

**NATIONAL PARTIES AND EUROPEAN  
LEGISLATORS**

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **NATIONAL PARTIES AND EUROPEAN LEGISLATORS**

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This dissertation examines the relationship between members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and national political parties by investigating how variation in party organization, in conjunction with the political goals of parties and individuals, affects European legislation and the representation of national interests. I examine the relationship between MEPs and their national parties through the methods and strategies parties use to select and supervise their party members serving in the European Parliament (EP). I identify patterns in candidate selection and supervision and determine how the electoral goals of parties in European elections lead them to make specific strategic choices for candidates and encourage specific behaviors in the EP. I argue that these choices, and the structure of party organization, influence the level of congruence between MEPs and their parties in European legislation. I determine that the single most important influence on both how a party organizes for European elections, and who they choose to represent them in the EP, is the national environment in which the party was founded and within which it was designed to function. The structure of national legislative institutions, and party systems and experience with the European Union (EU) and the Eurozone predict patterns in variation across party organizations with respect to their centralization of selection and supervision of MEPs. Similarly, European electoral goals are the result of domestic factors such as the position of the party in national government, party ideology for Europe, party system stability, and salience of EP elections. These goals determine the types of candidates, experienced in Europe, at the national level, or not all, that parties select to serve in the EP and how these MEPs view their role as a

party representative. In addition, both organization and goals influence legislator behavior in a variety of ways. MEPs in policy seeking parties that centralize the selection of MEPs, and also include them in their party leadership provide the most congruent behavior to their parties.

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## **PREFACE**

### **DEDICATION**

This dissertation is dedicated to my grandparents, Violet May and Douglas Leon Aldrich, who inspired my intellectual curiosity at an early age and always made sure I had enough books to read.

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## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

In a plenary session of the European Parliament (EP) on December 17, 2008, British Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) split a vote 17 in favor and 43 against a legislative amendment that would phase out the United Kingdom opt-out of the Directive on the Organization of Working Time.<sup>1</sup> While it is expected that MEPs within a national delegation may often split on a vote since they usually contain politicians from multiple parties, this vote was particularly peculiar because the British Labour Party was also split 13-5 in favor of removing the opt-out. What is even more peculiar is that those Labour members voting in favor of the abolition of the opt-out, the majority of 13, were rebelling against the Labour Prime Minister and party leader, Gordon Brown.<sup>2</sup> They were speaking publicly against their leader even though European elections were right around the corner ([BBCNews 2008b](#)).<sup>3</sup> In the end, twelve incumbents were re-elected in 2009, one that had been loyal to Gordon Brown, ten that had not, and one MEP that had been absent.<sup>4</sup>

Just before the 2014 EP elections in Denmark, MEPs from the Danish liberal party (Venstre) were also called out in the media for undisciplined behavior. This delegation was attacked for their divided behavior in the EP and its leader, Jens Rhode, was heavily criticized for publicly expressing his opinions ([Skaerbaek 2013](#)). After a few particularly condemnatory public comments expressing views contrary to the values of the Venstre party,

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<sup>1</sup>Directive 2003/88/EC, which modified a directive originally passed in 1993, Directive 93/104/EC. Vote ID 5115, *Organisation of working time - Recommendation for second reading : Article 22 16, 27.12.2008*.

<sup>2</sup>For further information on the directive and the politics of the working time opt-out in the UK see [BBCNews \(2009\)](#); [DailyMail \(2010\)](#); [Guillot \(2008\)](#).

<sup>3</sup>The term "European elections" throughout the document refers specifically to elections for the European Parliament which occur every five years at various dates within the same month in all European Union member states, not to be confused with any domestic election that simply takes place in Europe.

<sup>4</sup>Arlene McCarthy was re-elected but had been absent on the day of the vote (according to [www.votewatch.eu](#)).

Mr. Rhode lost his position as the delegation leader for the 2014 European election and a more loyal party member was chosen instead. She had served previously as party spokesperson and national member of parliament. Party leaders believed she would be a uniting force for the party in the lead up to the election.<sup>5</sup>

These two examples illustrate instances where national party delegations in the EP have spoken out against their national parties and publicly disagreed with their party leaders in the media. In the case of the Labour party, this issue was seen as a test of Gordon Brown's leadership within the party and his ability to control his MEPs ([BBCNews 2008b](#)). In Venstre, the issue was one of public image. The party was viewed as being unable to control even this small delegation.<sup>6</sup> While the problem of discipline is apparent in both situations, the consequences for this behavior were mixed. In the UK, many of the rebel MEPs remained at the top of their constituency lists and were re-elected to the EP. In contrast, the Venstre party was able to remove and replace the leadership position on the electoral list. While Rhode did get re-elected, the other two Venstre MEPs did not return to the EP. Why was there variation in the experience of these MEPs? Why was one party able to punish their MEPs and not the other? Are other parties able to avoid situations like these completely or do they face similar challenges? Examples like these two situations, as well as variation in the treatment of MEPs by their national parties, can be found across parties and individuals in the EP. In addition to highlighting different experiences in both party behavior and electoral strategy, these experiences also call attention to how parties deal with MEP-party relationships. How are some parties better able to control their MEPs than others? What are the consequences of political party treatment of MEPs for legislative behavior? What does this mean for party representation in the EP?

This dissertation argues that party organization is one answer to these questions of legislator control and party discipline in the EP. I argue that the centralization of MEP organization, in particular that of candidate selection and supervision, is one way national parties are able to enforce discipline within their EP delegations. For instance, the experiences described above can be explained, in part, by the candidate selection strategies and

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<sup>5</sup>Interview 9.17.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

<sup>6</sup>At the time there were three Danish Venstre MEPs in the EP.

procedures used by each party. The Labour party uses a decentralized method of selection for its candidates for the EP where potential MEPs are selected for the ballot by their regional constituency. Incumbents are especially privileged in this process because they only need the approval of a majority of constituents to be re-selected for the top position of their list.<sup>7</sup> There are twelve constituencies in the UK that are relatively autonomous in this process so the national leadership has very little control over candidate selection. In addition, candidates are elected from these constituencies on closed lists, solidifying the electoral advantage associated with the top position. In contrast to the Labour party, Venstre uses a highly centralized selection process. The leadership of the Venstre party selects all candidates and chooses the list leader, exercising absolute control over the content of their list. In this particular party, the top spot is identified by the party while the remainder of the list is ordered alphabetically. The number one position is a clear signal of the party preference to candidates and voters alike.<sup>8</sup> These differences in party organization provide a foundation for understanding why the UK Labour Party was limited in its ability to discipline MEPs through electoral means by its decentralized selection process, while Venstre was not. By centralizing selection, Venstre leadership was able to use its power to replace its divergent MEPs.

These contrasting examples highlight how the organization of candidate selection is one avenue for national political parties to create and maintain the accountability of their EP delegations. In this dissertation, I examine national party accountability in the EP through a framework that links party organization and a party's electoral goals to individual legislative behavior. The analysis makes three novel contributions to our understanding of legislative politics in Europe. First, I show that both a party's organization and its electoral strategies for the EP are determined by institutional and electoral conditions on the national level, illustrating how differences among member states of the EU can lead to inequalities in the representation of national parties. Second, I also show that these electoral goals define the strategies a party employs with respect to the type of legislator chosen to serve. Finally,

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<sup>7</sup>This process is called a trigger ballot, where all district members have the opportunity to vote to approve or not approve an incumbent's return. A majority is required for an incumbent to keep their position at the top of the list.

<sup>8</sup>Interview 9.17.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

I provide evidence that suggests the way a party is organized to select and supervise their MEPs has profound effects on how a legislator behaves with respect to party cohesion across different policy areas. In sum, this dissertation highlights how the centralization of party organization, in concert with the goals of each chosen legislator, provides for more or less congruent policy making at the European level. In order to reach these conclusions, I revisit classic theories of party organization and apply them to the unique context of the EP to contribute to our understanding of how parties can shape political outcomes. By investigating party control in the EP, I offer a comparative piece of research that highlights and explains the implications of these key differences for the most fundamental EU democratic process, parliamentary representation.

## 1.1 POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

The majority of the literature examining parties in the EP have been either studies of the internal workings of the legislature (Coman 2009; Hix, Noury and Roland 2005; Hix and Marsh 2007; Klüver and Spoon 2013; Kreppel 2001; Mühlbock 2012) or studies of the Europeanization of internal, national party politics and electoral competition (Ladrech 2002; Poguntke et al. 2007; Pridham 2011). A large scale study of how parties are organized for Europe is absent from the literature, but we do know a lot about how and why political parties organize generally. Typically, studies of political parties fit into one of the following three areas: First are studies examining parties as institutions; second, parties as the result of electoral systems; and third parties as systems themselves (Aldrich 2006). Of these three approaches, the study of parties as institutions, and more specifically as organizations, is the least explored in the literature (Mair 1994; Katz and Mair 1992a; Tavits 2013). One of the reasons it is still a relatively small area of study is a “lack of comparable knowledge,” of organizational features across a large number of countries (Enyedi and Linek 2008, 455). There are simply not many studies that investigate party organization systematically across countries (for an exception see Katz and Mair 1992b).

Large scale studies of party organization are sparse because it is difficult to conduct large cross-national studies of party organization and its consequences due to the endogenous nature of party development. Parties are institutions created and shaped by political actors already participating in the very system that constitutes the party's operating environment (Aldrich 2006). Political factors such as the design of electoral systems (Duverger 1954; Mayhew 1974), the structure of the party systems (Krouwel 2009; Panebianco 1988), and the political environment all influence the way parties are organized. For instance, many cross national studies are restricted to comparisons of parties and party systems across both electoral systems and legislative institutions. In contrast, within country studies are restricted to comparisons within one electoral system and a unicameral or bicameral legislative institution. Hence, comparing the effects of party organization on legislative behavior either creates too much variation at the electoral and institutional level (cross-national) or no variation at the electoral or institutional level (within country). While this is no fault of party scholars and excellent work has been done both within and across countries, it has thus far been incredibly difficult to isolate either the effects of electoral and party systems or the effect of institutional incentives. Hence, there is still a wide range of questions about the effects of parties and their organization on political outcomes that remain unanswered.

In this dissertation, I examine party organization in the EP to begin addressing some of these unanswered questions. I chose the EP because it presents a rare opportunity to explore the consequences of organization in an institution that did not create nor currently structures a large majority of the work of political parties. National political parties have developed simultaneously with national institutions, not the EP (with the exception of a few, rare parties formed solely to contest European elections). National political parties are structured to select and supervise national politicians. They pursue policy and seek to govern at the national level. While I expect national political goals, experience, and organization to structure the treatment of MEPs within their national parties, I also expect such treatment to have profound effects on legislative behavior in the EP. Regardless of where or how a party developed, its organization is aimed at holding its members accountable. Parties choose different strategies to ensure accountability. Different parties are more or less able to do so effectively, determining the quality of representation they receive at the European

level. Questions of accountability within parties and legislatures have often been central to studies of representation and the quality of democracy (Blais and Bodet 2006; Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987; Dalton, Farrell and McAllister 2011; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Thomassen 2005; Thomassen and Schmitt 1999; Wessels 1997). The importance of these questions is equal, if not more important, in the politics of the EP given the complexity of its institutional structure, its relationship to national politics, and its connection (or lack thereof) with European citizens.

National parties selecting and supervising MEPs and MEPs themselves face several accountability dilemmas. Parties are organized to perpetuate their own existence and maximize their influence in government and most parties are specifically constructed to do so at the national level. As national parties, they seek to grow and/or maintain their parliamentary presence, maximize their role in coalition governments, and gain control over their government for themselves. In order to do such things, they must first maximize their electoral success. The addition of EP elections creates another layer that parties must incorporate into their organization and often the role for a politician in EP office in the national party hierarchy is not very clear. Unlike traditional democratic systems, the politicians holding EP office do not form a government and the building of legislative coalitions occurs on a much larger scale. Legislation in the EU is much more complicated and involves several layers of institutions. Given these complexities, the gains from placing a party member in the EP are not immediately clear. Parties must learn how to extend their influence to the European level and will have different incentives to do so based on their European electoral and policy goals and their experience in the European legislative process.

The EP possesses many of the same features as a national legislature but a few key differences exist that make the relationships between national parties and their members in the EP unique. First, MEPs are agents in a dual principal environment where they must answer both to the party groups of the EP and to their national parties (Hix 2002). European party groups (EPGs) in the EP are the essential building blocks of legislative coalitions. The increase in parliament's power within the institutional structure of the EU in the past 25 years led to an increase in party groups' ability to influence policy, provide leadership benefits to their members, and increase the strength of party influence on individuals when voting



on European issues. Given that party influence grows with the ability of parties to provide benefits and sanctions to individuals (Rhode 1991; Smith 2007), and the role of the EPG in policy making and assigning power positions within the EP has increased (Kreppel 2001), the importance of the EPGs has grown over time. Since 1979, the EPGs have grown to resemble the traditional party structures of a national legislature, making them the main organizational force in the EP instead of national parties. This means the role of national parties in supervising and influencing MEPs is shared among two different groups. Since the party groups are comprised of national party delegations, preferences of the groups and the national parties often coincide so many of these functions work simultaneously towards the same outcome. However, this may not always be the case. National parties and their MEPs must learn to manage the competing influences of European, national, and constituency politics.

Another large difference between legislating in the EP and in national parliaments is the separation of powers across EU institutions and the technical nature of lawmaking in the EP. In the EU, the parliament is a lower chamber legislative body that works with the Council of Ministers (CoM) to pass legislation and create law. The European Commission has been assigned monopoly power over legislative initiative and introduces all legislation to these bodies (EuropeanUnion 2010). This makes the EP a more reactive body than a traditionally proactive legislature like the U.S. Congress, where agenda power is high. Their position as a veto player is important to legislating in the EU, but it creates a unique situation where MEPs must react to all measures proposed to them and parties cannot avoid facing certain untenable issues. Legislation in the EP is also often very technical and specialized. Some legislators may not prefer work in the EP because of this. It is technical and complicated lawmaking that requires large coalitions and working with interests that vary across many parties and countries.<sup>9</sup> Politicians experienced in national politics may not have the skills or experience necessary to work at the EP and, conversely, those that are experienced at the EU may not have immediately transferable skills for national parliaments. In addition, many of the committees also require specialized and technical knowledge, which can make

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<sup>9</sup>Interview 6.19.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

it impossible for a novice to adequately participate.<sup>10</sup> High investments in learning may be required, but it may take years to enjoy dividends from these investments. Finally, working in the EP requires individuals to be away from both their constituencies and the national political scene for the majority of their time, making it virtually impossible to stay involved in local or national politics if they would like to.

## 1.2 POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

The extant party organization literature is a starting point for a theory on national party organization for European politics, but it should not be assumed that national organization applied to the European level will function the same way. It also cannot be assumed that the an MEP will be valued like an MP in a party's organization or that the electoral strategies of national parties will resemble those utilized in national elections. This dissertation will fill a gap in the parties and EU literature by offering a categorization of the parties in the European Parliament on the basis of the centralization of party organization, specifically leadership organization and candidate selection that spans both Western and Eastern Europe. This represents a major step towards understanding the differences in parties across EU member states and provide motivation for exploring the organization of these parties further and understanding how representation in the European Parliament may differ across member states.

Investigating the influence of national parties, I argue national parties may hold several goals which can be categorized as *office seeking*, *vote seeking*, and *policy seeking*.<sup>11</sup> These goals are defined by national political experience and climate, but they manifest themselves differently in European elections than we would generally see in national elections. National parties are well-versed in national electoral competition and certain features of this national competition define and constrain the strategies available to parties in European elections. Specific strategies reveal patterns for the way candidates for the EP are selected and su-

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<sup>10</sup>Interview 9.17.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

<sup>11</sup>Adapted from [Strom \(1990\)](#).

pervised within their parties. Given the goals of a party and its experience in organization at the national level, parties are more or less competent at choosing the specific types of politicians needed for European elections. These chosen politicians exhibit different types of representative styles based on their level of supervision from their party, their skill set, and their career ambitions. Each of these representative styles encourage more or less congruence with party wishes, and parties that are better able to transfer their national experience to the unique challenges and opportunities in the EP are better able to encourage congruent behavior from their MEPs.

In addition to linking national politics to internal work in the EP, this research also contributes to the broader literature on political parties in the EU. For example, the literature on party change in the era of the EU has begun to address the impact of EU politics within national parties, but remains highly divided between research on parties in Western European democracies and the transitioning parties of Central and Eastern Europe. This division is a result of the largely introspective nature of the literature that has limited it to studies of internal party dynamics or competition (Ladrech 2002; Poguntke et al. 2007; Pridham 2011; Raunio 2002). These studies mainly focus on analysis of programmatic or ideological change, the emergence of Euroskeptic parties, internal party division over the issue of integration, or intra-party competition within a country (Ladrech 2007). Literature studying Eastern Europe points out a trend in programmatic change that can be attributed to the reduction in competition among parties. This change produced a moderating effect on ideology as well as a democratizing effect on organization (Pridham 2011). In Western Europe, the academic consensus is that parties have been unable (or unwilling) to seriously consider what role EU politicians have in their parties or in relation to domestic governance as a whole. These parties have not taken steps to increase the accountability of their members serving on the European level, nor have they created an internal discourse around European issues (Ladrech 2007; Poguntke et al. 2007).

A large body of work has also addressed MEPs and their behavior in the EP directly, but has yielded mixed conclusions with respect to party effects. While valuable in understanding the internal working of the EP, these studies have been restricted to analysis of national delegations and EPGs (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005; Hix and Marsh 2007; Coman 2009;

Mühlbock 2012). Beginning with studies of overall voting cohesion among EPGs and national parties (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005; Hix and Marsh 2007) and progressing to studies of contested voting in the EP and among EU legislative institutions (Coman 2009; Mühlbock 2012), this research has shown that MEPs are subject to a variety of influences from within the EP. Different circumstances dictate the strength of parties in maintaining unity. While these studies produce differing results in the debate over who controls the MEPs, they all share a desire to explain how party resources interact to influence the behavior of individuals. Each of these authors approached the relationship between the MEPs and their respective parties as one of dual principal, single agent. In doing so, the aforementioned studies identify how each party, either the national or the European group, offer different incentives to MEPs for loyalty and have different goals for pursuing unity among their ranks.<sup>12</sup> This dissertation continues in this vein by arguing that both the parties and individuals must engage in a decision making process where they balance competing demands in consideration of their own goals for the future, but in contrast to these studies, I am interested in understanding the impact of influences exogenous to the EP (i.e. exogenous national party structural and electoral influences).

In addition to testing classic theories of party organization and political behavior, the analysis also contributes to debates on the democratic legitimacy of representative government both in Europe and more broadly. The EU has often been viewed as an elite driven process where bureaucrats and government leaders have been the most important actors (Curtin 2007). Because the EP added public participation to the EU, it is sometimes viewed as an institution that was created to extend the legitimacy of the Union (Rittberger 2007). Governments are often considered both legitimate and representative when they are elected in free and fair elections with high levels of participation. Elections create accountability mechanisms within democracy and should ensure that the preferences of the people are represented in institutions (Manin, Przeworski and Stokes 1999). Studying the quality of elected representation in the EU is imperative because ongoing debates about its democratic legitimacy, or lack thereof, abound in public, political, and academic circles. On one side

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<sup>12</sup>For instance, see Hix and Marsh (2007) and Hix, Noury and Roland (2007) for research suggesting MEPs are more likely to side with national parties when conflict arises between their principals, but see Coman (2009) for a counter argument.

of the debate, those who deny a democratic deficit claim the election of governments and legislatures (both national and EP) implicitly ensures a high level of democracy (Moravscik 2002). Alternatively, others argue the institutional relationship between parliaments (both national and EP) and the other institutions of the EU (the Commission and Council of Ministers) may prohibit the functioning of democracy entirely (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999).<sup>13</sup> While the role of the EP and parliamentary democracy appears in a large amount of work addressing this debate (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2001, 2009; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007; Moravscik 2002; Papadopoulos 2007), the role of national party representation and MEP accountability has largely been limited to internal examinations of party strength in the EP or the role of European elections in European societies (Coman 2009; Evans and Maarten 2012; Farrell and Scully 2005; Hix 2002, 2004; Hix and Noury 2009; Hobolt and Høyland 2011; Kreppel 2001; Lindstadt, Slapin and Weilen 2011; Mühlbock 2012; McElroy and Benoit 2009).

### 1.3 MAPPING THE DISSERTATION

After identifying the European electoral goals of parties and measuring the empirical reality of party organization in Europe at the beginning of the dissertation, I conclude that electoral goals are linked to party organization to the extent that parties with a higher stake in European elections are more likely to centralize their selection and supervision procedures. I then link goals to candidate type and show that national politicians are likely to enter the EP only with vote seeking parties. Policy seeking parties tend to select politicians with previous EP experience and office seeking parties use the EP as a training ground for new politicians. In the final chapter I combine goals, organization, and candidate type to offer a theory of when MEPs are most likely to provide congruent behavior for their parties. The chapter concludes that organization is a more important indicator of congruence than MEP type and that the most loyal MEPs are those that are centrally selected and included in

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<sup>13</sup>These scholars argue that lack of power of the EP in decision making compared to the other, non-elected institutions increases the democratic deficit.

leadership. In order to reach these conclusion, I examine MEPs from parties with five or more members from across 17 member states.

To reach conclusions outlined above, I use data from a sample of parties in the European parliament across most member states, supplemented by extensive fieldwork at the European Parliament and in selected member states. This project empirically tests the implications of internal, national party controls dictated through formal party rules on candidate selection and legislator behavior. By focusing on the link between national parties and the EP, this project produces innovative results that speak to the nature of multi-level politics in Europe. Specifically, I directly compare individual MEP behavior to that which would be expected given the preferences of their national parties. The main analysis of the dissertation uses the population of parties that have five or more members in the European Parliament. Restricting the analysis to parties with multiple members in the EP ensures there can be comparison on both the party and the individual level. Attempting to isolate the effects of individual goals or experience on party and legislator choices become increasing difficult as the number of MEPs per party drops to only a few. The parties included in the analysis are chosen from those serving in the EP in the seventh session (2009-2014) and thus all references to the European Election are in reference to the 2009 European election unless otherwise noted. Complete descriptions of the data can be found in each individual chapter and their appendices.

All of the chapters also incorporate qualitative research from extensive fieldwork. The purpose of this work is to both corroborate the large N findings and add validity to the theoretical foundations used to derive hypotheses about the national party MEP relationship. This fieldwork includes interviews with party officials and MEPs mostly from, but not restricted to, Germany, the UK, and Croatia and who are members of the major parties belonging to the following EPGs: the Party of the European Socialists (PES), the European People's Party (EPP), the Alliance of Liberal sand Democrats (ALDE), and the Greens. These data were collected over several months of fieldwork that included interviews of MEPs, their staff, party leaders and other political elites between January 2013 and June 2014. These countries represent party systems that maximize variation in levels of experience with the EU in terms of years of membership (with one accession country/new member),

variance in federal/unitary structures, interest representation, and size (number of members in the EP). This helps ensure that patterns presented and analyzed are the result of the organizational structures of parties instead of specific or unique features of each case. While conducting the fieldwork, I investigated the way MEPs were selected to run for the office and their motivations, as well as the level of discretion given to individual party members that work in the EU and their level of communication with domestic parties.

### **1.3.1 Chapter 2: A Theory of Political Parties and European Politicians**

The next chapter explicates a theory of political party organization and individual behavior centered around the selection and supervision of politicians for elected office. First adapting [Strom \(1990\)](#)'s conceptualization of office, vote, and policy seeking electoral goals to European elections, I provide a foundation for understanding what parties can gain in a Europe election. I argue these goals dictate the choices they make for the type of politician they wish to serve them in the EP. Party organization plays an important role in determining how likely it is a party is able to choose their preferred type of politicians and how well they can maintain accountability once a candidate is in office. Subsequently, the individual ambition of each politician and national party organization work together to encourage or discourage cohesion in representation. The theory develops the expectation that nationally ambitious politicians from parties with centralized selection methods and policy and vote seeking goals will provide their parties with the highest level of policy congruence.

### **1.3.2 Chapter 3: Party Organization**

Chapter three investigates patterns in party organization across member states. I examine the centralization of political parties through candidate selection mechanisms for national and European office and the construction of executive party leadership. I argue that the centralization of these two choices have important implications for legislator behavior because they allow the party to control politician's careers and the power base within the party. Using classic theories of party development and organization, I argue that organization at the European level is the result of national institutional traditions and national

electoral experience. The chapter uses party statutes to compare the selection and supervision procedures across parties and compares European organization to that of the national level. Incorporating data on national level institutions, and unique party characteristics, I use logistic regression to test for the determinants of centralized selection for the EP and the inclusion of MEPs in their party's leadership. I find that parties are more likely to centralize than decentralize the management of their MEPs under a variety of national institution conditions, which highlights the strong role national politics and party experience play in determining their treatment of MEPs.

### **1.3.3 Chapter 4: Electoral Goals and Candidate Selection**

Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between European electoral goals and the composition of the EP with respect to personnel. It argues these goals dictate the choice made for candidate selection for the EP and are able to explain why variation exists among MEPs with respect to their past political experience, party service, and European institutional and party group leadership experience. The chapter highlights existing variation in politician type among member states and raises questions about the quality of representative democracy in the EU. A series of logistic regression models test under what conditions certain types of politicians are likely to serve their parties in the EP. The data originates from MEP curriculum vitae, parliamentary service records, and personal websites that are publicly available. I constructed a single comprehensive database recording the experience of MEPs with respect to local, regional, national, ministerial, and prime ministerial service at the national level. It also includes executive party service at the regional and national level as well as experience in the EP (years of service), EP leadership, and EPG leadership. In addition to this political service, the database also features educational achievement, area of educational and professional expertise, and the original data source. The results of the analysis reinforce the second order elections model of European elections. The conditions under which experienced national politicians and party leaders enter the parliament are rare and most likely to occur in vote seeking parties. The EP is found to be an institution for new and upcoming politicians and policy experts from office and policy seeking parties,



illustrating an evolutionary change in the role of the EP in a party's hierarchy from a retirement home to a training ground.

### **1.3.4 Chapter 5: Electoral Goals, Organization, and Legislator Behavior**

Chapter 5 explores the relationship between domestic parties and their MEPS by investigating how party leadership can influence their members outside of the legislative process. This chapter explores the link between party organization and personal ambition in strengthening programmatic representation in the EP. It adds to the current literature on MEP-party relations by offering insight into individual and party goals and how these interact within the structure of European elections and policy making. The effects of variation in party structures, individual political goals, and electoral systems on legislative behavior are tested utilizing an exogenous measure of national party congruence that allows for a comparison across parties and members states. This measure is constructed using data from voting records for MEPs in the seventh session and party ideology from the Comparative Manifestos project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2014). I focus specifically on differences in electoral goals, candidate selection, formal MEP supervision, and individual career experience as the main determinants of policy congruence. The data on party organization introduced in Chapter 3 and electoral goals and individual experience of Chapter 4 are combined with qualitative research in the European parliament to test the hypotheses of the chapter. I conclude that centralized candidate selection procedures increases an MEPs congruence with their party's preferences in parties that hold policy seeking or vote seeking electoral goals.

## 2.0 A THEORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND EUROPEAN POLITICIANS

In early 2013, Ingrid Antičević Marinović gave a speech at the European Parliament plenary. At the time, she was one of 12 observers in the Parliament representing Croatia.<sup>1</sup> The speech quickly made waves across social media and the Croatian press for the alleged poor quality of her English. The Croatian media criticized the speech for its scripted nature and questioned her competence as a European politician. The speech was viewed as embarrassing Croatia in the EP and Ms. Antičević Marinović's decision to speak English instead of Croatian was perceived as arrogance (Ciglar 2013).<sup>2</sup> The media also broadened its criticism to her party, the ruling party, and questioned the party's decision to send her to the EP. As a member of the SDP, Ms. Antičević Marinović had been chosen by the party leader and then prime minister, Zoran Milanović, to join 4 others as observers in the EP.<sup>3</sup> After the speech, Prime Minister Milanović publicly addressed the criticism, defending his choice of Ms. Antičević Marinović and his perceived understanding of her ability to speak English. This happened nearly simultaneously with the preparations for Croatia's first European election and when it was time for Milanović to select new candidates for EP office, Ms. Antičević Marinović was conspicuously absent from the new electoral list (Dnevnik.hr 2013a).

The example above illustrates three challenges parties face in European elections: who do we choose for Europe? How do we choose them? How do we treat them? First, the backlash of the media and the public against Antičević Marinović's English underscores a requirement that parties choose candidates for the EP that are perceived to be qualified. Second, the

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<sup>1</sup>Prior to their entry as a full member in June 2013, Croatia only had observer status in the EP.

<sup>2</sup>Each member state's native language is an official language of the EU and simultaneous translation is available in the plenary sessions. It is most common for MEPs to speak their native language.

<sup>3</sup>SDP-Socijaldemokratska Partija Hrvatske.

relative power of this party president in choosing the observers and subsequent candidates is reflected in the personal appeals to him to justify his decision. Finally, the absence of this observer from the following electoral list is an example of one tool parties have to manage the behavior of its MEPs. In this case the tool was the removal of an incumbent, but not all parties have the same tools or even the same goals in these elections. Some parties may be much better at avoiding situations like the one described above because they are organized differently, but all parties must be able to select good agents and manage them effectively. Some do not succeed. Political parties have many different tools available to them to manage European elections so what explains the variation in the organizational choices they make? What are the consequences of these choices for policy making and representation?

## 2.1 NATIONAL PARTIES AND EUROPEAN LEGISLATORS: AN INTRODUCTION

Many of the strategic choices parties make are dependent on their office, vote, and policy seeking goals.<sup>4</sup> Parties form to win elections and electoral success is necessary for survival, but parties organize differently given their strategic goals and resources ([Tavits 2013](#)). Many different combinations of goals exist given the different national, electoral experiences of parties. These combinations and their effects on organization is the starting point for the theory of presented here. [Strom \(1990\)](#) identified three main models of party behavior: vote seeking, office seeking, and policy seeking. Vote seeking parties try to simply maximize the number of votes won in an election, office seeking parties seek to gain votes in order to maximize their control over political office and power, and policy seeking parties want to maximize their influence on political outcomes ([Downs 1957](#)). While each of these three goals are interconnected, parties behave in patterned ways to manage the trade-offs between each goal. When considering their electoral goals, parties choose a mix of behaviors constrained by their organizational structure ([Strom 1990](#)).

There are three important components structuring the relationship between parties and

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<sup>4</sup>These come directly from [Strom \(1990\)](#) and will be discussed in great detail in what follows.

MEPs: party organization, party electoral goals, and the goals of individual politicians. Organization is the first important piece of this relationship and varies across parties in both its structure and strength. In examining the relationship between MEPs and their parties, I look at variation in formal organization for the selection and supervision of MEPs. A party's electoral experience can contribute to the choice over strong or weak organization ([Tavits 2013](#)). Whether a party organizes more or less formally on the national level determines the choices parties make for the organization of their European level politicians. With exception of only a few parties that organized for the sole purpose of contesting European elections, national parties are organized to contest elections and govern (or seek to govern) at the national level. Organizational choices made by these parties are the result of the structure of national legislative, executive, electoral, and party systems. Therefore, electoral and governing experience at the national level is the greatest predictor of European level organization and the choice to centralize or decentralize the selection and supervision of MEPs.

The organization of selection and supervision provides an innovative way to compare the MEP-national party relationship across member states of the EU. The centralization (or lack thereof) of the selection of candidates and the supervision of MEPs in office is the main source of variation in the organizational strategies of parties that allows for this comparison. National parties in Europe have many different strategies for selecting candidates for European elections that vary in their level of centralization and formality. Similarly, supervision choices vary with the level of involvement party leaders have with the MEPs and the role of an MEP in party decision making. The consequences of the choices parties make in organization are reflected in party loyalty and the congruence of MEP actions to party preferences. For instance, a party that values the seat of an MEP above one in local or national government will want to place their best politicians at the EP level. In order to ensure that these politicians run for EP office, they have a large incentive to centralize candidate selection in order to have control over the nomination process and their electoral list. As a result, potential candidates in centralized parties must be aware of the party leaders' power to exert direct control over their political futures([Hazan and Rahat 2010](#)). Because one must be selected to run for office, this centralization of power will extend a party's control over

its politicians to policy making activities ([Riker 1975](#); [Hix 2010](#)).

In March of 2013, both the ruling Croatian socialist party (SDP) and the conservative party of the opposition (HDZ) needed to build electoral lists to determine the very first class of Croatian politicians to enter the EP.<sup>5</sup> The construction of these lists was largely a balance between creating lists that were thought to be both electorally successful and provide for the parties' broader goals. The SDP made an effort to extend the ideology and policy of the ruling coalition by picking politicians that had played a major role in Croatian international politics and provided these candidates with directions and goals for their position once elected. These goals included mostly reputation building in the short remainder of their term and the desire to build Croatia's strategic importance with other members of the EP.<sup>6</sup> The HDZ chose their candidates for similar reasons but appeared to be much more focused on gaining more seats than the SDP as they were interested in discrediting the current coalition. The HDZ party leadership entered a coalition list which included Ruža Tomašić. This member of a right-wing political party is often controversial and the move was seen as a way to shore up votes from some of Croatia's most conservative voters, even at the expense of appearing willing to cater to the extreme right. In the end, the tactic proved useful as Ms. Tomašić won the second most preferential votes of any candidate in the election and the HDZ won the most seats overall ([Dnevnik.hr 2013b](#)). When asked about policy goals in their first year of office, most of the HDZ candidates (and eventually elected MEPs) simply mentioned following the European People's Party, in contrast to the specific goals mentioned by the SDP. This situation highlights how each party had overlapping behaviors for different goals, but also used different techniques to guide the action of their members. Each party also had clearly centralized selection methods that placed the majority of power with party presidents and also chose members from the upper strata of their parties to serve in the EP.

The example of Venstre in Denmark illustrated in the introduction showed how candidate selection can be an important tool for a party in achieving its goals. The move to replace the delegation leader can be interpreted as an attempt to strengthen party unity within the liberal party. By choosing the party spokeswoman and a well-known party member, it

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<sup>5</sup>HDZ-Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica.

<sup>6</sup>Since the seventh term of the EP was set to end in June 2014, these MEPs would serve one year before new elections would take place with the Europe wide election of 2014.

also appears to be an attempt to encourage a unified voice for the liberals at the EP that was lacking in the previous term and raise awareness for the election. Venstre also lacked any formal inclusion of their delegation leader in the party leadership and there were no formal lines of communication between the MEPs and the national party. One of these MEPs thought the lack of formal ties could be one of the key reasons they are consistently blamed for mistakes made in Brussels in the media. By replacing the leading candidate with the party spokesman, it ensured that a member of the party leadership would lead the delegation in the next term.<sup>7</sup> This example illustrates how MEP supervision and selection can be, and have been, used as tools for sanction, as well as tools for promoting party goals at the European level. Candidate selection and supervision, electoral goals, and individual ambition are the main elements this theory uses to hypothesize about the composition of the EP and MEP congruence with their national parties.

In order to determine the impact of selection and supervisory choices on European legislative outcomes, the analysis begins with the simple assumption that these choices are a direct result of the structure of party organization and its electoral and/or policy making goals. Different organizational structures produce different strategic incentives for party and individual behavior at the European level and parties and individuals must adapt to the mult-level incentives and constraints created by the EP. The organization of power within parties reflects these incentives (Riker 1975). Individual behavior affects the desirability of different outcomes. I define a party's preference for individual behavior as policy congruence, or the level to which a MEP's legislative output matches his/her national party's preferences. Conceptualizing the relationship between MEPs and their parties as the result of variation in organizational choices and electoral goals provides the dissertation's hypotheses. Centralized parties with nationally ambitious politicians will generate the most policy congruence between the EP delegation and the national party. The following sections first outline the European electoral goals of parties, then describe the role of party organization and individual ambition in determining congruence.

Previous Research has identified the potential effects of party organization on cohe-

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<sup>7</sup>In this particular party, the party spokesman is an official role and is statutorily included in the executive leadership, Interview 9.17.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

sion within the EP. [Hix \(2004\)](#) examines the distinction between *Party-centered* electoral systems and *Candidate-centered* electoral systems, including consideration of candidate selection procedures within the electoral system (emphasis in original). Hix argues the main determinants of electoral system effects on legislator behavior to be district magnitude, the electoral systems, and candidate selection rules. He expects parties to have the most power over individual careers, and thus their behavior, when electoral systems are party-centered; namely in closed list proportional representation systems where party leaders determine who serves in legislative institutions. In contrast, candidate-centered electoral systems are those with open list proportional representation or single transferable vote systems. Here candidates can appeal directly to voters and thus the party leadership has less control over their careers. Similarly, the more centralized selection procedures within parties, the more control over legislator behavior. Therefore [Hix \(2004\)](#) expects parties with centralized selection in closed list proportional representation electoral systems to have the highest level of control over their legislators and finds evidence in support for this hypothesis in the paper. Hix uses a decision theoretical model in the EP to test his hypothesis that considers an MEP to be the agent of two principals. First, the national party controls the future careers of MEPs and determines their policy goals. Second, the EPG determines access to office within the EP and the ability of a MEP to reach his/her policy goals. A MEP's voting decision (which determines party unity and cohesion) is a result of the incentives for voting with, and the cost incurred by voting against, each principal and the level of existing conflict between the two party levels. Using voting records, descriptive variables for electoral systems, and candidate surveys asking how each respondent MEP was selected, Hix is able to test for congruence under various party and electoral conditions.<sup>8</sup> His results show that national parties have most congruent MEPs in when they are in party centered electoral systems with centralized candidate selection.

