secondary to ultra identity and self-representation. The strong sense of group cohesion in ultra culture explains why ultra groups continue to exist despite club relegation to lower leagues. Athletic failure does not affect ultra identity to a significant degree.

Perhaps the most controversial ultra practice in the stadium is the use of pyrotechnics. Ultras use fireworks, typically brightly colored fire and smoke flares, as a part of their choreography or for goal celebrations. Pyrotechnics are always lit among the ultra groups in the stands, but often they are thrown onto the field, causing game delays. The use of pyrotechnics is illegal in most but not all Bundesliga stadia. In *Gegengerade*, one scene features slow-motion images of masked ultras (black bandito-like handkerchiefs over the face) in the stands waving flares in the air with fountains of red light and plumes of thick smoke engulfing the ultras. In a voice-over, the stadium moderator reports:

Die reinige, die zerstörende Kraft des Feuers. Unsere Vorfahren tanzten alle um das gleiche Feuer. Im tiefsten Inneren sind wir nichts anderes als Höhlenmenschen. Das

Feuer schützt uns. Mit der Fackel in der Hand kommt uns kein Säbelzahn tiger zu nahe.  
Wir sind nichts weiter als ein riesiger Haufen unbehaarter, unbekannter Affen. (Ehlail)

This particular monologue from the moderator seems both to explain and to undermine this ultra practice. While the analogy of ultras as “cave people” protecting themselves with fire from saber-toothed tigers seems to degrade ultra practice to a level of primitivism, the analogy also grounds the use of pyrotechnics in human nature. That ultras and “our ancestors” are both drawn to the “destructive power of fire” grounds ultra practice in a human instinctual behavior that transcends, or wants to transcend, the more immediate issues of adherence to stadium regulations, spectator safety, and fire prevention.

The choreography or “tifo” of ultra culture is celebrated in the film as a vibrant example of organized fandom. In this regard, images and terse explanations instruct the viewer efficiently. Perhaps the most unique aspect of ultra culture’s leftism is the conscious and seemingly unproblematic creation of “tifo.” Siegfried Kracauer called such crowd behavior “mass ornament,” or the willing creation of geometric patterns composed of the de-individualized masses in the stadia (Kracauer 76). The leftism of the Frankfurt School and Kracauer’s proto-Frankfurt School writings are concerned with the crisis of the individual in capitalist societies and mass culture. The over-determination of the individual as late capitalism’s primary subject and/or victim forbids the strong sense of group solidarity and belonging that are the hallmarks of ultra culture. The leftism of the ultra insists on self-determination (however possible or impossible that may be), but that self-determination is made as a “we.” Only the ultra group grants the individual a social identity. The communal choreography of the “mass ornament” reveals a level of organization, preparation, devotion, and solidarity that the consumer-oriented fan or even the individual, ultra-unaffiliated fan could never match.

In order to explain ultra ideology, the film relies on less poetic and visual methods that sacrifice the artifice of narration and aesthetic for the sake of informative clarity. In one scene, Kowalski sits at a street corner in the heart of St. Pauli with the hip and disheveled, graffitied milieu of the urban “Kiez” behind him. The scene is filmed from Arne’s first-person perspective, namely the documenting camera eye. The digital images are noticeably grainy in comparison to the rest of the film sequences, and the film direction is simple, according with a standing Arne with camera in hand. Kowalski delivers the following monologue directly into the camera:

Yuppies. Sie nennen die Gentrifizierung “Umstrukturierungsprozess eines Stadtteils,” aber eigentlich geht es dabei ja nur um den Zuzug zahlungskräftiger Bewohner und dann auch natürlich nur die mit Werbeagentur und Porsche unterm Arsch. Und in Wirklichkeit wollen die doch auch nur ein bisschen Punkrock in ihrem erbärmlichen Leben und haben keine Ahnung, wie sie das alleine anstellen sollen, Mann. Ja. Ja, schon scheiße, wenn man immer den Zug verpasst. (Ehlail)

“Gentrifizierung” or gentrification is a looming threat in the film. Here, Kowalski describes the “restructuring of a neighborhood” as a concession to wealthier tenants, yuppies who work for advertising firms and drive Porsches. In leftist ultra language, a Porsche is a flamboyant status symbol of egocentric wealth and advertising is the wholesale embrace and proliferation of exactly the decadent, wasteful capitalism that produces Porsches. Kowalski further critiques the disingenuous yuppies as merely wanting a bit of punk rock in their “pathetic lives.” These tenants are essentially “slumming it”; buying their place in the gritty urban world and hoping to claim the authenticity and raw intensity of the local punk rock and ultra subcultures as their own.

The specter of gentrification appears again in several scenes featuring “Koritke” the real estate agent. Magnus’ girlfriend Natascha is an aspiring real estate agent and receives several lectures from her boss Koritke on the real estate business. When she shows hesitancy to organize the eviction of tenants from Arne’s building in order to make gentrified renovations, Koritke

delivers one of several cartoonishly evil monologues in which he plays the capitalist villain, complete with an Italian business suit and a high rise office looking out over St. Pauli:

Die Bewohner von St. Pauli sind zu 97 Prozent arbeitsscheue, faule Mietnomaden. (...) Das sind doch keine politischen Wesen. Das sind Egoisten, die denken nur an sich selbst. (...) Das sind Asoziale und die restlichen drei Prozent, das sind Ausländer. Die kommen, wann sie wollen, und solange sie hier sind, kümmert sich der Staat um sie. (...) Wir befreien diese Leute von einer Ungerechtigkeit. Eigentum ist Diebstahl, Miete ist Raub. Ab sofort werden die Mieter nicht mehr beraubt. (Ehlail)

At the end of this monologue, we learn that Arne's building has already been sold to a wealthy couple and the current tenants will soon be evicted or "liberated" from the injustice of rent. Kortike's free market capitalism sees no political agency in the "rent nomads" of St. Pauli. Kortike continues by rehearsing the standard conservative critique of the welfare state that supports lazy and/or foreign populations (we are reminded of the word "Zecke" from the ultra song).

This heavy-handed belaboring of gentrification might seem far removed from the world of professional soccer, but it is just one part of the larger critique of capitalism in ultra culture. All that is systemically wrong with professional sport and (selectively) capitalism is summarized in the term "moderner Fußball." As already noted, the Kuttenfan, hooligan, and ultra subcultures all find their genesis in the commercialization of German soccer. The difference in ultra culture is that a social and political consciousness has engendered a self-reflexive fandom with a level of critical awareness of the socio-economic and political circumstances of professional sport.

All European ultras seem to share the critique against "modern soccer" (Pilz and Wölki-Schumacher 5). A typical banner among the ultras in the stands reads: "Ultras gegen modernen Fußball." Ultras bemoan the commercialization of soccer as the deterioration of traditional club soccer. The club member has been disenfranchised. Traditional clubs once governed by members are now run like corporations. Sponsors now have more say in the administration of a club. The

membership, while still able to vote on a limited range of decisions at yearly club meetings, has been relegated to consumer-oriented fandom. Since protesting the vague phantom of capitalism is abstract, the ultras focus their protests on soccer organizations, particularly the DFB, and sponsors, both of whom the ultras blame for transforming traditional club soccer into a corporate machine. In a short scene in *Gegenerade*, Kowalski vigorously chants with fellow ultras in the stands: “Fußball-Mafia DFB, Fußball-Mafia DFB!” The DFB’s long and dubious history of political positioning and economic control over the market of German soccer has been documented,<sup>46</sup> but it is doubtful that the ultra’s comparison between Germany’s national soccer federation and the mafia is academically informed.

Ultras often protest the financial decisions of their club and other European clubs. For example, when the energy drink producer Red Bull acquired SV Austria Salzburg, ultras in over six different countries (including Germany) all protested the action. Since these protests failed to prevent Red Bull’s financial acquisition of the team, the Salzburg ultras abandoned the rebranded FC Red Bull Salzburg and through their own initiative reorganized SV Austria Salzburg in a lower league. Similar protests occurred when Red Bull tried and failed to acquire a club team in Leipzig.<sup>47</sup>

In order to support the club in the stadium, ultras must obviously purchase season tickets and thereby contribute to the very financial system they claim to reject. Ultras do not, however, wear official team paraphernalia of any kind. All ultra scarves, hats, and t-shirts are self-created and celebrate the ultra group first. While Kowalski, Magnus, and Arne are never depicted in ultra-created gear, anonymous fans in the packed stadium wear clothing with the logo “USP,” “Ultras Sankt Pauli,” one of the largest Pauli ultra groups. Each ultra group determines a certain

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<sup>46</sup> See Havemann’s *Fußball unterm Hakenkreuz*.

<sup>47</sup> This is not a triumph that the ultras could claim, however, since DFB regulations forbid single-entity ownership in the top three leagues of the Bundesliga (Ruf 122).

set of sartorial codes that protest the consumption of official sport merchandising and also display outward signs of group membership and cohesion. Part of this self-definition also seeks to differentiate fandom subcultures. Baseball caps, bomber jackets, and boots, all associated with hooligans, and the jean jacket of the Kuttenfans are avoided. Ultras are visually more fashionable and stand in contrast to “schmuddeligere Proll-Kultur” (disgusting Proll culture) of the Kuttenfans (Pilz and Wölki-Schumacher 8).

While ultras are exceptional as sports fans for their critical relationship with contemporary professional sport, their fandom practice stops short of the rejection of modern soccer in its entirety. As *Gegengerade* demonstrates, gentrification becomes part of the St. Pauli ultra cause. The brawls between ultras and hooligans also demonstrate the anti-fascism and anti-racism of ultra culture. However, many other societal issues find no expression in ultra culture. First and foremost, ultras are soccer fans, and any critical thinking or socio-political agency they might claim is erected in the framework of professional soccer, meaning a high profile, well-funded part of mass and popular culture, inextricable from advertising and consumerism.

Ultra culture cannot, and ultimately does not, reject economic consumption per se. Ultra groups refuse to analyze their own subject position within this economic system. Any responsibility for contributing to the economic maintenance and expansion of professional sport is either ignored or denied. The translation of ultra ideology into practice is highly selective. A stadium ticket is an acceptable form of consumption. Official merchandise is not. A brand name shirt such as Polo or Lacoste as an ultra group uniform is acceptable. An official FC St. Pauli jersey is not. Dick Hebdige’s definition of subculture describes well ultra practice in regards to consumption: as a culture of “conspicuous consumption” and consumption “conspicuously refused” (125).

Ultras would not agree with the Frankfurt School critique of soccer and of the culture industry, or at least ultras would not see themselves as witless consumers being manipulated by it. Theodor Adorno famously saw the seeds of fascism in soccer. The martial formations and spectator enthrallment of soccer only serve to enslave the masses to “the machine” (Adorno 43). Modern sport as a whole legalizes well regulated and tolerated excesses of cruelty and aggression, as legal as the “neudeutschen und volksdemokratischen Pogrome” (ibid.). In the 1970s, proponents of the Frankfurt School such as Gerhard Vinnai and Bero Rigauer condemned soccer as an ideologically repressive tool of late capitalism transforming the play of sport into rationalized work. They suggested it conditions spectators to purge their emotional and sexual drives via fandom in preparation for reentry into the exploited workplace (Vinnai, Rigauer). The ultras’ suspicion of sport economics and their rejection of the authoritarian determination of fan behavior and identity are reminiscent of many neo-Marxist critiques of consumer culture. However, fandom within and not beyond consumer culture is the ultra’s *raison d’être*. This prevents ultra culture from manifesting itself into a politically driven, activist movement.

### **4.3 SOCIAL IDENTITY IN *GEGENGERADE***

The overall depictions of the three soccer subcultures establish a hierarchy that encompasses the historical development of German soccer fandom. In the twenty-first century, the Kutfanf generation is aging and diminishing in number and significance. Around Baldu’s Imbiss we see old Kutfans with their unkempt beards, mustaches, and faded jean jackets. There are no Kutfans in the stadium. Hooligans, who thrive but have been forced out of the stadia, all in the form of the classic skinhead neo-Nazi, are only depicted in conflict. In contrast to the Kutfans,

they have a clear sense of purpose and give form to that purpose with every punch to face or broken beer bottle thrown. The threat posed by the St. Pauli hooligans is not a punk-inspired anarchy but an ideologically organized and therefore far more alarming implementation of violence affiliated with Germany's fascist past. They also are never depicted in the stadium. The ultra movement is now the most visible form of fan culture; the "avant garde"<sup>48</sup> of soccer fandom.

