Between History and Memory:
Cultural War in Contemporary Russian and Ukrainian Cinema

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Any approach to the past tailors our perception of the present, which is in turn inevitably elusive and unstable. The present is a site of contestation between memory and history, as well as a site for recounting the distant past by reflecting it through the prism of the present. The transition from the Soviet Union to independent states in 1991 triggered tensions within these newly created nation-states, with the collective and individual past being given a range of new interpretations. The connection between memory and identity obtained a renewed force. Russian ideologists have often considered Ukraine as an inalienable part of Russia; the disintegration of the Soviet Union implied only a formal separation in a common Russian worldview. Meanwhile, the new national policy of Ukraine was frequently oriented towards independence and closer cooperation with the European Union. Contrasting memories about the past contributed to the tension between the two Slavic peoples, which, paradoxically, turned out to be productive in terms of self-definition of Russians and Ukrainians.

In this context, contemporary Russian and Ukrainian historical films aim to capture a past that is immediately relevant to the needs of the ever-changing present. Three issues—the location of filmmakers’ loyalties (evident in content and technique, as well as suggested by patterns of funding and shooting location); historical emphases; and neglect of historical facts with emphasis on others—are the focus of attention in this research. The dissertation examines the ways in which historical film is used by state authorities to construct cultural identities, wherein contemporary
films generate discourses that make history a site of contestation, most frequently (but not exclusively) between Ukrainian nationalism and Russian imperial ambitions. The research resides at the intersection of three fields: memory as a custodial practice, with film as a *lieu de mémoire*; the Russian imperial project; and the formation of specific ideologies about the shared past.
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1.0 Introduction

The representations of a shared past in Russian and Ukrainian historical films turn out to reflect the very different ideological agendas and state-constructed cultural memories of the two countries. The historical film is a powerful medium of cultural memory; it is a lieu de mémoire, in which the Russian imperial and Ukrainian nation-building projects become evident in a range of ways, including selectiveness of the represented past and the perspective of cinematic accounts.

The historical film is called upon to connect the past to the present; it may also bring into consideration hidden or competing memories that either challenge or complement prevailing narratives and authoritative accounts of the past, asking the viewer to consider the present as shaped by multiple memories, rather than by a unified historical narrative. The contemporary Russian historical film plays a decisive role in creating an image of Russia as a strong, united state, a successor of an ancient past and the beginnings of Orthodoxy, while Ukrainian cinema has been struggling to define Ukrainian national identity by overcoming its colonial trauma and rehabilitating forbidden memories from oblivion.

Historical film is more than simply a record of the historical past; it is a vivid portrayal that involves sensual and emotional perception, bringing it squarely into the realm of affect, and, therefore, of memory. It is a reenactment of the past in the present, reliving it, bringing it into the active memory of the public. Nostalgia for the past leads to a reinvention of the old, creating it anew through cinematic representations, a project that becomes particularly absorbing as the futurist orientation closely compatible with the modernist and Soviet periods gives way to a postmodern preoccupation with the invention of a new past and a “desire to pull all these various pasts into the present” (Huyssen, 25). A film may discover an alleged past about which the viewer
did not know; it distributes that alleged past for discussion and debate both by historians and regular viewers, creating what Alison Landsberg has referred to as prosthetic memories. In Landsberg’s view, technologies of mass culture enable memories to be “acquired by anyone, regardless of skin color, ethnic background, or biology. Prosthetic memories are transportable and therefore challenge more traditional forms of memory that are premised on claims of authenticity, ‘heritage,’ and ownership” (3). The framework of culture, furthermore, unites “the living, the dead, and the not yet living,” “as the Internet creates a framework for communication across wide distances in space, cultural memory creates a framework for communication across the abyss of time” (Assmann, “Canon and Archive” 97).

Memory practices are inherently connected to nation-building. As Jeffrey K. Olick maintains, “memory has long been the handmaiden of nationalist zeal, history its high counsel” (1). An intellectual descendant of Ernest Renan, Pierre Nora accepts Renan’s thesis of Willensnation, a nation brought about by human will, and he develops his own project uniting the concepts of memory and nation. The construction of national memories inevitably engages elements reflective of the state project. “Memory and the nation have a peculiar synergy. Even when other identities compete with or supplant the national in postmodernity, they draw on—and are increasingly nostalgic for—the uniquely powerful forms of memory generated in the crucible of the nation-state” (Olick, 2). Nora’s approach is productive in terms of memory construction in contemporary Russia, where both history and memory are highly institutionalized and heavily supervised by state power. In this way, Russian cinema is called to contribute to a project of official state building, deeply indebted to the production of a mythical empire with a long coherent history, although this coherence inevitably relies on a strategic selection of facts and often moves beyond the borders of Russian history. In Ukrainian cinema, the processes of memory construction may
be different, yet are similarly instrumental to the formation of the national ideology operated by the state.

The dissertation consists of an Introduction and five chapters that are connected both chronologically and thematically, representing several of the most widely used narratives in Russian and Ukrainian cinema today to construct often contrasting cultural memories about the shared past in the two countries.

In the Introduction, I provide the theoretical background in cultural memory studies necessary for the specific film cases. I discuss the controversies of memory and history and their problematized interrelationship as represented through the medium of film. In the introduction, I also point out some the terminology that I use in the dissertation. I argue why the term “cultural memory” is more preferable for the research than “collective memory” or other notions in circulation. I lay out the foundations of contested memories between Russia and Ukraine and map the ways that historical film serves as a powerful medium that can easily influence and shape public opinion in defense of a specific ideology.

Chapter One, “Myths of Ancient Rus’” concentrates on the role of the distant past for the present-day identity construction in Russia and Ukraine. In this chapter, I discuss how the memory of Kievan Rus' is used by Russian and Ukrainian ideologists to build a narrative that would support the respective policies of the two countries. The films discussed in the chapter provide a representation of the cultural memories and their contestation. Among the films discussed in this chapter are Andrei Kravchuk’s The Viking [Viking, 2016], Iurii Kulakov’s Prince Vladimir [Kniaz' Vladimir, 2005], Dmitrii Korobkin’s Iaroslav. A Thousand Years Ago [Iaroslav. Tysiachu let nazad, 2010], Vladimir Kil'burg’s Oleg the Seer [Veshchii Oleg, 2020], Iurii Kovaliov’s The
**Stronghold** [Storozhova zastava, 2017], and Taras Khymych’s **King Danylo** [Korol’ Danylo, 2018].

In **Chapter Two**, “Contested Cossack Past,” I explore the contestations over the cultural memories about Cossacks among the Russian and Ukrainian audiences. The chapter discusses the representation of the Cossack that is in constant flux both in terms of media, form, and content. The romanticized Cossack myth was revived in independent Ukraine with contemporary meanings added, aiming at the consolidation of the Ukrainian nation and legitimizing the new state. Filmmakers, diverse in their film styles, felt the need to make a film about Cossack hetmans (leaders). Some hetmans, such as Bogdan Khmelnitskii, fit national mythologies of both Russia and Ukraine simultaneously, with different stories supporting the myth. Among the films discussed in this chapter are Leonid Osyka’s *Hetman’s Regalia* [Hetzmans'ki kleinodi, 1993], Mykola Zaseev-Rudenko’s *Black Council* [Chorna rada, 2000], Iurii Ilienko’s *A Prayer for Hetman Mazepa* [Molytva za het’mana Mazepu, 2001], Mykola Mashchenko’s *Bogdan-Zinovii Khmelnitskii* [Bohdan-Zinovii Khmel’nyts’kyi, 2006], Oles’ Sanin’s *Mamai* [Mamai, 2003], Valerii Iamburs’kii’s *Hetman* [Het’man, 2015], Vladimir Bortko’s *Taras Bulba* [Taras Bul’ba, 2009], and the team Petro Pinchuk and Ievgen Bereziak, who directed *A Song about Taras Bulba* [Duma pro Tarasa Bul’bu, 2009].

In **Chapter Three**, “Memories of World War II,” I examine controversies of Russian and Ukrainian war films and the specificity of representation of the war within the two different ideological positions. As a result of the recent anti-Communist course in Ukrainian politics, the previously used term of the “Great Patriotic War” in reference to World War Two, inherited from the Soviet Union, was changed to a more neutral “Second World War.” The Second World War for Ukrainians has become recognized as a tragedy of a nation that is supported by heroism of
Ukrainian movements of resistance. In Russia, the Great Patriotic War became a foundation point for the state and almost a religious cult in cinema. Some of the films discussed in this chapter are Oles Ianchuk’s *The Undefeated* [Neskorenyi, 2000], Taras Khymych’s *Alive* [Zhyva, 2016], Sergei Mokritskii’s *Battle for Sevastopol / The Unbreakable One* [Bitva za Sevastopol / Nezlamna, 2015],1 Andrei Maliukov’s *The Match* [Match, 2012], Aleksandr Samokhvalov and Boris Rostov’s *We Are from The Future 2* [My iz budushchego 2, 2010], and Aleksandr Rogozhkin’s *Cuckoo* [Kukushka, 2002].

**Chapter Four**, “Traumatic Memories of the 20th c.,” focuses on traumas that were not favored in Soviet history, such as 1944 deportation of Crimean Tartars, repressions, and the 1933 artificial famine in Ukraine organized by the Soviet government. Among the films discussed in this chapter are Oles' Ianchuk’s *Famine-33* [Golod-33, 1991], Oles' Sanin’s *The Guide, or Flowers Have Eyes* [Povodyr, abo kvity maiut’ ochi, 2014], and Akhtem Seitablaiev’s historical drama *Haytarma* [Haytarma, 2013].

In **Chapter Five**, “Memory of the Russo-Ukrainian Contestation in the 21st c.,” I discuss the ideologically different viewpoints on the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and the annexation of Crimea in recent Russian and Ukrainian films. This chapter elaborates on some details of the tension between the two countries, toppling the monuments to Lenin and the anti-Communist

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1 The two titles of the film is a marketing strategy. In Ukraine, the film was released as *The Unbreakable One* (*Nezlamna*)—thus, Ukrainians watch a personal story of a woman sniper who was not broken by the war. In Russia, the film is known as *Battle for Sevastopol*. A strong reference to war is more preferable for the Russian film industry market, with WWII as the central historical event in Russian memory politics. The battle for Sevastopol appears only in one of the final episodes of the film, while the rest of the film is a story of a woman.
policies in Ukraine. Among the films discussed in the chapter are Akhtem Seitablaev’s *Cyborgs* [Kiborgy, 2017], Oleksii Shaparev’s *Winter of the Brave Ones* [Ukrainian release title Kruty 1918, 2019], and Aleksei Pimanov’s drama *Crimea* [Krym, 2017].

1.1 The Controversies of Memory and History

The relationship between memory and history is fundamental to shaping national identity and the ways it is established. This dissertation is set to view memory and history in their constantly shifting and problematized interrelationship represented through the medium of film. The new modes of relations between memory and history in Russian and Ukrainian cinema have posed a number of questions as to the ways in which they tend to converge or diverge to create contestation about the shared past.

Beginning at the very least with Nora’s 1984 contemplations about memory and history, numerous debates re-emerged about where history ends and memory emerges, whether they stand in constant opposition, and whether they can at all be separated from each other. For Nora, history is (among other things and at different historical moments) prosaic, written; it is a trace, a mediation, distance, and only a representation of the past. Memory, by contrast, is often construed as poetic and affective, a perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present (“Between Memory and History”). In his distinction between memory and history, Nora draws upon Halbwachs’ understanding of the plurality of memories, according to which “there are as many memories as there are groups, that memory is by nature multiple and yet specific; collective, plural, and yet individual” (Nora, “Between Memory and History” 9). For Nora, memory is alive and in “permanent evolution,” while history is a “reconstruction … of what is no longer” (8).
Distance is the primary reason for placing the past into the realm of history, while memory is a perceptible present. “With the appearance of the trace, of mediation, of distance, we are not in the realm of true memory but of history” (“Between Memories and Histories” 8).

Nora enters into a dialogue with Halbwachs and develops the idea of forgetfulness of our societies to such an extent that it made his argument reflect a nostalgic longing for the pure peasant societies. With the appearance of the trace, we are no longer in the realm of memory, but history. Nora is concerned about the acceleration of time and “increasingly rapid slippage of the present into a historical past that is gone for good” (“Between Memory and History” 7). He expresses concern about memory that is constantly disappearing; for him, the past gains importance because there is so little of it left. In Nora’s view, sites of memory represent the embodiment of memories and, therefore, give hope for their preservation since they are places where “memory crystallizes and secretes itself” (“Between Memory and History” 7).

Nora’s lieux de mémoire are representations of the past in the present. The scholar distinguishes between the “real memory” that is retained in primitive, archaic societies, and history, which is how “hopelessly forgetful modern societies” organize the past (“Between Memory and History” 8). He further argues for a distinction between the “dictatorial memory” that has no past but “ceaselessly reinvents tradition” and a memory that is “nothing more in fact than sifted and sorted historical traces” (Nora, “Between Memory and History” 8). The concept of selectivity also permeates Nora’s conceptualization of memory and history to an extent that his own approach to history of France in Les Lieux de Mémoire is highly selective. Eventually, Nora’s historically inflected argument asserts that history “besieged memory” in modern times: as historiography has entered its epistemological age, memory became engulfed by history so to discern them would be similar to running a knife “between tree of memory and bark of history”
(Nora, “Between Memory and History” 10). Nation is the last incarnation of the tradition of history that is deeply invested in memory. With the advent of society in place of nation, Nora argues, history became a social science, while memory—“a purely private phenomenon,” and nation itself—a “given” past, since society is future-oriented (“Between Memory and History” 11).

Although previously remembering and memory were viewed in contrast to history, in contemporary memory studies they have converged in powerful ways. “No longer considered to be polar opposites of each other, they are striking up new modes of relation” (Assmann, Shadows of Trauma 32). Jan Assmann viewed history and memory from a more nuanced perspective, which he illustrates as follows:

Unlike Moses, Akhenaten, Pharaoh Amenophis IV, was a figure exclusively of history and not of memory. Shortly after his death, his name was erased from the king-lists, his monuments were dismantled, his inscriptions and representations were destroyed, and almost every trace of his existence was obliterated. For centuries, no one knew of his extraordinary revolution. Until his rediscovery in the nineteenth century, there was virtually no memory of Akhenaten. Moses represents the reverse case. No traces have ever been found of his historical existence. He grew and developed only as a figure of memory, absorbing and embodying all traditions that pertained to legislation, liberation, and monotheism (Moses the Egyptian 23)

J. Assmann concentrates on what he calls “mnemohistory,” concerned not with the past as such but with the past as it is remembered. Mnemohistory is a way of applying the principles of reception theory to historical knowledge. Yet, “the past is not simply ‘received’ by the present. The present is ‘haunted’ by the past and the past is modeled, invented, and reconstructed by the
present. … there is much more involved in the dynamic of cultural memory than is covered by the notion of reception” (Assmann, *Moses the Egyptian* 9). The past continues to live on, unless it is no longer relevant for the present. The relevance, in the meantime, arises from the needs of the ever-changing present. As Wertsch points out, “weaving history into the fabric of the present is usually done to the service of self-interested identity projects, making the past into our past and one that appears to be less distant and separated from our present” (275). This is the principle on which national histories operate. According to Peter Novick, “collective memory is in crucial senses ahistorical, even anti-historical”; it, furthermore, “has no sense of the passage of time; it denies the ‘pastness’ of its objects and insists on their continuing presence” (3-4). While mainstream history lays claim to perceiving the past from a detached position and multiple perspectives, memory provides a certain committed perspective without ambiguities about which history is so sensitive. An independent historical narrative of an event, however detached and unbiased it may seek to be, may not satisfy the different communities who bare their own collective memory of the past and would be unwilling to surrender it. Analytic history provides an account of the past that in most cases does not relate to the tendencies of national memory. In the meantime, it is difficult to imagine a “mnemonic community in a project of critical self-reflection and humility without seeming to suggest that it should give up its deeply held commitments to national narratives and memories. Given how central national narratives are to identity projects, this is an unrealistic expectation” (Wertsch, 276). This is why, wherever national identity is concerned, the objectivity of historical narrative is sent to the background.

Another significant contribution to the debates around the relationship between memory and history was offered by Paul Ricoeur, who discussed the issue in terms of trauma. As a scholar whose views are invested in Freud’s psychoanalytic understanding of memory, rather than in
Halbwachs’s sociological method, Ricoeur takes traumatic experiences as a point of departure, for they can reveal “the nature of memory’s autonomy vis-à-vis history” (Hutton, The Memory Phenomenon 42). Ricoeur (87) regards memory as the “womb of history, inasmuch as memory remains the guardian of the entire problem of the representative relation of the present to the past.” One of Ricoeur’s major contributions is the distinction between the work of remembering (travail) and the duty to remember (devoir). Ricoeur viewed Nora’s duty memory as a problematic imperative, a responsibility to perform a certain identity, as opposed to a more dynamic notion of working through memory (travail) that is especially productive in reference to traumatic experiences and the acknowledgement of guilt.

Dominick LaCapra further developed the idea of working memory by arguing that sites of memory are necessarily sites of trauma. The working memory for LaCapra is “testimonial witnessing,” which he considers a “necessary condition of agency” and finds it “altogether crucial as a way in which an intimidated or otherwise withdrawn victim of trauma may overcome being overwhelmed by numbness and passivity, reengage in social practice” (12). In his discussion of the relationship between memory and history, LaCapra emphasizes that memory constantly informs history, even if the memory is false. Saul Friedländer, whose research primarily concentrates on Holocaust studies, further develops the rapprochement between history and

1 I choose to use the term “Holocaust,” since it is broader than “Shoah.” The Shoah, meaning “calamity” or “destruction” in Hebrew has been widely adopted since the 1940s to describe the genocide and persecution of European Jews specifically. However, the definition of the term “Holocaust” has been contested, in particular as to whether or not it should include the persecution of the other victims of Nazi Germany. The Holocaust often refers to the non-Jewish victims of Nazi Germany and is sometimes even extended to describe other genocides. The Hebrew word Shoah is also preferred by some people in wake of theological and historical reasons.
memory. Friedlander suggests that the “intertwining between the writing of the history of the Holocaust and the unavoidable use in its interpretation and narration of implicit or explicit moral categories remains a major challenge. It is around these shared moral categories that history and memory encounter one of the central differences” (12). The debates around Holocaust raised in the 1980s were focused around the controversy of historicization and sacralization. According to Nora, “memory installs remembrance within the sacred; history, always prosaic, releases it again” (“Between Memories and Histories” 9). In the case of the Holocaust, historians had to approach the past by integrating individual memories and experiences of the horrific events into the historical narrative. The historian was supposed to connect the plurality of memories into a coherent reconstruction of history. Chapter Four of the dissertation explores examples of trauma in Ukrainian and Russian cinema and ways of approaching memories that are beyond “mere” historical representation. The consideration of traumatic memories through the prism of generational or familial experiences, suggested by Marianne Hirsch, is another productive way of looking at the working memory. “Postmemorial work,” as Hirsch argues, “strives to reactivate and re-embody more distant political and cultural memorial structures by reinvesting them with resonant individual and familial forms of mediation and aesthetic expression” (33). In other words, even after all the participants of the traumatic events are gone, the traumatic experiences may affect those who were not directly involved in the events.

The subjective memories and objective historical accounts of the past now merged to represent one whole in the relationship of being complimentary to each other. As Aleida Assmann points out, “our current situation is not so much characterized by the dominance of history or
memory as it is by the complexity of their co-existence. They are two competing ways of referring to the past, each of which corrects and supplements the other” (Shadows of Trauma 35). As memory discourses began to increase at the beginning of the 1980s, the need for commemoration became a sign of the increasing necessity to preserve memories in the fear of forgetting important events and dates of the past. In contrast to the modernist and Soviet predominant reliance on the future, the shift towards the past might be conceived as a postmodern turn that came about in the wake of a number of crises of the twentieth century. As Hutton argues, “there had been too much displacement, destruction, and death in the wars and economic crises of the twentieth century to contend that somehow all of these disruptive forces might be adapted to a framework of history as an ongoing and uplifting journey” (11). With the fragmentation and breakup of the historical narrative, according to Hutton, “the absence of an overarching temporal framework redirected historians to the places of memory” (13). Yet, with all the focus on the past, it is its heritage in the present that is most important. The present, furthermore, is a “moment that defines the meaning of the past” (Hutton 15). The narrative of the past, however fragmented it might appear, is written through the prism of the present, which inevitably calls for nostalgia so characteristic of remembering and commemoration.

The selective approach to the past tailors the perception of the present, which is also inevitably elusive and unstable. Nora (“Recent history and the New Dangers”) emphasizes that “it is the present that has, essentially, become the province of history and it is the present that has even extended its methods to interpretation of the distant past.” With the acceleration of time, present quickly turns into past “re-awakening the age-old rivalry between memory and history” (Nora, “Recent history and the New Dangers”). The present, therefore, is a site of contestation
between memory and history, as well as a site for recounting the distant past by reflecting it through the prism of the present. According to Italo Svevo,

The past is always new; as life proceeds it changes, because parts of it that may have once seemed to have sunk into oblivion rise to the surface and others vanish without a trace because they have come to have such slight importance. The present conducts the past in the way a conductor conducts an orchestra. It wants these particular sounds, or those—and no others. That explains why the past may at times seem very long and at times very short. … The only part of it that is highlighted is the part that has been summoned up to illumine, and to distract us from the present. (302)

Memories and their representations not only continuously multiply in the last quarter of a century—in Huyssen’s argument—but also compete with each other in their inevitable multiplicity. The need for commemoration, furthermore, derives not from the receding memories or from forgetfulness, but from the necessity to harness these memories, control them, as well as to establish certain attitudes towards the past, a task usually commissioned by official powers. Memories encompassed by history go hand-in-hand with politics and are subject to construction. “Political traditions are validated through some sense of a stable past,” maintains Zelizer (227). The constant attempts to deny certain pasts or remake the past by way of remembering or forgetting are consequences of the existence of competing memories, clash of ideologies, adoption of new political lines leading to an erasure of awkward pages in history. As Barry Schwartz (9) puts it, “man’s capacity to twist history to his liking is universal and infinite.” The writing of history, furthermore, depends on the political and ideological connections of the historian, his or her identity, ethnic or religious affiliation. Nora emphasized that history “calls for a periodic, often
collective, process of orchestration, involving professional historians” (“Recent History and the New Dangers”).

1.2 Cultural Memory Vs. Collective Memory

In terms of terminology, the dissertation takes the notion of “cultural memory” to denote what might be called collective, social, or shared memory. In the early twentieth century, sociologist Maurice Halbwachs and art historian Aby Warburg independently came up with a similar idea of “collective” or “social” memory as opposed to biological ideas of memory, such as Jung’s archetypes. Halbwachs “developed his concept of collective memory not only beyond philosophy but against psychology” (Olick and Robbins, 109). In opposition to Freud’s individual memory, Halbwachs argued that it is only in group contexts that individuals can remember coherently. In Halbwachs’ understanding, collective memory is an active past that forms our identities and “it is in societies that people normally acquire their memories” (On Collective Memory, 38). This theory has had a major effect on the development of memory studies and nurtured further explorations of the dynamics between communities, memories, and history.

Michael Kammen, who sees collective memory in material objects, underscores that the collective memory is “the publicly presented past: … speeches and sermons, editorials and school textbooks, museum exhibitions, historic sites, and widely noticed historical art, ranging from oil paintings to public sculpture and commemorative monuments” (xii). Meanwhile, as Said points out, “collective memory is not an inert and passive thing, but a field of activity in which past events are selected, reconstructed, maintained, modified, and endowed with political meaning” (185). Hence, the collective memories both of the past and the present are commonly used for political
needs, since the memories emerge “from the intersection of official and vernacular cultural expressions” (Bodnar 13).

In wake of its problematized relationship between an individual and the group, the notion of “collective memory” has troubled scholars for decades and incited a search of alternatives to the term. Scholars studying memory across different disciplines (sociology, history, culture, psychology among others) tended to coin new terms to refer to the subject matter of the “collective” memory. Thus, such concepts as “social memory,” “public memory,” “cultural memory,” “collective remembrance,” “popular history making,” “images of the past” and others came about.

Jan Assmann is a proponent of “cultural memory,” which he perceives as a memory with formative and normative functions characterized by unity and specificity. While Assman distinguishes “communicative memory” and “cultural memory,” his scholarly interest resides particularly in the cultural memory, rather than in communicative, which he disregards for its proximity to the everyday, its instability, disorganized and limited nature. In his attempt to connect memory, culture, and the group, Assmann identifies “objectified culture” and organized ceremonial communication as collective identity. By sifting out all the instances of the temporal, transient, non-important memories that pass along in families, waiting rooms, or train rides, he concentrates only on the elite definition of culture and comes to a conclusion that “the concept of cultural memory comprises that body of reusable texts, images, and rituals specific to each society in each epoch, whose ‘cultivation’ serves to stabilize and convey that society’s self-image” (“Collective Memory and Cultural Identity” 132). It is precisely this collective knowledge and awareness of the common past that unifies the group as a single cultural entity. For Assman, cultural memory exists in specific objects of culture that convey knowledge about fateful events
in the history of the collective. The scholar is thus interested in the ways that the objectified culture of the past forms the cultural memory of the present.

Jan Assmann developed his concept of cultural memory based on Halbwachs’ understanding of collective memory and the relationship between memory and history, so he views the past as “a social construction whose nature arises out of the needs and frames of reference of each particular present. The past is not a natural growth but a cultural creation” (Cultural Memory and Early Civilization 33). Cultural memory is formed of symbolic heritage that can be found in written texts, monuments, festivals, celebrations, objects, and other media serving as mnemonic triggers that inscribe meaning into past events. According to J. Assmann, cultural memory, “unlike communicative, is a matter of institutionalized mnemotechnics,” it “focuses on fixed points in the past, but again it is unable to preserve the past as it was” (Cultural Memory and Early Civilization 37). So cultural memory is necessarily constructed around certain symbolic figures that help to preserve the memory effectively and to keep it alive with the passage of time.

Another proponent of the term “cultural memory” is Marita Sturken, who defines cultural memory as “memory that is shared outside the avenues of formal historical discourse yet is entangled with cultural products and imbued with cultural meaning” (3). The scholar examines cultural memory at an intersection of trauma, nationalism, oppositional politics, and cultural arenas such as art, popular culture, activism, and consumer culture. She uses the term to explore how popular culture has produced memories of significant events, such as the Vietnam War, as well as to gain insight into the relationship between cultural memory and history. Sturken purposefully chooses the term “cultural” over “collective” and distinguishes between “cultural memory,” “personal memory,” and “official historical discourse” (3). Sturken is primarily concerned with how “memory objects and narratives move from the realm of cultural memory to that of history
and back” (6), as well as how cultural memory engages with historical narrative to the effect of popularization of history. Whereas Jan Assman in his approach to cultural memory is more concerned with how objectified past forms cultural memory in the present, Sturken’s explorations focus more on the blurred boundaries between what is remembered and what constitutes the historical discourse, how a personal memory finds its way to the cultural memory and history, as well as on the constructive process of histories.

For Aleida Assmann, cultural memory “contains a number of cultural messages that are addressed to posterity and intended for continuous repetition and reuse” (“Canon and Archive” 99). The scholar distinguishes three dimensions of memory: the neural memory operated by individual brain; the social memory developed in social communication of individuals; and the cultural memory that is supported by symbolic media. Cultural memory, in A. Assmann’s interpretation, “relies on transferable cultural objects that have been handed down, such as symbols, artifacts, media, and practices, as well, it relies on institutions that, by means of transmission, are able to extend the lifespan of those objects beyond that of finite human individuals” (Shadows of Trauma 20). Cultural memory, therefore, exists beyond time, although it is still supported by individual memory. For A. Assmann, the collective memory exists independently from the cultural memory. Both the collective and cultural memory are symbolically mediated, yet the collective memory is connected to political memory, and distinguished from the individual cultural memory. “Institutions and associations, nations, states, the church, or a company do not ‘have’ a memory, rather, they ‘make’ one with the assistance of memorial signs and symbols. At the same time, institutions and associations are also ‘made’ with the assistance of this memory” (Assmann Shadows of Trauma 22). The political or official memory also includes the national memory that is tightly connected to identity formation and “is a much more unifying
construction that acts on society ‘from above’: it is grounded in political institutions and invested in a longer temporal duration of survival” (A. Assmann *Shadows of Trauma* 23). Similar to Nora, A. Assmann develops her idea of national memory based on Ernest Renan’s understanding of a nation. For Renan, “a nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things which, properly speaking, are really one and the same constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is the past, the other is the present. … The nation, like the individual, is the outcome of a long past of efforts, sacrifices, and devotions” (Renan). The affective interpretation of a nation is, in fact, nothing else but the vision of a nation as a collective community that has its collective experiences of the past and the collective memories of the common glories. “These are the essential conditions of being a people: having common glories in the past and a will to continue them in the present; having made great things together and wishing to make them again” (Renan).

While A. Assmann takes this romantic view of a nation as a premise, the scholar also emphasizes that nations transform certain historical experiences into myths. It is the myths of the glorious past that make the present more consistent and valuable. As one of the ways of defining a myth, it is

the form in which history is seen through the lens of identity, according to this meaning, myth denotes the affective appropriation of one’s own history. Myth in this sense is a foundational history that possesses a lasting significance whose force is not neutralized by historicization: it keeps the past alive in contemporary society and gives that society orientation for the future (A. Assmann, *Shadows of Trauma* 26).

The myth is thus a critical component in the construction of the present and the future of a nation. It unifies a community of people, solidifies their experiences, and validates their unity. A
myth, however, is not necessarily a distortion of the past; it, rather, creates a past that is much easier to identify with. The cinematic examples in Chapter One of the dissertation illustrate the different myths created in Russian and Ukrainian cinema relying on Aleida and Jan Assmann’s understanding of myth.

As an extension to Aleida Assmann’s interpretation, Jan Assmann counts myths among symbolic figures of cultural memory with the distinction between myth and history being irrelevant. “What counts for cultural memory is not factual but remembered history. One might even say that cultural memory transforms factual into remembered history, thus turning it into myth” (*Cultural Memory and Early Civilization* 37). The myth, in the meantime, is history that is called to illuminate the present. J. Assmann sees a deep interconnection between myth and history through memory, yet the fact that history becomes a myth “does not make it unreal—on the contrary, this is what makes it real, in the sense that it becomes a lasting, normative, and formative power” (*Cultural Memory and Early Civilization* 38). What matters is the remembered past, and whether it is a fact or a construct, it does not matter. J. Assmann asserts that “myth is a story one tells in order to give direction to oneself and the world—a reality of a higher order, which not only rings true but also sets normative standards and possesses a formative power” (*Cultural Memory and Early Civilization* 39). For many of the Israeli, such a founding myth is the Holocaust; for modern Russians, one of the myths is the Great Patriotic War; for Ukrainians—the Cossack state of the Hetmanate, *holodomor* and others.
1.3 The Dynamics of Cultural Memory

Neither Halbwachs nor Nora paid little attention to the dynamics of memory by making the primary reference to memories as stable sites where individuals and communities can draw their memories about the past, but instead viewed memory making is inevitably a process, not a static site. Although the concept of *les lieux de mémoire* has firmly established in memory studies, it can also be misleading “if it is interpreted to mean that collective remembrance becomes permanently tied down to particular figures, icons, or monuments. As the performative aspect of the term ‘remembrance’ suggests, collective memory is constantly ‘in the works’” (Rigney, 345).

Michael Rothberg’s concept of *noeuds de mémoire* was intended to become a more operative concept in this respect. While interrogating Nora’s *lieux de mémoire*, Rothberg suggests his concept of *noeuds de mémoire* as a moving model aimed at capturing the motion of memories as “rhizomatic networks of temporality and cultural reference” (7)—memories that cannot be localized in a nation or ascribed to a certain identity. The production of memory, in Rothberg’s view, is an “ongoing process involving inscription and reinscription, coding and recoding” (8). The global flow challenges stability of memory frameworks but also enables productive forms of memory. In his discussion of the dynamism of knotted memories, Rothberg addresses Halbwachs’ notion of the “social frameworks of memory” as a valuable starting point, yet he sees the “frameworks” equally static and unable to capture the current global motion. In the postmodern world, memories are not restricted by boundaries; they emerge at an intersection of diverse and multidirectional encounters of the past and the present, of different identities, as well as mediations. While Rothberg’s *noeuds de mémoire* manage to embrace the dynamic nature of memory in contemporary world, the metaphor still tends to operate within the same structures that Nora and Halbwachs have previously defined, without bringing any groundbreaking novelty to the
understanding of memory. Rothberg, in the meantime, excludes the discussion of history in relation to memory, thus concentrating only on multidirectional memory. In his view, such a multidirectional approach to memory allows for the transgressing national boundaries, as well as freeing remembrance from the “homogenous space-time of the nation-state” (12). Rothberg’s sensitivity to the constantly changing and flowing nature of memory is consistent with the perception of the postcolonial world, yet, as he himself perceives it, his metaphor still tends to be an abstraction that can only open avenues for further study of the temporal and spatial realms of remembrance.

With the dynamic turn in memory studies, a larger shift within culture studies occurred, which led scholars “away from such a focus on individual products to a focus on the processes in which those products are caught up and in which they play a role” (Rigney 348). Jan and Aleida Assmann approach the dynamism of cultural memory from a different perspective, looking at the ongoing processes of remembrance, how the memories are preserved in archives or enter into the cannon. The distinction between communicative and cultural memory by Jan Assmann mentioned earlier already indicates the “internal dynamic or lifespan” of cultural remembrance, meaning the limitations in time for communicative memory and a relatively longer life of canonical memories (Rigney 346). Remembering, in the meantime, necessarily has the other side of the coin, which is forgetting, while together they comprise one whole of any memory cycle. As Aleida Assmann indicates, “the continual processes of forgetting is not only a normal aspect of social life, but it is also a precondition for survival, and that is true for groups as it is for individuals” (Shadows of Trauma 35). In order to create new memories of the past that are relevant for the present, it is necessary to forget, and leave some pages blank, while emphasizing others. Yet, remembering and forgetting do not exclude one another, instead, they always go hand in hand. The cultural heritage,
in the meantime, is called to prevent forgetting. Museums and archives preserve the remnants of the past and constitute the cultural memory in terms of collective remembrance. So do historical films, as further chapters of the dissertation manifest.

A. Assmann distinguishes between two forms of forgetting—the active and passive one. Active forgetting is an intentional act of destroying memories. In Soviet times, for instance, censorship was, as in A. Assmann’s definition, “a forceful if not always successful instrument for destroying material and mental cultural products” (“Canon and Archive” 98). Passive forgetting is unintentional, which is why it can be later discovered and remembered again. “What is lost but not materially destroyed may be discovered by accident at a later time in attic and other obscure depots, or eventually be dug up again by more systematic archeological research” (Assmann “Canon and Archive” 98). Similar to forgetting, memory can also be classified into active and passive, with the institutions of active memory preserving “the past as present” while the institutions of passive memory [preserving] “the past as past” (Assmann “Canon and Archive” 98). The distinction can be exemplified by a museum that might have representative exhibitions with the most relevant objects for show. The same museum may also have a storage with long discarded paintings and objects, which, however, can be pulled out of the storage and placed in the main exhibition hall any time, when museum supervisors find it relevant. A. Assmann, therefore, defines the actively circulated memory as the “canon” and the passively stored memory as the “archive” (“Canon and Archive” 98). Canonization, in the meantime, means “sanctification,” with the main purpose to “endow texts, persons, artifacts, and monuments with a sanctified status” and delineate them from the rest as more valuable (Assmann, “Canon and Archive” 100). The selection of certain objects over others presupposes power and authoritative decisions taken as to their sanctification. The
archive, in the meantime, is an institution of passive cultural memory that is located in-between the cannon and forgetting.