While this work is one of the only studies that explicitly addresses the link between party organization and legislative behavior in the EP, it has been preceded and followed by a few other works that incorporate candidate selection in studies of legislative decision making.

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<sup>8</sup>The survey data is taken from [Raunio \(2000\)](#). Hix tells us that this includes 195 MEPs but does not comment on the number of national parties represented.

Faas (2003) argues that national parties are able to maintain strong ties to MEPs because of a high level of centralization and strong monitoring. Also using the data provided by Raunio (2000), Faas find that MEPs in centralized candidate selection parties are more likely to defect from their European Party Groups, thus concluding that national parties are strong for these MEPs. Gabel and Scheve (2007) argue that candidate selection methods can be used to hypothesize about intra-party conflict in European integration as well. In order to use the centralization of candidate selection as an instrumental variable for testing intra-party dissent as an independent effect on mass opinions for European integration, they make a compelling case that candidate selection is a measure of leadership power within parties. Parties that centrally select candidates will be more representative of leadership views than parties that mass select candidates. Decentralized selection is more likely to represent activists within a party because there is less control over these candidates by the leadership. In addition, Whitaker (2005) shows how national parties influence committee decision making and Lindberg, Rasmussen and Warntjen (2008) extend the analysis of candidate selection beyond the EP and provides an examination of all decision making bodies of the EU. They conclude that because national parties are also the key selectorate for members of the Council and the European Commission, they play a large role in determining policy outcomes at the European level. This dissertation compliments this existing work by expanding the scope of the empirical study of party cohesion to more parties and across more policy areas. It also builds on the research by investigating the origins of party organization at the EU level and how party organizations interacts with short term party electoral goals to encourage or discourage congruence.

## 2.2 NATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND PARTY ORGANIZATION

Political parties in EU member states originated to contest elections, influence policy, and govern at the national level. Party experience and expertise in national politics greatly influences their organization for EU level politics and their treatment of MEPs. When examining the organization of parties for EP level politics, I consider the centralization



of the party with respect to the selection and subsequent supervision of candidates and legislators. I argue the level of centralization around MEPs is determined by three aspects of the national party experience: the party's ideology, the institutional history of the party, and the national environment in which the party originated and operates. Each one of these aspects determines the way political parties are organized to select and supervise politicians at the national level, which greatly influences the way they choose to select and supervise politicians at the European level.

The way a party organizes is largely determined by the electoral conditions it faces and the resources it had at its origin. The main distinction between parties that centralize and those that do not is based on whether they need resources from a mass membership versus a few wealthy benefactors, businesses, or the state itself. Parties relying on mass membership for funding will remain decentralized while those that are state financed or control resources from a few elites will not. Without the need to gather funding from many different sources, parties will not see it beneficial to maintain large, decentralized membership organizations. They will instead centralize power and keep the control within the elite leadership of the party (van Biezen 2003). Resources available to parties at origination are also dependent on the ideology and societal sector the party represents. For example, center right parties rely more on business for resources while center left parties rely more on rural or low income voters for resources (Enyedi and Linek 2008). Thus center left parties are more likely to maintain large decentralized party organizations in order to reach and engage their electorate (Tavits 2013). Large, decentralized organizations are also expected when parties face tough barriers to entry in their national electoral systems. If the party is decentralized it can reach many more individuals to gain support than if it is centralized around only a small elite. These parties generally do not have the reputation or the resources that the main governing and opposition parties have and thus need to work on a more grassroots level to build the party (Tavits 2013). Each of these factors influence the initial scope and size of party organization at the national level. Because these institutions are structured under specific circumstances to work strategically in a specific electoral environment, it is likely that party organization will not be altered for European elections if it is working well on the national level. Given the second order nature of European elections, I expect the centralization (or lack thereof)

of party organization at the EP level to closely resemble that of the national level.

## 2.3 THE GOALS OF PARTIES AND POLITICIANS IN EUROPE

The electoral goals of parties dictate certain party behaviors and require certain tradeoffs among the priorities and the resources of parties (Strom and Muller 1999). In order to measure and empirically account for the possible goals of each party contesting a European election, a framework that bridges the literature on party goals and behavior from national elections to European elections is necessary. Because important differences exist between national and European elections, each of these goals will manifest themselves differently on the European level. The spoils of an election for the EP are quite different from those for national office and party goals must be redefined to account for the unique nature of the EP and its parliamentarians. In this section, I introduce each type of electoral goal and its application to European elections and then introduce the range of possible party types to differentiate parties by the goals they may pursue.

### 2.3.1 Office Seeking

Office seeking parties maximize the number of politicians they can place in important offices in order to be able to govern. Governing or being part of a governing coalition brings concrete benefits to parties and politicians. The goal of an office seeking party is traditionally that of gaining executive power because once a party enters a governing coalition, it is able to place its members in influential cabinet positions and enjoy the rewards of office. As a result, most studies of the electoral strategies of parties and coalition politics have been restricted to the pursuit of legislative office in order to enter executive politics (Riker 1962; Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Laver and Schofield 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1996). These rewards include personal benefits to those holding office (cabinet positions) as well as power over those positions in which these politicians hold (cabinet portfolios)(see Laver and Schofield (1990) and Riker (1962)). In order to maintain the recruitment of loyal and experienced

party members to serve, the party must offer incentives to individuals who contribute labor and often these incentives are the prestige, power, and sometimes lucrative salaries that governing ministers enjoy (Norris 1997a). Thus party leadership plays an important role in determining the value of office for the party's goals. Because office provides many valuable positions to the party, the leadership can use these positions to reward themselves and loyal party members (Strom and Muller 1999). Entry into the European legislature lacks this governing capability since no executive body is formed from the EP. National parties enter the EU executive by gaining governing status at the national level. The institutional function and structure of the EP thus creates a new situational regime that must be addressed to understand if, and when, parties contesting EP elections may be office seeking.

There are two key features of the institutional framework of the EP that make the pursuit of office, as it is currently understood, relatively unlikely in European elections. First, the lack of opportunity to build a governing coalition or executive body means that European governing positions for national parties cannot be reached through winning legislative seats in the EP. The executive body of the EU, the European Commission, consists of commissioners that are appointed by member state governments and the ministers that meet in the Council of Ministers are those currently serving in national government cabinets. Therefore, gaining legislative office in the EP is not the way to access the benefits at the European level that are usually associated with executive office. In addition, the candidates for the president of the Commission are formally proposed by the European Council and then elected by the EP (but not from the MEPs). The EP, therefore, has little power beyond the approval or denial of a Council nominee to determine the composition of the executive bodies of the EU. Seeking office in order to gain executive power is therefore not a feasible goal in EP elections.

In addition to gaining lucrative cabinet positions, gaining office can also mean participating in majority legislative coalitions (Strom 1990). One of the benefits of a legislative majority, beyond building executive power, is agenda control. Control of the legislative agenda often implies that parties can push the legislative docket closer to their preferred areas of policy and keep those areas which they do not wish to participate off the legislative floor (Cox and McCubbins 1993). This provides benefits in terms of future office seeking goals as parties that perform well in the legislature are better poised to perform well in the

next election (Strom and Muller 1999). However, the EP does not have agenda power in the current institutional arrangement granted by the Lisbon Treaty (nor did it have this power in any previous treaty) and a party's ability to create its own legislative majority is non-existent. Since the legislature consist of 750+ legislators and the largest national delegation is Germany with 99 MEPs, no one party, even if it takes all of the EP seats available to its country, in any given election, can make a legislative majority. While the EPGs do create large groups of MEPs that build legislative coalitions together, no rational party will prioritize office seeking to enter the majority because they have no control over the parties, voters, or elections in other member states.

Given that parties cannot gain executive office or majorities on their own, there are only a few conditions under which office seeking parties may exist in European elections. Returning to the discussion of the benefits of office, one concrete benefit of office holding is allowing parties to reward party activists and leaders with government positions. Therefore office seeking goals may be part of a party's strategy to recruit and maintain valuable political capital because it offers private benefits to the party's members (Norris 1997b). The ability of the party to provide these private benefits to individuals allows parties to maintain a professional core of members that is ready to do its bidding and support its governmental and electoral goals (Clark and Wilson 1961; Wilson 1962; Strom and Muller 1999). Without such incentives for individuals, parties would experience great difficulties in sustaining willing labor to maintain its organization and work for its electoral success. When considering the party goals of national parties in the EP, this presents a dilemma. On one hand, the empirical difficulty of establishing the goals of parties in any given real election has led scholars to assume that office seeking goals are purely those of seeking executive office (Strom and Muller 1999). If we restrict our theoretical understanding and analysis to this goal alone, there cannot ever be an office seeking party contesting European elections. Under no circumstances would a party pursue a pure office seeking strategy defined as accessing executive power because it simply is not possible. However, if by refining our definition of office seeking to include access to legislative positions, there are conditions under which parties may hold office seeking goals.

Office seeking parties in European elections are those with limited national opportunities,

either having just lost an election or a limited history of national representation. The United Kingdom's Independence Party, for example, had nine members in the EP in the seventh term, but had failed to gain any seats in Westminster prior to the 2009 European election. Thus, they should view EP office as a priority, simply as an opportunity to reward a few of their members with office. Parties like this, that have little to no history of representation in their national legislature, or new or small parties that cannot pass national electoral thresholds, will seek office in European elections. Parties also seek European office when denied access to national legislative institutions. These conditions are likely to occur when EP elections follow national parliamentary elections and a party has experienced a significant loss in votes, and subsequently, seat share. This means several of its best members have lost their legislative and government positions. For example, when speaking about seeking re-election in 2014, a current German liberal MEP expressed a muted concern that he may not have a choice if his party performed poorly in the upcoming German federal election. If his party were to lose a significant number of seats in the Bundestag, it was implied that an ousted Bundestag member may be nominated in his place.<sup>9</sup> His concern proved to be well deserved given the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) experienced their worst electoral showing since they entered the Bundestag in 1949. In September of 2013, the party failed to reach the 5% threshold for Bundestag representation and subsequently, 93 members of the chamber lost their seats ([FinancialTimes 2013](#)).

On one hand, an national loss may encourage party leaders to view EP office as a holding ground for these politicians until the next national election allows them to regain their national office, much like regional or municipal elections may function. Depending on the length of time between the last national election and the EP elections, many politicians may be looking for a home to tide them over for the interim governing period. On the other hand, the party may also wish to punish their "unelectable" politicians and place new, fresh faces in the European campaign. Given that EP elections are generally low stakes elections, they could be an opportunity to refresh the party image while preparing for another national election. Therefore, some parties may use the EP elections as a way to place their newest, but rising, politicians in office until the next national election comes along.

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<sup>9</sup>Interview 9.19.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

### 2.3.2 Vote Seeking

Vote seeking parties use their organization and policy programs for the sole purpose of winning votes and winning more votes than any other party (Downs 1957). It is not generally believed to be a goal that parties will singularly hold (Strom 1990). Because vote seeking parties are ultimately seeking to win the majority of seats available in their district, it is hard to distinguish the goal of vote seeking from office and policy goals. Ultimately the goal of any politician is to win an election or be reelected because neither of the other goals can be accomplished without first winning votes (Mayhew 1974). This has led many scholars to consider vote seeking a necessary strategy for either of the other electoral goals (office or policy seeking) instead of considering what observable behaviors exist when parties deploy this strategy (Strom 1990). This is intuitive in national elections. Parties that are pure vote seekers likely do not exist, but we can identify vote seeking behavior in modern political parties in concert with other goals. For example, the emergence of the catch-all parties in post-war Europe is one example of vote and office seeking strategies. These big parties had broad policy agendas that appealed to the greatest number of voters in order to maximize electoral success. Catch-all parties professionalized their organizations and tamed their ideological views to become more inclusive and attract a large portion of the electorate (Kirchheimer 1966; Panebianco 1988; Krouwel 2012). Parties originally organized to deal with societal, ideological, and environmental concerns began to evolve into organizations focused on the goal of survival. Electoral candidates were often selected because of professional experience and their ability to win an election (Ware 1996).

By addressing the difference between first order and second order elections that exists between national and European elections, we can determine if conditions exist to observe vote seeking behavior in European elections. National elections in Europe are first order elections because they are won and lost on national affairs and policy. European elections are contested by national political parties in the shadow of domestic level concerns and strategies are formulated accordingly (Reif and Schmitt 1980). Domestic politics are the single biggest predictor of European electoral outcomes, hence scholars continual reference to its second-order nature (van der Brug et al. 2007; Norris and Reif 1997; Reif and Schmitt

1980).<sup>10</sup> In light of this, it is feasible to consider the existence of purely vote seeking parties if European elections are viewed as referendums on governing coalitions rather than a choice for Europe on policy. Domestic constituencies still view European elections as second-order, choosing to punish or reward domestic parties for their current behavior instead of voicing their preferences for Europe. These elections are used to protest the current government and minor parties often gain protest votes from otherwise mainstream voters (Norris and Reif 1997). Therefore, large parties or coalitions, that are governing or serving as the main opposition, may care more about winning votes than about pushing policy or placing its members in the EP. A ruling party wants to win an election to maintain its status as the preferred party of the public. Opposition parties wish to maximize votes in order to discredit current ruling coalitions. A victory achieved by a wide margin can be ammunition for the opposition to call for new national elections or votes of confidence.

Contributing to this second order effect is the fact that major European parties have rarely needed to compete on European issues, instead they can gain broad support for their party in the elections by focusing on general domestic issues (van der Brug and van der Eijk 2007b). Issue debates in European elections have rarely revolved around integration or its consequences because it has rarely been strategic for parties to raise these issues (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). Regardless of the electoral goals of a party, keeping European integration out of public debate may be advantageous for parties if this debate highlights views that are unfavorable in the public's eye or to its future potential coalition partners. It also may be an issue that is divisive for a party and therefore would only create problems if candidates in parties had to discuss these issues publicly (Steenbergen and Scott 2004). Therefore vote seeking parties avoid drawing attention to European issues all together and instead use their national presence to garner support.

The European election in Croatia in April 2013 is a prime example of this phenomenon. Throughout the campaign, analysts of both party's campaign efforts continually highlighted the internal political nature of the debates, arguing that neither side participated in a discussion on the real "European" issues. Instead, each party leader used the elections for domestic

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<sup>10</sup>A large literature exists addressing the second order nature of European elections. For a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon see (Hix and Marsh 2011; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; van der Brug and van der Eijk 2007a).

gains. At the time the opposition, HDZ, was continually leading a media campaign against the ruling coalition on all aspects of government. The media also alleged the SPD leader was using various events to promote candidates for the local elections (Moskaljov 2013). In this example, both parties have vote seeking goals. The ruling party SPD wants to win the most votes to support their ruling coalition and HDZ wants to win the most votes to legitimize their attacks on the ruling government. Vote seeking parties are exactly these two kinds; ruling and opposition that specifically want to maximize votes in the second-order election.

### 2.3.3 Policy Seeking

Parties that seek, and are successful in satisfying, policy goals are able to change public policy so that it is congruent with their preferred policy positions (Strom and Muller 1999). In national electoral politics, policy seeking is conceptualized as a goal inherent in the legislative or executive coalition formation process and is thus inseparably tied to the pursuit of office. A party simply cannot influence policy until it has gained office, and in most cases, has entered into the government and gained hold of cabinet portfolios (Budge and Laver 1986). Thus, policy seeking has most often been treated as a complement to office seeking and characterized by behavior where parties seek ministerial positions with an appropriate coalition partner (Strom and Muller 1999). Party leaders in parliamentary systems know that they must work together in order to pursue policy and are willing to join coalitions for both the office and policy benefits these coalitions bring. In order to do this, leaders think about the potential coalitions that can be made in any give system and pursue the strategy that best suits their goals. Policy pursuit leads parties and their leaders to form coalitions with partners that are ideologically similar to them. This type of coalition formation should reduce the ideological distance between a party's preferred positions and those that they are likely to obtain given the constraints of the legislature and government (Axelrod 1970; Budge and Laver 1986; Strom and Muller 1999).

Identifying the pursuit of policy through European elections also provides a stark contrast from domestic elections. The structure of policy competition in Europe, the nature of policy making, and the structure of competition within the EP and between the EP and



the Council of Ministers, all influence the way parties are able to pursue policy goals in the EU institutions. First, the competitive policy space in Europe is two-dimensional. On one dimension, policy preferences and concerns follow the traditional left-right, greater vs. less regulation dimension that contains the majority of competition over European issues. The second dimension represents competition over “new politics,” which include areas like environmental concerns, cultural policy, etc. (Hooghe and Marks 2002). This means that when contesting European elections, national parties should be able to draw a great deal of their campaign and policy pursuits from the concurrently pursued goals of domestic politics. Given the legislative structure of the EU (described above) and the dimensionality of EU politics, most policy preferences are already pursued at the national level. Competition at the EU level may be seen by national parties as more of a nuisance than an advantage when their resources are already being used to pursue policy elsewhere.

In addition, policy areas related to European integration (i.e. market integration, cohesion, and enlargement) do not present large ideological differences across major parties in most European states (Hooghe and Marks 2002). This means that even in elections, the choice between pursuing office at the expense of ones ideological goals is mitigated by the centrist nature of competition. Parties that are likely to view European Elections as an opportunity to pursue policy are likely to be those on the extremes of the first dimension, which are typically parties that are Eurosceptic, highly nationalist, or opposed to market capitalism (or communist) (Hooghe and Marks 2002). Policy seeking parties can also be those more active in pursuing policies that fall on the second dimension of “new politics,” which can be ordered as a dimension stemming from green/alternative/liberal ideology to traditional/authoritarian/nationalist ideology (Hooghe and Marks 2002).

In addition to policy competition, the structure of EU policy making also changes traditional strategies of policy pursuit. The previous section, which described the structure of executive authority in the EU, also touched on agenda control in the legislature. Since the EP lacks this type of authority, pursuing specific policies or attempting to avoid the implementation of others is largely out of the control of MEPs. While the EP can ask the Commission to submit certain types of legislation, the EU has many different institutions seeking to define its political and economic priorities. While the EP is still important in

the passage of policy because it must write and approve legislation, it is likely parties do not see this as the most efficient track through which to pursue their policy goals. Instead, parties will opt to use their power in national portfolios and heads of state to set the agenda in concert with other European leaders. National parties are also able to use their national legislatures to define European policy within their national borders. While EP regulations passed by the EP and the Council of Ministers must be implemented according to the protocol set forth in the legislation, EP directives are transposed by national legislatures. Thus, parties also have the outside option of defining exactly how policy will take shape within their own states without needing to consult their MEPs. However, despite all of the alternative paths to policy influence available to domestic parties, MEPs can still play an important role through the co-decision procedure.

Every new treaty passed by EU member states has increased the power of the EP through the use of the co-decision procedure. The co-decision procedure requires that legislation pass both the council of ministers and the EP in order to be written into law. So while the EP may not be able to control its own agenda or the implementation of all legislation, the institution is still important to legislative decision making. Domestic parties seeking to pursue policy at the European level must consider how the EP and its members can work to its advantage or disadvantage in the co-decision process. In order for any party or group to get its prerogatives through the legislative process (or keep others from being successful), a legislative coalition must be built across the council and the EP that supports its position. In order to do so, politicians and parties must have the ability to connect to MEPs across many member states and other parties to create legislative majorities in both institutions. In the EP, these majorities are often created through the EPGs. Parties that have strong preferences for policy made at the European level will value the relationship with these party groups more than parties that do not. Therefore they will seek candidates that are able to work within these groups and have the capacity to work with other international politicians.

In contrast to vote seeking, policy seeking parties view the salience of European elections for how they relate to their goals for EU policy. Parties with very strong preferences for European policy (either pro or anti-integration) or those that are single issue parties, are likely to view European elections as an opportunity to pursue policy at yet another level.

Parties that are more active in pursuing policies that fall on the European level also view European elections as an opportunity to pursue policy. That is, these parties hold strong views on integration and seek to impact the evolution of the EU at the EP level. For instance, environmental policy at the European level is more progressive than it is in member states. Therefore, green parties look toward the EP with their policy goals because it is the most appropriate level for which to pursue those policies. Also, parties that seek to represent substantive issues that are salient in their constituency may also seek policy at the EP level if these issues are competences of the EU. MEPs can easily identify examples of policy areas that are most effectively handled at the EP level. It should not be surprising that most of these areas deal with the single market, the environment, or agriculture. For example, a MEP from a social democratic party representing a coastal region explained that the fishing industry was very important to the people of her constituency and her party. She reported that this issue was more European (as opposed to national) because fisheries policy is a regional issue and requires cooperation across many member states. She feels this issue is better represented at the EP level because the EP has more control over the issue and therefore more power.<sup>11</sup> Policy seeking parties are parties like this that have an electorate where EU policy and elections are salient.

Parties competing in any elections will have multiple overlapping goals and European Elections are no different. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the behaviors associated with the goals of office, vote, and policy seeking strategies occur simultaneously. This provides seven different combinations of electoral parties: office seeking, vote seeking, policy seeking, office-policy seeking, office-vote seeking, policy-vote seeking, and office-policy-vote seeking. Each of these types of parties exhibit different types of behavior and have different empirical indicators of their goals. These indicators are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

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<sup>11</sup>Interview 6.18.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.




Figure 1: Electoral Goals

## 2.4 SELECTION AND SUPERVISION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

The selection and supervision methods used by parties determine candidate behavior once elected. Selection choices, who parties choose to put on candidate lists, are the result of a party's office, vote or policy seeking goals. Most parties seek to win seats in an election and must decide which members of their parties to put in which seat. They may also have policy goals that they would like to see implemented by their office holders. Finally, to achieve either one of these goals, or any other instrumental goals they may hold, they need votes. Each of these goals requires parties to consider the type of candidate to place on a list given their beliefs about the expected behavior of these individuals in office and the preferences of voters. These goals define the recruitment strategies of parties and recruitment and selection strategies regulate what types of people and agents will represent a party in office. Once

in office, these agents are supervised by their parties. The type of supervision parties use determines what style of representation these politicians supply.

The internal decision making structures of political parties hold many implications for party unity and the relationship between party members and leaders (Best and Cotta 2005; Hazan and Rahat 2006; Öhman 2002). Different intra-party institutional structures create different incentives and pose different constraints on elected politicians and members. When parties are highly centralized, elections and behavior are largely party centered. When parties are highly decentralized, elections and behavior are largely candidate centered (Hazan and Rahat 2006). Party members serving in office are often motivated by career aspirations and are thus more likely to promote the interests of those that have the most power over them. If the party is party-centered, they are more likely to adhere to the party line to maintain favor with party leadership. If the party is candidate centered, then politicians cater more to the desires of the constituency that is most clearly linked with their reelection. The difference in the incentives to cater to one group or the other create differences in party unity in legislatures (Depauw and Martin 2009). Thus the cohesion of a party's legislative group is directly dependent on the selection methods a party uses. Empirical work has found that parliamentary party groups, where candidates were selected through centralized party leadership, tend to make decisions based on party discipline. In contrast, those in groups selected through more decentralized, and inclusive groups, tend to make decisions through deliberative processes producing more variance in outcomes with respect to party unity (Cordero and Coller 2015). Variance in party unity is also greater when legislators are faced with competing principles (Carey 2007). Examples of competing principals include parliamentary leaders vs. presidents, party leadership vs, constituents, or party delegations across different levels of government (i.e. National and EU). Parties that centralize control of candidates can control the composition of their parliamentary party and better enforce unity (Sieberer 2006).

The incentives and the internal structures of parties also cause variation in citizen control of, and access to, political parties. The amount of power held by party leaders directly effects the ability of citizens to control their elected officials. When parties are centralized, they tend to reflect the interest of national level politics rather than regional or local politics (Narud,

Pedersen and Valen 2002). Centralization also influences access to parties because the level of democracy within a party influences party membership participation levels (Pennings and Hazan 2001). Decentralizing party decision making procedures increases the number of party members participating in the process of selecting representatives and party leaders. With more people participating in these processes, parties experience higher levels of volatility among candidates and leadership. Party elites are less able to control who gets elected or who is in charge (Hopkin 2001; LeDuc 2001). Centralization can even effect a party members' willingness to participation in elections, albeit in an unexpected way. Precisely because the decentralization of candidate selection procedures increases the number of party members participating in decision making, it can lead to factionalization within parties and greater intra-party conflict (Katz 2001). When this occurs, the presence of conflict can actually discourage participation in campaigns. When members are empowered to control the selection process, it can lead to intra-party divisions that discourage campaign support overall (Kernell 2015).

Many other scholars have also examined centralization or decentralization within a party organization with respect to internal democratization, leadership control, and candidate selection (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Hazan and Rahat 2010; Ramney 1981; Scarrow, Webb and Farrell 2000). Overall there is evidence that parties are trending toward decentralization. Between 1960 and 1990, parties in Western Europe moved toward more decentralized procedures for selection processes. However these changes have been modest and slow moving, as to not effect the stability of parties (Bille 2001; Mair 2013). However, this has not meant that party membership is increasing. In contrast, party membership has been declining over the last few decades and parties have been unable to recruit many new members. This means party memberships are stagnating and are aging, reflecting a smaller subset of the population and making it difficult for parties to reach a large portion of the population. They also have increasing difficulties finding quality candidates to run in local and regional elections and no longer have large populations to supply them with resources (Scarrow and Gezgor 2010). Hence, the trend toward decentralization is one way parties are attempting to reach out the broader population but it is unclear if it is working. Complementing this research, Field (2013) found that this decentralization is more likely to occur in institution-

alized democracies like those of Western Europe which are experiencing this type of decline. Parties in Eastern Europe that are younger and more volatile are less likely to decentralize. If parties are trending toward decentralization and decentralized parties experience less party unity, are parties becoming less unified over time? The literature presented above would suggest this, but some scholars argue that the effects of decentralization are not as clear cut as those of centralization.

The consensus in the literature is that centralization of party power entails greater party control of legislators and candidates. In contrast, decentralization increases competition among candidates and opens the party up to many lower level constituency or non-party interests ([Hazan and Rahat 2010](#)). Party candidates elected at the local level cater more to local interests. This encourages them to behave independently and be more individualistic. This independence can sometime lead to a lapse in party unity ([Tavits 2009](#)). The organization of a parties power structure therefore implies trade-offs with respect to representation. More inclusive organization leads to the representation of greater number of interests, but at the expense of party unity. More exclusive organization encourages more party unity. Hence the effects of decentralization with respect to intra-party democracy seems clear, but not all scholars agree that this a straightforward relationship. Increasing the role of party members at the lowest level may at first seem as a clear democratizing step, but it does not always translate into empowering the party base to make important decisions. Many lower level party groups or non party interests may be representing their own interests through participation in party decision making, but it is also possible that they are simply cued by party elites. Thus increasing access to decision making simply increases the access points for party leadership influence. In essence, allowing party leaders to control the party base and therefore bypass any mid-level competition they may face ([Katz 2001](#)).

In addition, even if parties are trying to create greater intra-party democracy, it is not clear that more party members will actually choose to participate in the process. Evidence exists of participation inertia, party members that have previously participated in internal party elections will continue to do so, but those that have not are not likely to begin doing so ([Wauters 2010](#)). In fact, one study showed that such expansion in Germany proved ineffective in either increasing participation in elections or increasing membership. This

prompted the scholar to conclude that while changes to institutional rules can be rather effective in excluding or decreasing participation, it is not sufficient to increase inclusion or participation (Scarrow 1999). Parties have tried to increase their draw for membership but the structure of state institutions and tax payer funded parties have not created strong enough incentives to push for more public participation. Parties simply don't need the resources of the public enough to truly pursue full participation (Whiteley 2011).

Building on the work of Gallagher and Marsh (1988), Hazan and Rahat (2010) also offer an extensive discussion of the effects of party organization on political representation and policy making. Hazan and Rahat focus on candidate selection as an important determinant of the quality of democracy. They offer both a complex discussion of the categorization of candidate selection within parties and a discussion of its potential consequences for representation, competitiveness, and responsiveness. The book underscores the importance of party organization as a political influence but, like the literature presented above, they conclude that the the immediate effect of centralization vs. decentralization or inclusive vs. exclusive party structures is far from clear. Trade-offs among democratic norms are inherent in the choices party make over organization. It is these trade-offs that this dissertation considers in developing testable hypotheses about the selection and supervision of MEPs within national political parties.

### 2.4.1 Selection

Electoral goals determine the demand for candidate types that exists within a party and the selection method determines how these candidates are chosen within the party. From the discussion above, parties that value European elections are going to demand a range of candidate types depending on their electoral goals. Some parties may simply want to win seats to reward loyal party activists for their service and choose veterans of the national party or newcomers. Others may value the policy benefits of a seat in the EP and seek to choose candidates with proven legislative skills or those well versed in European politics, like incumbents. In either situation, selection serves as a way for parties to reward and sanction their members because the party has control over a politician's career and their



likelihood of being elected. In turn, politicians choose to behave in a way the party finds acceptable in order to further their personal career goals. Incentives created through the selection mechanism for EP elections encourages or discourages certain behaviors because potential candidates almost always need some form of party support to run in an election (Carey 2007; Tavits 2013). This support may be in resource only, as is the case in many elections in the United States where parties provide electoral campaign support but do not initially choose candidates, or it may be as total as requiring a nomination (and a good position) on a party's list. This is most common in closed list proportional electoral systems like national elections in Bulgaria, Poland, and Portugal for example. Once the support of the party has been received, the candidate is ensured at least a nominal amount of the vote from the party's strongest supporters and parties often work tirelessly in elections regardless of their electoral goals.

When considering their office seeking goals, parties consider the number and stature of all offices available for the party to contest. The size of the party and the number of seats available to its members determines the number of opportunities parties have to offer electoral benefits to party members (Ware 1996). Each member state in the EU has a different configuration of local, regional, and national legislative institutions to which they can nominate candidates. The number of elected offices available in each state depends on the nature of the national legislature (bicameral or unicameral), a federal vs. unitary structure of government, the frequency of elections, and legislative turnover (Norris 1997b). The number of EP seats open to each member state varies in the EU and the structure of each national electoral system determines any potential barriers to entry (electoral thresholds, number of constituencies, etc.). In the 2014 European election, the number of seats available to any member state ranged from 99 (Germany) to six (Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta).<sup>12</sup> In most countries, the number of willing and qualified candidates wishing to hold elected office outnumbers the number of offices that can be held (Ware 1979). The relationship between those that are chosen for election and the party is one of mutual benefit, that reinforces certain behavioral commitments on both sides. Parties provide electoral benefits

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<sup>12</sup>Due to changes included in the Lisbon Treaty, Germany will lose 3 seats in this election and the following countries lose one: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, and Romania.

to legislators and legislators provide policy benefits to parties. The more benefits a party can offer or withhold, the more loyal the politician.

The ability of party leadership to control party benefits is imperative for enforcing discipline and encouraging unity in policy making. One of the most effective ways to control these benefits is through the selection of candidates. [Hazan and Rahat \(2010\)](#) argue the level of democracy within a party, mostly considered through candidate selection procedures, is a key variable in determining party unity with implications for, “the fundamental nature of modern democratic politics and governance” (10). Candidate selection determines the composition of legislatures, the government, and the opposition. Reflecting both the character of a party and its internal power hierarchy, candidate selection is a tool parties use to determine both the type of legislator that serves them in parliament and their behavior in office. Centralization reduces intra-party competition and increases legislative responsiveness to the central party needs and interests ([Hazan and Rahat 2010](#)). The level of centralization of power in this process and the inclusiveness of party members provides the best way to compare selection mechanism across parties ([Hazan and Rahat 2010](#)). Candidates are usually chosen through a process whose structure lies somewhere between completely decentralized, mass membership selection to completely centralized with all decisions being made within the party leadership or by the party leader (Ware 1996). In addition, the selection of candidates also requires parties to make choices over who can become candidates ([Hazan and Rahat 2010](#)). Hence selection procedures can be categorized by both the selectors that choose candidates and the rules that include or exclude possible contenders.

[Hazan and Rahat \(2010\)](#) offer an extensive categorization of selection procedures that includes many levels. First, variation exists among parties with respect to the rules put in place to define the pool of potential candidates. Some parties place some restrictions on contenders for candidacy such as requirements for age, party membership or party membership length, monetary commitments, or membership in special groups (quotas, etc.). Some parties treat incumbents like any other potential contender but others have preferential treatment for their renomination. However a party chooses to restrict the pool of potential candidates, the rules can be placed on a spectrum of most inclusive—anyone can be a party candidate, even non-members—to most exclusive—candidates must fulfill a variety or strict requirements. Lax

requirements lead to more variation among electoral lists where strict requirements create more cohesive lists. These requirements create different incentives for the behavior of party members, both those elected and those desiring to be, that interact with selection procedures to produce different expectations of party unity (Hazan and Rahat 2010).

Hazan and Rahat (2010) compare selection procedures in terms of the inclusiveness and exclusiveness of selectorate. The selectorate is the group of party members or leaders that are chiefly responsible for choosing electoral candidates (Borchert 2011; Schlesinger 1966). Moving from most inclusive to most exclusive, Hazan and Rahat categorize selectorates that include voters (for instance, open primary elections) as the most inclusive followed by those that include only party members (closed primaries), those that include party delegates, then those restricted to party elites. Finally those involving only the leader of a party are the most exclusive. Selectorates may vary across the level of constituency they encompass. For instance, a party may utilize an elite party leadership selection mechanism but select candidates at the sub-national constituency level (decentralized), therefore the selectorate is exclusive, but the leadership in control is the sub-national, decentralized leadership. Also, candidates may face more than one selectorate. For instance, they may need to meet the approval of party leadership to become a potential candidate but then be subjected to a vote by party members to make an electoral list. Therefore selection often occurs as a multi-stage process.

It is the relationship between the inclusiveness of a selectorate and the responsiveness of politicians discussed by Hazan and Rahat (2010) that is of paramount interest here. The authors consider responsiveness to be akin to accountability and to be a measure of the relationship between candidates and the various influences they encounter in political life. Candidate selection methods, it is argued, produce variation in the selectorate that directly impacts the ability of party leadership to enforce discipline. The authors identify two conflicting approaches to the relationship. On one hand, the the relationship between the inclusiveness of candidate selection and responsiveness is thought to be linear. The more inclusive the selectorate, the more responsive candidates are to multiple sources of influence—party leaders, party members, individuals in their constituencies and other non-party actors. The more exclusive the selectorate, the more candidates are only responsive to party leaders

(or those that make up the small, exclusive selectorate). Politicians wish to get elected or reelected, so when facing exclusive selectorates they cater to the small group that controls their fate and party unity increases (Bowler 2000). If they must cater to many diverse interests for reelection, then party unity will suffer (Tavits 2009).

A competing explanation argues that while increased inclusiveness may be a necessary condition for decreased party unity, is not sufficient. Decentralization of party decision making can be used as a tool for cartel parties to buffer the leadership against the pressures of mid-level activism (Carty 2004; Mair 1997). This view argues that empowerment of the party base or membership actually serves party leadership because this selectorate will take cues from party leaders and reinforce their dominance. In this case, decentralization and the increased inclusiveness of the selectorate can actually exclude influence from ideologically divisive factions within the party and hence bolster unity (Hazan and Rahat 2010). In the end, both approaches highlight the impact of party leadership power on unity. If party leaders control selection, either by restricting the selectorate to themselves or controlling their membership, they can enforce party unity. When party leaders control selection, legislators are more unified (Benedetto and Hix 2007; Crisp et al. 2004; Hix 2004; Sieberer 2006)

Given the arguments of the literature above, if candidate selection and list placement are the privilege of elite leadership then we are more likely to see candidates selected that represent the interests of the elite and thus are more accountable to them. In contrast, when candidate selection is left to mass membership (like the primaries of U.S. parties), we are more likely to see personalistic candidates that appeal to a much broader base or special interests than simply the party elite (Bowler 2000; Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Hazan and Rahat 2010; Ware 1979). Parties with centralized control are better able to choose candidates that will behave loyally in the EP, but do so at the expense of voters who feel less connected to the electoral list. Decentralized parties are able to appeal to wider audience but lose some control over how their elected officials behave.

In most cases, with so few seats open to each party in the EP election and perhaps only slightly more available in national office, patterns have emerged to explain how parties allocate their personnel resources to the European office. I expect office seeking parties to nominate those that have recently been displaced by a national election and new politicians

to the EP list in order to maintain or provide office benefits to loyal members. I expect vote seeking parties to place national politicians or well known figures on electoral lists in order to increase their vote share. Finally, I expect policy seeking parties to be interested in candidates with either expertise in "European" policy or those that already have experience (incumbents). The electoral goals of the party will determine what type of candidate a party wishes to place on its list and increasing control over the selection process increases the probability that each party will select the "right" candidate. While formal hypotheses will be stated in the empirical chapters, the expectation is that MEPs selected under centralized organizational structures and with national ambition will be the most congruent with their parties.

#### 2.4.2 Supervision

Supervision of EP delegations by their national party leaders is costly, but so is disunity. It damages both the delegation in parliament and the face of the party in the electorate (Kam 2009). The number one cited cause for disunity among EP delegations and incongruity with their national parties was the lack of information exchange and understanding between levels of government.<sup>13</sup> The organization of leadership and the requirements for communication are some of the most important tools parties have to increase MEP congruence with their policy preferences.