To appropriate Goethe's term, fandom social identity is a "Wahlverwandschaft." One typically does not choose a national, ethnic or regional identity. Even club soccer fandom can be an inherited tradition among some German fans (to be "väterlicherseits Gladbacher," for example). Despite the unification of German regions into a single nation-state since Wilhelm, German regionalism continues to play an important role in socio-cultural identity. Many German club fans express a pride in regional heritage by the choice of a particular club (for example, the fan base of 1. FC Nürnberg is a decidedly Franconian fan base). However, the choice to support a club cannot always be reduced to regional affinity, especially in a region where several clubs coexist. Choosing FC Bayern München is not necessarily an articulation of Bavarian pride. Instead, it places value on athletic and financial success, global prominence, and celebrity. Choosing crosstown rivals 1860 München is likewise not necessarily Bavarian patriotism. It is instead the choice of simplicity, perseverance, and a strong work ethic; a "working-class" club. Many fans hold on to the notion that geopolitical identity is, like national identity, predetermined and can be either embraced or ignored but never substituted with a different identity choice. Many fans, however, choose their club according to the values they see expressed in a fan base.

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<sup>48</sup> Many ultra groups across Europe have used the term to describe themselves and their fandom without referring in any way to the "avant garde" of aesthetics. Here "avant garde" is reduced to a synonym for "innovative" or "progression."

Such flexibility of fan affiliation is indicative of uprooted conceptions of social identity that are growing in Germany's increasingly mobile, outward-looking society. It expresses an individual's desire to affiliate with groups or institutions that augment or compliment his or her self-identity and self-representation. Flexible fan affiliation is not just evidence of a cultural trend toward an expanded conception of self-identity in relation to expanded social spaces. It is also evidence of the power of marketing. The global ubiquity of FC Barcelona jerseys or New York Yankee baseball caps is not merely a product of athletic success. It is also product of aggressive, well-funded marketing campaigns that sell fandom identity as a brand.

Choosing ultra identity is an even larger conceptual extension of this phenomenon; choosing one's identity not only in the regional and perhaps value-oriented specificities of a club, but also in the transnational identity of the ultra. The social identity of the ultra is not solely determined by geographic affiliations. Ultras are neither patriots nor nationalists. Ultra culture is exclusively a club soccer phenomenon and takes no interest in supporting national team soccer or national team tournaments like the FIFA World Cup or UEFA European Championships (Pilz and Wölki-Schumacher 13). Ultra identity does not incorporate the federal state or region, since such geo-political boundaries are still too large. Even the city does not strictly function as a source of identity, especially in the case of a city like Hamburg with two successful and popular teams (HSV Hamburg and FC St. Pauli). In truth there is no geography of ultra identity, for a resident of Hamburg might not live in the St. Pauli city district but still chooses FC St. Pauli over HSV Hamburg.

The pan-European social identity of the ultra is filmically plotted out in indirect ways. The specter of gentrification represents an enemy of the broad, neoliberal landscape to which anyone is vulnerable, yet the specificity and exceptionality of the city district of St. Pauli is held

up as gentrification's most precious victim. This representation grounds a global danger in a specific geography. The ultra international identity is most apparent in the film's last scene. The film's last images are presented in a slow-motion montage, cutting back and forth between three locales in St. Pauli: Magnus amongst the ultras in the "Gegengerade" celebrating FC St. Pauli's promotion, Arne being beaten by riot police in front of Baldu's food stand, and Kowalski being chased out of the stadium and ultimately apprehended by the police as the (false) perpetrator of the arson attacks. The extra-diegetic music that accompanies this montage is a dirge-like rendition of Rodgers and Hammerstein's show-tune "You'll Never Walk Alone." Fans of various soccer clubs from the United Kingdom have appropriated this song, most prominently the fans of Scotland's Celtic FC (Aldred and Ingle). In a long-lasting and violent intercity rivalry between Celtic FC and Rangers FC called the "Old Firm," Celtic fans have come to symbolize Catholicism, Irish nationalism, and leftist-oriented fandom.<sup>49</sup> FC St. Pauli fans have incorporated this song into game day activities as a show of ideological support for Celtic fans (McDougall 230-35). *Gegengerade's* inclusion of this song establishes St. Pauli in a network of international leftist fandom and ultra loyalty.

The ultra movement has become a large social phenomenon. It is thriving in continental Europe, growing in the Middle East,<sup>50</sup> and in its infancy in the United States.<sup>51</sup> Ultra culture functions much like a religion. As it reaches beyond the borders of its inception, its political motivations change according to regional circumstances and needs, yet it retains a set of core principles and practices. Ultra culture builds its identity simultaneously on the particular and the

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<sup>49</sup> For an in depth study of the violent history of the "Old Firm" see Foer's *How Soccer Explains the World*.

<sup>50</sup> The ultras of Cairo's club team al-Ahly and their clashes with Egyptian police during the 2012 "Arab Spring" are a recent example of the ultra movement intervening in the political theater.

<sup>51</sup> The "barra brava" movement, originating in Argentina in the 1960s and quickly spreading throughout South, Central and North America, is also characterized by group organization and highly choreographed fandom. "Barra brava" is not strictly synonymous with ultra culture, however, since "barra brava" activity ranges from hooliganism, gang warfare, drug trafficking (Argentina), militant leftism (Mexico), or loyal consumerism (USA). There is less ideological consistency amongst "las barras bravas."

universal. It celebrates a micro-identity even smaller than the province, while celebrating a movement that transcends language and nationality. Ultra culture is a subculture, meaning that style and choices of economic consumption constitute a significant part of its continued and proliferated social cohesion. Ideologically, it is held together by a selective set of protest methods against a very selectively defined contemporary capitalism.

Ultra identity would seem to outweigh the geo-political specificity of German identity. To live as an ultra would necessarily seem to be a choice against identifying oneself as a “German” soccer fan. However, the binary of particular and universal in ultra identity allows for a selective German social identity that can emphasize some socio-historical elements of Germany while disregarding or blatantly rejecting others. The ultras of St. Pauli find identity in the specificity of German history by incorporating anti-fascist and anti-racist social stances. The “Antifa” ideology of ultra culture is not a result of political correctness or a corporate initiated advertising campaign. Ultras also rummage through German social history for their connections to German leftism. A critical awareness of authority, especially in the form of the German police state, is an inheritance from the German Student Movement, yet the ultras’ participation in consumer culture and sport fandom necessarily forbids them from embodying the antagonistic activist spirit of the “68ers.”

German ultra activity takes place in Germany’s stadia and responds to the specifics of German club soccer. Yet an ultra affiliation is not confined to German culture. The ultras of Germany are in a sense the foot soldiers of a larger movement, representatives of the transnational spreading the word in the domestic realm. A common sight on graffiti-covered walls and highway overpasses in Germany is the simple tag “Ultra.” A club affiliation is often suffixed e.g. “Ultra Augsburg” or “Ultra Sankt Pauli,” but such suffixes are, if not entirely

superfluous, then at least ambiguous. To identify oneself as an ultra is enough to declare one's transnational connections and simultaneously to ground oneself in a particular.

#### 4.4 THE DYSTOPIC STATEMENT

*Gegenerade* makes a *dystopic statement*. Like the multicultural statement, the dystopic statement seeks to educate the viewer. It instructs and informs the viewer in a filmic ultra survey course. The film's narrative is visually and conceptually simplified in order to accommodate for the pedagogy. The plots involving arson, Magnus' betrayal of Kowalski, and Stiller's plan to undermine the ultra movement sew the ultras lessons together with a simple narrative. Despite the absence of the sport of soccer in the film, the dualism of soccer narrative nevertheless dictates that the depicted social realm is one of stark contrasts and easily identifiable ideological camps. The soccer narrative presents a restricted social realm. In order to didactically present the ideological elements of ultra culture and its enemies, the variables of political consciousness and praxis are reduced to the binary of "right vs. left." Right-wing ideology or any political conservatism to any degree is reduced to a Cerberus-like three-headed beast: the first head represents the neo-Nazi, the second head represents the ruthless capitalist, and the third head represents the brutal law enforcer. The reduction of the socio-political left is even more truncated: left = ultra.

Ultra culture is presented as the only champion capable of fighting off the right wing. No other form of leftism could match the intensity and cruelty of the beast. The ultras are guardians, the last remaining force holding back the siege of the right from overrunning the neighborhood, the stadium, and ultimately the world of soccer. In addition to the pedagogy, such heroics leave

little room for narrative subtlety. The bad guys are wholly bad from their first on-screen moments, including Magnus whose betrayal of Kowalski is foreshadowed in his cold demeanor and ignoble indulgence in violence. The good guys, Kowalski and Arne, are passionate and emotional. The violence of the ultras has a noble cause: antifascism. The violence of the bad guys has no noble cause: it is chaos (Magnus' arson), capriciousness (Stiller's law), or avarice (Koritke's gentrification).

The use of violence by both the ultras and the right, an otherwise polarizing act signaling moral deterioration and the rejection of humanitarianism, still does not blur the line between left and right, noble and wicked. A hierarchy of just and unjust violence is established early in the film, placing the ultras firmly on the side of the just (when hooligans attack the innocent, ultras enact revenge). These stark binaries give the ultra subculture its motives and means, while the right wing is only sketched enough to allow its portrayal as an agent of oppression.

In the absence of a narrative invested in athletes, the "winners and losers" duality of sport is transferred off the field directly into the social realm. However, in contrast to *Football Undercover*, *Tiger*, or the Wortmann films, athletic success on the field does not find its social reflection off the field. The never-depicted FC St. Pauli wins "Aufstieg," while the social realm around it slips closer and closer towards dystopia. What makes *Gegengerade's* statement a dystopic one is that the ultras, the film's heroes, are the losers. The mismatch of athletic and social success highlights the gap between fan and sport institution. Whereas the women soccer players in *Football Undercover* enlist the institution to create a utopic space of equality and tolerance, *Gegengerade* divorces the social cause of the ultras from the institution of the soccer club. The institution thrives at the expense of its supporters, who are ultimately dispensable. The

tragic end of the film takes social idealism away from sport by pointing to the disparity and injustice in which the institution of “modern soccer” now exists.

The film’s tragic end does not, however, advocate for the end of ultra culture. The dystopian statement of *Gegengerade* is a pro-ultra statement. The dystopic statement is a cautionary tale. Not unlike a documentary film about ecological conservation, *Gegengerade*’s dystopic statement presents the ultra as an endangered species in danger of eradication. It depicts circumstances in the present and gives them a trajectory into an undesirable future. *Gegengerade*’s circumstances in the present are the social and economic conditions of “modern soccer” as the ultras understand it. The right extremist hooliganism, police oppression, and gentrification of “modern soccer” can only grow in strength and potency if the film’s end is projected into the future and the ultras slowly lose the great war of “modern soccer.” The dystopia is a world in which true ultras like Kowalski have been successfully exiled by police or replaced by experience-oriented hooligans like Magnus. Magnus signals the erosion of ultra culture from the inside, for his will to violence strays far from the soccer-orientation, group belonging, and social ideology of ultra culture. A “hooltra” culture, predicated on anarchist and not antifascist violence, means the slow death of ultra ideology.

It is difficult to imagine what a multicultural statement, or a statement gesturing towards a social utopia, could mean in the case of the ultra movement. The filmic focus on dystopia is an extension of a subculture that defines itself primarily through provocation and critical awareness. Ultras can only practice ultra culture in the presence of their opponents. Without the authoritative measures of sport organizers, without the contemporary hyper-capitalism of European club soccer, without the complacent and obedient consumer-oriented fans, and without the right extremist hooligan menace, ultras are nothing more than a spirited supporter group. Conflict,

threat, and even victimhood are inseparable from ultra culture. The strongest signs of ultra solidarity in European stadia only show themselves after a particular ultra group has endured an act of police brutality. Being or feeling persecuted plays a significant role in the affect of ultras. *Gegengerade*'s tragic end captures this ultra brand of slave morality that originates in the weak and demonizes the strong.<sup>52</sup> The depiction of dystopia, of ultra culture's doom, is the most logical extension of the ultra imagination. Dystopia is thus the most effective depiction to underscore the existential imperative of the ultra movement.