The active cultural memory, the canon, refers to three major areas—religion, arts, and history. National histories have become a canon relating the past to the present and instructing nations in ways to remember the past. “To participate in a national memory is to know the key events of the nation’s history, to embrace its symbols, and connect to its festive dates” (Assmann, “Canon and Archive” 101). The boundaries between remembering and forgetting, therefore, are not fixed, there is a constant internal flow and dynamics between and inside these two realms of cultural memory.

Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney argue yet another aspect of cultural dynamics. The scholars maintain that the concept of cultural memory is grounded on the “idea that memory can only become collective as part of a continuous process whereby memories are shared with the help of symbolic artifacts that mediate between individuals and, in the process, create communality across both space and time” (1). Cultural memory necessarily involves mediation and remediation in the process of remembering and forgetting the past. It is also based on communication through media. While contemporaries of certain events in the past create their first-hand memories about it, with the passage of time and the emergence of distance between the memory and the event, the remembrance of the past is now based on the previous memories and mediations of the memories. The process of memory production is thus never ending, as long as the past is of any interest to the present, otherwise, it turns into the dead history, which Nora so vehemently opposed. As Erll and Rigney emphasize, cultural memory is an “ongoing process of remembrance and forgetting in which individuals and groups continue to reconfigure their relationship to the past and hence reposition themselves in relation to established and emergent memory sites” (2).
Within the scope of this dissertation, it is useful to draw attention to factors that allow some memories to become hegemonic, while others are left out of attention and become obsolete. The cannon-building is an operative phenomenon in terms of political and cultural ideology formation. The replacement of some canons with others connected to the change of political powers is characteristic of modern societies and is directly connected to the dynamics of cultural memories. The representation of the same memory of the past through different media (writing, painting, sculpture, photography, film, television, etc.) creates the layers of mediation and contributes the holistic picture of the past performed in the present and called to emphasize certain ideologies of the present. The dynamic of cultural memory, therefore, “refers to a multimodal process, which involves complex interactions between medial, social (and ultimately also cognitive) phenomena” (Erll and Rigney 10). Along with mediation of memories, there is a process of remediation. As Jay D. Bolter and Richard Grusin argue, “at this extended historical moment, all current media function as remediations and that remediation offers us a means of interpreting the work of earlier media as well” (55). The scholars also assert that media are not a simulation but are real, they are “continually commenting on, reproducing, and replacing each other,” furthermore, “because all mediations are both real and mediations of the real, remediation can also be understood as a process of reforming reality as well” (Bolter and Grusin 55-56). Remediation of cultural memory, therefore, is a process of producing new real memories that are distantly connected to the past but also refashioning the present reality. Historical film, therefore, is a remediation of other preexisting media in the process of reenactment of a cultural memory. Cinema generally aims to provide a vision of the past that is perceived as a reality of its own rather than as a medium, in order to encourage the audience to forget about the mediation. The memory that a historical film
creates is, moreover, a memory about the memory of the past and continues to exist on its own in relation to the event in the past all other mediations of the memory.

In terms of mediation and remediation, reception is also an important factor. Kansteiner argued that “most studies on memory focus on the representation of specific events within particular chronological, geographical, and media settings without reflecting on the audiences of the representations in question” (179). In reception theory, meaning is produced both by the speaker and the reader (viewer), it arises only through interaction between these two poles. According to Roman Jakobson, Stuart Hall and others, there is usually a discrepancy between a message encoded and a message decoded.

The lack of “fit” between the codes has a great deal to do with the structural differences between broadcasters and audiences: but it also has something to do with the a-symmetry between source and receiver at the moment of transformation into and out of the “message-form.” That is called “distortion” or “misunderstandings” that arise precisely from the lack of equivalence between the two sides in the communicative exchange. (Hall 4)

The original message of the producer thus can be experienced differently by the audience in wake of difference of shared codes, previous knowledge, the ideology and values of the encoders and decoders. James Young also recognizes the “integral part visitors play in the memorial text: How and what we remember in the company of a monument depends very much on who we are, why we care to remember, and how we see” (364). This nuance is productive in terms of film as a cultural text, as the reception ultimately determines the impact on the audience and the efficiency of the cultural memory created. As Rigney argues, “The Mona Lisa, for example, is culturally significant, not ‘in itself,’ but as a result of its reception, including all the appreciative
commentaries, parodies, imitations, and so on that it has spawned. Artistic works are not just artifacts, but also agents” (349). The historical film, in this respect, is also an agent of all other media that preceded its narrative. In order to understand the role of film in cultural remembrance, it is necessary to look at its reception and its interactions with other acts of remembrance across media. According to Erll, what turns a “film about history” into a “memory-making film” is “what has been established around them,” specifically, “a tight network of other medial representations (and medically represented actions) [that] prepare the ground for the movies, lead reception along certain paths, open up and channel public discussion, and thus endow films with their memorial meaning” (396). It is ultimately the discussions, comments, rejections or acceptance of a film that turn it into a medium of cultural memory.

1.4 Contested Memories

“Memory contestation takes place from above and below, from both center and periphery” (Olick and Robbins 126). The newly formed nation-states use history as its main tool for national identity formation. According to Alonso, “the legitimacy which accrues to the groups and classes that control their apparatues, are critically constituted by representations of a national past” (48). The state has obtained the power over memory, and if the memory is shared by two or more nation-states, contestation is inevitable. “Since memory is actually a very important factor of struggle… if one controls people’s memory, one controls their dynamism” (Foucault 25). The dynamism of cultural memory presupposes the existence of counter-memories, which are usually contrasted with the dominant national memory. The dynamism of cultural memory is even greater if it is contested by two dominant powers.
The transition from the Soviet Union to a number of independent states in 1991 triggered numerous tensions within these newly created nation-states, with the collective and individual past being given a renewed interpretation. The connection between memory and identity obtained a renewed force. As Olick indicates, “there are no identities, national or otherwise, that are not constituted and challenged in time and with histories, but nations have had a special place in the history of memory and identity and in the history of their relations” (2). The transition allowed the post-Soviet states to articulate the cultural and historical narratives connected to their land that for a long time were suppressed by the totalitarian regime. The legacy of the tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union is one of the crucial factors for understanding memory wars in the post-Soviet space. This is especially true for Ukraine and for Russian–Ukrainian relations. In fact, Russia has always considered Ukraine as its inalienable part and the disintegration of the Soviet Union implied only a formal separation, in the Russian worldview. Meanwhile, the new national policy of Ukraine was oriented towards independence and closer cooperation with the European Union. Contrasting memories about the past contributed to the tension between the two Slavic peoples. The tension, in meantime, turned out to be productive in terms of self-definition of Russians and Ukrainians. In his discussion of the origins and location of national memory, James V. Wertsch argues that one of the best places to examine active national remembering is the discursive space created when members of different mnemonic communities confront one another over the past. We often do not recognize or acknowledge the full outlines of our ideas until we find ourselves in confrontations over ‘what really happened’ with members of other mnemonic communities. (260)

The concept of national identity is fundamental to the emergence of collective memories and history. The national narrative is supposed to unite different political and social elements
within a nation and generate a certain discourse about the past, that may not necessarily be objective or “true” from other perspectives. “National master narratives act as both official and general interpretations of the past but also legitimize the present and set an agenda for the future” (Carretero and Van Alphen 283). In the nineteenth century, with the rise of nation-states the writing of history began to be reconsidered in national terms. People were educated as members of a certain national community that was supposed to have its clear national identity. In the twentieth century, the multiple perspectives on history came about, yet the national component was not abandoned and continues to thrive in national narratives of the past. According to Carretero and Van Alphen, “the national perspectives overpowering collective memory might even partly explain why history and memory are still being confounded, instead of acknowledging that there are in fact different kinds of histories and memories” (286). The notion of master narrative is central to the representation of the common past, as it “celebrates the nation, its origins and its achievements, and generally functions to interpret the past in terms of a (national) group and its present goals” (Carretero and Van Alphen 286). The narrative, however, is not static and absolute, as it can be contested by multiple groups within the national community, as well as change to reflect the present needs of the community. When the past is shared by two or more national communities, the master narratives represented by each community might represent competing accounts that are often irreconcilable.

Resistance to the established historical master narratives represents a dynamic aspect of memory and shows “how representations of the past change to generate new and different ways of remembering” in societies (Carretero and Van Alphen 292). Carretero and Van Alphen also suggested a model of master narrative production with resonances for the Russian and Ukrainian historical narratives. The six components of their model include: a homogenous historical and
social subject; identification processes in terms of a ‘we’ versus ‘them’ structure; heroic and
transcendent key historical figures, such as Prince Vladimir for both Russia and Ukraine; a
monocausal or teleological account of the historical events in terms of one main goal, such as
liberation and independence for Ukraine; moral value judgments—positive about the national
subject and historical events and negative about the historical national other; an essentialist
conceptualization of nation and national identity (Carretero and Van Alphen 293). National
identity is thus internalized through master narratives, which can change with the change of
political situation. Coser, for instance, mentions that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, people
were forced to “shed their own collective memory like a skin, and to reconstruct a largely different
set of collective memories” (366). This example underscores the unstable nature of memories, as
well as indicates their constructed nature. As Nancy Wood underscores, “if particular
representations of the past have permeated the public domain, it is because they embody an
intentionality—social, political, institutional and so on—that promotes or authorizes their entry”
(2). Collective memories about the past that a social group did not experience personally is
necessarily a construction, an ideologically driven myth that is created by certain agents and passed
over to the group.

Historically, Ukraine can be divided roughly into four regions: first, the Western part,
(with previously Austrian-Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, and Ottoman domination in different
periods, namely Galicia, Bukovyna and Subcarpathian Ukraine); second, Central Ukraine,
Podillia, which belonged for centuries to the kingdom of Poland–Lithuania, and used to be the
homeland of the Ukrainian Cossacks, later becoming part of the Russian empire; third, Southern
Ukraine, populated only since the end of the 18th century mostly by Ukrainian and Russian
peasants and belonging to the Russian empire; fourth, Eastern Ukraine, which, since the 19th
century, became an important center of mining and heavy industry and attracted many Russian workers. As Kappeler points out, until today the political orientations of the population reflect the history, the ethno-linguistic composition and the geographical location of these regions.

Samuel Huntington used to argue that for centuries there existed a great historical divide separating Western Christian peoples from Muslims and Orthodox peoples, which runs “through Ukraine separating the Uniate west from the Orthodox east” (The Clash 158). He furthermore, views Russia as the core country of the Orthodox civilization and suggests several ways in which Ukraine might further develop. For Huntington, Ukraine is a “cleft country with two distinct cultures. The civilizational fault line between the West and Orthodoxy runs through its heart and has done so for centuries” (The Clash 165). In one famously untenable assertion, Huntington assured us that “if civilization is what counts […] the likelihood of violence between Ukrainians and Russians should be low. They are two Slavic, primarily Orthodox peoples who have had close relationships with each other for centuries” (“The Clash” 38). With regards to the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia, as well as Russia’s current military actions in Eastern Ukraine, this hypothesis is in retrospect risible.

The author makes a classical distinction between the “strongly nationalist” western Ukrainians and “overwhelmingly Orthodox” eastern Ukraine, where people speak mainly Russian. Although the distinction has been manipulated by politicians on many occasions, Huntington did not take into account the fact that cultures, or civilizations as he tends to call them, are not fixed entities. Over the years of its independence, Ukraine has largely overcome any divisions into east and west. While there are Uniate churches in Western Ukraine, Orthodoxy is still very powerful in the region. In addition, unlike Huntington’s predictions, religion does not prove to be a decisive factor for self-identification of Ukrainians. Language does not provide any reason for the split
either, since most Ukrainians are bilingual and can converse both in Russian and Ukrainian. The division of Ukraine into east and west is an oversimplification: Western Ukraine has never been completely western and rigorously disunited from eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian culture today can be described as a hybrid, a palimpsest of cultural layers, rather than co-existence of two distinct civilizations.

The politics of memory in independent Ukraine can be viewed from the position of postcolonial theory. Its main feature is ambivalence, since on the one hand, “we can see anticolonial and nationalist models of remembering, and on the other, the expressions of new subjectivity, transculturality, and ‘hybridity,’ as conceptualized by Homi Bhabha” (Yurchak 2). The idea of hybridity is most productive for Ukrainian society in the aftermath of its Soviet history. Ukrainians have been taught for many centuries that they are inferior and less worthy, so as a result they have internalized this as a fact. This is why “Ukrainian emancipation from the grip of the Russian empire is as much about politics and economy as about culture, including first and foremost the languages and narratives of the past, seen as crucial for the formation of Ukraine’s own identity” (Yurchak 3). Another feature of a postcolonial country is the necessity to forget and to establish new memories of the past, new heroes, new symbols and trajectories of the overall politics. “Anticolonial nationalism challenges and effectively subverts the ruling ideologies. The danger is, however, that in its will-to-difference,’ it easily becomes a copy of that by which it felt itself to be oppressed” (Yurchak 4).

As Andreas Kappeler indicates, “the Russian–Ukrainian relationship was and is still characterized by an obvious asymmetry, a hegemony of Russia over Ukraine. Russia uses the Orthodox Church and the traditional dominance of the Russian language as instruments for its policy. Not only Russian historians, but also politicians and even the Russian President try to
impose the imperial narrative on Ukraine.” (109). The scholar further argues that while on the one hand, the “Russia-led Orthodox East Slavic world “has a wide support among Ukrainians, on the other hand, Ukrainian historians and politicians use the Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian historical narrative with its national myths of liberty and Ukraine’s proximity to Europe in their struggle against the Russian hegemony. Thus, in the on-going “War of memories” both sides use history as a political weapon. According to Olick and Robbins, “noticing the ways in which images of the past are the products of contestation has led varieties of both constructionists and deconstructionists to emphasize that the past is produced in the present and is thus malleable” (128). As a result, the controversies about the heritage of Kievan Rus’, the Holodomor, the OUN and the UPA and World War II emerge, which became not only academic, but also political issues. They reflect the struggle over the geopolitical and cultural orientation of Ukraine that is of crucial importance for the future development of the post-Soviet space and Eastern Europe.

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was a Ukrainian nationalist political organization established in 1929 in Vienna. Its most prominent leaders are Andriy Melnyk and Stepan Bandera. On October 14, 1942 it established the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). The UPA was a Ukrainian nationalist paramilitary and later partisan formation. During the Second World War, it led guerilla warfare against Nazis and the Soviets. The ultimate purpose was an independent and united Ukraine. In 2015, the day of foundation of the UPA, October 14, became a national holiday—Day of the Defender of Ukraine.
1.5 Memory and Historical Film

In context of its narrative qualities, visual and sound representations, film is a powerful medium that can easily influence and shape public opinion. This power helps to explain why debates about historical verisimilitude are unlikely to wane. There is no way for a historical film to convince every viewer; discontent and resentment may infuse the ways in which the viewer assesses a historical film’s version of the past. Dissatisfaction with historical representation becomes even more heated when history is claimed by two or more political actors. According to Jonathan Stubbs (19), historical cinema encompasses “films which engage with history or which in some way construct a relationship to the past,” and this relationship, in turn, is “created not only by the films themselves but also by cultural contexts in which they operate and the discourses that they generate.” A historical film has become a museum of a certain kind, in which the past is vividly brought into the present with the help of sound effects, visuals, costumes, and detailed representation of lifestyles and behavior that refers to a certain period of history. No historical verisimilitude, however, can be required of a film, since this is only a mediation of the past. According to Carlsten and McGarry (10), “films often reflect a hidden or not-so-hidden propagandistic dimension, whether intentional or unintentional.”

In a “society of the spectacle,” as Guy Debord presciently defined the postmodern world already in the 1960s, historical films, heavily reliant on their visual qualities, acquire high value as representations of the past. Debord argues that the present age “prefers the sign to the thing signified, the copy to the original, representation to reality, the appearance to the essence” (Debord). The historical “truth,” if it exists, does not matter anymore, while its representations in the present acquire the main focus of attention. In the highly globalized world, memories have
increasingly become commodities for mass consumption, just like any other widely advertised product. According to Landsberg,

As products of a capitalist system, the images and narratives of the past made available by mass culture are themselves commodities, and for that reason many intellectuals are quick to condemn them. … Critiques of commodification often argue that commodities are imbued with certain ideologies that are often consumed by the purchaser along with the product itself (143).

Memories more often become entities for considerable investment of funds and human resources, with further promotion through the different media available in today’s world of accelerated information distribution and telecommunications. The more intensively memories are promoted, the wider audiences they reach, the higher the chances are that they can significantly influence or even mold public opinion about the past. A memory captured by historical film thus becomes a commodity, a commercial trivialization of the past.

Along with different commemorative events, monuments, museums, ceremonies, and symbols, film is a powerful medium for preserving and transmitting memories to the public. “Film can legitimize the codified narratives told about history, or it can subvert these by providing a range of competing images, symbols, discourses”; it can furthermore, “create, transmit and maintain counter-memory, a set of narratives that challenge the transmission of exclusionary or oppressive history” (Carlsten and McGarry 9). The constantly increasing number of historical films only supports the idea that contemporary societies experience an ever-growing necessity to memorialize the past (and consolidate the present). In the meantime, as Landsberg emphasizes, “film is imagined as an instrument with the power to ‘suture’ viewers into pasts they have not lived. The cinema offers spectators from diverse backgrounds and ancestries a shared archive of
experience” (14). Russian cinema of the last quarter of the century is abundant in historical dramas reiterating a wide range of historical events and periods, beginning with ancient Rus', the emergence of the Russian Empire, the Cossack legacy, and, most evidently, the Great Patriotic War, much of which will be discussed in the following chapters.

A film is full of sound, color and dialogue, all part of the filmmaker’s invention, which is why Rosenstone (1193) argues that “no matter how serious or honest the filmmakers, and no matter how deeply committed they are to rendering the subject faithfully, the history that finally appears on the screen can never fully satisfy the historian as historian.” Hayden White (1193) in his response to Robert Rosenstone’s article, introduces the term of historiophoty to denote “the representation of history and our thought about it in visual images and filmic discourse.” The scholar asserts that the writing of history is not much different from making a historical film. What differs, though, is the medium and devices used to produce a historical narrative. “But the historical monograph is no less ‘shaped’ or constructed than the historical film or historical novel” (White 1195). Narrativization has become one of the most powerful tools to form and retain memories, since stories “help make particular events memorable by figuring the past in a structured way that engages the sympathies of the reader or viewer (Rigney 347). Another aspect of narrative in cultural memory is also the relation between history and fiction. “While the difference between factual accounts and, say, novels has come to seem less absolute than it once seemed … the freedom to invent information, and not merely structure it, nevertheless gives to fiction a flexibility which is absent in other forms of remembrance” (Rigney 347). By constructing a narrative, a filmmaker, furthermore, transmits his or her attitudes towards the historical event, period, or phenomenon, with political implications. “Historical films,” as Robert Burgoyne (1) maintains, “have served as vehicles of artistic ambition and as catalysts of public debate from the very
beginnings of the art form.” Historical films (whether biopics, historical dramas, costume dramas, or other genres and sub-genres) can also be divided into films reenacting past events and films bringing memories of the past into the present. The more traumatic the past, the stronger the emotions it may recall in the audience. As traumatic pasts draw acute attention of filmmakers, they, therefore, may become sources of mass entertainment and revenues.

Live-action, feature film as a fictional narrative can inevitably have at best only partial historical veracity. According to Erll,

fictions, both novelistic and filmic, possess the potential to generate and mold images of the past which will be retained by whole generations. Historical accuracy is not one of the concerns of such ‘memory-making’ novels and movies, instead, they cater to the public with what is variously termed ‘authenticity’ or ‘truthfulness’ (389).

Historical film is a powerful tool for inducting audiences into its version of the past, invoking or constructing memories. In many ways, the historical film, like literary texts or other works of art “can be considered as simply one form of remembrance alongside others. At the same time, however, they are capable of exercising a particular aesthetic and narrative ‘staying power’ that ensures that they are not always simply superseded by later acts of remembrance” (Rigney 352). As Winfried Fluck maintains, filmmakers’ “representation of history is ‘subjective’ in the sense that it is constructed out of a cultural archive in … acts of selection and subsequent narrativization of these choices into history’” (218). This subjectivity is widely employed by Russian filmmakers in their attempt to gain funding from state officials and to ensure their films’ release.
This dissertation examines the ways in which historical film is used by state authorities to create national identities based on a selective approach towards events to be commemorated. The research focuses primarily on the filmic representation of a shared past of Russia and Ukraine. Three issues—the nature of filmic “loyalty”; the directors’ historical biases; and neglect of certain historical facts to the advantage of state ideology—are the focus of attention in this dissertation.

The memory wars between distinct constituencies in Russia and Ukraine began considerably before the 2014 annexation of Crimea or Russia’s military intervention into Eastern Ukraine. It is a longstanding tradition in Russia to treat the media and filmmakers as instruments for shaping public opinion, a tradition that goes back to the early Soviet period when cinema was proclaimed the most important of all arts. Ukraine’s recent ban on the broadcast of TV shows or films made in Russia after 2014, or films propagating Russian police and armed forces released after 1991, as well as films that are considered anti-Ukrainian, is a compensatory response of the Ukrainian State Cinema Committee to the invasion.

It was the Russian Ministry of Culture, however, that made the first step in this direction when Ilienko’s A Prayer for Hetman Mazepa (2000) was banned by Russia in 2002. In Ukrainian history, Cossack Hetman Mazepa is a controversial personality who fled Russian Tsar Peter the Great to fight with Sweden in 1708. Ilienko, however, emphasizes that his Mazepa is not a traitor and did not participate in the battle of Poltava; he took a neutral position. The film itself is a meditation about Ukraine under Russian rule; the filmmaker’s subjective view, a fantasy, and has only tangential relation to history. Ilienko’s Mazepa is a Ukrainian Hamlet, contemplating whether Ukraine should exist as an independent polity, a topic of great concern for Ukrainians after the first decade of independence and continuous struggle for existence. The film was taken seriously by Russian officials long before the Russian-Ukrainian conflict acquired its present form and scale.
Bortko’s *Taras Bulba*, to choose another example to which I will return in Chapter Two, was not banned in Ukraine when it was released in 2009, although the film is overtly propagandistic. No doubt, Gogol’s second edition of the novel (1842) is controversial itself and is a product of Gogol’s split Russo-Ukrainian identity, yet the film shoots the story in a completely Russian rendition, in which the Cossack past is a completely Russian history. This appropriation of Ukrainian history is evident in the director’s emphasis of the unity of Russia (at that historical moment referred to as “Muscovy”), thus leading the audience to believe that already in the 17th century Russian people were united as a “Moscow people.”

Overall, a historical film often seeks to compensate for the loss of a lived tradition and attempts to serve as an expression of nostalgia for the past. This nostalgia is characteristic of Russian contemporary historical cinema, with its inclination towards identity construction, patriotism rooted in the Soviet times, and nation-building potential. The Ukrainian historical film, in the meantime, tends to focus on a narrative that goes in a completely different direction.
2.0 Myths of Ancient Rus'

“There is no turning back to some foundational event fixed in the past as a point of origin, but rather the incessant updating of the past as it is imported into the present” (Hutton 95). The Russian historical film often seeks to update and reinstate the past, as it is brought into the present. Already in the sixteenth century, the first myths concerning Russia’s origins came about, including the myth of Russia as the Third Rome, the inheritance of Muscovite rulers from the Roman Empire, as well as Muscovy as the heir of Kievan Rus'. Although Kievan Rus' is generally considered to be the cradle for several Slavic peoples, Russian official ideology today tends to emphasize the solely Russian legacy of the ancient past.

The discourse of the Russian historical narrative today tends to accumulate every evidence that Russia is a successor of Kievan Rus' and its ancient past that served as a foundation for eventual consolidation of the Russian Federation as a powerful state. The erection of a monument to Prince Vladimir in Moscow in November 2015 is an example of such political justification through invocation of memory. Restoration of distant past is not uncommon in contemporary memory politics, yet this example is notable because it brings into question a past that is shared with other Slavic countries. Monuments to Prince Vladimir, in fact, can be found around the world—in London, Toronto, as well as in many other cities of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.

Ukraine, as a geographical heir of Kievan Rus', has always regarded St. Prince Volodymyr (in Ukrainian transcription) as its founding father. A statue to the baptizer of Rus' was erected in Kiev already in mid-nineteenth century on a hill over the Dnieper river where, according to the legend, citizens of Kiev where baptized in 988 B.C, so the location was thoughtfully chosen as a site of memory. According to Dmitrii Bykov, with this act of remembrance, Russia is trying to
enthrone Moscow as the mother of all Russian cities, whereas this status has always belonged to Kiev:

The thing is not even in the perversity of the idea itself … the problem is that the Vladimir hill exists only in one city, although the city is inimical to us today and we contributed a lot to that. One cannot do anything about that—Vladimir baptized Rus' not in the Moscow-river… You can build a pyramid in Moscow, why not, there is enough money for that, but it will not become Cairo; it is not difficult to erect also a Statue of Liberty … there is something very provincial in this idea. ("Bykov vysmeial ideiu")

Christianization of Rus' by Prince Vladimir is a legacy of three countries—Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, so there are no limitations on the use of the historical reference. Yet, the placement of the monument next to Kremlin in Moscow right after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 is an eloquent move towards the appropriation of the past in order to justify the present. According to Vladimir Putin, Prince Vladimir was a “spiritual founding father of the Russian state” and “consolidator and defender of the Russian lands” (Zubov). It is also notable that during the opening of the monument in Moscow, neither Putin, nor other high Russian authorities mentioned a single word about Kievan Rus’, or the fact that Vladimir spent most of his life (thirty-six years) ruling the ancient polity in Kiev. The sign on the Moscow monument, in addition, reads “Saint Prince Vladimir, the Baptizer of Rus,” omitting any mentioning that he was a Prince of Kiev, which in Ukraine is the only way St. Vladimir is referred to. While Prince Vladimir is generally considered

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1. Here and elsewhere translation mine.

2. See more Iavir “Volodymyr Sviaty: “Ch’ikh budehi?” Chastyna 1. Aktsiia.”
a common property beyond nationalization by any country, the struggle over the historical figure reflects the tense geopolitical relationship between Russia and Ukraine. As Peter Hobson indicates, ‘Vladimir’s association with Russia is doubly helpful for Vladimir Putin—the prince accepted Christianity in the Crimean city of Khersones” (Hobson). The idea that Russians and Ukrainians are one people, moreover, is one of the prominent imperial manifestos of the Russian ideologues. According to Vladimir Viatrovich, head of the Ukrainian National Memory Institute, “The thesis that we are one people is a reason for today’s war. Because it means that Russians have the right to tell us what our past is and how our future should look like” (Bogachevska).

The case of Prince Vladimir attains even more curiosity with the fact that in April 2018 another monument to the baptizer of Rus’ was established in Donetsk, on the territory of Donetsk Peoples Republic contested between Russia and Ukraine. Here again the symbolic meaning that the historical figure has recently acquired cannot be overestimated. St. Vladimir has become a shield to justify and sanctify the violation of territorial integrity of the neighboring country. Russia has received the blessing of Prince Vladimir to reconsolidate its territories, and, empowered by this great mission, the Russian State is only following the holy path. In this manner, there is also a significant tendency in emphasizing continuity of the Russian history. As Mariëlle Wijermars maintains, “Putin’s memory politics in the new millennium has sought to reintegrate the Russian Federation into an extended historical narrative” (4). The scholar further underscores that the central paradoxical claim of the Russian “state’s memory politics can thus be summarized as modernization through restoration and preservation” (Wijermars 9). The Putin era abounds in reemergence of historical figures that are now re-conceptualized and obtain a special status in the pantheon of Russian heroes. Aleksandr Nevskii, Peter the Great, Aleksandr II, Petr Stolypin, and even Stalin are taken as paragons of state reformation. Prince Vladimir is one more personality to
fit this list of the founding fathers. The mythic figure of the baptizer of all Rus', as presented by
the Russian state, however, has far-reaching implications about the historical unity of all Russian
(russkie) lands and therefore, the necessity to unite them again. Prince Vladimir is also a figure
reclaimed from oblivion of the Soviet times when the baptizer could not be accepted into the atheist
society. Andrei Kravchuk’s *The Viking* (2016) is one of the most recent representations of Prince
Vladimir in Russian culture.

In this chapter we will look at seven key figures in the common (if, some would argue,
appropriate) culture of Russia and Ukraine: Prince Vladimir, Iaroslav the Wise, Oleg the Seer, Ilia
Muromets, Alesha Popovich, Dobrynia Nikitich, and King Danylo. The Russian films discussed
in this chapter are Andrei Kravchuk’s *The Viking* (2016), Iurii Kulakov’s *Prince Vladimir* (2005),
Dmitrii Korobkin’s *Iaroslav. A Thousand Years Ago* (2010), and Vladimir Kil'burg’s *Oleg the
Seer* (2020). The films address the figures of Prince Vladimir, Iaroslav the Wise, and Oleg the
Seer. The Ukrainian films discussed in the following pages are *Unknown Ukraine: Sketches of our
History* [Nevidoma Ukraïina. Narosy nashoi istorii, 1994-1996], Iurii Kovaliov’s *The Stronghold*
(2017), and Taras Khymych’s *King Danylo* (2018). The Ukrainian films concentrate on the figures
of Ilia Muromets, Alesha Popovich, Dobrynia Nikitich, and King Danylo. The chapter explores
why certain historical figures have recently become more important in Ukrainian and Russian
culture.

2.1 Andrei Kravchuk. *The Viking* (2016)

As a remediation of the monumental art, Andrei Kravchuk’s film *The Viking* (2016) is
another significant monument to Prince Vladimir as a godfather to Russia’s contemporary politics
and works together with the earlier established monument in Moscow. Both the film and the statue became explicit embodiments of Russia’s political imaginings about its past and its present. The film aims to educate its audiences about Prince Vladimir the Baptizer in ways convenient to state memory politics. As Viktor Khokhlov points out in his review, the image of Prince Vladimir in the film was created in accordance with the statue on Borovitskaia square next to Kremlin. Hence, the main reference point was not the Primary Chronicle but the “new consistent image of the Baptizer, in accordance with contemporary policy of historical memory” (Khokhlov). Thus, the image of the defender and consolidator of the Russian lands appears.

Over the course of history, the image of Prince Vladimir altered depending on the tasks of the ruling ideology both in Russia and Ukraine. In their study of the shared history of Russia and Ukraine organized around personalities who entered the lists of the best Ukrainians and the best Russians, Vadim Aristov and Igor’ Danilevskii, respectively a Russian and a Ukrainian historian, maintain that Prince Vladimir did not baptize either Ukraine or Russia or both, “because these societies emerged already in the Christianized world, and it is they who ‘nationalized’ him,” meaning Vladimir (25). The scholars explain that in historical references of Muscovy, “Vladimir was primarily a character of dynastic and state history. Baptism did not constitute a self-sufficient, independent plot,” whereas for “Kievan orthodox authors of the 17th century who were raised and lived in a different cultural and political context,” Prince Vladimir was seen as the founder of the Kievan church tradition” (Aristov and Danilevskii 24). Later on, in the 19—20 century, Christianization acquires “national coloring” and a “special meaning” for Russian and Ukrainian histories (Aristov and Danilevskii 24). In the 21st century, this special meaning has led to the emergence of parallel images of Prince Vladimir referring to the same events in the past in completely different contexts and from absolutely different perspectives.
The necessity to maintain the status of Holy Russia through close ties with ancient Slavic rulers, such as Prince Vladimir, has been an important component of the overall Russian imperial ideology in the last two decades. As Denise Youngblood mentions (KinoKultura), Kravchuk “undoubtedly sought to reclaim St. Vladimir from Ukraine, and newly reoccupied Crimea provided many of the sites for location shooting.” The scholar is, however, concerned about the quality of the film and whether “the Putin regime actually wants to identify itself with the version of Vladimir? Or could The Viking possibly be considered a bizarre critique of Russia’s current leadership?” (“Andrei Kravchuk”). As a contemporary rendition of a distant past, the film invests the historical tale with even greater mythological references. The preparation for the shooting of The Viking, including the study of history, took seven years, yet historical veracity has nothing to do with the film. The Viking, however, was highly acclaimed by President Putin, who evaluated the film as “undoubtedly interesting” in spite of some “questions that can be arguable from the point of view of historians,” yet this is a feature film; that is why it is valuable (“Putin otsenil fil'm ‘Viking’”).

It is notable that the symbolic baptism of Rus' in Khersones (Korsun'), on the territory of present-day Crimea, is pictured as the climax of the film, whereas Vladimir’s rule in Kiev (his main activity as a political leader) appears to be entirely excluded from the narrative. Kiev itself is depicted as a miserable pagan village not worthy any attention. The low quality of the film, in spite of its relatively high budget (22 million dollars), is out of scope of this study, yet I should mention that the film takes the viewer into a murky world of dirty tramps, where most characters look alike, creating confusion among viewers; Prince Vladimir does not look any better than the rest of the rogues. The dark, gloomy, almost black-and-white world of paganism, murder, and fratricide suddenly changes to a full-color picture towards the end of the film, when Korsun'
present-day Khersones) is introduced. The shift of color visually astounds the viewer, whose eyes have already adjusted to the muddy landscapes and scenes of severe violence. The stunning view of the sky-blue sea, matched in a pan shot with golden landscapes of Korsun', brings a completely different atmosphere to the entire film. The image of the magnificent fortress of Korsun' is enhanced with an inspiring soundtrack and sounds of seagulls. This is a new blissful world, in which there is no place for grey colors. As Vladimir with his troops is getting ready to attack the fortress, monks in white clothing inside the fortress are praying and holding icons as shields against the enemy. When Vladimir finally enters the city and when his people, dressed in dirty rags, encounter Korsun' dwellers, who look like a living icon, the clash of the pagan and the Christian world becomes even more vivid. Inside the Orthodox temple, the camera follows Vladimir’s amazed look at the icons and murals. It is here that his transformation from a merciless murderer to a saint takes place. Kravchuk’s film neglects the tale from the Primary Chronicle that Vladimir got acquainted with four monotheistic religions before he made his choice of Orthodoxy. In The Viking, Vladimir accepts Orthodox Christianity only to marry Princess Anna, Byzantine Emperor’s sister, although some surviving versions suggest it was only one of the factors that influenced his decision. The emphasis on the marriage, however, is highly important for Russian ideology because the alliance with Anna later on nurtured the myth of the noble lineage of Moscow Tsars, not to mention the Byzantine double-headed eagle on the Russian coat of arms.

In Kravchuk’s film, Vladimir goes through an accelerated transformation from a pagan to a highly spiritual person, as he confesses all his murders in the church desperately crying before his baptism. It is notable that the baptism itself takes place one-on-one with the priest in the church, unlike the common image of Vladimir being baptized in a river together with people. Immediately after the ritual of baptism, he refuses to kill people, as he now believes in eternal life. The final
scene of the film is a picturesque idyll in which people in white clothes with happy smiles enter
the water and take the blessing of the new religion, while Vladimir acquires a Jesus-like appearance
and a thoughtful look.