The tools available to national parties to supervise and constrain their European politicians are similar to those used in national parliaments but become more complicated at the European level. Here, politics are often much more technical and it is impossible for national politicians to keep up with the nuanced nature of the legislation. In addition to a lack of technical knowledge and information, national politicians often do not know how the legislative process of the EP works.<sup>14</sup> In addition to difficulties with technical information, legislating at the EP level often requires a different kind of political skill and strategy. MEPs at the EP must be better at working in coalitions and reaching across party and national

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<sup>13</sup>Nearly every MEP I interviewed mentioned the lack of information exchange and its problems when asked about the nature of communication between themselves and their national party.

<sup>14</sup>Once again, this was a common thread through all interviews at the EP.

lines.<sup>15</sup> Also, politics often take place on different cleavages than in national parliaments, especially if something is in the national interest and will garner support from all national MEPs. Sometimes MEPs even deliberately avoid communicating with the national party altogether if they know it will cause problems and disagreement.<sup>16</sup> For instance, Tonino Picula and Davor Ivo Stier were both heavily criticized by their parties for intense cooperation on the EP's work in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Krasnec 2014).<sup>17</sup> With Picula representing the SDP and Stier the HDZ, these two politicians would never cross party lines in national politics. The opposition between the two parties and their leaders, Zoran Milanović and Tomislav Karamarko, respectively, remains healthy. So much so that this cooperation is thought to have cost Picula the leading spot on the 2014 SDP European electoral list (Dalje.com 2014).

In the EP, each party will have a different way of managing their communicative relationship with their EP delegation and there are several ways parties have chosen to supervise their MEPs. Parties are able to sanction members that perform poorly or diverge from the party line. The strongest tool for sanction available to national parties is the aforementioned selection and the use of the media to condemn the actions of a MEP to signal disapproval. Many parties also choose a head delegate from among their MEPs. This delegate serves as the main link between national parties and their EP delegations. This role is mostly for the purposes of sharing information but, for some parties, this person can act as a whip for the party members and ensure party unity. Providing direct instruction to parliament members on specific legislation is another way parties can ensure their politicians vote as they wish; however, direct instructions are rare in the EP. Most EP delegations have some flexibility to work on legislation on their own, but this varies in degree across parties. Those MEPs that expressed an ability to work freely without specific constraints from their national parties were often from German or Nordic Parties and often contrasted their experiences with their colleagues from Southern Europe, who do not experience this kind of freedom.<sup>18</sup> Finally, any tactic that makes sure MEPs are fully informed about their party's positions on policy matters helps increase the congruence of MEPs and their parties. The more an MEP is

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<sup>15</sup>Interview 6.18.2013(3). European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

<sup>16</sup>Interview 5.30.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

<sup>17</sup>Interview 6.10.2014. Zagreb, Croatia.

<sup>18</sup>Interview 6.4.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium. Interview 9.17.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

aware of the position of their party, the better they can represent it in any representative body. Information sharing that flows both to EP and from the EP to the party will help MEPs better understand their party's preferences and will help national parties determine what is at stake at the European level and what it means to them. One way to ensure communication occurs is to formalize it in the organization of the party. Formalizing positions for MEPs within the party leadership promotes communication between EP delegations and their parties.

The formal structure of executive leadership within parties is one way to compare national parties. All parties have executive leadership, but the composition of leadership varies. Just as centralization of selection determined the ability of a party to select its most preferred candidates, centralization of leadership allows parties to better supervise their MEPs. In this dissertation, I consider two types of leadership and measure how they impact the policy congruence of an individual with their party. I distinguish supervision of MEPs as either inclusive or exclusive based on whether or not an MEP is formally included in a party's leadership. I consider executive leadership to be any party body that is the main source of power between party congresses. For most parties, this body is comprised of a party president, vice president, perhaps a few party secretaries, and representation from the national legislature. For some parties at least one MEP, usually the head delegate, is also automatically included in this select group, but for most parties this is not a requirement. This inclusion is an important link for MEPs because it creates a direct connection with the leadership through which information can flow.

Information sharing between MEPs and their party leadership should work in one of two ways. First, inclusion in executive leadership can provide MEPs with valuable information about the party that allows them to make the most accurate decisions in the EP based on their knowledge. It also allows MEPs to share information with the leadership, which is especially important given the complexity of EP legislation. On one hand, I expect parties that have this type of inclusive leadership structure to have MEPs that behave more as trustees in their representation and be granted the discretion to make decisions on legislation as they see fit. Alternatively, I expect MEPs that are excluded from the leadership to behave more like delegates and attempt to cater to the party when faced with decisions. Trustees

make decisions based on their own knowledge and personal beliefs and have the insight and power to use their own expert judgment. Delegates will attempt to be loyal party members and behave in whatever way they feel the party would find most acceptable (Fox and Shotts 2009). Parties that have policy seeking goals are more likely to include MEPs in their leadership because they hold stronger preferences and are willing to make policy at the European level.

## 2.5 INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR CAREERS

The final part of the MEP-party relationship and its consequences is the motivation of the individual MEP. Party goals are important for the choices parties make when selecting candidates for and supervising politicians in the EP, but the MEP's personal goals also play a large role in determining their behavior. Each EPG and each national party offers individual politicians many different rewards and opportunities while also imposing their own constraints. One way to begin hypothesizing about how individuals react to both their party group and their national party is by addressing personal political ambition. While national parties provide individuals with the opportunity to seek and maintain office, the EPGs provide tangible benefits of office holding in the EP like leadership positions, committee assignments, and the assignment of reports (rapporteurships). The way an individual responds to the opportunities given to him or her is, in part, a product of his or her personal goals. Political ambition determines what politicians will desire for the future, which influences their behavior in the present.

The seminal work of Schlesinger (1966) on political careers in the United States provides a foundational theoretical account of how ambition is affected by several institutional and structural variables within a political system (Borchert 2011). Reviewing this work provides insight into the way political ambition can influence behavior in the EP because national parties in the EP work in many different political and institutional structures. Schlesinger (1966) identifies four major types of structural variables that determine the attractiveness and accessibility of public office in political systems. Structural factors that contribute to the



attractiveness of office include the hierarchical organization of the political system (federal vs. unitary) and the institutional arrangement of power. [Schlesinger \(1966\)](#) also identifies the structure of representation and political organization as determinants of the accessibility of public office. In terms of representation, Schlesinger's main theoretical argument is that differences exist across political systems in terms of who is instrumental in getting politicians in office. He argues that for some offices, the electorate is essential in getting into office, but for others it is the selectorate. The determination of which sector is most important in gaining office is often the result of the electoral laws in each state and the organization of the parties. Finally, consideration is given to the organization of interest representation. Similar to selectorate representation, interest groups are another system of recruitment for politicians and can open (or close) opportunities for politicians depending on their preference ([Schlesinger 1966](#); [Borchert 2011](#)).

[Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard \(2009\)](#) implicitly use the structure of opportunity model to draft a causal explanation for the differences in MEP behavior. First, they argue that across member states, activity and work in the EP is more or less conducive to returning to domestic politics. In some states, the work in the EP is too far removed from that of the domestic system and politicians have a hard time connecting to both their parties and their voters after spending time in Brussels. These types of states should be those where large parties compete for national office because not only is EP office more accessible, it may be more attractive if there are limited opportunities at home ([Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard 2009](#)). These authors use age as a proxy for ambition, arguing that those MEPs that are older are less likely to continue to forge domestic careers and will therefore seek to maximize benefits gained by working with the EPGs. These politicians may be close to retirement and/or have worked through domestic politics already. On the other hand, young politicians in the EP are likely beginning their careers and may be more inclined to work towards national party favor, and the EP can be the first stop on a long domestic career.

If personal ambition is linked to legislative behavior, it should also influence party unity. We can ask, how do individual career aspirations affect the "party in public" in the EP? Under what conditions does political ambition help or hinder party goals in the EP? The literature on personal ambition in the EP presents relevant hypotheses to answer these questions.

Nationally ambitious MEPs are likely to be delegates of the party and exhibit a higher level of policy congruence between national party preference and EP legislative outcomes because they need to protect and prolong their national careers. Individual based electoral systems (i.e. ranked higher in personal vote) will produce more trustees and have a lower level of policy congruence between national party preference and EP legislative outcomes because they are less dependent on the party. Older, but less experienced, MEPs will also have a lower level of policy congruence because parties have less leverage over their careers. Finally, parties with professional MEPs (e.g., incumbents) will have lower levels of policy congruence simply because they have created trustee relationships with their MEPs. These parties have opted to send these people to Europe to get the job done however they themselves see fit and leave them alone to do so.

## 2.6 CONCLUSION

My main objective is to analyze and explain the variation in party organization for European elections with respect to national party electoral goals and the consequences of organizational choices for MEP behavior. In order to do so I examine not only how parties are organized to select and supervise their MEPs, but also how the intersection of these choices and electoral goals impacts who is chosen for the EP and how they serve their party in office. In addition to further theoretical development, Chapter 3 summarizes and analyzes the organizational choices of national parties with respect to the EP. Chapter 4 investigates which candidate types are selected under a variety of electoral conditions. Chapter 5 provides the summary test of the theory by investigating the congruence of MEP behavior with their party's preferences given the organization and goals of each party and individual MEP ambition.

### 3.0 PARTY ORGANIZATION

Scholars of democratic institutions have identified party organization as an important factor for explaining party attributes and actions including, but not limited to, a party's connection to individuals and society, the choices a party makes in elections, and a party's electoral success, sustainability, and evolution (Duverger 1954; Gunther and Diamond 2003; Krouwel 2012; Kitschelt 1989; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1976; Tavits 2013; Ware 1996, 1979). National parties in EU member states are organized with national elections and institutions in mind. Previous work has claimed these national parties have not yet adapted their organization to incorporate MEPs and the European-level elections and institutions that come with them (Poguntke et al. 2007). In this chapter, I revisit this claim and examine the centralization of party organization for the European level, which I define as candidate selection and the composition of executive party leadership. These two aspects of organization are important because they define how parties select and supervise their MEPs, which in turn structures incentives for MEP behavior. I find that party experience, in national elections and national institutions, is the most influential predictor of EP level organization. In particular, the institutional structure of member state legislative institutions, the nature of the national party system, and past experience with EU membership and the Eurozone all predict the centralization of organization.

Parties are a basic institution of representative democracy, allowing for the aggregation of many interests in society with the goal of gaining office and influencing policy (Strom 1990). Parties are directly involved in the formation of national government and actively seek to influence the individuals they put in office to further their own goals (Ware 1996). Parties in Europe have been organized to gain office and influence policy at the national level. Their organization structure is the result of national dynamics like their access to resources (Katz

and Mair 1995), their founding ideology (Enyedi and Linek 2008), the competition within their national electoral systems, and the evolution of their electoral experiences (Tavits 2013). Given that party organization has profound effects for electoral success and performance in office at the national level, it should also affect performance in European elections and in the EP. However, for many parties, the national party institutions have simply been extended to the European level instead of adapted to it. Therefore, patterns in the organization of MEP selection and supervision should be based on the structure of national organization. Understanding the origins of party organization at the national level should tell us when and why parties will centralize control of these two functions.

In this chapter I present and analyze party organization for European legislators. I compare the formal treatment of MEPs to that of national legislators and investigate patterns in the centralization of power within parties, determining how parties have dealt with the addition of European level elections internally. I find that most parties have simply centralized their treatment of MEPs at the expense of broad, member participation. Most selection procedures are undemocratic, with a few elite leaders choosing candidates in the majority of parties. Furthermore, most parties do not incorporate current MEPs into their formal leadership structure. Thus I conclude that although the influence of European politics has grown immensely over the last few decades, and the EP continues to gain power and prominence, national parties are still not utilizing MEPs in the most representative way. In the next section I review relevant literature for party organization and its impact on expected patterns in the treatment of MEPs. Then I turn to the empirical reality of organization for European elections and its determinants.

### 3.1 POLITICAL PARTIES AS ORGANIZATIONS

Literature focused on the development and evolution of party systems in Europe identifies five common types of party organizations. These five types are cadre or elite, mass, catch-all, cartel, and business-firm. Each type is defined by its origins, its goals in terms of office, and its relationships with citizens and the state (Katz and Mair 1995). Each type

of party provides a different expectation for politician behavior based on two dimensions of organization. The first dimension identifies parties by the distribution of power within the party, differentiating centralized vs. decentralized decision making processes. The second dimension is the professionalization of the organization, categorizing parties as professional vs. amateur organizations (Krouwel 2012). These two dimensions allow us to understand many differences across political parties including the internal distribution of power in the party, leadership selection, and the use of party resources (Krouwel 2012).

Party leadership, in its scope, the way it is selected, and the way it is organized, influences many different party functions and outputs. Duverger (1954) identifies the classic distinction between parties as the difference between centralized and decentralized leadership. Choices over how to organize this basic feature of a party delineate parties into two categories: power stemming from the top leadership or power vested in mass membership. This has led scholars to identify several categories of parties. First, centralized parties have a small number of leaders who have control over the basic and most important functions of the party, the organization of elections and campaigns and communication with the candidates. Restricting control of these functions to a small number of people means that power remains in a tight circle of leaders who make most of the choices for the parties. Centralized parties have been designated as cadre, cartel, and business firm parties in the literature (Duverger 1954; Katz and Mair 1995; Krouwel 2012).

All party types work to promote their own survival and thus have goals and structures in place to achieve this. Mass parties incorporate large numbers of people into the party through hierarchical membership structures. Members pay dues to help finance the party and volunteer to help in campaigns. Since many people are brought together to work towards party goals, hierarchical organizational structures emerge to coordinate party activities with a small, democratically elected leadership (Michels 1962; Krouwel 2012). Catch-all parties seek to attract many voters from a broad ideological spectrum and thus depend less on traditional membership structures for support. Instead, they will look to interest groups and various sectors of society for voters and recruits. They incorporate professional politicians both into their ranks and into their candidacy opportunities. They have an incentive to centralize candidate selection to ensure the appropriate candidates are chosen for electoral

lists. Similarly, cartel parties resemble oligarchies and centralize their power to work in connection with the party in government to secure resources for the future. They seek to place members of their elite circle in office and will thus centralize selection to keep outsiders off the ballot. The most centralized party is the business firm party, where a political entrepreneur creates and maintains a party using his/her own resources and seeks only to contest elections solely for his/her personal benefit.

While placing national parties in Europe into these different categorizations is both beyond the scope and purpose of this dissertation, I can identify those parties which we would expect to centralize given their relationship to state or private resources. All parties need resources (funds) to contest an election. One major characteristic of a cartel party is their dependence on state resources (Katz and Mair 1995). Political parties that can depend on state resources generally do so in place of resources from mass membership or grass roots funding (van Biezen and Kopecký 2014). Similarly, leaders from business firm parties that can rely on independent wealth do not need resources from member organizations. As the need to pander to multiple funding sources disappears, parties are more likely to centralize their power. Especially in the case of public funding, dependence on, and control of, public party funding promotes centralization and elite control (van Biezen 2003). This leads to the first hypothesis linking national organization to treatment of MEPs. If state funded parties are more likely to centralization at the national level, we would expect the same at the European level; thus:

*H<sub>1</sub>: State financed parties are more likely to centralize the selection and supervision of MEPs.*

### **3.2 IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION**

In addition to identifying party types based on institutional development, political parties are often divided by ideology and/or party family for the purpose of scientific study. Ideology is almost always an explanatory factor when scholars attempt to explain party or individual political behavior. While ideology is present in nearly all studies of political phenomenon,

the link between organization and ideology is not quite clear (Enyedi and Linek 2008). The pioneering scholars of party organization discussed above would argue that ideology is simply one factor in the historical trajectory of parties that helps determine the way a party is organized. For example, a party's ideology can also imply a specific type of preferred organization based on its ideological beliefs. For example, Bündis90/Die Grünen is a German green party that has direct democracy as one of its founding principles and explicitly commits to decentralized and grassroots democracy in its party organization.

At the time of their creation, different party groups had different resources available to them in terms of the support they received from the public. The distribution of resources was similar across party types (ie. center-right or center-left) and thus parties belonging to the same party family resemble one another in organization (Duverger 1954; Enyedi and Linek 2008; Panebianco 1988). For example, Enyedi and Linek (2008) posit that since center-right parties tend to rely more on donations from business groups relative to center-left parties, this gives more autonomy to their politicians because they are less reliant on their public membership. They do not have the need for strong organizational structures to maintain a large, decentralized membership base. Tavits (2013) also links ideology to organization through the types of electorates parties seek to reach. She argues that parties seeking rural and/or poor voters will need more extensive networks to reach their electorate. These parties tend to be leftist parties that need organizations that cover large geographic areas of a state and focus on personal interaction between party members and citizens. In contrast, parties representing rich and/or urban voters do not need such extensive networks because it is easier for these parties to reach their potential voters (Tavits 2013). In some ways, this is an extension of the state vs. private financing argument since we expect parties appealing to broad membership bases, especially in rural communities, to decentralize their activities. Thus center-left parties should be more likely to decentralize party organization on both the national and European level.

*H<sub>2</sub>: Parties of the left are less likely to centralize the selection and supervision of MEPs.*

### 3.3 INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATION

As a point of caution, both [Enyedi and Linek \(2008\)](#) and [Tavits \(2013\)](#) avoid making strong causal claims between ideology and specific forms of organization. Determining whether or not holding certain ideological beliefs actually causes parties to organize their selection and supervision of MEPs certain ways is difficult since the majority of the national parties represented in the EP exist mainly to contest national elections and many originated before they needed to select MEPs. Instead, it is likely the organizational choices of parties with respect to European elections are largely dependent on the structure they have in place for selecting and supervising those in national office. The persistence of institutions and their structures is a common element of institutional theory.

Both historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism predict the persistence of nationally structured party organization even in European elections. Historical institutionalism argues that absent a major, exogenous shock or critical juncture for an institution, change will be rare and path dependent ([Mahoney 2000](#); [Peters 1999](#); [Pierson 2000](#); [Streeck and Thelen 2005](#)). Given that the EP was relatively powerless in its creation and has slowly developed more importance over time, its creation does not merit "critical juncture" status. Therefore, the organization of the party will not change much, if at all, when expanding to the European level. Similarly, rational choice institutionalism also fails to predict much change in the organization of the party for European elections. Given this theory argues that choices made, and action taken, by actors within institutions are the result of strategic considerations of the expected behavior of others ([Hall and Taylor 1996](#); [Shepsle 2006](#)). Since European elections are still second order, and national parties are organized to be successful at the national level, there is no reason to change their organization for Europe. If it works at one level, it should be expected to work on another given the actors and expectations remain largely the same. Thus, I also hypothesize that decisions taken at the national level will influence decisions at the European level. Institutional memory should be a large determinant of European organization.

*H<sub>3</sub>: Parties that centralize at the national level will be more likely to centralize the selection and supervision of MEPs.*



### 3.4 ENVIRONMENT AND ORGANIZATION

Finally, there are also important aspects of the political environment that can encourage or discourage centralization within a party. Electoral hostility, electoral outcomes, and the structure of national institutions can affect the strengthening and expansion of organizational networks that promote decentralization. [Tavits \(2013\)](#) argues that organization building is one strategy parties use to strengthen themselves when faced with harsh environmental conditions. Creating expansive organizational networks is one tactic that parties can use to increase vote share since dense and decentralized organization can reach many more people than small, centralized groups. Building and maintaining large networks and organizing large scale party elections and the like at the local and regional level is costly. Parties that use this tactic are those that believe alternative, and less costly, strategies are unlikely to win them votes. In addition, new parties organizing at the grass roots level may be parties that faced difficult barriers to entry when the party was founded or when it first contested an election ([Tavits 2013](#)).

Difficult barriers to entry stem from many different sources. Electoral thresholds may prevent the electoral success of new and small parties and constrain the number of parties within a system ([Moser 1999](#)). Electoral systems also play a role in determining the ease of entry and the level of competition parties face. Proportional systems foster multi-partism while majoritarian systems do not ([Duverger 1954](#)). While the EU does require that all EP elections be conducted under rules of proportional representation, the level of multi-partism varies across countries. This means that parties contesting European elections experience different levels of competition given the number of parties within their electoral system. The more parties in a system, the easier it is for any one party to gain at least some share of the vote, so each party in a multiparty system has a greater chance of success ([Jackman and Volpert 1996](#)). This is due in part to the fact that more active parties means that each party simply needs to gain a plurality of votes. They can focus their resources on a smaller groups of people. If only a few parties exists, each one must try to gain many votes. This requires them to spread their resources over a larger section of society ([Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004](#); [Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2000](#)). Thus, I expect multi-partism to encourage

centralization as parties will likely face less electoral hostility.

*H<sub>4</sub>: Parties in larger and more diverse party systems are more likely to centralize selection and supervision of MEPs.*

Party competition is often influenced by the structure of national legislative and electoral institutions. Access to office for parties is, in part, defined by the absolute number of offices available to win. This number of opportunities is dictated by the nature of the state (federal vs. unitary) and the legislature (unicameral vs. bicameral)(Norris 1997b). The more opportunities a party has to gain office, the less competition there is for any given position, especially in the EP. In addition, the decentralized nature of federalist government implies a higher tendency to decentralize since politicians are more likely to be more loyal to their local groups (Morgenstern 2003). Therefore, I hypothesize that decentralized parties are more likely in multi-level political systems.

*H<sub>5</sub>: Multi-level systems will be less likely to centralize selection and supervision of MEPs.*

### 3.5 FORMAL ORGANIZATION IN NATIONAL PARTIES: THE EMPIRICAL REALITY

In order to examine the organization of parties with respect to the EP, I analyzed party statutes and collected data from elite interviews, paying special attention to, and inquiring about, the processes of candidate selection within parties for both European and national elections and the inclusion of MEPs in executive party leadership.<sup>1</sup> I use these two measures as proxies for the centralization of MEP organization, which I have defined as centralized selection and inclusion in the executive leadership. I do so because candidate selection within parties is very easily delineated into centralized vs. decentralized processes since the selectorate for candidate lists is specified explicitly in most party statutes. Decentralized selection involves a greater proportion of party members in the process while centralized

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<sup>1</sup>A list of parties for which I had access to party statutes is in Table 24 in Appendix A. As stated in the introduction of the dissertation, the parties interviewed included the center-right, center-left, and liberal parties from Germany, the United Kingdom, and Croatia.

selection restricts it to a few elites. I also consider membership in the leadership as an action that brings MEPs into the inner circle of the party, therefore making them part of the party elite and centralizing control and communication. There are obviously many other measures that could be used to assess organizational centralization, but these two are easily identified in party statutes and also unambiguous enough to compare across many statutes. The main dependent variables are indicators for candidate selection procedure and the inclusion of MEPs in the executive structures of parties. The data contain 45 parties from 17 countries. The largest group of parties are social democrats, which belong to the group of the European Socialist (PES) in the seventh EP. This is followed by an equal number of liberal (the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE)) and conservative parties (European Peoples Party (EPP) and the European Conservative and Reform Group (ECR)). Just over half of the parties use some form of executive selection, but just under half include MEPs in their leadership, while about 30% do both.

The experiences of these parties in European elections also varies across many independent variables. Because I argue that European organization is most likely to be an extension of national organization, I identify variation across different party, legislative, and electoral systems at the national level. First, I identify party system and party characteristics because these will influence the level of centralization within a party (Hazan and Rahat 2010). This includes those parties that have executive selection for national elections because I hypothesize that these parties are more likely to centralize both selection and supervision at the European level as well. Just under 50% of the parties fall into this category, which is less than I find centralize for European selection.<sup>2</sup> In addition, I identify left parties as social democratic parties, green parties, or post-communist parties, which account for about 40% of the data. Parties that are given state funds for European elections are identified as state-financed and federal systems are identified. The final measure of the analysis is multi-partism, for which I use the effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979).<sup>3</sup> I expect that

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<sup>2</sup> A description of each party's selection process, along with a comparison to its national process is available in Appendix A in Tables 27 and 28.

<sup>3</sup>The effective number of parties is first calculated using Rae's national fractionalization measure (Fractionalization =  $1 - \sum_{i=1}^M t_i^2$  where  $t_i$  is the proportion of the national votes for the  $i^{th}$  party) from the EES contextual data (Rae 1967). The measure of the effective number of parties is taken as ENP =  $\sum_{i=1}^M t_i^2$  (Laakso and Taagepera 1979).

as this measure increases, parties will be more likely to centralize because competition will be lower.<sup>4</sup>

Table 1: Party Centralization for European Organization

Independent Variable	Hypothesis	Hypothesized Effect
State financing in European Elections	H <sub>1</sub>	+
Left Parties	H <sub>2</sub>	-
National Executive Selection	H <sub>3</sub>	+
Multi-partism	H <sub>4</sub>	-
National Multi-Level Systems	H <sub>5</sub>	-

### 3.6 ORGANIZATION FOR CANDIDATE SELECTION

Candidate selection practices for the EP vary across national parties. The coding of the statutes identifies those parties that did not mention formal procedures for candidate selection (no formal designation),<sup>5</sup> those that select their MEPs at the constituency level (mass), those that have voting delegates (in a national congress or elected committee/council convened for this purpose) that select the list (delegate), and those that have completely centralized selection (executive). Executive selection is defined as selection that took place solely within the executive body of a party, where the executive body is defined as the highest level decision making authority that meets between party congresses. Figure 2 presents the level of centralization of national parties in the selection of candidates for European elec-

<sup>4</sup>The contextual data on party family, state financing, electoral competition, bicameralism, and federalism comes from the European Election Studies contextual data (EES 2009a; Czesnik, Kotnarowski and Markowski 2010). The contextual data from the EES does not contain Croatia since they did not participate in the 2009 election. Therefore, I calculated fractionalization using data from the European Election database for the 2011 Croatian parliamentary election and the information on state party financing come from Smilov and Toplak (2013). The state is unitary and unicameral.

<sup>5</sup>Of the parties in the analysis, only eight fail to mention MEPs at all. These parties are listed in Table 25 in Appendix A. In these eight, there does not appear to be many statistically significant patterns or any specific determinants of the failure to formally recognize MEPs except for bicameralism. The results of a preliminary test of association are available in Table 26 in Appendix A.

tions throughout the data.<sup>6</sup> There are 330 MEPs in the data that represent parties with centralized selection versus about 161 MEPs that come from non-centralized parties.

Not only do these different types of selection represent different levels of centralization within the party, they also impact the way candidates themselves view their position. This was most notable in the way MEPs and candidates described the selection process that they experienced. In Croatia, the most centralized case, candidate MEPs often referred to their candidate status as one that was selected for them. Nearly all the MEPs and prospective MEPs I interviewed spoke about the selection process as a process outside of their jurisdiction. For example, I was often told things like, the president decided this, the president had the power to, the president had these criteria, and the president asked me to... When I asked current MEPs about their desire to remain in the EP or European politics, I was told things like, "I will do whatever the party thinks is useful,"<sup>7</sup> and, "I did not plan on it, but the party thought I would be a good, loyal name on the list."<sup>8</sup> In contrast, UK MEPs used language like, I was interested in, I decided to, I thought, and one MEP said she thought she would, "have more influence and input in the EP than as a backbencher in Westminster."<sup>9</sup> The UK processes are largely unique in the EP, with only a few parties characterized by decentralized control over selection. In the UK, the parties use a mass selection procedure where candidates can self-nominate and their party constituents choose among them. All of these examples show that MEPs are aware of the role of leadership in their careers and may be subjected to different incentives for their actions and their careers given the structure of their parties. The most centralized parties are those in Croatia. Most of the German parties tend to use some sort of delegate selection, and the UK is the least centralized with selection occurring through the mass membership at the regional level.

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<sup>6</sup>The source documents are available upon request and party abbreviations are in Table 38 in Appendix A.

<sup>7</sup>Interview 4.4.2013. Hrvatski Sabor. Zagreb, Croatia

<sup>8</sup>Interview 9.25.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

<sup>9</sup>Interview 6.26.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.




Figure 2: Candidate Selection Procedures in National Parties

### 3.6.1 Centralized Selection: Croatian Political Parties

Croatian political parties are good examples of centralized selection with selection processes taking place within the party leadership. In these parties, the presidents have almost complete power to choose candidates for both European and national parliamentary elections. Croatia elect MEPs in one constituency and held their first election in April of 2013 before they became full members of the EU in July of 2013. Also, in contrast to the parties above, Croatian lists tend to be coalition lists so parties must also be aware of the needs or demands of potential coalition partners and list order is decided with partners in mind. European elections also introduced a new electoral system. In addition to having only one electoral district (vs. 12 in national elections), EP elections also introduced preferential voting. Prior to 2015, national elections lists were closed and there were no preferential votes. These parties claim to try to represent the different regions of Croatia in the construction of their lists

but there is no formal requirement to do so.

The statutes of the HDZ, the conservative party, explicitly grant power to the party executive to select possible candidates for national and EP elections and the party president has final approval power. When selecting candidates for the 2013 election, the county organizations (Županija) were asked to provide the names of up to three possible candidates. These candidates were chosen by the county presidents in consultation with the national president, the party executive, and political secretary. After these names are identified, the process becomes much less transparent,<sup>10</sup> as the final list and ranking is decided within the executive. The HDZ presented a list with two additional parties, the party of peasants (Hrvatska Seljačka Stranka) and a right party, the Croatian Party of Rights (Hrvatska Stranka Prava Dr. Ante Starčević).

The SDP, the social democratic party, has a similar selection process to the HDZ. The statute explicitly grants power to the party president to select the candidates. Here the party president makes a proposal for the top spots on the list to the executive who can discuss the list and vote on it,<sup>11</sup> but in practice the list rarely changes from the party president's original proposal.<sup>12</sup> In the 2013 election, the SDP created a list in coalition with the liberal party (Hrvatska Narodna Stranka-Liberalni Demokrati) and the pensioners' party (Hrvatska Stranka Umirovljenika).

While the Hrvatska Narodna Stranka-Liberalni Demokrati, the liberal party, is not included in the analysis given that it did not place any members in the EP during the 7seventh session, it is worth noting its selection processes in order to get a complete picture of Croatian political parties. The president of the liberal party is granted statutory power to propose candidates for the European parliament to the national party board. This proposal generally entails representation of the Croatian regions, each of which can recommend 2 candidates to the president.<sup>13</sup> In the 2013 election, the HNS held the sixth and ninth position on the coalition list with the SDP but this list won only five seats.

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<sup>10</sup>Interview 5.22.2013. Hrvatski Sabor. Zagreb, Croatia.

<sup>11</sup>Interview 5.22.2013. Hrvatski Sabor. Zagreb, Croatia; Interview 5.24.2013, Hrvatski Sabor. Zagreb, Croatia

<sup>12</sup>Interview 3.1.2013. Hrvatski Sabor. Zagreb, Croatia, Interview 3.8.2013. Hrvatski Sabor. Zagreb, Croatia

<sup>13</sup>Interview 3.28.2013. Trg Josipa Bana Jelečića. Zagreb, Croatia.

### 3.6.2 Mixed Selection Methods: German Political Parties

German political parties provide examples for both executive selection and delegate selection. The CDU and the FDP, the center-right and liberal parties respectively, use party delegates to select their MEPs. These parties explicitly identify this process in detail in their statutes. The center-left SPD uses executive selection while the green party does not specify a formal selection procedure. In each German party incumbents do not receive any type of privileged status and must compete for nomination with the rest of the party members. Germany elects their MEPs in a single constituency, closed list, proportional vote.

The CDU, the conservative party, uses a federal convention to finalize a list that is proposed by the party of each federal state (the *Länder*). This differs from the national process only in the level of government that decides the list. In federal elections, local constituency level assemblies decide the list, but at the EP level, districts compile the lists for the state party convention. In order to construct the list, local party organizations choose candidates through secret ballot, then district lists are constructed before delegates to state congresses vote on the state lists.<sup>14</sup> In this party, lists are constructed for each *Länder* even though there is only one constituency in German EP elections. The number of MEPs taken from each list is decided by the federal party. While Germany has a closed list European election, the order of the lists can be debated and changed at the congress. Thus the CDU differs in candidate selection procedures across the national and European levels.

Candidate selection in the FDP, the liberal party, is similar to the CDU. The statute states that a national party congress votes on candidate lists in both European and national elections.<sup>15</sup> This is a delegate form of selection since party delegates are chosen from sub-national units to attend the congress. Before the national congress, you must get approval from your regional (presumably the state party organization) and then compete for a list position at the party congress. The FDP offers just one list for all of Germany and prospective candidates compete in an election process for a specific position on the list.<sup>16</sup> For example,

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<sup>14</sup>The description of the procedure in the statute does not specify the procedure before the state congress, this information comes from MEPs. Interview 6.18.2013.(2) and Interview 9.17.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

<sup>15</sup>The remainder of the selection information stems from Interview 9.19.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

<sup>16</sup>It appears that in Germany the parties have the option to offer one complete list for the election, like



three possible candidates may wish to be placed third on the list.<sup>17</sup> These three candidates compete for the third spot and the congress votes on their preferred candidates. The candidate with the most votes gains the third spot on the list and the remaining candidates are free to continue to compete for any lower spot (4th, 5th, etc). The only exception to this are the first and second spots on the list. While these can technically be contested in the same manner, the leadership chooses their preferred candidates for these spots and they generally go unchallenged, as it is assumed unwise for another member of the party to compete with these leadership choices.

In contrast to the CDU and FDP, the party leadership selects candidates in the SPD, the social democratic party. While the party statute clearly lays out the process for selecting national candidates, it does not do so for MEPs.<sup>18</sup> In federal elections, the party lists are determined at the constituency level. At the European level, selection is far more centralized because it is controlled by the federal party leaders and the SPD has only one list for the elections. Each regional party determines candidates by secret ballot for proposal to the party but the chairperson of the federal board decides which candidates from each region make the list (if there are multiple candidates recommended from the region). There is then a formula that decides which regions are represented and how many candidates from each region make the list. They do not guarantee that all regions will be well represented, representation is based on the strength of the party in a given area. The only requirement is that at least one member from each region is among the first 30 places on the list.<sup>19</sup> Even though the procedure is not formally specified in the party statute, it is nonetheless relatively complex and structured.

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the FDP does, where candidates appear on a list ranked from 1 to however many candidate they choose to put forward. The CDU is the only party that offers different lists to different Länder, and constructs its delegation post-election. The CSU (Christlich Soziale Union in Bayern-the Bavaria sister party of the CDU) naturally only offers a list for Bavaria.

<sup>17</sup>Given the previous electoral success of the FDP in European elections, it is generally believed within the party that only the first five spots on the list have a high likelihood of gaining seats in Brussels.

<sup>18</sup>The selection information presented here and incorporated into the data is from Interview 6.6.2013, Interview 6.12.2013, and Interview 6.8.2013, European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

<sup>19</sup>In the 2004, 2009, 2014 elections the SPD averaged about 23 seats so being among the top 30 does not necessarily mean each region will have a sitting MEP.

### 3.6.3 Mass selection: Political Parties in the United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, the Conservative party, the Liberal Democratic Party, and the Labour party all use decentralized methods of candidate selection. In addition the UK elects MEPs in twelve regional constituencies with a closed list proportional representation system. In contrast, National elections in the UK are conducted in 646 local constituencies using a single member district with majority rule. Therefore, it follows that the selection of MEPs in these parties occurs at the regional level. Each party uses a form of pre-approval for its candidates as a screening process before regional party membership decides the final composition of the list.

The conservative party uses an election board to create a list of approved candidates. Those wanting to run for EP office must submit a cv to this board to demonstrate basic competence.<sup>20</sup> A list of approved candidates for each region is then sent to all members in the region. These members rank the candidates, which determines the order of the list by the number of votes each candidate receives.<sup>21</sup> In this party, incumbents are placed on the top of the list as long as they receive a high approval rating from the party leadership.<sup>22</sup> Unlike their center-right colleagues in Germany, this party belongs to the European Conservative and Reform Group. This is a conservative group formed under the leadership of the UK Conservative party after the 2009 election.

The Liberal Democratic Party employs a procedure for candidate selection similar to the Conservative party. The party selects at the regional level where it puts out a call for candidacy to which potential candidates can apply. The party also has a pre-approval process to screen potential candidates. Those that are deemed acceptable can then request to be considered for the lists in up to two regions. A party panel then makes an alphabetical list of candidates which is then sent to all party members with a one page biography and CV of each candidate. There are also meetings where the candidates appear before members

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<sup>20</sup>The definition of basic competence will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.

<sup>21</sup>Interview 6.5.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium, Interview 6.18.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium, Interview 6.25.2013(1). European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium, Interview 6.25.2013(2). European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

<sup>22</sup>In the 2009 election this was 50%, but in 2014 it jumped to 60%. If there is more than one incumbent in a region, the regional party membership will vote to determine the order of these incumbents on the list (Interview 6.18.2013(3). European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium).

so that the members can ask them questions before they vote and can encourage votes on their behalf. Incumbents in this party must go through the same procedure as everyone else, except their incumbency means they are already approved as candidates. In the end, the party sends the membership votes to a third party service to tally the count that decides the final order of the regional lists.<sup>23</sup>

The Labour party also allows members to self-nominate for the election and also constructs regional lists. Lists are limited to four candidates that are chosen from the self-nominations by a regional party board. This list is then distributed to all party members of the region who rank the candidates. The candidate with the most first place votes wins the top spot, the most second place votes gets the second position, and so on. Incumbents in this party must seek approval from their constituency in a process called a trigger ballot. If a majority of the constituency votes to approve their current MEP, then the MEP retains the first position on the list.<sup>24</sup>

#### 3.6.4 Centralized Selection: Assessing the Empirical Relationships

In order to test the centralized selection hypotheses in this chapter, I begin with a  $\chi^2$  test to examine the relationship between the dichotomous variables of the analysis and centralized selection. The results of the  $\chi^2$  tests are reported in Table 2 and show that several of the hypothesized relationships are significant. The variable for left parties is the only variable not significantly related to centralized selection. Therefore there is no evidence in support of  $H_2$ , which predicted that parties of the left would be less likely to centralize. In order to examine the remaining hypotheses, I constructed a logistic regression model and these results are reported in Table 3.

