The Grand Strategies of Middle Powers: Organizational Determinants and Constraints

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Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the

Graduate School of Public and International Affairs in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Pittsburgh

2021
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What exactly is grand strategy? Is it a phenomenon that can be observed in practice, and in real time? What causes states to adopt the grand strategies they do? This dissertation tackles these questions head on, by proposing a novel theory which explains the form a state’s grand strategy might take. The “organizational determinants of grand strategy” theory posits that disparities in state and organizational-level resources (in the form of money, manpower, and elite attention) influence the form a state’s grand strategy takes, and governs the rate of change. This dissertation focuses on middle powers, which provides analytic leverage on the notoriously difficult concept of grand strategy. It examines the case of India and its grand strategy around three conflicts: the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the 1971 Third Indo-Pakistan War, and the 1999 Kargil Crisis. Additional three other cases are studied to increase generality of my theory: Australian grand strategy around the Vietnam War, Pakistani grand strategy around the Third Indo-Pakistan War, and Dutch grand strategy around Operation Trikora. This dissertation showcases that the “organizational determinants of grand strategy” theory is able to explain most, if not all, grand strategies considered and is generalizable to others, when appropriate data sources are available.
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Acknowledgements

It appears that it is almost time to put the pen down for the final time, but before I do, I would be remiss to not express my overwhelming gratitude to everyone who has made this dissertation possible. I may have executed the research project, but it was not done in isolation; the task was made infinitely easier by the advice, guidance, and support of a great many people. While I cannot possibly thank everyone that has assisted me along the way, I have done my level best. If I have inadvertently omitted you, please accept my apologies; I am grateful.

My largest intellectual debt of gratitude is owed to my dissertation chair, Ryan Grauer. Ryan, from the moment I walked into your office for the first time in the summer of 2014, I have greatly benefited from your mentorship, both personally and professionally; thank you. I appreciate you encouraging me to stick with the idea that blossomed into this dissertation. I am also deeply grateful that you allowed me to work remotely while I was writing, which enabled me to support my wife’s career. Your suggestions, ideas, and comments were always insightful, incisive, and kindly put; I could not have asked for a better advisor or mentor. Thank you, from the bottom of my heart, for the crucial role you played in helping bring this dissertation to life.

Additionally, this dissertation would not have been possible without the support provided by my committee members: Michael Kenney, Phil Williams, and Hal Brands. The insights and enthusiasm I’ve received from you has been overwhelming, and has improved the quality of this research project immensely. Thank you all for your individual and collective contributions and your support, personally and professionally; it has meant the world to me.

At the University of Pittsburgh, I’d like to thank Luke Condra, Bill Dunn, Taylor Seybolt, and Meredith Wilf for feedback at the earliest stages of this project. I also want to extend my
heartfelt thanks to both Sandra Monteverde and Diane Cohen, whose support and encouragement in my both my personal and professional life helped me carry on. I am equally grateful to Jennifer Bert, Mike Byers, Erin Carbone, Colin Clarke, Alex Halman, Jay Rickabaugh, and Yoon-Ah Shin. You all taught me a great deal through our time together, and for that I thank you. Finally, the Hillman Library staff deserve recognition, as on more than one occasion they went above and beyond to ensure I had access to the materials I needed, when I needed them.

In the course of my research, I was greatly aided by the contribution of numerous other individuals. Thank you to Jonah Blank, Sir Lawrence Freedman, Jack Gill, Rich Girven, Simon Miles, Patrick Porter, and Paul Staniland. I am also extremely grateful to Filipe Alonso, who generously coded me a file parser to facilitate the preparation of documents for text analysis; Alonso coded in a day or two something that saved me countless hours of my life, and I am extremely grateful. Thanks also go to Zélia Worman, whose suggestion of utilizing k-means clustering helped me solve a difficult problem facing my topic modeling efforts, and for her review of some of the later chapters. I would also like to thank the Library of Congress and its hardworking staff. The extensive holdings and research expertise at the Library enabled access to crucial primary and secondary sources I would have not been able to find otherwise. Finally, thanks go to Sage Journals and the National Archives of Australia for their permission to republish Figure 2.1 and Figure 6.4, respectively, in this dissertation.

There are numerous other individuals whose comments, feedback, and encouragement improved this dissertation. Thank you to Dwayne Butler, Lynn Davis, Dave Frelinger, Jacob Heim, Andy Hoehn, Mara Karlin, Mike Lostumbo, Karl Mueller, Stacie Pettyjohn, Paula Thornhill, Kari Thyne, Alan Vick, and Barry Wilson. I also want to express my gratitude to Adam Grissom for providing me a professional opportunity which proved to be the intellectual genesis of this project.
There are also those who long ago laid the very first intellectual foundations on which this dissertation was built. Thank you to all the wonderful teachers I have had throughout the years: Mary Lou Cantrell, for giving me a love of school; Fred Lindstrom, for not only teaching me how to learn, but reminding me that I could; Robert Gardner, for the class in high school on International Relations which inspired me to pursue political science in undergrad; and Sean Duffy for his mentorship during my tenure at Quinnipiac, and for suggesting I consider attending SAIS. Without this foundation even contemplating attempting this feat would have been impossible.

I would be remiss if I did not offer my thanks to those who supported the work by supporting the person doing it. I am eternally grateful for the friendship of Chris Armstrong, Daniel & Suzanne Balson, Martin Bennett, Alan Burns, Tony Campbell, Scott Christian, Tucker & Amanda Clauss, Stratton & Sharmili Edwards, Natalia Filipiak, Chris Francke, Marcy Frazho, Evan Hume, Jesse Mowery, Shannon O’Pray, Andrew & Laura Sanak, Julia Schiff, Heather Scott, and Matt Stafford. Your friendship has provided much vital comfort, relief, and encouragement to me over this arduous and difficult process.

I simply cannot thank my family enough. Thank you to my mom and dad, for all the love and support you provided; without your unfailing support at crucial junctures, I would have had to abandon this effort. Thank you to William Scott Morris for his encouragement, support, and prodding to consider getting a Masters, then a PhD, and urging me to see it through. To my sisters, Stacey and Samantha, I love you both, and cherish our relationships. To my non-biological brothers, Andrew Bibas, John Breznen, and Jeff Horton our discussions over the years inspired my love for exploring and discussing ideas, however heady, or minuet, they may be; thank you. To my dog, Walter Bishop Ferreira Worman, your calming and constant presence made lonely days toiling away in the basement writing this dissertation bearable; you are a good boy. To my
daughters, Ivy and Isabel, words cannot possibly hope to describe how much I love you, how much
I appreciate having you in my life, and how sorry I am for the times I could not attend, or do,
something with you because I was working on this, or tell you how much joy you have brought
me. You are amazing young ladies, and I want you to know that your dad loves you, is proud of
you, and is thankful for your support. Know that you can do anything if you put your mind to it.

Last, but certainly not least, thank you to my wife, Zélia. Your support was the *sine qua non* to
this effort, and I am eternally grateful. I started graduate school two days after we got
married, and over the course of this research project we have had two beautiful daughters, adopted
a dog, moved three times, bought a house, and so much more. Whenever anyone asks me how I
wrote this, given all we have had going on, I tell them the truth; I have the unfailing support of an
amazing partner. Thank you for taking care of Ivy and Isabel when I had to work; thank you for
baking me cakes to celebrate when I completed an important milestone; thank you for listening to
me complain; thank you for picking me up off the floor when the load became almost too heavy
to bear; thank you for everything you do. I love you so much, and I cannot describe how proud I
am to say that each day our relationship continues to get stronger. We have accomplished yet
another goal we set for ourselves; now it’s time for us to find another adventure to undertake. I
cannot wait to see what that will end up being, and when the kids are old enough, we’ll teach them
to fly…
1.0 Introduction

Grand strategy is one of the many areas of both the security and strategic studies literatures that has received a large amount of attention and active research. As such, there are a number of overarching questions in the field. First and foremost, while discussions about grand strategy are nothing new, there is a notable lack of consensus as to what constitutes grand strategy. Second, some scholars raise questions about whether grand strategies exist in practice. Related to this, there is a question about whether scholars and policymakers can observe grand strategy while it is unfolding, as much research in the field seems content merely to describe historical grand strategies, opening up charges of relying solely on hindsight to bring the concept to life. There is also an open question about what causes states to adopt the strategies they do. Finally, many wage fierce debates over the policy direction for a country’s future grand strategy, and are consumed with the appropriate response to a state’s particular circumstances. Complicating the study of grand strategy even further is the fact that analytic tools and theoretical models for discussing the aforementioned problems are relatively underdeveloped.

As such, the field is rife with topics that require elaboration and theoretical expansion. My dissertation posits an answer to the question about the existence of grand strategy, in order to demonstrate that not only do they exist in practice, but are knowable and observable while they are unfolding. Second, I develop a framework that explores the answer to the question of what causes a country’s grand strategy to change. In so doing, I shed light on what domestic factors may influence a state’s choice of strategy. This is an important question to address, as there is much discussion and debate in both the scholarly and policy-making communities over not only the correct grand strategy to choose, but in also understanding the grand strategies adopted by other
countries. My dissertation seeks to help broaden the academic study of grand strategy by unpacking the organizational forces constraining and enabling a country’s grand strategic decision making. This is, in and of itself, a novel contribution in a field largely dominated by state-level explanations of grand strategic change.

The fundamental background question that drove this research project is to what extent can grand strategy be subjected to theoretically informed social science research? This is no mere idle question. Scholars such as Murray soundly reject the idea that grand strategy can be subject to “theoretical principles.”¹ I sought to understand if the relative lack of theoretically-driven research on grand strategy is simply an oversight, or because the concept itself is not amenable to theoretical generalization, as some critics allege. This question is important, in part, because the existing body of literature on this subject tends towards preferring either retrospective, or prospective takes on the topic. Few scholars articulate frameworks with which to study grand strategy in the manner I propose. By focusing on understanding grand strategy from a theoretical perspective, I help both academics and policy makers begin to more deeply understand the drivers of grand strategy, and the constraints which may be placed on their own, or other nations, decision-making processes.

1.1 Defining grand strategy

One thing that becomes clear almost immediately in the study of grand strategy is that there have been numerous attempts to define the concept over the years. Posen, for example, writes: “A

¹ Murray (2011, 9)
grand strategy is a nation-state’s theory about how to produce security for itself.”\(^2\) Brands’
definition is not entirely dissimilar, with grand strategy being defined “…as the intellectual
architecture that gives form and structure to foreign policy.”\(^3\) Both definitions evoke the mental
processes that require states to think carefully about the situations they face, and the best way to
accomplish those goals. While Posen is slightly more specific as to the goal—security—Brands’
definition does not preclude it, opting instead for a more nebulous end-state, of which security
would doubtless be one amongst many priorities. Rosecrance and Stein offer a summary definition,
saying: “In modern terms, grand strategy came to mean the adaptation of domestic and
international resources to achieve security for a state.”\(^4\) Here again there is a focus on a specific
end; the security of the state. Kennedy writes:

> The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the
capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all of the elements,
both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement
of the nation’s long term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best
interests.\(^5\) (emphasis in original)

Martel generally agrees with the description, defining the term as “…a coherent statement of the
state’s highest political ends to be pursued globally over the long term…In essence, grand strategy
provides an overarching guide for the policies that the state should implement.”\(^6\)

With even this brief overview of a handful of definitions, it becomes clear that there are
several common elements which almost all definitions of grand strategy share. The first is that
grand strategy is concerned with ends, means, and the reconciliation of the two; this is the very

\(^2\) Posen (2015, 1)
\(^3\) Brands (2014, 3)
\(^4\) Rosecrance and Stein (1993, 4)
\(^5\) Kennedy (1991b, 6)
\(^6\) Martel (2015, 32)
essence of the concept of “strategy.” The second is that grand strategy is long-term, and not necessarily tied to a specific set of day-to-day circumstances that could be handled by lower-level strategy. This temporal element is what separates grand strategy from, for example, a yearly national security strategy. The production of security is inherently not a short-term endeavor; battles may be won, or economic advantage gained, but security is a moving target that states constantly strive to achieve in order to survive. Finally, there is the holistic nature of grand strategy; it is the combination of military, economic, and diplomatic strategy. Yet it is not the sum-total of all a state’s interactions with the outside world. Grand strategy is the main current of foreign policy, its guiding principle; grand strategy is not, for instance, mid-level ambassador meetings, day-to-day consular activities, or any of the myriad routine interactions states have with one another.

In this dissertation, I adopt Posen’s definition of grand strategy, which, to reiterate, is “…a nation-state’s theory of how to produce security for itself.” This definition combines all the essential elements listed above while providing a flexible, but still operationally useful, guide for identifying various countries’ grand strategies. Furthermore, Posen’s definition encompasses an overwhelming majority of the Brands, Rosecrance and Stein, Kennedy, and Martel definitions, all of which fundamentally deal with the intellectual processes by which states make tradeoffs for security (amongst other goals) over the long-term. Grand strategy concerns the means associated with those ends, and a theory is concerned with how those two things interact to produce an end-state, in this case the security of the nation.

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7 Betts (2000, 5)
8 Brands (2014, 3-7)
9 Posen (2015)
10 While security is not the only goal a nation pursues, it is one of the most important, even if how critical its pursuit is may depend on how much security one enjoys. See: Baldwin (1997, 19-20)
One of the problems hindering the study of grand strategy is that such theories of how to generate security are infrequently written down or clearly articulated; contradictions in statements, actions, or circumstances can lead to misperception or confusion. Silove has meaningfully advanced the field in her article “Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of ‘Grand Strategy,’” by laying out three distinct meanings of the frequently used term grand strategy. Silove summarizes the three meanings as: a plan, an organizing principle, and a pattern of behavior. The definition that I adopt, and the pattern I look for in the empirical chapters of this dissertation, might best be thought of as fitting Silove’s definition of a grand pattern, without conforming rigidly to her typology. As mentioned above, grand strategy is not everything a state does in the international arena, but rather the flow of foreign policy, most of which is observable to the outside world. Thus, having a disciplined way of categorizing these currents, and smoothing the variation, is essential to discern the overall pattern. In this dissertation I unpack what it means for a nation-state to have a theory of security, and examine how this theory of security might be influenced by the resourcing decisions of the country under consideration.

The potential means available for a state to resource its security priorities might at first seem problematically large. However, as outlined by several prominent scholars in the field, the elements of any successful grand strategy can be broken down into three main conceptual categories: persuasion, inducements, and armed coercion. Persuasion is essentially synonymous with diplomacy and other non-coercive, and/or non-transactory suasion, although it allows for tit-for-tat vote bargaining (e.g., in the United Nations). Inducements, then, are focused on transactory

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11 Silove (2017)
12 This particular framing and the following definitions are found in Epstein and Loyola (2016, 90-1), which cites Brands (2014) as the intellectual forerunner to this categorization, even though it appears (in some form) in other places such as Nye Jr. (2008)
suasion. or the financial, and other bargaining chips used to win over actors which persuasion and diplomacy would otherwise fail to move. Finally, armed coercion is the threat or use of military forces to achieve intended ends. These general categories represent a broad typology of the ‘ideal-types’ of strategies that states can pursue. States in reality can and will pursue mixed strategies. It is my contention, however, that, because of scarce resources, states are more likely to choose to emphasize one of the three types above the others. These three types of strategies—persuasion, inducement, and coercion—will constitute my definition of the form grand strategies can take.

1.2 Understanding grand strategy

Having defined what a grand strategy is, there are still two problematic questions which plague its study: whether or not grand strategies exist in practice, and whether grand strategies are knowable in real time. This section unpacks these two questions plaguing the study of grand strategy, ultimately coming to the conclusion that grand strategy both exists and is knowable in real time. Finally, I discuss potential drivers of a state’s grand strategy.

1.2.1 Does grand strategy exist in practice?

While many scholars believe that grand strategy does exist, there is a sizeable minority that does not. Generally, there are those who outright deny the concept’s existence, and there are those who are doubtful about the concept in general. I call the former grand strategic nihilists and the latter grand strategic skeptics. Both groups raise fundamental, and important, questions which must be addressed by scholars seeking to study grand strategy. In this subsection, I briefly unpack
the argument surrounding the former, as it a foundational concern, and discuss the implication of this argument for the study of grand strategy.

Grand strategic nihilists doubt that grand strategy exists as a meaningful or useful concept in the real world. They are distinct from the grand strategic skeptics, in that nihilists tend to believe that, for any number of reasons, crafting a meaningful strategy is impossible. Betts, while not a strategic nihilist himself, neatly summarizes a large number of criticisms that encompass this nihilistic school of thought. For instance, he describes the critiques of: 1) luck vs. genius (people often perceive as genius those who are simply lucky); 2) randomness vs. prediction (results often deviate from predicted outcomes); 3) psychoanalysis vs. conscious choice (leaders cannot often articulate what drives them); 4) cognition vs. complex choice (human cognition is limited in its ability to analyze potential paths); 5) culture vs. coercion (cultural differences make coercion difficult); 6) friction vs. fine tuning (friction in war prevents delays between signals and responses, hampering signaling); 7) goal displacement vs. policy control (institutions often pursue their own interests rather than the ends policymakers direct); 8) war vs. strategy (war often requires strategic change, meaning war drives strategy); 9) democracy vs. consistency (democracies cannot conduct strategy because consistent preferences can’t be obtained); and 10) compromise vs. effectiveness (compromise inherently destroys the efficacy of any strategy). More recently, scholars such as Edelstein and Krebs have continued in this vein of strategic nihilism, ostensibly rejecting strategy as a futile pursuit on the grounds that a state’s preferences do not remain consistent long enough for strategic choice to take place. While this is a variant of Betts’ critique of democracy vs

\[13\] Betts (2000)
\[14\] It is important to note that neither Betts, nor Edelstein and Krebs (2015) (even though their article has the term “grand strategy” in the title) directly tackles the question of (actual) grand strategy, but it is only a small leap to realize if they reject the ability to conduct strategy at lower levels, then this would, axiomatically, apply to the higher order and more complex realm of grand strategy as well.
consistency described briefly above, that these arguments are still continuing and in the public discourse underscores the pervasiveness and persistence of such beliefs.

Ultimately, the question of whether or not grand strategy exists is an empirical one; if it does, I should be able to observe it. In order to proceed, I assume that the answer to the question “does grand strategy exist” is yes, and look for it in the empirical record. In doing so, I address grand strategic nihilists head-on, and help fill a major gap in the literature. This dissertation directly challenges the strategic nihilist’s assertion that strategy as a concept does not exist, or cannot be pursued. If I am indeed able to identify grand strategies in the empirical record, I will have a firm answer as to whether or not it exists; this alone will prove a valuable addition to the literature on grand strategy.

1.2.2 Can we know grand strategy in real time?

Assuming that grand strategy does exist, is it something that can be observed in real time, or is it only knowable after the fact? Grand strategic skeptics raise important doubts about the observability of the phenomenon, which has important implications for the study of grand strategy. If grand strategies are not generally observable, this makes researching current grand strategies extremely problematic, if not impossible. One important implication is that, if grand strategies can only be knowable retrospectively, then there is little academics and policy makers can do in the moment. In this subsection, I summarize the general critiques raise by grand strategic skeptics, and lay out the implications of this line of argumentation for my dissertation.

Murray is a prominent grand strategic skeptic, and raises doubts about grand strategy as the kind of empirical phenomena which can be subjected to theoretical scrutiny. In Murray’s own words:
In fact, the best analogy for understanding grand strategy is that of how French peasant soup is made – a mixture of items thrown into the pot over the course of a week and then eaten, for which no recipe can possibly exist. In thinking about the soup of grand strategy, recipes and theoretical principles are equally useless. What works in one case may well not work in another. In various strengths, grand strategy consists of leadership, vision, intuition, process, adaptation, and the impact of a nation’s particular and idiosyncratic development and geographic position, but in no particular order or mixture.\textsuperscript{15}

Murray goes on to contend that grand strategy cannot be studied in the present, and instead is most understandable and able to be studied by way of retrospective coherence.\textsuperscript{16} Murray’s chief critique seems to be that the conditions under which states find themselves are so innumerable that they cannot be subject to any possible governing law, and that states cannot hope to come up with principles on how to proceed in advance. Advancing a different critique, Jervis suggests that grand strategy is almost impossible outside of extra-ordinary conditions in the international environment. As he famously argued, the United States would not and could not develop a grand strategy in the post-Cold War era due to the lack of “pressing threats.”\textsuperscript{17} What unifies these skeptics is that, while they admit the existence of the concept of grand strategy, they emphasize the extraordinary nature of the topic and underscore the difficulty in consciously creating, or rigorously studying, grand strategy.

Works analyzing grand strategy \textit{retrospectively} tend to fall into the category of histories, and seek to describe or analyze the contents of past grand strategies. Luttwak is among the leading scholars of this school, having written a number of books on the topic including \textit{The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire} and \textit{The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire}.\textsuperscript{18} Other authors

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Murray (2011, 9)
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Murray (2011, 10)
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Jervis (1998)
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Luttwak (2009, 1976)
\end{itemize}
have produced edited volumes in the same vein, such as Kennedy’s *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, which consists of a series of chapters, contributed by several notable authors, primarily focusing on the British and continental powers up to the World War II era but ending with a couple of post-World War II examples.\(^{19}\) Some authors, such as Layne, seek to use historical retrospectives to explore how history can be used to provide guideposts as to what a country’s (America, in Layne’s case) grand strategy should look like in the future.\(^{20}\)

I assume that grand strategies are knowable in real time. Just because the entirety of a strategy becomes clear after it has unfolded does not imply it was not present the entire time. To reason by way of analogy, a chess grand master does not articulate their strategy before sitting down with an opponent; their strategy is revealed in the choices they do or do not make. So, too, should grand strategy be observable as it unfolds. Once again, this claim is empirically verifiable, and I look for ways to identify and understand grand strategy in real time. Should I be able to do so, this will provide a firm rebuttal to skeptics claims.

### 1.2.3 What causes states to adopt the grand strategies they do?

There are authors who accept the points made above and seek to impose theoretical frameworks onto the study of grand strategy by approaching the problem from a more academic perspective. These works tend to try to advance the conceptual or analytic tools necessary for a theoretical study of grand strategy. Martel is once such author. His *Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice* articulates a framework for grand strategy that consists of two general phases, articulation

\(^{19}\) Kennedy (1991a)

\(^{20}\) Layne (2006)
and implementation. Martel describes a number of phases for both articulation and implementation, but his fundamental thesis is that articulation occurs over time and functions as an iterative process, but that it also must be matched with the resources of all varieties to be successful. Without these two components, he concludes, a grand strategy is doomed to fail.21 Martel’s work fails to fully satisfy because it is concerned primarily with the American experience; while it does an excellent job explaining the evolution of American grand strategy, his framework is unable to provide meaningful expectations or guidance regarding grand strategic form more generally.

Krasner’s paradigm is one in which grand strategies will be successful when a state’s “…power and beliefs – cleave along the same lines.”22 Krasner fails to elaborate or provide a rigorous testing of this assertion instead offering only the example of Containment as a positive example of this assertion, and the failure of Bismarck to draw Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary into an alliance as an unsuccessful counter-point.23 Krasner limits his discussion to the well-trod Cold War era and 19th century, as well as a brief explanation as to why the U.S. has not been able to create a grand strategy to deal with Al-Qaeda. What is crucially left wanting in his analysis is an examination of a case that is not nearly so well studied as Containment. An expansion to thinking about countries outside the Western Hemisphere would also be welcome.

Other authors have used historical vignettes to highlight the enduring challenges faced by current practitioners. Brands is one such scholar, and seeks to both address the concerns of grand strategic skeptics and develop a list of grand strategic principles through a series of case studies

21 Martel (2015)
22 Krasner (2010)
23 Krasner (2010)
on U.S. presidential administrations. Brands seeks to draw more generalizable guidance for policy makers while avoiding offering guidance on the content of a given strategy. This provides diagnostic value, but was intended to highlight barriers to change as opposed to providing guidance on when states will adopt a given strategy.

Others, such as Thompson, seek to test grand strategy “theories,” in the academic sense. In Thompson’s case his theory attempts to explain changes in a particular nation’s grand strategy through the use of historical vignettes, such as the interwar period and World War II from 1920-45. Thompson advances a rudimentary theory that the presence (or absence) of five factors (problem definition-correspondence, shocks, policy entrepreneurs, contestation, and reinforcement) indicates when a grand strategic shift is likely. The chief problem with his theory, at the moment, is that, while it may be able to retrospectively analyze and assess whether these factors are present in a given case, it does not necessarily provide expectations for what strategies states will pursue when and, by Thompson’s own admission, requires more rigorous testing across a wider number of cases to see if it is generalizable.

Porter highlights a somewhat different theory of grand strategy, by first noting American grand strategy has been stable over a long period of time in which much has changed. Porter suggests that a combination of power and habit have converged to cause stability where one might otherwise expect change. Where Thompson’s framework cannot necessarily provide expectations about what strategy will be pursued, Porter’s theory succeeds both in both providing guidance on how to potentially identify grand strategy in real time and offers meaningful guidance

24 Brands (2014)
25 Thompson (2016)
26 Porter (2018, 9)
27 Porter (2018, 11)
on what may cause change and what direction that change might take. What is required to bear out Porter’s theory, however, is also more rigorous testing.