Thus, while Khersones represents a space of Christianization, a spiritual center, and
appears as an embodiment of progress and a turning point in history, Kiev is dark and pagan, a
relic of the past left somewhere behind. In his review of the film, Khokhlov mentions that even in
Soviet films (Ilia Muromets [Ilia Muromets, 1956, Sadko [Sadko, 1952] by Aleksandr Ptushko)
Kiev was “pictured as a bulwark of culture much superior to neighboring lands. In The Viking, the
pagan Slavic world is depicted dirty and beggary,” while “Khersones when attacked by the army
of Vladimir seems to be Rome in comparison to it” (Khokhlov). Khersones is, therefore, the most
sacred place that Prince Vladimir is primarily associated with. As Putin once mentioned,

Khersones is Sebastopol. Can you imagine how powerful the connection
between the spiritual beginnings and state constituents is, in relation to the struggle
for this place, for Crimea in general, for Sebastopol and Khersones. In fact, the
Russian people has been struggling for many centuries to stand by its historical
spiritual font. (“Vladimir Putin sdal piat' gromkikh zaiaveli”)  

This is the ultimate spiritual space, a city where the ancient history of Russian Christianity
begins. It is thanks to Vladimir’s baptism in Khersones that the Russians can now enjoy all of the
traditions of Orthodoxy, as well as those magnificent churches throughout the country.

The Viking is, however, exceptional in the sense that this is the first feature film with Prince
Vladimir as the main hero. Another example can be Iurii Tomosheevskii’s Prince Vladimir [Kniaz'
Vladimir, 1993], but in this Russian film, Vladimir appears already on the deathbed in 1015. His
life is shown through flashbacks, as if a vision or a blurred dream. Vladimir is going through
turmoil of his soul; he can see what happened before and what is going to happen after his death, but he is not an active participant of the events. A similar paradigm of the image of the prince is evident in Soviet cinema, where his presence is most always minimized and episodic, for instance, in Grigori Koxhan’s *Iaroslav The Wise* [Iaroslav Mudryi, 1981]. As Vasyl Iavir points out in his review of *The Viking*, Russia creates its own, specifically Russian image of Prince Vladimir that plays a special role in today’s Russian historical narrative. He also emphasizes that “Russia does not steal the Ukrainian Vladimir, but invents its own Russian Prince Vladimir, baptizer of Rus. These two both functionally and visually distance from each other and begin to live in parallel worlds of two different historical memories” (Iavir, “Viking”). As often happens with cinematic representations of the past, the film sparked immense public debates to a historical topic that hitherto had been forgotten and marginalized. *The Viking* became one of the agenda-setters for collective remembrance and “it is then through the inter-medial reiteration of the story across different platforms in the public arena (print, image, internet, commemorative rituals) that the topic [took] root in the community” (Erll, *Mediation 2*).


Another attempt to bring the Christianization of Rus’ into contemporary Russian memory discourse was made in Iurii Kulakov’s animation film, *Prince Vladimir* (2005) targeted at young audiences, whom it was supposed to educate about the ancient history of Russia and the origins of Orthodoxy. The film was originally planned to be released in 2004, the year of presidential elections, under the ambiguous name *The Choice*, with the evident ambivalence of associations attached to the main hero’s name, Prince Vladimir. The official release of the film, however, was
delayed and took place only in 2005, while the original idea to tell children about the Christianization of Rus' was not fully realized. In the film, Prince Vladimir, in spite of his eponymous role, has no will of his own and tends to be influenced by sorcerers and evil powers throughout the film. The choice of religion, in the meantime, is made not by Vladimir, as it is discussed in the Primary Chronicles but by a boy, Aleksha, who is ransomed from captivity by Byzantines, travels to Constantinople where he is introduced to Christianity. Aleksha is the first to be baptized in the film, he is given a Gospel that saves his life and he continues to read from it and preach the new religion. Aleksha talks about the God and his son, Jesus Christ, to a kind old magician, who treats Vladimir after he is knocked out by a bull and saves his life from the spell of the sorcerer. The baptism of Vladimir, in the meantime, is shown only in passing as he takes a morning bath. Before the symbolic baptism Vladimir had no encounter with Christianity, except for the episode when he saw a cross that fell out of the hand of dead Iaropolk. Vladimir, thus, plays only a secondary role in the film with an unclear message, although his name stands in the title of the film. The main role and agency in the film is given to Aleksha and the sorcerer Krivzha. What makes the animation attractive and meaningful in terms of memory explorations, however, is how the magnificent Russian landscapes, beautiful soundtracks and the depiction of Russian traditions altogether inspire patriotic feelings and pride for Russia and its ancient history. The depiction of the celebration of *Maslenitsa,*\(^6\) full of color, music, featuring *bogatyri,* Russian beauties, and a *skomorokh*\(^7\) dance, with traditional humor and *sushki*—reflects all the possible stereotypes about Russia.

\(^6\) Russian for Pancake week, Mardi gras.

\(^7\) Russian minstrel, buffoon.
Although the film is rife with historical discrepancies and distortions, there is no logic or consistency in the story, it has a powerful message about Russian patriotism, memory of ancient Rus', Orthodoxy and Prince Vladimir as a solely Russian legacy. Prince Vladimir is shown during his rule in Novgorod, while his brother Iaropolk is set in Kiev. The conflict between the two brothers is the focal point of the story. Having believed the intrigues of the sorcerer, Vladimir resolves to go to Kiev and kill his brother. His decision is questioned by his warriors: “The walls in Kiev are strong. Will we be able to seize it?”—“We will,” answers Vladimir. Vladimir who, according to the Primary Chronicles is believed to have killed Iaropolk, is whitewashed by the authors of the film, since the execution of the murder is given to a Varangian. With no agency of his own, Vladimir is now destined to obtain the full power over Rus'. The impression is that a Novgorodian prince is unwittingly given rule over Kiev by a higher power: he is destined to become the sole prince of all of Rus' and defeat the Pechenegs8 and the evil powers. Kiev, in the meantime, is associated with Iaropolk, a weaker brother, while Novgorod equals Vladimir, Russia, spirituality, and power. Such phrases as “you are not my brother anymore” uttered by Vladimir to Iaropolk, as Vladimir becomes certain that his brother has betrayed him, can be further interpreted on the plane of brotherhood of Slavic nations. Although there is in fact no betrayal, and Vladimir learns about his brother’s honesty right before Iaropolk is killed, the fact that his brother is defeated brings Vladimir, a Novgorodian prince, on a higher level over the Kievan prince, Iaropolk.

While contemporary Ukrainian cinema does not have a feature film about Prince Vladimir, there is a wide range of documentaries arguing the Ukrainian side of the question of Vladimir’s origins. In view of Ukrainian historians, Vladimir was born and raised in Volyn’, a region in

8 Semi-nomadic Turkic tribes.
Ukraine, unlike the widely spread fact that he was born near modern-day Pskov, Vladimir ruled in Kiev for thirty-six years and became the baptizer of Rus' and significant political leader precisely during this time. These facts lead Ukrainians to believe that Vladimir belongs to specifically Ukrainian cultural memory that Vladimir is a spiritual leader, and founder of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.

Acknowledgement of St. Vladimir in Ukraine was also done on the state level, as he was admitted into the national memory. In 2008 President Iushchenko passed a decree about the “celebration of Christianization of Kievan Rus” (Hrytsenko 285). The holiday is celebrated on the day of St. Vladimir and symbolizes the thousand-year history of Ukraine, its legacy as a nation and a state. For Ukrainians, St. Vladimir is a symbol of unity of Ukrainian nation around the idea of a strong state and faith. In 2009, in his speech on the Day of Christianization of Ukraine-Rus, President Iushchenko mentioned that

St. Vladimir is one of the founders and defenders of our statehood. For us this day means several foundational notions. This is the legacy of the thousand-year history of Ukraine, of our nation and state. This is indivisibility of Ukrainian people and its unity around the idea of a strong nation and religion. This is sobornost' of all Ukrainians and all Ukrainian lands around our native state and spiritual capital—Kiev. This is powerful presence of Kiev in the world history and its civilizational influence of the neighboring lands and peoples. This is unity of our state and spiritual beginnings. (Iushchenko)

While the dispute can hardly ever be resolved peacefully—and this resolution is not the point of the study—I am primarily interested in the problem itself, in the unexplainable. What conclusions can we draw from these different conceptualizations of the same historical
personality? How does contemporary memory politics use history to produce new meanings about the past?

The ideology of The Viking, according to Iavir, is based on the anti-Norman theory of the emergence of Slavs that has been developed and kept sacred by Russian Slavophiles for the last two centuries: “The official position of the state … one can describe as a compromise, as ‘Norman-Slavophile’ meaning that the Varangians existed in Rus’ but in small quantities” (Iavir “Viking”).

It is indispensable for Russian patriotic thought to convince people that the Slavs were creators of their statehood and have both powerful ethnic and national roots. This is the foundation for Russian identity, providing confidence to feel self-sufficient, righteous, and spiritually unique as heirs of the sacred past and royal genes for world power and exceptional position on the international arena.

As Konstantin Ernst, producer of The Viking, mentioned in an interview:

Vladimir has played a tremendous role in the personal history of each of us.

We are who we are to a large extent thanks to his choice. I think this is a very important film because it tells a story about one of the apical points in our history.

… Moreover, we understand that Russia, in spite of its complicated geographical location, is a European country and we are people of European culture. This is also a result of the choice made by Vladimir. (Zabaluev)

This position explains a lot about the necessity to acquire Vladimir among the ranks of Russian heroes. Vladimir is literally a representation and the beginning of Russia’s high culture. The historical figure has also become the foundation of Russia’s westernization and the claim of its being unique and even superior to the West. Reclaiming Vladimir from Ukraine (and Belarus) is crucial to the establishment of the new memory politics in the modern Putin era.
The fact that Prince Vladimir acquires so much attention in Russia since 2015 and suddenly becomes such an important historical figure after many centuries of oblivion is a compelling indication of adding the prince to the cultural canon. As mentioned in the Introduction, Aleida Assmann distinguishes two types of cultural memory: the active memory, which is also the canon, and passive memory—the archive. Active cultural memory is “built on a small number of normative and formative texts, places, persons, artifacts, and myths, which are meant to be actively circulated and communicated in ever-new presentations and performances” (A. Assmann 100). The passive reference memory is at the other end of the spectrum and represents a “storehouse for cultural relicts” that are “de-contextualized and disconnected from their former frames, which had authorized them or determined their meaning. As part of the archive, they are open to new contexts and lend themselves to new interpretations” (A. Assmann 99). Prince Vladimir is one of those cultural relicts that has been kept somewhere in an archival storage for many centuries and then suddenly pulled out of the storehouse to join the main exhibition. Divested of any context or framework of meaning, the figure is now filled with contemporary contexts and interpretations of the present. A. Assmann defines archives as “institutions of passive cultural memory” that are “situated halfway between the canon and forgetting” (102) During the Soviet times, St. Vladimir was placed in the realm of forgetting, and now he is re-entering the canon, the active cultural memory, undergoing a new act of canonization since the 14th century. As A. Assmann underscores, canon is marked by “three qualities: selection, value, and duration,” with duration meaning being “independent of historical change” (100). Vladimir was selected to begin the Russian updated history, while facts of his life were also carefully chosen to support the image, which is now different from both imperial Russian and Soviet Prince Vladimir.
The history of Kievan Rus’ is being actively rewritten to fit today’s international politics of Russia, especially concerning the relations with Ukraine. The name “Kievan Rus’” was, furthermore, replaced by Ancient Rus (drevnerusskoe gosudarstvo) in Russian historical sources. As Iavir maintains, “Russia is forced to cede the value of statehood to the benefit of Orthodoxy. The former is connected with the ‘lost’ Kiev, while the latter—with the recently ‘found’ Khersones and Crimea” (Iavir “Viking”). The importance and influence of the Orthodox Church has considerably increased in Russia over the last two decades, which makes this turn to deep spirituality in history writing comprehensible. In imperial Russia, the official Church was administered in tandem with the secular imperial order, affirming the mythology of Moscow as the Third Rome. As Nikolai Berdiaev maintains, “The Byzantium Orthodox kingdom fell, and the only Orthodox kingdom left in the world, according to this teaching, was the Russian kingdom. The Russian people are the only bearers of true Orthodox faith in the world” (6).

For all the tumultuous changes since Berdiaev’s day, one might argue that—in this respect—little has changed. In Andreas Kappeler’s view, “today’s Russia follows this policy and is using the Orthodox Church as an instrument of its politics of hegemony” (111). The close relationship between the state and the church heavily contributes to the identity they create. As Katarzyna Jarzynska argues, present-day Russian nationalism “exists in a highly fragmented, non-homogenous state, characterized in the most general terms according to the two ‘lines’ of thought, an imperial-Orthodox line and an ethnic line, which encompasses the broadest views of particularly Putin-era nationalism” (1). In the narrative of Russian-Ukrainian relationship Orthodoxy also became a ground for Russian hegemony over Ukraine, as “Russia uses the Orthodox Church and the traditional dominance of the Russian language as instruments for its
policy” (Kappeler 107). The imperial narrative is widely used by Russian politicians to explain the Russian-Ukrainian relations; this is why the existence of a self-sufficient Kiev is impossible.

2.3 Dmitrii Korobkin. Iaroslav. A Thousand Years Ago (2010 Iaroslav. Tysiachu let nazad)

A similar practice of depicting Kievan Rus' without Kiev is also evident in Dmitrii Korobkin’s Iaroslav. A Thousand Years Ago (2010). For comparison’s sake, according to the Ukrainian mentality, Iaroslav the Wise is associated with his broad cultural activity in Kiev, his book collections and libraries, and most importantly, St. Sophia’s Cathedral in Kiev. According to Ukrainian historian Petro Kraliuk, Volodymyr “has only created a possibility for the [Kievan] state to exist” … while “Iaroslav the Wise made this possibility a reality. Over the years of his reign, Rus' was fully realized as a state and an empire” (5). In Korobkin’s Russian film, however, Iaroslav the Wise is a completely different character, settled in northern Russia. Referring to Iaroslav’s early career as a ruler in Rostov (Russia), where he was assigned at the age of ten and continued his service till approximately thirty years old, the Russian filmmakers are constructing an image of Iaroslav who has made a major contribution in his life and the history of Rus’ by building a fortress of Iaroslavl' and turning the indigenous people towards Christianity. Iaroslav’s reign in Rostov was only the first step in his career as a leader. He was then transferred to a more prestigious principality of Novgorod, and only after the death of his father he finally reached the top and became the Prince of Kievan Rus'. The film is dedicated to the one thousandth anniversary of Iaroslavl’, which defines the genre of the film. As Lars Kristensen mentions in his review, “Korobkin and Anno Domini … for their next project—turn to another city, Kazan… in order to
make Kazan’s film” (Kristensen). “Today it is considered that the city was founded in 1010, although the date is not documented,” maintains Kraliuk, who argues that the city of Iaroslavl was founded much later, in 1071 after the death of Iaroslav (Iaroslav Mudryi 30). With the focus on the future fortress of Iaroslavl, Kievan Rus’ is left on the margins, while Rostov principality gains all the attention. Only about twenty years after Christianization, Iaroslav brings Orthodoxy to northern Russia and successfully converts local people, just as Vladimir previously did. In most historical sources, especially Ukrainian, the Rostov period in Iaroslav’s activity is mentioned only in passing. For instance, in Grigorii Kokhan’s (a Soviet Ukrainian director) Iaroslav the Wise [Iaroslav Mudryi, 1981], governing in Rostov is given only as a fact at the beginning of the film, while the film itself is set first in Novgorod and then in Kiev after the death of Vladimir. The selective approach to biographical and historical facts thus allows the construction of absolutely different images that serve the purposes of the ideology.

Iaroslav the Wise did not enter the circle of heroes of Russian history until the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century when he received the epithet “Wise” in wake of the development of school education. In the Soviet discourse, the prince was discussed in terms of feudalism and as a ruler during whose leadership Kievan Rus’ managed to enhance influence in distant parts of the Rusian state, yet the prince remained a second-rate hero, since Soviet ideology proprietized revolutionary heroes of a much later period. “The main historiographical invention of the Soviet era that influenced mass consciousness and is associated with Iaroslav was a construct about the “golden age” of Ancient Rus’. The emergence of the construct is to a large extent connected to the activity of D.S. Likhachev” (Rostovtsev and Sosnitskii 31). Soviet scholars, however, also raised discussions about Iaroslav’s complicity in the murder of his brothers, an act that made the image of the prince more complicated and less attractive.
Among the most prominent literary texts that popularized Iaroslav in Soviet society is dramatic poem by Ivan Kocherga *Iaroslav the Wise* [Iaroslav Mudryi, 1946]. Kocherga is a Ukrainian Soviet playwright and the poem was first published in Ukrainian and then in Russian. In the poem, Kocherga adheres to the socialist ideology and creates an image of Iaroslav as a wise ruler who was forced by circumstances to act cruelly. The international connections of Iaroslav’s extended family were not prioritized in the Stalin era. This topic becomes popular much later, especially after Igor Maslennikov’s film *Anna Iaroslavna* was released in 1978. In present-day Ukraine, Iaroslav is often referred to as the “father-in-law of Europe” and this aspect of his activity is considered one of the most important, in wake of Ukraine’s orientation towards Europe. In post-Soviet Russian history, Iaroslav, in this respect, is called a Westerner whose main doctrine of state rule was “the Western spirit of mercantilism, priority of material values over spiritual” (Asonov 124). He is also contrasted to his highly spiritual father, Vladimir the Baptizer, who chose orientation towards Byzantium over Western Europe.

It is notable that two monuments to Iaroslav the Wise were erected in the 1990s: one in Iaroslavl, Russia (1993) and the other—in Kiev, Ukraine (1997). An interesting detail about these monuments is that the Russian Iaroslav holds a model of the Iaroslavl Kremlin in his hand, while the Ukrainian one—a model of St. Sophia Cathedral. In Ukraine, Iaroslav the Wise became the winner of the 2008 project *Great Ukrainians*, while in Russia he is ranked 38th among national heroes. The order of Prince Iaroslav the Wise is the highest state award in Ukraine since 1995.

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9 Anne of Kiev (Anne de Russie) was a daughter of Iaroslav the Wise who became the queen consort of Henry I of France. She later served as regent during the minority of her son Philip I of France.

10 See Rostovtsev and Sosnitskii for more information on competition between Russia and Ukraine for the memory of Iaroslav the Wise.
Therefore, the prince entered the pantheon of national historical leaders in Ukraine, while in Russia he is still a second-rate hero—a status inherited from the Soviet Union.

2.4 Vladimir Kil'burg. Oleg the Seer (2020 Veshchii Oleg)

Another major figure in the history of the Slavs that occupies a significant place in contemporary memory politics of Russia is Prince Oleg. Oleg’s significance in mythmaking concerns an effort to gain control over the emergence of Rus’ so as to prove that the history of Slavs is ancient and they were not conquered by the Vikings. In Vladimir Kil'burg’s film, Oleg the Seer [Veshchii Oleg 2020], Prince Oleg manages to unite scattered tribes into one polity, laying the foundation for Kievan Rus', and defending it both from the Vikings and the Khazars. Again, Russian cinema is going even deeper in history to make a claim about its superior position as an heir to the ancient past. A search of its foundation date is one of the major tasks of the memory policy in post-Soviet Russia. Bringing Prince Oleg into the present-day context is a claim that the prince is a direct founder of today’s Russia. As Wiejermars (21) maintains, “history can be an important source of framing devices” for many political leaders and movements. The scholar also mentions that “the rhetorical use of historical references can establish a line of tradition,” furthermore, “political actors can contextualize their connection to the political entity they seek to represent by indicating historical analogy between the present and a given historical occurrence” (Wiejermars 21). Putin’s regime follows the pattern by creating an image of an ancient prince uniting the isolated lands into one proto-state, demonstrating the necessity for Slavs to unite.

While Russian ideologists aim to create a linear ancient history of Russia, going back to Rus’ or Ancient Rus’ and earlier, the Ukrainians operate from the position that contemporary
Russia has nothing to do with Kievan Rus’ at all. In Russian official resources, it is considered that, after it was destroyed by the Tartars in 1240, Kievan Rus' literally moved to the north, where it was restored first as Muscovy, and then as the Russian Empire by reconsolidating all the Rus' lands. In Ukraine, in the meantime, historians insist that not only is Ukraine the only heir of Kievan Rus’ as a polity, but also that the name Rus’ belongs to Ukrainians as well and was appropriated by the Russians. According to Ukrainian historian, Mykhailo Hrushevskii, Kievan Rus' continued its existence as a state not in Muscovy, but rather in Halician-Volynian Principality in Western Ukraine, which became a political and cultural heir to the Kievan state and prolonged independent political life of Ukrainian-Rusian lands for another century after the collapse of Kiev. “The new state that arose there did not embrace all Ukraine as the kingdom of Kiev had done; yet for another century it remained a united and politically independent power in densely inhabited western Ukraine” (Hrushevsky 96). In his eleven volume History of Ukraine-Rus’, Hrushevskii also introduced the concept of Ukraine-Rus’, as well as insisted that Kievan princes used to call themselves russkie, Russian; this is why Rus' is an ancient name for Ukrainians. The Russian statehood, he would argue, emerged only after the Tartar Yoke was defeated in the 15th century and it has nothing in common with Kievan Rus' proper. The Vladimir-Suzdal principality, the future Muscovy, was a far periphery for Kiev, so there is no connection between these polities.

Hrushevskii’s interpretation of Ukrainian history has become the founding text for the construction of Ukrainian national identity, while Hrushevskii himself, banned in Soviet times, became a national hero of Ukraine featuring on fifty hrivnia note (Ukrainian currency). According to Serhii Plokhy, The History of Ukraine-Rus’ “was also a major cultural and political statement strengthening Ukraine’s claim to national distinctiveness and ultimately supporting the cause of its political independence” (Unmaking Imperial Russia 6). Hrushevskii has contributed a lot to the
formation of the new Ukrainian national identity that is now perpetuated by contemporary historians in the process of nation-building. Although Hrushevskii’s oeuvre belongs to early twentieth century, he is much influenced by the nineteenth century aspirations of Ukrainian nationalism. Nineteenth century became an age of historicization globally, as modern historiography emerged seeking “to objectify the past in a professional and independent academic discourse” (Aleida Assmann, *Shadows of Trauma* 28). It is in this period, according to Aleida Assmann (28), that “national myths also emerge that appropriate the past to the present by focusing on particular moments that will support an identity-constructing narrative.” The study of history, therefore, often served the national constructions of memory.

According to Kraliuk (33), a contemporary Ukrainian scholar, “by and large, the medieval empire that is usually called Rus’ or Kievan Rus, is neither Ukraine, nor, moreover, Russia, although it had a historical relation to the formation of the former and the latter.” The scholar further draws a parallel making an assertion that Rus’ has the same relation to Russia and Ukraine as Roman Empire has to Romania and Italy. Romanians have taken their name from the Roman Empire but in fact were only a distant province, hardly influenced by the cultural achievements of the Roman Empire.

The same with Russians and Ukrainians. The former emerged on a ‘barbaric periphery’ of Rus’, but in wake of different historical circumstances, have appropriated the name of Rus’ and Russia (the latter is a derivative of Rus’). Ukrainians who now populate the lands that used to be the center of Rus’ (in ancient times Rus’ was mainly the territory around Kiev), although have lost their ‘Rusian name,’ but it is from their land that ‘the Russian land began’. Respectively, just like Italians have a lot more rights to claim the ancient Roman legacy than Romanians,
Ukrainians have a lot more rights to claim the legacy of Rus' than Russians (Kraliuk *Iaroslav Mudryi* 34).

Another aspect of Kievan Rus' that is most important for the Ukrainian national thought is that the Kievan state was an early form of what later came to be called democracy, based on the *veche* (literally, the place where people consider affairs of state importance), a council that solved most of the problems of the state. Democracy has never been the main principle of state structure in Muscovy, and was only briefly practiced in Novgorod and Pskov principalities, where it was eventually stifled. The modern Ukrainian state formation is supported by the historical fact of the early presence of proto-democracy on the territory of Ukraine during the Kievan Rus' period. “In spite of the democratic tradition of the Rusians, Muscovy has announced and established the idea of its unity on the principle of monarchy and autocracy: Moscow is the third Rome. It became the driving force of Moscovite history after the defeat of Novgorod” (Klymonchuk 189). With autocracy being the main principle of state power over the course of Russian history till the present time, the quasi-democratic nature of Kievan Rus' has encountered resistance both in Imperial historiography, in Soviet times, and today. The Ukrainian historical thought goes back to Kievan Rus' first of all as a source of democracy that should be emulated by the new state system in independent Ukraine. Another aspect of Kievan Rus' that should be noted is the relationship between Orthodoxy and state power. According to Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytskyi, in Kievan Rus', “the state and church power did not merge, they were separated, with each of them being autonomous in their realm of power” (8).

The diametrically opposite visions of the shared ancient past, hence, spawn different realities in which the Russian and Ukrainian cultural memories develop today creating conflicting images of the past as reflected in the present. As Kappeler argues, “the question of the historical
heritage is the most controversial issue of the Russian-Ukrainian relations. History is one of the crucial factors of national identity and it is used in the politics of history by states and societies” (112). The Ukrainian ideology is, therefore, based on a deep conviction that Ukrainians, among other Slavs, are the main successor of the common cradle of Kievan Rus'. Georgii Kasianov maintains that “the great majority of the world’s states and nations have undergone the ‘nationalization’ of history,” meaning “a way of perceiving, understanding and treating the past that requires the separation of ‘one’s own’ history from an earlier ‘common’ history and its construction as the history of a nation” (“Nationalized history” 7). The nation became a new telos for Ukraine, around which the new historical narrative and cultural memory was shaped. Having nationalized Kievan Rus’ as the first form of Ukrainian statehood, Ukrainians were able to claim a millennial history of political thought.


The state-sponsored documentary series Unknown Ukraine: Sketches of our History (1994-1996) consisting of 108 fifteen-minute episodes served the mission of nationalizing Ukrainian history from ancient times to 1992 and aiming to create a holistic picture of the development of Ukrainian statehood. At the beginning of the first episode, the narrator refers the audience to the words of the Roman Emperor Trajan, who once allegedly stated that in order to exterminate a nation there is no need to kill young children, men or women: it is enough to bereave the nation of its history. In the following scene, a psychiatrist is talking to a patient asking him about his age and where he was born. The doctor then shows a pen and asks the man to tell her what one can do
with the object. As the man is unable to answer, the omniscient narrator explains that this is amnesia, a terrible psychic disease connected to the loss of memory. With images of uprooted trees falling down, the narrator continues his explanation, stating that amnesia is a tragedy for one person, but in terms of a nation bereaved of its historical memory and its name, the scale of the tragedy is immeasurable. For almost three hundred years, Ukrainians lived in a state of amnesia, the narrator follows. There was no history of Ukraine, it existed only as an echo of the imperial history of Russia. The documentary’s images of icons with crucified Jesus supports the idea of Ukraine as a martyr who suffered immense torture. The primary message of the episode, and the TV series in general, is to educate the new generation of Ukrainians to be conscious of their past in order to build the future of the nation. The Ukrainian culture is then compared to Greek culture, and the caves of Kiev Pechersk Monastery—to the mystery of Troy. Il'ia Muromets is then claimed to be a real person, not a mythic hero, as his relics are well preserved in the Kiev Pechersk Monastery, thus giving a clear allusion to his Ukrainian origins.

In Episode Four of the series, the origins of Ukrainians are tracked back to Trypillian culture that existed five thousand years ago. The comparison between the ancient tribes and Ukrainians is drawn simply by stating that Trypillians built and decorated their houses exactly as Ukrainians did thousands of years later. The model of the housing shown on screen, however, is a typical way of house building for many peoples in Eastern Europe. There is no ethnic connection between Ukrainians and the tribes of Trypillia. The Ukrainians, therefore, are heirs of ancient civilizations, yet constitute a unique ethnicity of their own. According to Kasianov, “nationalization of the Trypillia culture allowed Ukrainians to speak about five thousand years of Ukrainian history” (Past Continuous 227).
The TV series is based on the concept of the “flow of history” (Kasianov, *Past Continuous* 228). Beginning from the discussion of ancient tribes as ancestors of modern-day Ukrainians, the filmmakers make a statement about Kievan Rus' as the cradle of Ukrainian state system, which was then continued by the Galician-Volynian Principality. The period under the Polish-Lithuanian rule is a time of suppression and hardships that evidenced the viability of Ukrainians who were able to survive in spite of the oppression. The Cossackdom is an age of heroism and national tragedy, the time of fighting for liberation and establishment of the Ukrainian state, followed by the heavy burden of being a periphery of an empire. The twentieth century is a dark time of repressions, artificial famines, wars, and misleading ideologies, where Ukrainian found themselves in a trap of worshipping “wrong gods” and praying to Stalin and Lenin instead of their real God. And it is finally in 1991 that the Ukrainian nation began to reclaim its memory after long centuries of amnesia by restoring its long-forgotten past and making its people aware of the importance to recollect and preserve their ancient history in order never to repeat its tragedies.

The ideology of the TV series is straightforward. It constructs a linear model of Ukrainian history that existed since the times of Kievan Rus'. In the wake of unfavorable circumstances, that continuity was interrupted multiple times, as Ukrainians were subject to the rule of foreign powers, yet were able to live up till 1991, when they finally woke up from the millennial sleep and overcame amnesia. As Ernest Renan asserts, “forgetting is an essential factor in the creation of a nation,” and the case of Ukrainian historical studies, it became instrumental in the formation of national identity. At the same time, memory and remembering became a social factor “not by the fact that they are located at a place beyond actors, but by the fact that they become co-oriented via reflexive processes of expectations and imputations, which give rise to the impression that nearly everybody in society thinks about the past in that and no other way” (Schmidt, 196).
The contrasting vision of the shared past that has formed today in the Russian and Ukrainian ideologies only supports the idea that the past is a realm of the present, as the memories are constructed, reimagined and tailored to fit the political ideologies. As Landsberg maintains, memory is not a transhistorical phenomenon but, rather, “like all other modalities, memory is historically and culturally specific; it has meant different things to people and cultures at different times and has been instrumentalized in the service of diverse cultural practices” (3). As the examples of Russian and Ukrainian historical films show, “memory in its various forms has always been about negotiating a relationship to the past,” it, moreover, has become a strategy for consolidating new identities (Landsberg 4).

2.6 Iurii Kovaliov, *The Stronghold* (2017 *Storozhova zastava*)

The theme of ancient Rus' is not well represented in Ukrainian cinema or memory politics in the first decade after 1991. In many ways it is a result of the long stagnation of Ukrainian cinema, but also because there was no need for Ukrainians to prove a seemingly self-evident fact: Kievan Rus’ is Ukrainian history. It is only in recent years that the historical period begins to appear in Ukrainian cinema. Iurii Kovaliov, for instance, in his historical fantasy, *The Stronghold* (2017), creates a Kievan Rus' that is particularly Ukrainian. Even the traditional Russian (*russkie* bylīny) heroes Alesha Popovich, Ilia Muromets, and Dobrynia Nikitich acquire names in Ukrainian manner—Oleshko, Il'ko, and Dobrynia. The Ukrainian film industry has considerably changed after 2014, when Filipp Ilienko became the head of Ukrainian State Film Agency. While previously Ukraine served as a service area for Russian film industry, providing its actors, film
Patriotic film is any film that creates Ukrainian cultural context, regardless of the topic of the film, its plot line or genre. It can be a historical drama about a hetman or an entertaining comedy about the modern times. It is the Ukrainian cultural context that shapes Ukrainian national identity and fosters self-identification of Ukrainians. Most people think that a patriotic film is necessarily a historical film, about a historical event or figure. Clearly, such film will be patriotic, but patriotism is not limited to this only. Film is not supposed to replace a textbook or any other scholarly research, film is creation of mythology. Film is not science. It does not appeal to rationality; it appeals to people’s emotions.” (Linnyk)

The Stronghold is not a historical film but a fantasy, a fairy tale; this is why its contemporary flare is artistically motivated. The Ukrainian national ideology that has developed over the previous two decades of independence is a firm background for the film. The mere fact that the film is in Ukrainian and all the heroes, including the Polans and the ancient Rus people, speak Ukrainian is a compelling setting. In the film, an ordinary Ukrainian boy, Vit’ko, goes to the Carpathians to see a solar eclipse that opens a time portal into the past and the hero is taken one thousand years ago. There he has a number of adventures, a friendship with Oleshko (the Ukrainian original of the figure of Alesha Popovich), and overcomes his fear of heights before he returns home. This is a fully Ukrainian film sponsored by Ukrainian State Agency of Cinema, made by Ukrainian directors, with Ukrainian actors, and a Ukrainian audience may easily recognize the current Ukrainian reality under the fantasy disguise. The decorations of Kievan Rus'
are used to build a string of attachment of present-day Ukraine to its distant past, in compliance with the current Ukrainian ideology, as well as in opposition to the Russian memory policy.

With no pretensions to historical authenticity, *The Stronghold* creates a reality of Kievan Rus’ that is colorful and understandable for present-day audiences. The costumes and home interiors are decorated with traditional Ukrainian embroidery in red and black, which unequivocally sets the Ukrainian tone to the historical period. Hospitality and lavish meals on a nicely set table (completely out of historical context) are also indirect references to the traditional Ukrainian traits. The humorous nature of Oleshko is a representation of one of the conventional images of the Ukrainian warrior that came about much later and is usually associated with the image of a Cossack—outgoing, lively, with a good sense of humor, a bit clumsy and stupid, yet courageous. One of the major scenes in the film, in this respect, occurs when Oleshko refuses to be called in the Russian manner, Alesha, insisting that he is Oleshko: “Alesha-kalesha, maybe you are Alesha. I am Popovich, *kalesha* (a galosh) is not mine.” It is offensive for the legendary hero to be called in the Russian manner. A contemporary Ukrainian writer, Andrii Kokotiukha, points out that among the main achievements of the film is the fact that it “brings Ukrainian folk heroes once annexed by Russia back to Ukraine” (Kokotiukha). Whether this Ukrainization of ancient Russian heroes is legitimate is a question of ideology, yet an attempt of appropriation of a shared legacy by Ukrainians is evident.

When Vit'ko and his new girlfriend go to Leleche (a “stork dwelling place” in Ukrainian), the Kumans suddenly attack the village that is known for its positive people who never feel angry or envious and are like children. When the entire village is in flames, a powerful scene with a burning cradle invites associations with the conventional metaphor of Kievan Rus’ as the common
The Kumans, in the meantime, are a cinematic representation of the generalized enemy of Ukraine’s freedom and peace. Dressed in grey and black colors, with faces completely covered, they are typical representatives of the dark forces. In the circumstances of Russo-Ukrainian antagonism, they also imply Russian hostility. When the three legendary heroes—Oleshko, Il'ko, and Dobrynia—rush to save Leleche, they are framed by the camera, as if Vasnetsov’s famous painting *Bogatyri* (1898) came alive. When they stop, Dobrynia takes off his helmet without heeding to Il'ko’s warning about the danger, since the enemy’s arrow may reach him any time: “If I get an arrow in my forehead, I am destined to get one.” The phrase’s allusion might be lost to foreign audiences, yet every Ukrainian would immediately recognize the words of Arsenii Iatseniuk, former Prime Minister of Ukraine, who, during the Euromaidan revolution in 2013-14, incited people to withstand the pro-Russian forces with a similar phrase “We will go forward tomorrow: if we get a bullet in the forehead, this is your destiny to get one. But it will be honest, fair, and courageous” (“Iakshcho kulia v lob, to kulia v lob”).

