Steel, Robert
(2016)
Planning For Failure.
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.
(Unpublished)
Abstract
Sometimes I not only judge that P, but I also have some further “higher¬-order” evidence about my reliability when it comes to this sort of judgment. Perhaps I make an arithmetical judgment, but at the same time I have evidence that I am drunk and so arithmetically unreliable. I argue that the rational response in such a situation is to calibrate one’s confidence in P to the level suggested by one’s higher-¬order evidence—in this particular case, however confident I would be in P just given the description “I judged that P, drunkenly.” As a special case, this “calibrationist” doctrine entails a conciliatory view of peer disagreement. Some have found conciliatory views to be disturbing, taking them to collapse into psychologism and, at the limit, skepticism. I develop a conciliatory view which need be neither of these things, which is fortunate, since I also argue it is correct.
Share
Citation/Export: |
|
Social Networking: |
|
Details
Item Type: |
University of Pittsburgh ETD
|
Status: |
Unpublished |
Creators/Authors: |
|
ETD Committee: |
|
Date: |
3 October 2016 |
Date Type: |
Publication |
Defense Date: |
16 May 2016 |
Approval Date: |
3 October 2016 |
Submission Date: |
12 July 2016 |
Access Restriction: |
No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately. |
Number of Pages: |
157 |
Institution: |
University of Pittsburgh |
Schools and Programs: |
Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > Philosophy |
Degree: |
PhD - Doctor of Philosophy |
Thesis Type: |
Doctoral Dissertation |
Refereed: |
Yes |
Uncontrolled Keywords: |
Epistemology, Higher Order Evidence, Peer Disagreement, Calibrationism, Epistemic Planning |
Date Deposited: |
03 Oct 2016 19:02 |
Last Modified: |
15 Nov 2016 14:34 |
URI: |
http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/28590 |
Metrics
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Actions (login required)
|
View Item |