Here, I engage in a more disciplined application of theory to the problem of what causes a state’s grand strategy to change. By adopting a focus on organizations, I am able to explore the interactions between state investments, grand strategy articulation, and most importantly grand strategic capabilities. In pursuit of macro-level foreign policy ends, as well as for idiosyncratic internal reasons (e.g., concerns over regime stability), states develop an incredibly diverse array of formal organizations to serve as the functional means. Organizations, as articulated by Simon, can be defined most simply as “…systems of interrelated roles.” Formal organizations, which will be examined in more detailed in Chapter 2, are defined as purposely created networks of people, hired to pursue a common goal, that possess formal and informal roles, specified tasks, and the financial and technological resources to pursue their goal. It logically follows that these organizations may generate, by virtue of their mere existence, unique, nation-specific capabilities. This raises the questions: do the tools at a state’s disposal bias their choices of grand strategy in a systematic way? Are stronger sets of organizations preferentially favored? States, and especially those without sufficient power or resources to develop new organizations or tools, make do with what they have at their disposal.

Other things being equal, states should choose the strongest tools: in this case, the organizations they have created and resourced to reach their desired foreign policy ends. Therefore, the specific research question of my dissertation is: Does the variation in the strength of states’ formal organizations affect the form their grand strategies take? I find that the answer appears to be yes; the strength of a given set of institutions, as measured by the money, manpower, and

28 Simon (1991, 3)
elite attention invested, influences the form a state’s grand strategy will take. I contend that, if a state preferentially resources organizations whose function and goal is to persuade, then that state will pursue a persuasive grand strategy; states that favor organizations that provide investment opportunity or foreign aid should pursue inducive grand strategies. Likewise, states that invest preferentially in organizations like the military should pursue coercive grand strategies. In the process, I utilize text analysis in a novel way to identify grand strategic form, which also provides the potential to identify both current and historical grand strategies. Finally, my theory allows for testable predictions and concrete follow-on research to explore how certain state-level factors, such as organizational resources, influence a state’s grand strategy.

To address grand strategic skeptics’ concerns about the infinite variation of external context, I instead look inside the state. By bracketing the external situations states find themselves in, I can understand the forms grand strategies may take and observe under what conditions they may change. This has the effect of making my theory more generalizable, as it also limits the manifold forms the internal environment can take by focusing on the organizations which execute specific functions. Another example of a work looking at state-level factors is an edited volume by Rosecrance and Stein, *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, which demonstrates that factors such as domestic politics, beliefs and ideas, constitutional fitness, threat perception, and nationalism might matter in a state’s formation of its grand strategy. Rosecrance and Stein’s volume is concerned with how these internal factors influence the content of a country’s response to the international environment, for instance if the domestic conditions inside a country favor revisionism. I provide insight into the general form a state’s grand strategy will take. It is also

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29 This methodology is elaborated on in greater detail in Chapter 2.  
30 Rosecrance and Stein (1993) Chapters 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, & 8 respectively  
31 Rosecrance and Stein (1993, 19)
important to note that this volume does not address grand strategy from an organizational perspective, although much attention is paid to domestic political and economic constraints. The importance of internal differences among states, and their effects on grand strategy, are also supported by Martel, who asserts that “…not every state, society, and value system can produce any possible grand strategy, because it depends on the nature of [the state, its society, and political values.]” I demonstrate that this statement might be usefully amended to say that it depends on its organizations.

1.2.4 Why understanding grand strategy matters

This research question helps address two key areas for the scholarly community that are currently under-served in the literature and for policy makers (especially those in the United States), I provide insight into a foreign policy conundrum. First and foremost, this research question helps understand and explain grand strategy formulation and constraints. Unlike numerous others in the field, I am seeking to understand and inform what types of grand strategies might be adopted, not what type of grand strategy should be adopted. There are a large number of authors who look at the question of grand strategy prospectively and, quite often, prescriptively. These works overwhelming tend to seek to influence the contents of a given state’s grand strategy. Feaver has written on the subject of American grand strategy extensively and, in a more policy-oriented piece, discusses the need to refine America’s ‘legacy’ grand strategy and embrace the strategy that served the country well in the past. Posen has also written from a prospective

32 Martel (2015, 25)
33 Feaver (2012, 59-70)
framework, arguing for a strategy of ‘restraint’ in an attempt to shepherd the nations resources and avoid oversretch.\textsuperscript{34} Art shares Posen’s concern about oversretch, but argues for America to practice selective engagement with the world in order to manage the threats he sees brewing.\textsuperscript{35} Finally, this discussion about prospective grand strategy is not entirely limited to the United States experience, with authors such as Porter and Layton arguing about the usefulness of the concept for the United Kingdom and suggesting different paths that might be pursued to manage Britain’s place in the world.\textsuperscript{36} My dissertation adds to this body of work focusing on non-Western grand strategy.

Quite frequently these authors are predominantly seeking to influence current policy debates and change the macro-level direction of a country’s foreign policy. Typically, proscriptive grand strategic literature focuses on policy problems facing a country or a new administration. Given that these authors are quite often deliberately attempting to influence policy decisions, this focus is understandable. Drezner notes that effecting major change in grand strategy is difficult, despite many administrations’ attempts to do just that. In his words: “The tyranny of the status quo often renders grand strategy a constant rather than a variable, despite each administration’s determined efforts at intellectual differentiation and rebranding.”\textsuperscript{37} My research question tackles this problem head on, by proposing an explanation for this observed phenomenon, namely organizational continuity, and the difficulty associated with rapid change across a state’s organizational strengths.

\textsuperscript{34} Posen (2015)  
\textsuperscript{35} Art (2012)  
\textsuperscript{36} Porter (2010), Layton (2012)  
\textsuperscript{37} Drezner (2011, 59). This resistance to change is a similar line of argument to Porter (2018)
Theories that start with assumptions that grand strategies are either mere policy statements or fundamentally easy to change ignore the vast amount of governmental machinery and experience required to successful execute a country’s foreign policy. By examining the organizations that execute a country’s grand strategy, I can help explain why new grand strategies often only tinker around the margins or appear difficult to alter in the absence of some existential threat. My explanation is that, absent a fundamental re-alignment of a state’s organizational mix, there is unlikely to be a dramatic change in a country’s grand strategy; the strength of the organizations that execute it are unchanged. Such an explanation, if valid, would represent a deepening of scholars’ and policy makers’ knowledge of what causes states to adopt the grand strategies they do, and how to effect change.

My research can also help provide empirical support for the concept of grand strategy’s existence in practice. By approaching grand strategy from a theoretically-driven angle, I can provide a framework that has specific, testable expectations about states’ grand strategies across time. Should my theoretical expectations be borne out, this will provide powerful evidence in favor of grand strategy’s existence and worth beyond mere rhetorical shorthand. Alternatively, should my expectation not be borne out, I will still have provided evidence that can suggest whether it is a fruitful to study grand strategy from an organizational perspective.

Finally, my research has important implications for policy makers because it will help inform their understanding of the constraints on their own grand strategies as well as those of partners and adversaries. Grand strategy is an expansive enterprise that seeks to harness all of a state’s resources towards securing the nation’s highest priorities in the international environment. Focusing on the reasons that states may be led to favor one strategy over the other provides insight into the mechanisms by which nations choose the strategic paths they take. This has the added
benefit of not relying on highly detailed intelligence post-mortems about decision maker preferences. Rather, it provides an understanding of the general ‘lane’ the country is operating in, even if it cannot predict which specific pins the ball will strike.

1.3 Plan of this dissertation

The remainder of this dissertation proposes and tests a fundamentally new theory about grand strategic formation and change. In Chapter 2, I propose that grand strategy formation and change is best understood by looking at the disparate strengths of the formal organizations a state utilizes to execute its foreign policy. I also advance a novel methodology for measuring a state’s grand strategy, which seeks to address some of the concerns of grand strategic skeptics and nihilists by reducing some elements of analytic bias. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 form the heart of the dissertation, and apply my theory to India by examining Indian grand strategy in the wake of three major conflicts. These conflicts serve as potential inflection points around which resources may be reallocated to reinforce strengths or remedy deficiencies, meaning they are the periods when grand strategic change is arguably most likely.

Chapter 3 unpacks India’s famous grand strategy of Non-Alignment, as articulated by its founding Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and explores the stability of this grand strategy before and after the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Chapter 4 jumps ahead 10 years in time and considers Indian grand strategy around the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. While India’s grand strategy at the time is not as clear cut, I argue that it is best defined as a persuasive grand strategy, which is in contrast to much of the literature that suggests it might be best defined as coercive. Chapter 5 looks at the 1999 Kargil Crisis and helps answer the question of what theme best defines Indian grand strategy
in that era. Chapter 6 explores three mini-cases—Australia, Pakistan, and the Netherlands—in order to generalize my theory and methodology beyond India. Chapter 7 concludes with a look at each of the three primary cases as well the mini-cases and evaluates my theory against other leading theories of grand strategic formation; this chapter also addresses my dissertation’s implications for other debates in the field and ends by offering some concluding thoughts and directions for future research.
2.0 Toward a new theory of grand strategic change

For the purposes of this dissertation, I am primarily interested in examining the sources of stability and change in a country’s grand strategy. As detailed in the previous chapter, I adopt Posen’s definition that grand strategy is “…a nation-state’s theory of how to produce security for itself.” Typically, theories in the field either assume that change happens as a response to external events or as a function of internal forces. The theory that I lay out in this chapter suggests that change is instead a combination of these two factors; it is primarily a function of how states resource formal organizations that interact with the outside world. This change of focus can provide meaningful guidance about when to expect grand strategic change as well as the rate and substance of that change, redressing a deficiency in existing theories on the topic.

That states tend to be a privileged unit of analysis in both the international relations and security studies literature is a phenomenon that is neither new nor surprising.38 A state, as famously defined by Weber, is “…a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”39 The state, however, is conceptually distinct both from ‘government’ and ‘the government.’ Bealey and Johnson succinctly summarize the difference between the latter two. About government, they write: “Government (without the definite article) is an abstract term referring to the style, range, scope, purposes and degree of control [in a state].”40 ‘The government’, they note, “usually refers to the rulers, that group of people who are in charge of the state at a particular time.”41

38 Grey (2009, 304)
39 Weber (1947)
40 Bealey and Johnson (1999, 147)
41 Bealey and Johnson (1999, 147)
My theory is primarily concerned with the way the state makes decisions, not any particular government or administration. Whereas governments can vary over time with the people and legal forms that make them up, states endure. This focus allows my dissertation a broader scope and wider generalizability than if it were limited to the study of a particular set of historical actors or legal frameworks. My observations examine the various governments of the state (e.g., the Nehru government, or the Gandhi government) across different time periods but, in general, it is the state as described above that is the object of my concern. The rest of the chapter first examines existing theories of grand strategic stability and change before laying out my theory. I close by describing the methodology used to test my theoretical claim.

2.1 Existing Theories of grand strategic change

Generally speaking, theories that describe grand strategic stability and change come in two distinct types: externally oriented and internally oriented. Externally oriented theories posit that states respond to events in the external environment and choose their grand strategies primarily as a response to these developments. A theory that posits that grand strategies change in response to the rise and fall of external threats to a state’s survival is an example of an externally oriented theory. Internally oriented theories of grand strategic change posit that it is factors internal to states that determine when change is likely to occur. Theories that contend grand strategic change is tied to things like leadership turnover, election cycles, or strategic culture are best described as internally oriented theories.

Every theory of grand strategic change must explain two things: the form grand strategy takes before and after the evolution and the rate at which the change takes place. There are three
basic types of grand strategic form, each of which can be concisely described by the primary means by which it intends to achieve a state’s goals: Persuasive, Inducive, and Coercive. Persuasive grand strategies tend towards the use of diplomacy to solve challenges in the international environment; countries adopting this form of grand strategy would tend to shy away from bellicose rhetoric and threats. They may act in the international realm through multilateral forums such as the United Nations or cultivate an extensive network of bilateral relationships. Alternatively, a state might have a large diplomatic corps, be a member in many international committees or organizations, and have cultural ties (e.g., through a common language or ethnic population) to many other states. It is through activating these networks that the state seeks security. Any of these can be described as hallmarks of a persuasive grand strategy. Obviously, a state pursuing a persuasive grand strategy such as the one outlined above will also exhibit coercive and inducive behavior from time to time. Any of the three types of grand strategies described here will include a complex mixture of means, and so-called “pure” strategies of any type are extremely unlikely in the real world. Persuasive grand strategies are those whose dominant strategy is a reliance on the use of diplomacy even while they occasionally utilize coercive and inducive subordinate strategies.

Inducive grand strategies utilize transactory suasion as its primary tool. The key difference between inducive and persuasive grand strategies is in the use of monetary or other economic incentives to achieve their ends. Countries that primarily invest in and act through state-owned enterprises, for example, could be said to be pursuing an inducive grand strategy. Alternatively, a country might offer a large amount of development assistance or infrastructure investment to other countries in exchange for security, resources, or economic advantage. China’s heavy investment in Africa in exchange for favorable terms of trade on raw resources could be considered an example of an inducive grand strategy. If a state seeks influence in the world based on its abundance of
natural resources and forges numerous of financial or commercial ties around the world, that state is likely to leverage those contacts and offer financial inducements in order to achieve its foreign policy goals. In this example, the state recognizes that it has a strength in, hypothetically, its sovereign wealth fund, state-owned enterprises, or the fact that the state controls access to natural resource wealth and reaches for that option first when seeking to achieve its goals.

Finally, coercive grand strategies rely primarily on the threat or use of force to generate security. Not every country that pursues a coercive grand strategy is a malicious actor or possesses malicious motives. Coercive grand strategy in this context refers to the use of specifically military strength in any of its various forms to generate security rather than implying any normative moral judgement. Countries that invest heavily in their defense establishment, pursue robust alliances, utilize belligerent rhetoric, or rely on an active or burgeoning nuclear deterrent can be said to have a coercive grand strategy. Alternatively, they may be active in pursuing dense networks of military alliances, rely on ballistic missile or nuclear tests, or intimidate or even outright invade neighboring countries. North Korea’s reliance on displays of force to both deter other countries and force them to the negotiating table where aid can be obtained is a prime example of a coercive grand strategy. Thus, coercive grand strategies are those that generate security primarily through reliance on military strength even if diplomatic overtures or inducive incentives are also made.

After a theory sets expectations about what a shift in grand strategic form looks like – that is, what a grand strategy is changing from and what it is changing to – it should offer guidance on the expected rate of change. Can the drivers of grand strategic change identified by any given theory be said to be doing the heavy lifting in explaining variation in a case if the response comes years or decades after the stimulus? Put another way, given a change in the theory’s independent variable, how quickly should researchers expect to observe changes in the dependent variable? In
this respect, the concept of swift changes in grand strategy means moving at the rate of change in
the cause; that is, the two should occur very nearly in time. Conversely, slow in this context implies
the precipitating event may be many years in the past. For example, an internally oriented theory
that posits grand strategy is a function of individual leader’s personal preferences implies a
relatively rapid change, as grand strategy may change when a new leader takes office or a leader
updates their information about a situation.

Consider a case where evidence shows that the grand strategy of a country endured after a
new leader was elected and had articulated a new grand strategic direction for the country. Such a
rate of change would be considered slow from a leadership theory’s perspective, as grand strategic
change should propagate relatively rapidly. This would suggest that there must be either some
other causal mechanism or an important heretofore omitted intervening variable at work in the
case. This provides an objective benchmark by which to assess the speed of change in grand
strategy consistent with the logic of the theory. The remainder of this section lays out a number of
prominent externally and internally oriented theories of grand strategic change, describing the
cause of change in each of the theories, how those theories conceive of the path change should
take, and the speed with which that change is likely to occur.

2.1.1 Externally oriented theories of grand strategic change

Any theory that starts with the assumption that a state primarily alters its grand strategy as
a response to changes in its operating environment can be said to be externally oriented. While
there are potentially any number of theories that suggest grand strategic change is caused by factors
external to the state, external threat and regional security architecture are the two most prominent
such claims. External threat (or lack thereof) is a prominent system-level factor that could force an internal grand strategy shift; some form of this explanation is dominant amongst neo-realist scholars. Waltz and Mearsheimer both emphasize that the potential threats faced by rival states in the anarchic international system serve as prime causes of the outcomes observed in international relations, even if their conclusions about what to do about such threats differ. In this line of thinking, grand strategy change needs to keep pace with changes in the threat landscape. This type of theory could explain Canada’s adoption of a persuasive grand strategy as a logical outgrowth of the fact that it has enjoyed throughout its history a relatively peaceful coexistence with its southern neighbor and the lack of existential threats in the region. Likewise, the employment of a coercive grand strategy could be explained by a relative abundance of either strength over neighboring rivals or neighboring threats. Regional security architecture is similar to external threat but differs in that it is the constellation of other actors around the state that can cause grand strategic change. That is, a country’s grand strategy is a function of the neighborhood in which it operates. Some scholars have argued that the post-World War II security architecture in Europe, and specifically the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), played an important role in the formation of conditions which allowed (then-Western) Europe to join together in a common economic framework. Having been freed from the security dilemma in their immediate backyard, smaller states such as Belgium were able to pursue alternative grand strategies while the alliance looked after the common defense.

In order to say a theory of this sort fits a given case, it is not enough to merely show that grand strategic change or stability tracks cleanly with events in the international environment; the

42Mearsheimer (2001), Waltz (1979)
43Jones (2003)
speed with which these changes are observed is also critically important. An external threat theory implies that such shifts are temporally tied to the rise and fall of a country’s external situation or power position. In the case of regional security architecture, one would expect to see shifts in grand strategy tied to shifts in the balance of security arrangements and diplomatic support dominant in the region. Overall, the speed of grand strategic change should roughly correlate with the rate of change of the phenomenon it is describing. If a change in grand strategy is only observed decades after a new threat emerges, the theory cannot fully explain the case.

2.1.2 Internally oriented theories of grand strategic change

As the name implies, any theory that looks inside the state for the answer to the question of what causes a country’s grand strategy to change would be categorized as an internally oriented theory. Strategic culture is a prominent and robust internally oriented theory of grand strategic change. Broadly speaking, strategic culture advocates that countries have a particular set of historical circumstances and educational processes that condition strategic preferences and decision-making. Prominent strategic culture theorist Johnston argues that knowing how a culture views the role of war in human affairs, the threat war poses, and the efficacy of the use of force can provide meaningful insight into their strategic culture.44 The predominant strategic culture and the relative ‘stickiness’ of cultural beliefs both explain grand strategic choices and the persistence of such choices across relatively long periods of times. Variation in strategies between states in relatively similar power positions can be explained through the variation in cultural beliefs

44 Johnston (1995)
or historical circumstances and the organizations they develop; the grand strategies they pursue should be a reflection of those beliefs. Leadership change is another prominent internally oriented theory. Those who believe that leaders set grand strategy, or that leaders can drive change, fall into this camp. One problematic aspect of this line of argumentation is that such an ability to rapidly pivot is contrary to the long-term notion of grand strategy described in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, variations on the theme of leadership setting grand strategy are prominent in the literature. A more sophisticated version of this theory might argue that grand strategy changes if leaders and/or their grand strategic preferences change. Stability occurs when leaders or preferences remain constant.

In internally oriented explanations, just as in externally oriented ones, the direction of grand strategic change should track with the mechanism in question. Thus, in a strategic culture argument, change in grand strategic substance should map onto changes in cultural attitudes towards different grand strategy option sets. A country with a strategic culture that shifts from an emphasis on economic ties towards more traditional hard power would be expected to have its grand strategic form shift from an inducive to a coercive grand strategy. The direction of change should run in accordance with changes in the dominant internal mechanism. In a leadership theory, change should go with either the leader’s beliefs or the leader him- or herself.

Rate of change in these theories is governed by how quickly internal changes take to propagate through the system. If a strategic culture argument is correct, a relatively slow rate of grand strategic change should be observed because of the “stickiness” of culture. Sharp, sudden cultural shifts are possible, but unlikely. Strong confirmatory evidence for strategic culture as the dominant force at work would generally see incremental changes in a country’s grand strategy

45 Clarke and Ricketts (2017)  
46 Ehrlich and Levin (2005)
absent a major cultural shift and any large-scale discontinuity or clean break would present an extremely strong signal this theory was incorrect. For a leadership theory, if grand strategy is stable in the face of a leadership change, or a change in leader preferences, this theory is likely incorrect.

2.1.3 Problems with these theories

While these types theories can provide useful macro-level guidance for factors which can drive change, they are typically incomplete in one or more ways. For instance, some externally oriented theories cannot provide useful guidance as to the form change should take or account for variability in the speed of observed change. For instance, regional security theories do not predict what grand strategic change will look like, but only when change is likely to occur. Internally oriented theories can provide interesting insights into the process of grand strategic change, but can fail to explain what generates the impetus for change in the first place; this is a question that scholars have been fiercely debating for a long time. Neither set of theories can fully explain the complexities observed in the historical record, although some do a better job than others.

Externally oriented theories generally provide clear and observable answers to the question of what causes grand strategic change. They may even provide some guidance as to when researchers should observe change, but not necessarily expectations as to the form that change would take. Indeed, according to some, primarily realist, readings of international relations, it is hard to see an external threat theory of grand strategy predict anything but the pursuit of a coercive grand strategy. As such, more information about the internal workings of the state may be needed to explain non coercive grand strategies. Regional security architecture also provides guidance on
when to expect change, but it is unclear under what conditions different grand strategic forms might result.

Internally oriented theories provide a clear explanation for the process by which change occurs and provides some insight into the form that change might take. Nevertheless, these theories have their own shortcomings. For strategic culture, the difficulty is one of genesis. What sets the strategic culture of a country on a different path? Some variant of this problem has been identified as a potential source of weakness in these types of arguments for several decades.47 While not necessarily a fatal flaw, there is still room for improvement. Leadership theories tend to fare better, as change is generally expected around leadership transitions or shifts in preferences, and the form of change should follow leader preferences. The shortcoming of a leadership theory centers around cases of grand strategic stability and providing evidence of stability of preference being the mechanism at work. In the next section, I advance an argument that seeks to combine the best parts of both externally and internally oriented theories. In doing so, I generate a novel theory that can account for when grand strategic change will occur and provide crucial insights into what form that grand strategy might take and at what rate.

2.2 The organizational determinants of grand strategy

States are functionally similar to macro-level organizations. Accordingly, it follows that they may be understood utilizing concepts and models borrowed from organization theory. These concepts provide an important starting point for a new theory on grand strategic change. In fleshing

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47 Mearsheimer (1994, 42-44)
out this claim in this section, I first lay out a theoretical argument for why states may be thought of as organizations before dealing with some of the potential complications caused by states’ unique ends and describing a critical assumption that makes my theory work. I then introduce a prominent theory from the literature on organizations that can shed light on how states can generate their strategies. I conclude by offering my new theory, focusing on the organizational determinants of grand strategic change.

My dissertation focuses heavily on the role organizations play in shaping grand strategies, but this raises the question of what, then, are organizations? At its most basic level, an organization, as articulated by Simon, can be defined simply as “…systems of interrelated roles.”48 Blau and Scott, in differentiating formal organizations from other types, write:

Since the distinctive characteristic of these organizations is that they have been formally established for the explicit purpose of achieving certain goals, the term “formal organizations” is used to designate them.49

It is not enough simply to define what a formal organization is (system of interrelated roles formally established for an explicit purpose); it is also necessary to consider the properties of such an organization in order to specifically highlight the types of organizations I am most interested in. Scott and Davis go on to list the “Essential Ingredients” that make up organizations, namely: environment, strategy and goals, work and technology, formal organization, informal organization, and people.50 I am specifically concerned with what are typically defined as ‘work organizations’ or those formal organizations, as defined above, that are staffed by paid professionals, as opposed to charities or volunteer organizations.51 Given these considerations, for this dissertation, I define

48 Simon (1991, 3)
49 Blau and Scott (1962, 5)
50 Scott and Davis (2007)
51 Child (2016, 2).
formal organizations as purposely created networks of people, hired to pursue a common goal, that possess formal and informal roles, specified tasks, and the financial and technological resources to pursue their goal. Having specifically defined what an organization is, there is an additional characteristic of organizations that must be considered: their rationality.

Rational actors are considered to have consistent and complete lists of preferences and choose the highest ranking of the multiple choices available to them given their constraints.\textsuperscript{52} Frequently, it is also assumed that rational actors have perfect information available about the choices available to them. Many scholars, such as Simon, have noted that the aforementioned assumptions are frequently problematic in the real world.\textsuperscript{53} Other advances in the behavioral sciences like those posited by Kahneman and Tversky on the constraints on human cognition caused by uncertainty cast further doubt on the limits of pure rationality.\textsuperscript{54} Bounded rationality does not invalidate the notion that actors still behave as though they have generally consistent and stable preferences that guide their decision making, however; indeed, the assumption that actors function in such a way is a hallmark of the International Relations literature.

Accepting that individual, unitary actors can be thought of as rational, what evidence is there that aggregate, or organizational, rationality exists? It is after all a lynchpin of the argument I advance in this dissertation and, typically, rational choice theory deals with aggregate rationality by simplifying collective behavior into statements about individual behavior.\textsuperscript{55} This simplification could be problematic. As Brunsson points out “an individual has less difficulty going from decision to action than does an organization.”\textsuperscript{56} Olson famously described the difficulty in organizing large

\textsuperscript{52} Allison (1971, 29-30)  
\textsuperscript{53} Simon (1959, 256)  
\textsuperscript{54} Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982)  
\textsuperscript{55} Scott (2000, 132)  
\textsuperscript{56} Brunsson (1982, 30)
groups to provide collective goods in his work *The Logic of Collective Action*. Others are quick to point out that, “according to conventional rational choice theory, individuals participate if their net expected benefit from participation as compared with abstention is greater than zero.” Despite this rational basis for participation, Bendor and Hammond observe “…the literature has focused heavily on the tendency of institutions to be dumber than their members (via, e.g., conformity pressure)…”

People can and will participate in collective actor endeavors if they believe the goal is worthwhile and expect that they will benefit from participation, but this only explains the reason *individuals* will join collective endeavors. This does not change the fact that many scholars have asserted that collectives hinder rationality. Simon is one scholar who disagrees, demonstrating how organizational processes, such as the concentration of expertise and routinized decision-making, can help individuals more closely approximate rationality. At the level of the organization, this type of rational goal seeking behavior underlies the Rational Systems approach to organization theory. Scott and Davis summarize this perspective as “organizations are collectives oriented to the pursuit of relatively specific goals and exhibiting relatively highly formalized social structures.” It is this rational systems approach, with both its goal orientation and formalized structures, that allows for models of rationality developed around individual behavior to be applied to larger groupings in a meaningful way and thus permit expectations that organizations behave rationally. It is thus appropriate to think of organizations as rational actors (of some form).