In addition to the substantive variables of interest, this model includes a variable capturing membership in the Eurozone and length of membership in the EU (in years) to account for the depth of a party's experience in the EU. I also include a few more party level variables to account for each party's experience with the EU. This includes a measure of the party age (number of years a party has been active) and a measure of the relative size of the EP

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<sup>23</sup>Interview 6.17.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium

<sup>24</sup>Interview 5.30.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium

delegation. Relative size is the proportion of MEPs relative to party politicians at national and EP level (in 2004-2009 term). The average of this term is about 14% but some parties only had members in the EP (UKIP, GERB).

Table 2:  $\chi^2$  Test of Association for Centralized Selection

Centralized Selection	$\chi^2$
Left Party	0.930
National Executive Selection	8.259***
Bicameral Legislature	4.160**
Federalism	3.441*
State Financing	3.441*

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

The results in Table 3 show that several of the party and government characteristics are significantly related to centralized selection for the EP.<sup>25</sup> Examining the party variables first, the results support  $H_3$ , executive selection on the national level is a significant, and positive, indicator of centralized selection on the European level. Parties are more likely to remain centralized if they are already structured as such. Party age and the relative size of the EP delegation are also significant and positive indicators of centralized selection. As parties gain more experience with the EU (both in terms of time and personnel in the institutions), they are more likely to centralize their procedures. Table 3 reports the marginal effects of each variable, and although significant, these three effects appear to be relatively small. In order to examine these effects more closely, I calculated predicted probabilities which are available in Table 4.<sup>26</sup> These results show these party factors have very little effect on the likelihood of executive selection and the national factors are much more important.

In terms of national characteristics, these results support the relationships between executive selection and multipartism and multi-level government as predicted in  $H_4$  and  $H_5$

<sup>25</sup>The results reported are the marginal effects with country fixed effects. The results of analysis using country random effects are reported in the Table 31 in Appendix A. The results remain consistent with the fixed effects model reported in text.

<sup>26</sup>Predicted probabilities were calculated using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003). Unless otherwise noted, all simulations were conducted with the auxiliary independent variables set at their mean or modal category

Table 3: Logistic Regression for Centralized Selection

VARIABLES	(1) Centralized Selection
Executive National Selection	0.195*** (0.060)
Party Age	0.001** (0.001)
Relative Size of EP Delegation	0.405*** (0.154)
Effective Number of Parties	-0.080* (0.045)
State Election Financing	0.320 (0.202)
Federalism	-0.439*** (0.089)
Eurozone Member	0.839*** (0.166)
Membership (length in years)	-0.009** (0.004)
Observations	45
Wald chi2	297.3
Prob > chi2	0.00
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.508

Country clustered standard errors in parentheses

Marginal effects reported

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

respectively. Federalism has the largest effect on the likelihood of executive selection but it is negative. Parties in federal systems are almost 17% less likely to centralize their selection procedure than their unitary peers.<sup>27</sup> Membership in the EU also decreases this likelihood as the length of membership grows. As membership length moves from its minimum to

<sup>27</sup>Bicameralism also has a significant relationship with executive selection. While analysis with a  $\chi^2$  test of association (see Table 2) showed that bicameralism is significantly related to centralized selection. I was unable to test the strength or direction of the relationship in the logistic model. Among the parties here, all of the parties using decentralized selection are at least weakly bicameral so there are no decentralized observations in unicameral systems.

maximum the likelihood of executive leadership decreases. This highlights a potentially interesting variation between old and new member states with respect to party organization. The strongest relationship presented by the model is that of Eurozone membership. Countries in the Eurozone are much more likely to centralize selection at the European level. The predicted probabilities show that this difference is close to 80%. The only hypothesis that I did not find support for in the model was that of state financing. This variable is not significant at the 90% level so I cannot conclude that the origin of party financial resources for European elections influences organization in this case.

Overall the model predicts that centralized selection is highly likely under a variety of circumstances. The structure of government institutions has the largest effect on party organization with respect to the selection of their MEPs. This suggests that the experience of parties on the national level is the most important indicator of what parties will do at the European level. National parties appear to be merely replicating the national procedures or centralizing their procedure. The existing consensus in the literature claims that national parties in Europe have been unable or unwilling to seriously consider the role of an MEP in relation to their broader structure. Because of this reluctance to consider how best to deal with MEPs, national parties have not been able to increase the accountability of their politicians who are working at the European level ([Ladrech 2007](#); [Poguntke et al. 2007](#)). While I find no specific adjustment in the majority of parties with respect to their candidate selection procedures, which supports this claim, I find contrasting evidence with respect to accountability. I find that accountability, at least through selection for candidacy, is at least as strong as it is in national elections if not stronger. The tendency to centralize means party leaders have significant control over these MEPs in their placement and removal.

### **3.7 LEADERSHIP COMPOSITION IN NATIONAL PARTIES**

I consider the composition of party leadership to be another aspect of centralization because it brings agents of the party together with the leadership. In national politics, the party in office is almost inseparable from the party leadership itself. For example, in governing

Table 4: Predicted Probability of Centralized Selection

No Executive National Selection	98.53%
Executive National Selection	98.80%
<b>Δ in probability (min to max)</b>	<b>0.27%</b>
Party age minimum	97.25%
Party age mean	98.53%
Party age max	99.20%
<b>Δ in probability (min to max)</b>	<b>1.95%</b>
Relative size of delegation minimum	97.42%
Relative size of delegation mean	98.53%
Relative size of delegation max	98.56%
<b>Δ in probability (min to max)</b>	<b>1.13%</b>
Effective number of parties min	99.56%
Effective number of parties mean	98.53%
Effective number of parties max	86.16%
<b>Δ in probability (min to max)</b>	<b>-13.40%</b>
Unitary	98.53%
Federalist	81.85%
<b>Δ in probability</b>	<b>-16.68%</b>
Non Eurozone Member	19.68%
Eurozone Member	98.53%
<b>Δ in probability</b>	<b>78.85%</b>
Membership min	99.64%
Membership mean	98.53%
Membership max	83.58%
<b>Δ in probability (min to max)</b>	<b>-16.07%</b>

parties, it is very likely that the government leader is also the leader of the party. This is certainly true in Croatia where Zoran Milanović holds both positions. Tomislav Karamarko

is the head of the opposition in the Sabor and the leader of the HDZ. It is also true with David Cameron and the UK Conservative party, as well as Angela Merkel and the CDU. In fact, the very definition of cartel party is that the party in office has total control over the functioning of the party (Katz and Mair 1995). Therefore it is only natural that at least some of the party members in elected office at the national level are also included in the party leadership. However, leadership selection varies across parties. Many of the parties in this analysis have some combination of both ex-officio offices and elected members in their executive leadership. In national parties, gaining elite status within the party and high status positions within the government usually go hand in hand, so I would expect that this link between elected officials and the leadership is maintained even in the absence of formal rules. However, if parties really are not addressing the treatment MEPs and not incorporating them into their organization, I would not expect it to follow that MEPs will naturally enter the executive leadership. Some may be included due to the nature of their personal careers and ambition, but others may not. Therefore, I see the inclusion of an MEP as a centralizing tactic that maintains a link between the national party and the European delegation. I consider a party to have inclusive leadership if there is a statutory requirement that assigns a place in the executive leadership to at least one MEP. In the data, 25 parties have inclusive leadership (~ 44%). The parties including at least one MEP in their leadership have almost 260 MEPs in the legislature, while those that do not have about 230. Some parties include all of their MEPs, while others assign a delegation leader that assumes this position. In Germany and the United Kingdom, parties have formal delegation leaders but this role is undefined in Croatia.

### **3.7.1 Inclusive leadership: Germany and the United Kingdom**

German parties all employ national delegation leaders but they are used in different ways and have different roles within their party. All of the German parties included in the larger analysis have inclusive leadership except for the Green party (Bündnis90/die Grünen) and the SPD. The CDU includes both the president of the EP delegation and the chairman of the EPP group in the EP in their federal leadership. They include the EPP chairman from the



Formally exclusive		Formally inclusive	
SPÖ	PASOK	ÖVP	PiS
GERB	ND	CSSD	PO
HDZ	FIDESZ	NC	PSD
SDP	IdV	PR	PS(P)
ODS	LN	CDU	PD-L
EE	PD	CSU	PNL
LGM	CDA	Die Linke	PSD-PC
MoDEM	PVV	FDP	CON
PNC	Smer	PDL	LDP
PS(F)	S	UDC	UKIP
UMP	Labour		
B90/GR			
SPD			

Figure 3: The Organization of Party Leadership

EP as long as the position is held by a member of the CDU. The president of the delegation is selected every two and one half years when the current MEPs elect both a leadership board and the president.<sup>28</sup> The FDP also includes a member of the EP group on their federal board. Unlike the CDU they do not appear to specify a particular MEP to serve this role. Instead, the MEP that is doing the work most topical to the subject of the party meeting will attend but they will also provide a briefing of the remaining MEPs work.<sup>29</sup> The SPD includes a member on the board that is responsible for issues in the EU but the origin of this person is somewhat ambiguous and it appears this position is not statutorily required to be held by an MEP.<sup>30</sup> Within the parliamentary delegation, there is a leader who coordinates the work of the MEPs. This role is meant to ensure that the delegation covers all of the necessary political sectors and has balance in committee representation. The leader represents the group in public and serves as a link between the delegation, the Bundestag, and the party

<sup>28</sup>Interview 6.18.2013.(2) and Interview 9.17.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

<sup>29</sup>Interview 9.19.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

<sup>30</sup>The exact wording of the SPD statute is as follows: "Er (der Parteivorstand) besteht aus....dem order der Verantwortlichen des Parteivorstandes für die Europäische Union," which literally translates into the leader or leaders of the executive for the European Union.

executive.<sup>31</sup>

The parties in the United Kingdom also select delegation leaders, but vary with respect to the inclusion of these leaders in the party executive. In addition to the parties of the qualitative analysis, UKIP is also included in the data. This party is unique in the United Kingdom because all of its elected officials (national or higher) hold seats in the EP.<sup>32</sup> In the seventh term it had eleven MEPs in office and it sends at least two MEPs to executive meetings. These MEPs are selected by the delegation leader. The Conservative party has delegation leaders that are included on its party board. The role of this leader is described as more of a technocratic role than a political one. Committee leaders are also invited to ministerial meetings so this role appears to be much more important when the party is governing.<sup>33</sup> The Liberal Democratic Party requires the inclusion of a member of the EP delegation that is elected by the MEPs. This member serves as a liaison between the MEPs and the party, and the party also has two permanent staff members that are based in London and paid for by all of the Liberal MEPs. This is meant to provide daily contact between the MEPs and the national party.<sup>34</sup> In contrast to its counterparts in the United Kingdom, The Labour Party does not require a MEP to be included among the members of its executive board. In addition to its executive officers, the board elects six other members but none of them are required to be an MEP. The EP delegation does have a delegation leader. The role of leader is that of a liaison between the party and MEPs.<sup>35</sup>

### 3.7.2 Exclusive Leadership: Croatia

None of the three parties in the analysis for Croatia have inclusive leadership. Some of the new MEPs were members of the party executive by virtue of their standing in the party, but there was no formal requirement for ex-officio inclusion. The HDZ does require a number of members in other offices to serve in the presidency and then has 10 at large members.

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<sup>31</sup>Interview 6.6.2013, Interview 6.12.2013, and Interview 6.8.2013, European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

<sup>32</sup>This true for at least the 2004-2009 term. At this time UKIP had not won any elected seats in the House of Commons but it acquired one upon the defection of a Conservative MP in 2008 ([BBCNews 2008a](#)).

<sup>33</sup>Interview 6.18.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

<sup>34</sup>Interview 6.17.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium

<sup>35</sup>Interview 5.30.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium

The SDP has an executive that is elected at the party congress and the HNS includes many offices (even local party leaders), but do not require an MEP to serve (although they have not yet had any MEPs).

In addition to investigating the inclusion of a MEP in party leadership, I also noticed patterns in communication between MEPs and their parties. While this will be discussed at length in Chapter 5, the parties of the UK and Germany appear to have specific patterns in communication with their national parties through the delegation leaders and ties with specific EP committees and national ministers. On the other hand, the Croatian parties do not have any structure in place and at the time of my last interviews at the EP (September 2013), had no regular communication. While these observations are split between parties with inclusion (UK, Germany) and parties without (Croatia), further analysis is needed since Croatia had only a few months experience in the EP at the time my interviews.

### 3.7.3 Centralized Leadership: An Additional Assessment of Centralization

Measuring the centralization of EP organization as inclusion in party leadership, I again use both  $\chi^2$  and a logistic regression model to test the relationship between centralization and party and institutional factors. Highlighting differences across centralized selection and inclusive leadership, Table 5 shows that national executive selection and federalism are no longer significant predictors of centralization, measured as inclusive leadership. However, left parties and leadership composition are significantly related so I am able to further test the strength and direction of this relationship using logistic regression.

The results of the logistic regression model are reported in Table 6.<sup>36</sup> These results show that only one party factor but several institutional factors significantly affect the likelihood of inclusion across parties. In contrast to the model for executive selection, left parties have a significant, but negative, relationship with the likelihood of including MEPs in the leadership. Parties that belong to the socialist, post-communist, or green party family are almost 29% less likely to require that MEPs belong to their leadership. The predicted probabilities of the model are reported in Table 7. A quick glance through the statutory composition of the

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<sup>36</sup>The results reported are the marginal effects with country fixed effects. The results of analysis using country random effects are reported in the Table 32 in Appendix A.

Table 5:  $\chi^2$  Test of Association for Inclusive Leadership

Inclusive Leadership	$\chi^2$
Left Party	3.305*
National Executive Selection	1.969
Bicameral Legislature	6.178**
Federalism	1.285
State Financing	3.679***

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

leadership in these parties indicates that many of these parties have elected leadership so no single spot is reserved for any particular elected office.<sup>37</sup> This supports  $H_2$  which stated that parties of the left will be less likely to centralize given both their party ideology and their characteristics of their membership.

While only one of the party characteristics is a significant predictor of inclusion, the institutional factors are all significant. In contrast to the model of centralized selection, these results find that state financing of parties for European elections is significant. However, given that the relationship is negative, the result does not support  $H_1$  and the presence of state financing decreases the likelihood of inclusion. The predicted probabilities of the model also suggest that this variable has the smallest substantive effect on inclusion. Similarly, bicameralism, though significant, does not support  $H_5$ , which predicted that multi-level systems will be less likely to centralize. There is an inverse relationship between the presence of bicameral legislative institutions and inclusion. Contrary to the hypothesis, bicameral institutions are nearly 67% more likely to include MEPs in their leadership. Perhaps parties in multi-tiered systems have decentralized selection but include specific offices in its leadership to keep tabs on elected officials at every level. Similar to the selection model, the results show that relationships between the effective number of parties, eurozone membership, and the length of EU membership are consistent across models. The relationship between the

<sup>37</sup>For a description of all parties' formal leadership structures, see Table 29 and Table 30 in Appendix A

Table 6: Logistic Regression for Inclusive Leadership

VARIABLES	(1) Inclusive Leadership
Party of the left	-0.302** (0.148)
Party Age	0.000 (0.001)
Relative Size of EP Delegation	-0.137 (0.331)
Effective Number of Parties	-0.272** (0.137)
State Financing of Election	-0.380* (0.199)
Bicameral	0.576*** (0.092)
Eurozone Member	0.397** (0.182)
Membership (length in years)	-0.014*** (0.005)
Observations	45
Wald chi2	21.89
Prob > chi2	0.005
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.308

Country clustered standard errors in parentheses

Marginal effects reported

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

ENP and inclusion is the largest of these effects in this model. As the ENP increases from its minimum to its maximum, the likelihood of inclusion decreases by nearly 60%. As multi-partism increases across states, parties become less likely to assign a leadership position to an MEP.

Overall, the results of the models of inclusion of MEPs in the executive leadership of their party are consistent with that of centralized selection. Parties in countries that have bicameral legislatures, are members of the Eurozone, have multi-party systems, and are

Table 7: Predicted Probability of Inclusive Leadership

Not party of the left	78.31%
Party of the left	49.60%
<b>Δ in probability (min to max)</b>	<b>-28.72%</b>
Effective number of parties min	93.02%
Effective number of parties mean	78.31%
Effective number of parties max	33.82%
<b>Δ in probability (min to max)</b>	<b>-59.20%</b>
State financing in European election	78.31%
No state financing in European election	92.18%
<b>Δ in probability</b>	<b>-13.86%</b>
Unicameral	12.27%
Bicameral	78.31%
<b>Δ in probability</b>	<b>66.04%</b>
Non Eurozone Member	37.93%
Eurozone Member	78.31%
<b>Δ in probability</b>	<b>40.38%</b>
Membership min	94.33%
Membership mean	78.31%
Membership max	53.98%
<b>Δ in probability (min to max)</b>	<b>-40.35%</b>

relatively new to the EU are more likely to include MEPs in leadership. The results of both models, taken together, show that national institutional structures are very influential in shaping how parties treat their MEPs. This likely implies that variance across national institutions and party systems will also affect MEP legislative behavior.

### 3.8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This chapter investigated the determinants of two important organizational choices parties make with respect to their MEPs, the selection method for candidates in EP elections and the composition of a party's executive leadership body. I argue that these two choices can be used to measure centralization (or decentralization) in a political party because they manage two important functions. Candidate selection determines who represents the party at the European level and the composition of the leadership determines a party's power base. I found that parties are more likely to centralize than decentralize the treatment of their MEPs, even if they do not do so at the national level.

The chapter also highlights how differences across member states can have important consequences for the treatment of MEPs. Not all states view EP elections with the same level of importance and not all parties take the same level of care to consider their role of MEPs in their parties. Two of the strongest predictors of organization for the EP are membership experience in the EU and the Eurozone. These two predictors, along with many of the other country level independent variables, are largely bifurcated by Eastern and Western Europe. Obviously Western European member states have been members of the EU much longer than their Eastern peers. Most of them are also members of the Eurozone (with the exception of the United Kingdom) and their Eastern counterparts are not (with the exception of Slovakia). Almost all Eastern European parties are highly centralized, with a higher percentage of both centralized selection and inclusive leadership than Western European parties. This confirms that analysis across regions in the EU is still very important as these member states contain systematic differences that cannot be ignored.

In sum, these results confirm that national experience is a strong predictor of the treatment of MEPs. Variance across member state experience at the national level and with EU membership creates variance in the incentives MEPs face with respect to their national parties. The theory of the dissertation argues that parties have an incentive to centralize selection to increase their ability to select the appropriate candidates given their electoral goals. This chapter supports this claim and highlights the strong role national politics still plays in EP decision making. The next chapter will build on the insight offered here and

investigate how national electoral goals determine what type of politicians get chosen to serve in the EP.



## 4.0 ELECTORAL GOALS AND CANDIDATE SELECTION

Organization determines how parties select and supervise their MEPs, but electoral goals determine what kind of candidate a party chooses. This chapter continues the story of electoral goals, organization, and MEP behavior by examining the choices parties make for candidate selection as strategic choices of a goal seeking framework. National parties contesting European elections have office, vote, and policy seeking goals that are shaped by the national conditions under which they are accustomed to acting. Achieving these goals requires parties to think strategically about what type of candidate they wish to nominate for European elections and serve in the European Parliament.

Using a unique data set coding national party electoral goals and MEP biographic information, combined with insight from interviews with MEPs, this chapter considers how variation among legislator type is produced across member states given the competing electoral goals and demands of national parties. It also addresses the scarcity of work examining how and why national parties choose their MEPs. I argue when political parties control electoral lists, parties can choose the type of legislator representing their interests in the EP and do so according to their national electoral goals. I conclude that office seeking and policy seeking parties choose new and inexperienced politicians but vote seeking parties choose experienced, well known politicians from national government or EP incumbents. The analysis also confirms that national politicians and party leaders are rare in the EP, appearing as candidates only when parties are seeking to maximize votes in the spirit of a second order election. Newcomers are much more likely to be chosen by parties that are seeking to fill seats in the EP after an electoral loss. These conclusions support existing literature on European elections by confirming the dominance of the second order election atmosphere for legislator choice, but also highlight new trends in EP candidate selection and career choice.

This chapter provides not only an empirical glimpse into representation in the EP, but also a foundation for exploring the causes and consequences of variation in representation for future work. The results continue to support the premise that national politics dominate party strategies in the treatment of their MEPs.

Individuals are chosen by political parties and the public to represent their interests and work towards their policy goals. However, these individuals have private interests and personal goals that influence behavior in office and the quality of representation they choose to provide. Therefore considering the impact of individuals who serve in governing institutions is a fundamental task in the assessment of effective representation. Whether individuals adhere to a strict constituency or party mandate or pursue their own goals is, in part, dependent on the structure of the institutions in which they serve and the incentives that are created by their parties, their constituencies, and their political systems (Manin, Przeworski and Stokes 1999). Political parties play a pivotal role in determining who is placed on ballots and in office and the incentive structure through which politicians choose their behavioral strategies. Parties control selection procedures and, given the previous chapter's conclusion that parties are highly likely to centralize candidate selection for the EP, party leaders are able to act as gatekeepers for individual careers. Individual ambition and party goals intersect in electoral contests, determining the set of available politicians from which citizens choose their EP representatives. Thus, the examination of who gets chosen to participate in government and why is an important piece of research that allows us to assess how the quality of representation varies across politicians, parties, and states.

Examining this interaction of party and individual electoral goals in the dynamic setting of the EP once again allows for analysis across many electoral institutions and political environments. Not only does the EP contain a large amount of variation in who serves—legislator experience in government and party politics, age, gender, etc.—but it also contains many different nationalities from several member states and several national parties. Unlike national legislatures, this creates variation across groups of legislators in terms of the political institutions and the environments that elect these politicians. Many different aspects of life at the EP influence individuals' choices to run for office and their party's choice to nominate them. Using the goal seeking framework for European elections, this chapter

argues that certain domestic conditions and party goals make it more or less likely that specific types of politicians (or non-politicians) are chosen by their parties to serve in the EP. These types include politicians highly experienced in national government or national party leadership and inexperienced politicians with no government or party experience. Explaining the choice of a national party to choose a given type of politician helps to unravel the puzzle of representation in this multi-level institution and assess how the quality of democracy in the EU varies across parties and member states.

The theoretical insight of this chapter rests on the assumption that different national parties view the role of MEPs differently. Any casual observer of the EP knows that each seat in the institution is not equal in the eyes of national parties and incentives to serve in the EP vary widely. In 2009, salaries among MEPs were harmonized to about €92,000 annually, to be paid by the EU instead of being determined and paid by member states as in previous years. While this created equality among MEPs in absolute terms, it altered the incentives across member states for individuals to serve in the EP. For example, Italian MEPs, the highest paid before 2009, took a pay cut from nearly €143,000 per year while the Bulgarians, previously paid around €10,000, experienced an enormous boost in salary (Mocan and Altindag 2013). In addition to relative salaries, vast differences exist across these states, parties, and individuals in the desirability of the post, the value of an EP seat for one's individual career, and a party's broader political agenda. It was apparent while interviewing current MEPs that differences exist across individuals regarding motivations for seeking office, career goals within and beyond the EP, and personal views on representation. In addition, the previous chapter showed there are differences across parties with respect to the role of the MEP in decision making structures within parties, the place of EP office in the hierarchy of elected positions, and the processes of candidate selection.

For example, large differences exist with respect to individual motivations for running for, and holding, office. Parties in the United Kingdom consider campaign experience to be a very important identifier of a high quality candidate for national office. The EP election is viewed as a way for ambitious politicians to campaign for and win an election before being promoted or placed in competition for national office. Therefore, if one desires to serve in Westminster, the EP is a suitable way to gain more political experience before

running for national office.<sup>1</sup> In contrast, many German MEPs think the idea of serving in the Bundestag is uninteresting, and in some respects less important, than legislating at the EP level. To them, the EP is thought to be far more powerful and exciting than legislating at home and MEPs rarely return to national office.<sup>2</sup> As Chapter 3 reported, differences are also clear with respect to the treatment of incumbents. Some parties are organized to create a large advantage for their current MEPs and others try to make their MEPs work for reelection. This variation across individuals, parties, and member states creates the unique opportunity to observe and analyze candidate selection and legislator choice in a diverse multi-level system. In the legislature, there are many different types of legislators among its members from many different national parties and national electoral systems, with variation in the organization of their parties and their political experience. Below is a just a small sample, taken from the seventh session (2009-2014), of the plethora of politician types you can find in the legislature at any given time.<sup>3</sup>

- **Luigi Ciriaco Da Mita** is an Italian politician who made a career in national politics before entering the EP. Joining the EP in 1988, he had a long tenure in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, held several ministerial positions, and was once prime minister. He is a lawyer by training and was elected with the Union of Christian and Christian Democrats (UDC) in the 2009 election. He remained in the parliament until 2013. This is an example of what I call a *national politician turned MEP*, having left national politics to finish his career in the EP. His party, the UDC, placed third in the Italian national election prior to 2009, so they were neither the ruling party nor the main opposition.<sup>4</sup> They are also largely uninterested in European Affairs, having hardly mentioned Europe in their party manifesto for the European elections. Given this lack of interest, it is unsurprising that the party has *no formal process of candidate selection for European elections* and the *party leadership does not include an MEP*.
- **Pál Schmitt** is a Hungarian politician who made a career as a diplomat and Olympic

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<sup>1</sup>Interviews 6.5.2013, 6.7.2013, 6.18.2013, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium

<sup>2</sup>Interviews 6.4.2013, 6.6.2013, 6.18.2013, 9.18.2013, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium.

<sup>3</sup>For more information on the data sources for MEP information, please see Chapter 4, Section 4.4. For the electoral data see section 4.3 of this chapter (4) and for party organization see Chapter 3, Section 3.5.

<sup>4</sup>The Italian general election closest to the 2009 European election took place in April of 2008.

fencer before entering the EP. He had been the president of the World Olympian Association and the Hungarian ambassador to Spain and Switzerland. He entered the EP with Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance) in 2004 and was re-elected in 2009, but left the parliament in 2010. Fidesz won the majority in the Hungarian national election and he left to serve in the Hungarian National Assembly. He became the president of the assembly and was elected as the fourth president of Hungary later that year. Mr. Schmitt is an example of a *European elite*, serving as a diplomat before moving through the EP to enter national politics. In 2009, his party was in opposition in Hungary and Schmitt was a well known figure chosen to run for office. At the time of the European elections, Fidesz had experienced a significant loss in the previous national election and had a constituency with a higher than average interest in European elections. However this party *did not have formal procedures* for the treatment of their MEPs until 2014.

- **Martin Schulz** is perhaps one of the best known figures of the EP, having served as its president in the seventh and now eighth term (2014-2019). He is a German politician and member of the SPD. Before becoming EP president, he served as the leader of the socialist European party group, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (previously the Party of European Socialists). Prior to his EP service, he held only municipal and mayoral positions in the German government, but was an active member of his party, holding a position in the federal executive. He has been an MEP since 1994 and held many leadership positions in the EP prior to his presidency. Mr. Schulz is an example of a *European Politician* who has made a career in the institution. His party was part of the ruling grand coalition and had a strong interest in European affairs in 2009. It also has a *centralized process of candidate selection* but *no formal requirement that MEPs participate in party leadership*.
- **Marek Henryk Migalski** is a Polish politician entering the EP with no political experience and no national party leadership experience. Marek holds a PhD in Political Science and worked as an academic before he was elected for the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS); however, he never became a formal member of the party even after he entered the EP. He is a *Newcomer* to the political scene. While not a member of the PiS, this party still chose him to run for the 2009 election. At this time, the party had just left national

government after a 2007 election following the dissolution of the Sejm. They remained in opposition through 2009, but had no strong preferences for European integration nor a constituency that was particularly interested. *Candidate selection is centralized* in the PiS and they do *incorporate MEPs into their leadership*.

All of these members of the seventh parliament have different experiences and likely held different career goals at their time of entry. Table 8 summarizes the variation across these examples. As the table shows, they are all from different countries and serve different parties or themselves (as is the case of the non-partisan Migalski). Just as their experience and career goals differ, so does the treatment of European elections within their parties as the columns of Centralized Selection and Inclusive Leadership indicate. Some of the parties were in opposition at the time of the 2009 elections, while others were in national government. Some were relatively new parties and some were long established parties. All of these characteristics contributed to the election of each individual and this chapter will investigate the nature of that influence.

Table 8: Examples of Politicians in the European Parliament

MEP	Party	Country	Type	Centralized Selection	Inclusive Leadership
Luigi Ciriaco De Mita	UDC	Italy	National Politician	No Formal	None
Pál Schmitt	Fidesz	Hungary	National Politician	No Formal	None
Martin Schulz	SPD	Germany	European Politician	Yes	None
Marek Henryk Migalski	PiS (non-member)	Poland	Newcomer	Yes	Yes

#### 4.1 POLITICAL AMBITION AND EUROPEAN LEGISLATORS

If the strategic goals of political parties structure politician behavior in elections, then the strategic goals of individuals structure their own work in a legislature in reaction to party behavior. Legislators wishing to remain within their institution behave in systematic ways that are distinct from the behavior of those that wish to move to another institution. Politicians with progressive ambition use each elected position as a way to move up to a more

desirable office, while those with static ambition forge long careers in the same institution (Schlesinger 1966; Palmer and Simon 2003). The EP is characterized as an institution that houses both static and progressive kinds of legislators, those looking to return to national office and using the EP as a “stepping stone,” and those whose main interest lies in EU politics (Daniel 2015, 6).<sup>5</sup> Politicians both coming from and seeking to return to national politics will behave differently in the EP than their Europe-inclined peers, especially with respect to their relationship with their national party. Therefore parties must consider an individual’s career ambitions when considering who will serve in the EP.

A substantial body of literature exists addressing the role of individual legislators’ personal ambition, and the relationship between experience and legislative activity (Daniel 2015, 2013; Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard 2009). This research suggests that individuals with goals in European careers behave very differently from their nationally inclined colleagues (Borchert 2011; Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard 2009). These authors argue that politicians seeking national political careers will adhere to national party preferences and those seeking careers in the EP will be much more integrated into the European party system. Once in the EP, they argue that nationally ambitious politicians will seek to preserve the sovereign powers of the member state and will be less supportive of integrative policy. In contrast, those seeking careers in the EP will work with the EPGs to increase the power of the European institution in which they serve (Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard 2009). These type of politicians have become more distinct over time, as the EPGs and the EP itself evolved and became more powerful (Kreppel 2001). When conflict arises between EPGs and national delegations, European ambitious MEPs have incentives to cater more to their EP colleagues than their national peers. These groups have a large amount of control over leadership positions in the EP so any desire to grow your career in the Parliament must be realized through these groups. In contrast, those wishing to return to national politics are much more likely to side with their national peers to show that they are “good” party politicians in hopes of ultimately gaining a more lucrative seat back home.

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<sup>5</sup>Daniel (2015) also mentions the long held belief of EP scholars that the EP is a retirement home for national politicians that spend the last few years of their careers in the EP before leaving politics all together. Daniel (2015) and I both find this is no longer the case in the most recent sessions of the EP. However, even if this were the case, I would consider these politicians to really have no career ambitions, having already experienced their glory days in office.

Political career goals are explicitly linked to party candidate selection because national parties choose whom to place on the ballot. Individuals determine their behavior based on their goals for their careers in the future. National parties determine the implications of choosing certain candidates to seek and possibly gain office in the EP relative to their more general party objectives. Candidate recruitment and nomination mechanisms are important for the type of representative a party gets (Wessels 1997). Recruitment and selection strategies determine how several thousand eligible citizens are narrowed to a pool of a few select people that are able to run for elected office and represent the party (Mühlbock 2012; Putnam 1976). In most western democracies, this recruitment process has produced a professional core of politicians that make careers out of public office and tend to be highly educated, male, and middle aged (Wessels 1997). These professional politicians are more likely to maintain the structure of centralized party leadership and accountability to elites over the pressures of interest or citizens groups (Gunther and Diamond 2003; Norris 1997a; Ware 1979). If candidate selection and list placement is the privilege of elite leadership then we are more likely to see candidates selected that represent the interests of the elite as the result of a party's electoral strategy. The stronger a MEPs ties are with their national party, the more likely they will be loyal agents for the party when serving in an institution. Therefore candidates with national government experience or previous national party leadership will provide better representation of a party's interest. If some parties value policy making more than maximizing office, they will likely choose these "high" quality candidates that are experienced in working at the European level; namely incumbents with several years of experience. If they value office over policy, which is the case especially in situations where the election is serving as a referendum on the national government, they may seek to put candidates on the list that are the most recognizable even though they may be "low" quality candidates with little experience working in Europe or little desire to forge a career there (Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard 2009).



## 4.2 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT CANDIDATE SELECTION

The interests of elites in parties contesting European elections are determined by their electoral goals. These goals lead parties to make strategic choices for candidacy. Candidate selection methods increase or decrease the likelihood their goals will be realized in their choice for electoral candidates. Parties lie on the demand side of the principal-agent relationship where a legislator must supply certain behavior (Norris 1997b). Their preferences over behavior are determined by the goals of national parties given the structure of the national electoral systems and the availability of office (Pemstein2015). Just like individuals, national parties must determine the costs and benefits of choosing certain candidates to seek and possibly gain office in the EP. Electoral goals determine how to manage these choices and the types of candidates selected are the visible product of these considerations. Office seeking parties will seek new politicians to both reward their loyalty to the party and to fill seats in the EP. Vote seeking parties will maximize votes in the election. Policy seeking parties will choose experienced, educated, "European" politicians to work for party goals in the EP.

Office seeking parties view the European elections as a way to gain office when domestic positions are harder for them to attain. Parties that have recently lost a national election can also be office seeking since EP elections offer additional opportunities for placing members in office (Pemstein, Meserve and Bernhard 2015). The Hungarian party Fidesz is an example of an office seeking party. Having lost 2 straight national elections, Fidesz had been kept out of government for seven years between 2002 and 2006. During much of this time, party leader Pál Schmitt served in the European parliament. He was placed on the top of the European ballot and elected to the EP in both 2004 and 2009. However, after a landslide victory for Fidesz in the national elections of 2010, Pal left the EP to join the national parliament, having served less than one year of his EP term for the seventh session and became the Hungarian president upon election by the National Assembly. It appears his service in the EP may have just been an opportunity to hold office until national conditions improved for the party. Following from this example, when choosing candidates for the EP, office seeking parties should favor national politicians to make up for fewer opportunities for

office at home.

*H<sub>1</sub>: Office seeking goals will increase the probability national politicians will serve in the EP.*

Parties that have too few offices to offer their loyal members can use European elections as an additional opportunity to offer rewards to their members or as an opportunity to provide campaign experience to newer party members that have not yet sought office. If EP elections are rather low stakes, then placing a newcomer on the ballot can provide gains in experience at a relatively low cost. For instance, parties struggling electorally may be more likely to “clean house” and contest the elections with politicians that were not involved in their previous defeat. Therefore I also hypothesize that office seeking parties will choose to send national politicians that have recently lost office or new politicians to the EP.

*H<sub>2</sub>: Office seeking will increase the probability new politicians will serve in the EP.*

Vote seeking parties wish to nominate candidates that are well known and attractive in order to draw voters to their lists and increase the amount of votes they receive in the election. For example, in 2009, a Portuguese MEP was asked to run on a vote seeking party’s list for three specific, vote-maximizing reasons.<sup>6</sup> First, she was a woman and the party thought it needed women on the list to win. Second, she was from a particular region in which this party had failed to win in the last national election and needed representation in the EP election. Third, she had worked closely with the party president and was said to have brought a certain amount of prestige to the list.<sup>7</sup> These vote maximizing strategies elevate the public face of the party and the perception of public approval for parties in opposition and government alike. The strategy works to attract votes to the opposition, either as genuine support for the party or as protest votes against the current ruling coalition. Governing parties want to attract votes to maintain the perception of having the public’s confidence. For vote seeking parties, we would expect to see politicians on the EP candidate list that have recognizable names or desirable attributes for the electorate. These are usually experienced, well known

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<sup>6</sup>Discussion of how I empirically classify office seeking, vote seeking, policy seeking is forthcoming in Section 4.3 of this chapter.

<sup>7</sup>Interview 9.25.2013, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium.

politicians and party members that have a long tenure in office and in the party at the national or European level.

*H<sub>3</sub>: Vote seeking will increase the probability experienced candidates (national politicians, national party leaders, and incumbents) will serve in the EP.*

Policy seeking parties want candidates that can work effectively in the EP if elected. These parties seek out experienced candidates in European politics or diplomacy or candidates with a specific type of expertise to push their interests in an increasingly technical EP. One way parties promote policy goals is through reliance on EPGs. These parties have likely had success in placing well experienced MEPs in the European parliament who know how to work within the system and have already proven their ability deliver on party goals. For example, the UK Liberal Democrats is a policy seeking party and has strong ties with the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) in the EP. In the seventh term of the EP, over half of the delegation members had served in the Parliament since 1999 or earlier. A sixth term leader of the ALDE group in parliament went on to become the president of the entire ALDE organization. When considering candidates for the EP election, the party explicitly seeks members that have expertise in a specific policy area related to Europe.<sup>8</sup> As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Liberal Democrats use a pre-approval process to screen candidates. This process for candidacy is tailored for European candidates and consists of assessments in policy areas specific to Europe.<sup>9</sup> All policy seeking parties desire the same level of competence in European affairs in their MEPs and should seek out MEPs with experience and knowledge at this level.