#### **4.5 66/67 – FAIRPLAY WAR GESTERN: MULTICULTURAL HOOLIGANS**

Despite the relatively rapid geographic expansion of ultra culture, the number of “ultra films” is small relative to the wider canon of “Fußballfilm.” *66/67 – Fairplay war gestern* (2009), however, belongs to the much larger subgroup of “hooligan film.” This includes both documentaries and narrative films, the first examples coming from the United Kingdom in the late 1980s. In British hooligan films like *The Firm* (1989) or *Cass* (2008), hooliganism is contextualized in a social context that directly indicates its social origins: a hooliganism born of the disenfranchised lower class. Such depictions of hooliganism are ethnographic, offering artistic representations of the fringes of society. This sociological approach, whether in documentary or narrative form, offers the viewer pedagogical insight into a social “problem.”

The hooliganism of *66/67* forbids easy associations with hooliganism as a sociological phenomenon in the world. The social boundaries that *66/67* erects in order to frame hooliganism as a social problem are so broad as to be foreign to actual hooliganism. This is not an

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<sup>52</sup> See Nietzsche's *Zur Genealogie der Moral*.

ethnographic hooligan film that seeks to sensationalize fictitiously real world violence in narratively familiar ways. While the film depicts certain social and behavioral facets of hooliganism that can be found in actual hooliganism in the world, the film divorces hooliganism from its typical social genesis and milieu. The result is a depiction of hooliganism as a deeply troubling social problem that transcends social and political circumstances.

*66/67 – Fairplay war gestern* is a narrative feature film by directors Carsten Ludwig and Jan-Christoph Glaser. “66/67” refers to the historical 1966/67 club soccer season in the Bundesliga in which “Braunschweiger Turn- und Sportverein Eintracht von 1895 e.V.” (or simply “Eintracht Braunschweig”) won the regular season tournament and were crowned German champions for the first and only time in the club’s history. The film’s narrative takes place in 2008, after the club’s athletic success has long since passed. The former German champions are not only playing in the 3<sup>rd</sup> league but are also in danger of relegation to the “sportliche Bedeutungslosigkeit” of the 4<sup>th</sup> league.

The narrative follows the various storylines of a hooligan group in Braunschweig, Lower Saxony. This socially and ethnically disparate group seeks out and fights fellow hooligans or rival fans, whomever they can find first, in the name of Eintracht Braunschweig fandom. Florian, the group’s leader, tries but fails to keep the once large group of men from diminishing in size and significance. Now in their mid to late thirties, the group’s hooligans drop out one by one in order to become career men or fathers. The group has dwindled to six members. The hooligans meet regularly at a Turkish restaurant owned by fellow hooligan Tamer, who is caring for his dying father and running his financially precarious business. Florian distractedly pursues a romantic relationship with Tamer’s younger sister Özlem, a stage actress living in Berlin. Henning is not only a fellow hooligan but also a Braunschweig police officer in a family of

police officers. Otto is the second in command of the group. He is the lone homosexual among the hooligans. Otto is a “bug-chaser,” meaning he intentional attempts to contract HIV through unprotected sex. Christian is a lowly security officer in a deteriorating love relationship with Mareille. By far the most loyal to the group and the most obedient to Florian, the hooligan group’s disintegration affects him the most.

Things spin out of control for Christian when he stages a marriage proposal to girlfriend Mareille during halftime on the field in the Eintracht Braunschweig stadium. Mareille’s rejection brings him to the brink of suicide. Florian eventually talks Christian off of the roof by encouraging him to channel his aggression and hate into an upcoming and long since planned rumble with hooligans from Hanover. When the Hanover hooligans fail to arrive, an enraged Florian lashes out at the nearest group of people he can find, strangers in a parking lot without any affiliation to a soccer club or soccer whatsoever.

The story comes to a climax just before the hooligan group’s dissolution. Otto has visited a mysterious and exclusive “infection party” and it is unclear whether or not he already carries HIV. Henning’s father and commanding Braunschweig police officer discovers that his son has stolen fan memorabilia from the Eintracht Braunschweig clubhouse. Henning is suspended from the police force. Tamer’s father dies and the health department is threatening to close down the restaurant. Mareille, Christian’s ex-girlfriend, has been reported missing. Florian finally discovers Mareille in a small garden house after Christian has already kidnapped, raped and beaten her. It is uncertain that she will survive. Tamer’s sister Özlem finally breaks off the relationship with Florian for good, but Florian has already decided to work for his father’s shipping company abroad in China. The film ends with Otto and Florian on a rooftop, staring out

at the city of Braunschweig, high on narcotic pills, speculating on their futures and the future of Eintracht Braunschweig, which has successfully avoided relegation into the 4<sup>th</sup> league.

The hooligan group of 66/67 does not resemble the typical hooligan group of sociological study. The typical hooligan group consists of disenfranchised, lower class, young, white, heterosexual men with no prospects of social mobility, minimal access to education, and social and moral attitudes rooted in an unexamined sectarianism motivated by feelings of territorialism and articulated in physical violence. This would describe the various right extremist hooligan groups that have existed in divided and reunified Germany. The hooliganism of 66/67, however, casts a broader social net, incorporating a wide social demographic. The hooligan group consists of white Germans and Turkish-Germans. It consists of hetero- and homosexuals. It consists of various socio-economic classes. Florian, an engineer and son of a successful businessman, represents the upper middle class while Christian, a nighttime security guard, represents the working class. The inclusion of Henning, the police officer, inserts a representative of institutional authority and law enforcement into the hooligan group.

This social multiplicity makes the hooligan group's collective ideology difficult to trace. Tamer's activity in the group means that xenophobia or any programmatic racism is not a motivating ideology for these hooligans. The group members are aware that Otto is gay. Only his attendance at "Ansteckungspartys" comes as a surprise to the other hooligans. Homophobia, then, is also not a motivating ideology of the collective. The inclusion of several socio-economic classes forbids a social legitimation for the group's violence in economic disenfranchisement. These are not unemployed men with no economic prospects or no access to social mobility. Even Christian, whose career and living standards are the lowest, has humble, middle-class dreams of having a family and home if he simply continues to save and work hard, meaning his hooligan

aggression is not rooted in economic struggle. As a group, their actions can be described neither as politically right nor politically left. There are neither signs of typical right extremist hooliganism nor any signs of ultra-style leftism. The hooligans do not share an identity by virtue of common victimhood. They are not persecuted by any force nor are they the watchdogs of coming persecution like the ultras of *Gegenerade*. Even the common enemy that both ultras and hooligans have, the police, is represented in the group itself. The socio-economics and identity politics of each hooligan are so disparate that attributing a single collective ideology to the group is problematic. They are neither the single-minded, sociopathic hooligans nor the socio-politically aware ultras of *Gegenerade*.

Arguably, the most important characteristic of the hooligan group is its age. The narrative begins after the group has already diminished in size and significance. The hooligans are now grown men, struggling to maintain the responsibilities of mundane adulthood while remaining loyal to the hooligan group. The narrative focus on the existential end of the group, and not on its heyday, is tightly sealed off from the hooligan group's development through time. The past of the group and each individual hooligan plays no role in the narrative. The emphasis is not on the birth but on the death of hooliganism.<sup>53</sup>

The film does not indulge in flashbacks to socio-historically ground the hooligan group. The viewer never learns why each hooligan joins the group or from which specific socio-economic background each hooligan comes. The trope of the "broken home" does not inform the genealogy of this hooliganism, contrary to most hooligan films. There are no scenes of past child abuse, poverty, or parental substance abuse. There are also no depictions of the group as a spiritual or political cult, luring its members into a sect through the power of social belonging or

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<sup>53</sup> The USA/UK co-production *Green Street Hooligans* (2005) is exemplary of the narrative focus on the birth of hooliganism. An American college dropout is initiated into the violent world of a West Ham hooligan group. Powers of social allegiance and belonging transform a once promising student into a hooligan.

through a charismatic leader. The origins of this hooliganism are in the distant and undepicted past. The now of the narrative consists of adult hooligans, whose group cohesion is on the verge of disintegration, supporting a losing team. The cohesion of the group erodes because of time and maturity. As the hooligans age, conventional adult life increasingly intrudes on the decidedly youthful recklessness and self-indulgence of experience-oriented fandom. Individual crisis eventually outlasts the usefulness of hooligan identity.

On the surface, the hooliganism of 66/67 looks like a *multicultural* version of the Kutfanfan subculture: a simplified sectarianism that demands loyalty to the soccer club, loyalty to the group, and hatred toward all opponents. The Kutfanfans, however, support their club in an exclusive subculture of the white working class. Gays, Turkish-Germans, white working-class and educated Germans simply could not coexist in the Kutfanfan subculture. The hooliganism of 66/67 is socially inclusive. It transcends ethnicity and socio-economic class. Yet this casteless and colorblind brotherhood of violence does not strive toward the cultural harmony of conventional multiculturalist practice. The social goals of multiculturalism are missing in the hooligans' activity.

The end result of multiculturalism in *Football Undercover*, for example, is religious tolerance, cultural pluralism, and commonly established values of humanism, best exemplified in the form of the socially cohesive Al-Dersimspor women's team. Conventional multiculturalism is teleological; a goal-oriented program of cultural empathy and action that best reveals itself in the attainment of the goal, namely the final game between Al-Dersimspor and the Iranian women's national team, organized by the power of a persistent multiculturalist spirit. This is a telos driven by expansion, the need to convince others of the rightness of this brand of humanism and thus always setting anew the telos of multiculturalism in the next topos beyond. The

multiculturalist telos, once realized in the form of the Al-Dersimspor women's team, pushes onward in the attempt to fulfill itself anew (thus the Al-Dersimspor's insistence that the Iranian government take women's soccer seriously and thus a documentary film to convince "us," the viewers).

*66/67* forces the viewer to reexamine the function of multiculturalism, for the film's hooliganism presents a social constellation that fulfills some but not all expectations of multiculturalism. The film imagines a *multicultural hooliganism* but not a *hooligan multiculturalism*. The hooligan group of *66/67* has a multicultural makeup. We could imagine a multiculturalism-informed origination of the group in the filmically undepicted past; a multiculturalist impetus that staged the moment when these various persons from various walks of life accepted the social alterity of the other and formed an integrated group with common goals. The telos of multiculturalism came to fruition when the group was formed. But when this group established the boundaries of its own social engagement with hooliganism – and here I refer back to this chapter's descriptions of hooliganism's categorical experience-orientation, which prioritizes the experience of violence-induced intensity above all else, including fandom or social ideals – the group likewise abandoned the multiculturalist telos. This telos did not set itself anew beyond the group's formation.

The hooligan group is "multicultural" in a dative sense, implying a state of existence and set location that is immovable, seemingly fixed (the German dative case indicating location and stasis and not movement). "Multicultural" only describes the group's aggregate parts as an integrated unit but not its unified trajectory, its volitional movement, or how it carries its culturally varied existence forward into a moral practice. A *hooligan multiculturalism* would have to include expansion as its driving force. This would produce not a "multicultural" but a

“multiculturalist” hooligan group. The term “multiculturalist” acts in a Germanic accusative sense, implying movement, direction, and ideological proliferation by seeking out new direct objects as potential ideological receptacles (the German accusative case indicating not static location but the movement of objects in relation to location). A thing multiculturalist propagates multiculturalism, continues the trajectory of this program of morality and action to affect ever other objects in the world. The establishment of a single, limited multiculture (the hooligan group) does not sufficiently fulfill the multiculturalist telos. The multiculture qua hooligan group would have to expand in degree; more gays, more Turkish-Germans, and more educated elites. The multiculture would also have to expand in kind; women, the transgendered, Russian-Germans etc.