57 Olson (1971)
58 Finkel, Muller, and Opp (1989, 887)
59 Bendor and Hammond (1992, 312)
60 Simon (1997, 92-93)
61 Scott and Davis (2007, 58)
62 There are a number of alternatives to the rational-systems approach I adopt, including natural- and open-system theories. Natural-systems approaches tend to emphasize the fact that organizations tend to be no different than other naturally occurring systems, and thus subject to the same forces. This perspective also highlights the fact that
In the case of a research project such as mine, which is concerned with how states pursue goals, some assumption of rationality is warranted. Snidal points out that large swaths of International Relations scholarship utilize this assumption of rationality and the associated rational choice theory in various ways and at different levels of analysis.\textsuperscript{63} Accepting that organizations are rational actors, it is also appropriate to take the next step and apply theories and definitions developed in the organization theory literature to the investigation of states and grand strategies – actors and phenomena typically considered in the fields of Public Policy and International Relations. After all, these are frequently considered three distinct disciplines, require different expertise, and primarily focus on disparate levels of activity. Compounding this problem, states – the actors I examine – are required to pursue their national security, or survival, above all else, which bestows upon them different responsibilities, obligations, and capabilities than generic organizations possess. It is my contention that there is nothing contained in the definition of an organization I have advanced that necessitates state exceptionalism in this instance. States may be a unique \textit{form} of organization, but the definitions I have adopted applies equally as well to a state in its entirety as they do to the individual sub-entities created by and within the state to execute its various functions. While it is true that a state’s security is its over-riding concern, the primacy of this objective diminishes with the relative \textit{amount} of security enjoyed by that state. As a state

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\textsuperscript{63} Snidal (2013)
\end{flushright}
becomes more secure, and its existence is not in question, it can pursue other non-security goals that in many ways align with the activities of other organizations.\textsuperscript{64}

Not only can the insights of organization theory be applied to thinking about the behavior of states, there are numerous benefits to doing so when engaging in the study of grand strategy. Going back to Weber’s definition and my previous discussion, insofar as a state is geographically bounded and concerned with a monopoly on force, such entities can be considered a unique type of macro-level organization. By focusing on the larger bureaucratic apparatus erected to achieve its goals, this conceptualization provides the opportunity for a state to be considered no differently than any other organization, private or public; the state can also then be separated into its constituent elements (themselves organizations). The end purpose of private and public organizations may differ (e.g., private pecuniary gain vs. public benefit) and the locus of authority may differ (boards of directors/Chief Executive Officers vs. multiple different stakeholders), yet the basic forces at work are similar. In fact, Blau and Scott separate different types of formal organizations into four conceptual categories based on the group the collective is intended to benefit:

Four types of organizations result from the application of our cui bono criterion: (1) “mutual-benefit associations,” where the prime beneficiary is the membership; (2) “business concerns,” where the

\textsuperscript{64} Precisely defining the concept of security, and the emphasis states should place on security as a goal, is a widely debated topic. Wolfers has pointed out that the concept of ‘national security’ can be difficult to define (Wolfers 1952). Scholars such as Ullman have further muddied the waters by seeking a broad expansion of the term outside traditional hard power concerns (Ullman 1983). I use the term security primarily to mean the insurance of survival and continued viability of a state in the international environment, setting aside the question of even more expansive concepts such as ‘human security’ for the sake of intellectual tractability. As for the amount of emphasis states should place on seeking security, Mearsheimer is one scholar who argues that states seek their own survival and to maximize their power position vis-à-vis other states as their primary concern (Mearsheimer 1994). Baldwin points out that this position that security is the prime (or overriding) concern for states is inherently flawed because it: a) does not describe how people behave in the real world, and b) provides no logical place for states to stop pouring resources into it. Baldwin argues for considering security as something that has marginal value. That is, states rank security as a priority relative to the amount of security they currently enjoy (Baldwin 1997). In this dissertation, I adopt a marginal value of security approach, as the historical record has demonstrated time and again states can and frequently do pursue non-security related ends.
owners are prime beneficiary; (3) “service organizations,” where the client group is the prime beneficiary; and (4) “commonweal organizations” where the prime beneficiary is the public-at-large.65 (italics in original)

In this case, the various types of state level organizations which are the concern of my research are explicitly included in the latter two categories. While I frequently refer to the state as an organization, it is more precise to conceptualize the state as a ‘system-of-systems.’ In Management Science, a system is defined at its most basic as “…a set of interrelated elements.”66 The similarity with Simon’s definition of organizations is no coincidence, as organizations are a special category of system.67 Systems-of-systems can be thought of as “…the combination of a set of different systems forms a larger “system-of-systems” that performs a function not performable by a single system alone.”68 Throughout, I explore various components of this “system-of-systems” and tend, for the sake of simplicity, to refer to individual components as if they were independent.

Given the focus placed on organizations and organizational processes above, an assumption of rationality is an essential one for my theory. As I noted above, formal organizations are created to achieve a specific goal and the ability to set and pursue goals is a fundamental characteristic of rational choice. Furthermore, a recognition of constraints and the ability to adjudicate between competing goals is an essential element of strategy. If one cannot match appropriate means to the corresponding ends, then one cannot be said to be acting strategically. Mistakes, even self-inflicted ones, tend to bear the hallmarks of rational calculus; misperception, adversary or ally actions, unforeseen consequences, or simply bad luck are just some of the ways

65 Blau and Scott (1962, 42)
66 Ackoff (1971, 662)
67 Ackoff (1971, 661)
68 DeLaurentis and Callaway (2004, 831). While DeLaurentis and Callaway (2004) are referencing and responding to a different definition of systems than I offered, the definitions are functionally similar enough that their elaboration of the logic of what a “system-of-systems” is still applies.
that errors can disrupt an otherwise rational means-ends calculation. Finally, if a state was not behaving rationally—that is, acting to satisfy its most pressing issues first—then that state is likely to be at least a failing, if not failed. Such comprehensive mismatch would belie a deeper problem with the functioning of the state and such endemic problems are beyond the scope of this study. If a state cannot accurately assess its needs and figure out how to meet them or consistently fails to do so adequately, it would put the state at risk of destruction from either internal or external threats. None of this is to say that states, acting rationally, cannot still fail by misidentifying priorities, for example, or suffer some other catastrophe; rather, an inability to conform to some semblance of rationality makes these failures both more probable and more pronounced.

One potential objection to the framework laid out here is Allison’s famous challenge to the treatment of states as rational actors and his provision of an alternative model of “bureaucratic politics,” which offers an explanation for why states seem to deviate from predictions made by those who assume states are purposive, unified rational actors.69 In *Essence of Decision*, Allison describes the “Rational Actor Model” of consisting at its core of “…action chosen by a unitary, rational decisionmaker: centrally controlled, completely informed, and value maximizing.”70 This is what Allison labels Model I, or the Rational Actor Paradigm, I described in detail.

Allison summarizes a different model (which he labels Model II), one based on organizations, by saying: “Model II’s grasp of government action as organizational output, partially coordinated by a unified group of leaders, balances the classical model’s efforts to understand government behavior as choices of a unitary decisionmaker.”71 Allison’s preferred

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69 Allison and Halperin (1972, 41)
70 Allison (1971, 67)
71 Allison (1971, 144)
explanatory model—Model III, the governmental/bureaucratic politics model—describes governmental action as the result of political bargaining. In his own words:

> The decisions and actions of governments are intranational political resultants: resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence; political in the sense that the activity from which decisions and actions emerge is best characterized as bargaining along regularized channels among individual members of the government.72 (emphasis in original)

By this logic, outcomes like grand strategies are not best described as the rationally derived solutions to identified problems, but rather results of intragovernmental bargains. In their analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Allison’s work, however, Bendor and Hammond point out that Allison’s bureaucratic politics model explicitly includes bureaucratic actors who can make fine-grained distinctions about their interests and power positions as well as negotiate strategically to maximize their influence.73 From this they conclude that the bureaucratic politics model is essentially a variant of the rational choice model, but one that relaxes Model I’s assumption of a unitary rational actor and replaces it with an outcome which is the product of negotiation.74 What is important to take away from this discussion is that, for the theory developed in the remainder of this chapter to apply to the crafting of grand strategy, there is no requirement for the decision maker to be a unitary rational actor; even assuming Allison’s bureaucratic politics model dominates, as long as the outcome is fundamentally rational and driven by the logic of consequences, then my theory may be applied.

72 Allison (1971, 163)
73 Bendor and Hammond (1992, 304)
74 Bendor and Hammond (1992, 304, 321 Note Six)
2.2.1 The Resource-Based View of the Firm

If states can be usefully thought of as fundamentally rational organizations, what phenomena are likely to drive the creation of, and change in, their grand strategies? For many scholars in International Relations theory, the answer of how to formulate grand strategy is obvious. The international environment presents innumerable external threats and opportunities which must be navigated or exploited to the benefit of the nation. The same is true for many prominent theorists in organization theory. Whenever someone suggests changes to strategy because of current or future changes in the operating environment, they are starting from the assumption that the external environment should be the starting point determining which strategies are chosen.\textsuperscript{75} This externally oriented view is not the only basis on which firms or states can base their strategies, however.

A prominent alternative to a purely externally driven strategy is known in the strategic management literature as the Resource-Based View of the Firm. This view, as opposed to a market- or externally oriented focus, takes “the role of the firm’s resources as the foundation for firm strategy.”\textsuperscript{76} In its most basic form, the theory posits that it is the variation in firms’ resources and capabilities and the difficulty of competing firms in replicating those resources and capabilities that forms the basis for understanding a firm’s competitive advantage.\textsuperscript{77} Applying this resource-based view to strategy formulation, Grant outlines a five-step iterative process of how firms use

\textsuperscript{75} Take (for example) Porter (2008), a classic article on the competitive forces that shape strategy. Therein, he argues that the constellation of forces external to the firm, that is, the threat of new entrants to the market, bargaining power of both suppliers and buyers, threat of substitutes, and existing rivalries amongst extant competitors, shape competition, and which it turn shapes strategy (Porter 2008, 79-80). This all but explicitly assumes that the only relevant factors that drive strategy are outside the boundaries of the firm.

\textsuperscript{76} Grant (1991, 114)

\textsuperscript{77} Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley (2004, 426)
an assessment of their resources as the foundation of their strategy. Figure 2.1 below lays out these steps and the associated logic.

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Figure 2.1. A Resource-Based Approach to Strategy Analysis: A Practical Framework

1. Identify and classify the firm's resources. Appraise strengths and weaknesses relative to competitors. Identify opportunities for better utilization of resources.

2. Identify the firm's capabilities: What can the firm do more effectively than its rivals? Identify the resources inputs to each capability, and the complexity of each capability.

3. Appraise the rent-generating potential of resources and capabilities in terms of:
   (a) their potential for sustainable competitive advantage, and
   (b) the appropriability of their returns.

4. Select a strategy which best exploits the firm's resources and capabilities relative to external opportunities.

5. Identify resource gaps which need to be filled. Invest in replenishing, augmenting and upgrading the firm's resource base.

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Figure 2.1. Resource-Based View of the Firm and Strategy Formulation

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The starting point of this framework begins with *resources* because, in Grant’s words, “Resources are inputs into the production process.”\(^{79}\) These resources could be things such as human or monetary capital, intellectual property, capital equipment, and the like. Grant notes they are not generally productive on their own and organizations typically require bundles of resources working together to generate *capabilities*, which he defines as “…what [a firm] can do as a result of teams of resources working together.”\(^{80}\) Evaluating these resources and capabilities facilitates an understanding of which are the most difficult for other firms to replicate, and thus can serve as the basis of the firm’s competitive advantage.\(^{81}\) When distinctive or superior resources are matched to environmental opportunities, *competitive advantage* is achieved.\(^{82}\) Given this, Grant concludes, “The essence of strategy formulation, then, is to design a *strategy* that makes the most effective use of these core resources and capabilities.”\(^{83}\) Given the difficulty in replicating the foundation for a firm’s competitive advantage, it follows that a properly designed strategy should capitalize on this phenomenon, influencing the direction of the firm’s strategy towards utilizing its competitive advantage over other potential capabilities.

At first blush, theories of the firm, especially those which relate to profit-seeking motivation, may not seem directly applicable to states given the emphasis states need to place on their security. These two ends are not as incommensurable as they might first appear. The foundation of a firm’s continued existence is profit, or at least breaking even. As profit increases for a firm, so does the margin-of-error it enjoys. The firm’s ability to seek more diverse revenue streams (or even greater profit) also increases. The same is true for states and security. In fact, neo-

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79 Grant (1991, 118)  
80 Grant (1991, 120)  
81 Grant (1991, 123-9)  
82 Peteraf (1993, 179)  
83 Grant (1991, 129)
realism predicts much the same behavior as firms seeking profit as states seeking security. This is unsurprising given the fact that both share an underlying common foundation in economic logic. As noted earlier, Mearsheimer argues that states are power maximizers, an argument not entirely dissimilar from firms being profit maximizers.\textsuperscript{84} There are, however, a number of important differences between the two which warrant elaboration.

In seeking these profits, a firm can accumulate debt, sometimes even significant amounts of it, and continue operating for a period of time. A firm must eventually break even or continue to expand to remain viable. The same can be said of states, even states running considerable security deficits. This deficit can be sustained provided states (or firms) can find the backing of others. It is also true that the higher one climbs the power ladder, the higher the potential stakes, especially in the modern era. This is even more reason to utilize any potential insights into how states might increase their security. Security differs from profit in another crucial way, in that security can be a remarkably perishable commodity and vulnerable to potential shifts in equilibrium. Conventional armies were suddenly rendered much less secure at the onset of the nuclear age. Today, asymmetric anti-access/area denial capabilities are undermining aspects of both U.S. power projection capabilities and raising questions about new vulnerabilities that could be exploited in dangerous ways. Despite these shifts in equilibrium, balance is eventually restored, but not without noteworthy changes in the security environment. As the consequences of state death are high, it is important to utilize insights from as many fields as possible in order to try and prevent this disastrous occurrence. As such, utilizing insights from organization theory in the realm of international relations has tremendous value for the field. Furthermore, scholars such as Grey have pointed out the numerous parallels between the organization theory and security studies

\textsuperscript{84} Mearsheimer (2001, 11-12)
literature, and the potential for even greater integration between the two fields.\textsuperscript{85} In short, given the close association between the two disciplines, there is a strong argument for adapting theories from one field for use in the other.

\section*{2.2.2 The Theory}

Grant’s description of the application of the resource-based view of the firm’s role in strategy formulation demonstrates in clear detail the logic that undergirds my assertion that the capabilities available to a state may predispose them to favor one grand strategy over another. Figure 2.2 provides an adaptation of Figure 2.1, modified to fit the context of a state. The words in parentheses inside the boxes (e.g., State Resources (resources)) provide a crosswalk between the terminologies in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 for the convenience of the reader.

\textsuperscript{85} Grey (2009)
States, like firms, possess resources in a variety of forms, which are harnessed for the functioning and continuance of the state. One such enumeration of state resources is described by Morgenthau as the ‘elements of national power.’ For material elements of national power, Morgenthau lists: Geography, Natural Resources, Industrial Capacity, Military Preparedness, and Population.\(^86\) In order to turn these state resources into productive components of a government’s foreign policy, they are funneled into various state organizations such as the Ministry of Defence. Just as natural resources are latent wealth until they are extracted and refined, state resources such as money or manpower require institutions or organizations to harness and direct them to

productive ends. There could be innumerable reasons for initial investment in one organization or another. Over time, any pattern of differential investment and prioritization leads to state organizations of varying strength with differing abilities to achieve the state’s foreign policy objectives.

The implications of such a states-as-organizations, resource-based perspective on how states formulate strategy are profound. For one, this view suggests that, although states may have different ends than private firms, both are obligated to make resource allocation and investment decisions that in turn affect their current and future performance. This matching of ends and means is the core concept of strategy. Porter, one of the most prominent scholars of strategy in the private sector, defines strategy as: “… the creation of a unique and valuable position, involving a different set of activities.” As Porter goes on to point out, there is no one best market position to adopt, otherwise operational effectiveness, and not strategy, would be all that was required. Stated succinctly, states possess bundles of resources (e.g., Money, Manpower, Elite Attention), which they allocate to various organizations (e.g., Ministry of Defense, Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Commerce and Industry) to pursue their foreign policy priorities. The disparity in resource allocation caused by limited resource availability and imperfect substitution (e.g., foreign service officers generally possess different skill sets than civilians working in national defense) creates organizations of various strengths.

Over time, this disparity in strength, which may be slight at first, is factored into the decision-making calculus of policy makers when they decide how they believe they should pursue their desired end-state. A key process at work at this juncture is the concept of path dependence

87 Porter (1996, 10)
88 Porter (1996, 10)
and increasing returns. Pierson argues that one of the key features present when an increasing returns process is at work is that of inertia. That is, once a pattern is in place, it becomes hard to alter and the cost of substitutes are high.\footnote{Pierson argues that, in cases where increasing returns and path dependence are present, four features are liable to be found: multiple equilibria, contingency, a critical role for timing and sequencing, and inertia (Pierson 2014, 263). This logic of increasing returns and path dependence undergirds my theory as it explains why once states make resource allocation decisions, they are likely to continue to do so.} To re-iterate, the independent variable in this understanding is the state’s resource allocation decisions and the dependent variables are the form a state’s grand strategy takes and the rate of grand strategic change observed. When considering different options, policy makers take the differential strength of the state’s functional sub-organizations into account and display a tendency towards the use of stronger organizations more frequently, creating a bias in grand strategy form. That is, policy makers call upon those organizations more frequently because of their increased relative capability, and the resultant grand strategic form follows.

Change in grand strategic form, according to this organizational, resource-based theory, occurs because of both external and internal drivers. Similar to externally oriented theories, events in the international environment can become a catalyst for change when the states’ operating environment changes sufficiently or events demonstrate that existing grand strategies cannot cope with the burdens placed on them. Like internally oriented theories, change is moderated by the choices made previously. States cannot simply will away their existing organizations or alter the distribution of their resources and power overnight. Path dependence and a pattern of increasing returns logic is difficult to break outside of extra-ordinary circumstances. Changes can take time to propagate through the system. How, and to what degree, states alter the balance of resources
between their organizations will dictate the expected form of grand strategy, and the expected rate of change.

In this theory, substantive change in grand strategic form should map relatively cleanly onto the changes in resourcing levels across various state organizations. As resources flow into and out of these organizations, they become relatively more or less effective at their assigned function. Thus, when resources flow out of organizations that had previously been responsible for the country’s grand strategic form towards organizations associated with another form (e.g., from coercive organizations towards inducive ones), a corresponding shift in that country’s grand strategic form should be observed. The rate of change will be dependent on how dramatically the balance of resources is altered. Typically, changes in resources are incremental in nature, and thus change can take more time to propagate through the system; In cases where the resource reallocations are more dramatic, change may happen faster than it otherwise might.

The rate of change of grand strategy expected in this resourced-based theory thus places a heavy emphasis on the rate at which resources are distributed. If my theory is correct, there should be an observable correlation between the rate of change in resourcing patterns and the rate of change in grand strategic form. At the most extreme, my theory expects a very rapid grand strategic shift if all of the state’s resources previously devoted to one set of organizations are removed and focused on another set. Alternatively, the rate of change would be slower if resources were divided across organizations or provided in incommensurate amounts. Thus, if I were to observe marked shifts in resources from coercive to persuasive organizations, I would expect a marked shift in grand strategic form from coercive to persuasive grand strategy. More incremental rates of change in resources should yield more incremental changes in form. Alternatively, it may be that all of the indicators do not point in the same direction; that is, money and manpower may point in two
It may be also the case that all of these indicators are not created equal. In situations where indicators are pointing in opposing directions, my theory expects that the previously pursued grand strategy should dominate because of path dependence. In short, the cost of an alternative grand strategy is higher than it would otherwise be, whereas the cost of the current grand strategy is lower. Therefore, in these instances effecting change may require large preferential investment in one organization over another in the short term, or smaller preferential investments in the long term.

Put formally, I advance the general hypothesis that: States vary in their organizational strengths, and this variation is reflected in the grand strategy pursued by those states. From this general hypothesis, I derive two subsidiary hypotheses. The first is: The form grand strategic change takes is determined by the patterns of resource allocations amongst the organizations. The second subsidiary hypothesis is the rate of grand strategic change is correlated with the rate at which states invest resources into their organizations.

2.3 Methodology

The methodology selected to test the viability of my hypotheses alongside existing explanations of grand strategic change is to perform a within-case analysis and utilize congruence procedure to rule out as many alternative hypotheses as possible. This procedure is paired with process-tracing to determine which of the theories passing the congruence test best explains the case. This methodological approach is particularly useful for several reasons. First, as this research project is fundamentally developing a theory, there is a high priority on uncovering whether or not
it can accurately make predictions in the empirical record, a hallmark of the congruence method. Second, process-tracing allows me to unpack the specific links proposed by my theory, facilitates further development and refinement of the theory, and functions as an analytic explanation of the case, providing evidence of the theory’s validity. Finally, if my theory is right, it would suggest that it would be impossible, or at least extraordinarily unlikely, to find comparable cases of individual nation-states changing their grand strategies in ways that would permit between-case, controlled comparisons. When the added risk of multiple causality inherent in the determinants of grand strategy is considered, these three factors make the selected methodology an appropriate and strong choice to test my theory. The remainder of this section explains how I intend to increase the inferential power of my theory in a notoriously difficult area of study, describes the cases chosen, and details the critical variable operationalization necessary to test my claim.

### 2.3.1 Increasing Inference

Obviously, the list of priorities for a state and the possible means to achieve those ends can be problematically large to analyze. This is one of several challenges frequently cited as detrimental to the development of predictive theory in grand strategy. To make this problem more analytically manageable, I focus on the grand strategies of middle powers. Restricting my study to middle powers as opposed to super or great powers (the focus of almost all other studies of the topic) has three primary benefits. First, the scope of concern of middle powers is more

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90 George and Bennett (2005, 181)
91 George and Bennett (2005, 211)
92 For examples of the sorts of challenges which are frequently cited, see Murray (2011).
narrowly focused than great powers. Unlike great powers, with diverse geo-political interests spanning the globe, middle powers are more likely to have a limited scope of concern in a particular region or issue area. Determining middle powers’ grand strategic ends is therefore more readily accomplished than it is for great powers. The narrower scope of concern also implies that the major currents of middle power foreign policy should be directed at achieving grand strategic ends relatively unfettered by problems such as “wars of choice,” or as Freedman termed them, “Liberal Wars.” Freedman defines these Liberal Wars as:

Liberal wars are not pursued in the name of strategic imperatives but because values are being affronted. Interests might be involved at the margins, but these are unlikely to count as ‘vital’, except in the most enlightened terms. For this reason, liberal wars have acquired a discretionary aspect, to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. On this basis they have been described as 'wars of choice' to be contrasted with those of the past, which were 'wars of necessity' or 'of survival.'

This is not to imply that middle powers cannot undertake such “wars of choice;” rather, relative to their great power brethren, the number and scope of such wars of choice is dramatically limited by their weaker power position. Before one can engage in such wars, one has to enjoy a surplus of security such that a war of choice does not turn into a war of necessity. This serves to throw into sharper relief the priorities and problems facing middle powers in the realm of foreign policy.

Second, the marginal value of strategy is arguably higher for middle powers than great powers. Typically, great powers only need to worry about the impact of peer competitors or large coalitions on their existence, while middle powers do not enjoy the same luxury and can suffer at the hands of both peer and superior rivals. Super or great powers enjoy a dominant position in the

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93 For an overview of the definition(s) of the term “Wars of Choice” and its uses in academic and policy contexts, see: Saunders (2008, 1)
94 Freedman (2005, 98)
international environment and, as such, have the ‘luxury’ of being able to afford potential strategic missteps that other, smaller powers do not. Some might argue that super or great powers are often operating without a net whereas middle powers have the luxury of potentially being able to rely on a more powerful patron. This may be true in some cases, but it would also necessitate middle powers to sacrifice of much of their strategic freedom of action and, in effect, sublimate their strategic priorities to the more powerful countries’ priorities in exchange for said protection. If the middle power cannot fully guarantee a greater power will ‘bail it out,’ then it still needs to consider the course of action more closely than its potential patron does.