When the Kumans attack Rymiv, a Rusian village, with a powerful army accompanied by a huge stone monster, the powers seem unequal with no chance for Rusians to win. The fight between Oleshko and the stone monster, Golem, reads as a metaphor for the military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. In spite of the size of the monster, Oleshko manages to win the battle by ruse, taking Golem to the river and making him fall. As in a good fairy tale, Oleshko survives the confrontation, symbolizing the power of Ukrainians to withstand the enemy, however monstrous it might be. As the Kuman troops attack the Rusian village, Il’ia Muromets declares: “Brothers, truth is with us! Might is with us! God is with us! We are in our land! We will

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*Kievan Rus’ is often called a “cradle” for Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians.*
The reference is perceived by Ukrainian audiences as an unequivocal call for cohesion and resistance against the Russian aggression and raises the spirit of the nation in the times of conflict and undeclared war. When the stone monster Golem finally crumbles into pieces, the Rusians obtain freedom and peace and return to way of life they had always had. The good naturally beats evil in a fairy tale; the Kievan heroes beat the Kumans, also a desirable outcome for the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The suggestion of the film’s metaphor inspires and encourages Ukrainian audiences. *The Stronghold*, therefore, creates a purely Ukrainian world of Kievan Rus', appropriating the ancient Slavic history, and making the Rus people speak Ukrainian, dress Ukrainian, and protect their land from foreign invasion, much like their ancestors.

2.7 Taras Khymych. *King Danylo (2018 Korol’ Danylo)*

Taras Khymych’s *King Danylo* (2018) refers to the times when Batu Khan destroyed Kievan Rus', and the polity moved to Galician-Volynian principality in Western Ukraine, thus bringing into highlight Hrushevskii’s idea about the inheritance of Kievan Rus' by Galician-Volynian principality, rather than by Moscow. The film was intended as a blockbuster and a biopic of the first Ukrainian king, Danylo of Galicia, although some critics compare it to Kravchuk’s *The Viking* in terms of quality.12 Regardless of the artistic quality of the film, it draws a telling picture of the tendencies of the present-day Ukrainian memory, specifically, the emphasis on the Western roots of Ukrainian culture and its belonging to European culture. Prince Danylo of Galicia was

12 See Nastia Belova.
crowned by the Pope in order to organize a crusade against the Golden Horde. As Khymych underscores in one of the interviews,

A king means European values; King Danylo is one more evidence that Ukraine is a part of Europe, that democratic traditions existed here long ago. Ukraine has always been moving ahead along with Europe and fell behind only for some period in the wake of certain historical reasons. King Danylo who reigned in the thirteenth century is evidence that Ukraine is not a young country with twenty-five-year history, as some consider. (Grivinskii)

The fact that Khymych brings up the king as a proof of democratic values can be a doubtful statement, yet it complies with the Ukrainian patriotic thought. While keeping the title of the king, Danylo refused to participate in a crusade with the Papal troops and continued to fight against the Tartars with his own forces. King Danylo is considered a national hero of Ukraine; this fact explains why the choice of the personality for Khymych’s film is not random. Similar to The Viking, King Danylo did not become a popular historical blockbuster, yet the image of King Danylo also belongs to those archival storage artifacts suddenly chosen for the main exhibition.

The film, in addition, was not a state-sponsored project, but rather a personal effort of the filmmaker who raised funds to create a historical film. The politics of the film is, however, in line with the official process of cultural memory formation in Ukraine, as it refers to the times when King Danylo was in full power and consolidated the Western Ukrainian lands. According to Khymych, “inciting discussions is one the major functions of a film” (Grivincskii). The film was intended to create interest in ancient Ukrainian history among local audiences. While King Danylo is mainly associated with an image of a ruler in the Galician-Volynian Principality (now Western Ukraine), the principality also included Kiev and was called the Rusian Kingdom. The filmmakers
tried to create an image of Danylo as a wise and innovative leader, who had incorporated European culture into Russian society. There are, therefore, similar tendencies in Russian and Ukrainian cinema as far as memory politics is concerned. While Russian filmmakers appeal to the ancient European roots of their country through the figure of Prince Vladimir, Ukrainians apply the same principle to the newly recreated image of King Danylo. As Andreas Kappeler (107) points out, “Ukrainian historians and politicians use the Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian historical narrative with its national myths of liberty and of Ukraine’s closeness to Europe in their struggle against the Russian hegemony.” The scholar also emphasizes that “the ongoing ‘War of memories’ is of special interest. Both sides use and abuse history as a political weapon, and the controversies about the heritage of Kievan Rus” (Kappeler 107).

While the research here is primarily based on film, the interconnection with other media, the different ways of mediation and remediation, as discussed on the example of The Viking, as well as the emergence of a film within certain cultural, historical and political contexts, has a tremendous impact on the reception of the film and its ultimate ongoing influence. As mentioned in the Introduction, Astrid Erll (390) discusses the intra-medial rhetoric of a memory, inter-medial dynamics, “that is, the interplay with earlier and later representations,” and pluri-medial contexts “in which memory-making … films appear and exert their influence.” The choice of the mode of representation of a historical past, the intra-medial rhetoric, influences the kind of memory that is created. Large-scale historical blockbusters, The Viking and King Danylo create a certain rhetoric of significance of the mythologized past. The Stronghold, on the other hand, approaches the past in a more humorist and fairy tale manner, which creates a different mode of reception of the film, as well as a closer connection to the present. According to Erll, it is not only intra-medial strategies, “but also inter-medial relations [that] are involved in the process that turns fictions into media of
cultural memory” (“Literature, Film, and the Mediality” 392). Within the concept of inter-medial dynamics, the scholar emphasizes the importance of “remediation” and “premediation,” where the former refers to the fact that memorable events are usually represented again and again, over decades and centuries, in different media: in newspaper articles, photography, diaries, historiography, novels, film, etc.” (“Literature, Film, and the Mediality” 392). Premediation, in Erll’s terms, “draws attention to the fact that existent media which circulate in a given society provide schemata for future experiences and its representation” (“Literature, Film, and the Mediality” 392).

The emergence of Prince Vladimir in Russia as the defender and consolidator of all Russian lands was remediated and premediated by different media in the Putin era, beginning with the rewriting of history in compliance with the ideologically chosen course and Putin’s position on the ancient history of Russia, as well as the far-reaching mass-media, historical documentaries, and literature. The monument to St, Vladimir that preceded The Viking was a mediation of the statue to Vladimir in Kiev, located on a hill over the Dnieper, where allegedly the baptism of Kievites took place in 988. The monument in Moscow is also located on a hill over the Moscow-river; the only difference, however, is that no baptism ever took place in the river, since Moscow did not exist in the tenth century. As Erll (393) points out, “even despite antagonistic and reflexive forms of representation, remediation tends to solidify cultural memory, creating and stabilizing certain narratives and icons of the past.” The shift of the narrative by changing the location is accepted as true within the already existent ideological discourse, while the remediation of the monument served to solidify and stabilize certain narratives of the past. The fact that Christianization of Rus' never took place in Moscow is not important anymore, since “the boundaries between
documentary material and fictional reenactment are often blurred in the course of remediation” (Erll, “Literature, Film, and the Mediality” 394).

_The Viking_ became the next element in the system of media perpetuating the same imaginings about the ancient Rus' as the historical ancestor of today’s Russia. The film also remediates the annexation of Crimea calling for support among the vast Russian audiences, as it is “especially in the cinema of cultural memory that we find such manifest forms of remediation” (Erll 394). In the meantime, _King Danylo_ remediates the Ukrainian position concerning the legacy of Kievan Rus' that was inherited by the Galician-Volynian Principality after its fall. Along with the newspaper reviews of the film, Ukrainian documentaries about Kievan Rus' and the origins of Ukrainians, historical literature, and other media, _King Danylo_ both represents and updates the Ukrainian mythologized vision of the past. The two radically opposite positions of the Russian and Ukrainian cultural memory of the shared past, thus premediate the future discord and make reconciliation hardly possible, since premediation is the “effect of and the starting point for mediatized memories” (Erll “Literature, Film, and the Mediality” 393). Cinematic reenactment of the past makes the past intelligible to the audiences, as well as endows a historical film with an aura of authenticity, the “double dynamics of the premediation of mediation,” furthermore, plays “a decisive role in stabilizing the memory of historical events into lieux de mémoire” (Erll, “Literature, Film, and the Mediality” 395).
In Russia, the Cossacks remained a marginal factor in national history, border warriors who challenged the Russian state … In Ukraine, the Cossacks were those who took upon themselves the difficult task of defending the national religious and cultural traditions. (Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia* 194)

The Cossack era (in Ukraine approximately from XV to XVIII century) is an important historical period for the awakening and formation of Ukrainian national identity. As Serhii Plokhy points out, the Cossack past was “an important factor in the seventeenth-century ‘revival’ of the Ukrainian nation” (*Unmaking Imperial Russia* 193). Plokhy maintains that “Cossack history had acquired many characteristics of a Ukrainian ‘golden age’” (*Unmaking Imperial Russia* 193). The history of Cossacks, however, is not exclusively Ukrainian, since there were also Russian Cossacks, yet “only Ukrainian Cossacks in 1648 succeeded in creating their own political body.” Moreover, it is the Cossack tradition and Central European influences that “made Ukraine and Ukrainians more European and more democratic than Russia and the Russians” (Kappeler 112). In Russian culture, the role of Cossacks has always been ambiguous; at different times, they have been heroes, cruel murderers of the people, or victims of the regime. Ukrainian Cossacks constituted communities of free people living between the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. Russian Cossacks, in the meantime, have always been marginalized elements of the population on the periphery of the empire. For Russia, Cossacks emerged as a prominent power only in the late eighteenth century, when in
Ukraine they were already turning into a heroic past. The image of the Russian Cossack is built primarily on the role they played in the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century. In Soviet times, the Cossacks were first accused as tsarist adherents, but later allowed entrance into the official Soviet mythology.

While the myth of Cossackdom in Ukraine was evident to a certain extent already in the seventeenth century, it is only in the nineteenth century, with the rise of Romanticism in Ukrainian literature, that it emerged as an epitome of Ukrainian identity. According to Ukrainian historian Petro Kraliuk, “Romanticism cultivated nationalism. Therefore, the Cossack myth has transformed into a national myth. And undoubtedly played a remarkable role in the ‘national revival,’ specifically, in the Ukrainian national movement of modern era” (Kozats'ka mifologiia Ukraiiny 4). It is in this period that The History of the Rus became popular. The History became a key text in the transformation of Cossackdom into a historical and national myth. The History assisted in creating a sense of modern Ukrainian identity proliferating specifically Ukrainian cultural uniqueness. This historical work had a great influence on major Russian and Ukrainian writers and philosophers of the time: Ryleev, Pushkin, Shevchenko, Gogol, and others. It is also in the nineteenth century that the myth of Cossackdom becomes an object of contestation between Ukrainian, Russian, and even Polish cultures (Kraliuk, Kozats'ka mifologiia Ukraiiny 5). Since Ukraine was fully absorbed by Imperial Russia by this time, the Russian influence on the myth was inevitable.

The contestations around the Cossack myth continued in the Soviet times when the Cossacks were interpreted in terms of class struggle. Soviet ideologists emphasized that “Ukrainian Cossacks strived to ‘reunite’ with the ‘brotherly Russian people’” (Kraliuk Kozats'ka mifologiia Ukraiiny 5). According to Liubomyr Vynar, “the Bolshevik government relatively
slackened censorship over the work of Soviet historians in an attempt to impose and compare the struggle of the Red Army with the glorious Cossack warriors. It was an eloquent move with the purpose to awaken patriotism among Ukrainians” (488). After Ukraine obtained its independence in 1991, the myth was revived with a new force and a special emphasis was placed on Cossackdom as a precedent for Ukrainian statehood. Today, Ukrainian nationalism is inextricably connected to Cossackdom, although geographically Ukrainian national consciousness is most prominent in Western Ukraine, while Cossacks used to occupy territories in central and eastern Ukraine, and thus, were subject to Russian imperial power.

3.1 The Differences of the Cossack Myth in Russian and Ukrainian Cultural Memory

The idealized image of the Ukrainian Cossack flourished in the nineteenth century Ukrainian literature when folk songs about Cossacks, dumy, were revived in poetry and inspired national consciousness of Ukrainian intelligentsia. It is notable that in Ukraine the memory of the Cossackdom continued to thrive long after the phenomenon itself turned into a distant past. The emergence of an image of a peaceful Cossack playing kobza, the Ukrainian traditional string instrument, became one of the results of the evolution of the Cossack in Ukrainian cultural memory. The “Cossack Mamai,” a hero of numerous legends, folk songs, and dumy, became a generalized and idealized image of a Cossack, an embodiment of Ukrainian spirit and its heroic past. Paintings of Cossack Mamai necessarily feature a peaceful warrior with a kobza, which symbolizes musicality of Ukrainians, but also indicates that the Cossack is not a warrior in the traditional sense. His weapon is the word, rather than the sword. This is an elegiac image, sensitive
and spiritually rich. Such representation of the warrior also embodies the peaceful nature of the Ukrainian people.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, when Ukrainian national and cultural life is revived, the Cossack embodies national dignity and freedom; the warrior is a defender of the people, a brave knight, a hero of the historic past. This is a folk image of the Cossack that inspired Taras Shevchenko to write his historical poem *Haidamaky* (1841) about an uprising against Poles in 1768. In the poem, Shevchenko creates a generalized image of a Cossack, Iarema, representing a typical participant of the uprising—a poor orphan in service of a Jew, who eventually becomes a messiah and a martyr. The images of Kobzar Volokh, a minstrel playing *kobza*, as well as two Cossack leaders, Zalizniak and Gonta, complement the picture of Shevchenko’s Cossackdom. Zalizniak is an idealized Cossack leader who is referred to as a “splendid soul,” “manly heart,” “who rides at the head alone, with a glowing pipe” (Shevchenko). His wealth is the beauty of the steppe and the sea; all he has is the road because he does not have a home. The image is most fully depicted in the episode when the Cossacks come to Uman’ to kill Poles, and Gonta kills his own sons because they are Catholics. “My children, kiss me, for not I / Am killing you today — / It is my oath!” / He flashed his knife / And the two lads were slain” (Shevchenko). The oath given to the Cossack community is, therefore, prioritized over family values. The paternal drama is further revealed in the children’s burial, which he does according to Cossack traditions.

Along with the romanticized Cossack hero, the Ukrainian literature of the early nineteenth century also included a humorous ironic image of a Cossack. According to Kraliuk, processes that took place at the end of the eighteenth century, such as liquidation of the Hetmanate and transformation of Cossack foremen into the Russian gentry “made Cossackdom a ‘non-serious’ phenomenon” (Kraliuk, *Taemnychyi agent* 21). This is precisely the image of Cossacks in Ivan
Kotliarevskii’s mock-heroic epic *Eneida* (1798), where the heroes are drunkards and uncouth provincials, yet the comic nature of the warriors is combined with heroism creating an ambivalent perspective on the Cossackdom.

The nineteenth-century Russian Cossacks, in the meantime, represent a pro-imperial military force called to protect the imperial borders that have vastly expanded to the East. In Tolstoi’s *Prisoner of the Caucasus*, it is the Cossacks who save Zhilin from the Tatars. As opposed to the barbaric Tatars, the Cossacks along with soldiers represent “brothers” for Zhilin, and he immediately manifests his allegiance to Orthodoxy (and Empire) by crossing himself. In his novella, *The Cossacks* (1852), Tolstoi develops his idea of the Cossacks living on the outskirts of Russia. Here, Tolstoi creates a complex image of a Cossack who peacefully co-exists with the Chechen people, fighting with them only for fun; he “respects the hostile mountain-dweller but hates the soldier-oppressor who is a stranger to the Cossack” (Tolstoi). By living along with the Chechens, the Cossacks were influenced by their lifestyle and proximity to nature. “Foppery in clothes means imitation of a Circassian. The best gun is obtained from a mountain-dweller, the best horses are bought or stolen also from them” (Tolstoi). Although the Cossacks keep vigil on the border, there is certain continuity between the Cossacks and their enemies to an extent that they together create one whole. The contestation within the natural realm not only unites them but also orientalizes both of them, so the Cossacks, much as Circassians, represent the Other on the margins of the country. This is a poetic image, yet it is devoid of any national idea so much invested into the Ukrainian Cossack image.

While Tolstoi’s Cossacks represent the tsar, they do not kill Russian people. In Eisenstein’s *Battleship Potemkin* (1925), the image of Cossacks on the service of the empire obtains further development. In the Odessa steps sequence, while the White guards are moving from the top down
ruthlessly killing people on their way, the Cossacks suddenly appear to help the guards encircle and kill people further down the stairs. By contrast, in Ivan Pyr'ev’s *The Cossacks of the Kuban'* (1949), Cossacks do not represent the oppressive power of the tsarist regime anymore—they are rehabilitated to represent veterans of the war. Pyr'ev’s Cossacks constitute a male community in pastoral settings. They used to fight along with the Red Army in the Great Fatherland War, yet now they have settled down and live a peaceful life more concerned with women, domestic matters, and agriculture. They have lost their warrior status completely. What makes them distinct from other males is their clothing, so their identity is now mainly a performance. As Erll points out,

> whenever the past is represented, the choice of media and forms has an effect on the kind of memory that is created. For example, a war which is orally represented, in an anecdote told by an old neighbor, seems to become part of lived, contemporary history; but as an object of a Wagnerian opera, the same war can be transformed into an apparently timeless, mythical event. In literature as in film, there are different modes of representation which may elicit different modes of cultural remembering in the audience. (390)

The representation of the Cossack has been in constant flux both in terms of media, form, and content. During the Thaw, Soviet Ukrainian filmmakers found their way to reestablish the image of Ukrainian Cossacks as national heroes to a certain extent. Borys Ivchenko’s *The Lost Letter* (1972) based on a Gogol’s story is an example of such attempt. In the film, two Cossacks, Vasyl’ and Andrii, set out on a long trip to St. Petersburg to deliver a letter to the empress. Humor underlies the entire film, which, coupled with the romanticized depiction of the Cossack past could seemingly perfectly fit into the accepted socialist-realist paradigm of Ukrainians—stupid
backward peasants in national costumes. The Cossacks in the film are not courageous warriors on a battlefield, but rather awkward peasants who drink a lot and get into all kind of trouble on their way. Yet, they attack the imperial (as well as Soviet) power indirectly, by way of mocking it, and hence they are heralds of the Ukrainian national idea. Larysa Briukhovets'ka (263) points out that “the film asserts national identity connected first of all to the spirit of Cossack chivalry, and the sense of humor.” This humorous image of a Cossack is also one of the common ways Ukrainians would address their warriors, disparaging their heroic image in any way. This tradition started with abovementioned Ivan Kotliarevskyi’s *Eneida* (1798): “Aeneas was a lively fellow, / Lusty as any Cossack blade, / In every kind of mischief mellow, / The staunchest tramp to ply his trade” (Kotliarevsky).

### 3.2 The Importance of the Cossack Myth for the Cultural Memory in Contemporary Ukraine

After Ukraine obtained its independence in 1991, historical film became a seminal ground for consolidation of Ukrainians around their national memory and for the formation of the new national identity, as well as for opening up earlier silenced pages in history. The filmmakers’ approach to the genre is both diverse and coherent in capturing the past and creating a story of the nation. As Georgii Kasianov and Philip Ther argue:

The institutional and intellectual framework established for the study of Ukrainian history in independent Ukraine largely reflected the practical requirements of state- and nation-building. What happened, in effect, was a revival and state-sponsored diffusion on a mass scale of the standard “patriotic” historical
scheme of a ‘nation reborn,’ based on the methodological canons and cognitive models of the nineteenth century. (“Introduction” 1)

The cinema of independent Ukraine was first and foremost aimed at legitimizing the existence of the new state, as well as educating the audiences about the history of the Ukrainian nation. The range of contemporary Ukrainian historical films includes state-sponsored biopics and legacy films, art-house experimentations, as well as recent historical adventure dramas. The romanticized Cossack myth of the nineteenth century was revived with contemporary meanings added to it. As Anthony D. Smith (3) observes, “myth, memories, symbols and values can often be adapted to new circumstances by being accorded new meanings and new functions.” In the 1990s and the 2000s, the Cossack is first of all the defender of Ukraine’s independence, a warrior who fights for its freedom. The myth of Cossackdom, precisely the autonomous polity of the Hetmanate (1649-1764), provided a historical continuity to Ukraine’s statehood and justified its independence. In Ukrainian consciousness, the Hetmanate was the successor of Kievan Rus’; it was a period of resurrection of Ukrainian statehood, its cultural and political golden age. At this time, according to Ukrainian historian Oleksandr Ogloblin (13), “the idea of the Second Jerusalem—Kiev—becomes equally common for Ukrainian national and political consciousness, as the idea of the Third Rome—Moscow—for Russian consciousness.” The Cossack Uprising against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, led by Bogdan Khmelnitskii, obtains a symbolic meaning in the history of independent Ukraine. Bohdan Khmelnitskii and Ivan Mazepa become the most prominent historical figures of the Hetmanate for Ukrainian nation building. “The Ukrainian State existed at that time as a state under the power of the Zaporozhian Host, which is why the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army was considered the head and the ruler of the Ukrainian State” (Ogloblin 14). The necessity to explain and correct the double position of the Hetmanate
and, moreover, to emphasize its national orientation became a primary idea for Ukrainian cultural memory in its years of independence.

One of the common notes for many Ukrainian filmmakers in picturing Ukraine’s past, especially in the first two decades of its independence, is the theme of lamenting and bemoaning Ukraine’s miserable fate. As Ukrainian filmmaker Oles’ Sanin points out, “the tragic note is very loud. In every song comes weeping. Whatever strange it is, we build our history not on victories but on defeats” (Ganzha). This is exactly the logic prevailing in contemporary Ukrainian culture to such an extent that it seems as if Ukrainian history consists of constant famines, genocides, failures, and poverty. Filmmakers, in the meantime, tend to use this tragic victimized image of Ukrainian past in order to urge people to unite and overcome the troublesome legacy by rising from the ruins as a flourishing country. Whether Ukrainians want to identify with this image of Ukraine is questionable, and this can partially explain why Ukrainian cinema has been unpopular among domestic audiences for a long time.

One of the common tendencies in post-Soviet Ukrainian historical drama is to address the Cossack period in the history of Ukraine. Filmmakers, diverse in their film style, felt the need to make a film about Cossack hetmans. Leonid Osyka’s Hetman’s Regalia (1993), Mykola Zaseev-Rudenko’s Black Council (2000), Iurii Ilienko’s A Prayer for Hetman Mazepa (2001), Mykola Mashchenko’s Bohdan-Zinovii Khmel’nyts’kyi (2006) are the main films about Cossacks sponsored by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Ukraine in an attempt to create Ukrainian national identity. Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitskii tends to be one of the most popular Cossack leaders among Ukrainian filmmakers. The fact that the hetman topic has been a recurrent theme over the last quarter of a century is a compelling indication that there is an ongoing search for a
national hero and leader. Yet, in wake of the changing reality, this search in each of the three decades of Ukraine’s independence is distinct.

The works of “old-school” filmmakers, who have made a considerable contribution into the Ukrainian “poetic cinema” of the Thaw, Leonid Obyka and Iurii Illienko, are especially notable in this respect. Obyka’s *Hetman’s Regalia* (1993) is a film that reflects the historical turmoil in Ukraine right after it achieved its independence. The film covers several years of uncertainty after the death of Bogdan Khmelnitskii when the power was contested between hetman Vygov'skii and Khmelnitskii’s son, Iurii. Proponents of Bogdan Khmelnitskii help his daughter, Olena save hetman’s regalia, symbolizing Ukraine’s independence and thus preserve legal power in the country. According to Iryna Zubavina (72), “in this film, the director touches upon historical aspects of consolidation of Ukrainians around a strong personality that is one of the most prominent in domestic historical film.” Heroes of the film are united by the common purpose of saving regalia, a symbol of Ukraine’s statehood and legitimate power. The director creates a historical realm in which justice is finally achieved and power is passed over to the worthy successor of Khmelnitskii. The legend narrated within historical frameworks appeals to the ideas of nation building, as well as bringing the audience into the traditional Ukrainian discourse of rural lifestyle, landscapes, and Cossackdom.

In his *Black Council* (2002), Mykola Zaseev-Rudenko also focuses on the calamity Ukraine was going through after Khmelnitskii’s death, commonly referred to in history as the Ruin (1657-1687). This period of strife and civil war is a traumatic point in history of Ukraine when it actually fell apart into the right-bank and left-bank Ukraine, under Polish and Russian control respectively. The constant return to the trauma is a need to overcome it by going through the memory again and again, as well as by bringing in new interpretations. Much as Obyka, Zaseev-Rudenko creates a
male community fighting for power and manifests how this power eventually changes people. As a product of 2000, film also indirectly refers to corruption, power games, and elections in Ukraine at the turn of the twenty-first century. It is notable that Black Counsel [Chorna rada] was released under the title Zaporozhian Host [Zaporozhskaia sech’] in Russian translation. The translation of the original title could bear certain connotations to the name of Soviet Union—Chernyi sovet, thus, was changed to a more neutral title. Since the film is set in the times after Ukraine was annexed to the Russian Empire, it features a number of political intrigues and betrayals.

In his film, Mamai (2003), Oles’ Sanin addresses the long-forgotten image of Cossack Mamai in order to create an attractive image of Ukrainian national spirit both for domestic and foreign audiences. By focusing on Ukrainian and Tatar epics, Sanin creates a visually rich representation of what he construes as the glorious Cossack past. The film resembles a painting exhibition, especially at the beginning, when different angles and close-ups of iconographic paintings of Cossack Mamai establish the relationship with the viewer. The depiction of Cossacks throughout the film is in continuity with this pictorial representation at the beginning. The recurring image of a horse symbolizes the courageous warrior and his readiness to fight. In the narrative of the film, Sanin is trying to capture the meaning of those eighteenth-century paintings. Betrayed by his brothers who left him alone in the steppe, a young Cossack is saved by a Tatar woman, but is not accepted by her relatives, since he is a stranger. As Iryna Zubavina (116) points out, “the Cossack turns into a legend, and it does not matter anymore whether he is dead or alive,

Black counsel was a general Cossack counsel that met to address strategic questions when there was no unanimity between leaders. The most well-known black counsel took place in June 1663. Apart from Cossacks, also countrymen of all walks could participate and vote in the counsel.
because now he is a Mamai, a person without name.” He carves a kobza for himself and becomes a living painting, sitting in a pose of a Buddha. This is an image of a “warrior who preserves peace” and in this “seems to be the uniqueness of Ukraine’s mission” (Zubavina 116).

The fact that Sanin’s Cossack is depicted in close juxtaposition to the Tatars only supports the idea. The Ukrainian-Tatar friendship is an interesting twist to the traditional anti-Tatar orientation of Cossacks. As Plokhy points out, “in view of the eruption of the Russo-Ukrainian dispute over the Crimea in the early 1990s, the traditionally anti-Tatar character of Cossack mythology has changed dramatically” (Ukraine and Russia 181). Sanin’s film, therefore, both represents an old romanticized image of the Cossack, but at the same time imbues it with new meanings necessitated by present-day politics. As a student of Leonid Osyka, Sanin brought his own artistic vision of Ukraine’s past into his Mamai, where he emphasized the soul and beauty of a nation with ancient history and traditions. In spite of all its complexity and controversy, the visual beauty of Sanin’s film makes it attractive aesthetically.

The image of the Cossack in Ukrainian and Russian culture, therefore, is a diverse phenomenon that has been changing over time along with the development of history. Among other representations, a Cossack can be a brave warrior, defending Ukrainian land against Polish, Lithuanian, Tatar or Russian oppressors; he can be a peaceful minstrel, fighting the enemy with his song; he can also be an awkward peasant and heavy drinker with a good sense of humor. What unites them all is a love for freedom, courage, and the idea of Ukraine’s independence.
3.3 The Myth of Khmelnitskii

One of the tendencies in the cultural memory of independent Ukraine is to depict national heroes on the banknotes of Ukrainian currency as a sign of respect and rehabilitation, as well as admittance into the pantheon of heroes. Among them is Bogdan Khmelnitskii, whose image decorates a five hryvnia banknote. Whereas in Black Council, he appears only at the beginning of the film on his deathbed, or is only indirectly referred to in Hetman’s Regalia, there was a broader need to create a comprehensive image of the historical figure to support his pro-Ukrainian orientation and prove his status as a hero. Soviet and Russian history has always focused on 1654, the year of the Pereiaslav treaty, when Khmelnitskii had to swear an oath to Muscovy choosing between the two evils—either Polish or Moscow protection. Because of the Pereiaslav treaty, Khmelnitskii is an ambiguous personality in Ukrainian history. The myth of Khmelnitskii has been changing over the last several centuries. According to Ukrainian history, the turning point of Khmelnitskii’s period is 1648, when a new Cossack state, the Zaporozhian Host, was established. This is an event of national determination and formation of Ukrainian statehood that has always been neglected in Russian history.

Whereas none of the subsequent hetmans of the Zaporozhian Host after Khmelnytskii’s death in 1657 were able to match his greatness and contribution into Ukrainian national identity, his image was much mythologized in Ukrainian literature throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, with the History of the Rus being the main narrative promoting Khmelnytskii as the national leader. While the hetman becomes a hero in Russian, Polish and Ukrainian literature, it is only Ukrainian literature that embraces the question “not only of literary and historical tradition, and more broadly of collective memory, but also of the overarching processes of identity formation and ultimately of nation formation” (Grabowicz 76). There is a significant
transformation of the image of Khmelnitskii in Ukrainian literature. While in the seventeenth and eighteenth century he was perceived as the central symbol of Ukrainian self-identification and the founding father of Ukrainian statehood (in the works of Hryhorii Hrabianka,14 and the History of the Rus), later on, in the works of Ievhen Hrebinka15 and Mykola Kostomarov,16 the unification with Russia becomes more emphasized, with Khmelnitskii’s decision justified as a political inevitability. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the heroic image of Khmelnitskii is challenged in its entirety, primarily by Shevchenko, who “directly or implicitly casts Khmelnytsky as a failed or foolish leader who contributed to the present enslavement of Ukraine by Russia, precisely through his naïve treaty with Muscovy in 1654” (Grabowicz 86). As Amelia M. Glaser points out, the interest in Khmelnitskii in the early nineteenth century “soon gave way to a poetics emphasizing the folk, the national cause, and the structures of mythical thought. Here Khmelnytsky becomes more marginal, if not entirely absent, from depictions of the Cossack Ukrainian past” (16). The scholar also mentions that Gogol writes a lot about Cossacks but “does not specifically write about Khmelnytsky,” while Shevchenko “portrays Khmelnytsky as a tragic figure who turned Ukraine over to the Tsar at Pereiaslav” (16).

In Russian literature, the figure of Khmelnitskii obtains much interest within the Decembrist movement. For instance, Glinka’s novel Zinovii Bogdan Khmelnytsky or Little Russia Liberated [Zinovii Bogdam Khmel'nitskii, ili osvobozhdennaia Malorossiia, 1817], emphasizes the importance of unification of Russia and Ukraine, with the treaty providing major liberation and

14 Ukrainian statesman in the times of the Hetmanate, author of a Cossack chronicle (1666-1738).
15 Russian-Ukrainian romantic prose writer, poet, philanthropist (1812-1848).
16 Russian historian, publicist, and writer, one of the founders of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, proponent of Ukrainian national resistance (1817-1885).
benefits for Ukraine. Within the imperial context, this approach is unsurprising. Ryleev’s *Dumy* (1821) contains the poem “Bogdan Khmel’nitskii,” written in the traditional Decembrist manner of prophecy, ending with the pathos of freedom and infinite grace given to Ukraine by Khmelnitskii: “And freedom was established in Ukrainian steppes from that time, and people’s happiness and joy began to flourish in villages and towns” (“I votsarilasia svoboda s teh por v ukrainslikh stepiakh, i stala s schastiem naroda tsvest’ radost’ v selakh i gradakh” (Ryleev *Dumy*). Ukraine is depicted as the exotic other on the periphery of the empire and it is being civilized through the incorporation of its borders. According to nineteenth-century Russian historian Nikolai Ustrialov, as discussed by Stephen Velychenko, “the major fact in the history of the Russian tsardom was the gradual development of the idea of the necessity of reestablishing the Russian land within the borders it had under Yaroslav,” that is to say, the times of Kievan Rus' (Velychenko 98). The scholar emphasizes that “Rus' repeatedly expressed its keen desire to return to the rule of the Orthodox tsar,” which legitimizes the Treaty of Pereiaslav as a necessary act of the long-awaited unification (Velychenko 99).

The twentieth century saw much of remythologizing of Khmelnitskii. He became the only non-Russian historical figure whose importance was acknowledged by the Soviet regime, with the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitskii established in 1943. Soviet history primarily emphasized the significance of the Pereiaslav treaty for the unification of Russian and Ukrainian territories. Igor Savchenko’s historical drama *Bogdan Khmelnitskii* (1941), made in the best traditions of socialist realism, pictures him as a great military leader. According to Kalynowska and Kondratyuk (202), “the Stalinist Khmelnytsky champions class struggle, Ukrainian nationalism, and Russian / Soviet imperialism, all at the same time.” Savchenko’s film was a product of its time and belongs to the series of biographical films initiated and supported by Stalin between 1939 and 1953.
After Ukraine obtained its independence, Khmelnitskii was accepted as one of its founding fathers. According to Frank Sysyn (188), “the Soviet icon of ‘Reunification’ has been replaced with the statist school’s image of statesman and national hero.” In the process of nationalization of history, Ukrainians tended to abandon any pro-Russian past. In the case of Khmelnitskii, Ukrainians chose to reorganize the past for their national purposes. As a result, the interpretation of the hetman as a founder of Ukrainian statehood emerged. Khmelnitskii was now seen as a statesman deeply disappointed in the union with Russia and dissatisfied with the relations with the Tsar. Ukrainian historians emphasize that, after 1654, the hetman continued his search of allies for the Hetmanate leading a policy that opposed Moscow. In this way, Khmelnitskii is justified as a national leader of independent Ukraine.

In contemporary Russian history, Khmelnitskii also remains a prominent figure whose image is modeled after the previous imperial and Soviet narratives, yet there are different interpretations of the hetman. As Kurukin and Iatsenko (53) maintain, according to one of the historical narratives, “right after the Cossack uprising Khmelnitskii begged the Moscow Tsar about protection, according to the second version, he came to this thought only in 1652, according to the third—the hetman asked Moscow about help, while the Zemsky Sobor voted for the annexation of Ukraine.” After that, the Triumphant unification took place and Ukrainians were accepted under the protection of Moscow. The Russian Khmelnitskii, on the one hand, aspired “to free all Russian people (meaning Ukrainians and Byelorussians) from foreign rule and the Catholic church, and his troops were willing to fight together with the Tsarist army against the Poles” (Kurukin and Iatsenko

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17 The Zemskii Sobor, which literally means “assembly of the land,” was a kind of parliament in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Russia.
While on the other hand, Khmelnitskii entered into a secret alliance with the king of Sweden concerning the division of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth or was getting ready to accept Swedish protection, the age of Khmelnitskii, in general, was accompanied by “bursts of nationalism and Jewish pogroms” (Kurukin and Iatsenko 53). The Russian Khmelnitskii, therefore, is confusing and ambivalent, as in some recent Russian sources that depict him as “ambitious and unscrupulous,” no better than the traitor Ivan Mazepa (Kurukin and Iatsenko 54). This reduction of the role of Khmelnitskii in Russian official ideology is connected to the increase of glorification of the hetman in Ukrainian sources, especially after the Orange Revolution in 2004 when President Viktor Iushchenko used some of Khmelnitskii’s symbols of power during his inauguration ceremony. Overall, however, the Russian official ideology favors Khmelnitskii in comparison to Mazepa, who is unequivocally a traitor, although both Khmelnitskii and Mazepa aspired to the same thing—self-determination and independence of Ukraine.