The film’s narrative does not begin with the hooligan group’s formation and expansion but instead with the group’s entropy. The expansive force of multiculturalism has already expended itself in forming the hooligan group. In the film’s multicultural hooliganism, the ability of each individual hooligan to accept difference and translate that acceptance into communal social action could sustain itself only long enough to create a single multiculture. The group’s inception does not ideologically extend into an all-embracing multiculturalist practice. The teleological spirit of multiculturalism has instead prematurely shut down and in its absence the hooligan group is not only diminishing in number but each member is returning to a pre-multicultural existence. Each member loses the social anchor of group identity through integration and is forced to negotiate life individually and according to differentiated identity politics. This group of integrated social difference disintegrates into isolated social difference.

In the film’s first rumble, as Otto waits in a bathroom stall for the appropriate moment to attack a rival Kutfanfan, a line of graffiti on the bathroom wall is visible behind Otto’s shoulder:

“Das Chaos is aufgebraucht. Es war die beste Zeit.” Otto sits again in a bathroom stall in Tamer’s restaurant at the end of the film, after Tamer’s father has died and after Christian’s kidnapping and rape of Mareille. Despite being in a different bathroom, the same line of graffiti is visible behind Otto’s shoulder. This phrase bookends the narrative.

The term “Chaos” allows for various perspectives on the film’s hooliganism. In a general sense, “Chaos” can mean disorder, disorganization, lawlessness, or lack of structure. From the eyes of the other, hooligan activity is chaos. The performances of the ultras in the stadium are highly organized, choreographed spectacles while hooligan activity is characterized by spontaneity, eruption, and a brutal non-linear power (the chaotic, unpredictable movement of bodies and objects in space when hooligans meet in combat). Where the law of the state and the economics of sport industry regulate the public sphere, the hooligan appears, disrupting and defying order in obvious, visible displays of nihilistic power, forgoing protest or conventional channels of registering socio-political discontent.

From the eyes of Florian or Otto, however, the film’s hooliganism is not at all chaotic. It is instead organized and selective; a redefinition and reprioritization of law according to the emotional needs of hooliganism. *66/67*’s multicultural hooligans do not ideologically imagine their enemies in terms of ethnicity, sexual orientation or socio-economic class, but they nevertheless organize society by establishing their enemy as the heterogeneous rival fan, simply a more socially inclusive or socially indifferent method of organizing the ideological makeup of the otherwise multifarious other. If hooliganism does not qualify as “Chaos,” then the statement “Es war die beste Zeit” is a nostalgic sentiment. It is a remembrance of glory days long since gone, days that grow fonder and more hyperbolic in memory with age. “Chaos” as nostalgia becomes an unfulfilled wish in the present. It grounds the hooligan past in an imagined absolute

disorder, lawlessness and, thus, the hooligan version of liberation. To remember the past as “Chaos” is to reflect on the present as its antonym: ordered, structured, restricted, and to the hooligan, a form of confinement. These antonyms can be attributed to the age of the hooligans who with each year acquire more structure and regulators of lived experience.

“Chaos” can also refer to the emergence of social identity among the hooligans. “Chaos,” in terms of mythic and religious creation theories, is the void; a primordial cosmic state of mythic time before the deity’s creation of the world. To shrink this usage down to the microcosm of human social identity, the hooligan group as a giver of social identity acts “chaotically” in that it creates a firmament of social void; an existential pocket of social equality, or social repression, where no social difference is allowed to subsist. All hooligans, regardless of difference, are equally of the social void, individual identity politics waiting to emerge.

The multiculture that is the hooligan group forms an identity based on an imagined non-aggregated group; a group void of individuated social identity. The group annuls difference and fashions an identity out of this annihilation. With the group’s gradual dissipation comes the gradual emergence of individuated social identities. Out of the void comes difference. This difference is not created *ex nihilo* but out of the hooligan void containing social difference *in potentia*. The death of hooliganism is the death of the social void and the birth of social identity, and thus the birth of individuated and isolated suffering. The film’s construction of the social origin and makeup of hooliganism stretches the sociological confines of hooliganism beyond its boundaries of veracity. This multicultural hooliganism arguably has no referents in the real world and thus says more about multiculturalism than it does about hooliganism.

#### 4.6 THE BIRTH OF INDIVIDUAL VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL DEVIANCE

Only in the first hooligan “rumble” of the film does the group function as a collective with common goals. The collective action of this hooligan group, by virtue of its socio-cultural heterogeneity, is ideologically simple and without manifest political or social ideals. This ideological simplicity accommodates for the social variance of the group by ignoring that very social variance. The film begins with a hooligan fight in rival territory. Florian, Otto, Tamer, Christian, Henning and one other minor hooligan (Mischa) are waiting in the stalls of a men’s bathroom in a pub. When a Kutfanfan supporting a different club shouts at Otto to get out of a stall, the hooligans emerge, beating the Kutfanfan and forcing his head into a toilet. The Braunschweig hooligans take the Kutfanfans’ “Kutte” and enter the main room of the pub where soccer fans are watching a game on television. After lighting the Kutte on fire, the Braunschweig hooligans shout in unison: “Hurra, hurra, die Braunschweiger sind da!” and proceed with a wild assault, throwing beer bottles and chairs around the pub.

This scene captures the ideologically simple, almost childish need of the group to provoke and thereby affirm its own social identity. The hooligans count coup by attacking a rival Kutfanfan in his own territory. The social recognition of the other, that the fans in the pub know which club they represent, is not only important; it is sustains group identity. The individual history or motivation of each hooligan is irrelevant. The hooligans reconstitute themselves as a collective by fighting and chanting together, by standing before the enemy under a common name. The hooligans are all simply “Braunschweiger,” and this only refers to the club Eintracht Braunschweig and not to any form of patriotism in the city of Braunschweig.

The social structure of the hooligan group serves as a means to experience violence-induced emotional intensity by organizing a specific kind and degree of violence, minimalizing

its risk through strength in numbers and supplying the group with ideologically consistent and simple enemies in the form of any visually recognizable soccer fan supporting any club other than Eintracht Braunschweig.<sup>54</sup> Through the simple goal of rowdiness in the name of Eintracht Braunschweig the hooligans are united. This particular rumble is appropriately placed at the beginning of the narrative, before the viewer learns the character background of each hooligan. The group's dissipation into individual crisis descends rapidly after this scene and guides the rest of the narrative. Individuality becomes crisis. This rumble is one last act of collectivity and ideological simplicity. It is a sectarian skirmish whose damage to society is limited to the group's imagined terms of warfare. Only devoted soccer fans (of any ethnicity, sexual orientation or socio-economic class) in well-known fandom haunts (like pubs, soccer stadia, or prearranged rumble sites) have to fear this small and aging hooligan group. The violence of the group is restricted by its limited goal. Thus, its societal damage capacity is likewise limited, predictable, and containable.

When the group functions as a group, its actions are utopic in simplicity. Group existence and worth seems epistemologically settled. The enemy camp is soluble; its unquestioned stability affirms the stability of the group. Always knowing the enemy means always knowing the cause that renders the enemy. It means always knowing the source of problems and reducing all problems to that source. The comparative social complexity of each hooligan's individual engagement with society – as a male homosexual (Otto), as a Turkish-German (Tamer), as an unskilled worker (Christian), as a member of state law enforcement (Henning), or as an educated professional (Florian) – is ignored, even repressed, for the sake of the blissful simplicity of the hooligan group's social cohesion. As the narrative progresses towards the group's structural dissipation, each hooligan is depicted in his own struggles with existence. The ideological

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<sup>54</sup> Historically, Kutfans through their conspicuous sartorial codes have often been the victims of hooliganism.

simplicity of the group can neither support the causes of each of its members, nor can its powers of catharsis continue to channel and focus individual aggression into the straightforward outlet of hooliganism. When the social structure of the hooligan group can no longer direct the aggression of its hooligans, each hooligan finds new objects upon which to project that undiffused aggression.

Each hooligan reacts to the dissipation of the group in destructive ways. This is best exemplified in the characters of Florian, Otto, and Christian. As the group leader, Florian's aggression is on the one hand tightly controlled – his aggressive energies must administrate the group as a social unit, organizing hooligan violence according to appointments and schedules – and on the other hand beyond containment. When a Hanover hooligan group fails to arrive at a prescheduled rumble, a dejected Florian says to Otto: “Ich möchte irgendwas kaputt machen.” When Florian sees a group of young men in a parking lot, he attacks. The hooligans follow suit, but as they flee the scene, Henning asks if these men were ultras, hooligans, or even soccer fans at all. At Florian's command, hooliganism has become unfocused gang violence.

Florian's violence outgrows the multicultural hooligan model. In the absence of “legitimate” hooligan enemies, Florian broadens his violence to encompass “irgendwas.” This “something” is even broader and more socially inclusive than the previous enemy, the heterogeneous rival fan. Everything and everyone becomes a potential object of Florian's aggression. Without the structure of hooliganism, his aggression knows no bounds. It is an inversion of the graffiti line: “Das Chaos ist aufgebraucht. Es war die beste Zeit.” The relative “Chaos” of violence without structure, without an imagined ideological face, and without his administration brings Florian to an emotional crisis. The expansion of his aggression is symbolized in his decision to work for his father's shipping company. By accepting a

representative position in China, Florian is on the verge of spreading his violence beyond the local hooligan scene, even beyond the confines of Braunschweig. Hooliganism was indeed the only social force able to cage and focus his aggression. Sans hooliganism, this aggression is geographically and ideologically unbounded.

This is visually represented in two scenes with Florian and Otto. In the first one, Florian and Otto buy narcotic pills from a dealer in a streetcar. When the streetcar stops, Florian and Otto step out, not into the city of Braunschweig, but magically and without filmic commentary into a nameless, bustling city with minarets reaching into the sky. Although the city remains nameless throughout the film, a brief still shot of the famous Sultan Ahmed Mosque reveals that it is Istanbul. When the effect of the pills begins to fade, Florian and Otto board a streetcar and begin to sober up, once again back in Braunschweig. Istanbul rematerializes in the film's final scene. Florian and Otto search for a quiet place to get high. They step out onto a rooftop in Braunschweig and suddenly before them is the Istanbul skyline and the dazzling blue of the Bosphorus. Florian asks for all the drugs that Otto has in his possession, but before taking them, he sits at the rooftop edge in a medium close-up, staring out in silence over the urban landscape. The images of Istanbul represent the intoxicated state of Florian and Otto, a drug-induced dreamland, but they also represent Florian's unbounded self and the territory of his new potential. As a hooligan, he was restricted to the smallness of Tamer's restaurant or the local pub. No longer bound by his hooligan ideology, his potential to spread his aggression is vast, and he surveys his new terrain on high like a general.

As second in command of the group, only Otto's aggression rivals Florian's. His identity in the group is strong. He is the only hooligan to refer to the "wir" of Eintracht as family. At a local punk club, he takes the stage and shouts out a punk ode to Eintracht Braunschweig: "Die

Macht, Eintracht.” At the same punk club, he sits at the bar and hits on male club patrons with a mixture of playfulness and aggression, each time unsuccessfully. It is unclear in the narrative what role sexual orientation plays in Otto’s activity as a hooligan until Christian confronts Otto at a group meeting in Tamer’s restaurant. Christian has heard rumors about “Ansteckungspartys” and that Otto is active in this scene. Otto vehemently denies that he is both a “bug chaser” and that he is HIV positive here and in another scene with Florian. But he eventually confirms to Florian and Tamer that he has visited such parties “accidentally.”