Third, middle powers have fewer resources to invest and, as such, are more likely to concentrate on investing in one set of organizations rather than diluting the effect by spreading the wealth around. With limited resources and even more limited room for error, greater care must be taken to ensure that the nation’s resources are used wisely; a carefully devised and well-executed strategy can be decisive, especially when attempting the jump from middle power to great power status. A further implication is that middle powers are less able to create new capabilities or reallocate massive resources on the fly to suit their changing needs than are stronger states. This, in turn, means middle powers are forced to lean more heavily on the tools already at their disposal; that is, given their position, middle powers’ strengths are less fungible than their great power brethren. As Waltz argues about the relative fungibility of power:

As ever, the distinction between strong and weak states is important. The stronger the state, the greater the variety of its capabilities. Power may be only slightly fungible for weak states, but it is highly so for strong ones.95

95 Waltz (1986, 333)
Focusing on middle powers thus narrows considerably the scope of both ends and means to be analyzed in any given case of grand strategic change. Additionally, this focus increases our collective understanding of the drivers and effects of grand strategy, as middle powers have only occasionally been studied in this context. One prominent example of such work is Brands’ analysis of the grand strategy pursued by one of Brazil’s presidents.\(^96\) This piece demonstrates that the study of middle powers’ grand strategy is both warranted and valuable for understanding the phenomenon more generally. Finally, middle powers serve as a pool of most likely cases to test theories of grand strategy more broadly, as well as my theory specifically. Given the importance of strategic decision making in times of resource shortage, if grand strategy is to be found anywhere, it should be among middle powers.

This focus on middle powers invariably comes with a multitude of different challenges, some of which have been discussed above. One additional challenge is the specification of a widely agreed upon list of middle powers. In offering his own definition of small states, Keohane divides states into the following categorizations: “A middle power is a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution” (Emphasis in original).\(^97\) Cooper and Parlar Dal identify three contemporary ‘waves’ of middle power scholarship since the term’s coining in the Post-World War II era. The primary challenges they highlight for the study of middle powers are the tension between expansive and specific characterizations as well as the dangers of picking arbitrary thresholds for membership in the category of middle powers.\(^98\) This latter drawback was particularly evident in early attempts to define middle powers based on quantitative definitions, as

\(^{96}\) Brands (2010)  
\(^{97}\) Keohane (1969, 296)  
\(^{98}\) Cooper and Parlar Dal (2016)
they often employed arbitrary thresholds for middle powers that had an extremely limited temporal scope.99

To circumvent the problem of arbitrary analytic thresholds, Goldstein utilizes a methodology of grouping countries that were relatively similar on the basis of military expenditure, ending up with three general categories: superpowers, secondary powers, and an uncategorized ‘rest’.100 I employ this method of utilizing natural groupings of countries to determine the break points between power categories (superpowers, great powers, and middle powers) to determine my list of candidate middle powers. Specifically, I take the GDP (at then-year prices, in US Dollars) of a relevant year, look at approximately the top 15% of countries in that year, and group them into one of the three categories above.101 To demonstrate this method in action, consider the top 15% of countries identified by this metric in 1971 depicted in Figure 2.3.

99 For a brief discussion of the problems of at least two previous studies, see: Handel (1990, 26-28)
100 Goldstein (2000)
101 One challenge in the study of power rankings of countries, as previously discussed, is determining the threshold for inclusion. This approximate floor of the top 15% of countries was proposed by Gilley (2016). However, this concern is not directly relevant for my dissertation, as the case selected, India, is well within the category.
The guidance provided by Goldstein, combined with the GDP data, yields Table 2.1, which groups countries into super, great and middle powers by their GDP in 1971. Notional break points between countries are based on the rough step down in GDP level observed in Figure 2.3.

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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<td>Superpowers</td>
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<td>USSR (Former)</td>
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<td>Great Powers</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Middle Powers</td>
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<td>Czechoslovakia (Former)</td>
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<td>Yugoslavia (Former)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)</td>
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</table>

This ranking methodology has the benefit of being straight forward and replicable across time, especially in the post-World War II era, given the relative homogeneity of available measures like GDP. Furthermore, the list in Table 2.1, sorting merely on GDP, yields an intuitive list of powers based on common understandings of the Cold War power distribution. This method could be extended even further back to the 19th century, if necessary, by utilizing data such as the Correlates of War Project’s Composite Index of National Capability and diplomatic reach. While there are limitations to this method, especially as it relates to measuring non-military power historically, for my purposes, the method’s elegance and replicability outweigh such concerns.
The second important methodological choice for my study is that I only consider observations of potential grand strategic change that occur around major conflicts in which the relevant country was involved. This focus has two benefits. First, looking at whether and how a country’s strategy changed post-war helps break the iterative nature of grand strategy and removes some of the problems of possible endogeneity inherent in the study of this phenomenon. That is, a country’s current position in the international environment might be a function of past grand strategies. Looking at a state’s grand strategy after a war creates a plausible break point with the status quo ante strategy; it functions essentially as a natural experiment.103 Avoiding the problem of endogeneity inherent in the study of grand strategy is a critical first step in the development and testing of social scientific theories of the concept.

By looking at the differences in resourcing before and after a war, I can pinpoint what Kingdon calls a ‘policy window’ where a change, if any was to occur, is most likely to be observed.104 Kingdon contends that these policy windows can be either problem windows or political windows. Problem windows occur when “decision makers become convinced a problem is pressing” while a political window “can be opened by an event in the political stream – a change of administration, a shift in national mood, an influx of new members of Congress.”105 Often, both problem and political windows open after wars. Additionally, my theory asserts that states continue investing in organizations and grand strategic forms because an increasing returns logic is at work.

One of the criticisms of such arguments is that such a cycle is hard to break once started and

103 Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002, 12)
104 For a complete definition of Policy Windows see: Kingdon (2003, 166-168)
105 Kingdon (2003, 174)
implies relative stasis. These potential inflection points provide a clear opportunity to deviate from the path and, if necessary, begin movement towards a new equilibrium.

Second, wars can involve an influx or reduction in the material resources available to a state. Studying how a state reinvests these gains or rebalances after a conflict (if at all) further lessens the risk of encountering an endogeneity problem. An expansion or contraction in the resources available to a state should force pointed decisions about their investment decisions and, therefore, their grand strategy. Given these two benefits, focusing my observations around wars experienced by a state yields substantial increases in my ability to draw conclusions from the empirical record.

2.3.2 Case Selection

For my case studies, I examine the grand strategies pursued by India during the periods surrounding three conflicts: the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, and the 1999 Kargil Crisis. These cases are appropriate to test my hypotheses for several reasons. First and foremost, selecting one country as my case allows me to control for a large number of background factors, such as geography, adversaries, and cultural characteristics, which would otherwise complicate my analysis. Because of my methodological choices and after ruling out countries which would be prohibitively difficult to conduct research in or on (e.g., China), the list of cases

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106 Pierson (2014, 265)
which could be considered is relatively small. Given the already formidable challenges studying grand strategy, a within-case design presents the strongest case selection available.\(^{107}\)

Second, these cases represent various military outcomes for India: defeat and loss of some territory in the case of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, victory and sundering of its arch-enemy in the case of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, and stalemate in the case of the 1999 Kargil crisis. The Sino-Indian War of 1962, in which the Indian Army suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the People’s Republic of China, serves as the first potential break point for Indian grand strategy. Given that the outcome of the Third Indo-Pakistan War in 1971 was the division of East and West Pakistan into modern day Bangladesh and Pakistan, this case should prove a strong test of my theory as well as the potential alternative hypotheses.\(^{108}\) During the Kargil conflict, Pakistani forces made incursions into Indian territory. Although they were eventually defeated, the conflict spurred new interest in defense reform and Indian grand strategy.\(^{109}\) Third, there is potential for significant variation on the dependent variable values (grand strategic form, and the rate of any change) in the wake of these conflicts.

Fourth, as a post-colonial country that gained full independence relatively late, the organizations and structures comprising India’s government were originally created by the British to suit their own ends. This decomplicates an otherwise thorny analysis by further stripping away concerns about endogeneity. In the case of grand strategy, a crucial endogeneity concern is the potential for current grand strategies to be the results of prior grand strategic choices. The selection

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\(^{107}\) Other potential cases included Australia (post-Vietnam War), Netherlands (post-Operation Trikora), Pakistan (post-1971 Indo-Pakistan war). Case selection was validated by utilizing the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes Version 4.0 B dataset filtering on major conflicts (as defined by a value of 4 [Use of Force] or more on the HostLev [Hostility level of dispute] column) and identifying conflicts involving middle powers. Palmer et al. (2015), Kenwick et al. (2013)

\(^{108}\) Marwah (1979)

\(^{109}\) O’Donnell and Pant (2015)
of India removes this concern, as India gained independence from Great Britain in 1947 and reshaped its government dramatically in the aftermath of its independence. This means that Indian grand strategy from 1947 until the 1962 Sino-Indian war is a purely Indian grand strategy, as no “Indian” grand strategy would have been possible under colonial rule.

For all of these reasons, India represents a “most likely” test of my theory; if my theory should apply anywhere, it should apply to the selected cases. If I fail to find evidence that my theory and its attendant causal processes are at work in these instances, it would provide strong evidence that my theory is incorrect. As a most likely case for my theory, should I uncover little or no connection between India’s organizational resource allocation decisions and their form of grand strategy, my theory likely does not hold in other cases.

India offers more analytical leverage than many “most likely” cases, however, because it allows me to test my theory against the power of alternative theories. Specifically, each case is one which is a strong candidate for explanation by an alternative hypothesis. Post-World War II India, like many other countries around the world, found itself caught between two ideological blocs as the Cold War took hold. In the years leading up to the 1962 Sino-Indian War, India was under the leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who famously pursued a policy of Non-Alignment with either of the competing blocs.110 Debate still rages over whether or not the defeat of the Indian army at the hands of the Chinese led to an abandonment of the country’s policy of non-alignment within both the policy making and scholarly community.111 Because of this ambiguity, this case provides fertile ground to test both my methodology and the alternative hypotheses; theories that expect change and theories that expect stability have an equal chance of being able to explain the

\[110\text{ Mukherjee and Malone (2011a, 313)}\]
\[111\text{ Chaudhuri (2009)}\]
case. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War serves as my next observation.112 Any grand strategic change detected in this observation should be easily explicable by an external threat hypothesis, as Pakistan was weakened in military, economic, and territorial terms. The case is accordingly a tough test for my theory. Finally, I examine the 1999 Kargil Crisis in the post-Cold War era. This case is an important one to test a strategic culture argument, as India was at that point 50 years independent from British rule and, if Indian strategic culture was doing the work of dictating Indian grand strategy, it would be most detectable in this case. These cases thus help to transform my “most likely” case into something closer to a “crucial case” that is important in developing theories, as it has the potential to tell us much about how applicable my theory is across a range of possible cases.113

There are some who urge caution when generalizing from the case of India, especially as it relates to strategy. Sullivan succinctly summarizes this strain of argument, saying:

Scholars refer to a distinctive Indian identity and view of history, underpinned by unique values, images and ideas, but they do not go so far as to illuminate the nature or sources of such traits, nor do they reveal the complex systems of meaning and practice that lie behind them.114

A corollary to this argument is made by Tanham, who argues that India is unique because it possesses no history of formal strategic thinking:

…Indians do think strategically and have developed some strategic concepts, but like the British before them, they have developed these concepts in an informal and haphazard way. For example, India has never issued a white paper and does not appear inclined to do so.

Thus, the forces of culture and history and the attitude and policies of the independent Indian government have worked against the concept of strategic thinking and planning. As India’s need for

112 Mukherjee and Malone (2011b)
113 Flyvbjerg (2006, 230)
114 Sullivan (2014, 640)
strategic planning increases, a structure for planning is likely to develop slowly.\textsuperscript{115}

Some have taken Tanham’s work to mean that India does not have a grand strategy, even while noting that there is much scholarship that rebuts this line of reasoning.\textsuperscript{116} The underlying assertion is that there is something that hinders generalizability from the Indian case, especially in the domain of strategy. I have no reason to believe that the theory I have developed or my method cannot be applied to the case of India, and if this particular argument has any merit, I would expect to observe it.

To investigate the generalizability of my argument and findings, however, I make one final effort and conduct a series of mini-case studies to assess the applicability of my theory to countries other than India. I utilize congruence testing on three mini-case studies: Australia after the Vietnam War, Pakistan after the Third Indo-Pakistan War, and the Netherlands in the wake of Operation Trikora. These three cases represent alternative observations that were not selected for analysis because of the difficulties associated with holding a sufficient number of variables constant.\textsuperscript{117} Testing these cases for congruence with my theory’s expectations, even if only at the level of a plausibility probe, allows for a more robust analysis than looking at India alone.

2.3.3 Variable Operationalization

In this section, I detail how I operationalize each aspect of my research design, citing specific examples from my cases. Strategy formulation, a key piece of my research question, is

\textsuperscript{115} Tanham (1992, 52)
\textsuperscript{117} For an overview of how the case was chosen, and a mention of these other cases as potential candidates see this chapter, footnote 107.
best described as the process by which a strategy is created and articulated. In the strategic management literature, strategy formulation is often described as a process and typically either occurs via deliberate planning or emergent processes.118 In either case, evidence of grand strategic formulation should be detectable in the historical record. Accordingly, I expect that statements made by key leaders and public discourse to often reference a particular end and the means associated with achieving that end and, more specifically, that such utterances will fall broadly into one or more of the general grand strategic forms discussed previously. That is, there should be some connection between the topics leaders focus on and the language they use to describe those topics that is both identifiable and distinctive. I use such statements to identify grand strategies.

In measuring grand strategy, an alternative method might be to observe what policy makers do, as opposed to what policy makers say. After all, words and deeds frequently do not align for any number of reasons. I contend that focusing on outcomes does not truly get at an understanding of a state’s grand strategy, its theory of how to provide itself security, as there are myriad potential reasons for an observed action. In fact, this focus on observable actions is at the core of the concern articulated by grand strategic skeptics that grand strategy can only be analyzed through retrospective coherence. Focusing on actions or outcomes without understanding the theory that guides them at best risks misunderstanding and at worst allows the scholar to project one’s own theory or biases onto the facts.

To be clear, I am not arguing that focusing on what policy makers say as opposed to what they do is necessarily superior, as policy-makers may have unspoken motivations for their actions. Rather I am interested in a nation-state’s theory of how to produce security for itself, and this

118 Gandellini, Pezzi, and Venanzi (2013, 6-7)
theory should be reflected in the logic articulated to explain or defend actions taken. To illustrate this point, consider the purchase of advanced military hardware. Art contends there are four ‘ends’ to which states can acquire military power, one of which he terms ‘swaggering.’ The goal of acquiring military hardware in this instance is not necessarily primarily intended to increase security, but rather to increase prestige.\textsuperscript{119} In instances such as this, focusing on outcome would run the risk of misconstruing the action entirely. This type of behavior can be seen around the world in countries which purchase advanced fighter aircraft for which they have no clear operational need or indigenous capability to operate effectively. Rather than being a signal of military strength, and thus a coercive grand strategy, it suggests affluence and perhaps even an inductive grand strategy.

To operationalize policy makers’ statements as definitions of different forms of grand strategy, I primarily perform a text analysis on the \textit{Foreign Affairs Record} published by India’s Ministry of External Affairs – a resource that is freely available online and contains a wealth of data by year from 1955 to 1999, broken out by month.\textsuperscript{120} This text analysis uncovers key words and topics in the public statements, speeches, and written answers to questions submitted by members of the Indian parliament compiled in the \textit{Foreign Affairs Record}. These documents contain the official messaging members of the Indian government broadcasted to the world and so provide good insight into how the government articulated their priorities as well as the key themes they emphasized.

\textsuperscript{119} Art (1980, 13)  
The text analysis strategy I employ enables me to identify key topics present in the data without introducing potential issues such as coder bias. Specifically, I use latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA), which is a widely utilized method to stochastically extract topics, or clusters of words, from the document corpus while allowing for some word overlap between the topics.\footnote{For more information on LDA as a method of unsupervised topic clustering see Blei, Ng, and Jordan (2003).} LDA looks at each topic as a mixture of words and each document as a mixture of topics.\footnote{Silge and Robinson (2017)} Words are analyzed for how frequently they co-occur and grouped based on the clusters of words that best fit together. Documents are ranked based on the number of words they have that belong to one topic relative to others. One of the issues that must be carefully considered in this type of analysis is the correct number of topics to tell the model to look for. As of yet, no consensus exists on the best way to discover the optimal number.\footnote{For more information on this debate see, for example, Zhao et al. (2015), Wallach, Mimno, and McCallum (2009), Greene, O'Callaghan, and Cunningham (2014).} To avoid choosing an arbitrary number of topics, I utilize k-means clustering, which is a frequently used method in the biological sciences and has also been used as a comparison point for topic clustering.\footnote{Steinbach, Karypis, and Kumar (2000).} This allows for a more rigorous and transparent method of determining the number of clusters to be used than would otherwise be possible. As a whole, this methodology provides a robust and replicable way of uncovering a country's grand strategy.

With respect to state resources, I operationalize money, manpower, and elite attention by looking at three different types of data. For money, I use Gross Domestic Product, which is drawn from the World Bank’s DataBank and manually converted into 2010 US dollars.\footnote{The data utilized to operationalize this variable is GDP (current LCU) and available from \url{https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CN?locations=IN}. Normally, when performing time-series analysis data in real (inflation adjusted) terms is preferred. While this data is available from the World Bank, nominal data was chosen to begin with and I adjusted for inflation and converted the data into 2010 U.S. dollars myself because appropriation data available for India is only available in nominal rupees. Converting everything using the same method for all countries allows the comparison to be more rigorous.} As one of the
most widely used indicators for economic performance of a country, GDP represents a straightforward and easily understood measure for the total economic output for a country. This makes it a strong, and obvious, choice to represent money at the state level. For manpower, I similarly use the World Bank’s data on total population, as well as male population between 15-64. Both total population and male population are necessary to consider, as, historically, the male population of this age is the pool from which military recruits are drawn while total population reflects the total pool from which civilian agencies can draw.

To operationalize elite attention, I examine the headlines of a major Indian newspaper, *The Times of India*, to determine what foreign political concerns were making national attention. While this is not a perfect measure of elite attention, given the difficulty in measuring agenda-setting in public policy, focusing on foreign entities mentioned in a leading newspaper at the time can serve as a useful instrumental variable for my analysis. Given the historical importance of the English-language press in India, especially amongst the elite, looking at *The Times of India*, traditionally India’s highest-circulating English-language newspaper, is an appropriate choice as a proxy marker for elite discourse at the time. Every other Sunday, with some exceptions due to data unavailability, was sampled. Sunday editions of papers are frequently larger in size and more
widely read than other days of the week, making them a good barometer of the types of stories in the national consciousness.

At the organizational level, I use commensurate data to measure money, manpower, and elite attention resources. For money, I look at the total amount of funding appropriated by the Indian parliament to the organizations of interest (Ministry of Defence, External Affairs, and Commerce and Industry respectively). Data was primarily gathered from the Legislative Department of India’s Ministry of Law & Justice, which maintains a .pdf repository of the Text of Central Acts enacted by Parliament, published yearly with a range from 1851 to 2017. All appropriations acts, excluding temporary spending bills (Votes on Account) that were superseded by another appropriations bill, were summed and then converted to 2010 US dollars. Because of the nature of the Indian appropriations process, which often sees appropriations bills passed retroactively, each bill was checked for the fiscal year for it was authorized and added to that year’s total. Additionally, bills in the period of four to five years after the end of the case were examined to ensure no bills retroactively authorizing funding were overlooked. This allows for as comprehensive a snapshot of the monetary resources poured into state organizations as possible and provides a more complete ground truth than budget forecasts allow.

Other Sunday technique. The results were similar, typically with only the frequency of mentions for individual topics going down, as would be expected. There was some minor rearrangement of topic ranking, but nothing dropped off the list entirely. Additionally, some Sundays were simply missing from the digital archive. A look at the digitization efforts of the data shows that this may be because the original microfilm containing the data was either corrupted or unavailable. Missing dates only account for less than 2% of the total data sampled.


As discussed in an earlier footnote, I converted the data myself utilizing CPI data available from the World Bank ([https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL?locations=IN](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL?locations=IN)) and period average US Dollar exchange rates ([https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.FCRF?locations=IN](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.FCRF?locations=IN)). Period average (as opposed to period end) data is appropriate here, as government expenditure is typically considered a monetary “flow” (i.e., it goes out over time) and thus the exchange rate average is more appropriate than data collected at the end of the period, which is more useful for “stocks” (e.g., debt).
For manpower, I draw from India’s Census of Central Government Employees and use the total number of civilian persons employed by the ministries in question, including overseas and shorter-term hires.\textsuperscript{131} Data is generally available yearly from 1955 until at least 1978, and then every couple of years after that. These measures allow for a straightforward link between total population and the number of personnel employed by these organizations. Finally, elite attention is operationalized through a list of the most frequently occurring word pairs. The crucial difference between the two is that attention at the state-level is on the frequency of mentions of specific foreign entities in the \textit{Times of India} headlines, while attention at the organizational-level looks at all entities in the abstracts of the articles. Looking at abstracts and bigrams (word pairs) allows for more information to be captured, which is desirable at this level of analysis.

If my theory is correct, my topic modeling should uncover a pattern in India’s foreign relations consistent with either a persuasive, coercive, or inducive grand strategy. This grand strategy should be matched by corresponding resource allocations in the form of money, manpower, and elite attention into the organization(s) primarily responsible for conducting that grand strategic function. When grand strategic change is observed, shifts in both grand strategic form as well as resource allocation should co-occur and the rate at which the change occurs should correspond closely with the level at which these resources are being allocated to one organization set over the others.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter detailed several prominent explanations of grand strategic change and described the shortfalls of both externally and internally oriented theories. Borrowing an insight from the organization theory literature, namely the utility of analyzing a firm’s strategy through an assessment of its resources (as opposed to its external environment), I developed a theory of how states’ choice of strategy could be dictated by prior resourcing decisions. I described how this should be especially true for middle powers. Finally, I proposed testing this theory on the case of India, looking specifically at the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, and the Kargil Crisis of 1999, and described in detail how I operationalize each of my key variables with reference to the specific sources of data on which I draw. The proceeding chapters examine each of these observations in turn, first providing a brief background of the events, then describing Indian grand strategy in the years preceding the war and any change observed after the fighting ended. Finally, I assess each theory’s ability to explain any change or lack thereof in Indian grand strategy before ending with some general conclusions about the case.
3.0 The 1962 Sino-Indian War

In the years around the 1962 Sino-Indian War, India pursued an explicit grand strategy of Non-Alignment. This grand strategy was intended to provide security for India by maintaining maximum flexibility in options and friendly relations with as many countries as possible. Such a grand strategy is a classic example of what I called in Chapter 2 a persuasive grand strategy. It is unusual to find as explicitly formulated a grand strategy as non-alignment, and this provides a perfect platform to validate my use of topic modeling to uncover grand strategies while simultaneously testing my theory on the causes of grand strategic change. Finally, because the outcome of the Sino-Indian War was a decisive defeat for the Indian military, this case provides a solid test of all three types of theories of grand strategic change.

To that end, this chapter begins with a discussion of Indian grand strategy before the Sino-Indian War and introduces the topic modelling method I employ to empirically validate both the existence of Non-Alignment and its form as a persuasive grand strategy. I then provide evidence which demonstrates that India’s persuasive grand strategy experienced a high level of stability in the wake of its defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962 and validates the use of topic modeling as a method for uncovering grand strategies. The next section explores four potential explanations for what causes grand strategic change and stability. I unpack the theoretical expectations of

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132 NB: Throughout the rest of this chapter, and the chapters that follow, readers will encounter the terms non-alignment, and Non-Alignment. Non-Alignent (Capital N, Capital A) refers to the persuasive grand strategy as articulated by Jawaharlal Nehru. Non-alignment (lower case n, lower case a) refers to the concept of not choosing sides between the two superpowers during the Cold War. Thus, only one country chose to pursue Non-Alignment as a grand strategy, but many countries chose to pursue non-alignment as a strategy during the Cold War. To the fullest extent possible, I have endeavored to maintain this convention. Quotations from other authors have not been modified to fit this convention, however.
externally oriented theories of grand strategic change as well as those of internally oriented theories. I find that, while each of these theories has some explanatory power, they each fail to account for important aspects of the case. I then evaluate the ability of my theory of grand strategic change to explain the case. Here, the evidence suggests that my theory can account for both the observed grand strategic stability as well as the observed rate of change, though a few questions remain about ultimate causality. I conclude with a brief overview of what was learned and offer a road map for the chapters ahead.

3.1 Indian grand strategy around the 1962 Sino-Indian War

The years after Indian independence and Partition were largely spent dealing with the aftershocks of those sudden events and the challenges of constructing new governmental institutions to bolster the ones abandoned by the British in the wake of their departure in August of 1947. In the first 15 years of Indian independence, there were a number of political, economic, and social issues India had to contend with. Almost immediately after partition, India and Pakistan fought a war in which Pakistan gained control of almost one-third of the contested territory of Kashmir. In 1948, one of the leading lights of the Indian independence movement, Mohandas Gandhi, was assassinated. It wasn’t until January 26, 1950 that the Indian constitution came into

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133 Partition is the name given to the splintering of British India into the modern states of India and Pakistan and the turmoil that followed. Modern estimates of the number of people that migrated, many involuntarily, in the years immediately after the creation of the two states is approximately 15 million. Large-scale violence was not uncommon in the regions most affected by the separation of the two states. This complicated historical legacy even now casts a long shadow over both relations between the two countries and scholarship of the period (Brass 2003, Bharadwaj, Khwaja, and Mian 2008, Singer 2012).

134 Basrur (2010, 12)
force. Just two years later, India held its first general election, which had over 175 million eligible voters.\textsuperscript{135} Sitting in the background were the thorny issues of caste and Hindu-Islamic relations, which also needed to be addressed.\textsuperscript{136} Finally, over the course of 1947-1962, India completed two five-year economic development plans, which were aimed at boosting the country’s agriculture, infrastructure, and industrial output.