*H<sub>4</sub>: Policy seeking will increase the probability previous EP party leaders and incumbents will serve in the EP.*

If we consider the electoral goals of a party to also be dictated, in part, by the structure of opportunities in any given political system, systemic factors that vary by party and member state also play a role in choosing representatives for the EP. Party age may affect how well a party can identify its needs and strategize effectively. Older parties are more established in

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<sup>8</sup>Interview 6.17.2013 European Parliament, Brussels Belgium.

<sup>9</sup>Information on this process is available in the form of an information packet available at [http://www.libdems.org.uk/become\\_a\\_candidate](http://www.libdems.org.uk/become_a_candidate) (accessed on April 30, 2015).

their party systems and are likely better able to accurately predict their electoral outcomes. They also have a larger supply of candidates and are thus able to manage the demands of a multi-level system more easily. Therefore, I expect older parties to be more able to accommodate their “quality” members at the national level and less likely to need to use European elections as holding a ground between national elections.

Variation among member states in the structure of their legislative, governmental, and party systems also produces variation in the structure of opportunities for parties at the national and European level. Federal systems, like Germany, Austria, and Belgium already participate in multi-level politics at the national level and should thus be better able to manage the demands of filling European office more easily. Parties in federal states will have politicians that move more freely between levels of government and are thus likely to work in multiple positions before joining the EP. In contrast, states with bicameral legislatures should have less need to put experienced politicians in the EP, as they have many more opportunities for national office in their home state. Party system fractionalization also limits the number of opportunities for any single party by increasing the competition for seats among parties.

### 4.3 IDENTIFYING PARTY GOALS

In order to identify which parties can be categorized as having which type of electoral goals, I compiled a data set of electoral goals with contextual country level and party system characteristics by utilizing the European Election Studies contextual and manifesto data, the European Elections Database, and the Eurobarometer survey (EES 2009a; Czesnik, Kotnarowski and Markowski 2010; EuropeanComission 2009). I identify parties that hold office seeking goals as those that have experienced a significant seat loss in the national election directly preceding the European election of interest.<sup>10</sup> For this study, this will be

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<sup>10</sup>Change in seat share is for the lower house of a legislature. A list of institutions is available in Table 33 in Section B.1 in Appendix B. This table also includes a score for bicameralism that is used in the analysis of chapters 3 and 5. This score is taken from the European Elections Contextual Data (Czesnik, Kotnarowski and Markowski 2010), which takes the measure from the Comparative Political Dataset III, which uses the bicameralism index provided by Lijphart (1999).

the election in each member state immediately preceding the May 2009 European election and a significant seat loss is defined as a ten percent loss of the total number of seats held by a party in the previous session of the national legislature.<sup>11</sup> For example, in the 2005 election for the Portuguese Assembly, the Social Democrats had the largest vote loss (28.6%) and obtained only 75 seats in the assembly where it had previously held 105. Since this loss is greater than 10%, the party is coded as having experienced a significant loss. Table 35 in Appendix B displays the electoral data for parties and electoral coalitions included in this chapter. The Portuguese Social Democrats represent that largest seat loss, while Lega Nord of Italy had the highest national gains preceding the European election with an increase of 130.8% between their 2006 and 2008 elections. In 2006 the party won 26 seats, but won 60 in 2008. The average loss experienced by a party in the preceding national election was  $\sim 16\%$  and the average gain was  $\sim 44\%$ . Overall, seventeen parties experienced a significant loss.

<b>Party Electoral Strategy</b>			
	<b>Office-seeking</b>	<b>Vote-seeking</b>	<b>Policy-seeking</b>
<b>Empirical Indicators</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Significant seat loss in previous national election</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Party serving in current government</li> <li>• Party serving as majority minority party</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strong preferences for or against European integration</li> <li>• Salience of elections in party electorate</li> </ul>

Figure 4: Empirical Indicators Electoral Goals

<sup>11</sup>The dates of the last national, parliamentary elections held before the 2009 European elections are listed in Table 34 in Appendix B. The closest election was in Romania in November of 2008 and earliest election was February of 2005 in Portugal.

Table 9: Frequency of Empirical Indicators By Party

Empirical Indicator	# of Parties	Percent
Significant Loss	17	37%
No Representation	4	9%
Majority Minority	14	30%
Government	19	41%
Strong Preferences	19	41%
Salience of Euro Election	17	37%

Coding for vote seeking parties is relatively straightforward. The contextual data of the European Election Studies was used to determine which parties had ministers in the current government at the time of the election, while the electoral data allows the identification of the majority minority party.

Finally, in order to code policy seeking goals, the Eurobarometer of January and February of 2009 was used to first gauge the salience of EP elections in each party’s electorate and then manifesto data was used to gauge preferences for integration. The Eurobarometer study surveyed citizens of each EU member state and, this particular version, asks questions specific to the European Parliament elections of 2009. For the purpose of calculating salience, the survey includes questions identifying both the party for with which the respondent identifies and their level of interest in the election. The survey also asks which party respondents voted for in the previous national election and asks how interested they are in the forthcoming European election. For a party to be identified as having a constituency where European elections are salient, the party needed to have a previous voting constituency that held an interest in the top quartile of the data. In this particular case, the cutoff was around 61%. Table 36 in Appendix B displays the constituent interest in European elections of each party. The party with the highest interest among their supporters is the liberal-conservative party of Romania, Partidul Democrat-Liberal. The party with the least amount of interest is the right-wing, Partij voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands.<sup>12</sup> Based on the parties used in the

<sup>12</sup>GERB of Bulgaria is technically listed as having zero supporters interested in European Elections,

analysis, the country with the most interested party supporters on average is Romania and the lowest is Poland.

The party manifesto data from the European Election Study of 2009 was used to identify parties that have strong European agendas, both positive and negative (EES 2009b). The manifesto data offers a quantification of many different subjects addressed in the election manifestos of national parties for the 2009 European election. It codes the number of times parties mention European integration in their electoral programs, both positive and negative. It also offers a summary measure of integration views where the sum of integration skeptic views are subtracted from the sum of positive mentions of integration to produce a total score of pro-anti views on a scale from -100 (skeptical) to 100 (supportive). In order to produce an indicator of intense European views, a measure of absolute distance from the mean was calculated.<sup>13</sup> The highest quartile of this distribution was identified as parties that hold the most intense views of European integration. The distribution of this distance ranges from 0.52 to 80.78 where the cut-off for the top quartile is 11.11, which includes 17 parties. The integration score for each party and its absolute distance from the mean is listed in Table 37 in Appendix B. The parties with preferences closest to the mean are Il Popolo della Libertá and Christliche-Soziale Union of Germany ( $\sim 0.5$ ) and the furthest from the mean is the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) with ( $\sim 80.8$ ). In terms of specific views on integration, the country with the most positive parties, on average, is Romania and the least positive is the United Kingdom (which is largely driven by UKIP). Of the two measures of policy seeking, only six parties meet the criteria for both (ÖVP, CDA, PASOK, PD-L, PNL, PSD-PC).<sup>14</sup>

The coding of these goals is meant to be simplistic in order to capture a very fundamental level of differences across parties. Figure 5 identifies the distribution of goals across national parties. In Appendix B, Table 38 identifies the country and party of each abbreviation used in Figure 5. In this table, a single plus (“+”) indicates the party is identified as having

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however, this is due to the fact that the variable accounts for previous party voters that are interested in European elections and because GERB is a new party, it has no previous supporters

<sup>13</sup>Absolute Distance =  $|PRO/ANTIScore - 3.865099|$

<sup>14</sup>This measurement of policy seeking is meant to be strict and include only those parties whose views and constituents are substantially different than most. In Appendix D, the identification of moderate policy seeking parties in addition to strong policy seekers is reported along with the results of the main analysis of the dissertation with this alternative measure.




Figure 5: National Party Electoral Goals

one factor of these goals, additional plus signs indicates having additional factors. Eighteen parties are office seeking ( $\sim 39\%$ ), thirty-two are vote seeking ( $\sim 70\%$ ), and twenty are policy seeking ( $\sim 43\%$ ). The most common singular goal held by parties is vote seeking with twelve parties ( $\sim 26\%$ ). There are three parties each ( $\sim 7\%$ ) holding only office seeking or policy seeking goals.

Fourteen parties hold at least two concurrent goals ( $\sim 30\%$ ) and eight parties ( $\sim 17\%$ ) hold all three goals simultaneously. Table 10 displays the number of parties in each goal configuration. Another important feature of the data to note is that six parties (Die Linke, FDP, IdV, UDC, S, SLD-UP) are coded as having none of the goals described above. For an example of why this occurs, consider the SLD-UP in Poland. This party is the third



Table 10: Frequency of Goal Types By Party

Goals	# of Parties	Percent	Cum.
None	6	13%	13%
Office	3	7%	20%
Votes	12	26%	46%
Policy	3	7%	52%
Office and Policy	2	4%	57%
Office and Votes	5	11%	67%
Votes and Policy	7	15%	83%
Office, Votes, and Policy	8	17%	100%
<b>Total</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>100%</b>	

largest Polish opposition party and in June 2009 held neither the majority nor the largest opposition status. It is a center-left party with middle of the road views on integration (6.7) and about 40% of its supporters interested in the European Election. In the 2007 Polish election, it had only a modest loss of seats in the Sejm (3.6%). Similarly, the German liberal party FDP, has often been a junior coalition party in the federal government but it did not serve in this role between 1998 and September 2009 when there was a grand coalition. It also holds middle range views on integration (5.2), with a somewhat disinterested electorate (38%), and had gained several seats in the 2005 election ( $\sim 30\%$ ).<sup>15</sup> If we compare electoral goals in Eastern and Western Europe, the first thing to note is the less prevalent policy goals in Eastern Europe.<sup>16</sup> Twenty-seven percent of parties in Eastern Europe are policy seeking, while 50% of parties are in Western Europe. While parties are concentrated in vote seeking in both regions with office seeking being the least common goal, no Eastern European parties hold all three goals simultaneously.

<sup>15</sup>Given the electoral loss the FDP experienced in the September 2013 federal election and their failure to pass the electoral threshold for representation, this party would certainly be an office seeking party in the 2014 European Election.

<sup>16</sup>Separate maps of the distributions of goals among Eastern and Western Europe are available in Appendix B, Section B.1, Figures 17 and 16.

#### 4.4 WHO ARE THE MEPS?

In order to measure what types of politicians parties select for the EP, this study focuses on MEPs who served in the seventh session. While these politicians are not proper candidates anymore, they do represent a certain subset of candidates for the EP. These MEPs, in the vast majority of cases, were selected by their parties to hold the top positions on the candidate lists in the 2009 European elections. About 28% of these MEPs held the first position on their party lists, another 17% held the second position and another 10% held the third position. This means 55% of all MEPs serving in the seventh Parliament were listed in one of the top three spots of their party's list. Furthermore, a full 87% were placed in a top ten position. So while the sample here is not of the whole population of candidates, or all parties contesting the European election, it is a sample of those top candidates, or the very best example of a party's most preferred choice for the election.

The diversity of backgrounds and experience for MEPs is measured in terms of past national political service, past EP service, service to national party leadership, and European party group leadership. This information for each MEP in the seventh session of Parliament (2009-2014) was taken from MEP curriculum vitae that are made publicly available on the EP website and is supplemented by the personal websites of MEPs when necessary along with a MEP's history of EP parliamentary service. Education is also included in the data by simply coding the highest level of education obtained by the MEP and any specialized professional degree the MEP may have (law or MD). Past political service is coded on various levels, providing a unique data set that separates MEPs from one another on the basis of having served at the regional level (federal or regional state parliaments) or in national parliaments, cabinet positions, or prime minister positions. This allows the data to account for MEPs that have held multiple positions within their member state and indicates the level of government for which they have served. Party leadership indicates whether an MEP has ever served in the national leadership (executive) of their party or in a regional leadership executive position. EP leadership experience refers to MEPs that have ever held a leadership position within the European party group.

The data show a large amount of variation in the past experience and service of MEPs,

Table 11: Frequency of Politician Types

Experience Type	# of MEPs	% of Total MEPs
(1) Regional and National Gov Exp	239	43.40%
(2) National Party Leadership Experience	209	38.90%
(3) EP Incumbent	287	52.10%
(4) EPG Leadership Experience	165	30.10%
(5) No Gov Exp	157	28.50%
(6) No Party Exp	188	34.90%
(7) New	163	31.90%

suggesting that types of politicians chosen by parties at the national level is nonstandard and likely subject to strategic considerations or considerations of party resources and investments. Only about 50% of MEPs were incumbents in 2009, suggesting that turnover remains high in the EP. In terms of past national political experience, just over 40%, have held regional or national legislative positions. Party service is unevenly distributed among parties with only about 38% of MEPs having served in leadership positions, either presently or in the past. Variation also exists across countries and across parties with some parties having no MEPs that have previously held leadership positions within the party and some parties that only have current or past party leaders. European party group service is the least common type of positions for MEPs to hold with only about 30% having participated in the management of the party group. Table 11 presents the breakdown of experience, which is subsequently used as the seven dependent variables for the analysis, with the addition of politicians that have neither government nor party experience or are completely new to politics. Table 12 shows the distribution of MEPs across party types with respect to electoral goals.

Table 12: Frequency of MEPs by Party Types

Goal Type	Frequency	Percent	Cum.
None	43	8.14%	8.14%
Office	23	4.36%	12.50%
Office and Policy	18	3.41%	15.91%
Office and Vote	84	15.91%	31.82%
Office, Vote, and Policy	61	11.55%	43.37%
Policy	33	6.25%	49.62%
Vote	181	34.28%	83.90%
Vote and Policy	85	16.10%	100.00%

#### 4.5 TESTING GOALS AS PREDICTORS OF CANDIDATE SELECTION

In order to test the hypotheses about the relationship between party goals and the choice of politician type, a series of maximum likelihood estimation models will again be used for analysis. The relationship between office seeking, vote seeking, and policy seeking goals and the likelihood each type of politician serves in the EP is modeled in a series of logistic regressions.<sup>17</sup> I estimate the models using robust standard errors clustered on countries but also include several party and country level variables to control for variation across member states and parties with respect to institutional and party system factors. The results of the first set of models, testing the relationship between party goals and the choice of *experienced* politicians, are presented in Table 13. The results in Table 13 report the marginal effects of each type of electoral goal on the likelihood that a member of the EP will be one of 4 types. Either they will have held past regional or national government positions (1), or national party leadership positions (2), are incumbents (3), or have past EPG leadership experience

<sup>17</sup>With the exception of the “new” type who has no experience at all, the categories are not mutually exclusive and therefore an observation of a MEP may appear in more than one model. Accordingly, I chose to keep seven different models instead of developing a rank or multinomial category to identify politician types. While collapsing these categories into a more manageable index would make for a more concise analysis, the different politician types are not independent of one other, thus making any type of ordered or multinomial index statistically untenable.

(4). In addition to these models, Table 14 reports marginal effects of the independent variables on the likelihood of *inexperienced* politician types serving in the EP. These are those MEPS with no government experience (5), no party experience (6), or neither party nor government experience (complete newcomers) (7).<sup>18</sup> Overall, the results of the models provide evidence that electoral goals are in fact significant predictors of politician type.

#### 4.5.1 The Effects of Office Seeking Goals

These models suggest that parties with office seeking goals are more likely to place inexperienced MEPs in office over their nationally experienced peers. The results of the analysis show that office seeking parties, whether office seeking is a pure goal or combined with policy seeking, increases the likelihood that new politicians, those without government experience, and party members with no leadership experience will serve in the EP. These results support  $H_2$ , which hypothesized that electoral defeat at the national level may induce parties to “clean house” before European elections and seek new politicians for office. The strongest, positive effect of pure office seeking is on the probability of politicians with no prior national government experience serving in the EP (7). Inexperienced MEPs are 27% more likely to serve office seeking parties than non-office seeking parties. Similarly, MEPs with no party leadership experience are about 25% more likely and MEPs with neither government nor party experience are 15% more likely to serve these parties than non-office seeking parties. Figure 6 shows the change in probability for both inexperienced and experienced politician types, comparing office and non-office seeking parties.

Given that office seeking electoral goals are positively and significantly related to the presence of inexperienced politicians in the EP, it is unsurprising that this relationship is significant but negatively related to the presence of experienced politicians. In fact, pure office seeking goals reduce the probability of national politicians serving in the EP by nearly 44% versus non-office seeking goals. In addition, office seeking goals are not a significant predictor of incumbents, therefore I cannot make any conclusions about the relationship of this goal to the re-selection of an incumbent. The effect of office seeking goals also remains

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<sup>18</sup>Note that for some politician types, incumbency is omitted as a control variable given there are no observations of incumbents in these categories (no government experience, incumbents, and new politicians).

Table 13: Party Goals and Experienced Politician Types

VARIABLES	(1) Regional and National Gov Experience	(2) National Party Leadership Experience	(3) Incumbent	(4) EPG Leadership Experience
Office	-0.315*** (0.046)	-0.324*** (0.048)	0.056 (0.071)	-0.142*** (0.051)
Office and Vote	-0.043 (0.082)	-0.201*** (0.046)	0.210*** (0.061)	-0.107 (0.083)
Office and Policy	-0.352*** (0.079)	0.003 (0.113)	0.037 (0.087)	-0.227*** (0.036)
Office, Vote, and Policy	-0.067 (0.105)	-0.105 (0.097)	0.089 (0.074)	-0.056 (0.083)
Vote	0.095* (0.055)	-0.146 (0.125)	0.182*** (0.065)	-0.072 (0.095)
Vote and Policy	-0.002 (0.064)	-0.206** (0.093)	0.151*** (0.044)	-0.188** (0.092)
Policy	-0.092 (0.073)	-0.084 (0.152)	0.175** (0.086)	-0.150** (0.059)
Party Age	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Time since last election	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Bicameral	-0.092 (0.102)	0.010 (0.110)	-0.005 (0.067)	-0.028 (0.083)
Federalism	0.040 (0.086)	-0.137 (0.117)	0.052 (0.055)	0.314*** (0.081)
Effective Number of Parties	-0.040 (0.028)	0.023 (0.039)	0.008 (0.018)	0.015 (0.025)
Eurozone	0.019 (0.065)	0.065 (0.071)	-0.097 (0.062)	-0.071 (0.046)
Advanced Education	0.026 (0.058)	0.005 (0.035)	0.033 (0.056)	-0.030 (0.025)
Age	0.013*** (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
Incumbent	0.013 (0.038)	0.141*** (0.048)		0.287*** (0.047)
Observations	514	514	514	514
Pseudo R-sqaure	0.129	0.0641	0.100	0.162
Wald chi2(12)	4515	416.6	1652	3982
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Std. Err adjusted for 18 clusters  
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 14: Party Goals and Inexperienced Politician Types

VARIABLES	(5) No Gov Experience	(6) No Party Experience	(7) New
Office	0.258*** (0.073)	0.256*** (0.084)	0.195*** (0.066)
Office and Vote	-0.059 (0.061)	0.172 (0.111)	0.083 (0.076)
Office and Policy	0.287** (0.135)	0.251*** (0.091)	0.409*** (0.111)
Office, Vote, and Policy	0.031 (0.096)	0.080 (0.116)	0.113 (0.075)
Vote	-0.092* (0.048)	0.061 (0.095)	0.027 (0.062)
Vote and Policy	-0.029 (0.050)	0.205* (0.115)	0.070 (0.068)
Policy	0.004 (0.082)	0.228*** (0.075)	0.083 (0.105)
Party Age	0.000 (0.000)	0.002** (0.001)	0.001 (0.000)
Time since last election	-0.001 (0.001)	0.004 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)
Bicameral	0.011 (0.067)	0.073 (0.082)	-0.009 (0.053)
Federalism	0.005 (0.039)	-0.195*** (0.072)	-0.043 (0.037)
Effective Number of Parties	0.020* (0.012)	-0.034 (0.037)	0.000 (0.021)
Eurozone	0.058 (0.039)	-0.035 (0.053)	0.048* (0.028)
Advanced Education	-0.029 (0.036)	-0.018 (0.037)	-0.021 (0.032)
Age	-0.015*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.001)
Incumbent		-0.182*** (0.040)	
Observations	514	514	514
Pseudo R-sqaure	0.136	0.0878	0.0708
Wald chi2(12)	413.5	1052	1439
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00

Std. Err adjusted for 18 clusters  
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

robust with the addition of policy seeking goals to this electoral strategy (office and policy), providing further evidence in support of  $H_2$ .<sup>19</sup> However, because these models show us that the presence of national government and party experienced politicians are unlikely, I do not find evidence to support  $H_1$ , which hypothesized that office seeking parties will use European elections to compensate national politicians that have recently lost office. Instead, it appears parties experiencing electoral difficulties at the national level choose to use European elections to incorporate new and inexperienced politicians into the ranks of their elected officials.




Figure 6: Predicted Probability of Politician Type in Office Seeking Parties

<sup>19</sup>Figures 18 and 19 in Appendix B, Section B.2 display the predicted probabilities for variables representing goal combinations.



### 4.5.2 The Effects of Vote Seeking Goals

The results of the analysis also show that vote seeking electoral goals have a significant, but opposite, effect of office seeking on politician type.  $H_3$  hypothesized vote seeking parties will be more likely to place experienced politicians in the EP, both those experienced at the national and European level. The results of the analysis provide support for this hypothesis. Vote seeking electoral goals are significantly and positively related to the presence of national politicians and incumbents in the EP. While vote seeking is a positive predictor of both nationally experienced politicians and incumbents, the substantive effect is larger with incumbents. Incumbents are 18.5% more likely to serve in the EP in vote seeking parties than non-vote seeking parties and national politicians 9.6% more likely. In contrast, new politicians are 9.2% less likely to serve vote seeking parties than non-vote seeking parties. The predicted probabilities of the significant vote seeking relationships are reported in Figure 7. These results are consistent with the estimates of vote and policy seeking goals, where incumbents are again 15.4% more likely to serve these parties than non-vote and policy seeking parties. This hypothesis also predicted that national party leaders were likely to serve vote seeking parties in the EP but I do not find evidence for this relationship. Overall, the models show that MEPs with national party leadership experience are unlikely, regardless of the electoral strategy of parties.

### 4.5.3 The Effects of Policy Seeking Goals

Finally, the results provide evidence that policy seeking parties are more likely than non-policy seekers to choose politicians with European experience for EP office. The relationship between policy seeking and the presence of incumbents is positive and significant. As Figure 8 reports, the predicted probability of incumbents serving in the EP increases by 18.4% with the presence of purely policy seeking goals. In addition, policy seekers are less likely to send experienced party members to the EP, perhaps suggesting that their EP cohort of politicians is entirely separate from their national politicians. Perhaps European careers are on a separate path in the party than that of national careers. These results provide evidence, in part, to support  $H_4$ , which hypothesized policy seeking parties are more likely




Figure 7: Predicted Probability of Type in Vote Seeking Parties

to send incumbents and European party leaders to the EP. While the results with respect to incumbents are as expected, the relationship between EP party experience is significant, but negative. This is a curious result that remains to be explored in future research.

In sum, the results provide evidence that electoral goals are a determinant of politician type, supporting hypotheses about the effects of electoral expectations and experience on candidate selection. The results of the empirical analysis show that office seeking is the most powerful predictor of politician type, predicting that national parties will select new politicians after suffering a national electoral loss. These parties will rarely choose national politicians, favoring a new class of politicians instead. Vote seeking is the second, strongest predictor of type. The results show that vote seeking parties favor incumbents and national politicians over those that are inexperienced. Finally, policy seeking goals are the weakest in these models. This is likely partly due to the difficulty measuring policy seeking given




Figure 8: Predicted Probability of Type in Policy Seeking Parties

the limitations of the data. Policy seeking positively predicts only the choice for incumbents and non-national party leaders. One final result to note is that holding all electoral goals simultaneously (office, vote, and policy seeking) is not a significant predictor of any politician type. I would expect this since it is unclear what kind of politicians these parties would seek to place in the EP when they hold all goals.

#### 4.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The role of EP office has often been conceptualized as possessing two different functions. On one hand, exemplified by the electoral experience of MEPs in the UK discussed in the introduction, the EP can be a breeding ground for national politicians, or a “primary school of politics.” It is a place for newcomers to get their feet wet, prove they can win elections,

and/or prove they can sustain office. On the other hand, it has also been characterized as a retirement home for aging politicians that parties no longer want to hold domestic office positions, but are unwilling to remove from politics all together. The research reported here shows that this second idea, that of the EP as a retirement home, is no longer an accurate description of the EP. It is much more likely that the EP is either a training ground for new or young politicians or an institution with its own class of politicians. Parties may use the office as a reward to their newest, most loyal, and most active young members or they may have an entirely separate faction of party politicians dedicated to EP service. Especially after examining the policy seeking results of the models, the results of the electoral goals might represent growing tendencies to separate European from national politics within a party's electoral strategy.

Ultimately, this research contributes to the growing literature on the EP and the role of national parties in the politics of this increasingly important institution. The results support existing research claiming that European elections are second order national elections, where parties and voters use national issues to decide the election (Reif and Schmitt 1980). However, I show that parties are acting strategically given their second order electoral goals while simultaneously using them as opportunities to train new politicians. Which strategy prevails is dependent on the national electoral experience of each individual party. I also show that the effect of second order elections on the composition of the EP is conditional. Some parties opt to use the election purely for political gains in the national arena—*office seeking* and *vote seeking*—while others are seeking to strategically place well qualified politicians in office—*policy seeking*.

The analysis of this chapter highlights the conditions under which national parties will select different types of candidates and concludes that newcomers are far more likely to be chosen over experienced members of parties under a variety of conditions. This may be the result of the growing tendencies for the EP to be a learning ground for national politics or a separate political arena all together, with little switching between political levels. National politicians are likely to join the EP only when parties are seeking to maximize their votes in European elections. These are well known politicians with years of experience that are likely to attract votes to their party's list. The results also report that policy goals are

weak predictors of candidate type. This suggests that preferences over European integration and/or the salience of European elections within a party's membership do not play a strong role in developing the electoral strategy of a party for European elections. Since office seeking and vote seeking goals are the result of purely national electoral experiences and motivations, these findings support the persistence of second order elections when Europe's parliament is being elected. The implications of this are sure to be the subject of further study. If parties are choosing to nominate and subsequently provide different types of politicians to the EP, there is sure to be interesting variation in MEP behavior with respect to their member states', parties', and constituents' interests.

The results of this chapter have many implications for representation in the EP. This analysis shows that the type of politician a party chooses to send to the EP is usually a direct result of national electoral politics and not strong policy concerns. This extends the effect of the second order nature of European elections beyond just accountability and legitimacy. Parties will choose their politicians for the EP to make strategic gains at the national level, instead of considering the best way to represent any relevant policy interest they may have. An institution composed of partly inexperienced legislators, nationally ambitious legislators, and those seeking to hold European careers will naturally be unbalanced in the quality of representation each individual constituency receives. In order to understand this relationship more thoroughly, the next chapter will examine how the combination of ambition and party organization influence legislative behavior directly.

## 5.0 ELECTORAL GOALS, ORGANIZATION, AND LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR

This final empirical chapter of the dissertation builds on the analysis of the previous two, combining the data on party organization, electoral goals, and politician type to examine how party and individual attributes work together to influence legislative outcomes. The analysis investigates national party-MEP congruence, defined as the compatibility of MEP voting behavior with their party's ideological preferences, to determine under what conditions parties encourage or discourage their most preferred actions. I examine the effects of party centralization because parties are constrained in reaching their goals by three major attributes of party organization: the centralization of decision making, the quality of recruitment structures, and personnel accountability (Norris 1997*a*; Tavits 2013). As such, a theory on party control and the relationship between national parties and MEPs requires analysis of the centralization of candidate selection and supervision. All of these processes play a role in determining the loyalty of a representative to their national party and the level of policy congruence between domestic political parties and European legislative outcomes. I argue that centralized parties with nationally ambitious MEPs and office or vote seeking goals are more likely to experience compatible behavior from their MEPs. The careers of these MEPs are not only controlled by the centralization of the party, these MEPs also often wish to return to national politics and will cater to the national party in order to do so.

In addition to simultaneously testing all the theoretical components of the dissertation, the analysis makes both a methodological and a substantive contribution to the EP literature on party politics. First, I introduce a new way of examining cohesion by comparing the legislative activity of MEPs to their national parties' policy preferences using a party measure that is exogenous to the EP. I also examine behavior across both consequential and

inconsequential legislation and across economic policy, foreign policy, and employment policy which allows for an in depth assessment of the impact of parties and individuals across many different types of EP legislation. Second, I introduce the role of party organization for cohesion in a novel way using the unique data I have collected on the treatment of MEPs within their national parties. I find the level of congruence parties experience varies across legislative procedures, policy areas, and parties and incumbent MEPs that are centrally selected enjoy the highest level of congruence on consequential legislation and policy areas where the EP has substantial power.

## 5.1 PARTY COHESION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Legislative politics and party cohesion within the EP are well studied but scholars disagree on the relative strength of national parties in encouraging unity and enforcing discipline. There is also substantial disagreement on the role of EPGs versus national parties in influencing legislator behavior. For instance, [Hix, Noury and Roland \(2005\)](#) conclude that cohesion between the party groups and their members increases with the size of EPGs, evolution in the power of the parliament over time, and the presence of MEPs serving in governing, national parties. This leads the authors to conclude that when faced with a choice between two principals, the MEP is more likely side with the national party ([Hix, Noury and Roland 2005](#)). In a related study, [Coman \(2009\)](#) find that national parties only appear stronger in Western Europe and Central and Eastern European MEPs are more likely to favor their EPG. He argues that variation in the type of national party can account for much of the variation in defect rates among MEPs. He identifies variation across party type through differences in party and country specific variables that can be theoretically linked to party control (e.g. ideological clarity of the party platform, the size of the national party, and whether or not the party is in government). In addition to testing different party factors, Coman also argues that one must test only those situations where conflict is present between EPGs and national parties when voting in order to isolate the competition between these groups ([Coman 2009](#)). In order to isolate the causal mechanisms that provide either the

party group or the national party with more control over MEPs, [Coman \(2009\)](#) constructs a model that tests the effect of several different variables on voting behavior using only contested parliamentary votes where the EPG and the national party competed for MEP loyalty.

In both of these studies, the preferences (Hix et al.) and the average behavior (Coman) of both the EPGs and the national parties are taken from the roll call votes that are also used in calculating cohesion or defection. While this data is useful in establishing patterns of behavior across groups and individuals, it doesn't tell us how cohesive the behavior of the national groups is to their national party at large. In most studies of EP legislative behavior or cohesion, the dependent variables measure only when and how often an individual votes with the majority of the members of his/her national party and/or EPG. They do not measure whether individuals are voting the way they would be predicted to vote based on exogenous, national preferences, nor do they take into account different legislative procedures or policy areas. By assuming legislative behavior remains constant across legislative procedures and policy areas in their analysis, these studies miss important variation. Because the EP has varying levels of competence across policy areas, it cannot be expected that the value of each piece of legislation remains constant.<sup>1</sup> Parties value consequential legislation on policy areas that are beyond the control of national governments over inconsequential resolutions in an area where the EU has no power (foreign policy, for example).

Examining legislative behavior in a more nuanced way within the EP is important for several reasons. Recall the example in the introduction of the dissertation of the UK Labour Party and the working time directive. This vote was of particular importance to both the Labour Party and its MEPs because it was a legislative vote on an amendment in a directive. This means the result of such a vote, if the directive passes, is binding for member states. Not all of the votes in the EP carry this kind of power. Many of the votes are non-legislative, meaning they do not produce or amend binding legislation. This has obvious implications for legislative behavior because the consequences of votes across legislative and non-legislative procedures are not equal ([Carruba et al. 2006](#); [Lauderdale 2010](#)). EPGs and national parties

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<sup>1</sup>In EU vernacular, competence references the right to make policy in a given area, not the actual ability to do so.



should care more about consequential legislative votes and put more pressure on MEPs to behave appropriately. Because of the increased pressure on MEPs in legislative votes, delegations should be more cohesive than when they vote on inconsequential legislative. MEPs can vote their true, non-party or EPG influenced preferences on inconsequential legislation because the votes really have no weight. The data presented in this chapter shows that this distinction between procedures is incredibly important. In fact, the average variance of MEP ideal points within national party delegations in the EP when voting on legislative acts is 34% greater than when voting on non-legislative acts. On legislative votes, MEPs are subject to the many influences they must deal with at the EP: their national parties, their EPGs, their constituencies, committees, etc. On non-legislative votes, they are more free to vote as they would like. Hence party delegations are more cohesive when they need not negotiate with competing influences.

In addition to looking across policy areas, it is also useful to look outside of the EP for comparison with national parties. Continuing with the example of the working time directive vote, 12 members of the Labour party voted in favor of the amendment while 5 voted against. Most studies of cohesion simply measure the percentage of MEPs voting together and consider those outside of the majority to be rebels. Using this type of measure for cohesion, it appears that 5 members are rebelling from the party delegation in this vote. However, given we know the position of the national Labour Party and its leader, it is actually the majority of the party that is rebelling against their national peers. Hence, there is a great deal to learn by comparing individuals and national delegations to their national parties outside of the EP.

## **5.2 PARTY CENTRALIZATION AND PARTY INFLUENCE**

The level of centralization in parties is an important factor in determining the amount of control party leaders have over their members. Centralization works to reduce both ex ante uncertainty and increase ex-post control over agent behavior. Like all principal-agent relationships, parties want to place faithful agents in office. Centralization also increases the

certainty parties have that they are choosing a desirable agent. It reduces ex ante uncertainty through controlling the choice of agent and it can increase ex post control through the threat of removal and/or supervision. For example, Chapter 2 offered poignant examples of powerful Croatian party leaders. These leaders run highly centralized parties and they make nearly all important decisions. In the European elections of both 2013 and 2014, they were able to exert a large amount of control over the selection of candidates, exercising both ex-ante and ex-post control techniques. For instance, the leader of Croatia's SDP was able to use the EP candidate list as a way to remove an observer, Antčević Marinović, that had been scrutinized in the media. The leader of the HDZ similarly removed another observer because this particular politician had been an avid supporter of the past party president, Jadranka Kosor.<sup>2</sup> Just before the election the leader, Karmomarko, and his presidency (the executive of the party) expelled Kosor from the party. ([Vecernji.hr 2013a](#)). Several reasons were cited for such action, among those given by Karmomarko was that it was a "time for new people" in the party ([Vecernji.hr 2013b](#)).<sup>3</sup> The centralization of selection allowed the leaders to both reprimand a "disloyal" member (ex post) and also ensure that this type of agent could be replaced by a more desirable, loyal agent (providing better representation ex ante) for the next term. The following sections will summarize the relationships between cohesion, candidate selection, supervision, and individual political ambition while also providing the hypotheses of the chapter.

### 5.2.1 Centralized and Selection

Candidate recruitment and nomination mechanisms are important for both the type of representative a party gets and their performance in elected office ([Wessels 1997](#); [Siavelis and Morgenstern 2012](#)). Chapter 3 concluded the type of candidate a party chooses to recruit is based on its electoral goals for European elections. A party's ability to choose the right type is conditioned by the level of centralization in the selection procedure. If candidate selection and list placement are the privilege of elite leadership, a party's leadership is better able to control the type of candidate they choose. The clearer the goals of the party, the clearer the

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<sup>2</sup>Interview 4.14.2013, Zagreb, Croatia.

<sup>3</sup>Quotation is a translated by the author, the original text in Croatian is "Vrijeme je za nove Ljude."

strategy for whom to choose, and a more centralized selection process means the party has a greater chance of securing that particular type of candidate. All else equal, centralized parties are better able to select the “right” type of candidate. Centralized parties select politicians that match the type of politicians elites want to serve. Not only does this match make for better agents, centralization also allows the selected, and then elected, politician to realize how powerful their leadership is in managing their career. The national party is a very strong principal when centralized candidate selection is used (Hix 2004). Centralization of selection also allows them to easily remove politicians that have not served them adequately. Thus politicians from parties with centralized selection are more accountable to the leadership and must provide more congruent behavior. In contrast, when candidate selection is left to mass membership, politicians are more personalistic, appealing to a much broader base of constituents or special interests than simply the party elite (Ware 1979). These candidates know the power to maintain their office lies in a larger electorate and will cater to these interests instead of the party leadership. Therefore, the multi-stage process that determines policy congruence begins with the selection choice parties make over all possible candidates for EP office. Thus the first hypothesis is as follows:

*H<sub>1</sub>: MEPs in parties with centralized candidate selection methods are more congruent with their national parties than those in decentralized parties.*

### **5.2.2 Centralization and Supervision**

In addition to candidate selection, another practice that varies widely across national parties is how they incorporate EP politicians into their leadership structure and how communication with Brussels occurs. Just as centralization determines the power of selection procedures in parties, it also encourages specific behaviors in leadership-politician (principal-agent) communication and exchange of information. A party’s choice over the composition of executive leadership determines whether MEPs are part of the centralized leadership of the party. This structure, together with candidate selection mechanisms, is likely to determine whether the legislator acts as a delegate or a trustee. MEPs that act as trustees are likely to behave in the way they see fit based on their own personal beliefs, expert judgment or knowledge, or the requirements of the institutional decision making process. MEPs that act as delegates

are more likely to be loyal members of the party and act in a way they feel the party would find most acceptable (Fox and Shotts 2009). Trustees are expected to work independently in the EP, while delegates will stay close to the party.