Several scenes later, a man in an elevator offers Otto a private invitation to a “Vernissage,” an exclusive infection party. An enraged Otto slams the man against the wall and threatens to punch him, denying that he is even gay. Nevertheless, Otto ultimately accepts this invitation several scenes later. The film depicts Otto’s psychological conflict around bug chasing in a rapid, almost frenetic succession of aggression, denial, and acceptance. The man drives Otto to a mysterious, dimly lit building. Otto has a card-key with the “+” and “-” signs on it, presumably signifying HIV “positive” and “negative.” He enters a dark room with two doors, one with the “+” sign and one with the “-” sign. A red beam of light blocks Otto’s way towards these doors. When he passes his hand through the light, both doors open. The scene cuts here, and the viewer does not see Otto enter or leave the infection party. “Bug chasing” is not explicitly referenced again in the film. While there is no concrete visual evidence to confirm that Otto has attended the infection party, his mood thereafter, especially in the closing scenes with Florian, is maudlin and distracted.

Otto either wants to or already carries HIV. This act of self-destruction comes only when the social cohesion of the group dissipates. The aggressive energy that Otto once channeled into hooligan rumbles and defending the honor of Eintracht Braunschweig is inverted to attack the

self. The film does not root this startling act of self-destruction in any scenes of manifest homophobia that would suggest that Otto is a victim of societal oppression and bigotry. However, the dynamics of the group consistently single out Otto as different. Christian is the only hooligan in the group who expresses animosity towards Otto's sexual orientation. When Christian outs Otto as a bug chaser, he accuses him of endangering the health of each hooligan by possibly spilling infected blood in battle and spreading disease.

The other hooligans accept Otto's homosexuality with mostly amicable, but almost insulting jokes. For example Florian shoves Otto away as they hug each other, saying "Lass mich los, du Schwule." Florian silences Otto in a group meeting saying "Hör jetzt auf mit der Schwulengerede." The various jibes and remarks about Otto's sexuality are contextualized in a multicultural hooligan brotherhood. He is different from us yet one of us. Yet together these remarks consistently single Otto out as different in ways reserved only for Otto as the homosexual hooligan. Tamer, as the only Turkish-German in the group, is not similarly singled out, nor is Florian singled for his high level of education and access to wealth.

The film thus gives homosexuality a different socio-psychological weight. Otto's sexuality becomes a more intensely different social difference; more different than ethnicity or social class. The presence of Otto complicates the homosociality of the hooligan group. The homosocial bonding of the ultras in *Gegenerade* is simplistic, establishing a realm of permitted homosocial desire while reinforcing the heterosexual nature of this bonding by the consistent insertion of erotic, objectified femininity. The homosociality of the hooligan group initially seems progressive by comparison. Unlike the homosocial bonds of the ultras, which can only exist by reaffirming heterosexuality, the group affirms and accepts homosexuality by including Otto in a homosocial bonding that is not manifestly supported by the subordination of the

feminine.<sup>55</sup> Hegemonic and nonhegemonic sexualities coexist in a hooligan, brotherly unity. When Christian accuses Otto of bug chasing, the balance of the group's homosociality is disrupted, but it is difficult to discern if homosexuality per se or bug chasing is the disruptive force. It is difficult to discern if the film even differentiates homosexuality from bug chasing as socially disruptive. In comparison to ethnicity or socio-economic class, the film burdens homosexuality with dysfunctional psychology. Christian's irrational and prejudiced fear that Otto's blood could harm his fellow hooligans is partly fulfilled. Otto seeks out the means to infect his own blood with disease and that blood can now harm others. The film establishes a hierarchy of violence in Christian's fear. The unmitigated gang violence of hooliganism suddenly becomes second to Otto's violence of sexual disease.

The film structures Otto's sexual orientation as a potential source of emotional turmoil that he must endure alone once the solidarity and simplicity of hooliganism recedes. Otto's aggression is the most consistent in the film, even more than Florian's, who is depicted in states of remorse and self-doubt when Özlem breaks off their relationship. The psychological path that leads Otto to bug chasing and thus self-harm is ambiguous. The consequences of his bug chasing are twofold. In the absence of hooligan enemies, Otto has made an enemy of himself, but his participation in bug chasing consciously spreads disease beyond his limited suffering. According to the film's logic, Otto's potential to harm society becomes far greater now that the structure and containment of hooliganism has failed his individual struggles.

The film's overdetermination of bug chasing as a form of homosexual violence is underscored by Christian's heterosexual violence. Initially, Christian's violence seems emotionally and narratively more prominent. His crime indeed ends the structural cohesion and

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<sup>55</sup> Özlem and Mareille, the primary women of the narrative, wield great power over Florian and Christian respectively.

function of the group. Never again will the hooligans fight and suffer as a collective. The kidnapping and rape of Mareille provides disturbing visuals of Mareille's unconscious, naked, and bruised body lying lifelessly in Christian's bed. As an image, Christian's violence is shocking and obvious. The film narratively grounds Christian's motivation in the familiar metaphors of group allegiance and obedience. Christian is the submissive, compliant foot soldier, following any and all commands from the "Anführer" Florian. His social identity and self worth are entirely at the behest of the leader. When Florian convinces Christian that Mareille is and has always been worthless ("Sie taucht nichts!"), and furthermore convinces Christian to embrace and channel his hate into an upcoming hooligan rumble ("Benutz den Hass!"), Christian misinterprets this pep talk as a command to take revenge on Mareille. When Florian discovers Mareille's unconscious body, Christian steps out of the shower casually and says: "Florian, du hast Recht. Sie taucht nichts."

Christian's crime occupies more filmic time and provides more images than Otto's bug chasing. Christian's crime also guides the narrative to its tragic end. The hooligans are tied into Christian's crime either directly or indirectly. Florian is partly culpable for influencing Christian; Henning does one last bit of police investigation before his suspension, which allows Florian to find the scene of the crime; Otto arrives on the scene to criticize Florian; and even the sixth hooligan Mischa later reports "making a statement" about the crime at the police station. Christian's crime thus involves the group and reflects directly on it. The mild-mannered and sheepish Christian is made a victim of hooliganism. By employing the "just-following-orders" trope, the film critiques the power of the group more than individual psychopathology and culpability, echoing the well-known theories of le Bon and Freud's crowd psychology.<sup>56</sup> The narrative climax in Christian's assault brings the tension to an abrupt end. Christian's

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<sup>56</sup> See le Bon's *The Crowd* and Freud's *Massenpsychologie*.

heterosexual violence is linear and limited. In the absence of the group, Christian quickly directs his now unfocused hooligan aggression toward heterosexual deviance, but with the act ends that aggression. Mareille is near death, and Christian is in police custody. His story of violence is over. The death of the hooligan group marks the death of Christian as a social being in free society. He can do no more harm.

By contrast, Otto's bug chasing is narratively and visually teichoscopic. It is referenced and spoken about, but it is never visually depicted. His bug chasing is isolated from the rest of the hooligans. No other hooligans are in the scenes when Otto encounters the mysterious man with the invitation, and no hooligan knows that Otto has once again visited an infection party and is possibly HIV positive. Otto's decision to attend the infection party, like Christian's violence, comes when the hooligan group's social structure has outlived its usefulness. But unlike Christian's violence, the film does not tie the other hooligans back into Otto's violence and thus make the group also culpable for Otto's bug chasing. The film portrays Otto's violence as individually motivated, secretive, and invisible; a violence of subterfuge rather than Christian's violence of dumb brutal force. While Christian's violence expends itself quickly, Otto's violence lies in wait. If Otto remains HIV negative, there exists the possibility of rehabilitation. But if Otto is HIV positive and continues bug chasing, then his infection has the potential to spread beyond his control.

The film's narrative makes it difficult to identify the threat that Otto poses as a homosexual hooligan. Does the film posit bug chasing as a sadomasochistic weapon of biological warfare, or does the film posit homosexuality as the psychopathological path to bug chasing? How and to what extent does this film problematize, even demonize homosexuality? The film does not reach any definitive conclusions. It is sufficient to say that the inclusion of bug

chasing in the absence of group-organized violence relativizes hooliganism as a social problem. Individual violence becomes the immediate legacy of group violence. The deterioration of the hooligan group marks the revitalized immediacy of fractured and not communal identity politics. The hooligan group of *66/67* as a social equalizer once recognized and integrated social difference, but it could not sufficiently erase social difference by giving each hooligan an alternate and enduring group identity. The hooligan identity ultimately cannot include socio-cultural specificity and individual psychology.

#### **4.7 THE POST-DYSTOPIC STATEMENT**

The depiction of the hooligans of *66/67* is a negative form of the post-multicultural statement. The post-multicultural statement of *Football Undercover*, for example, is the depiction of the Aldersimspor women's team. Images of Turkish-German and white German women training and playing soccer together as a team are incorporated into the film without commentary or pedagogy. The hooligans are likewise depicted without pedagogy. They are visually placed in rumbles, in the pub, in the stadium, or out on the streets with no commentary. There are no visual or narrative cues that point to the socio-cultural diversity of the group's membership other than the visual alterity of the group itself. No visual or narrative cues call attention to the group's social alterity. There are no clear didactic statements that contextualize the group's social alterity as morally progressive.

While the inclusion of whites, a Turkish-German, and a homosexual in a hooligan group is startling for anyone familiar with this predominantly white and right-leaning social phenomenon, the film's social constellation is nevertheless represented with a sense of

naturalness and understatement. The work of multiculturalism – of accepting difference of various kinds and integrating difference into a social existence of “Miteinandersein” – has already been accomplished amongst the hooligans. The viewer is not supposed to wonder at the group’s powers of cultural tolerance and harmony. As an already united social unit, the narrative instead points to the group’s actions. It points to how this multicultural group influences the world and not how it came to be multicultural in the first place.

The post-multicultural statement, however, implies a goal by depicting a certain social constellation within an implicit morality. The post-multicultural statement implies that the goal of multiculturalism has already been reached and that its depiction is unquestionably good or morally right, so firmly right, in fact, that its heavy-handed moralization is no longer required. The post-multicultural statement is a depiction of social harmony in a documentary aesthetic and narration, a subtle depiction of lived-in, familiar social harmony that serves as a social model for the viewer. The hooligans, either as a unified and or fractured social group, are not depicted in social harmony. Their multicultural structure is depicted without pedagogy, but their goals are always destructive. The hooligans stand in no way for models of multiculturalism. Without the goal of social harmony, this becomes not a post-multicultural but a *post-dystopic statement*.

“Post-dystopia” describes a narrative of an already achieved dystopia. The dystopia at hand is the volitional and organized violence of hooliganism. The chaos of hooliganism “was,” after all, “die beste Zeit,” and the past tense indicates that the conditions for hooliganism – for the “best” hooliganism – already existed before the film began its narrative. The hooligan dystopia exists prefilmically. Profilmically, the dystopia grows. While the social cohesion of hooliganism wanes, its violent human impetus waxes. That the violence of the hooligans increases in severity and scope with the group’s structural decline only underscores the existence

of dystopia. The group's capacity to destroy becomes minimal, relativized in comparison with the individual's capacity to destroy. The narrative's drastic change in hooligan social structure – from the hooligan's collective and socially indifferent rowdiness to the hooligan's deterioration into individually oriented destruction – does not ultimately alter the existence of dystopic violence in the film's world.

The death of hooliganism does not diminish the violence of hooliganism in this dystopia. Hooliganism as a limited group phenomenon becomes simply one manifestation of a membrane of violence. Aggressive energy merely changes form and degree throughout the film, subsisting as an animistic property, regenerating itself perpetually. The soul of *66/67*'s world is violence. The change in narrative focus from group to individual violence does not present the possibility of rehabilitating the hooligans, as one might expect in most films of the “hooligan film” subgenre. When Germany recognized hooliganism as a social problem in the 1980s, it quickly established new methods of institutional rehabilitation. Charging the institution with the task of rehabilitation expresses the belief that hooligans are capable of reform under the proper conditions, that hooligans can be reintegrated back into law-abiding society. This is a liberal conception of criminality that prioritizes rehabilitation over penology. The predominant narrative trajectory of many hooligan films from the US, UK, and Germany is devoted to the belief in rehabilitation. Either filmic hooligans come to realize the error of their ways, or they die hooligan deaths. In either case, the violence stops.