In addition to the internal difficulties associated with a transition from a former colony of Britain to a newly independent nation, there were a number of pressing regional issues to contend with. As previously mentioned, India and Pakistan fought a conflict only months after the British relinquished control in 1947. Not long after this war, China re-emerged from its civil war and launched a military campaign into Tibet, placing it on India’s northern border. Globally, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was beginning to take shape. It was in this regional and international context that India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru formalized an Indian policy of Non-Alignment in international affairs, in which India would preserve its independence by refusing to ally itself with either of the two superpowers.\textsuperscript{137} This would leave India free to deal with both threats and opportunities in any way it chose. Ganguly succinctly states the crux of Non-Alignment, saying, “the doctrine [of Non-Alignment] called for steering a diplomatic path free from superpower dominance.”\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{135} Park (1952)  
\textsuperscript{136} Singer (2012, 17-19)  
\textsuperscript{137} Nehru served simultaneously as India’s first Prime Minister as well as its Foreign Minister from Independence to his death in 1964. As a politician, Nehru dominated India’s political and foreign policy landscape throughout his tenure.  
\textsuperscript{138} Ganguly (2010a, 1)
As discussed repeatedly throughout this dissertation, a grand strategy is a nation-state’s theory on how to provide security for itself. In Non-Alignment, one finds an unusually explicit example of how to do that. Appadorai contends that:

When we say that India follows a policy of non-alignment, it means (1) that India has no military alliances with countries of either bloc or indeed with any nation; (2) India has an independent approach to foreign policy, not being tied down to a particular line of action through membership of a bloc; and (3) India attempts to maintain friendly relations with all countries.\(^{139}\)

Given the description provided in the above quote, Non-Alignment was intended to serve India’s security by reducing the potential for wide-spread armed conflict like the recent world wars, which would have a deleterious effect on India, even if it could avoid being drawn into the conflict directly. In Appadorai’s words:

…it was [Nehru’s] conviction that a world war in the nuclear age was suicidal, and since in such a war it would be difficult to be neutral, India too would suffer destruction. [Nehru] bent his energies to reduce international tensions, to have nuclear tests suspended, and to achieve complete disarmament. The security of India apart, it was also his conviction that world peace was a precondition for the economic development of India which was urgently needed. To a country low in per capita income and in savings, and economically underdeveloped, assistance from the more developed countries by way of capital and know-how was a *sine qua non* for development and [Nehru] knew that the outbreak of war would make it impossible to get such co-operation.\(^{140}\) (Emphasis in Original)

In practice, the positive means through which this policy of Non-Alignment was pursued were robust participation in multilateral institutions, strong advocacy for India’s ideals, and relatively

\(^{139}\) Appadorai (1981, 18). In pushing for a nuanced understanding of non-alignment, Appadorai is quick to assert that this does not mean that India a) does not have close relationship relationships with other countries, b) is necessarily neutral on issues which divided the blocs, and c) would remain neutral in the event of a war (Appadorai 1981, 18). These caveats do not imply that Non-Alignment should be viewed as a meaningless concept, but rather that the concept did not necessarily imply a “passive” role for India in international affairs.

\(^{140}\) Appadorai (1981, 16)
little emphasis on the use of force and coercion to achieve goals.\textsuperscript{141} By maintaining freedom from superpower ideological competition and attempting to have warm relations with as many nations as possible, India hoped to maximize its power position in the international arena, reduce the chance of international conflict by reducing what India perceived as its root causes, and maximize the amount of development assistance it could acquire to bring prosperity to its population.

This aversion to the use of military force was not an absolute prohibition. India and Pakistan did fight a year-long war in 1947. In an interesting disjuncture between words and action, Indian forces were used to secure Portuguese Goa in late 1961 in what is known as Operation ‘Vijay’, or Operation Victory.\textsuperscript{142} Despite India’s protestations of peaceful intentions, it was thus not above resorting to the use of force when necessary, and these incidents clearly demonstrate its freedom of action in the international realm, a key goal Non-Alignment was meant to serve. This reinforces the idea that, while grand strategies are complex mixtures of means, they should still have a primary ingredient. Given this understanding of Non-Alignment, I expect to uncover evidence of a predominantly persuasive grand strategy aimed at securing India against its most pressing threats while simultaneously pursuing its economic development. The rest of this chapter explores India’s grand strategy in the period as well as potential explanations for why India chose to pursue this particular grand strategy.

\textsuperscript{141} This interpretation of some, or all, of the core means of Non-Alignment is widely supported in the literature, and can be found in such works as Mukherjee and Malone (2011a), Ganguly (2010a, 1), Garver (2010, 85), and Kapur (1994, 25-6).
\textsuperscript{142} Singer (2012, 35)
3.2 Measuring grand strategy

To understand a state’s theory of how to provide security for itself, its grand strategy, it makes sense to focus on how policymakers articulate their vision for doing so. By focusing on how leaders attempt to communicate their vision in the international arena, observers are afforded an opportunity to hear directly from policymakers what actions are being taken and why. To that end, many turn to the speeches of Nehru. Nehru exerted an enormous amount of influence on India’s foreign policy apparatus through his dual roles of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during the early days of India’s independence. His influence was so pervasive that Maxwell declared that Indian foreign policy during his seventeen-year reign was “…[Nehru’s] private monopoly.”\textsuperscript{143} Privileging this dominance in seeking to understand Indian grand strategy comes at a cost, however. While his voice may have been the most prominent, it was not the only one. Focusing solely on Nehru’s speeches may present a distorted view of Indian grand strategy, and potentially introduce bias. By considering all the available data, it is possible to gain a deeper appreciation for how well-articulated and ingrained Non-Alignment was throughout the Indian government.

Accordingly, to capture the Indian vision of grand strategy, I turn to the Foreign Affairs Record, published yearly by India’s Ministry of External Affairs between 1955 to 1999 and providing transcripts of various types on major diplomatic events. Included in the Record are documents ranging from the text of trade agreements to welcome speeches given by Indian officials to foreign dignitaries to formal replies to questions submitted by the Indian Parliament to major speeches touching on foreign policy topics given by Indian officials. This data provides a

\textsuperscript{143} Maxwell (1974, 633)
wealth of information both on what foreign policy ends Indian officials were fixated as well as on what means they viewed as most appropriate to achieve those ends. This type of primary source data, as opposed to secondary source accounts or more sterile diplomatic communiques, provides clear insight into how Indian leaders articulated connecting their means with their ends. Indeed, the diversity of voices and situations represented in the *Record* has the potential to allow for the construction of an exceptionally accurate picture of India’s messaging to the rest of the world.

In order to parse this large amount of data and determine whether the language employed by Indian officials matches the purported grand strategy of Non-Alignment, I use a common text analysis topic model known as latent Dirichlet allocation, or LDA. Put simply, this method extracts “latent” topics within the corpus of documents by looking at mixtures of words and associating them with other words which frequently co-occur. At its core, this method treats a topic as an assortment of words, and treats each document as composed, to various degrees, of one or more topics. As a probabilistic model, it also allows for non-exclusivity between words and topics, which allows for the possibility that some words may belong to several different topics simultaneously. The results of the model are a number of word-topic probabilities; the higher the *beta* of a word, the higher the probability it is associated with a given topic; that is, the less likely it is to be associated with other topics. There is also a statistic which measures document-topic probability, *gamma*. *Gamma* identifies which documents are primarily composed of which topic; the higher the *gamma*, the more likely the document is comprised of words associated with that topic. Thus, a *gamma* very near 1 would indicate that document is composed of words that are all associated with a single topic. In disambiguating topics, *gamma* can be helpful in rapidly identifying which documents are most strongly associated with the topic, giving clues as to what is being uncovered by the model.
To gain a sense of the utility of this modeling approach, consider the following hypothetical example. A topic identified by the model from a corpus of documents may be composed of the terms “trade,” “investment,” “manufacturing,” “exports,” and “tariffs.” One could surmise from this list that the topic the model has identified has something to do with economic development or international trade. In order to verify that this is in fact the identified topic, a list of the documents most strongly associated with the topic can be generated by the model. If, in looking at the top results on such a list included documents with titles like “Indo-German Automobile Import Agreement,” “Import-Export Tariff Reduction Treaty,” “Speech by the Indian Prime Minister to the Lok Sabha on GATT accession,” there would be strong reason to believe that the topic inference was correct. In cases where the topic is more ambiguous; care needs to be exercised in the interpretation of the topics. The macro-level process remains unchanged, however.

One issue which can plague studies employing this kind of analysis is the potential for introduction of different types of bias. One potential source is coder bias. As an unstructured machine learning model, however, no prior knowledge of any potential topics in the data is required by or provided to the model.\textsuperscript{144} It is also the reason that the presentation order of the topics is arbitrary. This methodology thus reduces the potential for the introduction of coder bias and prejudicing the outcome of the analysis by removing the coder from the equation.

Another area where bias can be introduced is in the selection of the number of the number of topics to tell the model to look for. Setting the correct number of topics for modeling is one of the thornier questions in the field of LDA topic modeling; selecting too few topics runs the risk of artificially truncating important information while selecting too many topics risks diluting the results with extraneous information. I utilize a \textit{k-means} clustering algorithm to identify the

\textsuperscript{144} Anthes (2010, 16)
appropriate number of clusters for use in this analysis. *K-means* clustering is a mathematical algorithm which randomly groups the provided data until it finds the groupings which it believes best describe the data. Conceptually, this is similar to having a model sort through a bag of 100 marbles that are a random number of different colors and find the groupings that best represent the contents of the bag despite not knowing how many marbles of each color or their overall distribution are actually present in the bag. The model looks at a wide variety of different permutations, generating a graph which visually represents the declining differences between each additional grouping. After the model has generated the graph, all that needs to be done is to identify the number of clusters at which the descriptive utility of additional clusters yields a decreasing rate of return. The result is an overview of the major themes present in the corpus which can be executed relatively quickly and reliably replicated.
Figure 3.1. Estimated number of clusters for topic modeling
Figure 3.1 shows the estimated number of topics in both the pre-1962 and post-1962 document corpuses. In order to strike a balance between parsimony and informational content, it is customary to look for the point on the graph where information begins being added at a decreasing rate. In a mathematical sense, this would be where the slope of the line begins flattening at a decreasing rate. Typically, this point can be easily determined by eye. For pre-1962, there appear to be between four and six number of topics that could be potentially used, so five topics were chosen for analysis to function as a convenient analytical mid-point. For the post-1962 data, the results clearly favor a choice of four topics as the correct number into which the model should cluster the words.

3.2.1 Pre-1962 grand strategy analysis

India’s grand strategy of Non-Alignment offers a unique opportunity to test the applicability of the use of unstructured topic modeling to the field of grand strategy. As noted, it is relatively rare to have a grand strategy as explicitly articulated as Non-Alignment was during this period. If Non-Alignment was in fact the grand strategy of India during this period and the topic modeling method is an appropriate tool to discover it, I would expect to see clear evidence of it. This section presents the results of running the LDA model described in the previous section on the data from the years 1960-1962. Figure 3.2 shows the topics generated by the model. It is important to bear in mind that the order in which the topics are presented and their identification numbers are assigned randomly by the model, and have no analytic utility.
At a glance, topic 5 is the most readily understood from the collection of words; it refers to various economic agreements made between India and other countries. The strong association with the words “agreement,” “countries,” “development,” and “trade” suggest the topic refers to a
set of agreements between countries. It is not a stretch to assume it refers to agreements made between India and other countries. Non-Alignment was meant not only to generate security for India by reducing the potential for conflict in the world more broadly, but also to generate economic development within India. Nehru was a firm believer in the importance of developing India’s economy and foreign aid played an important role in helping grow India’s economy.  

Although not everyone would necessarily consider securing international economic agreements a security concern, economic development does generate both internal and external security for a state by increasing available resources. The presence of this topic can be viewed as an external manifestation of one of India’s leading domestic priorities. As a driving force of Nehru’s Non-Alignment strategy was the promotion of international peace to help secure economic development, the presence of this topic on the list is an important indicator that this assertion is correct.

Topic 3 is likewise relatively straightforward to interpret. Several keywords such as “Congo,” “United Nations,” “Goa,” and “Security Council” betray what the topic is almost immediately. As mentioned earlier, India seized Portuguese Goa in 1961. Additionally, shortly after the Congo became independent in 1960, the United Nations deployed a peacekeeping operation there to prevent a civil war. India responded by sending an infantry brigade group – India’s only participation in peacekeeping operations during the Cold War. It is therefore safe to conclude that topic 3 captures India’s dealings with the United Nations and specifically the Security Council both in handling the fallout of its seizure of Goa as well as contributing troops to support the efforts to help calm the situation in the Congo after the withdrawal of the Dutch. Robust

\[145\] Kapur (1994, 55-64)  
\[146\] van Rooyen (2010, 8)
diplomacy and a presence in multilateral venues such as the United Nations was another key hallmark of Nehruvian Non-Alinement. That the analysis bears this out as well is yet another strong indicator that the description of non-alignment provided earlier was correct.

Topic 2 captures the Indian concerns over China and the border issues between India the two countries. Strong associations with the terms “Chinese,” “China,” and somewhat weaker associations with the terms “border,” “territory,” and “posts” suggest this topic relates to the rising tension and concern in the pre-war period about Indian and Chinese forces on the Sino-Indian border. One of the defining features of the Sino-Indian border dispute was Nehru’s “Forward Policy” of placing Indian soldiers in positions north of the McMahon line (the de facto border between the two countries) in an attempt to force Chinese troops to withdraw. That this topic is present on the list indicates that this matter was a key issue in Indian foreign policy in the pre-war period and was discussed at length by Indian officials in their public statements.

Topic 4 is also likely capturing India’s concerns over both sovereignty and its border security, this time with a focus on Pakistan, as the strong associations with the term “Pakistan,” and moderate association with “Kashmir” suggest. Interestingly, the document-topic associations show that most of documents most strongly associated with this topic are drawn from speeches given to visiting foreign dignitaries and heads of state. As Pakistan was a key foreign policy issue for India, its association with more than one topic and that it is strongly associated with a topic closely related to both Kashmir and sovereignty is not unexpected.

Topic 1 is the most uncertain from a glance, with the words being generally vague and with no obvious link to a recognizable topic. Here, document-topic probabilities, or the gamma statistic introduced earlier, can help. This analysis shows that the collection of documents most strongly
associated with Topic 1 generally relate to the ideational aspects of India’s grand strategy.\textsuperscript{147} Many of the documents strongly associated with this topic relate to India’s denouncement of South Africa’s apartheid and participation in the United Nations Trusteeship Council for recently decolonized or decolonizing countries. In describing the totality of Non-Alignment, Nehru asserted “[India has] other positive aims also, such as the promotion of freedom from colonial rule, racial equality, peace and international cooperation…”\textsuperscript{148} Given these goals were an explicit end of India’s engagement with the world, the topic’s presence in the topics generated by the LDA model yet again supports the assertion that India advocated these ideals at length.

Notably absent from these topics were references to the superpowers. India’s grand strategy was predicated on explicitly avoiding entanglements with either of the two Cold War ideological blocs. The absence of these topics is yet further evidence that Non-Alignment – as conventionally described – was the grand strategy pursued by India. When thinking about Indian grand strategy, as well as grand strategy more broadly, it is necessary to consider both what is found as well as what was not. The rather limited set of topics on which India was focused for its grand strategy lends credence to my earlier assertion regarding the analytic utility of the relatively limited scope of concern of middle powers is correct. Countries’ resources are limited, as is their ability to focus on multiple topics simultaneously. If the essence of strategy is matchings ends and means, then what ends are not pursued or what means are not used are equally important in assessing a grand strategy. This also suggests that, in the utilization of topic modeling for uncovering grand strategy,

\textsuperscript{147} Examples of the top 5 document titles most strongly associated with this topic ($\text{gamma} > .999$, scores near 1 mean the model identified the document as being almost exclusively comprised of words related to that topic) are: “Shri B.N. Chakravarty's Statement on Apartheid Policy in South Africa,” “Shri J.N. Khosla's Statement on Racial Discrimination in Non-self- governing Territories,” “Shri C. S. Jha's Statement in Trusteeship Council on Ruanda-Urundi,” “Shri Krishna Menon's Statement in Special Political Committee on Apartheid,” and “Shri C.S. Jha's Statement on the granting of independence to Colonial Countries.”

\textsuperscript{148} Nehru (1963, 456)
the absence of an expected or likely topic is almost as powerful a piece of evidence as the presence of one.

When considering holistically the set of topics the LDA model identified, I would classify the grand strategy pursued by India during this period as persuasive in form. This classification is based on the extremely frequent appearance of words and topics typically associated with multilateral forums, diplomatic suasion, and an utter lack of words or topics associated with coercive elements of power; if anything, coercive terms are conspicuous by their absence from Figure 3.2. The secondary literature also fits this assessment, as scholars overwhelmingly agree that Non-Alignment was overwhelmingly a diplomatic strategy. One of the explicit goals of this project was to answer the charges leveled by grand strategic skeptics and nihilists about the existence of grand strategy, and this analysis represents a strong step in that direction.

### 3.2.2 Post-1962 grand strategy analysis

Despite the fact that non-alignment was intended to generate security through diplomacy, India was unable to prevent relations with China from deteriorating toward the end of the 1950s. In late October 1962, after months of rising tensions and occasionally bloody border skirmishes, China launched a simultaneous two-front offensive across the contested border between the two countries. Chinese forces quickly overran Indian soldiers who had been placed in unsupportable forward positions high in the mountains, before the Indian soldiers had had time to properly adapt to the high altitude. The assault continued, with the Indian military suffering a progressive series of stinging defeats. A unilateral cessation in the fighting occurred in late October, at which time the Chinese offered to withdraw their forces and begin negotiation on a settlement. The negotiated
settlement did not take hold, however, and a second Chinese attack in mid-November almost swept
the Indian military from the field.

India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian War sent shockwaves through the Indian political elite. Even though tensions had been steadily rising between India and China for a number of years before the outbreak of war, and despite the controversial “Forward Policy” that saw Indian forces placed at, or slightly beyond, the de facto border between the two countries, there is little indication that Indian officials seriously believed that war with China was likely.\textsuperscript{149} The results of the conflict were so shocking to India that Nehru was forced to ask for military assistance from the United States. Heretofore, United States involvement in the conflict had been limited to supplying equipment. Nehru asked President Kennedy to consider escalating the United States’ level of involvement dramatically, asking for it to conduct air superiority and bombing missions against the Chinese.\textsuperscript{150} A unilateral Chinese ceasefire on November 20\textsuperscript{th} precluded this potential escalation and China withdrew to its proposed settlement line, handing India a complete defeat and imposing the desired Chinese outcome on the border dispute.\textsuperscript{151}

The loss led to a serious weakening of Nehru and cost Defense Minister V. K. Menon his political career.\textsuperscript{152} Such a shocking and decisive defeat should have also led to a re-examination of India’s grand strategy, as Non-Alignment simultaneously could not prevent the outbreak of war and proved unable to win once engaged in conflict. Although India’s grand strategy would not necessarily have to have been altered in the wake of such a defeat, a loss of this magnitude serves as a very clear inflection point at which a country would have the chance to reassess its grand

\textsuperscript{149} Noorani and Dalvi (1970, 137)
\textsuperscript{150} Riedel (2015, 136-8), Brecher (1979, 617)
\textsuperscript{151} Garver (2010, 92), Riedel (2015, 140)
\textsuperscript{152} Narang and Staniland (2018, 437)
strategy and decide whether or not to stay the course. In that regard, while India would remain non-aligned between the two superpowers, there is less clarity on whether or not Non-Alignment, as envisioned by Nehru, continued to be as well-defined and dominant a grand strategy as it had once been.

When considering India’s grand strategy in post-war period, what is notable is the relatively high degree of surface-level continuity with India’s pre-war Non-Alignment approach. Non-Alignment, as a label, appears to have survived a number of challenges in the years immediately after the war. There were many dramatic short-term actions undertaken after India’s defeat, including seeking military assistance from the United States and joint military drills with Great Britain, yet there was no formal renunciation of India’s policy of non-alignment.\textsuperscript{153} Not even Nehru’s death in 1964 or a second round of fighting with Pakistan in 1965 were enough to cause formal abandonment of the doctrine. A key question in this regard is whether the apparent continuation of Non-Alignment as the avowed grand strategy of India was in name only. For my purposes, the question is whether or not there were fundamental changes to the form of Non-Alignment that caused it to move from a persuasive grand strategy to either an inducive or coercive approach.

Existing scholarship is unclear on whether there was a deviation from a persuasive grand strategy. Brecher contends that, in the wake of the 1962 conflict, India withdrew from its activism in world affairs, stating:

\begin{quote}
In reality, the foreign policy of Nehru’s India began to change [after the 1962 Sino-Indian war] in two respects: (1) from “equidistance,” in relation to the superpowers, to “equal proximity” to Moscow and Washington; and (2) from an active, dynamic involvement in world politics, that is \textit{neutralism} in its original Nehru-Menon conception, to a more passive role, almost a withdrawal from conflicts external
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{153} Brecher (1979, 619, 626)
to India’s narrowly-conceived national interests, namely, to *non-alignment*.\(^{154}\) (emphasis in original)

As far as my theoretical framework is concerned, a shift from “equidistance” to “equal proximity” or from “neutralism” to “non-alignment” is a distinction without a difference provided that the overall *form* of the grand strategy remained persuasively oriented. From my theory’s perspective, whether or not India was an active, engaged participant in world politics is largely a matter of policy-maker preference as long as a persuasive form of grand strategy is observed. Figure 3.3 reveals that, between the period of 1963-1967, there is good reason for concluding there was a continuation of Non-Alignment as a persuasive grand strategy, even if there were some minor perturbations in its outline.

\(^{154}\) Brecher (1979, 268-9)
Figure 3.3 is broadly consistent with Brecher’s analysis of the narrowing of India’s focus in the post-war era, with a decrease in observed topics from 4 to 5 and a corresponding decrease
in the number of topics associated with the United Nations.\textsuperscript{155} What is noteworthy about the list is the continuity between Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3; remember that individual topic numbers assigned by the model are analytically meaningless. The observed stability is remarkable, as India suffered a decisive defeat in a war with a regional rival and, in the wake of that failure, it might reasonably be assumed that India’s grand strategy would radically change its shape or focus. War with the Chinese came as a shock and what was more surprising was the Indian military’s failure when push came to shove. As will be discussed in the proceeding paragraphs, the analysis in Figure 3.3 paints a relatively clean picture of Non-Alignment as the continuing persuasive grand strategy of India in the post-war era.

Topics 1 and 3 relate to two of India’s major diplomatic initiatives, with the focus being primarily on nuclear disarmament, with some discussion of economic development. Relatively strong association of the topic with words such as “nuclear,” “weapons,” “disarmament,” and “treaty” all attest to the nuclear weapons portion of the interpretation of Topic 1.\textsuperscript{156} This topic also makes sense from a historical perspective. While it did not appear in the pre-war topic analysis, Nehru’s India was a strong advocate for nuclear disarmament because of the danger of catastrophic destruction he perceived as arising from the proliferation of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{157} India did take some concrete steps under Nehru’s successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, to advance India’s nuclear

\textsuperscript{155} This reduction in topics was independently derived from the \textit{k-means} analysis detailed in Figure 3.1 earlier in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{156} The documents most associated with Topic 1, as measured by \textit{gamma} value are: “Shri V. C. Trivedi's Statement on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”, “Shri V. C. Trivedi's Statement in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament”, “Shri V. C. Trivedi's Statement in the Disarmament Commission”, “Shri B. N. Chakravarty's Statement in the Disarmament Commission”, "Sardar Swam Singh's Statement in the General Assembly on South West Africa", "Shri V. C. Trivedi's Statement on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", "Shri V. C. Trivedi's Speech in the Political Committee on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", "Shri V. C. Trivedi's Statement in the Political Committee on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", "Shri V. C. Trivedi's Statement on General and Complete Disarmament", "Shri V. C. Trivedi's Statement on Nuclear Weapon Tests".

\textsuperscript{157} Kirk (2010, 279)
program to the point where it would still be several months short of a testable device.\textsuperscript{158} Despite this fact, India still strongly advocated for nuclear disarmament over the period. The terms “agreement,” “trade,” “development,” “economic,” and “assistance” clearly mark Topic 3 as being related to economic development. As was discussed in the pre-war analysis, economic development was an important aim of Non-Alignment. Diplomacy aimed at promoting nuclear non-proliferation and economic development is consistent with the scholarly description of Non-Alignment and directly increases India’s security without the use of force.

Topic 2 relates to the two issues of the border wars, first between India and China and then between India and Pakistan in 1965. The strong association with “pakistan,” “kashmir,” “china,” “cease,” and “fire” attest to that. In the wake of a major military defeat, it is unsurprising to see much discussion, both internally and externally, about the subject and my analysis bears out this continued focus. Finally, Topic 4 is drawn from the collected speeches of Indian leaders to foreign dignitaries and again underscores the key themes of non-alignment with the terms “peace,” “economic,” “development,” and “freedom.” As was discussed, these were all key pillars of Nehruvian Non-Alingment strategy and ideational goals. That it remains an identifiable topic despite a) a major defeat in the Sino-Indian War, b) Nehru’s death in 1964, and c) the reduction in overall number of topics identified by the analysis suggests a strong continuity in the way Indian leaders talked and thought about how to achieve their priorities. Taken together, these four topics display a continuity in both the priorities and the language used to describe those priorities from the pre-war to the post-war era.