The success of the MEP-party relationship relies on the intersection of individual and party goals within a framework of oversight. Because many factors influence the decision making of the EP, MEPs acting as delegates are likely to have a harder time pursuing personal goals or cooperating with their colleagues because they are more constrained by the party. They are likely to be informed by the party before making decisions and acting in way they feel will serve the party best. In contrast, trustee-style MEPs will likely be more successful in the EP because they are able to work freely and make their own decisions over policy outcomes. This EP level success may sometimes come at the expense of greater congruence with national party preferences. MEPs that can work freely are better able to manage the complexity and specialization of legislating in the EP where the party is simply not as knowledgeable. Therefore they will have a greater opportunity to shape their own agenda and that of the parties. These two types of information exchanges are depicted in Figure 9.



Figure 9: Information Flows in MEP-Party Relationships

The inclusion of MEPs in their party’s executive authority may also increase the exchange of information between the EP delegation and the party leaders. MEPs often told me that the main reason for tension with their national party was a lack of communication and/or information sharing. Communication standards are vastly different across national parties serving in the EP. Some MEPs, and/or their assistants, disclosed that they rarely speak to their counterparts in their home country but others communicate almost daily. Usually this lack of communication was due to a lack of interest on behalf of their party leaders for their work in the EP. However, sometimes this also stemmed from a lack of understanding of the

complicated nature of EP legislation. MEPs often commented on the technical aspect of EP legislation and the difficulty this creates for an outsider to understand. One MEP shared a pattern of communication breakdown between his party and himself. He said he often experienced a total lack of awareness or interest when trying to communicate with his party during important policy debates. He often tried to consult national leaders over important policy matters but rarely had luck engaging them, only to have to later bear his party's lament after unfavorable legislation was concluded and no longer an issue for the EP.<sup>4</sup>

Being left out of regular communication with the national party appears to inhibit both the sharing of policy preferences from the leadership to the MEP and the sharing of information from the Parliament back to the party. If an MEP is included in the executive structure of the party, not only will he or she have greater access to information on the policy preferences of his or her party, but the MEP will also be able to share information about their work and the current agenda of the parliament more easily. Having an executive structure that requires regular communication between MEPs and their party leaders helps to eliminate information asymmetries that can often increase agency losses between parties and their politicians. Hence I hypothesize inclusive in the central leadership is more likely to result in scenario A, where MEPs act as delegates for the party and the direct effect on ideological congruence is positive:

*H<sub>2</sub>: MEPs incorporated into party executive structures are more congruent with their national parties.*

Parties goals will also affect the way in which communication works between MEPs and their parties. One of the determinants [Coman \(2009\)](#) concludes affected the influence of national parties on their MEPs was ideological coherence. Coman argues that the clearer the position of a party on any given policy area, the easier it is for a MEP to determine what position he or she should also take. This can be extended to party goals. The clearer the goals of the party, the easier it is for a MEP to determine what the party wants. Policy seeking parties want to influence policy and are more likely to make their preferences known to their MEPs, who are then able to act more in congruence with the party. In contrast, office and vote seeking parties will experience less congruence with their MEPs because

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<sup>4</sup>Interview(3) 6.18.2013, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium.

they simply do not care about legislating and do not have clear preferences. Therefore, the hypotheses about electoral goals and congruence are as follows:

*H<sub>3</sub>: MEPs in policy seeking parties are more congruent with their national parties than those in office or vote seeking parties.*

### 5.2.3 Individual Ambition and Experience

One final consideration in determining how politicians will behave is the personal goals of the MEP. In addition to the centralization of selection, parties must also be able to recruit the candidate types they want to serve. Parties first decide what type of candidates to choose from possible alternatives, but chosen politicians must also be interested in competing or be persuaded to compete for office. The motivations of an individual play an important role in the way an individual will behave if elected. This intersection of party goals and individual ambitions means that many scenarios for candidacy can exist. Chapter 3 concluded that office seeking parties are most likely to nominate inexperienced politicians. Parties with relatively stronger policy seeking preferences will prefer those that have experience working at the European level.

Political ambition in the EP is an ever growing area of study in EU politics and research on the topic tells us that individuals with goals focused on European careers behave very differently from their nationally inclined colleagues (Borchert 2011; Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard 2009; Pemstein, Meserve and Bernhard 2015). Existing literature often distinguishes between these two types of candidates as *low* and *high* quality, which is meant to imply that candidates with experience and ambition in Europe (often incumbents) will make better MEPs (high quality) than those that are more interested in the national arena or are relatively inexperienced in European politics (low quality) (Pemstein, Meserve and Bernhard 2015). National politicians adhere to their national party preferences but EP careerists are more integrated into the EP party system (Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard 2009). Nationally ambitious politicians are more likely to be delegates and exhibit high levels of congruence since they need to protect and prolong their careers with their national parties. EP careerists are more likely to behave like trustees and produce lower levels of congruence because they are less dependent on their national party for career advancement. Experience can be used

as a proxy for ambition since a measure of experience contains information regarding past political career choices. A hypotheses regarding the relationship between experience and congruence are below.

*H<sub>4</sub>: MEPS that with national political experience are more congruent with their national parties than those without national experience.*

### 5.3 MEASURING INDIVIDUAL AND PARTY PREFERENCES

A large sample of MEPs and parties is used to empirically test the implications of internal party controls dictated through formal party rules, external controls dictated by member state electoral and institutional characteristics, and individual experience attributes. Contributing to the understanding of multi-level European politics by focusing on the domestic party-EP link specifically, the analysis directly compares individual behavior to the expected behavior given national party preferences.

#### 5.3.1 Party Positions

The first step in empirically analyzing the relationship between the MEPs and their national parties is determining how best to measure ideological preferences for both the national parties and MEPs. There are several large data sets available that contain various measures of ideological positions on several different issues that can be used to construct exogenous and aggregate measures of national party preferences.<sup>5</sup> I use the Comparative Manifestos Project study from the 2009 European Elections to measure party preferences in the areas of economic policy, employment policy, and foreign policy along with an aggregate measure of left-right placement (EES 2009b). The creators of the manifesto project have categorized manifesto text into many different areas on the levels of local, regional, national, and global

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<sup>5</sup>This data includes the expert data of the Chapel Hill Surveys that provide party positions for European integration and the Comparative Manifestos Project which provides data on a range of issues (Budge et al. 2001; Hooghe et al. 2008; EES 2009b; Hooghe et al. 2010; Volkens et al. 2011). These data sets allow for positions on issues in national and European elections to be coded on an ideological scale in order to estimate preference ideal points for national parties across Europe. The manifesto data contains a series of positions on individual issues that are both domestic and European.

and have also indicated whether the particular coded statements are representative of leftist views or rightist views, allowing the placement of parties from left to right in each policy area.<sup>6</sup>

### 5.3.2 Individual Political Positions

To measure individual behavior in the EP I use legislative voting records. This data has been collected and made available through the Votewatch Europe project and the work of Hix et al. (2007, 2009). I use the raw roll call data from the start of the seventh term (2009) through March 2013 to estimate individual ideal points. I first separated the data into specific policy areas corresponding to EP committees, as well as two data sets: one that incorporates only legislative acts and one incorporating only non-legislative acts.<sup>7</sup> When using EP roll call votes in the analysis, it is important to recall that not all votes in the EP are equal in terms of procedural importance. One of the largest criticisms that can be levied at the use of roll call votes in their entirety in the EP is that many of these votes have no real bearing on legislative outcomes. As the introduction stated, many votes are on strictly procedural or non-legislative reports and resolutions and are far less important than co-decision votes, which carry greater legislative weight. Therefore, the use of the complete universe of roll call votes in determining the ideal points of MEPs can lead to false identification of party relationships (Carruba et al. 2006). In less consequential votes, MEPs are expected to vote absent any conflicting demands from their national parties, their peers, or EPGs.

In order to illustrate this difference in behavior across both procedures and policy areas, Figure 10 displays the density of ideal points for legislative and non-legislative votes in a single national party in the EP. This figure visually displays the densities of the same set of legislators in the *Platforma Obywatelska*, a Polish Christian democrat/liberal conservative party. In the figure, the dash line displays the density of individual positions of the Polish MEPs given their voting behavior on legislative votes while the solid line marks the same

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<sup>6</sup>For further information on the coding of this variable, please see Appendix C, Section C.1.2.

<sup>7</sup>The use of roll call votes for the measurement of ideological positions is not unproblematic (Carruba, Gabel and Hug 2008); therefore this analysis used data from the most recent EP session where roll call voting is now the standard procedure in order to mitigate any possible selection effects of the roll call data. I would like to thank Simon Hix for his generosity with this data as it is not yet published publicly.



measure for non-legislative votes. The y-axis represents the number of places at any given ideal point, the actual ideal points are then shown in the the x-axis. This figure shows that not only are the point estimates for these legislators different across voting procedures, but they are also much more cohesive in non-legislative voting. The density of the legislative ideal points is rather flat, suggesting each individual legislators has an unique ideal point for legislative voting. The strong peak near 25 for non-legislative votes suggests that members of the party vote similarly and thus share ideal points clustered around -0.7 to -0.5.




Figure 10: Individual Ideal Points for Legislative and Non-Legislative Votes: Polish Christian Democrats/Liberal Conservatives(Platforma Obywatelska)

In addition to these procedural differences, it is also prudent to examine ideal points across committees or policy areas because the EP does not have equal amounts of power across policy areas. While capturing legislative ideal points on a left-right dimension (first dimension) will encapsulate many of the ideological splits among MEPs and national parties, it is also necessary to think of issues that arise in the EP that split legislators along a pro- vs. anti-integration dimension (second dimension) (Hooghe and Marks 2002; Marks and Steenbergen 2002). This allow us to identify policy areas where the greater debates take place over who has the right to legislative and when is the EP the appropriate institution

to do regulate policy. Politicians themselves are likely to behave differently across policy areas given their career goals. As stated above, nationally ambitious MEPs will likely be less open to more integrative policy because they will value sovereignty more relative to their Europhile peers. By dividing the ideal points into three different policy categories, I am able to test if there is more or less congruence across first and second dimension issues.

For example, foreign policy is still a largely national area of policy that fall on the first dimension. The EP has relatively little power and only 9% of the foreign policy legislation used in ideal point construction was on legislative acts. In contrast, employment and social policy generally tends to relate to issues of the single market and the free movement of people. As the debate over the working time directive illustrated in the beginning of the dissertation, some of the debates over employment policy take place on the first dimension (left vs. right, more vs. less regulation), but a great deal also encompass debates over competence, or which level of government is most appropriate to regulate in this area (second dimension). Of all the legislation coming from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, only 28% of it was legislative acts. In the third area of policy examined in the analysis, Economic and Monetary Policy, 66% of the votes taken were on legislative acts, making it the most consequential areas of policy in the analysis.<sup>8</sup> Given these differences, I expect votes across policy areas to provide different levels of congruence conditional on how active (or inactive) the parties are in a given area.<sup>9</sup>

Figure 11 displays three density curves for the same Polish party for ideal points across the three policy areas. These curves shows that there is more dispersion for economic and monetary policy (solid line). Employment policy (dash line) follows a similar distribution and both of these policy areas resemble the legislative ideal points more closely than they do the non-legislative ideal points. This suggests significant variance among MEPs in their voting in these areas, even though there is some cluster in foreign policy votes (short dash

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<sup>8</sup>The percentages reported here are taken from only those votes used in the analysis (July 2009-March 2013) and not all of the votes in the seventh session.

<sup>9</sup>Another problem that can arise in using roll call votes is the selection effects the agenda may have on the determination of individual legislator positions. Ideal point construction in item response models produces point estimates that are derived only from the available votes so if agendas vary over sessions of the EP, comparing the ideal points across legislators and across time is difficult. This is less of a problem in this study since the relative distance from party to individual is the subject of concern and I am not trying to compare MEPs over time (Carruba et al. 2006; Høyland 2010).




Figure 11: Individual Ideal Points for Policy Area Votes: Polish Christian Democrats-Liberal Conservatives (*Platforma Obywatelska*)

line) around -1. The differences across policy areas is further supported given correlations among them reported in Table 15. The ideal points presented in the figure above along with the remaining members of the EP were constructed using item response models through the *IDEAL* process in R (Clinton, Jackman and Rivers 2004).<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup>Ideal points can also be constructed through the use of the NOMINATE procedure, which also provides unique ideological identifiers for each MEP (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007; Poole and Rosenthal 2007). However, due to the small number of roll call votes for certain policy areas and the unusual amount of absenteeism in the voting records, the IDEAL process provides an estimator that allows us to assess the certainty of the estimates in a way that the NOMINATE scores do not. For more detailed discussion see Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) and Lauderdale (2010). For more information on this process, see Appendix C, Section C.1.1.

Table 15: Ideal Points Correlations Among Policy Areas

	Economic	Employment	Foreign
Economic	1	0.7123	0.8637
Employment	0.7123	1	0.7734
Foreign	0.8637	0.7734	1

#### 5.4 COMPARING PARTIES AND THEIR INDIVIDUALS: THE EMPIRICAL CHALLENGE

The majority of prior work on national party unity and power in the EP has used vote data entirely endogenous to the EP; measuring unity, coherence, or strength among MEPs of national party delegations only (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007; Coman 2009; Mühlböck 2012). I seek to extend our understanding of the relationship between national parties and their MEPs by measuring extra-parliamentary unity between these legislators and their parties. Preferences within the party must be linked to behavior within the parliament using an exogenous (of the EP) measure of party preference. This task is difficult given that there are no straightforward ways to bridge party preferences with individuals in the EP. While most of the party data described above offers ideal points for parties on a left/right scale, these exogenous measures of position are not immediately comparable with ideal points constructed from individual records. The individual points calculated using roll call data are merely a representation of relative left-right rank among the members of the legislature for the particular set of votes, therefore we cannot draw any conclusions about the substantive nature of this left-right placement or assume it shares a common ideological space with any of the manifesto data. However, it is possible to measure the relationship between the two scales using a few simple assumptions and conceptualizing congruence as a measure of relative distance between where the party preference predicts an ideal point and where the ideal point is observed in the data. The first assumption I make about the relationship

between parties and their legislators in order to calculate party predictions is that it is linear:

$$\text{MEP Ideal Point Estimate } (Y) = \alpha + \beta \text{ Party Preference}(x) + \varepsilon \quad (5.1)$$

Given the linearity assumption, the position  $x$  of any given party (from the manifesto data) predicts the individual's point estimate  $Y$  given a starting intercept ( $\alpha$ ), a slope  $\beta$ , and random error  $\varepsilon$ . The actual measure of congruence used in the analysis is each MEP's residual error from the equation above. The regression equation above estimates values for  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  which are used to predict a MEP ideal point given their party's preference ( $x$ ). The farther the distance of the observed MEP ideal point from this predicted value, the less congruent the MEP. Therefore the main dependent variable of the analysis is constructed as follows:

$$\text{Inverse Preference Congruence} = |\hat{Y}_i - Y_i| \quad (5.2)$$

where  $\hat{Y}_i - Y_i$  is predicted by equation 5.1

Because I am interested in the relative size of this distance, and whether or not it increases or decreases with changes in the predictor variables, I take the absolute value. This results in a dependent variable that measures *inverse* congruence. As this dependent variables increases, observed MEP ideal points move further away from the predicted ideal points and congruence decreases. As the measure decreases, observed MEP ideal points are closer to the predicted points and congruence increases. Therefore a negative and significant relationship between a predictor variable and the dependent variable represents a positive effect on congruence. In sum, I use linear regression to test the chapter's hypotheses where the dependent variable is inverse policy congruence measured as the absolute value of the residual error between each individuals' ideal point and that which their party's preferences would predict in equation 5.1.


### 5.4.1 MEP-Party Congruence: An Empirical Example

In order to illustrate the construction of the dependent variable, I return to the Polish example described above. Figure 12 graphically depicts both the observed and the predicted ideal points for this party's MEPs. In this figure, the curves are the density estimates of the observed ideal points for each individual for legislative votes (dash) and non-legislative votes (solid) in Figure 12a; and economic votes (solid), employment votes (short dash), and foreign affairs votes (dash) in Figure 12b. The dotted vertical lines mark the predicted ideal points for each legislator give the party's preferences and Equation 5.1. Of course the data from the party will predict all the MEPs at the same position (the vertical dashed lines) because it predicts the same ideal point for all of its legislators. If there was perfect unity and congruence, we would observe each MEP at this point.


Figure 13 presents an example of a single, specific legislator, *MEP A*, and the calculation of his/her congruence in legislative acts. Suppose this MEP has an observed ideal point of -1.68 when voting on legislative acts, represented by the dot marked MEP A in the figure. The party manifesto data gives Platforma Obywatelska a value of 0.099 on the left/right scale. When the initial regression equation (5.1) was estimated, it provided a value for  $\alpha$  of -0.255, a value for  $\beta$  of -0.030 and a value for  $\varepsilon$  of -0.019. Given the party preference value of 0.099, Equation 5.1 yields a prediction of  $\hat{Y} = (-0.255) + (-0.30 \cdot 0.099) + (-0.019) = -0.277$ , which is represented by the vertical line in the figure. Thus, the dependent variable is the absolute value of the distance between these two points:

$$\text{Inverse Preference Congruence} = |\hat{Y}_i - Y_i| = |-0.277 - (-1.68)| = 1.403 \quad (5.3)$$

Together, these three figures show that the error present when individuals are voting on non-binding legislation (non-legislative) is less than for binding legislation (legislative) when both are predicted using the left-right position of the party (12a). These figures also show that both the dispersion of ideal points and the measure of congruence is greater in votes for foreign policy than on votes for economic or employment policy (12b). This suggests that this Polish party experiences more difficulty in maintaining both delegation unity (shown by



(a) Congruence for Legislative and Non-Legislative Votes



(b) Congruence for Policy Area Votes

Figure 12: Congruence: Polish Christian Democrats-Liberal Conservatives(Platforma Obywatelska)




Figure 13: Example of MEP Inverse Congruence

the individual ideal points) and congruence (shown by the distance from the vertical line) in foreign policy than in the other policy areas. The Polish example was chosen to display the measurement of the dependent variable in a mid-sized party. While there appears to be much variation in legislative ideal points and across policy areas, non-legislative ideal points appear quite uniform. While the variance in non-legislative votes is small in this particular example, the variance across parties is quite large. The summary statistics for all dependent variables are listed in Table 16. For a complete list of the mean inverse congruence of each party across both legislative acts and all three policy areas, see Appendix C, Section C.2.



Table 16: Summary of Dependent Variables

	Mean	Variance	Min	Max
Legislative Acts	0.841	0.254	0.116	2.387
Non Legislative Acts	0.681	0.353	0.024	3.097
Economic Policy	0.888	0.128	0.465	1.824
Foreign Policy	0.774	0.212	0.057	1.960
Employment Policy	0.780	0.302	0.034	2.021

## 5.5 PARTY, MEMBER STATE, AND INDIVIDUAL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The data for party, member state, and individual level characteristics utilized in this chapter have been described at length in previous chapters. The main independent variables measuring party organization as selection and leadership structure are the subject of Chapter 3. All of the additional party and member state level variables are also described in Chapter 3, with the exception of the variable *Open Electoral List*. I use this variable to denote those countries that have preferential voting in European Elections. Finally, I use the measures for national politicians, incumbents, and new politicians that are described in Chapter 4 for individual experience, but have modified them to be mutually exclusive indicators. *National Experience Only* is an indicator for those that have served only in national government before entering the EP. *European Experience Only* is an indicator for those that have served only in the EP previously and *No Experience* is an indicator for those that have held no previous government or party positions, at the national or EP level, before entering the EP. The omitted category in this case are those politicians that have held multiple positions on multiple levels. I also add a measure of party switching in order to account for those MEPs that switched their national party affiliation in the seventh session as a control variable, although this was rare. The remaining control variables account for variation across national institutions and member state experience with the EU. As Hix (2004) found, features of the

electoral systems, combined with selection mechanisms, are also important predictors of a party’s ability to exercise control over their members. Proportional representation systems with closed lists have the most powerful parties in terms of discipline. Similarly, [Hix \(2004\)](#) also theorizes that unitary states will have more cohesive parties than federal states. Therefore these are also included as control variables in the model. All of the predictor variables are listed in [Table 17](#).

Table 17: Predictor Variables

Main Predictor Variables	Control Variables
Centralized Candidate Selection	Open Electoral Lists
Inclusive Leadership	Federalism
Office Seeking Goals	Bicameral Legislature
Vote Seeking Goals	Eurozone Membership
Policy Seeking Goals	Membership in EU in Years
National Experience Only	Age of MEP
European Experience Only	Party Switcher
No Experience	

## 5.6 EMPIRICALLY MODELING CONGRUENCE AND ORGANIZATION

The analysis models five linear regression equations for congruence, one for legislative votes (1), non-legislative votes (2), economic and monetary policy (3), employment and social policy (4), and foreign policy (5), all where the dependent variable is inverse congruence.<sup>11</sup> [Table 19](#) reports the results for legislative versus non-legislative congruence while [Table 20](#) reports the inverse congruence equations across policy areas. All of these models also include

<sup>11</sup>Given that no information with respect to the treatment of MEPs can be gained from statutes that make no mention of MEPs, in this analysis I have included only MEPs from parties that make explicit mention of this treatment. Therefore the analysis includes 362 MEPs. In order to test if addressing/not addressing MEPs could influence the behavior of MEPs, I have also constructed five Heckman selection models ([Heckman 1976](#)) which test for the independence of the congruence models from the choice to include or exclude MEPs in party statues. The results for those models and their analysis are available in [Appendix C](#), [Section C.4](#), [Tables 46](#) and support the analysis presented here.

an interaction variable for the presence of both centralization tactics, centralized selection and inclusive leadership, in order to assess the effect of simultaneous use of both strategies.

Overall the results reported in Table 19 show that party organization and the electoral goals of parties are significant predictors of congruence, but past experience has only limited effects. These results of the models provide evidence in support of the hypotheses, which are summarized in Table 18, with the exception of individual political ambition. I find little evidence in support of a relationship between individual MEP political experience and congruence. Table 20 suggest that the effect of organization extends only to foreign policy (4) but the effects of electoral goals are robust across specifications.<sup>12</sup> The variation in the results across equations suggests that the analysis of ideal points at the aggregate level (i.e. the full universe of roll call data for any given session) may overlook interesting variation. In these models, we can see that many of the covariates do not have equal effects across the different models. Breaking the roll call data into the three policy areas in addition to the different procedural votes allows us to reach conclusions that may be obscured by the aggregate measures. The following sections summarize the results across the models in detail.

Table 18: Congruence and Party and Individual Characteristics

Independent Variable	Hypothesis	Hypothesized Effect on Inverse Congruence
Centralized Selection	H <sub>1</sub>	-
Inclusive Leadership	H <sub>2</sub>	-
Policy Seeking	H <sub>3</sub>	-
National Political Ambition	H <sub>4</sub>	-

### 5.6.1 The Effects of Centralized Selection on Congruence

The results of the model in Table 19 suggest that the effects of party centralization, while significant, differ across procedures in EP legislation. By including the interactive term, I am able to determine the effect of centralized selection on MEPs in parties that use this

<sup>12</sup>In these models, the omitted category for electoral goals is that of no goals, which includes 37 MEPs, about 10% of the sample.

method of selection versus those that do not, both when inclusive leadership is present or when it is absent. In Legislative Acts (1), the unique coefficient of *Centralized Candidate Selection* reports that centralized selection is both significant and negatively related to inverse congruence, thereby increasing the level of congruence between MEPs and their parties. In fact, the use of centralized selection increases congruence in legislative acts by about 6%, providing evidence in support of  $H_1$ . When combined with inclusive leadership, the effect becomes even stronger, providing for a 21.8% increase in congruence, further supporting  $H_1$  for legislative acts. This suggests that parties which choose to exercise centralized control over both candidate selection and supervision have the most congruent MEPs. However, centralized selection has the opposite effect in non-legislative votes when used on its own. In this case, centralized selection increases congruence (decreases inverse congruence) *only* when used simultaneously with inclusive leadership. If a party uses both of these centralizing tactics, the marginal effect is equal to -0.285, or about a 9.3% increase in congruence.

Table 20 reports the results of the models for the three policy areas and these results complement the findings described above. In Foreign Policy (4), centralized selection behaves much like it does in the model for Non-legislative acts. This is unsurprising given that many of the votes used to determine the ideal points for foreign policy were non-legislative resolutions. The EU has very little supranational power in this area. Centralized selection again only has a positive effect on congruence when combined with inclusive leadership, increasing congruence by about 3.2%. These results remain similar in employment policy; however the effect is weaker, decreasing congruence by a nominal 1% when present by itself. When parties centralized selection and include MEPs in their leadership, the effect is much stronger, increasing congruence by almost 18%. These results provide more evidence in support of  $H_1$ , which stated that centralized selection should increase MEP congruence. The only policy area where this does not hold is economic policy (3), where there is no significant effect.

Table 19: Congruence and Party Organization in Legislative and Non-Legislative Acts

VARIABLES	(1) Legislative Acts	(2) Non-Legislative Acts
Centralized Candidate Selection	-0.137* (0.073)	0.480*** (0.103)
Inclusive Leadership	0.389*** (0.137)	0.285** (0.110)
Centralized Candidate Selection*Inclusive Leadership	-0.358** (0.164)	-0.765*** (0.154)
Office Seeking Goals	0.440*** (0.072)	0.430*** (0.0911)
Vote Seeking Goals	0.035 (0.053)	-0.198*** (0.0527)
Policy Seeking Goals	-0.209*** (0.045)	-0.0317 (0.0617)
National Experience Only	0.071 (0.062)	0.0333 (0.0757)
European Experience Only	-0.060 (0.058)	0.152** (0.0652)
No Experience	0.058 (0.069)	0.217** (0.102)
Open Electoral Lists	0.224*** (0.060)	0.139** (0.0661)
Federalism	-0.341*** (0.116)	-0.559*** (0.0961)
Bicameral Legislature	0.150** (0.069)	0.571*** (0.111)
Eurozone Membership	-0.017 (0.095)	0.279*** (0.105)
Membership in EU in Years	0.002 (0.003)	-0.00152 (0.00262)
Age of MEP	0.002 (0.002)	-0.00422* (0.00251)
Party Switcher	0.016 (0.119)	-0.113 (0.127)
Constant	0.349* (0.177)	0.0466 (0.179)
Observations	362	362
R-squared	0.270	0.402

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 20: Congruence and Party Organization Across Policy Areas

VARIABLES	(3) Economic Policy	(4) Foreign Policy	(5) Employment Policy
Centralized Candidate Selection	0.088 (0.057)	0.622*** (0.079)	-0.190* (0.100)
Inclusive Leadership	0.113 (0.115)	0.610*** (0.128)	0.512*** (0.100)
Centralized Candidate*Inclusive Leadership	0.015 (0.134)	-0.684*** (0.150)	-0.150 (0.101)
Office Seeking Goals	0.118* (0.060)	0.269*** (0.075)	0.685*** (0.067)
Vote Seeking Goals	0.152*** (0.040)	0.070 (0.056)	-0.312*** (0.044)
Policy Seeking Goals	-0.219*** (0.044)	-0.155*** (0.049)	-0.110* (0.056)
National Experience Only	0.084* (0.049)	-0.001 (0.072)	0.027 (0.070)
European Experience Only	0.044 (0.054)	-0.012 (0.072)	-0.006 (0.054)
No Experience	0.075 (0.055)	0.157* (0.082)	-0.004 (0.068)
Open Electoral Lists	0.112* (0.063)	0.374*** (0.068)	0.216*** (0.072)
Federalism	0.122 (0.100)	0.005 (0.105)	-0.154** (0.076)
Bicameral Legislature	0.070 (0.062)	-0.154 (0.101)	0.161 (0.108)
Eurozone Membership	-0.325*** (0.081)	-0.484*** (0.099)	-0.143* (0.081)
Membership in EU in Years	0.007*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)
Age of MEP	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Party Switcher	-0.123 (0.117)	-0.348** (0.142)	0.055 (0.145)
Constant	0.357** (0.144)	0.023 (0.205)	0.325 (0.215)
Observations	362	360	361
R-squared	0.232	0.207	0.508

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### 5.6.2 The Effects of Inclusive Leadership on Congruence

The relationship between inclusive leadership and congruence reported in Tables 19 and 20 suggest that including MEPs in party leadership is a powerful tool for influencing legislator behavior only when used as a compliment to centralized selection. In both the models for legislative and non-legislative acts, the unique effect of inclusive leadership is positive, decreasing congruence by 17.1% and 9.3% respectively. These effects are also robust across most policy areas, increasing inverse congruence by 32.1% in foreign policy and 23.6% in employment policy. Similar to the results described above, the effect is not significant in economic policy. These results do not provide support for  $H_2$ , which hypothesized that the inclusion of MEPs in party leadership should increase MEP congruence. However, if the effects of inclusive leadership are examined in parties that also exercise centralized selection, the effect does have the hypothesized effect in non-legislative acts and foreign policy, increasing congruence by 9.3% and 4% respectively. This suggests that the impact of inclusive behavior is again conditional on both the selection method used by parties and the type of legislative activity in which the MEP is participating.

### 5.6.3 The Effects of Electoral Goals on Congruence

Not only are electoral goals significant predictors of the type of politicians a national party will choose to send to the EP, as shown in Chapter 4, they are also strong predictors of MEP behavior. The results reported in Tables 19 and 20 show that policy seeking significantly reduces inverse congruence, providing evidence that MEPs from policy seeking parties tend to be more congruent than those that are not. When voting on legislative acts (1), MEPs from policy seeking parties are 9.2% more congruent than MEPs from parties without policy seeking goals. The relationship between policy seeking and inverse congruence is also negative in economic policy, foreign policy, and employment policy, decreasing this measure by 16.1%, 8.1%, and 5% respectively. In contrast, MEPs from office seeking parties are about 19.3% less congruent when voting on legislative acts, 14% less congruent when voting on non-legislative acts, and 8.7%, 14.1%, 31.6% less congruent across the three policy areas respectively. These results provide evidence in support of  $H_3$ , which hypothesized that MEPs from policy seeking

parties are more congruent than their non-policy seeking peers. The effect of vote seeking remains ambiguous, appearing significant in some models, but with inconsistent effects. Taken together, these results suggest that electoral goals are important determinants of legislator behavior. In supporting the theoretical hypothesis on goals of the this chapter ( $H_3$ ), it appears the only MEPs who deliver on actual congruent policy are those in policy seeking parties.<sup>13</sup>

#### 5.6.4 Individuals and Congruence

One disappointing result of the analysis is the lack of evidence in support of  $H_4$ , which hypothesized that nationally ambitious politicians should be more congruent with their national parties than their European-ambitious peers because they seek to please their national parties to return to the national arena. The results of the analysis show that this national ambition, measured by proxy through national experience has no effect on congruence. National experience is only significantly related to inverse congruence in economic policy (at 90%). The indicator for European experience is significant and positively related to non-legislative voting and foreign policy and inexperience is significant and positively related to foreign policy only. Given that these effects are only significant in a small number of cases, there is not much of evidence to support  $H_4$ . Ambition may have no effect on behavior, as shown in the models, or it also could be that these measures are simply poor proxies for ambition. Perhaps we are unable to predict what a politician desires for their future career given their past experience. In order to incorporate alternative measures of individual characteristics, I also included age as a possible determinant of behavior. Following [Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard \(2009\)](#); [Pemstein, Meserve and Bernhard \(2015\)](#) who use age as a proxy for ambition, the variable was also included here but does not perform any better, suggesting that better proxies of ambition are necessary in future work.

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<sup>13</sup>The effects of electoral goals are also analyzed in models using mutually exclusive indicators of each goal combination. These results are reported in Tables 47 and 48 in Appendix C, Section C.5. The results provide further evidence in support of the analysis presented here.



### 5.6.5 National Institutional Effects

In order to continue examining, and control for, the effects of national institutional and electoral conditions on party and legislator behavior across member states, I have included several institution variables that are worth noting. Several of these variables provide evidence that institutional structures influence behavior by influencing levels of congruence across individuals. First, the indicator for open list electoral systems performs as we would expect. It is positively and significantly related to inverse congruence. MEPs elected in open list systems are less congruent than their closed list peers across the models. Similarly, those in states with bicameral legislatures are less congruent, although only in the aggregate measure of legislative and non-legislative acts. Finally, it is also worth noting that these models for legislative and non-legislative acts also provide evidence that MEPs in federal states are more congruent than their unitary peers, as shown by the negative and significant relationship with inverse congruence. In sum, national institutional structures are important for the MEP party relationship, supporting a theme that has been present throughout the analysis in this dissertation.

## 5.7 ALTERNATIVE TESTS AND EXTENSIONS

One of the contributions this dissertation seeks to make to the EP literature is extending our analysis of MEPs and their behavior to include analysis of the relationship between a MEP and his or her national party outside of the national, EP delegation. To date, most studies of legislative behavior in the EP (For example [Hix, Noury and Roland \(2007\)](#); [Coman \(2009\)](#); [Mühlbock \(2012\)](#)) have looked at cohesion among a national delegation in the EP or between a national delegation in the EP and the Council of Ministers. The analysis of congruence in this chapter used an innovative measure of the MEP-party relationship to determine how closely MEPs deliver on their national party's wishes at large, not just among themselves. However, in addition to the analysis of congruence, I also conducted two additional empirical tests of the effects of organization and electoral goals. First, I use analysis of divergence from

the national delegation in order to test if organization and electoral goals can create more unified groups within the EP. Not only does this serve as an alternative test of the theory, it can also serve as a direct complement to the existing literature. Second, I also extend the analysis to a more explicit measure of legislative output. Using data on the legislative activity of each MEP, I test how organization and electoral goals influence specific choices over the activities of each MEP.

### 5.7.1 Alternative Test: Within Group Divergence

In order to implement the alternative test, I construct a measure of group divergence to test the effect of organization and electoral goals in an alternative scenario. I measure the absolute value of each MEP's distance from their party mean across the subsets of ideal points I have constructed. The closer each MEP is to the mean, the "better," or less divergent, the MEP is within his or her delegation. This alternative is given by:

$$Divergence = |\text{Party Mean} - \text{Individual Ideal Point}| \quad (5.4)$$

Using divergence as the dependent variable, I estimate another series of linear regression models replicating the analysis above to examine the chapter's hypotheses in a new context. If organization and electoral goals affect behavior, I expect these relationship to hold when measuring divergence within delegations as well. These results are reported in Table 21 for legislative and non-legislative acts. This table suggest that electoral goals and organization are again significant predictors of behavior, but the effects denote slightly different dynamics. Complementing the results of the analysis of congruence, the effect of inclusive leadership, is significant and positively related to the distance of an MEP from the party delegation mean. Parties that include MEPs in their leadership have more divergent MEPs. These MEPs are roughly 6.4% further away from the mean than those in other parties. For non-legislative ideal points, the effect of organization is again significant and positive only for MEPs in parties with inclusive leadership. In these two models, vote seeking goals are also significant predictors across legislative procedures but office and policy seeking are only significant in non-legislative votes. While the significance and direction are as hypothesized

(i.e. policy seeking decreases divergence from the group mean and office seeking increases it), the substantive effects are quite small, 2% and 4% respectively.

Table 22 reports the results for models of the three policy areas. In these model the effects described above carry through, inclusive leadership is again a significant and positive predictor of individual divergence from the group. Including MEPs in the leadership increases divergence by 10.6%, 14%, and 19.7% in economic policy, foreign policy, and employment policy. The effects of electoral goals are also significant and mimic the results found in the congruence analysis, albeit with the addition of significant vote seeking goals. In this case the hypothesis that policy seeking leads to increased congruence is supported if we consider divergence from the group to be an alternative measure. Policy seeking decreases the distance from the mean by about 5% in foreign policy and 4.2% in employment policy, the two policy areas where this effect is significant. Overall, party organization and electoral goals again have significant effects on individual MEP behavior under a variety of conditions.