*66/67* depicts its hooligans as inherently incapable of reform. Their violence is unstoppable. The exit of each hooligan from the group does not extinguish his violent human nature. In the absence of the group, Christian immediately manifests his aggressive nature in rape. Otto seeks self-annihilation. Florian takes his violent nature abroad. The hooligans reveal

that their aggressive tendencies thrive sans soccer and subculture. To invert Jean Paul Sartre's attack on Cartesian dualism, essence does indeed precede existence; here an a priori essence of violence and hate that inflects all existential forms imbued with it. The movement of violence from group to individual contradicts the belief in rehabilitation by increasing and encouraging violence. The individual, conceived in the crowd psychology of Freud or Le Bon as the hero of reason and rationality in comparison to the irrational animalism of the group, is the vehicle of a violence that transcends the limitations of group structure.

The post-dystopic statement of *66/67* is ultimately a conservative statement positing the irreversible, uncorrectable digression of a dystopic expanse. Multicultural hooliganism lacks the multiculturalist mission of expansion, but it harbors the expansion of violence and annihilation. Whether in a group or isolated in the individual, there is no hope for reform. Here the dualism that the soccer narrative inspires – the relegation of society and its numerous complexities into the two camps of winners and losers – is further reduced to one. There is one predominant class of social beings in the narrative: violent perpetrators. Losers are abundant in this narrative. Winners are scarce. The only winner in the narrative is the one character who successfully escapes the dystopia; Tamer's sister Özlem, who leaves Florian and moves to Munich.

The multicultural hooligan as a dystopic figure cannot be limited to a single rung of society. Any larger societal phenomenon such as poverty, political disenfranchisement, or restricted social class mobility is removed as a variable that could contribute to the film's hooliganism. The film's hooliganism does not come from any particular place in society, meaning it could come from anywhere, or *no-where*; truly a dystopia. The disturbing depiction of Otto leads us to wonder if the film truly seeks to condemn homosexuality as in some way pathological. Christian's heterosexual violence not only forces the viewer to compare

heterosexual and homosexual deviance, it also forces the viewer to conceive of violence in sexual terms. In a similar fashion, the post-dystopic world of *66/67* leads us to wonder if the film seeks to condemn multiculturalism as a means to social harmony. Does multiculturalism plant the seeds of dystopia?

The multicultural constellation of the hooligan group does nothing to proliferate multiculturalist practice. It instead organizes violence. The film's narrative constructs multiculturalism *as* hooliganism. Like the limited social form of hooliganism itself, multiculturalism becomes an ephemeral social shell, a temporary reorganization of people but ultimately not an enduring moral code. Multiculturalism becomes just another subculture like the hooligan or even punk subcultures; a set of clothing and attitudes that one wears for a time before moving on to the next subculture.

What justifies the “dystopic” of the post-dystopic statement is the lack of narrative alternatives to the dystopia. There is no way out of the dystopia. The film does not posit alternatives to the violence of multicultural hooliganism. A multiculture forms and creates hooliganism. That hooliganism dissipates and creates individual violence. To employ Sartre once again, there is no progress. The film negates institutional solutions by including Henning, the Braunschweig police officer; a representative of institutional intervention. The film negates the rehabilitating power of family and love. Tamer's father dies and his family is falling into emotional crisis. Özlem leaves Florian once she realizes that he is incapable of reform. Even the family that is Eintracht hooliganism fails to save Otto from himself.

The dystopic statement of *Gegengerade* and the post-dystopic statement of *66/67* are differentiated by conceptions of hope in the power of soccer to create social identity. Despite the death and destruction of *Gegengerade*, the depiction of the ultra subculture and its social identity

establishes dystopia as a warning. However violent and provocative, the ultras are depicted as champions. The collective social identity they derive from “modern soccer” questions but does not forever condemn the world of soccer as an organizer of social cohesion and solidarity. A trace of hope is expressed in the ultras as a new and necessary breed of contemporary societal gadflies. Their protest acts as a moral conscience for the authorities of “modern soccer” to heed and behold.

The dystopia of *66/67* is not a warning but merely a statement. Any amount of hope in the world of soccer and fandom to create productive forms of social engagement or to create progressive social identities that work towards genuine cultural harmony is categorically denied. In post-dystopic depictions, multicultural hooligans are beyond salvation. Violence thrives regardless of its vehicle in a group or in an individual. *66/67* does not deny that soccer and fandom creates social identity. What *66/67* denies is that any social identity based on collective structures can address the crisis of the individual. Whereas *Tiger* and *Football Undercover* see the potential in soccer to rethink social belonging beyond entrenched enclaves, and where *Gegenerade* sees the potential in soccer to form social solidarity in the face of a common enemy, *66/67* sees only an ephemeral reorganization of human suffering.

In the logic of *66/67*, any and all social identities of soccer are phantoms against the constant of individual suffering. This regression to the crisis of the individual is an existentialist expression of individual alienation. It is a contrarian expression of pessimism. This expression comes at a time when filmmakers are fascinated by soccer precisely because its traditions of social identity formation in contemporary Germany are so popular and powerful. *66/67* does not deny the popularity and power of social identities in soccer. It denies their usefulness and their ability to change human nature. The power of soccer is only the power to distract fans from

themselves. It is the power to channel individual frustrations in one instead of one hundred of directions. Once the social identity of soccer fades, the individual will still have come to terms with his or her own company.

#### 4.8 STATEMENTS COMPARED

What makes the statement of *Gegenrade* different from the previous examples of *Tiger* and *Football Undercover* is its social trajectory. While the *Tiger* and *Football Undercover* posit utopias of community that seek to transcend societal conflict, *Gegenrade*'s social ideal is based on and defines itself by conflict. The film does not posit conflict as a social end in itself. Conflict serves two functions: 1) the film depicts the status quo of German soccer as teetering on the edge of dystopia. According to the film's logic, conflict is the only remaining weapon to fight back the incursion of dystopia. 2) Open conflict, and not the more typical, peaceful forms of political protest in the contemporary German public sphere, underscores just how desperate the struggle against dystopia has become. *Gegenrade* makes a dystopic statement, a statement that informs, educates, admonishes, and warns. The dystopia of the future has its roots in the present, and *Gegenrade* posits ultra culture as the only phenomenon preventing this dystopia from taking full form.

*66/67* depicts German hooliganism in a "post-state," like the post-multicultural statement. The film depicts a set of social circumstances with a sense of naturalness. These social circumstances are not contextualized, and the narration is without pedagogy. Just as *Aldersimpor* in *Football Undercover* is depicted without referring to its genesis and without questioning its social constellation, *66/67* depicts soccer hooliganism without defining it or

attempting to explain it either sociologically or psychologically. And just as Al-Dersimpson and its immediately recognizable multicultural membership and thus its immediately recognizable moral yet intentionally understated worth, the hooliganism of *66/67* is given an understated negative moral worth by combining sensational violence with mundane human existence. *66/67* makes a post-dystopic statement. Just as the post-multicultural statement does not inform, but instead depicts a utopia without manifest moralization, the post-dystopic statement describes, but does not prescribe, an already existent dystopia. The post-dystopic statement is not a cautionary tale like the dystopic statement. It offers no solutions or strategies on how to avoid, subvert, or even diminish the negative social consequences of the dystopia. In this statement, dystopia is the poison of now, and there is no antidote.

In the case of either soccer patriotism in *Tiger* or an inclusive cosmopolitan empathy in *Football Undercover*, German identity is depicted as a positive force able to shore up or form larger communities. A collective social identity paves the road to utopia. The dystopias of *66/67* and *Gegenerade* incorporate conceptions of the darker side of collective identity. Ultra culture and hooliganism are examples of negative social identity. They, too, unite people, form communities, and imagine relationships between kinds of people in society, but these communities exist only where conflict and aggression thrive. The films present German soccer's potential to create social identity and solidarity among soccer fans out of societal discontent, anger, and the will to destroy.

## 5.0 CONCLUSION: SOCIETY THROUGH THE LENS OF SOCCER FILM

Throughout this investigation I have repeatedly explored how soccer inspires consistent and meaningful social interaction in ways that other phenomena in German culture cannot with the same intensity. Exploring soccer in film and media, we can find the cultural imagination at work. We are shown how people experience soccer in their neighborhoods and communities, how they define themselves, how they relate (or would like to relate) to others, and how they imagine their society. It is this power to imagine, and thus recreate, German society that renders soccer film so vibrant. We should make no mistake: “true” soccer fans, the ultras and the season-ticket holders in Germany’s club stadia, will find no satisfaction in soccer film, for the game is rarely its singular focus. Soccer film is much larger than one hundred meters of grass or celebrity players. It is a means of re-visioning Germany society, placing soccer as the nexus through which various issues take form.

To be sure, my focus on soccer film and soccer-related media has pushed the game of soccer into the background. We have seen how, under the term of soccer, contentious German discourses like patriotism, gender politics, fandom subcultures, European Islam, cultural integration, and multiculturalism operate. These issues are certainly not exclusive to the world of soccer, but my investigations have found them in conceptually simple forms of artistic production that speak to a broad viewership precisely because of the popularity and accessibility of soccer. Examining conceptually and aesthetically straightforward objects of soccer culture

finds narratives of extremes: winning or losing absolutely, heroes or villains, and social harmony or social destruction. Metaphors of “utopia” and “dystopia” have thus been used to describe the social realms and motivations these media depict.

The discourse that has appeared most consistently throughout my analysis is multiculturalism. Because soccer is omnipresent in Germany society, the link often made between soccer and multiculturalism is not unexpected. The everyman’s realm of soccer is used to depict multiculturalism, which should be every man’s concern. My dissertation’s sample of soccer film demonstrates a fluid relationship between soccer as an artistically mediated narrative and the theories and practices of multiculturalism in contemporary German society. Close-readings have found multiculturalism as the central ideas of Tiger “die Krallen von Kreuzberg,” the work of Kanak Attack, *Football Undercover*, and *66/67 – Fairplay war gestern*. The analyses of these cultural objects have not only investigated the discursive role that multiculturalism plays in forming filmic characters and narratives. They have also investigated multiculturalism as a medial construction, or intersection of cultural discourses, visual cues, and narrative strategies that in some way comment on multiculturalism not only as an ideal of society but also as a social practice. These films construct social identities in support of or in opposition to multiculturalism, and soccer serves as means of mediation.

## **5.1 MULTICULTURALISM AND STATEMENT THEORY**

Multiculturalism emerged out of the new social movements of the 1970s and 1980s as a term to designate the claims for representation made on dominant culture by various identity-based politically and culturally excluded groups. Those groups included women, gays and lesbians, and

the disabled, but the primary focus of multiculturalism tends to be ethnic and religious minorities, minority nations (e.g. Catalans, Welsh, Basque etc.) and indigenous people. This broad definition does not describe how and in what form such political claims manifest themselves. For a more concrete definition of multiculturalism in material culture, Janice R. Welsch and J.Q. Adams' *Multicultural Films: a reference guide* of 2005 classifies a large and disparate body of 150 American film into multicultural subgenres: African American, Latino/a, Asian American, Arab American, Native American, and European American films (Welsch and Adams).

This classification permits any film about minorities in a culture to be considered multicultural. Under this definition, directors like Spike Lee or Fatih Akin would be multicultural filmmakers. This definition is not untrue, yet the specificity of these directors' work seems to be unfairly subsumed under the vast and relativizing rubric "multicultural film." Instead of defining multiculturalism according to its contents, I have explored multiculturalism according to the filmic and narrative strategies employed to depict it. The relationship between soccer and multiculturalism is here understood as a relationship of medial and narrative construction.

This dissertation investigated how multiculturalism is visually and narratively constructed, and to what extent soccer informs its filmic construction. With the membership of multicultural films and media so broad, a categorical classification of multicultural aesthetic is reckless. However, in the smaller units of *statements* as explored here, multiculturalism takes on a more consistent and observable form.