The 2004 celebration of the 350th anniversary of the Pereiaslav treaty became a cornerstone in Russian-Ukrainian relations. The anniversary became the Third Pereiaslav, with the first being that of 1654, the second in 1954, when the friendship of people and unification of Russia and Ukraine were widely celebrated in Soviet Union. It is in 1954 that Khrushchev granted Crimea to Ukraine in acknowledgment of their friendship, without ever thinking that Soviet Union could disintegrate one day into separate nation-states. After Ukraine obtained its independence in 1991, Russia still continued to regard it “as a part of its own strategic orbit, while many Ukrainians [wanted] to liberate themselves from the Russian hegemony and advocate a closer cooperation with the European Union” (Kappeler 107). While in the first decade of independence, the relations between Russia and Ukraine were only at the stage of formation, with the beginning of the Putin era in 2000, Russia’s strategy as to relations with Ukraine obtained a clear framework. Ukraine
was forced into a deeper integration in wake of “multiple dependencies such as energy, trade, credits and labor migration,” all of which became “instruments for the reintegration of the post-Soviet space” (Dragneva and Wolczuk). The increased focus on Ukraine was a reflection of Russia’s assertive international politics, as well as the rise of neo-imperialist ambitions and the cultivation of patriotism. In the Russian worldview, Ukrainians and Byelorussians are Russians who were, however, separated from Mother Russia in the period from the Mongol invasion to the Pereiaslav treaty, when the unification finally took place. The 350th anniversary symbolized an old tendency of the former imperial center towards the assimilation of Ukraine in the new circumstances of contemporary world and caused ardent debates among Ukrainian politicians and historians.

The fact that the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, gave an order to celebrate the 350th anniversary of the Pereiaslav treaty at the state level became a controversial historical event, because by that time the Pereiaslav treaty has already become a synonym of Ukrainian-Russian unity. After the Presidential order to celebrate the Pereiaslav treaty was declared in 2002, two years before the actual celebration, the year of 2003 was announced as the Year of Russia in Ukraine. The year of friendship turned out to be, rather, a year of conflicts between Russia and Ukraine. The first conflict took place in September 2003 when an agreement to create a Single Economic Region (Edinoe ekonomichesko prostranstvo) was signed among Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Later on, in October, a conflict concerning the island of Tuzla on the border between Russia and Ukraine in the Kerch channel (Crimea) began. These events preceded the celebration of the anniversary of the Pereiaslav treaty in 2004 and the subsequent disunity about this historical event among Ukrainians.
After Ukraine obtained its independence in 1991, its memory politics continued to be formed by former Soviet politicians: the national component in Ukrainian national identity formation did not become immediately prominent and Ukrainians continued to live under the imperial consciousness by inertia, conditioned to think of themselves as part of Russia by previous ideologies, having not yet formed an ideology of their own. According to Ukrainian historian I. Gyrych, “in the twentieth century, the Pereiaslav legend through mass media formed the little Russian consciousness among Ukrainians. Such legends shaped new strata of people who did not want to be Ukrainians, did not want to have a country of their own. This is why the contemporary Ukrainian elite feels such a connection to the myth about Pereiaslav” (Hrytsenko 159). Ukrainian historian Viktor Brekhunenko commented that “the Presidential order [was] an act of national humiliation. We must not celebrate an event that laid the foundation of enslavement of Ukraine. But it is definitely necessary to study the Pereiaslav treaty and its consequences” (Hrytsenko 159). The celebration of the anniversary thus led to the rise of the nationally conscious Ukrainians to oppose the Presidential order and speak up for the Ukrainian national identity.

Based on the controversial interpretations of the Pereiaslav treaty, the interpretation of the image of Khmelnitskii is similarly confusing. Ukrainian historians tend to look for an explanation of the hetman’s decisions through depiction of his victories and defeats. Mykola Mashchenko’s Ministry-sponsored film *Bohdan-Zinovii Khmel'nyts'kyi* (2006) is a search of a national hero: Mashchenko addresses the romantic times of Ukrainian knighthood and creates a community of Cossacks who spend their lives in the battlefield. This is a male world of cannons, guns, and sabers founded on fraternity and devotion to the common goal. Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitskii is a wise leader, a hero, yet he is also a controversial figure: his sometimes inadequate behavior […] give specifics. It is notable that Ilienko’s *Prayer for Hetman Mazepa* and Mashchenko’s *Bohdan*
Khmelnytskyi were made almost simultaneously with the purpose to exonerate the two controversial personalities in Russian-Ukrainian history. Mashchenko places Khmelnitskii in the tumultuous times of struggle between the Cossacks and the Poles without idealizing the Hetmanate.

Khmelnitskii is pictured as a troubled neurasthenic personality who happened to come to power in unfavorable times and was doing his best to serve his people, yet the circumstances were against him. In the film, Khmelnitskii is emotionally broken, ridden by guilt, and burdened by power. As Maschenko points out, Khmelnitskii is “an extraordinary personality… they say that Bohdan has inherited a neurasthenic temper from someone in his family. He could burst into tears for no reason, and, in the same manner, he could grow furious for no reason, grab his mace and smash Cossacks’ heads relentlessly” (Bezruchko). While Savchenko’s Khmelnitskii is certain where to go, determined to unite Russia and Ukraine, “Maschenko’s attempt at nationalist discourse positions Khmelnytsky as a conflicted and flawed character pressured by historical circumstances to turn to the Russians as the least of several evils” (Kalinowska and Kondratyuk 214). Although by the time Mashchenko began to work on his Khmelnitskii, a Polish filmmaker Jerzy Hoffman has already made his With Fire and Sword [Ognem i mechom, 1999], the Ukrainian director wanted to make a biographical film about the hetman as a personality, rather than another film about the struggle between Poland and Ukraine. In Mashchenko’s view, Khmelnitskii was “the first to raise Ukrainians for the Christ’s faith, for freedom and independence of Ukraine. He was the first to develop a national idea and began to create an independent state within its ethnographic borders and was the first to win the battles that shook Europe” (Fesenko). There is a notable scene in the film during the siege of Zbarazh where Khmelnitskii stops his Cossacks from plundering a Catholic church, saying that they have raised their swords for their faith but not
against Catholic priests, that God will turn away from them if they destroy churches, regardless of faith. “He who does not respect other’s faith, does not respect his own one”—Khmelnitskii teaches his Cossacks, thus revealing his wisdom and diplomacy.

The filmmaker underscores, that “the problems that Bohdan solved then were topical yesterday, are topical today, and will be tomorrow. Our people still struggle with the question ‘Who are we? Where do we come from? Are we on the right way? Whom should we join?’” (Fesenko). For Mashchenko, therefore, Khmelnitskii is an idealized, wise national leader, who was forced to make difficult decisions, while the Pereiaslav treaty is only a military agreement, “it has never been an act of friendship forever” (Fesenko). For Khmelnitskii, the agreement with Russia was just like any other military agreement with Poland or the Tartar Khan. Mashchenko’s Bohdan-Zinovii Khmelnytskyi ends with the betrayal of Poland, eventually leading to the treaty with Russia, yet the treaty itself was not included into the script.

Khmelnitskii, already burdened by a personal tragedy, receives a letter from the Polish king stating the declaration of war. The hetman tears the letter and with tears in his eyes gets hold of his mace—the symbol of power—that is emphasized in a close-up. This is a moment when Khmelnistkii makes a decision. As the camera moves towards his face, his look manifests the resolution to fight for Ukraine. With words “War is war. Bon appetite, dear royal ambassadors!” he vehemently overthrows the table. The next scene takes place in a church, where Cossacks have gathered ready to fight. A low-angle shot of the hetman with candles on both sides of him and sounds of traditional Cossack kobza music emphasize the importance of the moment. Khmelnitskii reassures his warriors that no one can destroy them unless they destroy themselves. He feminizes Ukraine by saying that it is looking at them with tears in its eyes, but that the Cossacks will revenge the Poles for every tear in their mothers’ eyes, for every drop of blood. The mace he firmly holds
in his hands provides credibility to every word he says. Khmelnitskii calls the Cossacks to go to the West as far as the Ukrainian language and Orthodox faith reaches. As he raises his mace, he declares that Ukraine will spread to the West and keeps standing still in the pose, while the Cossacks rejoice and cry out “Ukraine!” in exultation. The posture of Khmelnitskii in the last scene of the film resembles a statue to the hetman erected in 1888 by Mikhail Mikashin in Kiev and often remediated by different sources in the process of creation of updated cultural memories of the hetman.

The filmmaker saw Khmelnitskii overburdened with personal guilt for his historical decision, which is why the image of the hetman is confusing. According to Mashchenko, he was trying to recreate the essence of the complicated historical events through certain episodes and the image of Khmelnitskii himself. The filmmaker is confident that “history did not forgive to Bohdan the defeat under Berestechko or the Zboriv treaty. History did not forgive him also the Pereiaslav treaty—Taras Shevchenko wrote about it numerous times” (Bezruchko). As a result of the filmmaker’s doubts about Khmelnitskii’s true adherence and loyalty to the Ukrainian national position, the film did not manage to construct a compelling argument about Khmelnitskii as Ukrainian national hero, a founding father of Ukrainian national identity. As Kalinowska and Kondratyuk (216) maintain, “Mashchenko’s fragmented and incoherent film is symptomatic of a fragmented and incoherent Ukrainian postdependence identity. It remains in constant flux, caught between Europe and Russia, East and West, unable to define itself and maintain a more or less stable position.”

Valerii Iamburs'kii’s Hetman (2015) is not a state-sponsored film and approaches the figure of Khmelnitskii in a different context, yet the memory it presents deeply resonates with contemporary Ukrainian patriotism. In this film, Khmelnitskii is not a monumental national leader
in the battlefield, but rather a human person who can love a beautiful woman, play with his children, and be a good friend. “He is a good man!” one of the Cossacks describes him. The film was intended as a historical blockbuster with a romantic line at its center. Although not quite a blockbuster, the film became a good attempt of creating a historical drama for mass audiences, which makes *Hetman* different from the abovementioned historical films.

The film brings bright associations with present-day Ukraine and its political situation. For instance, the slogan “Zbarazh is ours!” (“Zbarazh nash!”) implicitly speaks to the audience about the situation with Crimea alluding to the popular Russian slogan “Crimea is ours!” (“Krym nash!”). In the film, while Khmelnitskii is a wise political leader many Cossacks are not satisfied with his strategies, they are confident that they know better how to rule a country and are ready to solve all issues with a gun. This reminds Ukrainian audiences about the current situation in the country, where people tend to criticize political authorities and meet in the main square in Kiev to make a new revolution and change power. Yet nothing is changing for the better. In response to such criticism, Khmelnitskii says: “Well, everyone seems to know what to do in this country. Everyone! But nobody is doing anything!” After the Turkish khan betrayed Khmelnitskii and did not support him in a major battle, Cossacks accuse Khmelnitskii of betrayal and want to kill him. When he speaks in his own defense, Khmelnitskii says that he is ready to face the judgment but promises: “We will free our people from slavery! We will govern our land on our own! Cossacks, do you believe me? Then listen to me, let’s unite in troops and exterminate this scum all over Ukraine!”

In terms of the current Russian-Ukrainian antagonism, Khmelnitskii’s words resonate with the present-day geopolitical situation in Ukraine. Khmelnitskii is the kind of a leader that Ukraine needs today—assertive, sometimes cruel, but deeply dedicated to his people. In spite of his love for a Polish woman, Helena, he sacrifices his personal feelings for the patriotic love of his country.
Iamburskii creates a history of Ukraine that, unlike the widespread stereotype, is not based on self-pity or lamenting about its poor fortune. In the film, Ukrainians are ready to fight back, they are strong, confident, and proud of themselves. When Bogdan Khmelnitskii swears to be a loyal hetman, he says: “I, hetman Bohdan-Zinovii Khmelnytskyi, with the power given to me by the people, proclaim this day as the day of foundation of a new country, Ukraine! And we will not stop in Kiev. Ukraine will reach Lviv and Galych! And may everyone remember this!” This is one of the most patriotic moments in the film called to invoke deep national feelings among Ukrainians and make them feel proud of their glorious past. The use of the name “Ukraine” can be argued as a historical inaccuracy, since Khmelnitskii was a leader of the Hetmanate, yet this misuse of names serves the national ideology, as the filmmakers tend to present an updated version Ukrainian history—a history of victories rather than of defeats. When Khmelnitskii’s Cossacks approach Zboriv, where the Polish troops attack them with canons and weapons, they move towards them with swords only totally confident of their power, ready to die for the great cause. The entire film is, therefore, a series of victories. When the king of Poland announces Khmelnitskii the hetman of all Ukraine, the Cossacks rejoice in exultation. It is notable that Iamburskii chooses specifically the period in history that is filled with victories during the Cossack uprising against the Poles in 1647 and does not touch upon the Pereiaslav treaty.

In the final scene, Khmelnitskii cheers up his Cossacks before another battle, raises his symbolic mace and rides his horse, as if the Kievan statue came alive. As the Cossacks move towards the enemy with their swords and flags raised high in the air, the voiceover announces that in June 1652, Cossack troops under the leadership of the Great Hetman of Ukraine, Bogdan-Zinovii Khmelnitskii, with support of the Crimean khan defeated the Polish army. “It was a great victory, the result of which was complete independence of Ukraine that was not burdened by any
agreement with the Polish king anymore”—the title further reads, with triumphant music supporting the message. The selective approach to picturing the events, as well as updating of historical facts (there was no Ukraine in its present borders at that time) appeal to Ukrainian patriotism and provide grounds for Ukraine’s independence and national identity today, as well as make implications about Ukraine’s recent history.

Khmelnitskii is an interesting personality because he tends to be positively pictured not only by Ukrainians but also Poles, as Jerzy Hoffmann’s historical drama With Fire and Sword shows. According to Kalinowska and Kondratyuk (2090, the conclusion of the film “emphasizes a parallel positioning of Poland and Ukraine vis-à-vis the threat of Russian expansion, and it suggests a common ground for a reconciliation and cooperation.” Every film about Khmelnitskii is an attempt of filmmakers to reimagine the past and create a cultural memory of the figure to satisfy the needs of national identity. Khmelnitskii represents a reusable symbol of the past that is supposed to resolve conundrums of the present. As Jameson (102) asserts, “history is what hurts, it is what refuses desire and sets inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis, which its ‘ruses’ turn into grisly and ironic reversals of their overt intention. But this History can be apprehended only through its effects, and never directly as some reified force.”

3.4 Ivan Mazepa: Traitor or Hero?

Another reusable symbol of the past, yet much more controversial, is the figure of Hetman Ivan Mazepa (1639-1709), glorified in contemporary Ukrainian tradition and absolutely despised by Russian history. Iurii Illienko’s A Prayer for Hetman Mazepa (2001) features the director’s reflections about the Cossackdom during the reign of Peter the Great. The film stands among other
Ukrainian state-sponsored films in wake of its baroque style, theatricality, and narrative fragmentation, which contributed to the ambiguity of its reception by Ukrainian audiences. As Erll underscores,

…films that are not watched or books that are not read may provide the most intriguing images of the past, yet they will not have any effect in memory cultures. The specific form of reception which turns fictions into memory-making fictions is not an individual, but a collective phenomenon. What is needed is a certain kind of context, in which novels and films are prepared and received as memory-shaping media. (395)

Ilienko’s Mazepa was out of context of the film industry in the early 2000s, yet its influence on Ukrainian cultural memory is still evident.

Ivan Mazepa is a controversial figure in history, since he deserted his army and sided with Charles XII, King of Sweden. In 1708, Peter the Great announced a death sentence for Mazepa but it was executed only on his dummy, because Mazepa was out of reach of Moscow authorities. Ukrainian Orthodox Church then was forced to pronounce anathema against Mazepa. He was denounced as traitor by the Russian and later Soviet history and remained in this status for centuries. The battle of Poltava and the figure of Peter the Great are “prominent sites of Russian national-imperial memory, immortalized by Aleksandr Pushkin and Peter Tchaikovsky. In the Russian and Soviet Empires, disloyal Ukrainians were qualified as ‘Mazepists’” (Kappeler 113). Yet, as Russian historian Tatiana Tairova-Iakovleva maintains, in the Russian Empire, “the ‘mazepists’ were not traitors, but rather those who adhered to the Ukrainian national idea” (6). Even after the revolution of 1917, “mazepists” meaning nationally conscious Ukrainians, were prosecuted by the Soviet authorities.
Mazepa’s primary goal was with the help of the Swedes to create Ukraine as a separate state, independent of Russia. The hetman did not want to join the Swedes or the Poles instead of Russia, but rather to make Ukraine an equal polity of its own. The image of a traitor, however, was tightly glued to the name of Mazepa for over two centuries in Russian consciousness. In his poem “Voinarovskii” (1825), Russian Decembrist poet Kondratii Ryleev explains Mazepa’s motivation as follows: “Mean, petty ambition led him to treason. The blessing of the Cossacks served him as a means to multiply the number of his adherers and a pretext to hide his treachery. Could he, who was brought up in a foreign land and already twice tainted by betrayal, be driven by a noble feeling of love for the motherland?” (Ryleev “Voinarovskii”).

After Ukraine acquired independence, there were strong moves to rehabilitate Mazepa’s image. Ilienko, in particular, aimed to create a neutral image of the hetman. Yet, caustic remarks about Muscovy throughout the film, as well as the negative image of Peter the Great, resulted in a ban on the film in Russia. Rejected in Moscow, the film did not gain much popularity in Ukraine either, in wake of the complexity of its form. According to Zubavina (110), “Iurii Illienko’s A Prayer for Hetman Mazepa sends the audience directly the capricious Baroque worldview as an authentic attribute of ‘Ukrainianness.’ By combining the incomparable, which is the pragmatics of an anti-imperial work with an irrational poetics, the director … has created a real revolt against the ‘rational.’” The scholar also indicates that “the performance is primarily not political but artistic, oriented towards theater, painting, and light design” (Zubavina 112). Whereas the paradoxical reality created in the film exists on an intersection of all those artistic paradigms to create a postmodern work with notes of surrealism, the political plane it represents still has a powerful voice.
At the beginning of the film, Peter the Great forcefully crushes Mazepa’s entombment shouting “Get out of the coffin! You traitor! Stand up! I’ll show you independence!” In fury, he first destroys the statue of Mazepa on top, then the tomb, and finally gets to his coffin, when Mazepa’s arm suddenly appears from it and clutches him by the throat. Now Mazepa is in the position of power and suggests Peter to remind him how their cooperation began. In a dream-like story, suddenly a horseman knocks on the window shouting “Why in hell have you built your fucking capital in my swamp?” while Peter is seemingly stuck in mire supporting the words. Mazepa reminds Peter that it was him and his Cossack troops who provided power to Peter over Muscovy. In a retrospect, the next scene is a depiction of the first encounter of Mazepa and Peter, when Mazepa came to Peter and swore an oath to be faithful to him forever. With Mazepa standing on his knees, Peter feels uncomfortable and pleads Mazepa to stand up because he wants to have a look at Mazepa’s boots. Mazepa then takes off his boots and Peter jumps around wearing them. As Peter undresses Mazepa, he places him on his throne and asks him to stay around Moscow with his Cossack troops. Peter behaves insanely, while the film in general promotes an openly anti-Russian position.

The memory the film suggests is deeply controversial, with a historically conditioned ideological clash lying at its foundation. The film reflected the necessity to whitewash the figure of Hetman Ivan Mazepa in the renewed Ukrainian cultural memory as he was admitted into the pantheon of Ukrainian heroes already in 1992 when his image found its place on a ten hryvnia banknote. Along with Mashchenko’s Zinovii Bohdan Khmelnitskii, and Zaseev-Rudenko’s Black Council, Illienko’s Mazepa is another film that, according to filmmaker Oles' Sanin, favors “making films about personalities portrayed on banknotes of the country” (Martyniuk).
In 1994, the first monument to Mazepa was erected in the village of Mesepintsy in Kiev region. The opening ceremony included President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma, foreign ambassadors, and representatives of Ukrainian government. The attitude to Mazepa, however, remained ambivalent for a long time after Ukraine obtained its independence. According to Igor Kurukin and Vladislav Iatsenko (70), a Russian and a Ukrainian historian, “on the one hand, among the population of an older age group and left-wing political forces the image of the hetman was compliant with the paradigm of the Soviet school textbook, and on the other—Mazepa was turning into a symbol of the Western, European orientation of Ukraine.” The rise of popularity of Mazepa among Ukrainians coincides with the first conflicts between Russia and Ukraine in the early 2000s. Viktor Iushchenko, who came to power in Ukraine after the revolution, promoted Mazepa as a champion of Ukrainian statehood, giving Mazepa the leading role in the formation of national memory of Ukraine.

In 2009, Iushchenko ignored Putin’s suggestion to celebrate the tri-centennial of the battle of Poltava, which could only deteriorate the relationships between the two countries. It is also notable that “after 1997, any textbook of history of Ukraine would contain no less than twenty pages about the Mazepa epoch” while “Russian history textbooks are brief and rarely clear” about this period in history, emphasizing primarily the fact that Mazepa entered a secret agreement with Charles XII and was a traitor (Kurukin and Iatsenko 72). The debates between Russia and Ukraine, and within Ukraine about the memory of Mazepa, still continue and “express antagonistic, exclusive interpretations of the past” (Kappeler 113). The antagonism, furthermore, is not only among historians, but also among the political circles of the two countries.

Post-Soviet Ukrainian cinema is rife with experimentation. In terms of auteurism in historical drama, Illienko’s A Prayer for Hetman Mazepa and Oles’ Sanin’s Mamai (2003) are
most prominent examples. Both films failed to attract wide audiences and remained outside of viewers’ attention both domestically and abroad. Widely known for his “poetic” cinema, Illienko’s last attempt to produce an aesthetically rich film was highly criticized for its surrealism and chaotic nature. As Iurii Shevchuk points out, “Illienko consciously builds his scenes, setting, and costumes so as to dissuade the viewer from believing in any historical verisimilitude” (Shevchuk). The experimental approach towards history along with its open-endedness, as the film does not provide any answers or finalization, but rather invites viewers to create their own meanings, making Illenko’s *A Prayer for Hetman Mazepa* unique in an attempt to create a new cultural memory of the past. The figure of Mazepa is refashioned to fit the contemporary cannon of Ukrainian national thought.

3.5 The Two Taras Bulbas

The contrast between the Ukrainian and Russian interpretation of the Cossack myth is most prominently embodied in the two screen versions of Gogol’s *Taras Bulba* by Vladimir Bortko (Russia) and Petro Pinchuk / Ievgen Berezniak (Ukraine), both released in 2009. Bortko’s Taras Bulba fights for the “Russian land” and the “Orthodox faith,” implying that Ukrainians do not exist as a separate people. Pinchuk and Berezniak’s film, on the contrary, emphasizes the Ukrainianness of the Gogol’s novel, as they use a Ukrainian translation of it and embellish with traditional Ukrainian mise-en-scènes. The Cossacks in the film reflect most of the typical stereotypes—heavy drinking, horse riding, peasant culture, and traditional Ukrainian humor, yet they are deeply dedicated to their struggle for Ukraine’s liberation from the oppressive enemy.
The appropriation of the Cossack memory attempted by Vladimir Bortko in his version of *Taras Bulba* became an insult to Ukrainian national identity. The film aroused resentment among Ukrainian intellectuals in wake of what can be regarded an encroachment on Ukrainian national memory. After the release of Bortko’s film, Ukrainian Minister of Culture Vasilii Vovkun immediately denounced it as a film made to Russian state order. Vovkun also mentioned that the film creates the impression that Russian imperialism has reappeared through Gogol in a new disguise in the twenty-first century (“Ministr kul'tury”). Members of the Center for Ukrainian National Revival also shared their concern as to “when foreigners [Russians] will finally stop interpreting Ukrainian history” (“Ministr kul'tury”). The fight for Gogol as a national Ukrainian poet *versus* Gogol as a Russian national poet will most probably never end, with each side struggling to acquire the full right for the writer’s legacy.

The equivocation is grounded in the fact that Gogol wrote two versions of *Taras Bulba*. History was one of the most important realms in which Gogol intended to develop professionally; he even planned to write a six-volume history of Ukraine. Yet, the project remained largely unrealized. In the early 1830s, Gogol applied for a teaching position at the history department of Kiev University, but was refused the job due to lack of qualification. It is in this period of his life that the writer’s passion and emotional sentiment for Ukraine became most pronounced and culminated in the first version of his novel *Taras Bulba* (1835), which appeared as a bright manifestation of this passion. As Edyta M. Bojanowska (100) points out, “Ukrainian history was Gogol’s private and most passionately held interest, most integral to both his scholarly and artistic endeavors. … It is also the topic that most often put Gogol in collision with official imperial historiography.” As he continued his life and work in St. Petersburg, Gogol’s Ukrainian national views were much criticized by Russian authorities, while his aesthetic style and political allegiance
eventually came under the influence of Russian ideology. This shift in his loyalties towards duality and the internal split of his identity between Ukraine and Russia led him to rework *Taras Bulba* in 1842 entirely, thus switching from Ukrainian nationalism to Russian imperial patriotism.

In comparison to the first redaction that appeared in the *Mirgorod* cycle (1835), the later revised version of 1842 features a drastically different agenda. Whereas the first edition of the novel portrays Cossacks as free people fighting for Ukraine, the second version explicitly promotes Russian virtues and incorporates Russian spirit into the image of Cossacks. In her study of the Cossack myth, Kornblatt (39) emphasizes Gogol’s important role in establishing a model of the Cossack hero as the “defender of holy Russia.” The scholar underscores the association of the image of a Cossack with the Russian soul, which is most prominent in the second redaction of the novel, published in 1842. According to Saera Yoon (431), “the Cossacks in the 1842 *Taras Bulba* completely internalize a form of the Russian identity. They have adopted the patriotically charged epithet ‘Russian’ to describe themselves, and in so doing express their animosity toward Poland within the framework of the opposition between Russia and the West.” There should be made a clear distinction, however, between “Russian” as *russkii* and *rossiiskii*. As Geoffrey Hosking (9) and other scholars maintain, these two adjectives refer roughly to the distinction between “ethnic” and “imperial” Russianness. The distinction further assigns to *Rus’* as pre-imperial Russian identity rooted in the people, land, and the church, while *Rossiia* refers to the state and to the multinational imperial Russia ruled over by an *Imperator* (rather than by a tsar).

Whether Gogol was forced by imperial power to bring those changes into the novel, or he himself has gone through a significant transformation of his attitude toward both Russia and Ukraine, it is clear that the ideology represented in the second version of *Taras Bulba* favors Russian national identity and creates an image of heroic Cossacks as a perfect example for Russian
national pride and Russian patriotism. Yoon (441) also views Gogol’s Cossack world as an exemplification of Benedict Anderson’s imagined community, “as if Gogol understands that appealing to the collective imagination is the best way to enhance national consciousness.” Yet, Gogol never completely discarded his Ukrainianness. According to Bojanowska (102), “his historical texts often feature a duality between the gestures of support toward official ideology and points of tension with it.” This inherent ambiguity allows different interpretations of Taras Bulba as a Cossack figure, on the one hand, fighting for Ukrainian people against Poles, Mongols, and the Russian Empire; and on the other, fighting for the single Russian (russkii) people against Poles and Mongols.

With the Russian imperial implications already inscribed in the literary text, Bortko, in his cinematic rendition of the story, enhanced the ideology with contemporary meanings. In his review of the film, Stephen Norris discusses the divorce between Russia and Ukraine that took place in 1991, and then reoccurred during Orange Revolution in 2004. Gogol’s dual Russo-Ukrainian identity coupled with Bortko’s dual identity, as a Ukrainian-Russian director, resulted in a deeply Russian patriotic interpretation of the novel and the historical past associated with it creating a shared memory of exclusively Russian Cossacks who fought for the Russian land against the Poles (the West). Although this is a narrative of defeat, it promises a great victory in future, and hence enforces the Russian identity and the unity of people. According to Reihardt Koselleck (297), it can “by virtue of an inverse logic, raise a challenge to identify, precisely out of defeat, with the fatherland for whom the fallen had given their lives.” This powerful sense of unity vibrating through Gogol’s novel is the main reason why claiming the sole right for the text became so crucial for the support of Russian and Ukrainian national ideologies.
The Russian appropriation of Gogol in Bortko’s adaptation is evident even before the film actually begins. The Russian tricolor at the film’s beginning followed by an acknowledgement of support from the Russian Ministry of Culture already signals the ideological slant the film is going to take. Another articulation of the film’s ideology is the kind of a narrative “epigraph” that Bortko chooses for his film: before the actual story begins, a black-and-white flashback features Taras Bulba (played by the Ukrainian actor Bogdan Stupka) addressing his Cossack regiment about the true comradeship, a monologue from the novel learned by heart by generations of Soviet schoolchildren. Its choice is ideologically explicit, since Taras Bulba speaks about the unity of the Russian people in their fight for the Russian land (*russkaia zemlia*), which immediately establishes a connection to contemporary Russia, especially after the image of the Russian flag.

The depiction of Ukrainian Cossacks throughout the film is rife with stereotypes—enormous drinking, dancing, collective training and a lifestyle resembling a never-ending feast. The traditional Cossack outfit—wide trousers (*sharovary*), embroidered shirts, and the classical Cossack hairstyle (the *oseledets’*), also contribute to the stereotypical representation. They speak Russian, however, although the Poles speak Polish in the film. As Kraliuk underscores, “briefly, Bortko lets us know: there is no Ukrainian language, while Ukrainian Cossacks are Russians who love Orthodoxy, the Russian land and the Tsar, as they expect salvation from him” (*Taemnyi agent* 11). The brightest example of the stereotypical depiction of the Cossacks is a citation of Ilia Repin’s painting “Zaporozhian Cossacks Are Writing a Letter to the Turkish Sultan” (1891), which also bears an anti-Tartar reference permeating the entire film as a representation of the current Russian attitude towards the Tartars. It seems as if Repin’s painting comes live in the film, as the Cossacks are contagiously laughing while writing the letter.
The ceremonial nature and rituality of the Cossack lifestyle, in the meantime, demonstrate the laws that existed within this society of free people, including signs of democracy that reigned in the Zaporozhian Host. This is especially visible in the scene where the Cossacks denounce their leader or decide to fight the Poles when they receive news of the Polish invasion. As mentioned in Chapter Two, democracy has never been a feature of Russian rule. Russia has always been an autocratic state, and by appropriating the Cossack past, it also attempts to tap into the democratic formations of this period of history, claiming its people-oriented nature.

A special role in the film is given to the narrator voiced by Sergei Bezrukov, a popular Russian actor. While the omniscient narrator represents Gogol himself, the necessity of this voiceover, is debatable, since in most cases he only reiterates what the visuals and sound have already shown. If considered from the ideological point of view, however, the narrator’s role is quite clear. He not only enhances and explains the narrative, but also guides the audience in the necessary direction and emphasizes the most important messages of the film—ideological statements about the magnificence of the Russian land. During the battle with the Poles, the central Cossack characters are happy to die for the Russian faith and the Russian land, which they express in their last words before death. As Kraliuk emphasizes, “the Zaporozhians do not just die. Before dying, they necessarily have to say something like ‘May the Russian land be blessed!’” (Taemnyi agent 11). Orthodoxy acquires a much prominent role in the film than in the original text, serving the ideological purposes of the filmmakers. Bortko’s Taras Bulba, therefore, contains a number of details that have never existed in Gogol’s novel, neither in the first or second redaction, thus updating the cultural memory of the Cossack past to match the current ideologies.

The antagonism between the Russians and the Poles in the novel, and even more so in Bortko’s screen adaptation, is also a representation of Russia’s antagonism to the West that existed
already in the nineteenth century when Gogol wrote his novel and still continues in the Russian Federation. What Gogol was trying to promote under the pressure of tsarist censorship is that Russians and Ukrainians are Slavic people in contrast to the westernized Poles, who are also Slavs, but not Orthodox. This antagonist position vis-à-vis the West in the novel is very advantageous for today’s Russian politics, which is why Bortko’s film is so widely acclaimed in Russia. Furthermore, as Ellen Barry points out in her review of the film in The New York Times, “Mr. Bortko aimed to show that ‘there is no separate Ukraine,’ as he put it in an interview, and that ‘the Russian people are one.’” (Barry).

In the meantime, there are serious historical inconsistencies in Gogol’s text that remain overlooked. Gogol sets the novel in the fifteenth century, when there was no Russia as such but, rather, a number of principalities under the Tatar overlordship until 1480. It is only in the sixteenth century that Muscovy gained power during the reign of Ivan IV and the Poles occupied Ukrainian territories. Taking into account such significant deviations from historical facts, the validity of the historical “truth” in Gogol’s text is questionable. Historical verisimilitude, however, is not the point, since the past represented both in the novel and in the two film adaptations of Gogol’s text speak more to the present than to the past. As Rigney (347) underscores, however, “‘inauthentic’ versions of the past may end up with more cultural staying power than the work of less skilled narrators or of more disciplined ones who stay faithful to what their personal memories or the archive allow them to say.”

The Ukrainian version of Taras Bulba, directed by Petro Pinchuk and Ievhen Berzniak, is nothing like Bortko’s Hollywood-style historical blockbuster. This is a low-budget film with its main focus on Ukrainian spirituality and national unity. The first images introducing the film to the audience are flames and black shadows covering what is symbolically pictured as Ukraine.
flame occupies wheat fields—a symbol of Ukraine—and even turns into red representing blood spilled on those fields. The ghostly images of Cossacks galloping through the fields are then suddenly replaced by the stillness and peacefulness of pastoral landscapes characteristic of Ukraine. The pastoral idyll is sensuously accompanied by sounds of a kobza, with a kobza-player singing about the bygone times, most probably alluding to the once powerful state of Kievan Rus'.

The actual story begins only after a series of anecdotes involving women wearing traditional Ukrainian clothes, a piglet, as well as depiction of a traditional Ukrainian home interior with an abundance of embroidered towels, and men forging a horseshoe. All these scenes establish the purely Ukrainian environment in which the film is set. Gogol’s novel, originally written in Russian with only occasional Ukrainian phrases, is translated into Ukrainian, which contributes to the consolidation of the Ukrainian setting, and therefore establishing a purely Ukrainian cultural memory. The Ukrainian Taras Bulba is generally about the Cossackdom as free people, about their heroism, valor, their way of life and bravery in fighting the enemy. Unlike the Russian version, there is not a single indication of the “Russian land” (russkaia zemlia) in the film, which is an intentional act to avoid equivocations.