Table 21: Individual Divergence from Group Across Legislative Procedures

VARIABLES	(1) Legislative Acts	(2) Non Legislative Acts
Centralized Candidate Selection	0.013 (0.032)	-0.056 (0.037)
Inclusive Leadership	0.109*** (0.040)	-0.055* (0.028)
Centralized Candidate Selection*Inclusive Leadership	-0.031 (0.043)	-0.004 (0.039)
Office Seeking Goals	0.037 (0.026)	0.051** (0.025)
Vote Seeking Goals	0.094*** (0.019)	-0.041*** (0.013)
Policy Seeking Goals	-0.004 (0.029)	-0.033** (0.017)
National Experience Only	0.039 (0.036)	0.033 (0.023)
European Experience Only	-0.003 (0.028)	0.015 (0.019)
No Experience	-0.006 (0.022)	0.075** (0.030)
Open Electoral Lists	0.070** (0.029)	-0.006 (0.021)
Federalism	-0.003 (0.028)	-0.068*** (0.024)
Bicameral Legislature	-0.136*** (0.045)	0.020 (0.035)
Eurozone Membership	-0.022 (0.028)	0.107*** (0.029)
Membership in EU in Years	0.004*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Age of MEP	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Party Switcher	-0.016 (0.047)	-0.036 (0.045)
Constant	-0.109 (0.074)	0.122** (0.056)
Observations	367	367
R-squared	0.164	0.215

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Table 22: Individual Divergence from Group Across Policy Areas

VARIABLES	(3) Economic policy	(4) Foreign Policy	(5) Employment Policy
Centralized Candidate Selection	0.056 (0.038)	0.041 (0.032)	-0.049 (0.037)
Inclusive Leadership	0.149*** (0.043)	0.271*** (0.051)	0.336*** (0.052)
Centralized Candidate Selection*Inclusive Leadership	-0.002 (0.046)	-0.075 (0.050)	-0.147*** (0.051)
Office Seeking Goals	0.072** (0.028)	0.109*** (0.033)	0.192*** (0.035)
Vote Seeking Goals	0.070*** (0.019)	0.144*** (0.025)	0.070*** (0.026)
Policy Seeking Goals	-0.008 (0.028)	-0.085*** (0.026)	-0.083*** (0.025)
National Experience Only	0.014 (0.035)	-0.027 (0.042)	0.035 (0.033)
European Experience Only	0.013 (0.028)	-0.070** (0.030)	-0.051 (0.033)
No Experience	0.007 (0.034)	0.000 (0.036)	-0.013 (0.040)
Open Electoral Lists	0.148*** (0.037)	0.167*** (0.044)	0.210*** (0.038)
Federalism	-0.035 (0.039)	0.010 (0.040)	-0.107*** (0.039)
Bicameral Legislature	-0.089* (0.052)	-0.197*** (0.060)	-0.172*** (0.040)
Eurozone Membership	0.013 (0.042)	-0.051 (0.039)	0.116*** (0.032)
Membership in EU in Years	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Age of MEP	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Party Switcher	-0.090 (0.058)	-0.123 (0.087)	-0.005 (0.072)
Constant	-0.287*** (0.070)	-0.200** (0.097)	-0.339*** (0.093)
Observations	367	365	366
R-squared	0.189	0.273	0.350

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

### 5.7.2 Extension: Legislative Effort

To test the impact of organization even further, I also model the effect of organization and electoral goals on individual legislative activity. A natural extension of the theory presented here is to extend the hypotheses to a measure of legislative effort and test whether party organization and party goals influence the amount of, and type of, work a legislator performs in the EP. Representation through voting is just one way that a legislator can impact policy. Legislators can also actively shape policy through committee work, the drafting of legislation, and shaping debate, etc. In the EP there are many channels to influence policy through parliamentary activities. Testing influence on policy is a difficult task but I extend the analysis here to test a simple model of effort and how party organization and goals may encourage or discourage MEPs to work more or less visibly. Visible demonstrations of opinions and work are also informational signals to parties and peers, so I construct models that test the effect of organization and goals across the total effort observed for a legislator. This effort is defined as the number of activities recorded in the log of parliamentary activities for each individual MEP. This includes each individuals' record of public speeches in plenary, participation on the proposal of motions for resolutions, submission of written declarations, and parliamentary questions.<sup>14</sup>

The results of the models, estimated using a Poisson maximum likelihood regression, are reported in Table 23.<sup>15</sup> These models are consistent with the results of the congruence analysis and show that candidate selection methods have a positive impact on the number of activities a MEP chooses to participate in, but that the composition of party leadership does not. While the table reports the marginal effects, the expected count of total activities is presented in Figure 14. This figure shows that an MEP in a party with centralized selection will complete roughly 107 more activities than their non-centrally selected peers.<sup>16</sup> The

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<sup>14</sup>While work within committees as a rapporteur is argued to be some of the most influential work in the EP (Ringe 2010), I opted not to include these activities due to the selection process for these roles. Because rapporteurs are assigned strategically through the EPGs, the likelihood that each individual would have this opportunity is not equal (Daniel 2013).

<sup>15</sup>The distribution of the data (count) does not allow for simple linear regression, therefore a Poisson distribution is assumed, a maximum likelihood model estimated, and marginal effects are reported. The model is run on the sample of 367 legislators whose parties include mention of the EP elections and data on parliamentary activity was available.

<sup>16</sup>This interpretation is for those parties with central selection only (i.e. Centralized Selec-

Table 23: Poisson Model with Marginal Effects for Legislative Effort and Party Organization

VARIABLES	(1) Total Effort <sup>†</sup>	(2) Speeches	(3) Motions for Resolutions	(4) Written Declarations	(5) Parliamentary Questions
Centralized Selection	122.010* (71.703)	40.393 (41.456)	27.487** (11.167)	-0.274 (0.473)	59.802** (23.872)
Inclusive Leadership	81.932 (101.017)	13.265 (62.508)	8.279 (11.401)	0.009 (0.398)	73.319** (34.537)
Centralized Selection*Inclusive Leadership	-85.340 (127.813)	-0.399 (81.106)	-11.445 (12.597)	0.773 (0.665)	-96.442** (42.316)
Office Seeking	90.622** (42.616)	96.306*** (29.714)	1.852 (6.881)	-0.326 (0.215)	-3.544 (14.235)
Vote Seeking	76.966** (32.190)	59.797*** (21.401)	-4.799 (4.984)	-0.394** (0.169)	22.427** (10.226)
Policy Seeking	52.196* (31.451)	25.227 (21.220)	3.965 (5.754)	0.019 (0.188)	11.220 (11.107)
National Experience Only	-45.869 (41.516)	-34.548 (22.417)	-15.107*** (5.575)	0.032 (0.319)	3.882 (17.599)
European Experience Only	-34.832 (34.576)	-28.079 (22.062)	2.595 (7.901)	-0.140 (0.244)	-10.832 (11.181)
No Experience	-16.156 (37.831)	-7.903 (23.455)	-9.526 (6.381)	-0.322 (0.224)	-0.277 (15.881)
Open Electoral Lists	51.516 (59.136)	-4.398 (34.838)	14.566* (8.606)	-0.346 (0.455)	52.957** (23.452)
Federalism	-141.323** (56.948)	-74.086** (33.454)	6.068 (9.512)	-0.685** (0.346)	-64.409*** (18.171)
Bicameral Legislature	-393.971*** (124.963)	-272.542*** (83.436)	22.532*** (4.471)	0.382 (0.395)	-96.904* (51.400)
European Membership	-77.880 (113.354)	-45.609 (66.641)	-22.461 (14.184)	0.672 (0.553)	-12.649 (39.276)
Membership in Years	3.143 (2.709)	0.756 (1.536)	0.427 (0.286)	-0.006 (0.014)	1.675* (0.984)
Party Switcher	125.871 (91.190)	77.397 (63.450)	-6.350 (8.726)	0.200 (0.372)	51.407 (36.217)
Age	-6.075*** (1.297)	-3.220*** (0.745)	-0.340 (0.226)	-0.041** (0.021)	-1.890*** (0.526)
Observations	367	367	367	367	367
Wald chi2	131.7	186.8	29.55	22.12	114.4
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.0205	0.139	0.000

<sup>†</sup>Total effort does not include the writing of reports or opinions since these are strategically assigned and each MEP does not have an equal opportunity to partake in this type of work

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

effect of electoral goals is also shown in this model. Those in office and vote seeking parties participate in more total activities than policy seekers or those with no goals. As models 1 and 2 show, the majority of these activities are in the form of speeches, which are the most visible activity in which MEPs can participate. Figure 15 also shows that MEPs from office seeking parties are predicted to perform about 67 more activities than those from non office seeking parties (Inclusion=0).

seeking parties. MEPs from vote seeking parties are predicted to perform about 41 more activities than those in non-vote seeking parties. Overall, it is clear that party organization and electoral goals impact the legislative activities of their members.




Figure 14: Expected Value of Total Effort and Organization




Figure 15: Expected Value of Total Effort and Goals



## 5.8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The results presented in this chapter illustrate an important relationship between party organization, party electoral goals, and MEP behavior. These results provide evidence for hypotheses  $H_1$  and  $H_2$ , which predicted centralization will increase congruence in selection and supervision respectively. However, supervision appears to be powerful only when utilized simultaneously with centralized selection. The results also support  $H_3$ , which predicted that policy seeking will increase congruence among MEPs and their parties. Unfortunately, the results provide little support for  $H_4$ , which hypothesized that nationally ambitious politicians will exhibit less congruent behavior than those that are new or experienced in Europe.

The conclusions of this chapter make two main contributions to the current literature on party politics in the EP. First, the results across the two legislative procedures and three policy areas, in both the calculation of the individual ideal points and the models of congruence, support the authors who argue that we cannot treat all pieces of legislation in the EP as equal (Carruba et al. 2006; Lauderdale 2010). Significant substantive differences exist across legislative behavior that is conditional on both the type of legislation (consequential vs. inconsequential) and the policy area of the legislation. The centralization of organization increases congruence at a higher rate when MEPs are voting on consequential legislation (legislative acts) than on inconsequential legislation. Second, the analysis agrees with the current state of the literature on national party influence (Coman 2009; Hix and Marsh 2007; Hix, Noury and Roland 2005), determining that national parties are in fact influential in their MEPs behavior. However, it also extends our understanding of this relationship by highlighting the conditional nature of national party influence. Providing further evidence for the argument set forth by Coman (2009), the results suggest that variation in party types drives variation in the relationship between parties and their MEPs. In addition to variation in national party influence with respect to the electoral goals of parties, the analysis also highlights important differences across electoral systems and member state institutions, a common theme throughout the dissertation.

The results of the empirical tests reported here do allow for some interesting conclusions with respect to representation in the EU through the EP. If we assess the overall impact of the

results, it is clear that representation is not equal across parties nor is it equal across policy areas. The strategic incentives created through the electoral and party system conditions across the EU create different incentives for behavior in both parties and individuals. Some parties are organized to encourage more policy congruence between their national preferences through their treatment of MEPs, while others are not. This gives us cause to think about the way we approach questions of democratic legitimacy more broadly. Perhaps shifting our approach in the assessment of democracy to the examination of differences across policy areas and member states can provide more insight into how, when, or why the EU appears more democratic in some instances than others.

By modeling the relationship between party organization and legislative behavior, I sought to investigate whether or not political parties have created mechanisms for the selection and supervision of their MEPs that may be able to provide accountability in the EU when citizen accountability is lacking. It appears that centralized decision making with respect to candidate selection helps to ensure more accurate representation of national interests through the use of this ex-ante mechanism. However, it also appears that national parties do not have a strong internal accountability mechanism if it is not present at the time of candidate selection, even when these MEPs are included in their leadership.

## 6.0 CONCLUSION

Encouraging legislator behavior compatible with party interests in legislative institutions is an essential skill for effective party representation. Understanding how some parties are able to successfully encourage desirable behavior is critical for the understanding of representation in democratic societies. One way parties are able to structure behavior is by organizing to create the correct incentives for their members serving in government institutions. The organization of power within political parties creates incentives for members to be more or less loyal given their individual goals and the goals of the party. For this dissertation, the EP provided a unique laboratory in which to observe legislator behavior under a variety of conditions created by variation across party organizations and national institutions. Situated between broad cross-national party studies and narrow, single institution, country studies, this research uses the opportunity created by the structure of the EP to approach party organization and its consequences in a novel way.

### 6.1 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION

In this dissertation, I provide a unique way of comparing and contrasting the relationship between national parties and MEPs. I theorized the relationship is structured by three factors: the organization of parties with respect to selecting and supervising MEPs, the electoral goals of parties, and the goal of the individual legislator. National institutions and electoral experience shape organization within a party, which determines the power relationship between MEPS and their national party leaders. Parties that centralize selection are better able to control their legislators because they are better able to select appropriate

candidates for office and have greater control over these candidates and their political futures. Similarly, parties that incorporate legislators into their executive leadership increase the ease of communication between the EP and the party which increases both understanding of what the party wants from the EP and what the MEP can, and will, do in the legislative process. What the party wants is determined in part by their electoral goals.

Parties have office seeking, vote seeking, and policy seeking goals which are determined by their experience in national elections. Office seeking parties maximize the number of party members that they can place in elected office. In European elections, parties will have office seeking goals if they have limited opportunities at the national level. The limits on opportunity could be caused by a recent electoral loss at the national level or a history of little representation entirely. I theorized that when parties have just lost an election, they may seek to place otherwise "national" politicians in the EP so that they can continue to hold office. Alternatively, they may place political newcomers in office in order to distance themselves from a recent, but unsuccessful, national campaign. The results of the analysis show that this second scenario is much more likely in the EP and office seeking goals predict the selection of new politicians for the EP.

In contrast to office seeking parties, vote seeking parties simply wish to maximize the number of votes they receive in an election. While many scholars would argue vote seeking is only an instrumental goal held as a means to achieve other office or policy goals (Strom 1990), vote seeking in European elections can be advantageous to two types of parties. First, parties in the majority and/or governing at the national level may be vote seeking (even without office or policy goals ) because they seek to "win" the election. Given the second order nature of elections, maximizing the amount of votes won by the majority can provide valuable leverage for the party to continue governing with the perceived will of the people. Second, parties that serve as the main opposition may gain domestically by maximizing votes in European elections. Maximizing votes and winning more than the ruling party or coalition provides leverage for this party to delegitimize the status quo government and provides a protest option for dissatisfied voters. In either case, these vote seeking parties will choose to nominate candidates that are well known nationally and will attract voters. Politicians with mostly national experience will serve these parties in the EP.

Policy seeking parties wish to change public policy to reflect their ideological and policy preferences. Nearly all national parties will have policy goals at the national level, but this is not so clear at the European level. National parties have several avenues through which to pursue policy, even at the European level, which makes the concentrated effort necessary to effectively legislate in the EP unattractive to some parties. Those that will pursue their goals through the EP are those that are committed to policy changes in areas that are largely the purview of the EP and the Council of Ministers (i.e. fisheries, the environment, single market issues, etc.) or hold very strong view toward European integration. These parties will nominate European ambition politicians that may or may not have experience, but will likely not have had long national careers.

The final party of the theory argued that individual goals, either those based on a national career or those hoping to achieve prominence in the EP, will effect the choices legislators make in the EP and the way they view their role in their party. I argued, along with the literature on career ambition in the EP (see [Pemstein, Meserve and Bernhard \(2015\)](#)) that EP ambitious politicians will cater to their European party groups and their EP peers more than the preferences of their national parties in order to advance their career in the EP. Nationally ambitious politicians wish to return to national politics so they will be better agents for their national party in order to increase the likelihood the party will nominate them for advanced position in their national legislature or government. I hypothesized that centralized parties choosing nationally ambitious politicians will experience highest level of congruence. However, in contrast to the previous literature, I find no difference across politician types.

## **6.2 MEPS AND THEIR NATIONAL PARTIES**

The results of this dissertation suggest legislator behavior in the EP is shaped in part by the way parties treat their legislators and by the goals of parties for European elections. National parties in the EU develop both their organizational structure and political goals for European elections from their experiences at the national level. Complementing existing

research on the democratic deficit, this research reinforces how national, not European, political calculus can determine both the choice for who serves in the EP and the behavior of these chosen MEPs once in office. When organizing the structure of control over EP candidates and MEPs, national governing and party institutions are the most powerful predictors or centralization (or not) at the EP level. National parties that centralize their selection processes for candidates at the national level will do so for European elections. The probability of centralized candidate selection for European elections is also highest in countries that are newer, unitary, member states in the Eurozone. These types of states are also more likely to have parties that include at least one MEP in their leadership, thereby also centralizing the supervision of their MEPs. The patterns across member states and parties with respect to party organization for the EP reinforces the strong role of national politics in the EP.

In addition to party organization, Chapter 4 shows how national politics also play a significant role in determining who is selected to serve national parties in the EP. When parties think strategically about their goals in European elections, national politics are a strong determinant of what kind of politician is chosen to represent that party. Vote seeking parties seek to win the European election. Office seeking parties want to distance themselves of recent national electoral defeat or train new politicians, while policy seeking parties may wish to create an entirely separate class of European politicians. After empirically defining European electoral goals in terms of national political strategies, I found that office and policy seeking parties are more likely to choose new and inexperienced politicians while vote seeking parties are likely to choose known national politicians and incumbents. The results of Chapter 4 continue to support the claim that European elections are second-order national elections by showing how electoral strategies are the result of national electoral experiences. The chapter concludes that candidate selection choices are the result of national electoral politics.

While the role of national political influence in EP elections and legislation is a common theme throughout the dissertation, Chapter 5 combines the analysis of the previous chapters to investigate legislative behavior. The results reinforce the role of national political environment but highlighting the important consequences of party choices over organization. Parties that choose to centralized candidate selection are better able to enforce congruence

among their MEPs. This effect is multiplied if parties choose to combine centralized selection with the inclusion of MEPs in their leadership. The choice to simultaneously exercise control over selection and actively supervise MEPs yields behavioral rewards in the EP legislative process. However, if parties choose only to include MEPs in their leadership, the opposite effect ensues. MEPs in leadership that are not centrally selected are more bold in their behavior in the EP and are less congruent than their peers. The chapter also finds that MEPs in office seeking parties are less congruent than their policy seeking peers, suggesting that the absence of any policy goals deters MEPs from providing congruent behavior. In sum, the results of the dissertation sheds light on the way different strategic incentives are created by the electoral and party system conditions national parties face, which creates variation in the behavioral incentives of their MEPs. However, the way a party organizes control over its MEPs can significantly effect the MEP-party relationship.

### 6.3 BROADER IMPACT

This dissertation contributes to the empirical and theoretical study of parties, legislators, and legislatures by demonstrating how it is crucial to consider the goals and organization of a political party when interpreting legislator behavior. The analysis of the dissertation also contribute to the broader party literature by demonstrating the consequences of party organization and electoral goals across a variety of conditions. The empirical measurement and categorization of the treatment of MEPs across several parties participating in the EP provides for a cross-national analyzes of the consequences of party choices across many institutional and electoral conditions. The data collected from party statutes and aggregated for the purpose of studying legislative behavior in the EP provides a more cross-national, comparative study than the literature that has been restricted to one or two country studies (e.g. [Frech \(2016\)](#); [Kovár and Kovár \(2013\)](#); [Lundell \(2004\)](#)). Testing the effect of organization on legislator behavior gives us the ability to observe variation across parties and member states in the EU in terms of the level of accountability their internal structures provide. In addition, the separation of MEP voting behavior across legislation types and policy areas,

along with variation in outcomes in the analysis, demonstrates an important alternative way to examine legislative behavior. Taken together, these two empirical characteristics of the dissertation suggest that instead of continuing to study legislative behavior within the EP in a “one size fits all” manner, where strategic behavior is expected to be universal across all MEPs and parties, we should begin look at the incentives created by national parties across a variety of external conditions.



**APPENDIX A**

**PARTY ORGANIZATION**

Table 24: Coded Statutes by Country

Country	Party	# of MEPs
Austria	Österreichische Volkspartei	6
	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs	5
Bulgaria	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	7
Czech Republic	Ob anská demokratická strana	9
France	Mouvement Démocrate	6
	Nouveau Centre	22
	Parti socialiste	16
	Partitu di a Nazione Corsa	15
Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	13
	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands	34
	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V.	7
	DIE LINKE.	7
	Freie Demokratische Partei	11
	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	22
Greece	Nea Demokratia	7
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	8
Hungary	Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség-Keresztény Demokrata Néppárt	14
Italy	Il Popolo della Libertà	27
	'Io amo l'Italia'	7
	Italia dei Valori - Lista Di Pietro	5
	Lega Nord	9
	Partito Democratico	22
Netherlands	Partij van de Arbeid	5
Poland	Platforma Obywatelska	24
	Prawo i Sprawiedliwo??	7
Portugal	Partido Social Democrata	8
	Partido Socialista	6
Romania	Partidul Democrat-Liberal	10
	Partidul National Liberal	5
Slovakia	SMER-Sociálna demokracia	5
Spain	Independent	23
Sweden	Arbetarepartiet- Socialdemokraterna	6
United Kingdom	Liberal Democrats Party	13
	United Kingdom Independence Party	11

Table 25: Parties with no Formal Organization of MEPs

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Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
GERB
Fidesz
La Gauche moderne
Panhellenic Socialist Movement
Partido Socialista
Partitu di a Nazione Corsa
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands

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Table 26:  $\chi^2$  Test of Association for Formal Organization of MEPs

Formal Organization	$\chi^2$	P-Value
Left Party	1.990	0.158
National Executive Selection	1.189	0.276
Bicameral Legislature	6.140	0.013**
Federalism	0.227	0.634
State Financing	0.275	0.600

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 27: European vs. National Candidate Selection

Country	Party	European Selection	National Selection	Agreement
<b>Austria</b>	ÖVP	Proposal by federal party chairman and federal party executive approval	Composition of federal list (Bundesrat) decided by federal executive committee on recommendation of federal chairman	Yes
	SPÖ	Composition of list decided by federal party council with consultation of regional and divisional organizations	Composition of federal list (Bundesrat) decided by party executive of each state, "land," with agreement of the state parliamentary party and consultation of the state women's organization	No
<b>Bulgaria</b>	GERB	No formal mention of European Elections	Mass election of candidates by members	No
<b>Croatia</b>	HDZ	Party presidency determines list	Party presidency determines list	Yes
	SDP	Candidate list decided by party president	Party President chooses only a portion of candidates on the list	No
<b>Czech Republic</b>	ČSSD	The central executive committee approves proposals for candidate to the EP	The central executive committee approves proposals for candidate to the Chamber of Deputies	Yes
	ODS	Local assembly proposal of candidates and regional assembly approval	Local assembly proposal of candidates and regional assembly approval	Yes
<b>France</b>	EE	Electoral lists for all external elections decided by ad hoc group	Electoral lists for all external elections decided by ad hoc group	Yes
	LGM	No Mention of MEP selection in statute but statute explicitly states all unassigned powers are subject to rules proposed by National Bureau	No Mention of MP selection in statute but statute explicitly states all unassigned powers are subject to rules proposed by National Bureau	Yes
	MoDem	Candidates for elections are determined by national party council	Candidates for elections are determined by national party council	Yes
	NC	National committee chaired by president of the party prepares list for EP elections and executive committee has final decision	National committee chaired by president of the party prepares list for national elections and executive committee has final decision	Yes
	PNC	The executive secretary has power to delegate the management of elections	The executive secretary has power to delegate the management of elections	Yes
	PR	The party bureau makes decisions on all candidate nominations	The party bureau makes decisions on all candidate nominations	Yes
	PS (France)	Candidates for elections are determined by national party council	Candidates for elections are determined by national party council	Yes
	UMP	Candidates for elections are determined by national party council	Candidates for elections are determined by national party council	Yes
<b>Germany</b>	CDU	Federal convention finalizes the list with a recommendation from the federal states (Länder)	Lists decided at constituency level assemblies	No
	CSU	Delegates from various groups and the party executive choose candidates	Delegates choose candidates	Yes
	Die Linke	Federal executive of the party determines the list of candidates	Länder executive determine candidates	No
	Bundis 90/Die Grüne	Not formally incorporated into statute but the party holds a national convention where members with support from their local/regional parties are allowed to compete for a spot on the list and	Unknown	N/A
	FDP	Meeting of national party congress votes on list	meeting of national party congress votes on list	Yes
	SPD	Not formally incorporated into the statute but the executive level of the party section the list	Determination of the list if done at the constituency level	No
<b>Greece</b>	PASOK	No mention MEPs in party statute	Central political committee decide	No
	ND	Candidates are chosen by the president of the party	Candidates are chosen by the president of the party	Yes
<b>Hungary</b>	Fidesz	No mention MEPs in party statute	No mention of parliamentary elections in statute	Yes

Table 28: European vs. National Candidate Selection Contd.

Country	Party	European Selection	National Selection	Agreement
<b>Italy</b>	IdV	The party bureau approves candidates for European elections	The party bureau approves candidates for national elections	Yes
	LN	The federal council determines composition of list	Each state council appoints a committee to construct the list for federal elections	No
	PD	The selection of candidates occurs with a primary or broad democratic consultation at every level	The selection of candidates occurs with a primary or broad democratic consultation at every level	Yes
	PDL	Candidate for European elections are established by the National President in consultation with the Bureau, and formalized by the National Political Secretary	Candidate for national elections are established by the National President in consultation with the Bureau, and formalized by the National Political Secretary	Yes
	UDC	Regional committee submits proposals to the national council for European Elections	Regional committee submits proposals to the national council for Parliamentary Elections	Yes
<b>Netherlands</b>	CDA	The party congress submits candidates for European elections	The party congress submits candidates for national elections	Yes
	PVV	The party is a professional election party and thus has no organization and no official members. The only member is the founder, Geert Wilders, and he makes all of the decisions	The party is a professional election party and thus has no organization and no official members. The only member is the founder, Geert Wilders, and he makes all of the decisions	Yes
<b>Poland</b>	PiS	The regional committees submit a list to the political committee for approval	The regional committees submit a list to the political committee for approval	Yes
	PO	Regional party submits lists to national council for approval	Regional party submits lists to national council for approval	Yes
<b>Portugal</b>	PSD	Many bodies can make proposals, national council approves	Many bodies can make proposals, national council approves	Yes
	PS	No mention of selection for European Elections	List is put forth by political committee and members vote	No
<b>Romania</b>	PD-L	The national bureau approves candidates for the European Parliament	The national bureau approves candidates for the national parliament	Yes
	PNL	The national party leaderships chooses candidates	The national party leaderships chooses candidates	Yes
	PSD-PC	The selection of candidates for the EP is approved by the executive committee, which is a larger and more representative body than the national permanent bureau	The selection of candidates for the senate and chamber of deputies is approved by the executive committee, which is a larger and more representative body than the national permanent bureau	Yes
<b>Slovakia</b>	Smer	National bureau approves list proposed by president	National bureau approves list proposed by president	Yes
<b>Spain</b>	PSOE	Federal Committee has final approval power	Federal Committee has final approval power	Yes
<b>Sweden</b>	S	Party executive chooses list for European Parliament	A nomination committee prepares elections	No
<b>UK</b>	Conservatives	Members of regional party vote on the list of approved candidates	Local constituencies choose candidates through selection panel	No
	Labour	A Regional board makes a list that is put to vote at the local level	Local constituency selects the list	No
	LibDems	Regional candidate committee prepares list of parliamentary candidates and eligible voters in regional constituency vote	State candidate committee of prepares list of parliamentary candidates and eligible voters in local constituency vote	No
	UKIP	Joint responsibility of region and national executive but the national executive has final say	Joint responsibility of constituency and national executive but the national executive has final say	No

Table 29: The Composition of Executive Leadership

		<b>MEPs in the Executive</b>	<b>Inclusive or Exclusive</b>
<b>Austria</b>	ÖVP	The head delegate serves in the federal party executive	Inclusive
	SPÖ	The federal executive is an elected body and does not automatically include a MEP nor is a MEP a member of the presidency	Exclusive
<b>Bulgaria</b>	GERB	The party executive committee is elected and does not automatically include a MEP	Exclusive
<b>Croatia</b>	HDZ	The presidency does not automatically include an MEP, certain other offices are automatically included as well as 10 additional members	Exclusive
	SDP	Members of the presidency are elected at the party congress so a MEP is not automatically included	Exclusive
<b>Czech Republic</b>	ČSSD	MEPs are included in the central executive committee (in an advisory capacity)	Inclusive
	ODS	The executive board does not include an MEP	Exclusive
<b>France</b>	EE	The executive board is elected by the congress. Only the national secretary, treasurer, and two spokesmen/women are automatically include	Exclusive
	LGM	The national bureau is elected on a proposal by the president, it does not automatically include an MEP	Exclusive
	MoDem	The president appoints 30 members and the national council approves, a MEP is not automatically included although a few offices are	Exclusive
	NC	The executive committee includes all MEPS	Inclusive
	PNC	The 12 members of the executive secretariat are elected by the congress and do not automatically include a MEP	Exclusive
	PR	The executive includes all MEPs	Inclusive
	PS (France)	The federal council and secretariat are elected and do not automatically include a MEP	Exclusive
	UMP	The High Authority of the Union is elected by the bureau on a proposal of the president, it does not automatically include a MEP	Exclusive
<b>Germany</b>	CDU	The federal board includes the president of the delegation to the EP and chairman of the EPP-ED group if they are a member of the CDU	Inclusive
	CSU	The party board includes the chairman of the CSU group in the EP.	Inclusive
	Die Linke	The party executive committee includes a representative of the parliamentary group of the EP	Inclusive
	Bundis 90/Die Grüne	The federal executive does not automatically include an MEP	Exclusive
	FDP	The federal board includes a member of the EP from the Liberal parliamentary group.	Inclusive
	SPD	The party executive includes a member responsible for the EU but does not explicitly state it is a MEP	Exclusive

Table 30: The Composition of Executive Leadership Contd.

		MEPs in the Executive	Inclusive or Exclusive
<b>Greece</b>	PASOK	The political council includes the party president and the secretary of the central policy committee along with 13 elected members but does not automatically include an MEP	Exclusive
	ND	The political council has 7 automatic members from party leadership and 14 elected members with the only requirement that 7 of these be parliamentary but no specific requirement for an MEP	Exclusive
<b>Hungary</b>	Fidesz	MEPs have only an advisory role in the leadership group	Exclusive
<b>Italy</b>	IdV	The bureau does not include an MEP	Exclusive
	LN	A representative of MEPs may participate but are not members of the federal council	Exclusive
	PD	The national secretariat is appointed by the national secretary and does not automatically include any party politicians	Exclusive
	PDL	The national council includes MEPs	Inclusive
	UDC	The national directorate includes the head of the EP delegation and the head of the delegation to the EPP	Inclusive
<b>Netherlands</b>	CDA	MEPs are not automatically included in the executive committee	Exclusive
	PVV	The leader, Geert Wilders, is the sole leader	Exclusive
<b>Poland</b>	PiS	MEPs are included in the Political Committee	Inclusive
	PO	MEPs are included in the national council	Inclusive
<b>Portugal</b>	PSD	The group coordinator for the EP is included in the national council	Inclusive
	PS (Portugal)	MEPs are not included in the national secretariat	Exclusive
<b>Romania</b>	PD-L	The leader of the EP delegation is included in the national permanent bureau	Inclusive
	PNL	The permanent delegation of the party congress leadership includes MEPs	Inclusive
	PSD-PC	The head delegate of the EP group is included in the permanent national bureau	Inclusive
<b>Slovakia</b>	Smer	MEPs are not automatically in the party leadership	Exclusive
<b>Spain</b>	PSOE	MEPs are not automatically included in the federal executive committee	Inclusive
<b>Sweden</b>	S	Members of the executive include in the party chair, party secretary, and five elected members so MEPs are not automatically included in the leadership	Exclusive
<b>UK</b>	CONS	The leader of the EP delegation is included in the party board	Inclusive
	Labour	In addition to executive officers the party board includes 6 elected members but MEPs are not automatically included	Exclusive
	LDP	The federal executive includes on MEP elected by the EP delegation	Inclusive
	UKIP	The leader of the EP delegation has the responsibility to select two MEPs to attend the executive council meetings	Inclusive

Table 31: Centralized Selection Logistic Regression with Country Random Effects

VARIABLES	(1) Selection Country Random Effects
Executive National Selection	3.144 (1.923)
Party Age	0.026* (0.013)
Relative Size of EP Delegation	7.625* (4.343)
Effective Number of Parties	-1.500*** (0.489)
State Election Financing	2.705* (1.626)
Federalism	-3.288*** (0.705)
Eurozone Member	6.991*** (2.641)
Membership (length in years)	-0.161*** (0.060)
Observations	45
Number of Countries	17
Wald chi2	9.010
Prob > chi2	0.341

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



Table 32: Inclusive Leadership Logistic Regression with Country Random Effects

VARIABLES	(1) Inclusion Country Random Effects
Party of the left	-1.519 (1.038)
Party Age	-0.002 (0.010)
Relative Size of EP Delegation	-0.748 (1.652)
Effective Number of Parties	-1.438* (0.862)
State Financing of Election	-1.882* (1.118)
Bicameral	4.708** (2.266)
Eurozone Member	2.463 (1.554)
Membership (length in years)	-0.068** (0.028)
Observations	45
Number of Countries	17
Wald chi2	6.617
Prob > chi2	0.579

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## APPENDIX B

### CANDIDATE SELECTION

#### B.1 ELECTORAL GOALS OF NATIONAL PARTIES

Table 33: Legislature Chambers in Election Data

Country	Chamber Name		Bicameralism Score
Austria	Nationalrat	National Council	2
Bulgaria	Narado Sabranie	National Assembly	1
Croatia	Sabor	Parliament	1
Czech Republic	Poslanecká sněmovna	Chamber of Deputies	2
France	Assemblée nationale	National Assembly	3
Germany	Bundestag	Parliament	4
Greece	Parliamet of the Hellenes	Parliament	1
Hungary	Országgyűlés	Diet	1
Ireland	Dáil Éireann	Lower House	2
Italy	Camera dei Deputati	Chamber of Deputies	3
Netherlands	Tweede Kamer	House of Representatives	3
Poland	Sejm	Lower House	3
Portugal	Assembleia da República	Parliament	1
Romania	Camera Deputaților	Chamber of Deputies	3
Slovakia	Národná rada	National Council	1
Spain	Congreso de los Diputados	Chamber of Deputies	3
Sweden	Riksdag	Legislature	1
United Kingdom	House of Commons	Lower House	2.5

Index of bicameralism according to Lijphart (1999)  
1 - unicameralism;  
2 - weak bicameralism (asymmetrical and congruent chambers);  
3 - medium strength bicameralism (asymmetrical and incongruent or symmetrical and congruent);  
4 - strong bicameralism (symmetrical and incongruent).  
Data and index wording from the Comparative Political Dataset III which was reproduced in Czesnik, Kotnarowski and Marowski (2010).