We have seen how the *multicultural statement* is a narrative and visual strategy intent on teaching a viewership the values of multiculturalism, constructing a didactic space out of life-

like, but ultimately fictive, cultural circumstances and carefully manufactured socio-political artistic dimensions. The multicultural statement depicts situations that *could exist, could apply*, and most importantly, *should apply* to the viewer. Its subjunctive construction does not hide a certain level of fiction. Its ultimate moral conclusion is based on this fiction: a “what if” clause, or more precisely, “given the social situation at hand, what if?” This statement’s pedagogical goals are met by using cultural stereotypes and tropes in order to construct immediately legible images. These images direct the viewer towards the morality of multiculturalism, which is depicted as good, desirable, and possible. A multicultural statement must implant a desirable future into the viewer’s imagination, negating any notion of society that either does not yet include a multicultural space or still requires its reaffirmation and strengthening. A multicultural statement is based on differentiation and distinction in order to perform its pedagogical function. To differentiate cultures is to solidify, reify, and reduce cultures to manageable images for the sake of employing a comparative method.

We best see the multicultural statement in the figure of Tiger “die Krallen von Kreuzberg.” His ethno-comedy combines cultural and national stereotypes of Turks and Germans to encourage a harmonious, bi-national form of soccer patriotism. Tiger teaches the viewer how to read his own image: the image of the urban, working-class Turk. Through his comedy, he sketches the confines of a Turkish figure and an oppositional German figure. The tension between these two figures produces humor, yet the viewer recognizes the resolution of tension when it takes place and accepts it as morally good: Turkish and German fans celebrating together and fans switching from one camp to the other. Tiger plays the role of the teacher, instructing with humor and drawing the line toward the pedagogical goal of harmonious cultural existence. His engagement with fans on the streets of Berlin posits situations that might not be accessible to

all his viewers – namely fan revelry amongst fans of many cultures, religions, and ethnic heritages – but as a multicultural statement, the viewer understands that these situations could and should apply to everyone.

In contradistinction, the *post-multicultural statement* was explored as an advanced method of presenting multiculturalism to a savvy audience. This statement depicts multicultural characters through understatement. In visuals and narratives that seem organic, multiculturalism is presented as an already-achieved social reality that requires no didacticism. The post-multicultural statement is no more or less fabricated and mediated than the multicultural statement. Both edited and reconstructed to form the appearance of a narrative whole. The post-multicultural statement is in the present tense, describing and not prescribing a “now.” In a mode of description and summation, it does not call its own stability into question as the multicultural statement does. The post-multicultural statement constructs the appearance of achieved multiculturalism and, thus, has no need to strive for a utopia it appears to possess already.

We have seen how the post-multicultural statement is dependent upon a certain relationship between the viewer and the discourse of multiculturalism. The subtlety of this statement runs the risk of illegibility. It is not immediately legible for viewers without an enculturated understanding of multiculturalism as a discourse and as a set of socio-cultural practices and artistic representations. While this statement retains the goal of positing multiculturalism as a moral good, its lack of pedagogy makes for a subtle representation of multiculturalism only recognizable to viewers already enculturated by multiculturalism and thus able to recognize it in rudimentary and advanced forms. A diachronic understanding of the development of German multiculturalism over time grants the post-multicultural statement its message.

*Football Undercover* exemplifies the post-multicultural statement. There is no didactic explanation of the cultural and ethnic makeup of the women's team of Al-Dersimspor. The film neither calls attention to the team's multicultural membership of Turks, Germans, Christians, and Muslims, nor does it employ didactic narrative or visual devices to form a message of heavy-handed morality out of Al-Dersimspor. While we are visually presented with images of multicultural objects, this multiculturalism is not presented to the viewer in an obviously moralizing fashion. There is no attempt to convince the viewer that the team's multicultural camaraderie is possible, desirable, or morally right. The images of Al-Dersimspor make a post-multicultural statement, because a multicultural ethos qua goal is replaced with an uncommented-on multicultural "reality." The multiculturalism of Al-Dersimspor is so common through the lived experience of the players that it is an ordinary state. The utopia of a multi-culture has seemingly been achieved.

Further in this study we explored how the *dystopic statement* frames the social realm in negative terms. Like the multicultural statement, the dystopic statement seeks to educate the viewer and inform about the status quo. Rather than didactically presenting social relationships on their way to a harmonious goal, however, this statement depicts the status quo as dysfunctional. The social realm is deteriorating into dystopia. It is envisioned on the path to destruction, but destruction is not a nihilistic or anarchistic goal of the social imagination. Instead, it is used as an object of fear to indicate the need for social change. The dystopic statement is a cautionary tale.

*Gegengerade's* depiction of ultra culture is exemplary. It instructs and informs the viewer in a filmic ultra survey course. The film's narrative is visually and conceptually simplified in order to accommodate this pedagogy. Not unlike a documentary film about ecological

conservation, *Gegengerade*'s dystopic statement presents the ultra subculture as an endangered species. This statement makes a call for reform, highlighting dystopia as a wakeup call for change. The depiction of dystopia, of ultra culture's demise at the hands of the right wing, is a logical extension of the ultra imagination of social struggle and victimhood. Dystopia underscores the existential imperative of ultra social identity and the larger movement by putting its existence in question.

The *post-dystopic* statement presents social circumstances in an advanced state of decay. It is a negative form of the post-multicultural statement. This statement presents dystopia as an already-achieved social reality. Here there is no hope of salvation in a broken society. *66/67* exemplifies this statement. Like the diverse women's team in *Football Undercover*, the "multicultural hooligans" of *66/67* are depicted without pedagogical or didactic intent. They are visually placed in rumbles, in the pub, in the stadium, or out on the streets in battle with no commentary. There are no visual or narrative cues that point to the socio-cultural diversity of the group's membership, which includes Germans, Turks, hetero and homosexuals, and members of several socio-economic classes. No visual or narrative cues specifically call attention to the group's social alterity, which is not contextualized as morally progressive. The multicultural work of accepting difference of various kinds and integrating difference into a social existence has already been accomplished. As an already united social unit, the film instead points to the group's actions; how this multicultural group influences the world and not how it came to be multicultural in the first place.

The hooligans are not depicted in social harmony and thus do not serve as a social model for the viewer. The hooligans stand in no way for advocates of multiculturalism. "Post-dystopia" describes a narrative of an already achieved dystopia. The dystopia at hand is the volitional and

organized violence of hooliganism. That the violence of the hooligans increases in severity and scope with the group's structural decline into individual crisis only underscores the existence of dystopia. The group's capacity to destroy becomes minimal, relativized in comparison to the individual's capacity to destroy. The post-dystopic statement of *66/67* is a conservative statement positing the irreversible, uncorrectable decay of a dystopic expanse. Multicultural hooliganism lacks the multiculturalist mission of expansion, but it instead harbors the expansion of violence and annihilation.

Each of these medial tools traces a different relationship to multiculturalism and social identities, but all of them restrict signification and reduce social complexity to manageable circumstances and largely predictable consequences. In these soccer films, statements are influenced by *soccer narrative*. The soccer narrative refers to a broad narrative strategy employed in many, if not most artistic artifacts that make soccer their theme in a social context broader than mere athletics. It is a typical narrative that works to reduce an object's social realm to simple depictions of either/or. Social binaries stand in mimetic relationship to the intrinsically dualistic nature of competitive sport and the soccer match, defined by two sides and in the distinction of sides a typical ethical moral distinction: good versus bad, underdog versus favored, newcomers versus champions. The social realm of soccer narrative might not find a happy ending as the typical sport film narrative does (as the dystopic films of *Gegengerade* and *66/67* demonstrate), but that social realm nevertheless functions dualistically and in relative conceptual simplicity. This produces social realms of extremes.

The social identities put forth by several of these films define themselves in relation to culture writ large: Tiger's multiculturalism is bi-national and *Football Undercover's* multiculturalism is transnational. Here "culture" refers to peoples, places, and spaces, and

multiculturalism organizes that vastness. The social identities put forth by the fan films of this dissertation, however, reduce multiculturalism and even culture down to the *subculture*. Here identities form and function in a compact yet intense social unit. Soccer film is in a singular position to capture the raw intensity and violence of perhaps the most well known aspect of European soccer culture: radical fan subcultures.

## 5.2 SOCCER SUBCULTURES

Outside of the stadium, soccer film provides one of the best venues to study subcultures. The fan subcultures of European soccer are unique, both in terms of subcultures and fans. There have been numerous sociological and ethnographic studies of the hooligan subculture, and the research on ultra culture is growing as this movement continues to spread across Europe and into the Middle East. The study of subcultures was most notable in the work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham with Dick Hebdige's work on the punk subculture arguably being the most well know contribution. Despite sport subcultures being numerous and noticeable, especially in Cultural Studies' home of the United Kingdom, sport did not receive sustained treatment in the development of the discipline at the CCCS. However, the center supported limited research on kung-fu, pool, skateboarding, and squash (Hargreaves and McDonald 51). Sport sociologist Jennifer Hargreaves describes the "silence on sport" in Cultural Studies as a "form of cultural chauvinism." This is proof that Cultural Studies academics operate with an "intellectual mindset that dichotomizes mind and body (quoted in Hughson et al 81-2). Regardless of Cultural Studies' neglect of sport subcultures, the typical

Cultural Studies reading of youth subcultures as a form of social resistance has influenced the contemporary sociological research on hooligans and ultras (39-40).

The fandom of soccer subcultures typifies the notion of subculture as social resistance. Soccer fandom, either the hooligan or ultra fan subcultures, is exceptional in this regard. While other European sports attract many spectators and win fan devotion (motor sports and boxing have remained popular in Germany since the early twentieth century), soccer is the only sport that has nurtured forms of fandom that incorporate strong group organization, group identity, and social resistance. The wave of fan films that accompanied the rise of hooliganism in Western Europe beginning in the 1980s and the ultra movement at the turn of the twenty-first century have attempted to capture the energy of these subcultures in documentary and narrative works.

The fan film subgenre of soccer film has not successfully crossed the pond from Europe to the United States.<sup>57</sup> This reflects the divergence of fandom practices in the North American and European sports markets. While fan violence is a phenomenon in North America, most visible when teams win important games and fans take to the streets to “celebrate,” the ideologically organized, experience-seeking subculture of hooliganism is foreign to North American sport. Fan practices in North American and European stadia are also divergent. American baseball fans, for example, are often considered “submissive fans” who are inclined to “go along with whatever is asked of them by sporting authority,” which does not suggest that they do not enjoy their fandom experiences, but that “such experiences do not involve practices indicative of social resistance” and do not “express an identity of their own making” but instead of sport officialdom (Hughson et al 105). Consumer-oriented fandom accounts for the majority of sports fans on both continents, but European soccer subcultures, especially in the ultra movement, have developed social identities that view consumerism as inauthentic, manipulated,

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<sup>57</sup> The American / British co-production *Green Street Hooligans* (2005) is a notable exception.

and passive. This approach to fandom sees sport as more than just a pleasurable spectator activity.

The economic and administrative specificities of club soccer have given European, and specifically German, fans a critical awareness of sport governance. This critical awareness does not exist in any other form of sport fandom in Europe, yet this awareness is not latent in soccer. For example, *Major League Soccer* has existed in the United States and Canada for twenty years and has grown fan bases that directly imitate European fan practices such as songs and chants, “tifo,” and self-designed soccer paraphernalia. However, because *Major League Soccer*, like most other professional sport leagues in North America, uses the franchise system of team ownership, fans have no official relationship to sport authorities and are largely unconcerned with sport industry. North American fans have not been alienated from relationships of power because there have been few opportunities for fans to take part in the administration of a professional team. Fan alienation has created European soccer subcultures. European fan practices have arrived in America, while a subculture consciousness has not.

My dissertation’s analysis of fan film as a socio-political object confronts a methodological problem in theorizing such a mass phenomenon, and that is the problem of socio-political consciousness and consumerism, a problem represented by advocates of the Frankfurt School. If soccer fandom is, as explained in the work of German sociologists Rigauer, Böhme, and Vinnai, a mechanism of capitalist enterprise and a misguided social practice stemming from false consciousness and supporting the financially powerful – and if soccer fandom is performed in deference to more political or critically engaged forms of social agency like political campaigning, protest movements, participation in literature salons etc. – then how do we understand those who gladly participate in this culture and derive social identity from it?