It is notable that Ukrainians did not have their own screen version of Taras Bulba for a long time, although the novel was filmed internationally in Germany (1924), France (1936), England (1938), USA (1962), and other countries. In the early 1940s, Soviet-Ukrainian filmmaker Aleksandr Dovzhenko suggested a script of the film, yet it was never realized. In the early 2000s, there was a huge project of Taras Bulba in Ukraine with Gérard Depardieu starring as Taras Bulba, directed by a Polish director Jerzy Hoffman, which, however, was not realized either. Nevertheless, the novel, as well as its author, has always been considered as deeply Ukrainian and promoting specifically Ukrainian national ideas. Hrushevskyi, for instance, regretted that Gogol
did nor write in Ukrainian but explained this fact by the influences of his time and surroundings. “Gogol grew up on the ruins of the Hetmanate, without ever suspecting that with the death of the Cossackdom Ukraine did not stop living. … Gogol became an enthusiastic poet of Ukrainian life that was dying in front of his eyes under the new influences” (Hrushevskyi Tovy 379). Taras Bulba was translated into Ukrainian numerous times. This maintains the necessity for Ukrainians to emphasize Gogol’s Ukrainianness, in spite of his adherence to the Russian language and sometimes derogatory references to Ukraine as Little Russia (Malorossia). Kraliuk defines Taras Bulba as a novel that fits neither Russian or Ukrainian patriotic discourse, and that is neither an anti-Polish, nor an anti-Semite text. Rather, it is a really deep work revealing both the mentality of Ukrainians, and their relations with neighbors—the Poles and the Jews. The work is also a subtle ridicule of the Russian ideological stereotypes (Taemnyi agent 16).

Gogol and his literary legacy constitute another site of memory contested between the Russian and Ukrainian ideologies to support the present-day political agendas of the two countries. The poet is, rather, a product of his time having no relation neither to Putin or the Euromaidan revolution, yet his figure is actively used to support those ideologies and his works are selectively enhanced or highlighted to underscore today’s vision of the past, either from the Russian, or Ukrainian position.

The two films create a cultural memory among Russians and Ukrainians about the glorious past, which they do not wish to share with each other. While the Russians exult with patriotic feelings after watching Bortko’s film, most Ukrainians denounced the director for the pro-Russian propaganda, and after 2014 the film was entirely banned as anti-Ukrainian for showing in Ukraine.
The two versions of *Taras Bulba* as a novel are an epitome of the struggle taking place both inside Gogol’s mind and in society of his time, as Russian imperial ambitions aimed to overthrow Ukrainian national spirit. The two screen versions on the occasion of Gogol’s bicentennial are meant to mark the author’s anniversary in a political way that favors the presentist models of Russian and Ukrainian societies and enhances the construction of national identities and cultural memories of these two countries.
4.0 Memories of the 20th C.: Great Patriotic War or Second World War?

Wars, soldiers, and the victims of war have been remembered in ceremony, in ritual, in stone, in film, in verse, in art, in effect in a composite of narratives. All are charged with the weight of the event: twentieth-century warfare is infused with horror as well as honour; the proper balance in representing the two is never obvious (Winter and Sivan 9).

4.1 Staging the Question

Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (9) have suggested the notion of “collective remembering” as a “set of acts which go beyond the limits of the professionals,” with the intention to explain the collective memory of wars in the twentieth century (8). Winter and Sivan distinguish their approach to “collective memory” from that of the scholars who define it “as the property of dominant forces in the state,” and in order to avoid generalizations prioritize “collective remembrance.” Much of their concern is connected to the fact that there are different groups within the collective who behave differently in relation to past events. Some members of the group might actively engage with memories of the war by bringing their private memories into the collective remembering, while others would not care about the war and stay passive. “Collective remembering,” therefore, brings precision into this realm of memory, which the scholars understand as a product of individuals or groups of people. For the scholars, “the collective
remembrance of past warfare, old soldiers, and the victims of wars is, therefore, a quixotic act. It is both an effort to think publicly about painful issues in the past and one which is bound to decompose over time” (Winter and Sivan 10). As Siegfried J. Schmidt (194) points out, “remembering needs occasions and it is selective by necessity. What is remembered and what is forgotten first of all depends upon the subjective management of identity, which in turn is steered by emotions, needs, norms, and aims.” Schmidt views remembering also as a cognitive process that exists only in the present, which is why the past “exists only in the domain of (actor-bound) remembrances” (194). In addition, remembering needs production and performance, that is to say, “narrations of remembrances, which make use of narrative schemata as modes of socially acceptable production and performance of remembrances” (Schmidt 194).

The scope of individual memories about the war is varied, yet as the participants of the war disappear, the memories disappear with them. The different artifacts of collective remembrance and ceremonies dedicated to those fallen in the war is subject to the influence of both state authorities and the civil society. As long as the memory of the war continues to be important for the present, collective memory of it will persist and develop. Memories of the past evolve with every new generation into new representations of the events. The Second World War experienced by the soldiers and civilians first-hand is a completely different war in comparison to the memory of the war perceived eighty years after. The collective remembrances of the war, including ceremonies, parades, and monuments have mediated the original memory and created collective memories of their own that have piled up on the first-hand experiences, distorted and idealized them.

The memory of the past is constantly changing in connection to the collective’s projections about the present situation and the future. The vision of the Second World War has been constantly
evolving with the course of state politics. During the Soviet times, memory of the Great Patriotic War was a memory of the great victory that justified the losses. Soldiers of the Red Army, all as one, were selflessly fighting for the great cause saving their mothers and children from the enemy.

In post-Soviet republics, with Stalinist crimes uncovered in the 1980s and the 1990s, the vision of the war has divided. The same military formations now tend to be considered both heroes and traitors by different communities, depending on the political allegiance and the collective memory they share. This is the case with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, *Ukrayins’ka povstans’ka armiia* (UPA). With the fall of previous political regimes, the memory is automatically reversed, with the consequent “reordering of people’s entire meaningful worlds” (Verdery 35). In terms of tremendous disorientation, the new political regimes had to form new memories of the past using “dead bodies as one of many vehicles through which people in postsocialist societies reconfigure their worlds of meaning in the wake of disorienting change in their surroundings” (Verdery 50). Traumatic memories of the past that are especially painful are usually imbued with politics and ideologies, which is why disputes that they create are particularly difficult to appease.

The new nationalized history of Ukraine introduced after it acquired its long-awaited sovereignty, presented a new interpretation of the major events of the 20th century, with the Soviet regime depicted as the main offender. “The Soviet period in this narrative was described exceptionally negatively, as a dark epoch of totalitarianism, national suppression and endless attempts to assimilate or even to destroy the Ukrainian nation” (Kasianov, *Past Continuous* 229). Beginning with the late 1980s, the blank pages of Ukrainian history began to be filled in, with Soviet taboos uncovered and crimes against the Ukrainian people manifested. According to Kasianov, “the principal slogan was that of a return to ‘authentic’ history,” while “the source of that ‘authentic’ history was discovered in the previously forbidden works of earlier historians that
began to appear as part of the ‘rehabilitation’ wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s” (‘‘Nationalized’ history’’ 9). After 1991, the process accelerated with an even stronger force. The new history of Ukraine obtained a clear shape and objectives, with the national component being the main essence in the historical narrative that was formed primarily based on the works of Ukrainian historians of the turn of the twentieth century. “Nationalized history began to fulfill important instrumental functions: legitimize the newly established state and its attendant elite; establish territorial and chronological conceptions of the Ukrainian nation; and confirm the appropriateness of that nation’s existence as a legal successor in the consciousness of its citizens and neighbors alike” (Kasianov, ‘‘Nationalized’ history 11). The national history of Ukraine was based on a presumption of existence of Ukrainian ethnicity that now was organized into Ukrainian nation-state with a continuous history beginning from the ancient tribes and ending in the hiatus of the Soviet regime, when Ukrainian people existed as a nation without state. In the wake of diversity of Ukrainian regions and the various historical influences, including religious—Catholic and Uniate in the West and Orthodox in the east—the existence of a single historical narrative is complicated and at times confusing. Since Western Ukraine was united with the rest of the territory only in 1939 by Stalin, it is difficult to speak of one homogenous Ukrainian nation or its continuous linear history. Ethnocentricity was characteristic of the Soviet historiography, while Ukrainian diversity makes it a multiethnic nation. A new cultural memory began to be constructed in Ukraine, with history serving as its main instrument in the process of formation of knowledge and memory of the past.

Thus, since the Cossack culture has never existed in Western Ukraine, there is no empathy with it in this region. Similarly, since the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and the nationalist partisan movement after the Second World War were located
geographically in Western Ukraine, central and Eastern regions do not feel a strong sentiment about those movements. In his study, Kansteiner focuses on the collective memory of groups that did not experience it but only perceived the fact of its existence, and hence failed to remember. The scholar analyzes moments when collective memory failed to become collective and brings up an example of the memory of the Korean War, which “remained a ‘forgotten’ war” (192). In spite of all the efforts of the Korean War veterans, the memory of the war did not enter the collective memory of the Americans, as did the Second World War or the Holocaust. While construction of the collective memory is conditioned by many factors, he points out a paradox that “the more ‘collective’ the medium (that is, the larger its potential or actual audience), the less likely it is that its representation will reflect the collective memory of that audience” (193).

The historical narrative of independent Ukraine is fraught with myths. The central myth of the twentieth century is, according to Kasianov, the ‘ethnocidal’ policy of the Soviet state and the powerful related thematic line of the famines and repressive policies of the 1920s-40s. The myth (whatever the real grounds for it that can be found in the past) also serves as a powerful explanatory tool in current political debates and collective memory construction: political, economic and cultural problems are often explained as an outcome of human losses suffered by the Ukrainian people during the Soviet period. (“‘Nationalized’ history 19)

The Holodomor, furthermore, is often compared to the Holocaust in order to undermine allegations about Ukrainian anti-Semitism and collaboration with the Nazis during the Second World War. Among other repressions and tragedies carried out by the Soviet regime in connection to Ukrainians, the Second World War became an example of “a tragedy of a non-state nation that
found itself in the epicenter of a conflict of two totalitarian regimes” (Kasianov, *Past Continuous* 229).

As a result of the recent anti-Communist course in Ukrainian politics, the Great Patriotic War has now become the Second World War for Ukrainians. “The Great Patriotic War” is a part of the Soviet mythology that remained in historical discourse of independent Ukraine for more than twenty years, although the main emphasis was placed on Ukraine’s contribution to the victory. There were a number of suggestions as to the new name for the 1941-1945 period including the “Soviet-German war,” yet the decision was made on a more neutral “Second World War.”

Russia, however, continues to use the Soviet term of the Great Patriotic War, thus perpetuating the Soviet mythology about the war and acquiring the role of its heir. The controversies behind the terminology is comparable to the different expressions used in reference to the American Civil War, which can be called the War Between the States and the War of Northern Aggression. According to James V. Wertsch,

such referring expressions point to, or index, compressed narratives that are built into the very names (with their ‘hypostatic’ tendencies) used to a seemingly straightforward proposition. Disputes over such episodes of naming are not about unadorned facts or their encoding in propositions. Instead, they are about the selection of some events and motives and the neglect of others—processes routinely accomplished by emplotting events in accordance with a particular storyline (165).

The Second World War for Ukrainians is a tragedy of a nation that is supported by heroism of Ukrainian movements of resistance. With the new course of representation of the war in Ukraine, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), an ultra-radical nationalist party, and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), a nationalist paramilitary and later partisan formation,
obtained special importance. As Kasianov indicates, “here in the center of attention were the Organization of Ukrainian nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army as uncompromising and consistent champions of independence. The sacrificial narrative was thus counterbalanced by the heroic one” (*Past Continuous* 235). Among the most widely known leaders of these organizations are Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych, who were persecuted by the Soviet regime as traitors and Nazi collaborators. Today, a number of right-wing Ukrainian political organizations claim to be inheritors of the OUN. In contemporary Russian political discourse, nationally conscious Ukrainians are often referred to as “banderovtsi” and fascists, bearing all the negative connotations about Ukrainian nationalism promoted by the Soviet regime in connection to the OUN and the UPA.

The Ukrainian nationalism of the 20th century was largely liberal combining Ukrainian national consciousness with patriotism and humanist values, which after the First World War developed into “integral nationalism,” with the nation considered to be the highest value, more important than social class, the individual, religion or other aspects. Members of the OUN were thus urged to “force their way into all areas of national life” such as institutions, societies, and families, the willpower was seen as more important than reason and warfare that was glorified as an expression of national vitality (Subtelny 441-6). Among reasons why Ukrainian liberation movement of the 1930s—1950s is so acute even today are the following three: the military nature of the OUN members and collaboration with the Germans; armed struggle against the Soviet regime; and an ideology prioritizing national state over an individual. The negative attitude towards the OUN-UPA has been formed by the Soviet regime in Eastern and Southern Ukraine over a long period of time, so it became engraved in the memory of the older generation. This is why even today Ukrainians in these regions do not fully accept leaders of the movement as heroes,
and they are glorified primarily in Western Ukraine. The question of acceptance of the OUN-UPA into the official cultural memory was raised already in 1991, when the first President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk managed to address it vaguely, yet with a hope of resolution. During the first decade of Ukraine’s independence, when the course of the national ideology was in the process of formation, the issue was studied by historians and discussed with caution.

There is one page in the history of the UPA that is preferred to be left blank in contemporary Ukrainian history. It is the fact of intensified attacks of the UPA against the Poles that happened towards the end of the Second World War. This resulted in massive deportations of Ukrainians from the territory of Poland after the war and culminated in the 1947 operation titled “Vistula,” that was supposed to end the Ukrainian-Polish armed conflict. According to Yuliya Yurchak, perestroika and the declaration of glasnost led to a greater attention to previously taboo topics, “among these topics were the OUN, the UPA, operation Vistula, and the Ukrainian-Polish armed conflict. However, whereas the topics of the OUN and UPA fight against the Germans and Soviets were foregrounded, the wrong deeds of these organizations found little attention in memory space” (229). In Poland, however, the conflict became one of the central blank spots in history recently revealed and was even considered to be called a genocide. For most Ukrainians, the historical fact remains obscure.

In the pages that follow, we will look at two clusters: Ukrainian cinema about the Second World War and Russian films about the Great Patriotic War. The Ukrainian films discussed in this chapter are Oles Ianchuk’s The Undefeated (2000) and Taras Khymych’s Alive (2016). The Russian films are Aleksandr Rogozhkin’s Cuckoo (2002), Andrei Maliukov’s The Match (2012), Aleksandr Samokhvalov and Boris Rostov’s We Are from the Future 2 (2010), as well as Sergei
Mokritskii’s *Battle for Sevastopol / The Unbreakable One* (2015) that is a combined Russian-Ukrainian production.

### 4.2 Ukrainian Cinema: The Second World War

For independent Ukraine that was seeking every opportunity to nationalize its own history and make it serve its purposes of an asserted national identity, the OUN / UPA became an important component in the memory of the national struggle during the Second World War. In 2010, President Iushchenko passed the second decree about members of the OUN-UPA. According to the decree, members of the OUN and soldiers of the UPA who during the Second World War and in the period immediately after the war led the liberation war of the Ukrainian nation against the fascist invaders and the Stalinist totalitarian regime with the purpose to create the Ukrainian independent state, were now considered full-fledged participants of the Second World War. Yet, the view of the UPA in different regions of Ukraine is still highly polarized. Iushchenko also assigned the title of the Hero of Ukraine to Stepan Bandera, one of the most controversial leaders of the nationalist movement. This heroization, however, eventually played a negative part both in the image of Bandera and Ukraine’s nationalism.

The most controversial page in the history of Ukrainian nationalists is the announcement of independence of Ukraine on June 30, 1941. In Soviet and Russian history, this act was the most pronounced fact of Ukraine’s collaboration with the Nazis, with an emphasis that Ukrainians pledged loyalty to Hitler. Contemporary Ukrainian history, however, focuses on German repressions against Ukrainians after the declaration of independence. According to Aleksei Bakanov and Georgii Kasianov, a Russian and Ukrainian historian respectively,
if in contemporary Russian history and mass media, the scope of anti-German actions of the insurgents is minimized and the main emphasis is laid on their negotiations and cooperation with the Germans, in contemporary Ukrainian history, by contrast, the collaboration of the UPA with Germans is considered as ‘tactical’ and insignificant, while the UPA is viewed as almost the only force in European history that challenged two totalitarian regimes—the Hitler’s and Stalin’s regime—simultaneously (169).

In view of Soviet historians, and eventually in Russian vision of the movement, the UPA was a direct offspring of the Nazis. Ukrainian nationalists fought against the Germans, primarily in 1943, and when the Germans began to retreat, the Soviets became the primary occupant. Ukrainian nationalists had a hope that the war will exhaust the two totalitarian powers and “Ukrainians and other peoples of the USSR will be able to use this situation in order to initiate anti-Soviet uprisings, the result of which will be the formation of independent Ukraine and other nation-states on the territory of the USSR” (Bakanov and Kasianov 171). Thus, in 1944—1954, a large-scale war against Ukrainian nationalism unfolded in Western Ukraine between Soviet Cheka troops and Ukrainian partisans.

In The Undefeated (2000) and The Company of Heroes [Zalizna sotnia, 2004], Oles Ianchuk recovers forbidden pages in Soviet history and builds Ukrainian identity based on its repressed past, once again returning to the image of Ukraine as a victimized martyr. Both films address the struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Western Ukraine for independence from the Soviets during and after the World War Two. In The Undefeated, Ianchuk creates an idealized image of Roman Shukhevych, leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The image, however, “reminds us of a ‘socialist’ cliché of a positive hero who can only love the Motherland and his family”
(Zubavina 94). In his films, Ianchuk tells Ukrainian history of the twentieth century from the position of Ukrainian nationalists yet tends to apply Soviet cinematographic principles to the construction of the hero. Although the film is set in the period after the Second World War, in the 1950s, it still seems as if the war never ended. In Western Ukraine, tired but undefeated troops of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army still continue their struggle. The once powerful and well-organized Army has lost its military power but still has a vibrant spirit of nationalism. This was the final year for Shukhevych, as he was caught and executed by the Soviets during a secret military operation organized against him in March 1950.

At the beginning of the film, Shukhevych is swimming in the sea, and as he slowly gets out of the water exposing his young male body, he realizes that he has lost something. It turns out to be a medallion with an image of the Mother of God. This serves as a transparent sign of the upcoming tragedy, and the feeling of anxiety permeates the entire film. Shukhevych and his wife, Halyna, speak Ukrainian and seem to be entrapped in the Russian-speaking world in Southern Ukraine where Shekhevych is getting medical treatment. The doctor whom they visit even makes a joke that Halyna is using an old-fashioned Ukrainian pane (“mister”) instead of the Soviet tovarishch (“comrade”). Disguised as teachers, they travel across Ukraine while the life of Shukhevych and the entire Ukrainian national movement of the Second World War are shown in flashbacks.

During his last travel, Shukhevych recollects his entire life from his young childhood, the time he became nationally conscious, to the times of war and struggle. In one of the scenes, the camera lingers on dead bodies of civilians killed by Soviets, among which Shukhevych finds his brother. The dramatic scene is juxtaposed to an announcement of Ukrainian’s independence made by Stepan Bandera, a leader of the OUN. With Ukrainian flags raised, people rejoice at the news,
which justifies the cost paid by Ukrainian people. In the face of the national victory, personal tragedy is a necessary sacrifice.

Another flashback brings attention to the brutality of the Red Army. Soviet officers are pictured as ruthless Nazis, as they mercilessly kill civilian Ukrainian captives in a barn with the roaring motor of a car muffling the sound of the guns. Relatives of the prisoners are waiting outside, behind the fence with parcels of food to pass to them. One of the Soviets officers comes out to them and asks an old man for a lighter. As the man gives the lighter a quick shot shows that behind the fence the barn in which the people were killed is now set on fire. When the Soviets are done with the execution and are getting rid of the dead bodies they suddenly see an old man with a horse cart passing by, who becomes a casual witness of the crimes, so they drag him into the barn as well. The image of a lonely horse getting out of the yard juxtaposed to lamenting of old men and women over the bodies of their relatives makes the scene even more powerful. The scene is followed by the arrival of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, who look like Nazis, yet speak Ukrainian. They raise the Ukrainian blue and yellow flag and have it depicted on their collars. The poor civilians look at them as their saviors from the oppressive Soviet and fascist powers.

In negotiations with a German colonel, Shukhevych shows no signs of collaboration with the Nazis; the Ukrainian leader preserves an independent position of Ukrainian nationalism. He refuses to join the German army at the war front because the Germans did not satisfy the Ukrainian terms of agreement, among which was to recognize Ukraine’s independence, release Stepan Bandera and other Ukrainian leaders from prison, as well as to stop assaulting Ukrainian nationalists and civilians. Shukhevych’s argument is that, in spite of the agreement, the Germans continue to kill Ukrainians across the region. Shukhevych is not afraid of being accused of treason by the Nazis, because he and his army swore to independent Ukraine, not to the Führer. According
to Larysa Briukhovetska, Ianchuk’s Shekhevych asserts that “they will not give up the struggle, although they know that they are doomed to death, but they are fighting for the longer prospects. It is clear that he meant our time, our independence, he believed that earlier or later it will come true” (Prykhovani fil’my 329). The position of Ukraine in the war is thus depicted as independent, the Insurgent Army was sure to fight for its own interests, unlike the widely accepted interpretation of collaboration. The national idea was the primary goal in this fight with two enemies—the Soviets and the Nazis. While the agreement with Nazis did not last long, the Ukrainian nationalists continued their struggle as partisans even after the war ended. The struggle of the insurgents in Western Ukraine is connected to Ukraine’s independence finally obtained in 1991. It is also implied that as a result of the nationalists’ fight in the 1930-1954, Ukraine eventually was able to obtain its independence, so the OUN and UPA are a stepping stone in Ukraine’s nationalist narrative today.

A different approach to the history of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army is taken by Taras Khymych in his drama Alive (2016). Moving away from conventional patriotic cinema, Khymych tells a story of a woman with the main focus on romantic love and human feelings. The filmmaker aimed to create an optimistic vision for the future of Ukraine through the fate of a woman. The comparison of Ukraine to a woman is an old metaphor, which Khymych applies in new conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian undeclared war. Just like the woman in his film, Ukraine will endure the calamities and continue its existence as a prospering country. The film is based on an individual memory of the war of a real woman, Anna Popovych, who told the filmmakers her life story showing “history completely different from that in a textbook” (Novyk). “I was touched by the human side of the story, not military, not political, nor was I concerned with the contestation but just a story of a woman,” tells the filmmaker in an interview (Kryzhanivs'ka). The concentration
on human feelings against the historical background makes the film more appealing to viewers and renders it as a film of the new generation. So, whereas, Ianchuk and Khymych address the same historical period, the politics and goals of the filmmakers are radically different.

In 2016, there was no need to rehabilitate the history of anti-Soviet nationalist forces, so the center of gravity is shifted towards ordinary people and their feelings. The approach to picturing the collective memory of war has changed in relation to the present and the primary needs of the public in recollecting the past. Khymych’s goal in making the film was to make a statement about Ukrainian nationalism through a story of a woman who has gone through numerous hardships in her life, survived the war, mass killings and repressions, as well as outlived her enemies who tortured her. In terms of the current war in Ukraine, the filmmaker finds it a timely recollection of the past to remind people about real hardships that people used to go through, sustain the severities and remain human in spite of it all. The film was sponsored by private funds; this fact helps to clarify the reasons why the topic of nationalism is addressed from a different perspective. Instead of the monumentalism of a national hero, like in Shukhevych’s The Undefeated, the ordinary woman who witnesses the events and tells her individual memories attains more credibility and is closer to Ukrainian audiences in the current circumstances of war.

The film is set in the early 1950s when the Ukrainian nationalist movement has turned into a partisan struggle. Anna, the protagonist, has lost her relatives in the war and, having met one of her childhood friends of childhood among partisans, she joins the troop as the only woman and is supposed to cook and do housework for the male community. Soviet soldiers chasing the insurgents in the woods are ruthless enemies aiming to suppress the partisan movement by all means. It is a kind of hunting sport for them to find the partisans and kill them. When the underground shelter is uncovered and the insurgents have to escape, Anna ends up severely
wounded in her arm. Caught by the Soviets, she comes to her senses surrounded by enemies only to realize that her arm was amputated. By luck, she is saved from death by a Soviet officer who once brutally raped her. She is now a crippled beauty, a reflection of the land whose beauty is crippled by the invaders.

In order to save her from the inevitable death, her fellow partisans take her to the woods, give her a grenade and leave her there. This is the only way they can protect her, since they are all chased after and can be executed any minute. Being hungry, she survives by eating leaves from bushes and drinking water from the river. Surrounded by bears and wolves, Anna manages to stay alive because, as she comments, she did not smell like a human anymore; she has dissolved in nature and adopted its essence. She manages to survive even in the cold of the winter. In one of her feverish dreams, she recollects a conversation with the Soviet officer who made the shot, as a result of which she lost her arm. He confesses to her that to kill someone is the simplest task for him, but he did not manage to kill her, although he took a direct aim. He never believed in God, but she made him believe that there is some higher power over people. Anna’s spirituality and her exclusive status are underscored throughout the film, with an aim to create a metaphor for Ukraine’s power to survive all the calamities in wake of strong faith and assistance of God.

Anna stays alive throughout the film, when everybody else, including her enemies, dies. When she is imprisoned, with no hope left, she suddenly receives a gift from her enemy — warm boots with an image of a heart stabbed with knife on them. She accepted the gift and was not executed, yet she had to walk in those boots during the following ten years in a labor camp. The Anna’s acceptance? of the gift is a symbolic reference to Ukraine’s acceptance of the Soviet regime, in spite of the large-scale struggle.
4.3 Russian Cinema: the Great Patriotic War

World War Two is a special topic in contemporary Russian cinema. This special status is evident from an abundance of war films that have emerged in the past few years, such as Pavel Lungin’s *The Island* [Ostrov, 2006], Fedor Bondarchuk’s *Stalingrad* [Stalingrad, 2013], Kim Druzhinin and Andrey Shalopa’s *Panfilov’s 28 Men* [28 Panfilovtsev, 2016], Sergei Mokritskii’s *Battle for Sevastopol / The Unbreakable One* (2015), Andrei Maliukov’s *The Match* (2012). The films are representative of the myth constructed around the Great Patriotic War and how this myth is in dialogue with contemporary Russian reality.

Sergei Mokritskii’s *Battle for Sevastopol / The Unbreakable One*, Andrei Maliukov’s *The Match*, and Aleksandr Samokhvalov and Boris Rostov’s *We Are from The Future 2* are of special interest for this chapter, since the films are set in Ukraine and create a memory about Ukrainians from the position of present-day Russians.

In Russian cinema of the 2000’s, the topic of the Great Patriotic War became a kind of a religious cult. While some films, such as Aleksandr Rogozhkin’s *Cuckoo* [Kukushka, 2002], Piotr Todorovskii’s *In The Constellation of Taurus* [V sozvezdii byka, 2003], Aleksei Karalin’s *A Time to Gather Stones* [Vremia sobirat’ kamni, 2005], Dmitrii Meskhiev’s *Our Own* [Svoi, 2004], Vladimir Fatianov’s *Major Pugachev’s Last Battalion* [Shtrafbat, 2004], Vladilen Arsenev’s *Echelon* [Eshelon, 2005] still preserve a deeper look at the real problems of the war, other war dramas of the 2000’s comply with the general exultation about war and victory over the enemy (Nikolai Lebedev’s *The Star* [Zvezda, 2002], Renat Davletiarov’s *The Dawns Here Are Quiet* [A zori zdes’ tikhie, 2015]). As Denise Youngblood argues, “some recent films, such as the television miniseries *The Penal Battalion* and *Major Pugachev’s Last Battle*, bring the crimes of the Stalin era to viewers who are unlikely to read books on the same topics,” other examples of the Russian
cinema today are “*The Star* and films of its ilk,” “Russian versions of *Saving Private Ryan*, part of the wave of nostalgia for the simpler days of the Good War” (230).

Aleksandr Rogozhkin’s *Cuckoo* (2002), set in World War II, creates a memory about wartime in which communication among different cultures is ultimately impossible: efforts among a Finnish soldier Veikko, a Red Army captain Ivan, and a Sami woman Anni lead only to misunderstanding and confusion. Although the film features elements of comedy, especially in relation to the cultural differences between Veikko and Ivan, this is a wartime drama revealing serious and philosophical implications of the trauma. As Youngblood underscores, “*The Cuckoo* is a light-hearted and optimistic look at a serious subject: the futility of war” (226). Unlike the glorification of war that has overtaken Russian cinema after 2008, the film is one of those few representations of traumatic memory that depicts the other side of the war. The film opens in 1944 in Northern Finland, where Veikko is trying to free himself from shackles, as he was chained to a rock by the Germans for being a pacifist. A Red Army captain, Ivan, is accused of anti-Soviet activities and is driven as prisoner through the same area. A lucky accident frees him from his captors. Anni, a lonely Sami woman discovers Ivan’s unconscious body and brings him back to life. Along with the melodramatic theme of the film, one of its major lines is the inevitable divide drawn by the war between people, their relationships, between man and nature, between fathers and children, between countries and cultures.

While the traumatic experiences of the war are preferred to be left behind and silenced, the tendency of the last decade is to prioritize the pride of victory, to manifest the might and generate more power for the Russian state as the heir to the Soviet Union. The Russian filmmakers of the 2010s tend to privilege the Great Patriotic War by turning it into a spectacle, thus enhancing the heroism and justifying the sacrifices of the Soviet people. The tragedies of the war are perceived
as a necessary sacrifice for the bright future that was about to come with the emergence of the
Russian Federation. The participants of the war were not destined to see the results of their
heroism, but Russian citizens today are grateful to their grandfathers for this inevitable sacrifice.
The pathos transpires through patriotic films of the Putin era and is clearly aimed to upsurge
patriotic feelings through nostalgia, through the feeling of belonging to a big powerful country and
through the importance of individual contribution into the great cause. Such mediated memories
create alternative pasts. As Schmidt argues,

Media systems work as observing and describing systems which do not start
from ‘the reality’ but from former descriptions of reality which are then
transformed into new description. In this sense the description of reality and the
reality of description coincide. By this argument the tedious question of the relation
between media and reality can be resolved. Due to their system-specific logic,
media cannot represent an extra-medial reality. They can only produce and present
media-specific realities—and this equally holds true for the making of a / the past
(198).

In this way, the Soviet description of reality is transformed into the updated Russian
description of the war.

During the Putin era, the celebration of the Victory Day in Russia (May 9) has become the
most spectacular performance of the year, with tanks moving along the Red Square and military
power pompously displayed. The Soviet myth of the victory is actively reused by the Russian state
today in order to promote itself and obtain support of voters. The primary idea behind the Putin
regime is to create an image of Russia as a superpower. As Oleksii Polegkyi writes, “the memory
about the victory is used to present Russia as a great power and justify its pretentions to a special
status in Europe. Any objection against the myth of victory in the Second World War is considered a threat to Russia’s domination in the post-Soviet space” (Polegkyi). The myth of the victory, furthermore, legitimizes any military interferences of Russia in the post-Soviet space, including Ukraine. According to Polegkyi,

Putin’s regime is trying to create an entire ideology around the concept of the ‘special path,’ mixing Stalinism and neo-Eurasianism with conservative Orthodox values and Russian nationalism. History and the past are viewed as symbolic resources that are important tools in the process of achieving political goals and preserving power. (Polegkyi)

It is notable that the Victory Day was not celebrated in the times of Stalin or Khrushchev. The tradition began twenty years after the war ended, in 1965, when the immediate memories of the war were already blurred under the influence of the official ideology and many soldiers had died. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the tradition of parades in the Red Square was forsaken for a while, yet with the beginning of the Chechen wars, it was restored with a new force. Since 2008, lethal weapons began to be widely demonstrated in the Red Square again. The celebrations can be framed in terms of Jan Assmann’s “festival memory,” where the “ceremony as a means of communication is itself a forming influence, as it shapes memory by means of texts, dances, images, rituals, and so on” (Cultural Memory and Early Civilizations 38).

By using such a relatively distant and at the same time close past as a tool for mobilization of support, the Putin’s regime, on the one hand, indicates that there were no other significant victories to boast of and, on the other, exploits an already developed brand the legitimacy of which is difficult to dispute. With the constantly decreasing number of living veterans of war, the memory of the Second World War is turning into a dead past that is updated and retrieved to serve the
present. Among other things, it is used to cover failures in domestic and international politics and to maintain an illusion of belonging to the great victory. The role of allies in the war is reduced or completely silenced producing an image of Russia as the sole heir of the victory, while those who are against this policy are fascist. The legacy of the war constitutes one of the foundations of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. For Kremlin, the Ukrainian government consists of fascists and even neo-Nazis, while Ukrainians are banderovtsi. The Ukrainian national movement for liberation and independence has never been forgiven to Ukraine and continues to be perpetuated in Russian memory as a negative phenomenon.

In Maliukov’s The Match, the events are set in occupied Kiev of 1941. The film is based on true events of August 1942, when a so-called death football match between the Ukrainian team Start and a German team took place. Although the members of the Ukrainian football team were warned by the Germans and even ordered to lose the game, they did not obey the Nazis and did their best to win the match, after which they were all executed. In the film, as Germans invade Kiev, Ukrainians happily greet Nazis with bread and salt and hold portraits of Hitler to show their loyalty to the occupant. Ukrainian children wave Nazi flags, women dress up for the arrival of the Germans, and when they finally arrive, everyone is smiling and throwing flowers, waving their hats and holding up Hitler’s portraits and German slogans. The overall excitement and rejoicing about the arrival of the Nazis is immense. A close-up of the Nazis arriving in a car shows that they even feel uncomfortable about such a warm reception. A red gate, furthermore, with a slogan in German and Ukrainian “Es lebe deutsche Armee! Slava vil'niï Ukraiini!” (May live German army! Glory to free Ukraine!) with Nazi swastika along the perimeter is an exaggeration creating a compelling ideological statement about the role of Ukrainians in the war. The mayor of Kiev is concerned about the organization of the reception and wants the meeting to be held on the highest
level possible. He has even prepared a speech in German, which Germans do not understand. The Nazis are introduced to the old Russian hospitality tradition of bread and salt. As instructed by his interpreter, the German leader takes a piece of bread, dips it in salt and eats it, with Ukrainian girls in national costumes laughing flirtingly and insisting that the Germans take the entire loaf. Confused about the tradition, the Nazis take the bread loaf and flowers as a sign of friendship, while a Ukrainian in the crowd makes a comment that everything will be all right. The mayor, in the meantime, having exhausted all his knowledge of German begins to speak Ukrainian, which is harshly received by the German interpreter who immediately orders him to speak Russian. The mayor expresses loyalty to the Nazis as well as his hopes that, by combined efforts, they will be able to liberate Ukraine and nervously passes a folder, allegedly, with requirements about Ukraine’s liberation. After a brief depiction of the war where the main hero, Nikolai Ranevich, is confused, the exultation in Kiev makes an even more comical and absurd impression.

The scene than switches to landscapes of Babii Iar (a district in Kiev), where Germans plan to stack fifty to sixty layers of dead bodies, with the capacity of up to fifty-sixty thousand “units.” Ukrainians further widely collaborate with Germans in the mass extermination of Jews in Babii Iar. When patients of a nearby psychiatric clinic as a test group are sent to the ravine to dig the pit, Ukrainians actively participate in organizing the process, as well as in stacking their corpses in the ravine afterwards. Ukrainians assist the German Gestapo to gather Jews in Babii Iar and are completely conscious of the fact that it is a road to death for the people. This collaboration is explained by the fact that Ukrainians are sure that it is the Jews, not the Germans, who destroyed the city of Kiev and killed Ukrainians. As Stephen M. Norris points out, “certainly some Ukrainians collaborated with the Nazi occupiers … but the film overwhelmingly casts anyone who
speaks Ukrainian or who wears traditional Ukrainian clothing as villains and anyone who speaks Russian and who supports the Soviet war effort as heroes” (Norris, “Andrei Maliukov”).