Table 34: Timing of National Elections Preceding June 2009 European Election

Country	Month	Year
Austria	September	2008
Bulgaria	June	2005
Croatia	November	2007
Czech Republic	June	2006
France	June	2007
Germany	September	2005
Greece	September	2007
Hungary	April	2006
Ireland	May	2007
Italy	April	2008
Netherlands	November	2006
Poland	October	2007
Portugal	February	2005
Romania	November	2008
Slovakia	June	2006
Spain	March	2008
Sweden	September	2006
United Kingdom	May	2005

Table 35: Change in Seat Share in National Elections Preceding June 2009 European Election

Country	Party	$\Delta$ in Seats	$\Delta$ in Seats %	Last Election	Second Election
Austria	Österreichische Volkspartei	-15	-22.7%	2008	2006
	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs	-11	-16.4%	2008	2006
Bulgaria	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	0	NA	2005	2001
Croatia	Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica	0	0.0%	2007	2003
	Socijaldemokratska Partija Hrvatska	22	64.7%	2007	2003
Czech Republic	Czeska strana socialne demokraticka	4	5.7%	2006	2002
	Obczanska demokraticka strana	23	39.7%	2006	2002
France	Europe Écologie (Les Verts)	NA	NA	2007	2002
	Mouvement Démocrate	0	NA	2007	2002
	Parti socialiste	46	32.9%	2007	2002
	Union pour un Mouvement Populaire	-44	-11.0%	2007	2002
Germany	Bundnis 90/Die Grunen	-4	-7.3%	2005	2002
	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands	-10	-5.3%	2005	2002
	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e. V.	-12	-20.7%	2005	2002
	DIE LINKE.	52	NA	2005	2002
	Freie Demokratische Partei	14	29.8%	2005	2002
	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	-29	-11.6%	2005	2002
Greece	Nea Demokratia	-13	-7.9%	2007	2004
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	-15	-12.8%	2007	2004
Hungary	Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség-Keresztény Demokrata Néppárt	-24	-12.8%	2006	2002
Ireland	Fine Gael Party	19	61.3%	2007	2002
Italy	Il Popolo della Libertà	0	NA	2008	2006
	Italia dei Valori - Lista Di Pietro	13	81.3%	2008	2006
	Lega Nord	34	130.8%	2008	2006
	Partito Democratico	246	NA	2008	2006
	Unione dei Democratici cristiani e dei Democratici di Centro	-3	-7.7%	2008	2006
Netherlands	Christen Democratisch Appèl	-3	-6.8%	2006	2003
	Partij van de Arbeid	-9	-21.4%	2006	2003
	Partij voor de Vrijheid	9	NA	2006	2003
Poland	Platforma Obywatelska	78	58.6%	2007	2002
	Polska Jest Najważniejsza	0	NA	2007	2002
	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	11	7.1%	2007	2002
	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	-2	-3.6%	2007	2002
	Solidarna Polska	0	NA	2007	2002
Portugal	Partido Social Democrata	-30	-28.6%	2005	2002
	Partido Socialista	25	26.0%	2005	2002
Romania	Partidul Democrat-Liberal	48	71.6%	2008	2004
	Partidul National Liberal	5	8.3%	2008	2004
	Partidul Social Democrat	-10	-8.1%	2008	2004
Slovakia	SMER-Sociálna demokracia	25	100.0%	2006	2002
Spain	Partido Popular	6	4.1%	2008	2004
	Partido Socialista Obrero Español	5	3.0%	2008	2004
Sweden	Arbetarepartiet- Socialdemokraterna	-14	-9.7%	2006	2002
United Kingdom	Conservative Party	32	19.3%	2005	2001
	Labour Party	-57	-13.8%	2005	2001
	Liberal Democrats Party	10	19.2%	2005	2001
	United Kingdom Independence Party	0	NA	2005	2001

Table 36: Percent of Party Supporters Interested in European Elections

Country	Party	Abb.	%
Austria	Österreichische Volkspartei	ÖVP	65.69
	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs	SPÖ	50.99
Bulgaria	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	GERB	0.00
Croatia	Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica	HDZ	-
	Socijaldemokratska Partija Hrvatske	SDP	-
Czech Republic	Česká strana sociálně demokratická	CSSD	30.43
	Ob anská demokratická strana	ODS	38.71
France	Europe Écologie	EE	57.14
	La Gauche moderne	LGM	50.91
	Mouvement Démocrate	MoDEM	61.7
	Nouveau Centre	NC	50.91
	Parti Radical	PR	50.91
	Parti socialiste	PS (France)	57.99
	Partitu di a Nazione Corsa	PNC	57.14
	Union pour un Mouvement Populaire	UMP	50.91
Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	B90/GR	62.75
	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands	CDU	57.29
	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V.	CSU	63.33
	DIE LINKE.	Die Linke	50.55
	Freie Demokratische Partei	FDP	37.97
	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	SPD	53.01
Greece	Nea Demokratia	ND	71.72
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	PASOK	70.08
Hungary	Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség-Keresztény Demokrata Néppárt	FIDESZ	58.06
Ireland	Fianna Fáil Party	FF	75.98
Italy	Il Popolo della Libertà	PDL	53.85
	Italia dei Valori - Lista Di Pietro	IdV	54.55
	Lega Nord	LN	48.84
	Partito Democratico	PD	62.5
	Unione dei Democratici cristiani e dei Democratici di Centro	UDC	54.76
Netherlands	Christen Democratisch Appèl	CDA	61.47
	Partij voor de Vrijheid	PVV	18.18
Poland	Platforma Obywatelska	PO	44.41
	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	PiS	36.25
	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	SLD-UP	40.00
Portugal	Partido Social Democrata	PSD	47.41
	Partido Socialista	PS (Portugal)	47.06
Romania	Partidul Democrat-Liberal	PD-L	76.44
	Partidul National Liberal	PNL	75.53
	Partidul Social Democrat	PSD-PC	68.81
Slovakia	SMER-Sociálna demokracia	Smer	46.45
Spain	Partido Popular	PP	59.78
	Partido Socialista Obrero Español	PSOE	53.16
Sweden	Arbetarepartiet- Socialdemokraterna	S	46.96
United Kingdom	Conservative Party	CON	42.67
	Labour Party	Labour	44.95
	Liberal Democrats Party	LDP	52.00
	United Kingdom Independence Party	UKIP	57.14

Min: 0% Max: 76.4% Mean: 53.85%  
75<sup>th</sup> Percentile = 61.47%

Table 37: Pro and Anti Integration Score from Manifestos

Country	Party	Abb.	Pro vs. Anti Integration	Absolute Distance from Mean
Austria	Österreichische Volkspartei	ÖVP	15.0	11.3
	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs	SPÖ	2.0	1.9
Bulgaria	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	GERB	1.3	2.6
Croatia	Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica	HDZ	.	.
	Socijaldemokratska Partija Hrvatske	SDP	.	.
Czech Republic	Česká strana sociálně demokratická	CSSD	5.6	1.7
	Ob anská demokratická strana	ODS	-2.8	6.7
France	Europe Écologie	EE	5.2	1.3
	La Gauche moderne	LGM	20.0	15.9
	Mouvement Démocrate	MoDEM	12.0	8.1
	Nouveau Centre	NC	20.0	15.9
	Parti Radical	PR	20.0	15.9
	Parti socialiste	PS (France)	4.7	0.8
	Partitu di a Nazione Corsa	PNC	5.2	1.3
	Union pour un Mouvement Populaire	UMP	20.0	15.9
Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	B90/GR	6.6	2.8
	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands	CDU	15.0	11.0
	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V.	CSU	3.3	0.5
	DIE LINKE.	Die Linke	0.2	3.6
	Freie Demokratische Partei	FDP	5.2	1.3
	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	SPD	11.0	6.9
Greece	Nea Demokratia	ND	11.0	7.5
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	PASOK	17.0	13.0
Hungary	Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség-Keresztény Demokrata Néppárt	FIDESZ	11.0	7.1
Ireland	Fianna Fáil Party	FF	9.3	5.4
Italy	Il Popolo della Libertà	PDL	4.4	0.5
	Italia dei Valori - Lista Di Pietro	IdV	0.0	3.9
	Lega Nord	LN	-3.6	7.5
	Partito Democratico	PD	13.0	9.2
	Unione dei Democratici cristiani e dei Democratici di Centro	UDC	0.0	3.9
Netherlands	Christen Democratisch Appèl	CDA	.	.
	Partij voor de Vrijheid	PVV	9.8	5.9
Poland	Platforma Obywatelska	PO	9.1	5.2
	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	PiS	6.3	2.4
	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	SLD-UP	6.7	2.9
Portugal	Partido Social Democrata	PSD	16.0	12.2
	Partido Socialista	PS (Portugal)	14.0	9.7
Romania	Partidul Democrat-Liberal	PD-L	18.0	14.5
	Partidul National Liberal	PNL	16.0	12.6
	Partidul Social Democrat	PSD-PC	.	.
Slovakia	SMER-Sociálna demokracia	Smer	-2.4	6.2
Spain	Partido Popular	PP	7.6	3.8
	Partido Socialista Obrero Español	PSOE	2.2	1.6
Sweden	Arbetspartiet- Socialdemokraterna	S	1.4	2.5
United Kingdom	Conservative Party	CON	-8.5	12.4
	Labour Party	Labour	9.4	5.5
	Liberal Democrats Party	LDP	18.0	13.7
	United Kingdom Independence Party	UKIP	-77.0	80.8

Min: -77.0 Max: 20.0 Mean: 3.87

75<sup>th</sup> percentile for absolute distance from mean = 11.11

Table 38: Party Classification by Goals

Country	Party	Abb.	Office Seeking	Vote Seeking	Policy Seeking
Austria	Österreichische Volkspartei	ÖVP	+	++	++
	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs	SPÖ	+	+	-
Bulgaria	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	GERB	+	-	-
Czech Republic	Česká strana sociálně demokratická	CSSD	-	+	-
	Ob anská demokratická strana	ODS	-	+	-
France	Europe Écologie	EE	+	-	-
	La Gauche moderne	LGM	+	+	+
	Mouvement Démocrate	MoDEM	+	-	+
	Nouveau Centre	NC	+	+	+
	Parti Radical	PR	+	+	+
	Parti socialiste	PS (France)	-	+	-
	Partitu di a Nazione Corsa	PNC	+	-	-
	Union pour un Mouvement Populaire	UMP	+	+	+
Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	B90/GR	-	-	+
	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands	CDU	-	++	-
	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e. V.	CSU	+	++	+
	DIE LINKE.	Die Linke	-	-	-
	Freie Demokratische Partei	FDP	-	-	-
	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	SPD	+	+	-
Greece	Nea Demokratía	ND	-	+	+
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	PASOK	+	+	++
Hungary	Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség-Keresztény Demokrata Néppárt	FIDESZ	+	+	-
	Fianna Fáil Party	FF	-	++	+
Italy	Il Popolo della Libertà	PDL	+	+	-
	Italia dei Valori - Lista Di Pietro	IdV	-	-	-
	Lega Nord	LN	-	+	-
	Partito Democratico	PD	-	+	+
	Unione dei Democratici cristiani e dei Democratici di Centro	UDC	-	-	-

Country	Party	Abb.	Office Seeking	Vote Seeking	Policy Seeking
Netherlands	Christen Democratisch Appèl	CDA	-	+	++
	Partij voor de Vrijheid	PVV	-	+	-
Poland	Platforma Obywatelska	PO	-	+	-
	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	PiS	-	+	-
	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	SLD-UP	-	-	-
Portugal	Partido Social Democrata	PSD	+	+	+
	Partido Socialista	PS (Portugal)	-	+	-
Romania	Partidul Democrat-Liberal	PD-L	-	+	++
	Partidul National Liberal	PNL	-	-	++
	Partidul Social Democrat	PSD-PC	-	++	++
Slovakia	SMER-Socialna demokracia	Smer	-	+	-
Spain	Partido Popular	PP	-	+	-
	Partido Socialista Obrero Español	PSOE	-	+	-
Sweden	Arbetarepartiet- Socialdemokraterna	S	-	-	-
United Kingdom	Conservative Party	CON	-	+	+
	Labour Party	Labour	+	+	-
	Liberal Democrats Party	LDP	-	-	+
	United Kingdom Independence Party	UKIP	+	-	+






Figure 16: Party Goals in Western Europe




Figure 17: Party Goals in Eastern Europe

## B.2 PARTY GOALS AND SELECTION




Figure 18: Predicted Probability of Type in Office and Policy Seeking Parties




Figure 19: Predicted Probability of Type in Office and Vote Seeking Parties




Figure 20: Predicted Probability of Type in Policy and Vote Seeking Parties

Table 39: Goals by Parts and National Politician Type

VARIABLES		(1) Regional and National Gov	(2) No Gov Exp	(3) National Party Experience	(4) No Party Exp
Office Seeking	Experienced Significant Loss	-0.141** (0.057)	0.074* (0.043)	-0.038 (0.066)	0.048 (0.043)
Vote Seeking	Majority Party	0.136** (0.069)	-0.120*** (0.040)	-0.095 (0.123)	-0.106 (0.068)
	Minority Party	0.123* (0.064)	-0.088 (0.054)	-0.099 (0.095)	-0.086** (0.040)
Policy Seeking	EU Salient	0.034 (0.076)	-0.026 (0.042)	0.037 (0.106)	0.094 (0.058)
	Strong Pro or Anti Sentiment	-0.149*** (0.040)	0.119* (0.063)	0.014 (0.082)	0.036 (0.050)
	Party Age	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)
	Time since last election	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.004** (0.002)
	Bicameral	-0.129 (0.112)	0.022 (0.082)	0.017 (0.121)	0.098 (0.072)
	Federalism	0.002 (0.076)	0.024 (0.034)	-0.081 (0.094)	-0.206*** (0.057)
	Effective Number of Parties	-0.046 (0.029)	0.027 (0.017)	0.015 (0.039)	-0.048 (0.041)
	Eurozone	0.005 (0.084)	0.077** (0.038)	0.076 (0.072)	-0.037 (0.053)
	Advanced Education	0.037 (0.060)	-0.026 (0.037)	0.010 (0.041)	-0.027 (0.034)
	Age	0.013*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.004** (0.002)
	Incumbent	-0.000 (0.041)		0.138*** (0.050)	
	Observations	514	514	514	514
	Pseudo R-sqaure	0.130	0.140	0.0463	0.0624
	Wald chi2(12)	754.7	508.0	250.6	300.9
	Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Std. Err adjusted for 18 clusters  
 Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 40: Goals by Parts and European or New Politician Type

VARIABLES		(5)	(6)	(6)
		Incumbent	EP Party Exp	New
Office Seeking	Experienced Significant Loss	-0.001 (0.039)	-0.038 (0.049)	0.057*** (0.021)
Vote Seeking	Majority Minority Party	0.126* (0.069)	0.069 (0.052)	-0.072** (0.030)
	Government Party	0.101 (0.062)	0.093* (0.055)	-0.030 (0.028)
Policy Seeking	EU Salient	0.033 (0.064)	-0.090 (0.079)	0.044 (0.034)
	Strong Pro or Anti Sentiment	-0.054 (0.057)	-0.026 (0.065)	0.042 (0.029)
	Party Age	0.001** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.000)
	Time since last election	0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)
	Bicameral	-0.002 (0.072)	-0.082 (0.092)	0.005 (0.044)
	Federalism	0.014 (0.054)	0.354*** (0.095)	-0.052* (0.031)
	Effective Number of Parties	-0.004 (0.020)	0.031 (0.021)	-0.012 (0.018)
	Eurozone	-0.128** (0.060)	-0.046 (0.051)	0.049*** (0.018)
	Advanced Education	0.030 (0.060)	-0.021 (0.024)	-0.023 (0.029)
	Age	0.016*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.005*** (0.001)
	Incumbent		0.273*** (0.041)	
	Observations	514	514	514
	Pseudo R-sqaure	0.0995	0.152	0.0715
	Wald chi2(12)	3025	719.2	872.5
	Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00

Std. Err adjusted for 18 clusters  
 Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## APPENDIX C

### ELECTORAL GOALS, ORGANIZATION, AND LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR

#### C.1 VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION

##### C.1.1 Dependent Variable: *IDEAL* Points

Modeling outcomes in the EP has been a highly contested area of analysis since the first appearance of NOMINATE scores. Several empirical studies have explored this relationship between the voting behavior of individual MEPs within and among the EPGs and their national parties (Hix and Lord 1997; Hix 1999; Hix, Noury and Roland 2007). However, measuring party discipline, influence, or party effect on voting is incredibly difficult. In fact, extracting the effect of party organization and power from individual behavior in voting is nearly impossible (Hix 2002). Empirical evidence has provided only controversial conclusions about the direct measure of party influence (Krehbiel 1993; Snyder and Groseclose 2000; Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart 2001; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2001; Snyder and Groseclose 2001). Several criticisms have been made against the empirical testing of party influence because of the difficulty of detangling the role of parties from ideology (Snyder and Groseclose 2000) and identifying instances of strategic party voting remains tricky (Denzau, Riker and Shepsle (1985)). The main problem constraining the measurement of party influence is the inability to accurately separate legislators' ideological preferences from party voting. Instead of attempting to derive and explore the mechanisms that induce party voting in individuals, this paper instead seeks account only for the distance between

an MEP and the calculated position of their national party taken from exogenous accounts of party preference.

The first step in the creation of the dependent variable is estimating several sets of distinctive ideal points from the available roll call data. This data provides the vote choices for each MEP (or their absence) on the set of roll-call votes between the beginning of the EP term in July 2009 and March 2013. It identifies every individual by a unique MEP identification number, and tracks membership in the EPGs (Hix, Noury and Roland 2006; Hix and Marsh 2007). This data set provides 802 MEPs and sets of votes from each of the EP's main committee; however, the data used includes a set of all legislative votes and all non-legislative votes, as well as all votes where the main policy areas are economic and monetary policy (*economic*), the foreign affairs and security policy (*foreign*), and the employment and social policy (*employment*). Ideal points were calculated for all committee areas however, not all areas experience a substantial amount of legislation that is necessary to construct reliable ideal points nor are they easily matched to manifesto data to connect the individual and party preferences. Total number of votes for each area is listed in Table 41.

The ideal points are calculated for each MEP using the IDEAL Bayesian estimation process (Clinton, Jackman and Rivers 2004). The MCMC simulation process first identifies prior values for the parameters  $\hat{\mu}$  and  $\hat{\sigma}$  for all roll call votes for all MEPs using Bayesian estimation and then repeats the process per its specification (Clinton, Jackman and Rivers 2004; Han 2007). The simulations then produce mean values of  $x$  along with their standard errors. These measures were estimated in one dimensions only with all contested (not unanimous) votes and MEPs voting less than 25 times removed and each simulation was run 10,000 times.



Table 41: Votes in the 7th EP Session by Committee

Committee	# of Votes
Agriculture and Rural Development	352
Budgets	488
Budgetary Control	295
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home affairs	254
Constitutional Affairs	80
Culture and Education	34
Development	64
Economic and Monetary Affairs	367
Employment and Social Affairs	167
Environment, Public Health, and Food Safety	391
Fisheries	148
Foreign Affairs	449
Women's Right and Gender Equality	143
Industry, Research, and Energy	177
Internal Market and Consumer Protection	56
International Trade	234
Legal Affairs	45
Petitions	12
Regional Development	70
Transport and Tourism	70

### C.1.2 Dependent Variable: Party Preference

As stated in the text, in order to construct the measures of preferences, the manifesto scores for several variables have been aggregated to produce preference scales for all parties. The creators of the manifesto project have categorized manifesto text into many different areas on the levels of local, regional, national, and global and have also indicated whether the particular coded statements are representative of leftist views or rightists views. I use these indicators of left and right to construct a left/right scale for preferences in external relations (foreign Policy), economic policy, and employment policy along with a general measure of left/right placement. The following example will illustrate how these measures were constructed.

The manifesto data uses a coding scheme that identifies rightist and leftist statements of a party. For example, when coding statements about the military that appear in a party's manifesto, positive statements are identified as rightist votes while negative statements are leftist votes. Similarly, negative statements on economic protectionism are considered rightist and positive statements are considered leftist. To create the right left index, the sum of rightist codes is subtracted from the sum of leftist codes, leaving a range of possible outcomes that rank parties from left to right. The data ranges from about -25 to 21 with Germany's Die Linke as the party at the farthest point left, Greece's Nea Demokratia at the furthest right, and the British Labour party at the median. This same process was used to construct the individual measures of foreign policy rankings, economic policy rankings, and employment policy ranking. The summary statistics are as follows:

Table 42: Policy Measures for Parties

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Right-Left Aggregate	-4.46	9.311	-24.63	20.18
Economic Policy	2.80	2.71	-4.05	11.33
Foreign Policy	-4.38	3.71	-12.54	7.84
Employment Policy	-1.98	2.68	-15.97	0.00

## C.2 INVERSE CONGRUENCE

Table 43: Mean Inverse Congruence by Party Across Legislation Type

Country	Party	Legislative Acts	Non-legislative Acts
Austria	Österreichische Volkspartei	0.3242	0.4088
	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs	0.5567	0.5015
Bulgaria	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	0.8363	0.1931
Czech Republic	Česká strana sociálně demokratická	0.1872	0.1444
	Ob anská demokratická strana	1.1531	0.2949
France	Europe Écologie	1.0590	3.0967
	La Gauche moderne	0.3828	0.8824
	Mouvement Démocrate	0.1163	0.5086
	Nouveau Centre	1.1674	0.9297
	Parti Radical	1.7710	1.0113
	Parti socialiste	0.4847	0.2515
	Partitu di a Nazione Corsa	1.0520	2.6973
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire	1.7587	0.9736	
Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	0.8041	2.3248
	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands	0.8717	0.0723
	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e. V.	0.6911	0.2797
	DIE LINKE.	0.9101	0.4673
	Freie Demokratische Partei	0.2272	0.0648
	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	0.5821	0.7204
Greece	Nea Demokratia	0.1370	0.7483
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	0.6372	0.5023
Hungary	Fidesz	1.0285	0.6846
Italy	Il Popolo della Libertà	1.1304	0.8226
	Italia dei Valori - Lista Di Pietro	1.1017	1.2641
	Lega Nord	1.0042	0.7036
	Partito Democratico	0.7323	0.6894
	Unione dei Democratici cristiani (UDC)	0.3510	0.2761
Netherlands	Partij voor de Vrijheid	1.5191	1.3913
Poland	Platforma Obywatelska	1.1022	0.3453
	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	0.5305	1.1640
	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	0.5820	0.2721
Portugal	Partido Social Democrata	0.6934	0.1888
	Partido Socialista	0.2272	0.1115
Romania	Partidul Democrat-Liberal	1.3823	0.3663
	Partidul National Liberal	0.1337	0.0600
Slovakia	SMER-Sociálna demokracia	0.6338	0.6012
Spain	Partido Popular	0.7404	0.1070
	Partido Socialista Obrero Español	0.5417	0.2902
Sweden	Arbetspartiet- Socialdemokraterna	0.4393	0.1518
United Kingdom	Conservative Party	0.7019	0.9249
	Labour Party	0.6784	0.2350
	Liberal Democrats Party	0.4566	0.3154
	United Kingdom Independence Party	2.2712	0.6789

Table 44: Mean Inverse Congruence by Party Across Policy Areas

Country	Party	Economic policy	Foreign Policy	Employment Policy
Austria	Österreichische Volkspartei	0.6809	0.7213	0.8041
	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs	0.8948	0.5641	0.3162
Bulgaria	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	1.2164	0.8113	0.4152
Czech Republic	Česká strana sociálně demokratická	0.7474	0.4131	0.4038
	Obanská demokratická strana	0.9286	0.8029	1.1177
France	Europe Écologie	0.8325	1.3545	1.4719
	La Gauche moderne	1.2160	0.2263	0.3249
	Mouvement Démocrate	0.2971	0.4947	0.5809
	Nouveau Centre	1.2078	0.5260	2.0209
	Parti Radical	0.4060	0.7753	1.6973
	Parti socialiste	1.0142	0.8303	0.1012
	Partitu di a Nazione Corsa	0.8045	1.3455	1.3889
	Union pour un Mouvement Populaire	0.9175	0.7743	1.6881
Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	0.7779	0.8663	1.2899
	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands	1.1714	0.9246	0.4681
	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V.	0.8446	0.8243	0.6159
	DIE LINKE.	1.5426	1.1693	0.7713
	Freie Demokratische Partei	0.6140	0.3356	1.0821
	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	0.8187	0.1492	0.8921
Greece	Nea Demokratia	0.1581	0.4333	0.1474
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	1.0033	0.6859	0.1855
Hungary	Fidesz	0.9668	1.4157	0.4834
Italy	Il Popolo della Libertà	1.0448	0.8771	1.4979
	Italia dei Valori - Lista Di Pietro	0.2163	1.5823	0.1898
	Lega Nord	0.9632	1.0613	0.1680
	Partito Democratico	0.7585	0.3844	0.2292
	Unione dei Democratici cristiani (UDC)	0.6013	0.8837	1.9983
Netherlands	Partij voor de Vrijheid	1.2742	1.0591	1.4111
Poland	Platforma Obywatelska	1.3087	1.6256	0.7600
	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	0.9461	0.3585	0.8093
	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	0.8257	0.0632	0.1961
Portugal	Partido Social Democrata	0.6334	0.9841	0.7592
	Partido Socialista	1.0391	0.3461	0.0663
Romania	Partidul Democrat-Liberal	1.2701	0.9108	1.1202
	Partidul National Liberal	0.3231	0.5405	0.8261
Slovakia	SMER-Sociálna demokracia	0.9699	0.7898	0.1385
Spain	Partido Popular	1.3384	0.8014	1.0357
	Partido Socialista Obrero Español	0.7592	0.2259	0.1067
Sweden	Arbetspartiet- Socialdemokraterna	0.7475	0.9823	0.0336
United Kingdom	Conservative Party	0.9078	0.9939	0.8399
	Labour Party	0.8014	0.3369	0.8693
	Liberal Democrats Party	0.4524	0.1827	1.0337
	United Kingdom Independence Party	1.4541	1.9605	1.9701

### C.3 ELECTORAL GOALS AND ORGANIZATION INTERACTIONS

Table 45: Interactive Effects of Electoral Goals and Party Organization: Full Model

VARIABLES	(1) Legislative acts	(2) Non-Legislative acts	(3) Economic Policy	(4) Foreign Policy	(5) Employment Policy
Centralized Selection	-0.174* (0.104)	0.241*** (0.0513)	0.113 (0.085)	0.413*** (0.074)	-0.024 (0.090)
Centralized Selection*Office Seeking	0.707*** (0.135)	2.675*** (0.172)	0.438*** (0.113)	1.028*** (0.152)	0.781*** (0.172)
Centralized Selection*Vote Seeking	-0.336*** (0.106)	-0.177** (0.0870)	-0.012 (0.089)	-0.250** (0.107)	-0.734*** (0.126)
Inclusive Leadership	0.269*** (0.075)	0.0730 (0.0513)	0.282*** (0.074)	0.425*** (0.079)	0.608*** (0.099)
Inclusive Leadership*Policy Seeking	-0.404*** (0.101)	0.0285 (0.0670)	-0.339*** (0.086)	-0.660*** (0.106)	-0.472*** (0.133)
Inclusive Leadership*Vote Seeking	-0.195** (0.085)	-0.196** (0.0761)	-0.262*** (0.076)	-0.423*** (0.092)	-0.497*** (0.098)
Party Switcher	0.105 (0.094)	0.194** (0.0940)	-0.144 (0.112)	-0.189 (0.125)	0.085 (0.126)
National Politician	-0.035 (0.044)	-0.0444 (0.0322)	-0.035 (0.042)	-0.020 (0.054)	0.012 (0.048)
Incumbent	-0.084* (0.045)	-0.0550 (0.0345)	-0.048 (0.040)	0.009 (0.052)	-0.030 (0.051)
New Politician	-0.064 (0.066)	0.0343 (0.0575)	-0.037 (0.056)	0.076 (0.078)	-0.065 (0.070)
Office and Policy Seeking	0.872*** (0.211)	0.244*** (0.0865)	0.446*** (0.121)	0.810*** (0.174)	0.285 (0.178)
Office and Vote Seeking	0.220** (0.095)	0.0704 (0.0863)	0.363*** (0.102)	-0.029 (0.136)	-0.015 (0.151)
Office, Vote, and Policy Seeking	0.382*** (0.111)	0.215*** (0.0664)	0.164 (0.101)	0.252** (0.111)	0.105 (0.155)
Vote Seeking	0.616*** (0.091)	0.272*** (0.0975)	0.640*** (0.088)	0.741*** (0.126)	0.205 (0.127)
Vote and Policy Seeking	-0.081 (0.090)	0.537*** (0.0761)	0.175** (0.071)	0.134 (0.112)	-0.563*** (0.132)
Open Electoral List	0.249*** (0.047)	0.146*** (0.0408)	0.185*** (0.054)	0.370*** (0.053)	0.103* (0.058)
Federalism	-0.290*** (0.088)	-0.156** (0.0713)	0.271*** (0.074)	0.276*** (0.092)	-0.544*** (0.110)
Bicameralism	-0.031 (0.091)	0.203** (0.0796)	-0.098 (0.076)	-0.452*** (0.093)	0.438*** (0.127)
Eurozone	-0.226*** (0.060)	-0.124** (0.0530)	-0.413*** (0.056)	-0.830*** (0.074)	-0.176** (0.079)
Membership	0.008*** (0.002)	0.00234 (0.00145)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.020*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Constant	0.419*** (0.109)	-0.0241 (0.0917)	0.257** (0.108)	0.148 (0.134)	0.502*** (0.152)
Observations	362	362	362	360	361
R-squared	0.452	0.833	0.359	0.429	0.610

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## C.4 HECKMAN SELECTION MODEL FOR CONGRUENCE AND PARTY ORGANIZATION

The data for the predictor variables of selection and supervision used in Chapter 5 include only those parties for which party statutes explicitly mention the treatment of their MEPs. This means that of the 436 observations I have for individual MEPs, 74 of them are excluded from the analysis because their party statutes do not provide enough information to determine how their parties treat them in selection and supervision. This characteristics of the data highlight a few important complications of the modeling process that must be addressed. First, the amount of detail in party statutes varies widely across parties. As Chapter 3 highlighted, there are parties that do not mention their MEPs at all, those that mention MEPs but are vague, and there are those parties that provide full information, addressing the EP and their selection procedures. If this information is missing in a party statute, it is impossible to infer what the leadership of the party is thinking about the EP or how they view their politicians in it. In order to make the most use of the unobserved information in this choice, I construct a five selection models to test whether or not legislative behavior is independent of the choices made when writing party statutes in addition to the modeling in Chapter 5. In other words, I test whether or not I can draw inferences about selection and supervision that are independent of the choice to make statutes explicit when it comes to the treatment of their MEPs. Not only does this allow me to flesh out even more variation between parties, it also allows me to make the most use of my data.

These Heckman models incorporate factors that might contribute to the decision of a party to formally address MEPs in a statute in a selection equation before constructing the baseline model to test the hypotheses of Chapter 5. These models estimate these relationships in a two-stage procedure that first tests a model to identify under what conditions parties choose to incorporate the EP into their statutes, then it estimates a model on how formal selection and supervision procedures influence congruence. The predictor variables for the selection equation are taken from the theory of Chapter 3. However, it is important to note that I did not find any patterns for why a party would or would not include this in its statute in that analysis. The results of the models are reported in Table 46 and the

important statistic to note is that of the Wald test of the independence of equations. This statistic tells us whether the congruence equation is independent of the the inclusion or exclusion of the formal mention of MEPs in the statutes. If this statistic is significant, then a Heckman model is appropriate. As the tables report, this is only significant for models of Legislative Acts (1) and and Non-Legislative acts(2). However, comparing the results of these two models with those in the analysis of Chapter 5 shows that the results of Chapter 5 and its analysis are robust across the specifications.

Table 46: Heckman Selection Model for Congruence and Party Organization in Legislation

VARIABLES	(1) Legislative Acts	(2) Non Legislative Acts	(3) Economic Policy	(4) Foreign Policy	(5) Employment Policy
Centralized Candidate Selection	-0.118* (0.063)	0.586*** (0.120)	0.087 (0.056)	0.620*** (0.077)	-0.188* (0.099)
Inclusive Leadership	0.302** (0.151)	0.047 (0.103)	0.107 (0.114)	0.604*** (0.127)	0.515*** (0.099)
Centralized Candidate Selection* Inclusive Leadership	-0.285 (0.185)	-0.568*** (0.156)	0.029 (0.138)	-0.668*** (0.156)	-0.134 (0.103)
Office Seeking Goals	0.390*** (0.072)	0.335*** (0.094)	0.111* (0.061)	0.262*** (0.074)	0.650*** (0.062)
Vote Seeking Goals	0.059 (0.042)	-0.197*** (0.049)	0.152*** (0.039)	0.070 (0.055)	-0.299*** (0.048)
Policy Seeking Goals	-0.174*** (0.045)	-0.008 (0.065)	-0.224*** (0.044)	-0.160*** (0.048)	-0.117** (0.051)
National Experience Only	0.038 (0.061)	0.020*** (0.000)	0.084* (0.048)	-0.002 (0.070)	0.028 (0.066)
European Experience Only	-0.011 (0.050)	0.073*** (0.000)	0.044 (0.053)	-0.015 (0.071)	0.001 (0.052)
No Experience	0.037 (0.050)	0.137 (0.100)	0.075 (0.054)	0.155* (0.081)	-0.005 (0.061)
Open Electoral Lists	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)
Federalism	0.190*** (0.058)	0.027 (0.065)	0.109* (0.062)	0.369*** (0.068)	0.190*** (0.071)
Bicameral Legislature	-0.579*** (0.129)	-0.192** (0.641)	-2.222*** (0.123)	0.058 (0.120)	0.015 (0.071)
Eurozone Membership	0.555*** (0.084)	0.205 (0.126)	-0.011 (0.442)	-0.253* (0.416)	-0.171 (0.121)
Membership in EU in Years	0.034 (0.109)	0.036 (0.107)	1.152*** (0.340)	-0.510*** (0.108)	-0.193** (0.078)
Age of MEP	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.037*** (0.003)	-0.035*** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)
Party Switcher	0.051 (0.098)	-0.067 (0.124)	-0.123 (0.115)	-0.349** (0.139)	0.067 (0.138)
Constant	-0.005 (0.156)	-1.131*** (0.186)	-0.249 (0.231)	0.116 (0.218)	-0.639** (0.270)
Federalism	-1.416*** (0.255)	-4.802*** (0.075)	0.168 (0.417)	-2.235*** (0.429)	-2.902*** (0.873)
Bicameral Legislature	2.253*** (0.271)	4.854*** (0.617)	3.539*** (0.124)	3.478*** (0.137)	3.790*** (0.630)
Eurozone Membership	0.345 (0.283)	1.333*** (0.229)	-0.347*** (0.091)	1.156*** (0.336)	1.521*** (0.283)
Membership in EU in Years	-0.005 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	0.007*** (0.009)	0.013*** (0.008)	-0.028** (0.013)
Constant	-0.362** (0.160)	0.262* (0.146)	0.432** (0.172)	-0.279 (0.234)	0.582*** (0.204)
Observations	436	436	436	434	435
Censored	74	74	74	74	74
Uncensored	362	362	362	360	361
Wald chi2	290.9	.	115.8	212.6	388.9
Prob > chi2	0.000	.	0.00	0.00	0.00
Wald Test of Independence	29.42	19116.32	0.87	1.05	2.78
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.34797	0.3050	0.952

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



## C.5 THE EFFECTS OF ELECTORAL GOALS TESTING MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE COMBINATIONS

Table 47: Congruence and Party Organization in Legislative and Non-Legislative Acts

VARIABLES	(1) Legislative Acts	(2) Non-Legislative Acts
Centralized Candidate Selection	-0.328*** (0.072)	0.266*** (0.0721)
Inclusive Leadership	0.180 (0.130)	0.196** (0.0809)
Centralized Candidate Selection*Inclusive Leadership	0.018 (0.169)	-0.292*** (0.112)
Office Seeking	0.779*** (0.110)	2.602*** (0.156)
Office and Policy Seeking	0.871*** (0.225)	0.160* (0.0822)
Office and Vote Seeking	0.218** (0.103)	0.0692 (0.0706)
Office, Vote, and Policy Seeking	0.417*** (0.114)	0.207*** (0.0623)
Policy Seeking	-0.410*** (0.128)	-0.0686 (0.0739)
Vote Seeking	0.318*** (0.093)	-0.0130 (0.0617)
Vote and Policy Seeking	-0.152 (0.106)	0.416*** (0.0773)
National Experience Only	0.059 (0.059)	0.0534 (0.0445)
European Experience Only	-0.007 (0.049)	0.0478 (0.0335)
No Experience	0.041 (0.061)	0.106** (0.0535)
Open Electoral Lists	0.293*** (0.053)	0.210*** (0.0428)
Federalism	-0.207 (0.136)	-0.252*** (0.0818)
Bicameral Legislature	-0.174* (0.096)	0.210*** (0.0725)
Eurozone Membership	-0.264*** (0.098)	-0.0499 (0.0670)
Membership in EU in Years	0.011*** (0.003)	0.00204 (0.00177)
Age of MEP	0.167* (0.100)	0.186** (0.0862)
Party Switcher	0.001 (0.002)	-0.00390*** (0.00136)
Constant	0.385** (0.151)	0.114 (0.105)
Observations	362	362
R-squared	0.429	0.837

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 48: Congruence and Party Organization Across Policy Areas

VARIABLES	(3) Economic Policy	(4) Foreign Policy	(5) Employment Policy
Centralized Candidate Selection	0.014 (0.057)	0.384*** (0.068)	-0.335*** (0.101)
Inclusive Leadership	-0.007 (0.111)	0.477*** (0.108)	0.471*** (0.107)
Centralized Candidate Selection*Inclusive Leadership	0.268** (0.135)	-0.335** (0.146)	-0.076 (0.135)
Office Seeking	0.416*** (0.090)	0.886*** (0.132)	0.863*** (0.147)
Office and Policy Seeking	0.492*** (0.142)	0.673*** (0.189)	0.272 (0.190)
Office and Vote Seeking	0.285*** (0.107)	-0.042 (0.120)	0.012 (0.148)
Office, Vote, and Policy Seeking	0.196** (0.088)	0.294*** (0.112)	0.195 (0.160)
Policy Seeking	-0.242** (0.101)	-0.794*** (0.131)	-0.492*** (0.165)
Vote Seeking	0.500*** (0.072)	0.278** (0.119)	-0.489*** (0.121)
Vote and Policy Seeking	0.152* (0.082)	-0.053 (0.123)	-0.727*** (0.159)
National Experience Only	0.066 (0.046)	-0.024 (0.064)	0.053 (0.068)
European Experience Only	0.065 (0.049)	0.026 (0.062)	0.000 (0.055)
No Experience	0.052 (0.049)	0.102 (0.074)	0.005 (0.069)
Open Electoral Lists	0.162*** (0.057)	0.456*** (0.057)	0.216*** (0.066)
Federalism	0.357*** (0.111)	0.129 (0.125)	-0.444*** (0.120)
Bicameral Legislature	-0.216*** (0.082)	-0.468*** (0.113)	0.153 (0.145)
Eurozone Membership	-0.533*** (0.083)	-0.735*** (0.105)	-0.193** (0.092)
Membership in EU in Years	0.015*** (0.002)	0.020*** (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)
Age of MEP	-0.071 (0.113)	-0.156 (0.120)	0.196 (0.137)
Party Switcher	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)
Constant	0.226* (0.133)	0.122 (0.179)	0.625*** (0.214)
Observations	362	360	361
R-squared	0.354	0.408	0.546

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## APPENDIX D

### IDENTIFYING PARTY GOALS USING MODERATE AND STRONG POLICY SEEKING PARTIES

Table 49: Frequency of Empirical Indicators By Party

Empirical Indicator	# of Parties
Significant Loss	17
No Representation	4
Majority Minority	14
Government	19
Strong Preferences	23
Salience of Euro Election	27




Figure 21: Party Goals with Inclusion of Moderate Policy Seekers

Table 50: Additional Policy Seeking Parties

Country	Party	Abb.
Austria	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs	SPÖ
Bulgaria	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	GERB
Czech Republic	Ob anská demokratická strana	ODS
France	Europe Écologie	EE
	Partitu di a Nazione Corsa	PNC
	Parti socialiste	PS (France)
Germany	DIE LINKE.	Die Linke
	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands	CDU
	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	SPD
Italy	Il Popolo della Libertà	PDL
	Italia dei Valori - Lista Di Pietro	IdV
	Lega Nord	LN
	Unione dei Democratici cristiani e dei Democratici di Centro	UDC
Portugal	Partido Social Democrata	PSD
	Partido Socialista	PS (Portugal)
Spain	Partido Popular	PP
	Partido Socialista Obrero Español	PSOE
Slovakia	SMER-Sociálna demokracia	Smer
Sweden	Arbetarepartiet- Socialdemokraterna	S
United Kingdom	Labour Party	Labour

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