How do we understand their time, action, and devotion? While the agency of soccer fans is not the agency of a political or protest group, the study of fan film takes seriously the power of soccer subcultures to form long-lasting social identities in a time when other groups like religious congregations or political parties in Germany are attracting fewer members. The loud and sometimes violent social interactions inspired by soccer are more than just puppetry with capitalism pulling the strings. Films like *Gegenerade* and *66/67* present soccer subcultures in their moments of agency, social organization, and solidarity, but also in their moments of nihilism and unjustifiable violence.

The multicultural and subcultural forms of social identity in these films establish both soccer and soccer fandom in an interesting relationship to the nation: both elude the nation as a singular source of social identity. Multicultural social identities do this by affiliating themselves with large conceptual constructs, while subcultural social identities do this by finding value in the smallness of a single group. The nation plays an ambiguous and sometimes problematic role in German soccer film, for the notion of the nation is often accompanied by conceptions of conventional patriotism that do not recognize the twenty-first century circumstances of German soccer, German social identity, and Germany's place in an increasingly interconnected, globally minded world. Most soccer film connects to the world not through the nation, but through the club.

### **5.3 CLUB OVER NATION**

Most German soccer films make for poor studies of conventional patriotism and nationalism. This might come as a surprise since the mass displays of soccer patriotism in the public sphere of

post-2006 Germany continue to attract much press coverage in Germany and abroad. With the exception of Sönke Wortmann, most filmmakers are unconcerned with German patriotism and national fandom, focusing instead on communities and constellations smaller than the country or the nation (like the club, town, or district), or on issues that transcend the nation (like ethnicity or gender). There are three reasons for German soccer film's avoidance of patriotic and/or nationalist issues.

The first reason is logistical. In the case of documentary films, access to either the men's or women's national team is difficult to obtain. Sönke Wortmann, Britta Becker, and Sung-hyung Cho are part of the small group of directors who had have intimate access to the teams for filming purposes. Phillip Kohl's *Transnationalmannschaft* (2010) is one of the few documentaries that focus on national team fans and not the players, focusing particularly on German fans with a migration heritage. In the case of narrative films, any story around the national team tends to require a high budget. Wortmann's *Das Wunder von Bern* not only used computer-generated effects to recreate Wankdorf Stadium in Switzerland, but also used precise choreography with accomplished athletes to recreate historical player movements on the field. Such expensive and pedantic period pieces are beyond the logistical scope of most soccer film directors.

The second reason is that, despite the festive and "innocuous collective identity" of national team fandom, the suspicion still lingers that the "bonds of nationalism always contain a fear of what exists outside" and thus national soccer fandom is presumed to retain "psycho-cultural roots in xenophobia" (Hughson et al 124). This reason implies that omitting national fandom in soccer film is a way of avoiding the elephant in the room that is Germany's history of institutional racism and xenophobia. This makes the directors of German soccer film complicit in

the failure to confront the past and a quasi-admittance of the dangerous power of national team fandom to enthrall the masses once again under the German flag.

The third, and more likely, explanation is that club soccer is simply nearer and dearer to German hearts than national team soccer. Club soccer on the professional and amateur level is culturally more pervasive and likewise more mundane than national team soccer. It is accessible to all as a sport. As a practice of fandom, it represents an identity of choice and not heritage. The power of club soccer to create bonds of social identity is far greater than the occasional “all-star games” of national team competition. The relationship between the German national team and its fans is arguably static in comparison to club soccer’s player/fan relationships. Many fans, ultras in particular, believe that *they* are the club; they are the essence of Schalke 04 or FC St. Pauli. The players on the field are important, but ultimately dispensable. Club fans celebrate themselves first and the team second, while national fans celebrate the team first and themselves second.

When soccer film situates a narrative in the German city, town, or club, this could be read as an articulation either confirming or condemning the provincial. For example, the short soccer film *Die Katze von Altona* (2002) is set in the backwaters of Hamburg. A cross-dressing young man works at a soccer clubhouse in fear of being discovered by the conventionally masculine club members. Here a closed society is accompanied by a closed worldview. The provincial is depicted as an inhibitor of social tolerance. However, many soccer films open up the world of club soccer by situating it in a specific locality. *Gegengerade* demonstrates this by depicting its characters in a leftist fan tradition that is idiosyncratic to the St. Pauli district of Hamburg. The conflicts in the film threaten the uniqueness of St. Pauli’s ultra/leftist scene. Yet by establishing a narrative in St. Pauli and in its ultras, the film connects the struggles of the Pauli fans to the pan-

European project of the ultra movement and to the global issues of gentrification and neoliberalism. Pauli's struggles become global struggles. *Football Undercover* takes an otherwise insignificant amateur women's club team in Berlin-Kreuzberg and builds a narrative that spans continents and includes several cultures, political states, and interpretations of religious practice and jurisprudence. Here are soccer films that begin their narratives in the local and build bridges beyond Germany's political borders.

Conventional notions of patriotism and the nation simply do not describe the social constellations of the majority of German soccer films. Most soccer films are so provincial that the German nation disappears. But some are so cosmopolitan that the German nation cannot contain them. While it would be difficult to apply any one theory of cosmopolitanism to the possible social trajectories of soccer film, Bruce Robbins' explanation of "actually existing cosmopolitanism" as a "reality of (re)attachment, multiple attachment, or attachment at a distance" begins to describe the social intersections that soccer film can represent (3).

#### **5.4 THE WOMEN'S GAME**

Arguably the most compelling subgenre of soccer film is women's soccer film. I hope the discussions here have opened new insights and have made clear that women's soccer film merits further research. The rubric "gender politics" only begins to describe the issues at hand in most women's soccer film. Gender politics as a filmic conceptual guide has the power to include multiple issues like women's equality, women's athletics, sexuality, the athletic body, women's inclusion in sport authority, and culturally inherited gender roles. However, gender politics also has the power to resist discourses that might otherwise dominate a particular film narrative. The

gravitational pull of gender often prevents women's soccer films from contributing to other discourses not directed related to gender politics.

For example, two documentary films on the German women's national team, Britta Becker's *Die besten Frauen der Welt* (2008) and Sung-hyung Cho's *11 Freundinnen* (2012), depict professional players who represent Germany at the highest level of the global women's game. These women not only play for the German nation, but they also succeed prolifically. *Die besten Frauen der Welt* documents the national team as they win the World Cup tournament. Yet these documentaries are not merely female equivalents to Wortmann's *Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen*. There is no German soccer nation in full euphoria to be seen, no crowds of fans jostling for autographs, and no policemen celebrating their team with German flags. Through the individual biographies of the national team players, these films emphasize personal narratives of struggle and prejudice. These films reveal that, despite the unparalleled success of the women's national team, gender alienates women's soccer from patriotic sentiment. Ultimately, the most definitive adjective in "German women's national team" is "women." These films pose the question: are national fandom and soccer patriotism inherently "male"? Can the objects of patriotic fandom only be "masculine"?

*Football Undercover*'s contribution to women's soccer film is unique. Gender politics is developed on a transnational scale, addressing women's equality in Germany, Iran, and, indirectly, Turkey. Yet gender politics does not overpower other contentious issues of German society that are present in the film, like European Islam and the "Muslim woman" debates. This documentary makes no doubt about its stance on women's equality in the Islamic Republic. Yet this message speaks to specific German issues of migrant integration and religious practice in the public sphere as well, especially as the headscarf debates were transforming themselves into anti-

veiling legislation in Germany and France. The film's intervention into the debate on the "Muslim woman" in Europe skillfully avoids the traps of the political spectrum, since the right and left sides of European political communities seemed to collapse in the face of the supposed common enemy in Islam. *Football Undercover* does not make a place for the Muslim woman in Germany, but instead reveals that she already has a place. The film's contribution to the Islam in Germany debate is to depict the Muslim woman as an enculturated, soccer-loving German who is beyond the need for integration.

*Football Undercover's* reception at international film festivals reveals the communal goals of women's equality, women's athletics, and the gay and lesbian community. The relationship between queer film and women's soccer film is a delicate one. In combination they can advocate for tolerance and emancipation on two social fronts, yet the addition of queer themes could rehearse certain stereotypes of the woman soccer player as a masculine athlete. Any analysis of women's soccer film would have to decide where and to what extent to include queer film. The existence of several soccer films about gay players fighting against hegemonic masculinity and homophobia warrants a separate study on the conceptual and narrative characteristics of "queer soccer film," keeping in mind that homosexuality in men's and women's athletics have commonalities and disparate adversities respectively. The form of gender political soccer film also must be taken into consideration: soccer films about gay players are comedies while films about women and/or lesbian players are documentaries.

## 5.5 FUTURE RESEARCH

My dissertation has kept its focus within the borders of German-language cinema. The next step is to open the investigation to incorporate soccer film from other national cinemas. The United Kingdom was the first to produce hooligan films in the late 1980s, and the first ultra documentaries were from the Italian ultra scenes of the 1990s. A comparative method could further define the generic parameters of hooligan and ultra fan film and examine the local attributes of these pan-European subcultures. Broadening the research on soccer subcultures and fan film to incorporate other national cinemas also invites a comparative investigation into the ultra movement as it spreads in the Middle East, most prominently Egypt, and right-wing hooliganism as it spreads across Eastern Europe. Such an investigation would have to take into account professional soccer's difficulty in regulating fandom subcultures, as numerous incidents of fan-based racism and xenophobic hooliganism in Italy, the Netherlands, Serbia, and Poland have revealed.

Studying multiculturalism in soccer film could benefit from a multinational perspective and account for the growth and hindrance of multiculturalism as implemented in various European states. The Dutch, Belgium, Italian, and French professional leagues and their respective national teams feature many players with migrant heritages, yet multiculturalism remains a contentious discourse off the field. France's Mahgreb population in particular offers parallels and significant contrasts to the Turkish population in Germany. The 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa inspired several reportage pieces and documentaries on the power of sport in a divided society. Bringing these issues into consideration would open the study of multiculturalism to a global level.

A multinational perspective on women's soccer film would allow for the incorporation of American women's soccer films, next to Germany the most significant women's soccer country and a frequent producer of women's soccer film. This study could examine the social implications of documentary narrative structures and how they advocate for the continued existence and expansion of women's soccer. Turkish-German director Aysun Bademsoy's soccer trilogy *Mädchen am Ball* (1995), *Nach dem Spiel* (1997), and *Ich gehe jetzt rein* (2008) charts similar terrain to *Football Undercover*. These documentaries follow the lives of women players from an exclusively Turkish soccer club in Berlin-Kreuzberg. While they temporarily break from traditional, cultural prohibitions against Muslim women in sport, the last installment of the trilogy shows the players long after they have given up soccer and settled back into lives of domesticity and despair. Bademsoy depicts the intersection between Turkish-Germans and traditional prohibitions against Muslim women in sport again in *Ein Mädchen im Ring* (1996), a documentary about a Turkish-German school student in Köln who trains as a boxer while she completes her "Abitur." The work of Aysun Bademsoy could be examined in dialogue with *Football Undercover* in order to inform a more detailed discussion of Turkish-German women in soccer, in traditional and progressive family constellations, and in religious communities.

It seems impossible to imagine that soccer as a sport, spectacle, and source of film and media could grow larger than it already has in Germany and in the world. Yet recent signs of soccer's expansion show this to be the case. The novelty of public viewing sites during the 2006 World Cup is gone. Now public viewing is an expected fixture of high profile tournaments, and the size and scope of public viewing will grow to meet the demands of the fans. International club soccer tournaments like the UEFA Champions League or the UEFA Europa League have risen from minor tournaments with few interested spectators to global televised events. Even the

United States sports market, one of the most resistant to “imported” sport forms, has been infiltrated by soccer. It seems only a matter of time before the American sport film genre turns to soccer to tell its stories of triumph over adversity.

The globalization of soccer has already and will continue to change Germany’s self-perception as a soccer nation. The continued creation of soccer film will most certainly introduce new imaginations of German society onto the screen. But these imaginations cannot be bound exclusively to the nation, national history, or historical forms of social identity. Soccer film has the power to combine the game’s nearly universal appeal with narrative strategies that imagine the world not as a disparate collection of states and peoples, but as a cosmopolitan realm, united in the innate human drama that sport so efficiently conveys.

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