The analysis of India’s grand strategy around the Sino-Indian War with the type of topic modeling performed here yields a number of important insights to the discussion surrounding Non-

\textsuperscript{158} Basrur (2016, 186)
Alignment. First and foremost, I have validated the scholarly consensus on Non-Alignment as the grand strategy of India in the pre-war period. Second, I was able to discern in a transparent way what makes Non-Alignment a persuasive grand strategy as opposed to a coercive or inducive grand strategy. I was also able to identify a shift in both topics and scope after the war, although the change was not large enough to be considered an abandonment of a persuasive grand strategy. Finally, these results clearly demonstrated the viability of topic modeling as a method of uncovering a state’s grand strategy in a manner that is not vulnerable to the sorts of criticisms frequently leveled against grand strategy scholarship by grand strategic skeptics and nihilists. Having described the form India’s grand strategy took both before and after the way, I now turn to an exploration of the potential causes for this observed macro-level stability.

3.3 Potential Explanations

What accounts for this relatively high level of continuity in Indian grand strategy before and after 1962? This section walks through each of the three types of potential explanation (externally oriented, internally oriented and organizational determinants) discussed in Chapter 2. Each of these potential explanations are analyzed in turn, focusing first on what behavior might be expected from India if the theory is correct and then assessing how well the historical record aligns with that expectation. Should the empirical reality fail to be congruent with the theories’ expectations, that theory is set aside as a potential explanation. Process tracing is used to assess the validity of any theories passing the first test.

In assessing the theories’ congruence with the historical record and tracing their causal mechanisms, there are two important things to keep in mind. First, the theories will have different
expectations for when grand strategic form should change. Second, the theories operate on different time scales and posit that grand strategic shifts should occur more or less swiftly. Theories that expect grand strategic change based on external threat implicitly assume that grand strategic shifts can happen quickly once that threat is identified. Alternatively, theories emphasizing strategic culture operate on a much longer time frame. The implication of this is that, for example, what may be relatively rapid change for a strategic culture explanation may be relatively slow in the context of a theory highlighting external threat. A given theory may fail to explain the case based on its inability to account for either the observed change or stability in form or the speed of response. Congruence testing provides a transparent method to determine whether or not a theory can adequately explain the change or stability observed in a case. Process-tracing is necessary both to determine whether or not the proposed causal mechanism is present but also to judge whether the rate of change is in line with theoretical expectations.

3.3.1 Externally oriented theories

Can externally oriented theories of grand strategic formation account for the relative stability in Indian grand strategy after their defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War? On its face, this case should be relatively easy for such claims to explain. In this section, I consider the explanatory power of the two potential externally oriented theories considered in this dissertation: external threat and regional security architecture. I first determine whether they are congruent with the case and then, if they are, conduct more detailed process tracing to determine whether or not their causal mechanisms may plausibly be at work. I conclude with a section summarizing how the theories fared.
3.3.1.1 External Threat

Prior to the 1962 Sino-Indian War, although tensions had been rising for several years, Indian policy-makers generally did not believe war with China was a real possibility. The surprising failure of the country in the conflict shocked the nation. Per the logic of the external threat claim, this shocking defeat should necessitate a re-calibration of threats, which would be likely yield either a major grand strategic shift or a dramatic increase in focus on the attention paid to the threat from the Chinese. It is possible that an external threat claim could anticipate grand strategic stability, however, if the regional threat posed by China was thought to be dwarfed by the more pressing threats posed by the superpowers; in such a situation, even a shocking defeat by China would not change India’s grand strategic calculus. In my earlier examination of Indian grand strategy during this period, I determined that the Indian approach is best categorized as stability. Thus, the theory could be congruent with the case, though the explanatory power of the theory depends on whether Indian policymakers did, in fact, concentrate on the threats posed by the superpowers when crafting the state’s grand strategy. Because Indian grand strategy was stable across the pre- and post-war periods, to substantiate the explanatory capacity of an external threat explanation, I would need to find evidence that India was more focused on superpower competition than regional security concerns when crafting its security policy. If such evidence is not present in the historical record, an external threat theory cannot pass the necessary hoop that would suggest causal import, and it will be likely that some other causal mechanism was at work in shaping Indian grand strategic thought.

In his comprehensive study of Non-Alignment, Rana contends that it was a strategy consciously created to deal with three threats: 1) the Cold War superpowers, 2) the “northern
neighbors” (i.e. Pakistan, and China), and 3) the other south-east Asian countries.\textsuperscript{159} Rana argues that Non-Alignment was first and foremost created to preserve India’s new-found independence from the predations of the superpowers, especially in the realm of foreign policy decision making.\textsuperscript{160} This is suggestive evidence in favor of an external threat explanation. What is problematic about this argument is that it raises questions about why India should be more concerned about loss of independence in foreign policy over the threat of invasion by China. This is especially true given India was dealt a painful lesson in just how large, and real, a threat China posed to Indian territorial integrity. That India’s grand strategy would have remained fixated on such a hypothetical, far-off threat when more concrete, proximate threats were present in both time and space seems to run contrary to this theory’s theoretical expectations.

Moreover, the empirical record demonstrates that India was focused on China as a threat in the aftermath of the conflict and largely chose to direct its focus towards an internal balancing strategy against China.\textsuperscript{161} In the aftermath of its defeat at the hands of the Chinese, India did take some concrete steps to redress its military deficiencies. They included increasing military spending and seeking military assistance in the form of equipment, training, military exercises, and funding from both Great Britain and the United States. What assistance was provided by the Western powers was both meagre and short-lived. A military assistance program signed between India and the United States in the aftermath of the war reportedly totaled between $70 to $120 million dollars.\textsuperscript{162} While it is unclear whether these are inflation-adjusted numbers, I will conservatively

\textsuperscript{159} Rana (1976, 49)
\textsuperscript{160} Rana (1976, 49)
\textsuperscript{161} One of the potential causes for this is Nehru’s alleged disappointment in the relatively even-handed approach of the Colombo powers to the conflict, despite his outward public support of their proposals. Reference to this fact is made in Brecher (1979, 629), though the source is personal conversations between Indian officials and the author, rendering corroboration of this assertion difficult.
\textsuperscript{162} Brecher (1979, 626), Riedel (2015, 162). Additionally, all numbers in the remainder of this paragraph are in 2010 United States Dollars, unless otherwise stated.
assume they represent figures in then-year dollars. Adjusting for inflation, the total amount of aid given by the U.S. in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian War totaled somewhere between $190 to $330 million 2010 dollars. In the fiscal year immediately after the war, Indian defense spending shot up from around $2.9 billion (fiscal year 1961-1962) to $7 billion (fiscal year 1963-1964). U.S. assistance thus translates to roughly 2.7 to 4.7 percent of all the money spent on Indian coercive elements of power for the fiscal year 1963-1964. A more substantive package of aid was negotiated but never executed. 163

Another important historical fact that needs to be accounted for is that India’s intelligence service also worked with the CIA to assist Tibetan rebels against the Chinese occupation. The CIA operation had been ongoing prior to the outbreak of the war; formalization of the collaboration with India was the only thing which signaled a break from historical precedent.164 Given that this activity was inherently clandestine and involved a high-level of public deniability, it is unclear how much weight one should assign to this piece of evidence; as a fairly low-level clandestine activity, it is unlikely that it alone would justify declaring a significant disjuncture with the overall current of Indian grand strategy. It is also highly debatable the extent to which this data point represents a significant departure from prior Indian policy. Nevertheless, the effort highlights an increased focus on the Chinese threat. Finally, there was some effort to increase India’s ability to acquire a nuclear weapon should the need arise, although it would still be more than a decade before India’s first nuclear test.165 While India did cite the threat from China as part of its

163 Riedel (2015, 162-3) recounts how an agreement between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Nehru for an aid package totaling $500 million over 7 years, a much more substantive and lasting commitment, was agreed to in principle, but the death of Kennedy and Nehru in close succession ultimately led to the deal falling through.
164 Riedel (2015, 160)
165 Kirk (2010, 285)
justification in acquiring nuclear weapons, it conducted only a single nuclear weapon test in 1974 before suspending tests for almost twenty-five years.  

From the available evidence, it does not appear that an external threat theory passes the theoretical hoop it needs to. While India did take some steps to increase its military capabilities, the actions were not sufficient to demonstrate the theory’s stipulated causal mechanism was at work. The argument for grand strategic stability in this case rests on prioritization of non-alignment between the superpowers, and not regional concerns. Mention of the superpowers does not appear in my content analysis, severely weakening the case for expectations of stability. If regional concerns dominate, then either grand strategic change or a dramatic shift in focus are called for, and neither appears to be the case. Scholars have argued that, despite the defeat in 1962, China was perceived both to be a less salient threat than neighboring Pakistan and tended to remain on the periphery of the public mind; the reduced prominence of this issue meant that politicians had less incentive to deal with the issue than other, more salient matters.  

This lack of security prioritization is borne out by the content analysis performed in the previous section. An external threat theory would expect to see China appear as a focus in multiple topics in my content analysis. Instead, China appears in only one topic: the same as the pre-war

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166 Malik (1998, 193-4)  
167 Narang and Staniland (2018, 417, 435-6). It could be argued that the reason for stability in this case was that India was fixated not on the superpowers, but the threat of Pakistan. If Pakistan was the over-riding threat that India was focused on, and not the combination of the superpowers, Pakistan, China, and India’s regional neighbors as Rana (1976) contends, then the assertion that Non-Alignment was primarily articulated to keep India free from superpower interference is simply wrong and, moreover, the very logic of Non-Alignment as a strategy begins to unravel. If one considers Pakistan the primary threat, then the logic of Non-Alignment falls apart in the following manner: In order to deal with Pakistan and its neighbors in the way it wanted, India recognized that it had to contend with the threats of the superpowers first, and it did so by refusing to choose sides. It could not, however completely ignore the threat posed by the superpowers, as the concern about intervention by the superpowers was always a possibility. Additionally, as I mentioned earlier in my discussion, India clearly recognized the threat posed by China and felt compelled to respond. Thus, Pakistan may have been the object of primary concern, but Indian leaders were clearly cognizant of the potential threat posed by superpower intervention and of China, suggesting that concerns over Pakistan were not totally dominant.
level. Instead, it is Pakistan which continues appearing in multiple topics both pre- and post-war. This is surprising from an external threat perspective because, until 1965, India and Pakistan had not fought a conflict for almost 20 years. If it was the proximity to conflict that was increasing the number of mentions of an issue, both countries would be expected to appear in the same number of topics pre-war. Additionally, India managed to fight Pakistan to a draw in 1965; it was beaten handily and embarrassed on the world stage by the Chinese in 1962. Given the fact that it was China, and not Pakistan, that dealt India a crushing major defeat, that Indian grand strategy did not focus more directly and emphatically on addressing it is problematic and suggests an external threat theory cannot explain grand strategic stability in this case.

3.3.1.2 Regional Security Architecture

The most straightforward expectation of a regional security architecture theory is that, given the failure of Indian strategy to maintain Indian security in the regional security environment in which it operated, change would be expected if there was a change in the constellation of alliances and diplomatic support in the region; stability is generally expected when the constellation of alliances and countries remains unchanged. The problem in this case is that India suffered a defeat and the pressure on India’s web of relationships changed; suddenly, the threat from the Chinese was greater than previously anticipated. Thus, grand strategic stability in this case would only be expected if there was a strengthening of India’s extant security network to ensure it could withstand the strain. Since Indian grand strategy in this period is characterized by stability, a regional security architecture theory can be said to be potentially congruent with the case; the important theoretical hoop that now needs to be cleared is to find evidence that India sought to significantly bolster its relations in the region.
The regional security architecture that existed in the region was relatively straightforward. India had positioned itself as a leader amongst non-aligned nations, with military procurement agreements, but no explicit defense pacts, with the Soviet Union; Pakistan was allied with the United States, and China found itself in a position as the odd-man out. As aligning more closely with the Soviet Union or the United States would violate the premise of Non-Alignment, India could only attempt to shore up its security position by using the non-aligned movement to strengthen its web of relationships in the region. As an ostensible leader of the non-aligned movement, India had many possible diplomatic avenues it could have exploited to attempt to externally balance against the Chinese. In fact, a group of non-aligned nations came forward in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian War and advanced a series of proposals as a starting point to address the dispute.\textsuperscript{168} As summarized by Elkin and Fredericks, the proposals suggested:

\begin{quote}
China should withdraw from the western sector, this area to become a demilitarized zone pending a final solution; in the east, Indian and Chinese forces could be positioned along the McMahon Line except for the Thagla ridge and Longju areas where lines of control would be settled in future discussions.\textsuperscript{169}
\end{quote}

These proposals were meant to represent a starting point for future negotiations and have been described as fairly even-handed.\textsuperscript{170} After some clarifications, India accepted the proposals \textit{in toto}. China, on the other hand, only accepted the proposals in principle.\textsuperscript{171} Progress stalled and the proposals went nowhere. India also offered to refer the matter to The Hague Court of International Justice or other court of arbitration, but these overtures were also decisively rebuffed by China.\textsuperscript{172}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[168] Power (1964, 283). The six countries, referred to in this context as The Colombo Powers were: The United Arab Republic (U.A.R.), Sri Lanka, Kampuchea, Burma, Indonesia, and Ghana. Nehru, Parthasarathi, and Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund. (1985, 542)
\item[169] Elkin and Fredericks (1983, 1132)
\item[170] Brecher (1979, 629)
\item[171] Nehru (1982, 699)
\item[172] Nehru (1989, 594)
\end{footnotes}
While these failures may seem obvious signals of the need to shift toward internal balancing because of the failure to generate sufficient traction for an external balancing solution, this failure would have been far from certain at the time. More tellingly, some scholars have argued that, while India had a tendency towards multilateral rhetoric, its real preference was for bilateral diplomacy and, as such, failed to put its full weight of effort behind multilateral solutions. Arthur Rubinoff, commenting on India’s failure to cultivate the non-aligned movement into a third power bloc to counter-balance against the superpowers, declared “If Nehru was unwilling to yield India's hard-won freedom to the major powers, he was also hesitant to sacrifice the country's independence in an association of non-aligned states.” The implication of Rubinoff’s assertion is that India would no more bind itself to the other non-aligned nations than it would align with the superpowers. Thus, India took no meaningful, sustained action to shore up its regional web of alliances.

India could have alternatively pursued a series of bilateral security guarantees with either neighboring countries or the superpowers. The viability of such a path is uncertain, however. A quick survey of the countries surrounding India at the time shows a lack of a sufficient number of militarily strong allies in the region to counterbalance China. Rather than resort to an external balancing approach through the use of multilateral institutions or strong bilateral relationships to generate significant international political support for itself, a hallmark of Nehru’s Non-Alignment policy, India instead chose to internally balance. This suggests that India was not necessarily as concerned with the regional web of alliances, but rather the direct threat of the Chinese and its ability to counter it, which is a mechanism that is more in line with an external threat hypothesis than a regional security architecture one. As such, the weight of available evidence suggests the causal mechanism of this theory is very likely not at work in this case.

173 Rubinoff (1991)
3.3.1.3 Summary of externally oriented theories’ ability to describe the case

The previous sections have shown that, while Indian grand strategy may be generally congruent with the expectations of an external threat and regional security architecture theory, both of these theories fail to clear crucial hoops in order to suggest that their causal mechanisms are at work in the case. Just because some aspects of the empirical record are congruent with their expectations, it does not mean that these theories’ mechanisms are at work. In this case, external threat theories expect change when internal balancing against China is pursued or stability when superpower concerns dominate; available evidence suggests neither of these expectations is met. A regional security architecture theory would expect grand strategic stability only if the existing web of alliance was reinforced; here, the notable lack of attempts to bring international agreements in play to hem in the Chinese is telling. As such, I conclude that these theories cannot adequately account for the weight of evidence in the case.

3.3.2 Internally oriented theories

If externally oriented theories cannot fully explain the case, what about internally oriented claims? Internally oriented theories expect change in grand strategy only in response to internal factors such as changes in leadership or strategic culture. Such alterations can be catalyzed by external events, but there must also be a detectable internal change before the theories expect any observed grand strategic change. In this section, I examine the two internally oriented theories selected for analysis: leadership and strategic culture. Each section starts by determining whether or not the theory’s expectations are congruent with the case. If it is, I conduct more detailed process tracing to determine whether or not there is evidence of that theory’s causal mechanism at work. I then conclude with a separate section summarizing the theories’ abilities to explain the case.
3.3.2.1 Leadership

A leadership theory expects that grand strategies to change as leaders and/or their preferences do; this could either be through physical leadership change, or change of a single leader’s preference. In the absence of a change of either administration, or inter-administration preference, stability should result. In my discussion of post-War Indian grand strategy, I noted that Nehru died in 1964. His successor, Shastri, died in 1966 and Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, took office after that. A leadership theory would expect grand strategic stability in these circumstances only if the three Prime Ministers’ preferences were similar. Given that Indira Gandhi was Nehru’s daughter, and, as described in greater detail in Chapter 4, favored a realist version of Non-Alignment, their preferences can be said to be broadly similar. This leaves the question of Shastri, about whom much less is written. According to Ankit’s account, Shastri also generally favored what I would term a persuasive grand strategy.174 Given all three leaders can plausibly be said to share similar preferences, then a leadership theory can be said to be broadly congruent and potentially explain the case.

When considering the empirical record, however, a leadership theory of grand strategy has to be able to explain some of the more important variations in the case. At issue is whether there is a plausible mechanism specified by the theory that would account for, a) the decision to selectively update Indian beliefs only about China, b) the choice to internally balance in that case only, or c) the ultimate course pursued. If anything, it seems that such a claim would expect that the Indian leaders would act on their previous preferences and favor an external balancing solution but, as was discussed in the section on regional security architecture, that alternative was not pursued. At best, this suggests some intervening variable not currently specified may be at work.

174 Ankit (2020, 47-53)
My analysis of India’s post-war grand strategy did reveal signs of a potentially coercive shift. As such, this criticism does not fatally weaken a leadership theory, but it does undermine confidence in its ability to fully explain the case.

### 3.3.2.2 Strategic Culture

A strategic culture theory anticipates no significant change in India’s grand strategy after the Sino-Indian War unless there is a corresponding change in India’s strategic culture. Given that India had a very clearly articulated grand strategy and had pursued that strategy from independence to the Sino-Indian War, the continuity observed in the post-war period – in form and substance – should be relatively easy for this theory to explain. As for the rate of any small changes observed, while exogenous shocks such as defeat in a war can cause factors internal to a country to shift, shifts in grand strategy should track changes in strategic culture and, by necessity, take time to propagate. Thus, grand strategic change, if it is explicable in strategic culture terms, should only be observed after internal factors shift, be in line with those changes, and move at the speed with which those mechanisms move. Any outcome that is not congruent with those expectations cannot be described as congruent with the case.

In the aftermath of a decisive defeat in a major conflict, a strategic culture theory expects relative stability in grand strategic preference, coupled with an uptick in discourse concerning how to address the deficiencies. Strategic change should happen relatively slowly; culture is not an immovable object, but neither is it especially agile. Adjustments can be made, but progress will be slow. This is precisely the behavior observed by India throughout the period. As mentioned above, India’s strategic culture throughout this period was dominated by Nehru in his dual roles

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175 Basrur (2016, 184)
as both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. There is also evidence that these preferences did not rest solely in the mind of Nehru. The presence of like-minded allies such as V.K. Menon, who represented India first in the United Nations and later as Defense Minister during the time of the Sino-Indian War, lend support to this assertion.\footnote{Power (1964, 259-60, 275)} Even though Menon was removed from his post in the aftermath of India’s defeat, Nehru remained; Nehru’s death in 1964 was not sufficient to change the fundamental tone and tenor of India’s foreign policy framework, as there were simply no alternatives to be found. Indeed, some scholars have gone as far as to argue that the original Nehruvian framework has lasted to the present day.\footnote{Chaulia (2002, 216)} My analysis determined the grand strategic form over the case is best described by stability, and thus a strategic culture theory can be said to be congruent with the case.

As the trajectory of India’s grand strategy in the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian War seems generally congruent with a strategic culture hypothesis, it is necessary to determine whether or not there is evidence of the theory’s causal mechanisms at work. In Chapter 2, I detailed that the causal mechanisms for the strategic culture theory, as articulated by Johnson, consist of a central paradigm and operational assumptions about how to translate those preferences into reality. Johnson argues that the “central paradigm” of a strategic culture can be determined by answering three questions and understanding how a given culture views:

\begin{quote}
\ldots the role of war in human affairs (whether it is inevitable or an aberration), about the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses (zero-sum or variable sum), and about the efficacy of the use of force (about the ability to control outcomes and to eliminate threats, and the conditions under which applied force is useful).\footnote{Johnston (1995, 46)}
\end{quote}
The answers to these questions, Johnson posits, helps frame how a country will view its option set in the foreign policy domain: “The second part [of the strategic culture theory] consists of assumptions at a more operational level about what strategic options are the most efficacious for dealing with the threat environment, as defined by answers to the first three questions.”179 In this model, if a country’s culture tends toward believing war is an aberration, the nature of the threat is variable-sum, and force has limited utility, that country might tend towards utilizing what I have identified as persuasive grand strategies.180 Countries on the opposite end of the spectrum would likely pursue what I would term coercive grand strategies.181

Johnston concludes this description with an empirically falsifiable statement of strategic culture which provides the testable core of the theory:

…the essential empirical referent of a strategic culture is a limited, ranked set of grand-strategic preferences that is consistent across the objects of analysis (e.g., textual sources for potential answers to the central paradigm) and persistent across time. This ranking is not, therefore, necessarily responsive to changes in non-cultural variables such as technology, threat, or organization.182

If strategic culture is driving grand strategic choice in this case, then there are two important hoops for it to clear; the first hoop is evidence of the central paradigm and the second hoop is evidence that those operational level assumptions are in alignment with that paradigm.

A distinct Indian strategic culture, as understood in Johnston’s terms, could reasonably be said to exist from 1947-1964. This is exemplified by Nehru’s ideational non-alignment and the panchsheel agreement signed in the 1950s between India and China. As described by George

179 Johnston (1995, 46)
180 Variable sum in this context implies that the threat is not existential; there is inherently room for negotiation and not all conflicts represent existential threats to the state.
181 Johnston (1995, 47)
182 Johnston (1995, 48)
Tanham, *panchsheel* (or five principles) was an agreement between the Indians and the Chinese (which was later expanded by the Indians to refer to relations with all nations) in which relations would be based on respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.183 A strategic culture theory would emphasize that, because the *panchsheel* approach was extended by India to refer to all countries, some of these principles serve as important sign-posts to some of the key independent variables of this theory. For instance, equality and mutual benefit suggests that conflict is variable-sum. Likewise, peaceful co-existence could suggest a view of war as an aberration. It follows that India’s persuasive grand strategy pre-1962 is in line with a strategic culture hypothesis expectation and, as such, the theory passes the first hoop.

A strategic culture explanation begins to break down in India’s change in perception of how to deal with the Chinese threat, however. If a strategic culture hypothesis is accurate, then India’s central paradigm dictated the selection of a persuasive grand strategy. This does not clearly align with what the empirical record indicates. Despite being closer to believing war is an aberration, threat is variable-sum, and force has limited utility, India pursued a limited military buildup to address the threat in the post-war era rather than a diplomatic solution.184 The central paradigm of Indian strategic culture suggests that war is an aberration, therefore there would be no pressing reason to create new military forces wholesale, yet that is what was done. For instance, India created a roughly 10,000-strong division of ethnic Tibetans to operate as a commando force to conduct operations inside Tibet in the event of a future war with China.185 The Indian Air Force

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183 Tanham (1992, 36)
184 Tanham (1992, 38)
185 Garver (2010, 93)
was modernized from a transport force to a fighting force and, with U.S. help, eight divisions were prepared for mountain defense against the Chinese.\textsuperscript{186} Whereas before India had met the expansion of Chinese influence in the region with diplomacy and accommodation, a more hardline stance was now suddenly in play.\textsuperscript{187} Thus, this theory does not seem to cleanly pass the second hoop, given the rapid and unexpected change in operational assumptions without a change in its central paradigm.

That India’s strategic culture would selectively apply and update their operational beliefs very rapidly, but only in the case of China, suggests that, even if a strategic culture theory does seem suggestive, another causal mechanism was also at work in shaping its grand strategy. While an approach emphasizing the importance of strategic culture can explain the stability in Indian grand strategy over the period, it does not cleanly pass the hoops it needs to in order to serve as a persuasive explanation.

\textbf{3.3.2.3 Summary of internally oriented theories ability to explain the case}

In the previous two sections, I outlined the theoretical expectations of both a leadership theory and a strategic culture theory of grand strategic change. While a leadership theory is congruent with the case based on the fact that Nehru, Shastri, and Gandhi all plausibly shared a similar set of beliefs regarding what grand strategy to pursue, confidence in the theory is undermined because it fails to account for much of the variation in the historical record; there is the question as to why the Indians would only update their preferences with regards to China and, furthermore, there is little explanation as to why they failed to follow their prior preferences, which

\textsuperscript{186} Cohen and Dasgupta (2010, 8)\textsuperscript{187} Garver (2010, 93)
suggests another causal mechanism at work. A strategic culture theory fares better, but fails to fully clear one of the theoretical hoops it would need to in order to completely establish its causal mechanism was at work. While there was not sufficient evidence to rule out this theory, its explanatory power appears relatively weak.

3.3.3 Organizational determinants of grand strategy

My theory, which posits that the strength of a state’s constitutive organizations plays a crucial role in determining the course of a country’s grand strategy, expects change when resourcing changes and stability when it does not. In the aftermath of a major defeat, traditional organization theory would expect that India would be likely to adjust the way it resources its organizations engaged in the creation and implementation of foreign policy, though it would not be guaranteed to do so. If India did make such a change, and funding were shifted away from the strongest organization(s) (as opposed to strengthening them further), I would expect to detect a corresponding shift in grand strategic form. The rate at which any change occurs would be dependent on how quickly the resourcing levels change. If, by contrast, India did not make changes in its funding patterns, I would expect to observe stability in its grand strategy. As described above, India’s grand strategy did not change from its persuasive form in the wake of the Sino-Indian War. My theory can thus be congruent with the observed outcome, but only if the government’s allocation of resources to the various types of agencies tasked with carrying out foreign policy remained relatively stable over the same period.