It is notable that, while the protagonists of the film—the captain of the football team, Ranevich, and his beloved, Anna—are also Ukrainians who live in Kiev, they speak Russian, and therefore represent positive heroes. It is remarkable that Anna saves a Jewish girl from the merciless Ukrainian police by pretending that it is her daughter and deliberately speaks Ukrainian to her in front of Ukrainian policemen.

By the end of the film, however, the city mayor is frustrated by the Germans and admits that it did not work out to create independent Ukraine under the German rule. There is a scene in which a Ukrainian flag—the blue and yellow bicolor—is taken down by the Nazis and a German flag is unfolded instead. The film thus provides a commentary about Ukraine’s independence and aspirations towards Europe, as well as constructs a negative memory of Ukrainians during the Second World War. The Match was highly criticized by Ukrainian nationalists and denounced as anti-Ukrainian. According to Andrii Parubii, a Ukrainian politician, the film rouses discord between nations, it is, moreover, “not about football, not about war, not even about love. This is propaganda of the Russian world (russkii mir), where all those themes are only a background. The main thing here is to show that if a person is wearing a Ukrainian vyshyvanka [embroidered t-shirt], they are collaborationists” (“Parubii: fil'm ‘Match’”).

According to Norris, “The Match touched a nerve, one that exposed painful memories over the memory of the Second World War and the historical relationship between Russia and Ukraine.” The film, therefore, highlights several ideas inherent in the Russian ideology: Russians and Ukrainians are one people; any attempt of Ukrainians to obtain independence is doomed to failure; and Ukrainian nationalists are fascist. The Match also transmits the waves of deep nostalgia for
the Soviet past, with characteristic glorification and mythologizing of the war. As Denis Gorelov indicates, the film makes an impression that

it was made about 30 years ago, in spite of inadmissible Jewish and love scenes in those times. All heroes are eager to get married and voluntarily register at the military enlistment office, while all sheep dogs bark furiously. Police officers say ‘shvydche’ [Ukrainian for ‘faster’]; Germans say ‘schnell.’ Good people hide Jewish children, bad people bring bread-salt to the enemy. Nazis are brutal, ours are civilized. …The story consists of readymade blocks that are like packaged food that was frozen long ago in the times of strategic reserves. (Gorelov)

The *Match*, therefore, recycles a traditional Soviet stereotype about Ukrainians as comic “little brothers” that existed since Stalin’s times. In Maliukov’s film, however, the comical effect is imbued with the rhetoric of treason that refers both to the nationalist movement of the OUN and UPA (also Soviet ideological discourse), as well as to Ukraine’s current aspirations towards Europe.

Aleksandr Samokhvalov and Boris Rostov’s *We Are from The Future 2* is another example of portraying Ukrainians as traitors in Russian cinema. While the genre of the film is fantasy rather than a historical drama, it nevertheless addresses historical events at the Ukrainian front during the Second World War, specifically the activity of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The film provides a Russian perspective on Ukrainian nationalists, picturing them as uncouth drunkards, mentally deficient betrayers and murderers. As Natalia Shmeleva points out in her review of the film, “it seems as if the interpretation of this line of history was well financed by money-bags interested in a scandal between Russia and Ukraine, and the film in general seems to be made only to present a historical reference about the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the SS Galychina division to
the audience” (Shmeleva). In Ukraine, the film was denounced as offensive and humiliating the Ukrainian memory and national identity. It is notable that the film was made in 2010, before the actual conflict between Russia and Ukraine developed, a fact that supports the idea that the memory war between the two countries began much earlier.

The film begins with a documentary footage setting an allegedly historical context. The narrator comments that in the summer of 1944, the enemy was driven back to the Western border of the Soviet Union. German troops that included the Division SS Galychina, consisting of Ukrainian volunteers, was surrounded by the Soviet army under the town of Brody. The SS Galychina Division was almost completely destroyed. A year later, Germans restored the division, but it never fought on the territory of Ukraine again. The documentary footage then turns out to be a lecture at a university in St. Petersburg, at the end of which students are invited to join a reconstruction of events of 1944 in Western Ukraine. The professor, however, warns the students that in Ukraine, they can be derogatively called Moscali (“Muscovites”), thus emphasizing the age-long animosity between Ukrainians and Russians. The film is a fantasy in which two Russian archeologists and two Ukrainians participating in the reconstruction of events of the Second World War travel in time back to the summer of 1944 when the battle under Brody took place.

When the Russian expedition headed by Filatov and Vasiliev arrives in Western Ukraine, they are met by an eccentric Ukrainian nationalist Taras and his weak-willed friend, Seryi, a son of a rich Ukrainian deputy. Taras immediately calls the Russians moscali, shows a sign of a rope around his neck and tells them to hang themselves, thus provoking Filatov and Vasiliev into conflict from the very first encounter. The fascist flag with a swastika waving in the background of a medium close-up of Taras, in the meantime, enforce the negative image of Ukrainians and create a visual association of Ukrainians with fascists. The brutality in behavior of Ukrainians is
sustained throughout the film. During a rock concert in the evening, Taras notices Masha, another participant of the historical reconstruction, and addresses her rudely, aiming to pick her up, but she is saved by Vasiliev. When Vasiliev and Masha dance together later on, Taras suddenly attacks Vasiliev from behind and a fight between Russians and Ukrainians begins.

In the reconstruction of the war, Russians are dressed up as members of the Red Army, while Ukrainians are soldiers of the SS Galychina Division. Driven by their personal interest in the expedition, Filatov and Vasiliev go astray from the reconstruction site. When they suddenly notice a bomb and try to move away from it quietly, Taras and Seryi, acting like stupid clowns, appear with words “Death to katsapy (derogatory name for Russians)” and throw a grenade under their feet. All four have to run from the explosion in the background, which takes them back in time to the actual events of the 1944. They eventually find themselves captives of Ukrainian insurgents and have to prove that they are neither Communists nor fascists. Since Taras and Seryi were dressed in the uniform of the Ukrainian nationalist division they are interrogated first, while Filatov and Vasiliev are claimed as Communists and are subject to execution. The contemporary Ukrainians, however, appear suspicious to the insurgents who among other things, check their allegiance to Ukrainian nationalists by making them drink. In order to prove their adherence to the nationalist movement, Taras and Seryi are then pressured to shoot Communist captives, Filatov and Vasiliev included. As they refuse, the insurgents first mercilessly kill dozens of captives themselves. Filatov and Vasiliev, however, are not affected by the bullets. So the insurgents force Taras and Seryi to raise their guns against the two under the threat of death. When they refuse to shoot, the Ukrainians join Russians in the pit as captives. By luck, Germans begin bombing at the very moment when the insurgents were about to kill the four, and they have to run away all together forgetting about their previous conflict. It is ultimately the Russians who do all the heroic deeds,
however, saving them from both the Soviets and fascists in 1944, while Ukrainians serve as a funny background and act as half-wits and cowards in the most important moments. Taras is, however, given a minor mission of saving a baby at the end of the film, yet the fact does not make him a hero. Even the use of a Ukrainian soundtrack by a popular Ukrainian band *Okean El'zy* in romantic scenes does not create a better impression about Ukrainians. In spite of the previous strife, both Russians and Ukrainians have to cooperate and fight vehemently against fascists in order to return back to their time. Although the adventure unites them all, the credit for the heroic struggle belongs to the “big brothers”—the Russians—rather than to the “little brothers”—the Ukrainians. The film thus builds a hierarchy of nations common in the times of high Stalinism.

In Mikhail Chiaurelli’s film, *The Fall of Berlin* [Padenie Berlina, 1949], this hierarchy was most evident in the fate of three fellow soldiers—Aliosha, a Russian representative, Kostia, a Ukrainian, and Iusup, an Asian. In this Soviet war film, Kostia is also a comic character who can never become a full-fledged hero like Aliosha. As a representative of “Little Russia,” Kostia is doomed to die first—he does not manage to get to the Reichstag and raise his flag on its top so he passes his banner to Iusup, who also fails to get to the roof of the building—he is shot on the way, and falls into Aliosha’s hands with the banner tightly gripped in his hand. It is ultimately only the Russians who manage to get to the top and obtain victory over the Germans, and Aliosha, as the protagonist of the film, does not die. Throughout the film, Kostia and Iusup are portrayed as silly and backward men, with Kostia telling stupid jokes in broken Ukrainian and Iusup being too hot-tempered in situations that require prudence—certainly possessed by Aliosha.

It is only the global Soviet identity that mattered and constituted the essence of the society’s organization. The attempts to build a heterogeneous society without borders, however, turned vain, since, as Widdis emphasizes, “the ideals of heterogeneity collided with the practical
advantages of homogeneity in the creation of a unified Soviet state” (191). As a successor to the Soviet Union, Russia has incorporated the Soviet nationality policy into its agenda; this sleight-of-hand requires that Ukrainians are still not viewed as a separate and worthy nation of its own. The well-known national stereotypes continue to sustain the imperial consciousness and the relations towards the backward periphery.

The idea that Russians and Ukrainians are one people resounds in Sergei Mokritskii’s *Battle for Sevastopol*. The film is a product of Russian and Ukrainian combined efforts and tells a story about a Soviet Ukrainian woman sniper Liudmila Pavlichenko. The film was positively accepted both in Russia and Ukraine, yet it is worth mentioning that the film was released under different titles in these two countries, partially in wake of the recent tensions between the neighbors and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. As Mokritskii explained in an interview, “Ukraine is struggling for independence. And after Crimea became a part of Russia, the title *Battle for Sevastopol* is not quite politically correct for Ukrainian perception. We did not want to arouse new conflicts among people” (Vinogradov). This is why the title *The Unbreakable One* (*Nezlamna*) was accepted for the Ukrainian version, although this is one and the same film. It was also dubbed into Ukrainian to facilitate its release in Ukrainian movie theaters, yet by the movement of the actors’ lips, it is clear that the film was shot in Russian. The film itself, the montage, and the music score are the same in both Russian and Ukrainian versions. Mokritskii, who spent half of his life in Ukraine and half in Russia, emphasizes that it was necessary for him to make one film for the two countries, that it meant a lot for him, because, as he points out, “we are one people all the same; we are people of the same, common aesthetic cultural codes. And I hope that maybe still in my lifetime the historical curve will turn somewhere else, in a more pleasant direction, that the good-neighbor relations between our countries will be restored” (Vinogradov).
While the film is positioned as a historical drama and its Russian title calls for associations with Bondarchuk’s *Stalingrad* (2013), *Battle for Sevastopol* frustrates the expectations of a military blockbuster (or maybe, on the contrary, pleases the audience with absence of mass battle scenes and its concentration instead on the romantic life of a woman). As Tatiana Filimonova indicates, “the Ukrainian release title, *Nezlamna (The Unbreakable One)*, is perhaps better at conveying the film’s essence, a combination of a military biopic and tragic melodrama” (Filimonova). The question is then why it was necessary to leave the *Battle for Sevastopol* title in the Russian version, instead of adopting the title of *Nesokrushimaia* (“the unbreakable one” in Russian), if the director is so keen on reconciling the Russians and Ukrainians and if the film is about everything else (including relations between the Soviet Union and the US), except for the battle of Sevastopol itself. The title then suggests the necessity to please the Russian Ministry of Culture in its patriotic propaganda for the Russian audiences.
5.0 Traumatic Memories of the 20th C.

Traumatic memories of the twentieth century are primarily recounted as relating to the trauma of the Holocaust, which has already become a “universal trope for historical trauma,” that is sometimes taken as a reference for any genocide (Huyssen 23). A century earlier, traumatic memories occupied a central position in Renan’s concept of a nation, and yet these two models of trauma are rarely brought into contact with each other. According to Renan, “shared suffering unites more than does joy. In fact, periods of mourning are worth more to national memory than triumphs because they impose duties and require a common effort” (Renan).

The Holodomor is a term used by Ukrainians to refer to the artificial famine that took place on the territories of Ukraine, southern Russia and other Soviet republics in the 1932-1933 and caused over seven million deaths. Whether the man-made famine was an intentional genocide of the Ukrainian people is still a highly debatable issue. The primary goal of Stalin’s regime was industrialization and the development of the socialist economic and military power on the world arena. The first five-year plans did not prove effective, although it was officially claimed that the results exceeded expectations. The rapid massive modernization of all industries required resources that the Soviet Union lacked. The Great Depression of the early 1930s also influenced the economy of the Soviet Union. Stalin’s regime was doomed to complete failure. This is why special measures were required to avoid the inevitable fiasco. According to Soldatenko and Shubin, “the monstrous famine was a result of the hard choice of the Stalin’s team: either at least to some extent successful completion of the industrial breakthrough or lack of resources and complete economic collapse, a gigantic incomplete, a monument to meaningless waste of labor” (145). This would also automatically mean a crash of Stalin’s regime and power. So, with the
higher purpose of building socialism as priority, lives of peasants were insignificant. As Soldatenko and Shubin argue, “Stalin’s guilt was not in his alleged aspiration to kill as many peasants as possible, but in coldblooded indifference to the lives of his contemporaries, with a stake on the future economic success. In this respect, he was similar to capitalist managers in the USA and Western Europe” (Soldatenko and Shubin, 148).

The process of filling in the blank pages in the history of Ukraine began in the 1980, yet the steps taken within the still Communist society were tentative and insignificant on the large scale. “Yet, the mentioning of the famine of 1932-1933 in official sources and further concessions of authorities that allowed public discussions of the tragedy were quite symptomatic, since the topic remained under strict ideological taboo for more than half a century” (Kasianov, “Ukraina-1990”). The notion of famine was not allowed into the official discourse; instead, even as late as 1987, it was referred to as “food hardships” (Kasianov, “Ukraina-1990”). The process of filling in the blanks in 1990 transformed into the “nationalization of history—the process of defining ‘one’s own’ national history from the earlier common space and time” (Kasianov, “Ukraina-1990”). The process has already taken place at the turn of the twentieth century when the national Ukrainian history was aimed to be separated from the imperial Russian history, yet this time the attempt resulted in more tangible outcomes.

In May 2009, the Security Service of Ukraine filed a lawsuit against Iosif Stalin, Viacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, Pavel Postyshev and other communist leaders who were eventually found guilty in the genocide of 1932-1933 in Ukraine resulting in millions of deaths. In 2010, President Iushchenko addressed leaders of other countries in Eastern Europe—Russia, Poland, Georgia, Baltic and other countries— with a suggestion to sign an agreement about the creation of an international tribunal over the crimes of Communism. The Russian Federation, as a successor
state to the Soviet Union in the international arena, refused to acknowledge famine of 1932-1933 as an act of genocide. In his response, President Medvedev stated that “the tragic events of the early 1930’s in Ukraine are used, to our mind, with the purpose to achieve immediate advantage-seeking political goals. In this connection, the statement of ‘purposeful holodomor—genocide of Ukrainians’ is insistently exaggerated” (Medvedev). Medvedev also emphasized that this initiative is aimed at “alienation of our peoples united by centuries-old historical, cultural and spiritual ties, and special feelings of friendship and mutual trust” because the Ukrainian verdict also contains a clause establishing criminal responsibility for all those who do not agree with their version of events (Medvedev).

Within the framework of the course recently taken by Russia, the Holodomor does not have a place for it very existence. This is why the topic is generally avoided in Russian historiography and mass media. The famine of 1932—1933, in the meantime, is considered a tragedy that has affected Russians to the same extent as Ukrainians. As Andreas Kappeler points out, “Russia may consider itself as the legal successor of the Soviet Union, but Russia is not responsible for the Stalinist crimes. On the other hand, Ukrainians have to accept that Russia is not the Soviet Union and that among the perpetrators and victims of Holodomor there were Ukrainians and Russians” (114).

In Ukraine, the Holodomor was acknowledged as an act of genocide already in 2003-2004. The Law of Ukraine about the Holodomor of 2006 became the culmination of the institutionalization of the memory about the famine of 1932—1933. According to Lina Klymenko, “the Holodomor law can be considered to be an attempt by the Ukrainian political elites to consolidate the Ukrainian nation through the construction of a national trauma” (Klymenko). The law also recognized the famine as a genocide of the Ukrainian people. “The claim became a
defining moment for the construction of Ukrainian national identity” and it also “cemented the understanding that as a national group, Ukrainians were treated differently from other nations during the Soviet period … and that today Ukrainians should be united through the collective memory of the famine” (Klymenko).

Vice-Prime Minister of Ukraine at that time, Dmytro Tabachnyk, underscored that “we have to prove to the world that artificial famines of the Soviet period were our Ukrainian Holocaust. It was a conscious genocide of Ukrainian people that left its merciless trace on our whole history, on our national consciousness” (Kulchytskyi). The extermination of Ukrainians, however, in comparison to the Holocaust, does not have any racial implications. Ukrainians were killed because they resisted collectivization, and because Ukrainians have always had strong national aspirations and a viable liberation movement. The Holodomor became one of the major components of Ukrainian cultural memory and national history of the Soviet period. It is a trauma that unites Ukrainians across regions and establishes a negative attitude towards the Soviet past. According to Andreas Kappeler, “the controversy among historians about Holodomor turned into a ‘War of memories.’ Ukrainian nationalists accused Russia (instead of Soviet Union) of the crime of Holodomor and even demanded an official apology” (114). In view of the scholar, framing the Holodomor as genocide is debatable because both Russians and Ukrainians suffered from the tragedy, which is why “the common heritage as victims of the Stalinist terror would indeed have the potential for a common Russian-Ukrainian remembrance of Stalinism and a common coming to terms with the Soviet past,” it could, therefore, become a point of collective remembrance, rather than a point of discord (114).
Oles' Ianchuk’s *Famine-33* (1991), Oles' Sanin’s *The Guide, or Flowers Have Eyes* (2014), and George Mandeliuk’s *Bitter Harvest* [Girki zhnyva, 2017] exemplify the scale of the tragedy, as well as contribute to the formation of Ukrainian national identity as a victim of the Soviet regime.

In the chapter, we will turn our attention away from Russian cinema and look instead at three Ukrainian films: Oles' Ianchuk’s *Famine-33* (1991), Oles' Sanin’s *The Guide* (2014), and Akhtem Seitablaev’s *Haytarma* (2013).

### 5.1 Oles' Ianchuk. *Famine-33 (1991 Golod-33)*

Oles' Ianchuk’s *Famine-33*, based on a 1963 novel by Vasyl Barka, was made in 1991, around the time when Ukraine obtained its long-awaited independence. The film expresses the necessity for articulating the common trauma that Ukrainians shared and was supposed to draw a bold line between Ukrainians, unified by this painful memory, and the Soviets (also implying Russians) as offenders. The film is also called to emphasize the importance of the newly achieved independence as an assertion that such things will never happen again. The trauma of the Holodomor is still alive in the memory of its survivors, as well as in the inherited experience of the second generation of survivors. The necessity in films about famine is explained by the search for reparative practices that would offer alternative ways of understanding the trauma.

For a very long time, Ianchuk’s attempt to embrace the trauma was the only one of its kind. As Olga Papash writes, the film became “not so much an aesthetic representation as a political argument called to consolidate Ukrainians, raise them in their fight for independence, rather than adequately depict events of the 1930s” (Papash). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the film
opened taboo pages in history that were kept silenced for many years; it also served as a “stimulus for quick distancing from the Soviet past as an element to overcome it, creating a feeling of belonging to Ukrainian people” (Papash). Famine-33 is a collective remembrance of the trauma with an inscription of meanings of the 1990s—that is, independence, anti-Communism, the birth of Ukrainian statehood, martyrdom, and the feeling of being deeply victimized on the way to freedom. As Iuliia Kysla writes, “Famine-33, besides being a political statement, was also a project of remembrance, commemorating the memory of the victims who died massively, in silence and total oblivion. It was also about giving them a voice that they been denied for too long” (94). The film was released on the eve of the referendum at which the majority of Ukrainians voted for independence from the Soviet Union. As Ianchuk points out in an interview, he “wanted people to see what life was like in a colony, the inhabitants of which were mercilessly exploited in the name of a utopian ideology” (“Film Shows Ukraine Famine”). In the film, the tragedy of the whole nation is shown through the tragedy of the family of Katrannyks, as they starve to death, one after another.

The subtitles at the beginning set the tone for the rest of the film. Here, the story goes back to 1917 when the Russian empire collapsed and Ukraine was seeking its independence. This attempt was crushed and Ukraine was “swallowed” by the Soviet Union. When Stalin came to power in the late 1920s, the Communist Party took brutal control over all aspects of society. Ukrainian farmers were forced into collective farms, which did not differ much from serfdom, and those who refused to join the collective farms were labeled as “enemies of the people.” Soon the entire population became the enemy of the people. The logic of the narrative then moves to 1932, when Kremlin issued directives that led to millions of deaths of Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian national idea and the struggle for independence is thus connected directly to the artificial famine
of the 1933. The directives issued by Kremlin as to the confiscation of grain from Ukrainian farmers appear to be a consequence of Ukraine’s previous aspirations for independence. At the same time, according to the narrative, the famine of the 1932-1933 took place only in Ukraine, disregarding other regions, such as Kuban' in Southern Russia. There is no mentioning that there were also natural reasons for the famine, as the harvest of the year, in addition to systematic confiscations, was lower than in previous years. The titles then conclude that Stalin is criminally responsible for the loss of millions of lives in the famine of 1933.

The church service opening the film enacts Ukrainian spirituality and connection to the higher power, as well as implies the path of martyrdom and forgiveness that Ukraine has been following for centuries. As communists brutally enter the church with the purpose to break the service and expropriate the church valuables, the chaos begins and people take icons off the walls in order to protect them from the invaders. The confusion and panic in the church culminates with the scene in which communists throw the church bell from the belfry. The bell crashes down in slow motion and breaks against the church steps with a resounding rumble. The beginning of the film in color then switches to black-and-white that is sustained throughout the film, emphasizing the scope of the trauma and the clear division between the white (the positive and spiritual) and the black (the evil of the Soviet antichrist). Scenes in color are primarily associated with the past, and the color returns at the end of the film after the famine ends, leaving numerous dead bodies behind. The contrasts between hunger and abundance of food, deep spirituality and mercilessness go hand in hand to underscore the struggle and martyrdom of the people. As Kysla points out, “the individual spectacle of a hungry body is created predominantly through close-up images of villagers numb with despair and hunger silently waiting in the pouring rain for their bread delivery, only to be brutally dispersed later by armed soldiers” (95). Dead bodies in the street are not an
extraordinary occurrence, but rather part of the daily life of the village. “While viewers do not see the psychological starvation in a process, they confront its visual consequences imprinted on the emaciated bodies, usually faces of the starving people predominantly singled out as Ukrainians” (Kysla 95).

The family of the Katrannyks are eating thin broth, sitting at the table with an icon overlooking the meal, as an indispensable attribute of the house. As the father, Myron Katrannyk, is talking about the abundance of food that the Soviets have, the members of the family are eating the broth even faster to satisfy their hunger and not to think about food. Yet, when the father mentions oranges, his daughter cannot resist any longer thinking about food and says that she wants oranges, an impossible dream in the circumstances. They suddenly hear sounds of galloping horses and anxious knocks on the window, interrupting the meal and making everyone freeze in fear. As they open the door, communists rush into the house and examine every corner in search of grain or other food, although everything has already been confiscated. In humiliation, the grandmother implores them to leave at least some food, but the communists are merciless. They hit the old woman and take away the remaining supplies. As Papash underscores, “the image of the humiliated old woman creates a powerful affective and symbolic context … in this scene, the emphasis on matriarchy of the traditional Ukrainian society as it is pictured by the authors of Famine-33 stands out … An associative line of the woman- mother- guardian is built” (Papash). The woman, in the meantime, is simultaneously the traditional image of Ukraine that is humiliated, brought to its knees, yet forgiving and overcoming all hardships. The scene of hopelessness is juxtaposed to symbolic spirituality embodied in a golden chalice that a neighbor brings to the Katrannyks with a request to hide and protect the church possession from plundering by communists. Stolen by communists, icons from the church will later reappear on the shelves of
Torgsin (Foreign Trade store), emphasizing Soviet blasphemy. The tree in which the chalice is hidden reappears as a magic symbol of unshakeable values throughout the film. Although the Katrannyks could sell the chalice and buy at least some food to save their children from a hungry death, they chose to die of starvation. Myron Katrannyk, moreover, has to suffer torture because of the chalice, but does not disclose to the communists the place where it is hidden.

Dead bodies and the people’s starving appearance overflow the film’s narrative, creating an image of infinite suffering and despair. The climax of communist brutality is manifested in the scene when hundreds of bodies are thrown off a train down the hill and then burnt in the ravine. The ironic title at the end of the film, stating that the harvest of 1933 was lavish but there was nobody to collect it, underscores the tragedy. Andrii Katrannyk, the only survivor of the family, meets a famished old man, asking him where all the people are, whether the plague has taken them all. “It’s not the plague, it’s the state,” replies the old man. According to Rogatchevski, moreover, “two individuals are singled out in particular as bearing personal responsibility for the famine, Viacheslav Molotov … and Lazar’ Kaganovich” (Rogatchevski).

In the last scene, as Andrii is lying in the wheat, lonely and broken, recollecting the times of a year before, he sees his parents, brother and sister playing cheerfully in the field. As Papash writes, it is difficult to imagine death of six million people but death of six people is much more understandable; the focus on an individual tragedy, moreover, “helps to mask the aspects threatening national identity, and at the same time to adapt the image of collective trauma” (Papash). The film concentrates on the spiritual and moral side of Ukrainian identity with a strong emphasis on martyrdom as an integral part of it. “The illogical readiness of Ukrainian peasants to die from a Bolshevik bullet is positioned by the film as a voluntary and quite conscious sacrifice, as an act of Christian martyrdom for the sake of future salvation of Ukraine” (Papash). The famine
thus obtains rationalization and is explained as a necessary sacrifice on the way to Ukraine’s independence. The past is a constantly changing substance; it becomes a part of the big narrative created by the state for its ideological reasons. As Stephen Bertman argues, “like an individual, a nation can rearrange the pieces of the past in order to create a version of the truth that is more psychologically satisfying. And if certain pieces do not fit, a political regime or even a whole people can dispense with them altogether, choosing sweet oblivion over the pain of remembrance” (63).


While Ianchuk’s politics is oriented towards the construction of Ukrainian identity around its status as a victim, Sanin’s drama *The Guide* (2014) reflects the contestation between Russia and Ukraine that was accumulating before the Euromaidan revolution. Both films aim to depict the collective suffering leaving “little room for nuance: all Soviet officials are universally evil, though the trope of a ‘good communist’ committing suicide is present in each film” (Kysla 96). And yet, if Ianchuk’s “*Famine-33* was a political statement against ‘communist tyranny,’ *The Guide* takes one step forward towards constructing a vivid, although very blurred and fragmented, vision of the ‘other’ non-Soviet Ukraine, that of the period of the Ukrainian national revolution of 1917-1921” (Kysla 96). *The Guide* is an attempt to re-interpret the Soviet history in a more complex and nuanced way.

Sanin’s story of the 1933 famine is set in the context of elimination of Ukrainian culture, specifically extermination of *kobza*-players as enemies of the people —minstrels considered a symbol of Ukraine. While at the beginning of the 2000s, Sanin is interested in creating an almost
silent art-house film, *Mamai*, discussed in Chapter Three, his Hollywood-style historical drama, *The Guide*, referring to the tragic events in Ukraine in 1932-1933, is oriented towards wide audiences. While the Holodomor serves only as background to the story, Sanin concentrates on mass repressions against Ukrainian musicians in the 1930s and the extermination of Ukrainian culture in general. The filmmaker takes the historical fact of an All-Union convention of kobzars (minstrels) that took place in Kharkov in December 1930 and ended with a bloody carnage as the minstrels were all killed by the Soviet Cheka officers. In the times of mass collectivization, industrialization and imposition of the Socialist ideology, Ukrainian culture continued to thrive, a fact that could not be overlooked by Soviet authorities. In this film, an American, Michael Shamrock, arrives in Soviet Ukraine, where he plans to start his business. He is forced to become a communist, and as he travels to Moscow with his son, Peter, he is secretly commissioned with a task to hand over to an American journalist some important papers about repressions planned for Ukrainians. “Interestingly enough, these documents function in a similar way as the golden chalice does in Ianchuk’s drama. In *The Guide*, they become the proof of Stalin’s planned genocide against the Ukrainians” (Kysla 99).

The secret documents lead Shamrock to persecution and eventual death. His ten-year-old son Peter manages to run away, as he meets a blind minstrel, *kobza-player*, Ivan Kocherga, who saves him from the Soviet persecutors. The boy becomes a guide to the *kobza*-player and begins his journey with him. The film is saturated with all possible metaphors representing the Ukrainian national idea: the legendary Cossack past; the Ukrainian song that strikes with truth and deep pain about Ukraine’s tragic destiny; the archetype of the mother, which is simultaneously an image of Ukraine, as well as faith and hope for Ukraine’s liberation. The song of a *kobza*-player is ultimately the soul of Ukrainian people and the primary enemy of Stalin. As it resounds in the film, *kobza-
players are Cossacks, who had left their sabers and taken kobzas instead, because one can kill a Cossack, but a song will live forever.

The traditional female image of Ukraine is represented by Ivan’s beloved, Orysia, who lives in a solitary house somewhere in the field. When Ivan and Peter get to this home, there is a brief moment of happiness and stillness that exists beyond the overall suffering, repressions, and the impending threat of famine. Blind Ivan makes love to Orysia, digs a well by the house, and shows Peter how to fight with a cane. When they leave, he asks her to burn Peter’s belongings because he is chased after by the communists, a request she does not fulfill. When Ivan comes to the house next time, it is empty with everything turned upside down. Is spite of his blindness, Ivan can see what actually happened there. He finds Orysia’s torn necklace on the floor and feels what happened, as the events are shown in a flashback to the viewer. The beads of the necklace are a citation of Sergei Paradzhanov’s Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors [Tini zabutykh predkiv 1965], where love, death, and nationalism are also tightly interwoven into one narrative, and a similar necklace reappears throughout the film. Ivan clairvoyantly understands that two Cheka officers were brutally beating Orysia, one of them tore the necklace and smashed the woman against the table. They then dragged her out of the house and threw her into the well that Ivan had once built. As Ivan “sees” what happened to Orysia, the images of brutality are interspersed with the images of the previously happy life when Orysia was smiling to him.

The negative image of the Soviet power is embodied in the character of Vladimir, a Chekist who happens to fall in love with Olga, the same woman whom Michael Shamrock loves. Out of jealousy, Vladimir gives an order to kill the American. Among his other crimes, Vladimir also participates in the expropriation of grain from peasants in a Ukrainian village, marking the beginning of the famine in the film. Vladimir and Ivan Kocherga turn out to be old enemies, as
they both fought in the battle of Kruty in 1918, in the aftermath of which they found themselves in opposite camps. Vladimir joined the Bolsheviks, thus betraying his people, since he is Ukrainian, and Ivan remained loyal to his ideological positions. Vladimir eventually becomes the one who gives merciless orders concerning the extermination of kobza-players in Kharkov during the convention, in spite of all the persuasions of Olga, who eventually became his wife. In his communication with his wife, Vladimir often switches to Ukrainian, although he speaks Russian most of the time. Overall, “though an evidently negative construction, the figure of a Chekist capable of feelings alludes to Ukraine’s uneasy relationship with the Soviet past, in a way, suggesting that there might be multiple readings of that past” (Kysla 101).

Olga wants to convince Vladimir that the songs of kobza players are true history and true memory of the people and that kobza players are as harmless as children. Vladimir is confident, however, that one song of a minstrel brings more damage to the Soviet power than the harm of one hundred of “enemies of the people.” As the kobza players are taken by train to the execution site through the winter snow and cold, they do not give up their struggle and sing in chorus a Cossack song about freedom. They are then taken to a ravine where explosives are already set up and ready to detonate with the “red rocket” signal given by Vladimir. Ivan is, however, executed separately. Vladimir shows his relentless creativity in torturing his personal enemy, as Ivan is tied up to a pole on a hill and is pierced with a screwdriver, which visually resembles the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. In this way, Sanin also incorporates religious references, and the symbolism of martyrdom that has become a common pattern for picturing Ukraine’s past. When Peter shows up in an attempt to save Ivan, a fight between Ivan and Vladimir begins and they both fall down the cliff as the explosives detonate. Eventually, it is only the boy who survives the massacre. The final title of the film states
that a famous British journalist Gareth Jones (1905-1935) was the first to publicize in the Western world the existence of the artificial famine in Ukraine but was killed in Manchuria.

While the extermination of kobza players occupies the central part in the film’s narrative, the famine is shown only schematically, in passing, with the “horrors of starvation … verbalized more than visualized; relying heavily on a voice-over narration citing official Soviet directives about the collectivization in Ukraine” (Kysla 98). One of the most powerful scenes to depict the Holodomor, however, is a black-and-white scene, in which Peter is wandering through a field of dead sunflowers (Ukraine has always been associated with abundant sunflower fields). The film presents the famine “as a deliberate policy on the part of the Soviets to destroy the Ukrainian people, singling out two individuals, Joseph Stalin and Lazar Kaganovich, as responsible for the deaths of millions of innocent civilians” (Kysla 99). The Holodomor is represented as a Ukrainian Holocaust, suggesting a clear link between Stalin’s and Hitler’s crimes. The film thus “reiterates Ukrainian’s longing for the same international recognition for Holodomor as enjoyed by Holocaust” (Kysla 99). In one of the interviews, Sanin indicated that his film is not “a story about the Holodomor, this is a story about the time that made people turn into wolves” (Cherevko). For him, the Holodomor is a “history where there was no time or space, where people did not want to see anything in front, where there was no future for them” (Cherevko).

The Guide strikes a painful note in the memories of the past consistent with the national policy that has crystallized in independent Ukraine especially after the recent revolutions. Although the film was made before the Euromaidan revolution, when it was released in 2014, it was warmly accepted by Ukrainians on the peak of Russo-Ukrainian antagonism. Pro-Russian critics, in the meantime, found it anti-Soviet. According to Aleksandr Gusev, “The Guide is perceived as an attempt to substitute the official ideas of the Soviet era with new ones, even through they may be
more consistent with the historical truth, yet equally ideologically biased” (Gusev). The ideological bias of the filmmakers contributes to the determinacy of the film’s main ideas and lack of variance in their assessment. As Neil Young indicates, *The Guide* “leaves little room for ambiguity: the Soviets here are, to a man, repellent and murderously immoral, as incarnated by stern military-man Comrade Vladimir,” the scholar finds the film “far too manipulative to be truly effective” (Young). The cinematic representation of the trauma of repressions, famine, and suffering makes it accessible to generations who did not experience it. As Ibrahim argues, “the production of cultural symbols in the project of remembrance is often politically and historically driven appropriating different cultural and physical manifestations and formats to communicate the imperative at hand” (111). The visual construction or reconstruction of traumatic events in film, however, can often simplify the memory, since traumatic experiences are often located in the sacred domain.

### 5.3 Akhtem Seitablaev. *Haytarma* (2013)

Another film important in the context of traumatic memories about the Soviet past is Akhtem Seitablaev’s historical drama *Haytarma* (2013) that manages to capture and successfully convey the memory of the Soviet deportation of Crimean Tatars in May 1944. The main character of the film, Amet-khan, major of the Guards, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, is a Tatar fighting among the ranks of the Soviet army. The character is based on a real person. The film depicts Crimean Tatars loyal to the Soviet State and Stalin in particular. During the celebration of Amet-khan’s and his friends’ sudden return home from the front, one of the Tatars makes a toast to Stalin. This loyalty only adds to the overall paradox of the genocide later organized against the people.
Although the film is primarily about a traumatic memory that the Soviets are responsible for, it still has room for positive depiction of Soviet officers. Major Korin saves the family of Amet-khan, even if it cost him his own life, because Amet-khan once saved his own family. The depiction of the Soviets during the deportation, however, resembles the way fascists are usually pictured in Soviet films: coldblooded, with grim faces, merciless in executing their orders and killing innocent people. There is a scene in which a woman is trying to escape the death train and attempts to run away, but a Soviet soldier with a sheep dog follows her, just as a typical Nazi would do in a Soviet war film. In the last scene of the film, when Amet-khan finds himself lonely in an empty city, he looks at a huge portrait of Stalin and his eyes express an unbearable loss and pain.