The next sections trace the causal logic of my theory. My theory’s key independent variables are described in both the pre- and post-war periods; as will be shown, their values align with what my theory anticipates. The pre-war distribution of organizational resources is perfectly
in line with what my theory would expect given India’s adoption of a persuasive grand strategy. Post-war, the Ministry of External Affairs continued to enjoy robust resourcing, which accounts for the stability in India’s overall grand strategy, while increases in resources allocated to the Ministry of Defence shed light on why, despite the maintenance of a persuasive grand strategy, there are signs that other grand strategic options may have been beginning to present themselves.

In tracing the causal logic of my theory, I first measure the values of state-level money, manpower, and elite attention. This sets the baseline expectation about what level of resources India had available to it and flags any important variation in overall resources that might account for change observed later on. I then measure the allocation of resources at the organizational level, the distribution of these resources conditions expectations regarding grand strategic form, and expectations regarding stability and change. To maintain consistency with the preceding sections and my earlier description of the value of the dependent variable, I begin with a discussion of the pre-war situation before describing any post-war variation.

### 3.3.3.1 Pre-war state-level resources

Figure 3.4 below shows Indian GDP in the years from 1960-1962, as data from the World Bank does not go back further. India’s GDP in 1960 was approximately $147 billion 2010 US dollars, putting India solidly in the middle power category for this time period and making it one of the more prosperous of the developing countries in the period. Additionally, this level of GDP puts India in the company (at the time) of states such as Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden, and China, even if India’s level of development lagged well behind some of these countries. While
rightfully thought of as a developing country during this period, India still possessed relatively robust monetary resources at the time.

Figure 3.4. GDP of India 1960-1962 (Constant 2010 USD)

If India had a fairly large economy at the time, it was relatively small on a per-capita basis. With almost 450 million people living in India in 1960, India was the second most populous country in the world, behind China.\textsuperscript{188} Even if one only considers the male population of India between the ages of 15 and 64, the approximate pool eligible to serve in the Indian military at that time, India had a total of almost 132 million people from which it could potentially draw to staff its organizations.\textsuperscript{189} With only this population, India would have been one of the largest countries in the world. These resources demonstrate that, although India may have lagged behind even great powers (not to mention the two superpowers), it still had a respectable number of

\textsuperscript{188} Van Staaveren (1993)
\textsuperscript{189} The World Bank Group (2018c)
resources it could devote to external issues. This data tells me that India grew at a relatively modest rate, and thus large increases or decreases of resources at the organizational level cannot be accounted for by growth or contraction at the country level.

The final independent variable required for my theory is the set of foreign policy topics, and specifically other countries, that were occupying elite attention during this time period. This is an important distinction from what dominated policy-maker attention at the time, even if one is a subset of the other. Elites more broadly set the general agenda, while policy-makers set the specific agenda and are responsible for the ends-means reconciliation, which is the bread-and-butter of strategy. To capture this larger audience, I look at newspaper headlines from the Sunday edition of the Times of India, the most widely read English language daily newspaper in India at the time. This gives a sense of the topics that were most likely to be at the top of the national agenda at the time. Text analysis of the headlines of the Times of India reveals that border issues, as well as reporting on the activities of the superpowers, occupied the international headlines. Table 3.1 shows the top 10 mentions of foreign entities in the headlines in the years between 1960 and 1962.
Table 3.1. List of top 10 foreign entities mentioned in Times of India headlines, 1960 – 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word(s)</th>
<th>Total Number of Mentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Chinese” or “China”</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Pak” or “Pakistan”</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goa</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmir</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This list generally comports with regional events, befitting India’s status as a middle power. High on the list are China and Pakistan, India’s neighbors and regional rivals, as well as the superpowers. That references to the superpowers showed up here is an indication that the Cold War was on the agenda. That such references were absent from the grand strategy discussion reinforces the idea that Non-Alignment was intended to put distance between India and the superpowers. Finally, those familiar with India’s colonial history know the status of both Goa and Ceylon (later Sri Lanka) were large issues.

From this overview of India’s state-level resources in the pre-war period, it is apparent that India was very much a middle power focused on regional issues mostly involving its border regions as well as the status of other regional post-colonial entities. India’s financial resources were respectable, if diffuse, and its pool of manpower, whether measured by total population or only males of around military age, puts it as one of the most populous nations on the planet. Because this growth followed a relatively predictable trajectory, change in the distribution of organizational-level resources cannot be accounted for by a change in the distribution of money, or manpower; as such, any variation must have been a deliberate choice. Furthermore, my analysis
of the *Times of India* provides the pool of available topics I would expect India to be focusing on.

How then, did India choose to funnel these available resources into its formal organizations?

### 3.3.3.2 Pre-war organizational-level resources

During this period, some of India’s organizations were undergoing frequent re-alignment, presenting a potential complication when describing the constellation of foreign policy options India possessed. The organizations responsible for both persuasive and coercive functions do not change. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs is the primary organization responsible for diplomacy and thus persuasive grand strategic functions, and is henceforth referred to as the persuasive organization. The Indian Ministry of Defence and the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force make up the constellation of organizations which represent India’s coercive potential, and is referred to collectively as the coercive organization. India’s inducive potential resides in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry until 1964; later, it undergoes several reorganizations. The organization(s) primarily responsible for the task at the time are referred to herein as the inducive organization.

In the period leading up to the 1962 Sino-Indian War, investment in India’s foreign policy organizations was relatively constant. Figure 3.5 displays the total amount of money allocated to each of the three organization areas in that fiscal year and captures the relevant line items for each of the respective organizations present in the Indian Appropriations Bill(s) passed both *in* and *for* those years. This is an important fact to bear in mind because, due to Indian law, any money spent by the union government must be passed in an appropriations bill. As such, it is not uncommon

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190 This problem is exclusively related to reorganizations related to what was known up until 1963-4 as the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which saw various reorganizations and splits until settling into the separate Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Industry in 1972.
for unplanned expenses to be passed retroactively. For example, should unbudgeted expenditures for the Ministry of Defence take place in *fiscal year* 1961, a bill may be passed in a future year fiscal to authorize it. These numbers have also been included so that the totals represent the actual amount appropriated for the year, rather than that simply budgeted, yielding a more holistic picture.\textsuperscript{191}

\textsuperscript{191} When I say the figures capture the relevant line items, they typically include the top line item (e.g. “Ministry of Commerce and Industry”), relevant major functional activities (e.g. “Foreign Trade”), any noted miscellaneous expenditures, and all noted capital outlays. In the case of the Inducive organization(s) some extraneous activities have been removed such as those related to general internal industry (e.g. “Industries” line item) or other social provisions (e.g. “Salt”) in an effort to isolate the effort being paid to elements of the organization relevant to foreign policy. Similar treatment was given to the persuasive and coercive organization(s).
Figure 3.5. Money appropriated to select Indian organizations for the years 1960-1962
When interpreting Figure 3.5, care must be exercised due to the difference in scale between
the three organizations, with coercive spending being orders of magnitude higher than the others.
Military equipment is notoriously expensive to acquire and sustain. In comparison, running an
organization that primarily relies on human capital (e.g., the diplomatic corps) is significantly
cheaper. As such, relative changes in funding are the relevant statistics to consider. Funding for all
three organizations rose in fiscal year 1961-1962 after remaining relatively flat in the years leading
up to the conflict. Throughout much of India’s history, defense spending accounts for a large
percentage of the Indian budget. In this period, it accounts for almost 28% of total planned
spending. Despite this, in pure percentage increase, inducive organizations received the largest
boost in funding thanks primarily to a dramatic increase in capital outlays for the year. While a
capital outlay can be thought of as an investment in an organization, if it is not followed up with
more year-to-year funding, it could signify that old infrastructure was replaced by new
infrastructure, such as when a new headquarters is built. Alternatively, such outlays can become a
drag on the organization if the expenditure is in excess of capacity and unable to be utilized fully.
This suggests that the inducive organization was just getting set up, as evidenced by the fact that
the major budgetary line item for my purposes, foreign trade, does not show up as a line item until
1964.

The persuasive domain experienced a 37% increase from fiscal year 1960-1961 to fiscal
year 1961-1962, as opposed to only a 5% increase in the coercive realm. Figure 3.6 shows these
percentage changes in chart form. The implication here is that, while in absolute amounts India
was investing more financial resources into the coercive domain, the persuasive domain was
going relatively more investment. It is this relative emphasis, across all three domains, which is
the important driver of my theory, as opposed to the absolute value. While the trend line for the
persuasive and coercive organizations appear to switch places in the figure, the relative emphasis was still on the persuasive organization, as the relative investment gap in 1961-1962 was more in favor of the persuasive organization than the 1962-63 gap was in favor of the coercive organization; this implies the relative emphasis was still in the persuasive domain and is suggestive of a persuasive grand strategy.

![Graph showing percentage change in appropriations from previous fiscal year](image)

**Figure 3.6.** Percent change year over year in appropriations to select Indian organizations 1961-1962

When considering civilian personnel working in these various organizations during the period, it is necessary to expand the time period being discussed from 1955 to 1963. This is necessary because, while the *Census of Central Government Employees* was conducted regularly during this period, I have been unable thus far to locate publicly available published versions of the years 1960-1962. This is less problematic than it might appear at first because of the nature of civil service generally and the Indian civil service in particular, which is both difficult to get into
and experiences very low turnover, rendering dramatic changes from year to year unlikely. Figure 3.7 details the number of civilian personnel employed by these organizations on the date of the census in that year. Despite the missing data points, the three graphs indicate clear trends over time in employment in each of the three ministries, with the beginnings of gradual changes in the post-war years.
Figure 3.7. Personnel employed by various Indian organizations per year (1955-1963)
Civilian personnel from 1955 to 1959 in the persuasive category grew relatively rapidly - by over 68% before data become unavailable. This corresponds closely to India’s observed persuasive grand strategic form. Scholars have contended that India reached the peak of its diplomatic influence in the mid to late 1950s.\textsuperscript{192} This closely correlates with growth in personnel in the persuasive domain. Given that data from 1960 to 1963 is missing, it is not clear quite what to make of the personnel spike in the persuasive organization in 1959. Regardless, manpower in the persuasive organization remained higher at the end of the period than it was in the late 1950s. Without personnel, organizations cannot do their jobs and that this variable moves in tandem with an observed persuasive grand strategy is an indicator that my organizational theory of grand strategy might help explain the case. Civilian personnel employed in the coercive domain remained relatively stable, growing by only around 3,500 people, or less than 1.5%, over the period up to 1959, when personnel in the persuasive domain increased by double digit percentages. This also tracks with the description of Nehru as having placed limits on defense growth and his preference for diplomatic solutions. While personnel numbers in the inducive area actually double, it is unclear how many, if any, were engaged in efforts in the international arena; the inducive organization has a role to play not only in external trade promotion, but also in internal commercial regulation; many of the personnel may have been engaged in internally facing positions. Thus, the significance of this level of growth is unclear.

Analysis of the abstracts of the \textit{Times of India} front page articles yields further insight into the organizations which were most covered during this time. Looking at the topics covered in these articles gives us an idea of the broader pool which were occupying elite attention at the time. For this piece of the analysis, rather than use a simple word frequency, a two-word (bigram) analysis

\textsuperscript{192} Kapur (1988, 50)
was used. Bigrams have the potential to contain more detailed information than single word, or unigrams. For instance, bigrams have the benefit of preserving the distinction between “united states,” “united kingdom,” and “united nations.” While unigrams are excellent for capturing most state or administrative political entities, bigrams can capture additional actors or potentially common descriptors associated with those words. Thus, bigrams allow for a more diverse set of information and better inference of foreign policy priorities.

Table 3.2. List of top 10 bigrams in select Times of India abstracts between 1960-1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word 1</th>
<th>Word 2</th>
<th>Number of appearances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>Union</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lok</td>
<td>Sabha</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United</td>
<td>Nations</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>government</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many of the top appearances in the list in Table 3.2 reflect frequently reported news items, including, for example, reports on the activities of heads of state (prime minister, chief minister) or major local political entities (Lok Sabha.) Most interesting for the purposes of determining what elite attention was focused on was the attention paid to both the Security Council and, by extension, the United Nations, which also appears on the list. That the goings-on of the Security Council and the United Nations more broadly is on a level with major domestic issues of the day, such as the Indian Communist Party, sends a strong message that elite attention was pulled in the direction of multilateral fora. A majority of the references to the Security Council in the abstracts directly refer to topics identified in my analysis of Indian grand strategy over the period, including articles on the Security Council discussions on the Congo and the conflict between India and Pakistan over
Kashmir. That some of the topics covered here are also addressed specifically in both the topic modeling and India’s grand strategy lends support to the idea that policy-maker priorities align in some meaningful way with elite attention.

All of these indicators are perfectly in line with the expectations of my theory: the allocation of money, manpower, and elite attention resources all point to a persuasive grand strategy focused on border threats, the Cold War, and economic development while also underscoring the importance of institutions such as the United Nations and the Security Council in India’s efforts to achieve security. Two of the independent variables in my theory, manpower and elite attention, were focused on persuasive elements of power, and this is in line with my theory’s expectation of a persuasive Indian grand strategy. That the third, money, shows an increase for all three organizations suggests that more money was flowing into the national budget at the time. Given that the biggest funding increase was in the inducive area, which was driven by a major increase in capital outlays, this is most appropriately viewed as a likely aberration rather than a sign of a substantive change in grand strategy. Since there was relative continuity in grand strategy from the period before to the period after the 1962 war, there should also be relative continuity in resourcing levels over that time. This expectation of relative continuity in resourcing is an important hoop my theory must clear.

3.3.3.3 Post-war state-level resources

India’s economy continued to grow at a steady pace in the period after the 1962 Sino-Indian War, although it did suffer a little in the aftermath of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict, as Figure 3.8 demonstrates. India’s population likewise continued to climb steadily, reaching a total of
The most interesting continuity was the maintained focus of elite attention on the border issues between India and Pakistan. Interest in events in Vietnam pick up during this period, coinciding neatly with an uptick in the United States focus on the war effort there. Overall, however, elite attention in the country at large remained focused rather unsurprisingly on India’s nearest neighbors, with which it had just engaged in two conflicts. This relatively orderly overall increase in Indian resources suggests the available pool of money and manpower from which India was drawing was stable, and would not account for any variation in organization-level resourcing.

![GDP of India 1960-1967 (Constant 2010 USD)](image)

**Figure 3.8.** GDP of India 1960-1967 (Constant 2010 USD)

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193 The World Bank Group (2018d, 2018c)
Table 3.3. List of top 10 foreign entities mentioned in Times of India headlines, 1963-1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word(s)</th>
<th>Total Number of Mentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Pak&quot; or &quot;Pakistan&quot;</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Chinese&quot; or &quot;China&quot; or &quot;Peking&quot;</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Viet&quot; or &quot;Viet Nam&quot; or &quot;Hanoi&quot;</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmir</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Soviet&quot; or &quot;Russia&quot;</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As these figures attest, India was not materially weakened by the defeat, nor did it undergo extraordinary growth. Thus, deliberate decisions about areas of emphasis are the driving factors behind changes in resource levels and prioritization. The next section explores the link between post-war Indian grand strategy and organizational resources levels. As there is wide latitude for potential alternative grand strategic paths the country could take in order to clear the next hoop, an organizational theory of grand strategy must demonstrate how the two moved in tandem over the period.

### 3.3.3.4 Post-war organizational-level resources

In the post-war period, money flowed both to the persuasive and coercive domains with spending peaking in 1963-1964 for coercive purposes and 1964-1965 for persuasive purposes (see Figure 3.9). A majority of the spending increase in the coercive realm in the 1963-1964 fiscal year can be attributed to a $1.2 billion-dollar defence capital outlay as well as an almost doubling of
the money allocated to the armed forces. While this is a significant investment, and could potentially be indicative of a shift towards a coercive grand strategy, relative trends in investment are more important to consider than absolute dollar amounts. Figure 3.10 depicts the relative changes in funding and shows that, after this initial influx of investment in coercive organizations, the pattern falls back to historical levels. Investments in the persuasive elements also continue to climb upwards, but at a much slower rate than previously. Finally, money allocated towards inducive elements of power continued to bounce erratically, with a majority of the increase in the later part of the period attributable to the introduction of a “Foreign Trade” line item, which begins to grow substantially. This indicates that a surge of resources flowed into the primary national security related organizations in the aftermath of the war and suggests the beginnings of an effort to expand external economic outreach.
Figure 3.9. Money appropriated to select Indian organizations for the years 1960-1967
Figure 3.10. Percent change in appropriations from previous fiscal year
Figure 3.11. Personnel employed by select Indian organizations per year, 1955-1967
Personnel figures tell a slightly different story, with numbers for the Ministry of External Affairs beginning a slow decline and Ministry of Defence civilians beginning to tick upwards starting with 1962. Re-organizations continued to affect personnel numbers in the inducive ministries, resulting in an overall reduction in the number of personnel employed there as personnel were spun off into various different ministries and organizations. Based solely on this indicator alone, my theory would expect grand strategic change. When money is factored in, however, grand strategic paralysis is likely to result because of path dependence. Thus, my theory’s expectation of stability or change, and thus its ability to describe the case, hangs on the direction of the third indicator.

Elite attention at the organization level shifted substantially from pre-1962 to post-1962, as measured by the frequency of mentions in the abstracts of *Times of India* articles from 1963-1967. As it relates to foreign political entities, word combinations related to the Vietnam War (“viet nam” and “north viet”) are the highest in the number of appearances with the Security Council following closely behind. The most striking feature of Table 3.4 relative to Table 3.3 is the almost complete lack of foreign policy topics absent the references to the Vietnam War. This suggests that elite attention was not as focused on foreign policy topics as it was pre-war.
Table 3.4. List of top 10 bigrams in select Times of India abstracts between 1963 – 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word 1</th>
<th>Word 2</th>
<th>Number of appearances of pair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahadur</td>
<td>Shastri</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet</td>
<td>Nam</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lal</td>
<td>Bahadur</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indira</td>
<td>Gandhi</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>Viet</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That internal issues would dominate is not especially surprising, as this was also the case in the pre-war abstracts (Table 3.2). Another explanatory factor accounting for the dominance of internal political issues is the death of Nehru in 1964, the short-lived Prime Ministership of Lal Bahadur Shastri, and the accession in 1966 of Indira Gandhi (Nehru’s daughter) to the role of Prime Minister. For a country that had been dominated by one man from its independence in 1947 until his death in 1964, three Prime Ministers in three years represented a dramatic change. Given that this indicator points in a different direction (inward) from either of the other two, this reinforces the expectation of stability.

India’s grand strategy remained persuasive from pre- to post-war, but there were some indications that a coercive shift might be underway. As there was macro-level stability in the form of a persuasive grand strategy, there must be a readily identifiable reason for this, but must also account for the increase in coercive topics. When I dive into the variables of my theory, this pattern can easily be found in the differing rates of investment across the resource categories. When one or more are slower to move, as in this case, it would suggest a slower but still detectable change, which was borne out by the historical record in this case. When all three variables change in the
same direction at the same time, my theory would expect very rapid change in grand strategic form. As the indicators were mixed, with some additional monetary resources flowing to the coercive organization (in absolute terms) but a return to historical patterns of investment vis-à-vis the persuasive organization, manpower falling for the persuasive domain and increasing in the coercive, and elite attention firmly fixed elsewhere, my theory, emphasizing organizational path dependence and the logic of increasing returns, would still expect stability to result.

3.4 Conclusion

When assessing the relative continuity in Indian grand strategy in the years surrounding India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian War, which theory offers the most compelling explanation? The short answer is no one explanation seems to have the decisive weight of evidence behind it, but some fit the available evidence better than others. Both externally and internally oriented theories have some explanatory power, but they fail to account for the rate of change under the surface. Conversely, my theory is able to relatively cleanly explain both the macro-level stability in grand strategic form and the onset of changes seen in the aftermath of the conflict. Table 3.5 below summarizes the macro-level findings, comparing each of the rival theories’ expectations of any substantive change and the expected rate of change with the empirical reality.
Table 3.5. Summary of rival theories ability to explain the case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Externally Oriented</th>
<th>Internally Oriented</th>
<th>Organizational Determinants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External Threat</td>
<td>Regional Security Architecture</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Grand Strategic Variance</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectation met?</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causal Mechanism</td>
<td>With threat</td>
<td>With security arrangements</td>
<td>With leadership change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectation met?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explains the case?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some Doubts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On one level, it would appear that a persuasive strategy like Non-Alignment should fit relatively cleanly into an externally oriented threat hypothesis. Indian policy-makers, and especially Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, had decided the biggest existential threat to Indian independence was subordinating Indian foreign policy decision making to one of the Cold War superpowers. Non-Alignment was thus a rational response to this external reality. This theory breaks down in its inability to account for the relatively slow abandonment of a persuasive grand strategy in the wake of India’s disastrous defeat in the Sino-Indian War. Indian leaders were surprised that the Chinese had resorted to the use of force and found the Indian strategy for preventing, or winning, such a conflict woefully inadequate. Such a theory would anticipate a rapid pivot to both regional security concerns as dominant and a re-orientation of strategy to deal with these threats. While some of this behavior was observed, namely an increase in defense spending and attention paid to the military, the boost was rather quickly followed by a return to historical patterns of investment, and there was no prioritization of the threat from China; clearly another
causal mechanism, or at the very least an important intervening variable, was at work. So, while an external threat theory can explain some aspects of the case, it cannot fully account for India’s choices. Regional security architecture’s theoretical expectations of grand strategic stability are also met, but India’s failure to bolster those relationships after its defeat are at odds with this theory.

Internally oriented theories also present a potential explanation for Indian behavior. A leadership theory is plausibly congruent with the case, although there are some questions about why leader preferences would only update in this one instance and not more broadly. It is clear from Jawaharlal Nehru’s public articulations of the core tenets of Non-Aligment that he had a clear conception of India’s strategic culture as one where force had a limited role to play and the state sought diplomatic solutions to problems well before it would resort to military solutions. Culture, however, is a relatively sticky concept and is slow to change. If an externally oriented theory cannot account for the relatively slow shift away from a persuasive grand strategy, a strategic culture hypothesis cannot account for the speed with which India abandoned its global engagement and turned towards a military buildup to address the Chinese threat in this instance.

Here, my organizational determinants of grand strategy approach can offer something of a “goldilocks” explanation for the rate of change. Organizational strength takes time both to generate and to decay; the “slowness” of India to abandon a diplomatic strategy can be explained by the time it takes for the coercive elements of power to build up strength. As I noted in the section on my theory, I observed mixed investment patterns, with money flowing generally in line with historical trends, an increase in coercive manpower with a corresponding decrease in persuasive and inducive manpower, and elite attention consumed with internal matters, resulting in grand strategic paralysis. The empirical record bears out my theoretical expectations, with the theory
passing the critical hoops that it needs to, though it fails to gain sufficient support to completely rule out the alternative hypotheses.

The next chapter examines how Indian grand strategy was impacted by its decisive victory in the Third Indo-Pakistan War over the course of the years 1972-1977. This case provides further insight into the ability of an external threat theory to explain Indian grand strategic outcomes, as the victory by the Indians in the 1971 war saw the dismemberment of India’s arch-rival into two separate countries. It also robustly tests the regional security architecture hypothesis, as 1971 marked the landmark signing of the 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship agreement, which drew the Soviet Union and India into closer military cooperation.
4.0 The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War

This chapter considers India’s grand strategy around the third Indo-Pakistan War, which occurred in December 1971. The conflict initially started as an internal dispute between the two “wings” of united Pakistan and ended with an Indian invasion into East Pakistan after a pre-emptive attack on Indian targets by the forces of West Pakistan. The time period of this case makes it an attractive one for study, as it picks up at the end of the data I examine in the previous chapter, allowing me to see if the trends in Indian grand strategy identified in the earlier period are borne out. Furthermore, as this case involves India’s existential enemy and ends with Pakistan losing a vast swath of territory, it makes for a robust test of external theories. As such, if I find evidence that my theory can justify India's grand strategy in this disparate situation as well as, or better than, competing theories, it will increase confidence in its explanatory power.

4.1 Indian grand strategy around the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War

When studying Indian grand strategy, or Indian politics generally, there is a tendency to focus on the prime minister, especially in the early years of the Republic. In the years surrounding the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister and not coincidentally Nehru’s daughter, looms large. Malone argues “Mrs. Gandhi’s foreign policy maintained a rhetorical commitment to her father’s ideology of non-alignment and anti-imperialism, but

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194 Narang and Staniland (2012, 80)
contained distinctly realist strands of thought and behavior. This defines Gandhi’s tendencies as realist as understood by International Relations scholars, as opposed to what I term a coercive grand strategy. Realists believe that the fundamental nature of the international system is characterized by anarchy, and the implication of that anarchy is that states are in a self-help system. As a consequence, the accumulation of power is critical to ensure survival. What does this imply about the likely form of India’s grand strategy during this period? A persuasive grand strategy, like that adopted by Gandhi’s father, but predicated on the practice of realpolitik is likely to have a reduced emphasis on the ideational, or idealist, rhetoric typical of Nehruvian Non-Aligment. It would also likely involve India attempting to maximize its power diplomatically and seek to enter negotiations where it has maximum leverage. This suggests that diplomacy is still likely to be India’s predominant means of interacting with the outside world, but bilateral, not multi-lateral; negotiations are likely to increase in frequency, especially with smaller countries where India would have more leverage.