The film is an epitome of the Tatar trauma and had a huge impact on Tatar audience, who accepted the film as their own memory. At the same time, Haytarma also became a site of contestation. The film roused acute debates and even a scandal with Russian officials immediately after its release. It was also perceived as a precursor to the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and restoration of Soviet practices towards the Crimean Tatars. While movie theaters both in Crimea and Ukraine were flooded with viewers eager to see the film, the Russian ambassador in Simpheropol at that time, Vladimir Andreev—without having watched the film—accused it of one-sided depiction of the Tatar deportation. Among reasons for such claims, he mentioned that the film did not fully explain why Soviet authorities took that decision and that it did not depict the heroic side of the Soviet army during World War II. For Crimean Tatars, in the meantime, the film became a memorial to the events of May 1944. It restored and re-enacted a memory that was still alive, given the relative proximity of those events to the present day. The necessity in such films can be explained by a need in reparative practices that would offer alternative ways of
understanding or making sense of the trauma. Interviewed after the screenings, Crimean Tatars claimed they could see their parents’ or grandparents’ story in the film.

The director, himself of Tatar origin, had wanted for a long time to make a film about the traumatic experiences of his relatives. Seitablaiev belongs to a generation of Tatars born after the deportation, so he can remember his relatives’ experiences only by means of stories, images, and behaviors among which he grew up; he is a bearer of the “postmemory,” as Marianne Hirsch has defined it. “Postmemory’s connection to the past is actually mediated not by recall but by imaginative investment, projection, and creation,” Hirsch maintains (5). Although Seitablaiev did not experience the hardships of the displacement himself, the memories that circulated in his family compensated for this fact, while his imagination and talent could draw the rest of the picture. This is a kind of appropriation of sufferings by the second generation whose identity is preconditioned by the trauma they themselves did not experience.

Ianchuk’s Famine-33 (1991), Sanin’s The Guide (2014), Seitablaev’s Haytarma (2013) constitute a coherent cluster, yet the time lapse between Ianchuk’s film, on the one hand, and Sanin’s and Seitablaev’s—on the other, makes them dissimilar. There is, however, a definite purpose behind these films—to consolidate Ukrainians as a nation around the traumatic events of the past. The famine, in particular, became the grounds for the construction of national identity in contemporary Ukraine, although it took place primarily in eastern and central regions of Ukraine and did not affect all strata of the society. Klymenko emphasized the role of Ukrainian political elites and their claim-making in “the creation of the narrative of suffering, their definition of the tragic event, and their categorization of victims and perpetrators” (Klymenko). The scholar points out the specificity of the Ukrainian case: “the intention of the Ukrainian policy makers to unite Ukrainians and to distance them from the Soviet past it once shared with Russia” (Klymenko). The
narrative constructed around the famine or the deportation of the Tatars aims to project the suffering of particular individuals in the past onto the present, “so that it becomes a symbol of identification for the whole collectivity today” (Klymenko).

A wide range of commemoration symbols and rituals were established around the Holodomor in Ukraine, such as the Holodomor Memorial Day taking place on the fourth Saturday of November since 2006, the National Museum Memorial to Holodomor Victims erected on the slopes of the Dnieper river in 2008, the three-day commemoration of the Holodomor in November 2007 with video testimonies and public disclosure of the communist regime’s crimes in Ukraine. The totality of such remembrance practices infuses the society with the feeling of belonging and connection to the traumatic past, as well as unification against the enemy—the Soviet regime and Russia as its successor.
6.0 Memory of the Russo Ukrainian Contestation in the 21st C.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the communist symbols—statues of Lenin, Dzerzhinskii and other communist leaders, as well as images of hammer and sickle, stars, and names of streets, institutions, etc.—mainly remained unaffected in most regions of the newly formed independent Ukraine. Only Western Ukraine disposed of the totalitarian symbols immediately. This lack of unified attitude towards the Soviet past eventually led to an absence of a single strategy in handling the communist heritage. As A. Assmann underscores, “we define ourselves through that which collectively we remember and forget” (*Cultural Memory and Western Civilization* 54). In Volyn, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne and Chernivtsi regions all monuments to Soviet leaders were taken off the register of monumental art. This meant that the government or local authorities were not responsible for them anymore. As a replacement, statues of Stepan Bandera and other Ukrainian activists were introduced in Western Ukraine. As Ann Rigney points out, “while pulling down a monument may seem like a way of ensuring long-term memory, it may in fact turn out to mark the beginning of amnesia, unless the monument in question is continuously invested with new meaning” (346). The reconstruction of identity, in the meantime, means the reconstruction of memory, which “takes place through the rewriting of history books, the demolition of monuments, and the renaming of official buildings, streets and squares” (A. Assmann *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization* 54). In Ukraine, the process of vast renaming streets and even cities took place in the 2010s, marking the formation of a new identity.

The process of de-Leninization was delayed until the 2000s in most regions of Ukraine, and only the most egregious monuments were demolished at the beginning of the 1990s. Thus, for a long time, the shift in collective memory and identity had only an episodic and local nature and
did not turn into a comprehensive state policy. In 2006, however, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory was founded and was supposed to facilitate the process of formation of the national identity. Currently, to many Ukrainians, the statues of Lenin have acquired a new meaning, they became not only a symbol of the Soviet past, but also of the on-going Russo-Ukrainian antagonism. Although Russia is not Soviet Union, in Ukrainian consciousness it has become directly associated with it and the communist past.

The Russo-Ukrainian controversy reached crisis in late 2013, when Russian pressure led to a re-orientation of Ukrainian policy. In December 2013 during the Maidan protests, the central monument of Lenin in Kyiv was toppled, triggering a whole series of demolitions throughout 2013-2014, when dismantling of Lenin statues reached a national scale. The phenomenon even obtained its name—Leninopad—“the fall of Lenins.” Over the year of Leninopad during 2013-2014 all existing monuments in regional centers and most statues in district centers of Ukraine were dismantled. In the meantime, the tombs remaining after the dismantled monuments are used to support national memory—they were painted blue and yellow, featuring national symbols of Ukraine, or traditional Ukrainian embroidery styles. At the same time, since 2013, while communist statues were constantly removed, other symbols of collective memory appeared instead in order to remember the Heroes of the Heavenly Hundred and those killed in Eastern Ukraine. However, there was no unified government policy as to the establishment of such memorials, and those that appeared were made possible due to the funds of local activists, entrepreneurs, or other institutions.

As Ukraine was constantly moving away from the nostalgic Soviet narrative about the past, it created its own anti-Communist ideology that culminated in April 2015 when Ukrainian government passed a law prohibiting the Communist Party of Ukraine and propaganda of its
symbols. For Nora, public commemorations are important in terms of legitimacy of political power. The scholar distinguishes “dominant” and “dominated” sites of memory, where the former is “spectacular and triumphant, imposing, and, generally, imposed—either by a national authority or by an established interest, but always from above” (“Between Memories and Histories” 23). The dominant sites of memory of the Soviet regime are now replaced by new national symbols and lieux de mémoire of independent Ukraine. As Winter points out,

much of the scholarly debate about sites of memory concerns the extent to which they are instruments of the dominant political elements in a society … Some such events are observed whoever is in power—witness Bastille Day in Paris or Independence Day in Philadelphia or elsewhere in the United States. But other events are closely tied to the establishment of a new regime and the overthrow of an older one. (62-63)

Supporters of the anti-communist law in Ukraine assert that Communist symbols inhibit building national identity and promote totalitarianism. Such legislation was severely condemned by academics and human rights organizations, as well as Ukrainian activists. While other eastern European countries also banned communist symbols, Ukraine’s law is way more far-reaching than any previous measures taken anywhere else. Hence, Ukraine is now making a belated effort to declare independence from the communist past.

After the Euromaidan revolution of 2013-2014, and in the circumstances of the ongoing war, Ukrainians have developed a new mythology and new heroes. Such concepts as “Maidan,” “Heavenly Hundred,” “volunteers,” “Cyborgs” began to fill in the semiotic space. The war also changed the attitude towards national cinema in Ukraine. As a result, more funds are allotted to film industry after 2014 to produce patriotic films that would counteract Russian cinema that had
overtaken Ukrainian movie theaters and TV channels in 2010-2014. Ukrainian cultural producers strove to develop a new model of the national hero—“a young man who is not a natural warrior, but, who, in the course of a war, takes up arms and is ready to sacrifice his life for the country” (Khromeychuk). One of the major films that reveals this kind of a protagonist is Akhtem Seitablaev’s patriotic military drama *Cyborgs* (2017) released on the Day of Armed Forces of Ukraine, celebrated annually on December 6 since 1993.18

In the pages that follow, we will look at two Ukrainian films (Akhtem Seitablaev’s *Cyborgs* and Oleksii Shaparev’s *Winter of the Brave Ones*) and one Russian film: Aleksandr Pimanov’s *Crimea* (2017). All three films focus on the recent events in Ukraine (Euromaidan revolution, annexation of Crimea, and the ongoing military conflict in Eastern Ukraine), yet bring different perspectives on the events.


Seitablaev’s *Cyborgs* is a military drama about male camaraderie, valor, and heroism and is set in the heart of the Russo-Ukrainian military conflict at the Donetsk airport in the Donbass region in the fall of 2014. In the film, a group of Ukrainian military men arrive at the destroyed airport and stay there for two weeks. The dominating colors throughout the film are all shades of grey, with Ukrainian blue and yellow flag appearing to be the only bright spots against the dark background. At the beginning of the film, the main hero with the nickname “Major,” a young man

18 The holiday replaced the Soviet equivalent of the Day of Defenders of the Fatherland celebrated on February 23 and still kept as a major holiday in Russia.
who comes from a rich family, but who ran away from home to participate in the armed conflict, says to the journalists: “We will not surrender the airport, clear? All of Ukraine is with us.” It is notable that women are excluded from the war, as a young woman covered in Ukrainian flag, not accepted into the ranks of the military men is watching the trucks with soldiers leaving for the airport.

In spite of the gloomy atmosphere, with death and destruction hovering over the heroes, they are able to sustain their sense of humor. Even a ride on a truck along bumpy countryside roads is taken as a ride on a rollercoaster. Inspired by patriotism, the men are ready to yield all the pleasures and comfort of their home for the larger idea of defending the motherland against the enemy. As the trucks are bombarded on the way to the airport, one the military men is injured, yet his fellow men risk their lives to bring him into the safe place and save his life. The idea of camaraderie and male friendship is thus established. When the men arrive at the airport, the view of what is left of the airport and its buildings is shocking—it is a site of demolition and complete destruction. After the “Major” sees dead bodies in the freezer and experiences the first day of vigil at the airport, the young man is concerned by questions of life and death and is going through a transformation of his world view.

The film is centered around six characters. The heroes are more or less archetypal characters of a war film. Seitablaev allows each of the characters to reveal his attitude towards the war and the future of the country. This is the main idea of the film—to tell about the variety of people who fight for Ukraine—both young and old, liberal and conservative, Ukrainian and Russian-speaking, those who wanted to avoid army service and those who have always wanted to fight in a real war. Seitablaev creates a new mythology of Ukraine, new military heroes in the new circumstances of war.
One of the central scenes of the film is when the commander of the military regiment asks his men why they are on the battle front. “Because I hate those who kill our guys, who violate our borders,” says the “Major” The old man claims that he loves Ukraine, which is immediately questioned by the commander. There are no roads in Ukraine, the nature is beautiful only in the Chernobyl area—what do we fight for? The question makes the men think and dig deeper into their souls to find the true reasons, why they came to the epicenter of the conflict. The older man then speaks up and reveals that the mere thought that the border between Ukraine and Russia can be moved to the West, the thought about the “brotherly peoples,” and that children have to go to the war makes him feel injustice and the need to be in the forefront. The image of the old man is an embodiment of all those Ukrainians who have lost their sons in armed conflict, who love Ukraine in spite of its many drawbacks. The patriotism of the commander then turns into a didactic tirade, as he continues to teach his men about the true reasons to be in the forefront. He underscores that Ukrainians have to know their history, love, feel, think, and feel injustice, they need to analyze their mistakes, pay for the past, protect the present, and take responsibility for the future. Along with the armed conflict there is also a conflict of generations, and this is the main reason, why the “Major” is at war with gun in his hands, instead of participating in an international music contest. He belongs to the generation of young Ukrainians, and he blames the older generation raised by the Soviet Union for destroying the country over the years of its independence. The conflict is not only between Ukrainians and Russians, but among Ukrainians themselves who are distinguished by age, education, as well as by different views as to the future development of the country.

According to Seitablaev, he wanted to make a film about the birth of the new epos, about the “emergence of new heroes of a new country” (Karamanoglu). Through the image of the “Major,” “his fate, his becoming, his encounters and conflict dialogues with older people we tell
about the world that is born inside the war. The world they fight for, the world they want to live in and want their children to live in” (Karamanoglu). As Seitablaev underscores, Cyborgs is “an attempt to understand what kind of war it is, between who and what for” because what we have is “not a civil war but a civilizational choice between the past and the future. To be Ukrainian today is not an ethnic belonging but a clear choice between the past and the future” (Karamanoglu). It is notable that heroes in the film speak both Ukrainian and Russian, so the traditional distinction between “us” and “them” in terms of language does not work here. The enemy is a Ukrainian or Russian who belongs to the generation of the past, mainly the Soviet past. When the “Major” hears a Soviet popular song as a ringtone on a telephone of a dead man lying nearby, he immediately identifies him as an enemy by the choice of the ringtone. The conflict between the old, Soviet, and the new, European is at the center of the film’s narrative.

The memory of the Russo-Ukrainian war is laid over the memory of the Soviet past. The reason the film was successful among Ukrainian audiences is that the war is still going on, people continue to die, and the memory of the events of 2014-2015 is still fresh in the mind of those who witnessed them. Although the mythology of the cyborgs has already entered the Ukrainian cultural discourse, it is still in the process of formation.

### 6.2 Oleksii Shaparev. *Winter of the Brave Ones (2019 Kruty 1918)*

The concept of the cyborgs as new military heroes has developed during the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, but also harks back to the battle of Kruty that took place in January 1918 when several hundred Ukrainian cadets had to withstand the Bolshevik forces of 4000 men in order to defend Kiev, and lost the battle; they all died, many of them severely tortured and executed by the
Bolsheviks. The memory of the defeat became one of the central milestones in Ukrainian cultural memory today, as it is connected to the shootings on the Independence Square in Kiev in January 2014, when more than one hundred men, most of them students, were killed by snipers. In 2018, the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine and the Institute of National Memory announced the 100th Anniversary of the Battle of Kruty that was celebrated on the national level. “The Battle has become a symbol of heroism and self-sacrifice of the young generation in their fight for independence of the entire Ukrainian people” (“January 29th, Battle of Kruty’s 100th Anniversary”). The anniversary was marked under the general motto “Kruty. The First Cyborgs,” thus connecting the past to the present. According to Olesya Khromeychuk, “the symbol of the Battle of Kruty is a young man, a student, who was still a child only yesterday, but who entered his manhood by joining the battle and dying a hero’s death, and this image is being reactivated in the context of the present war” (Khromeychuk). The importance of the battle for contemporary Ukrainian memory politics and the formation of the image of the new Ukrainian military hero today is also underscored in Oleksii Shaparev’s historical film Winter of the Brave Ones (2019). According to Oleg Danylov, the ongoing war in Ukraine has changed the attitude of Ukrainian authorities to film industry: “We need our own heroes, our national epos to resist the flow of lies streaming from TV screens, including national TV channels and movie theaters” (Danylov).

Shaparev’s historical drama is a state-sponsored film dedicated to 100th anniversary of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the battle near Kruty railway station not far from Kiev. The film was supposed to be released on the Day of Military Forces of Ukraine on December 6, 2018, yet came out two months later. In the center of the film’s narrative are two brothers, Oleksii and Andrii Savitskyi who are in love with Sophia. The Bolsheviks have surrounded Kiev and are ready to occupy it. Authorities of the Ukrainian People’s Republic gather military forces to defend
Ukraine’s independence against the enemy. The film begins in 2018, as a contemporary Ukrainian soldier, a “cyborg,” is walking through a field towards the Kruty Heroes Memorial. The soldier came to this place for a blessing before going to the war in Eastern Ukraine. He then sits on a bench and begins to read about the battle of Kruty, and the story of Ukraine’s struggle for its independence in 1917-1921. The figure of the soldier is a link between the glorious past and the steadfast resistance to the enemy today. The filmmakers draw a line connecting the two events thus creating an updated memory of the battle of Kruty resonating with the ongoing conflict. The implication is, however, that Russo-Soviets were able to defeat Ukrainians in 1918, yet now this will not happen again. The film is centered around cadets—the young generation of Ukrainians who understand the importance of the historical moment and will fight to death in order to defend their motherland from the Bolsheviks.

The meeting of Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, the first Ukrainian President of the Ukrainian People’s Republic during the national revolution of 1917-1921, in the Sophia square in Kiev reminds the viewer of a meeting during the 2013-2014 Euromaidan revolution. Ukrainian flags wave all around the place; students wear blue and yellow ribbons around their arms, people have gathered to listen to Hrushevskyi’s speech, who announces that a war has been declared on Ukraine.

Kruty Heroes Memorial is a ten-meter red column situated on a hill and includes a chapel and a cross-shaped lake. It was erected in the village of Kruty, Chernihiv Oblast on August 25, 2006 by President Viktor Iushchenko.

The Ukrainian War of Independence lasted from 1917 to 1921 and resulted in the establishment and development of Ukrainian People’s Republic (June 1917). The war consisted of military conflicts between different governmental, political and military forces. The struggle led to a division of Ukraine between the Bolshevik Ukrainian SSR, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia.
by the Petrograd government under Lenin. Some people in the crowd refuse to fight and are ready to accept the Bolshevik power, yet the rest are encouraged to participate in the military struggle. The film’s narrative implies that the *veche* in the Sophia square was the beginning of the Ukrainian tradition to go to “maidan” in order to solve national problems. After the military recruitment is announced, cadets are vying with each other for being accepted into the military ranks. This effort is also a targeted campaign to increase military enrollments in Ukrainian army today.

The film creates a new image of Ukrainians and Ukrainian lifestyle. Unlike the stereotypical image of uncouth villagers in traditional costumes, in *Winter of the Brave Ones*, Ukrainians are cultured, well-educated and European in their nature. Young people meet at a café, drink Viennese coffee, play tennis at leisure; women are elegantly dressed; young men are intelligent and gentle. There is a language distinction between Ukrainians speaking only Ukrainian and the Bolsheviks speaking Russian. What is more important is the fact that Russian, along with French and German, is dubbed into Ukrainian in subtitles. The image of the enemy in the figure of Mikhail Murav'ev, head of the Red Army, is demonic, brutal, and a drug addict, on the edge of insanity; he also happens to like classical music. Confident in the power of his army, he orders his soldiers to go forward and shatter the group of students, yet when the impossible happens and his army is defeated in the first battle, he steps back and lies down on the couch like a child. Later, when Ukrainian captives are awaiting execution, Murav’ev brings a mechanical phonograph into the room and begins to speak about his great mission, then suddenly he starts dancing in the reddish light of bonfires like an antichrist. The already terrified captives are astonished by such behavior.

In the morning, the young men are lined up for execution by firing squad. Observing the scene through his sunglasses Murav’ev is wearing a coat with a fur collar, while the captives are undressed to underwear. The young men then suddenly begin to sing the Ukrainian hymn:
“Ukraine’s glory, Ukraine’s freedom did not disappear…,” yet the song is interrupted by the shooting. One man, however, is not killed, and Murav’ev himself approaches him with a gun. When they stand opposite each other, the young man continues singing until his song is interrupted by Murav’ev’s shot. Yet, he managed to say the final word and deliver his message: “Fate will smile on us Ukrainians, our skies will be clear. / Our enemies will vanish like a sun-dried foam, / We will be the only masters in our dear home.” The film thus makes a reference to the future, when Ukraine finally obtained independence in 1991, and at the same time connects the current war to the events of 1918, creating associations and images that sustain the image of Russians as an age-long enemy of Ukrainians.

6.3 Aleksandr Pimanov. Crimea (2017 Krym)

A Russian view of the revolution in Ukraine in 2013-2014 and the annexation of Crimea is provided in Aleksei Pimanov’s drama Crimea (2017). The vision of political events is given through a romantic story of Sasha from Sevastopol and a journalist Alena from Kiev, who meet in Crimea in 2013, fall in love, but reach the brink of a breakup because of their political views. For Alena, the annexation of Crimea is an invasion, while for Sasha, it is unification with Russia. The film begins with stunning panoramic views of the Crimean Mountains. When the Russian Romeo and Juliet meet, Alena tells that she came to Crimea because she is participating in a film about ancient Ukraine, provoking a sarcastic comment from Sasha, surprised that a film about Ukraine is shot in Crimea. Sasha is also mocking Alena’s name bringing associations with the popular Soviet chocolate bar Alenka, thus establishing a worldview set in the Soviet past. He later sustains his Soviet origins when boastfully shows Alena his old car, made in the USSR (as he himself is).
In the fall, Sasha travels to Kiev to see Alena, who is now an activist in the Euromaidan revolution. Sasha does not like the events in Kiev. The Ukrainian nationalists are intimidating, dangerous, and uncontrollable, everything is in flames and the enraged crowd of Ukrainians throw grenades into the military forces Berkut that try to resist them. One of the Berkut men is on fire and Sasha saves him. The stereotypical image of a bad Ukrainian nationalist is embodied in Alena’s friend, Mykola, who, according to Alisa Taezhnaia, “looks like an evil Gogol” (Taezhnaia). It is notable that neither Mykola, who has a Ukrainian name, nor Alena speak Ukrainian. After a brief stay in Kiev, Sasha travels by bus to Crimea. Ukrainian nationalists, including Mykola, attack the bus, break windows, severely beat people; Sasha is also injured. Many passengers are brutally killed, among them Vania, Sasha’s friend. Alena comes to see Sasha in the hospital, yet their relationship is at risk because Sasha now hates Ukrainians, while Alena is a convinced adherent of the Euromaidan revolution.

One of the turning points in the film takes place at a dinner with Sasha’s parents, when the meal is interrupted by news on the TV, and Sasha’s parents learn that Alena was an activist in the revolution. Alena tries to persuade Sasha’s family that Ukrainian nationalists are heroes, that Ukrainians are fighting for their rights, but Sasha’s father declares that “they will come to Crimea soon to make Ukrainians out of us.” Alena leaves the house; the couple falls out, as Sasha is ready to fight against Ukrainians in a war that he feels is going to take place soon, even if he would have to fight against Alena’s family.

While the film is poorly made, with no clear internal motivations of the main heroes, unclear relationships between them, poor dialogue, lack of information about the essence of the conflict in Ukraine and any motives behind the revolution and the aggressive behavior of Ukrainians, the film is useful for its clear advocacy, delivering an abstract idea about bad
Ukrainians who kill Russians, citizens of Crimea and representatives of pro-Russian military forces. The main heroine, Alena, is a Ukrainian activist who shares dinner with the Berkut military man Petr saved by Sasha, and even makes a toast to all men, defenders of women. She enjoys the company of Sasha’s parents and the Berkut man, as if she has no idea about their pro-Russian political views. The death of Petr, whom she hardly knows, later on influences her so much that she decides to stay in Crimea and change her political views. As a real Ukrainian, Alena drinks one shot of vodka after another until she is drunk and unconscious. For Sasha, however, this is a moment of long-awaited unification, so he uses the moment to have sex with Alena. As Taezhnaia points out, Alena and Sasha have nothing in common, yet Alena tends to return to him, the two characters are, ultimately, only figures necessary for the filmmakers’ purposes, since “without their awkward passion and comic sex, accompanied by electric guitar, Crimea would be just an extended news reel” (Taezhnaia).

Simultaneously, Russian forces land in Crimea to protect its citizens from Ukrainian aggression. The Russian military forces occupy Crimea without any resistance on the part of Ukrainian military men. With the traditional female image of Ukraine in focus, the penetration and unification during the sexual act allegorically also implies the annexation of Crimea. The drunk girl tenderly calls Sasha an occupant, yet continues to love him. According to the film’s main idea, Ukraine cannot live without Russia, it understands its mistakes and submits to the invincible Russian power. According to Maria Kuvshinova, the entire film is permeated with ecstasy about Russia’s military potential and its sense of domination over Ukraine: “The idea of the filmmaker is clear: Ukraine is a stupid woman, Russia is a man with a huge gun. War is bad; this is why the weak one has to surrender without a fight” (Kuvshinova).
At the end of the film, Sasha goes to Donbass to fight against Ukrainians; this fact becomes clear from telephone conversations between Sasha and Alena, who is back to Crimea working on the film about Ukrainian history. During the shooting at a magnificent location in the mountains, she suddenly stops, unable to speak about the occupation of Ukraine. The ending remains open, with the further relations of the protagonists unclear. The change of Alena’s political allegiance remains poorly motivated in the script, while the acting of the actress is unconvincing. The film ends with telephone conversations between family members separated by the war. It is notable that the only conversation in Ukrainian is about drinking, in which some Mykola drinks heavily, thus perpetuating the Russian stereotypical image of a Ukrainian.

Although the clash of ideologies is at the center of the narrative, Pimanov insists that the “film is not about war. This is an anti-war film. It was made with no political subtext or propaganda. The film is dedicated to Russian and Ukrainian soldiers who decided not to kill each other. This is an act that should be immortalized in history. And it should become a lesson and an example for further relations between people” (Obukhovskaia). The primary mission of the film, according to Pimanov, is reconciliation of Russians and Ukrainians. The film was made to show the “historical truth” from both sides. According to the filmmaker, enemies are only those Ukrainians “who killed and burnt people. They are enemies for me. While the rest of Ukrainians are brothers, friends, and dear ones for me. Ukrainian authorities intend to stop the film from showing; this effort is ridiculous. I think people will watch it in Ukraine and make their own conclusions” (Obukhovskaia). The film has the status of a national film; it was made with support of the Russian Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Culture. Pimanov’s Crimea was awarded a prize from the Russian Military and Historical Association for achievements in “studying, preserving and popularization of history”; from their perspective, it became the best historical film
of the year (Fedorov). As a state-sponsored film, Crimea’s “historical truth” fully complies with state ideology and, naturally, creates a memory of the events in Ukraine beneficial for Russian propaganda.

As a Russian film critic, Taezhnaia underscores in her review, “Crimea does not look like a film but, rather, like a TV show for audiences with an uncompromising patriotic position. …Crimea blurs the recent painful history to create the truth of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation” (Taezhnaia). According to Kuvshinova, the film bears a “naïve faith, borrowed … from the previous century, in the propagandistic abilities of cinema” that “continues to live in the minds of the older generation” (Kuvshinova). The only thing that Ukrainians find reassuring is that the film actually admits that Russian military forces landed in Crimea and occupied it without any resistance on the side of Ukrainians, although officially the presence of Russian military forces in Crimea was denied. Ultimately, Pimanov has presented his own version of events in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea that deviates from the official Russian version. As Ruzaev points out, “it is notable that if in reality Crimea was annexed as a result of people referendum, it turns out that Pimanov’s film is not interested in any referendums,” instead “the admiration of Russian military power and didactic explanations like ‘Some came to kill, others came to defend’” are of more importance (Ruzaev). As a result, although the film serves the Russian ideology in terms of legitimization of the annexation, the effect is the opposite one.
7.0 Conclusion

The dissertation, therefore, is an exploration of memories about the past shared by Russian and Ukrainian filmmakers. The primary goal was an examination of the divergent interpretations of the past and how these interpretations both reflect and influence the present. Both in Russia and Ukraine, memory has historically been highly institutionalized and state-operated, with more recently diametrically opposite ideologies. The political elites have had a huge influence on the memory politics and the construction of national identity in both countries. Decades ago, in his three-volume collection *Les Lieux de Mémoire* (1984-1992), Nora was concerned about the influence of state politics on the formation of national memory in France. In the case of Russia and Ukraine, the situation is more complex, since the same memory of a shared past tends to be interpreted and claimed by two diametrically opposite political powers. Dealing with the past inevitably involves political interests, power, exclusion, and debates. Memory operates as a process of selection, remembering, and forgetting and can be even used as a political weapon.

The question of rehabilitation of the OUN and the UPA became a top priority on Ukrainian political agenda before Ukraine even obtained its 1990 independence. Uncovering the Soviet crimes while creating a new narrative of the past and consolidating Ukrainians as a nation around a traumatic event, such as the Holodomor, was the first step in creating the independent Ukrainian state. Individual memories of those who suffered from the Holodomor and Soviet repressions became the primary source of national identity, although initially there was not much unity among the different political camps of the 1990s. The battle between Ukrainian nationalists and unreformed communists was a battle for historical memory.
The institutionalization of national memory reached a new level with the establishment of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance operating under the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. It was first founded in 2006 as a special organ for the restoration and preservation of national memory, then discontinued by President Viktor Ianukovych in 2010, and became a full-fledged state institution in 2014. This reflects the fluctuations in Ukrainian politics and attitude towards memory policy. Since 2014, Ukraine has identified a clear memory policy that recently found its reflection in a documentary by Iurii Dankevych and Omelian Oshchudliak *History of Struggle and Victories: A Film about Main Achievements of the Institute over the Past 5 Years* [Istoriia borotby i peremog: film pro golovni zdobutky instytutu za ostanni 5 rokiv, 2019]. The film is a summary of the current Ukrainian memory politics, with the main focus on the areas of the 2014 Maidan revolution; Soviet repressions against Ukrainians in the 1930-1940s; the Holodomor; and the OUN and the UPA. These are the major areas around which contemporary Ukrainian identity is constructed, while the films discussed in this dissertation tend to reflect a similar tendency in fiction film.

One of the main achievements of Ukraine, according to the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, is the 2015 law on decommunisation of Ukraine. It is emphasized that, after the law was passed, Soviet archives became public and now anyone could find information about repressed relatives. Dankevych and Oshchudliak’s *History* features a story of a woman who was able to identify what had happened to her grandfather in the 1930s and how he was killed. The emphasis on individual memories that are compliant with state memory policy thus empowers and justifies state policy. The Institute boasts about the books published and even board games developed for young Ukrainians to learn history in an appealing way. In board games modeled after Monopoly, the players have to unite Ukraine and fight against the Soviets.
While the new memory policy of Ukraine is oriented towards filling in the gaps and remembrance of the previously blank pages in Ukrainian history, it also sweeps aside huge areas of history. The main purpose for Ukrainian memory politics is now the eradication of the 70 years of Soviet rule of Ukraine, regardless whether there was any positive impact on its development. The Soviet crimes, in the meantime, tend to be positioned as crimes against specific Ukrainians, disregarding the fact that millions of Russians, Jews, and other ethnicities also became victims. The selective approach to history gains popularity in the wake of targeting the needs of individual Ukrainians and appealing to recent memories that are still painful. It is not taken into account, however, that the history of the OUN and the UPA is the history of Western Ukraine, whereas residents of Eastern or Southern Ukraine might not empathize with it. In this respect, cinema as a mediator of memory creates prosthetic memories among audiences who have no connection to the experiential memory. Khymych’s Alive, for example, refers to the struggle between the Soviet NKVD and the remainder of the troops of the UPA through an emotional story of a woman. This film facilitates internalization of this memory by the audience, and those Ukrainians who had never heard about the UPA before would at least read about it online after watching the film. This strategy is the power of constructing a collective memory around a traumatic event in the past and linking it to the present.

Cultural memories are dynamic and the ongoing processes of remembrance have been changing fast over the past two decades both in Russia and Ukraine. Many memories previously preserved in archives suddenly entered the cannon, such as the figure of Prince Vladimir in Russia or Ivan Mazepa in Ukraine. By concentrating on the rehabilitation of the UPA participants, Ukrainians tend to forget and leave in the background the fact that the Second World War was a trauma not only to Ukrainians but also to many Soviet citizens.
While the early memory politics of independent Ukraine was centered around the distant past, primarily the Cossack period and Ukraine as part of imperial Russia, after 2014, there was a major turn to a relatively recent history and memories that can still be reached first-hand. The Soviet crimes are now deliberately paralleled with contemporary Russian politics towards Ukraine in order to support a long history of the Russo-Ukrainian antagonism and justify Ukraine’s politics in relation to Russia. If there were no aggression towards Ukraine on the part Russia, Ukrainians would, in all likelihood, still be in disagreement about their identity and memory politics, unable to define themselves as a nation. Therefore, there is also a positive side to the conflict. The painful memories serve to unify Ukrainians, determine their identity, and bind them as a nation.

Unlike the Ukrainian orientation of memory policy towards elimination of the Soviet past, the Russian state memory policy is geared towards using the Soviet past as a foundation for its current collective memory. The Second World War, or, rather, the Great Patriotic War, is one of the major manifestations of the Soviet society. It was a central event in the formation of the Soviet identity. The suffering, death, and collective trauma have transformed and united the people. This affective interpretation of a nation is compliant with Renan’s vision of a nation as a collective community that has its experiences of the past and memories of the common glories. The Great Patriotic War can be considered the consolidation of the Soviet people as an entity. As a significant event of the past, the war has a huge potential for its political use in the present.

Although repressions and Soviet crimes were brought up on the agenda in the 1990s, they were later overshadowed by a new mythology of the Great Patriotic War, in which the state and the people closely cooperate. The state feels the suffering of the people and admits the price of the victory, while Stalin’s repressions remain in the background of the genocides organized by Nazis.
The contestation about the memories of the Second World War in the Ukrainian and Russian perspective is fundamental to the cultural war between Russia and Ukraine.

In its search of a foundational event, Russia also tends to go back to a thousand-year-long history in order to create a memory of the Russian Federation as an ancient state. Kravchuk’s Viking and other films are a vivid manifestation of the argument. The search of its foundation date has been one of the major aspects of the Russian memory politics in the post-Soviet period. In terms of Russian political perspective, there has never been an independent Ukraine or Ukrainian nation, even after 1991. Ukraine has always been a part of Russia and was supposed to continue playing that role. The emergence of Ukrainian national identity grounded in anticommunist laws and traumatic events of the Soviet past has led to the conflict of memories between certain constituencies in Russia and Ukraine. The cultural war thus preceded the military conflict between the two countries.

Cinema is a powerful tool in memory politics when it works along with other media. Enhanced by historical books, TV shows, symbolic memorabilia, holidays and traditions, a film is one of the sites where memory is created and where memory lives. Film is also a tool for popularization of history and making it more accessible to wider audiences. Cinema creates a vision of the past as a reality of its own, rather than a mediation. Reinvention of the past in film usually leads to debates and discussions both among historians and regular audiences and may significantly influence the formation of certain memories among viewers. The Russian film industry, in this respect, is deeply indebted to the production of a mythical empire with a long coherent history. The Ukrainian cinema, in the meantime, tends to create an image of Ukrainians as victims of the traumatic past and, therefore, unify them as a nation. The objective history is
irrelevant for these purposes; it merges with subjective memory to create a new narrative about the present.


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