This expectation largely aligns with the description emerging from my analysis of Indian grand strategy in the wake of the 1962 war with China. Non-Aligment was in many ways aspirational early on, articulating goals such as anti-racialism and de-colonization, which India championed at the time. While not a pacifist grand strategy by any means, the promotion of those ideas was central to India’s engagement with the world. The Indian defeat in 1962 and Nehru’s subsequent death shook both Non-Aligment and faith in Nehru’s policies. This manifested itself in Indian foreign policy by the abandonment some of Nehru’s idealist rhetoric,

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195 Malone (2011, 160)  
196 Nehru (1963, 456)  
197 Kaviraj (1986, 1698)
and increasingly looking to maintain its security through realpolitik.\textsuperscript{198} It was through the increase in coercive expenditure detailed in Chapter 3, the acquisition of weaponry from the Soviets and others, and the signing of a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union that Gandhi sought to strengthen India’s military position.\textsuperscript{199} This adherence to realpolitik does not necessarily imply a preference for a coercive grand strategy, however, which is a point underscored by Gandhi’s approach to the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. Even after securing Soviet support in the event of a conflict, she continued diplomatic overtures in both public and private over threats or outright intervention in East Pakistan.\textsuperscript{200} Thus, while Gandhi may have abandoned some more of the ideational aspects of Nehruvian Non-Alignment, there is little reason to believe that India had abandoned a fundamentally persuasive grand strategy.

\subsection*{4.1.1 Measuring grand strategy}

As noted, Malone’s description of Gandhi’s foreign policy appears broadly consistent with the description of the changing nature of Indian grand strategy in the aftermath of 1962 outlined in Chapter 3: a commitment to a persuasive grand strategy while abandoning some of the ideational elements. Is this understanding reflected in the operational approach of the Indian government at this time? The types of documents collected for my analysis of the way in which India conceived of its grand strategy in the period between 1967 and 1977 are broadly consistent with the types of documents examined in Chapter 3, being drawn from the \textit{Foreign Affairs Record} published by the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Ganguly} Ganguly (2010b, 1)
\bibitem{Kaviraj} Kaviraj (1986, 1699)
\bibitem{Singh} Singh (2013, 62-3)
\end{thebibliography}
Ministry of External Affairs. Speeches by the President, Prime Minister, various vice ministers, the Minister of External Affairs, Trade Agreements, and other various documents all appear across the time period covered. This diversity of documents and speakers allows for as accurate a picture of India’s articulation of its theory of security as possible. Utilizing *k*-means clustering, Figure 4.1 suggests that the appropriate number of topics in the corpus of documents during both the pre- and post-war eras is three. Given that this case starts almost immediately after the last, one of the immediate oddities in the data is the reduced number of topics identified via *k*-means clustering; four topics were identified in the post-1962 analysis. The limited number of topics identified in Figure 4.1 has a straightforward explanation, however, as domestic political concerns routinely dominated Indian attention at the time.\(^{201}\)

One critical event occurred during this period which directly affects how one should interpret any theory of grand strategy, especially in the post-war period. If the aftermath of the 1971 war saw India triumphant over its arch-rival, domestic political events, especially from 1975 onwards, during a time known as “the Emergency” dominated Indian attention. Kaviraj notes that, despite winning an overwhelming electoral victory in parliamentary elections in 1971, by 1973 food distribution problems and short-term inflationary pressures produced large-scale electoral discontent.\(^{202}\) In 1975, the Indian courts invalidated Gandhi’s election as Prime Minister; rather than abdicate power, however, she declared a state of emergency throughout India that significantly curtailed freedom of speech, and particularly the press.\(^{203}\) Gandhi was finally ousted in elections she called in 1977, which swept the Indian National Congress from power.

\(^{201}\) Tharoor (1982)
\(^{202}\) Kaviraj (1986, 1702)
\(^{203}\) Paul (2019, 201)
Figure 4.1. Estimated number of clusters for topic modeling
4.1.2 Pre-1971 grand strategy analysis

As discussed in the previous chapter, India’s grand strategy of Non-Alignment, especially in the pre-1962 years, was an unusually well-articulated grand strategy against which I could measure the ability of my topic modeling to identify the concept. Indian grand strategy during this period is not quite as defined, but there are clear expectations regarding its form. As previously stated, I expect to observe a persuasive grand strategy similar to Non-Alignment in this period, though with slightly more pronounced coercive elements, or at least an abandonment of the ideational aspects of Nehruvian Non-Alignment. This would also generally be in line with scholars’ descriptions of Gandhi’s general approach to foreign policy. Ganguly and Pardesi describe Gandhi’s foreign policy as having “two competing visions”: one that championed decolonization and weak states and another that sought to increase defense readiness and the importance of the utility of force.204

204 Ganguly and Pardesi (2009)
Figure 4.2. Topic Modeling results for India’s 1966-1971 Foreign Affairs Record entries – Beta Statistic
Figure 4.2 displays the results of the topic modeling for the pre-war years. As mentioned above, Ganguly and Pardesi describe Gandhi’s foreign policy as having two competing visions. It is striking that one half of this vision, which emphasizes defense readiness and the utility of force, does not seem to be readily apparent in the topics identified by the model. Here, turning to gamma, a statistic measuring how much a given document is composed of words from the set of topics, can be especially helpful in deciphering the topics by providing a deeper understanding of the kinds of documents these topics were drawn. While the specific ordering of the topics is analytically meaningless, the model allows for terms to overlap between topics, which may be significant when interpreting results from the overall topic analysis described below.

Topic 1 primarily relates to Indian issues raised through the Security Council. That the model identified both the terms “United Nations” and “Security Council” in Figure 4.2 are strong indicators of this. A look at the top ten documents by their gamma value also confirms this; seven out of the top ten documents explicitly reference the Security Council in their titles. That “Pakistan” rates so highly as a term in this topic, as well as the terms “east” and “west,” is to be expected for at least two reasons. First, India had fought an inconclusive war with Pakistan in 1965, and the unfolding crisis that would eventually lead to war in 1971 was heavily discussed.

205 It is important for readers to bear in mind that, in LDA, each topic is a mixture of words, and each document has contained within it, to varying degrees, a mixture of different topics. Beta, the statistic displayed in Figure 4.2 shows the strength of the association between the word and the topic, whereas gamma displays the strength of the association between a document in the corpus and the topic.


207 Niksch (1972) Pakistan at this time was separated into two “wings” called East and West Pakistan respectively. Post-war, these wings would become known as the countries of Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Second, Gandhi was fixated on redressing the perceived imbalanced in India’s capabilities vis-à-vis both China and Pakistan in her foreign policy at this time.\(^{208}\) Indian interest in South Africa suggests some continuation of the positive aims of India’s foreign policy begun under Nehru, such as anti-racialism, which manifested itself as outspoken criticism of Apartheid. What is interesting is that, although this topic might be thought of as indicative of a coercive grand strategy, given the focus on East and West Pakistan, that these concerns were brought up in the context of the United Nations suggests a more persuasive bent.

Topic 2 is drawn from documents related to India’s pursuit of international agreements around the world. This topic is made up of not only of words related to Indian negotiations around global nuclear disarmament like “nuclear,” “weapons,” “weapon,” and “disarmament,” but also “trade,” “agreement,” “signed,” and “treaty.” A look at the documents most strongly associated with this topic reflects this bifurcation, with the documents fairly cleanly divided between India’s work on committees for nonproliferation or disarmament and its trade and economic development treaties.\(^{209}\) While eight of the top ten documents are related to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, there are also a relatively robust number of more commonplace agreements represented in the corpus. Notably, this focus on nuclear disarmament is a continuation of a trend seen in the previous case, where abolishing the weapons was a substantial piece of India’s foreign affairs agenda. This focus on the pursuit of international agreements is a hallmark of a persuasive grand strategy, however.

\(^{208}\) Dixit (2004, 123)

\(^{209}\) The top ten documents associated with topic 2, as measured by their gamma statistic are: “Shri V. C. Trivedi's Statement on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, “Shri Azim Husain's Statement in Political Committee on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, “Shri Azim Husain's Statement in Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,” “Shri Azim Husain's Statement at Conference of Committee on Disarmament,” “Indian Delegate Shri Banerjee's Address on Disarmament at U.N. First Committee,” “Shri Azim Husain's Statement in Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee,” “Ambassador Hussain's Statement on Disarmament,” “Indo-German Credit Agreement Signed,” and “Indo-U.S. Food Agreement Signed.”
The unigrams identified for inclusion in Topic 3 yields a list that is fairly generic, with no immediately obvious topic. Looking at the gamma statistic, Topic 3 is associated with documents primarily related to speeches given by Indian leaders outside of the context of the United Nations (Topic 1), and negotiations over international agreements (Topic 2).210 Looking at the list of top bigrams, or word pairs, for the entire corpus, the top use of the term most strongly associated with Topic 3 (“countries”) is “developing countries,” and, for the second most strongly associated term (“world”), the top occurrences are “world community” and “world peace.”211 While it might be tempting to assume that the term “development” might be similarly linked to the term “economic” appearing later in the list, looking at the list of top bigrams, or word pairs, reveals that it actually refers to “development decade,” a reference to the United Nations initiative. Taken together, Topic 3 appears to capture India’s attempt at leadership in the developing world, and comes from high level communications with other nations, using themes and language similar to the way Non-Alignment was described under Nehru.

Absent from the list once again are references to the superpowers, an indicator that, despite the fact that there were attempts by the superpowers to mediate the conflict between India and Pakistan, India was concerned with raising these issues with the international community more broadly.212 Given the topics, it appears most appropriate to again classify India’s grand strategy

210 The top ten documents associated with topic 3, as measured by their gamma statistic are: “Prime Minister's Speech at State Banquet,” “President Giri's Address,” “President's Message on Republic Day,” “Shri Dinesh Singh's Address to Consultative Assembly,” “Shri Dinesh Singh's Statement in Trade and Development Board,” “Shri L. N. Mishra's Address at Ministerial Meeting of 'Group of 77',” “Prime Minister's Speech at Civic Reception,” “Prime Minister's Address to Public Rally,” “President's Independence Day Message,” and “Shri Morarji Desai's Speech at Luncheon by Foreign Correspondents' Club.”

211 It is important to note that the terms “developing” and “peace” also feature in the topic 3 list.

212 Some scholars have described India’s attitude towards international institutions as “hostile.” See, for instance, Narang and Staniland (2012, 84). It is nevertheless noteworthy that, despite this attitude, India quite often interacted with the international community through multi-lateral forums, including prominent membership on a committee on nuclear disarmament. This is an important indicator of India’s belief that involvement in international forums had utility for advancing India’s interests.
during this period as primarily persuasive in nature. Given the earlier discussion about Gandhi’s worldview and the fact that this chapter picks up where Chapter 3 left off, I expected to find a persuasive grand strategy with either some coercive elements and/or a de-emphasis on ideational language. My analysis has uncovered the latter; India appears to have adopted a persuasive grand strategy with a reduced emphasis on ideational language in the period before its 1971 war with Pakistan.

4.1.3 Post-1971 grand strategy analysis

Tension between the two halves of Pakistan was nothing new; dating back to the mid-1960s, they had co-existed uncomfortably for several years prior to the war in 1971, with the primary complaint being economic disparities between them.\(^{213}\) Tensions began to rise when president Ayub Khan, who had come to power in a coup, was forced from office in 1968 because of a deteriorating political situation in the country.\(^{214}\) Ayub Khan resigned and handed over the reins of the country to General Yahya Khan (no relation), who abrogated the constitution and, in 1969, declared martial law in response to agitation for a move back towards a more representative democracy.\(^{215}\)

The tensions between East and West Pakistan over disparities in economic investment in the two regions came to a head in the parliamentary elections of 1970, when the Awami League, made up primarily of influential Eastern Pakistani, and thus Bengali, political parties, gained a

\(^{213}\) LaPorte (1972, 99)  
\(^{214}\) Pardesi (2004, 388)  
\(^{215}\) Choudhury (1973, 230)
majority in the Pakistani parliament. After the Awami League’s victory at the ballot box, the Pakistani army, accustomed to political influence and general dominance in the political sphere, refused to cede power and decided to intervene militarily to resolve the situation. What resulted was both a military and humanitarian disaster.

Two days before the national assembly was to meet, Yahya Khan announced its postponement, which led to an uprising in East Pakistan. Indian involvement in the conflict began almost as soon as the Pakistani army’s crackdown, with India not only providing refugees safe haven, but also sheltering the Awami League and declining to halt the creation of training locations for Bangladeshi fighters on its territory. Fearing that more open Indian involvement in the crisis was inevitable, as both Indian and Pakistani troops were being built up along the border, the Pakistani army decided to conduct a unilateral, pre-emptive strike on Indian forces on December 2nd, 1971. This triggered a two-pronged counteroffensive by the Indian military, which overwhelmed the Pakistani forces and managed to capture some territory in Eastern Pakistan in under two weeks. It also spelled the definitive end of a united Pakistan and left India’s primary rival dramatically weakened.

Many scholars have argued that the events of 1971 heralded a new era in Indian security policy. They point to several reasons to believe such a claim. For example, on August 9th, India and the Soviet Union signed the “Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation Between the Government of India and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”

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216 Oldenburg (1985, 712)  
217 Ziring (1974, 416-417)  
218 Mascarenhas (1971, 91-2)  
219 Haider (2009, 540)  
220 Schofield (2000, 142)  
221 Republic of India (1971)
notable, as previously India had studiously maintained a policy of non-alignment between the superpowers, and this treaty, while not a formal security guarantee, was a departure from previous Indian policy. Furthermore, given the thoroughness of the victory, and the dramatic weakening of Pakistan, India’s victory in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war was a significant potential inflection point for Indian grand strategy. Not only was India in a dominant military position, but Pakistan’s economy was weakened by the removal of Bangladesh and further plunged into crisis by the economic policies of President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.\textsuperscript{222} The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war could therefore be interpreted as a shining example of the success of Indian grand strategy. India was neither the instigator of the conflict between East and West Pakistan nor the aggressor. The outcome of the conflict left it standing atop the remnants of its dramatically weakened adversary as the acknowledged leader of the sub-continent.\textsuperscript{223} This military ascendancy over Pakistan was then further solidified by India’s first nuclear test in 1974, even if it was billed as a ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion.’\textsuperscript{224}

\textsuperscript{222} Husain (2009, 5)  
\textsuperscript{223} Kapur (1988, 51)  
\textsuperscript{224} Mitra (2009, 16) Remarkably, this nuclear test was not followed up on for a significant period of time. Kirk (2010, 285)
Figure 4.3 displays the results of my analysis of the Foreign Affairs Record in the post-war period. There is a fair amount of overlap between the topics; words like “economic,” “cooperation,” “world,” and “peace” appear across topics, and evoke themes reminiscent of Non-
Alignment. Topic 3 is perhaps the most easily parsed, as it clearly relates to India’s international agreements and efforts to pursue economic and development deals. One defining aspect of the early post-war period was Indian attempts at securing advantageous, if not necessarily friendly, relations with the newly created Bangladesh, as indicated by the presence of the term “Bangladesh.” Terms associated with this theme are readily apparent with “agreements” being the most obvious, but “trade,” “signed,” “rs” (the abbreviation for the Indian Rupee), and “million” are all equally suggestive. A look at the top ten documents associated with the term likewise confirms this focus on bilateral agreements between India and other countries. Emphasis on bilateral negotiations, where India may have more larger leverage over a narrower set of smaller or equally sized countries, as opposed to multilateral venues that would give India narrower leverage but a larger platform, is suggestive of the kind of realpolitik diplomacy associated with Gandhi.

Topic 2 is similar to Topic 3 in that it deals with documents from Indian leaders in bilateral forums, most of which were public speeches. Here, India shows a shift away from the multi-lateral venues favored by Nehruvian Non-Alignment; while multi-lateral venues were still important enough to appear in both pre- and post-war analyses, bi-lateral forums were increasing in

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225 In the list of bigrams from the Foreign Affairs Record, the top pair of words containing any of these terms is a combination of two of the terms on the list: “economic cooperation.”
226 A large number of India’s bilateral agreements around this time deal with Bangladesh. As a newly formed country, any number of mundane agreements (e.g. travel restrictions, residual border issues) would need to be renegotiated or created from whole cloth. Despite this, characterizations of the state of Indo-Bangladeshi relations since its founding have ranged from mediocre at best to problematic from the beginning. For examples of these different characterizations, see Datta (2002), Hossain (1981), Pant (2007)
popularity. Importantly for a persuasive grand strategy, many of the same themes such as “cooperation,” “friendship,” and “peace” remain. Another intriguing holdover from Non-Alignment that comes out in this topic is that, excepting a few speeches delivered in, or about, the Soviet Union, almost all of the top 100 documents are remarks delivered to the leaders of developing countries. This further reinforces the concept of a persuasive grand strategy, with India seeking diplomatic influence in the developing world.

Topic 1 is drawn from documents from India’s dealings in multilateral forums. This is readily apparent from the presence of terms like “United Nations,” “conference,” and “committee.” Many of the same themes as those articulated in Topic 2 are present here, including a focus on “developing” countries, as well as “peace.” That topics 1 and 2 refer to developing countries underscores Ganguly and Pardesi’s claim that India had interest in demonstrating leadership and building ties amongst developing countries. Despite the shift in the venue (from multi- to bi-lateral engagement), that India was attempting to build diplomatic influence, especially among those non-aligned with the superpowers, is a quintessential example of a persuasive grand strategy.

When considered as a whole, it is clear that, during this period, India continued to pursue a persuasive grand strategy. Given the contents of Topic 3, it could be argued that, with respect to Bangladesh, India chose to pursue a mixed persuasive-inductive grand strategy. This is evident from the fact that, while many aspects of Non-Alignment remain present in Indian rhetoric, there are clear signs of shift away from that version of a persuasive grand strategy: notably, a rise in the emphasis placed on bilateral forms of communication and efforts to secure advantageous agreements with Bangladesh. Based on this analysis, the relationship between Indian grand strategy pre- and post-war is best characterized by stability.
4.2 Potential explanations

In the previous section, I identified India as having a persuasive pre-war grand strategy, even if there were some more realist elements in Gandhi’s foreign policy, as some scholars argue. Post-war, my analysis identified similar results. As in Chapter 3, in this section I first analyze each potential explanation of this grand strategic continuity for congruence between its expectation and the empirical record. I then utilize process tracing to validate the theories that are congruent. The two axes along which grand strategy theories have expectations are, first, whether to expect change or stability in form and, second, how fast this change should occur. Congruence testing can easily detect the first. The presence of the stipulated causal mechanism and the rate of change can be validated through process tracing.

4.2.1 Externally oriented theories

Externally oriented theories, both in the form of external threat or regional security architecture claims, should clearly explain this case, as it represents a dramatic change in both the external threat faced by India and the regional security balance; if such factors drive grand strategic change, they should do so in this case. In this section, I lay out each of the theories’ expectations and causal logic before determining whether or not they are congruent with the case. Assuming they are, I then look for evidence that the stipulated causal mechanism may be at work, before ending with a summary of how well the theories performed.
4.2.1.1 External Threat

An external threat theory of grand strategic stability and change is one that, generally, expects stability when the threat landscape is stable and change when it is not. India won a decisive victory in 1971 and managed to cleave its arch-rival in two. Because of this success, an external threat theory might offer a straightforward prediction for Indian grand strategy post-1971: India would continue its grand strategic trajectory. Recall that there were some signs of a shift towards a more coercively oriented strategy detected in the post-1962 war environment, as described in Chapter 3. The results of the 1971 war could have validated this trajectory; India managed to remove the threat of a two-front war with Pakistan at minimal cost. Furthermore, having lost a war in 1962 to China and fought Pakistan to a draw in 1965, such a decisive win could be seen as a major validation of India’s strategic direction and, as such, indicate that no further adjustments were necessary.

However, the same logic might be used to justify change; given the relatively short turnaround from mere stalemate in 1965 to complete and relatively easy victory in 1971, theories of this type could just as easily predict India would double down on a shift away from a persuasive grand strategy and accelerate its rate of change. India had achieved conventional superiority over its arch-rival; only China stood between India and regional hegemony. If India continued to accelerate its military development and followed the path of a coercive grand strategy, it might plausibly have been able to challenge its only serious regional rival.

The precise expectation of an external threat theory of grand strategic form is thus indeterminate. However, as there is a version of the claim that could be argued to expect India’s pre- and post-war grand strategic relationship to defined by stability, it could be congruent with the case. The analytical utility of the claim depends on whether there is evidence for the causal
logic stipulated by this theoretical claim: India’s grand strategic stability should result because it was considered to be strong enough vis-à-vis both Pakistan and China and, thus, no further changes were needed.

In assessing this argument, it should be noted that scholars often contend India’s achieving conventional superiority over Pakistan and push to answer the threat of China’s nuclear weapons program drove Indian modernization policies during this period. 228 This claim is suggestive of the causal logic of an external threat theory, and underscores the notion that stability in grand strategic form is attributable to the same impetus being present throughout the time period.

There is some reason to think that external threats emanating from Pakistan and China were an important source of grand strategic stability. In defeating Pakistan in 1971, India can reasonably be said to have demonstrated that the conventional military deficiencies identified post-1962 had been adequately addressed. The investments in the coercive organization in Chapter 3, together with the signing of the treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union and the acquisition of weaponry from the Soviet Union and others, redressed the balance of power such that India had no further need to significantly invest in conventional forces to deal with that threat. However, in 1964, two years after India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian war, China jumped even further ahead by successfully conducting a nuclear test, something no buildup of conventional arms could hope to match. Thus, while India may have been strong enough to defend itself conventionally, there was still the nuclear balance of power to consider.

Scholars have noted that the origin of India’s pursuit of nuclear weapons was at least in part a response to the threat of China’s nuclear program. Furthermore, the failure of Indian efforts to achieve nuclear guarantees that would assuage its security concerns convinced India that some

228 Ganguly (2015, 191-192)
form of nuclear deterrent was needed. After conducting its test, India adopted a policy of nuclear ambiguity, not conducting another nuclear test for over 20 years. This restraint has been attributed to the fact that the international community’s outcry over the test surprised Indian decisionmakers, and the fact that the treaty with the Soviet Union left India with a strong enough security guarantee. The implication of all of this is that, by demonstrating some level of nuclear capability, India could arguably be said to have achieved sufficient parity that it could cease further immediate development.

Thus, there is reason to believe that an external threat theory may have been the driver of Indian grand strategy during this time period. It is plausible that the observed stability in Indian grand strategy was driven by the balance of the reduced threat of conventional war with Pakistan and the increased nuclear imbalance with China. Once those threats had been adequately addressed, first by defeating and dismembering Pakistan and then by demonstrating some nascent nuclear capability and securing a diplomatic victory by concluding a treaty with the Soviet Union, there was no further need to change Indian grand strategy in a coercive direction. The Achilles heel of such a theory, however, is in its indeterminacy; India could just as easily have continued its trajectory and continued to transition towards a coercive grand strategy. For example, China, which had previously enjoyed a robust nuclear guarantee from the Soviet Union, continued to pursue nuclear weapons despite this guarantee, which contributed to the Sino-Soviet split. There is no necessary reason why, based on external threat calculations alone, India had to stop where it did, as the example of China clearly demonstrates. While the causal mechanism may plausibly be

\[229\] Ganguly (1999, 159)

\[230\] Chakma (2005, 216)

\[231\] Ganguly (1999, 161)

\[232\] Gobarev (1999, 30)
at work, the theory on its own cannot provide guidance as to precisely why that particular branch of logic should apply in this particular case. As such, an external threat theory’s ability to explain the case is weaker than it otherwise might be.

### 4.2.1.2 Regional Security Architecture

A regional security architecture theory suggests that grand strategic change results from alteration in the web of alliances and guarantees in and around the country in question; stability is expected when that picture is relatively stable. In this case, the most straightforward expectation is that stability should result because India’s internal power and web of alliances were sufficient to defeat Pakistan in East Pakistan but not to capture Kashmir. However, it is also plausible that the defeat of Pakistan left a void in the region that India could fill with new constellations of alliances and diplomatic support. As with the external threat claim, a regional security architecture argument does not clearly suggest that there would necessarily be either change or stability in India’s grand strategy during this period. Given that India’s grand strategic trajectory over the course of the case is characterized by stability and there is a version of the regional security architecture theory that could account for such consistency, the claim could plausibly be congruent with the case. For the theory to offer a full explanation, there must be evidence that the constellation of alliances and diplomatic support was the driving factor in India’s decision to maintain a persuasive grand strategy.

One of the most common pieces of evidence cited for India not pursuing complete victory against Pakistan is the pressure the superpowers exerted on India. In response to the crisis, the United States deployed the *USS Enterprise* to the Bay of Bengal and the Soviet Union exerted
diplomatic pressure on India; both sought to secure a quick resolution to the conflict.\textsuperscript{233} There is also the matter that, by all accounts, India was caught off-guard by the international outcry generated by its first nuclear test, which played a role in restraining its nuclear development.\textsuperscript{234} If this narrative is correct, it suggests that India’s ambitions were restrained by the regional web of alliances and that there was no further space for India to expand in the coercive domain; any further or future aggressions on the part of India would likely lead to superpower intervention. However, this narrative may not be as straightforward as it appears. There are those who suggest that the role the superpowers played in the conflict has been overstated, and that instead it was structural factors, such as improved defenses on Pakistan’s west flank, a lack of materiel, the fact that most Indian forces were concentrated to the east, and other practical factors that may have restrained Indian ambitions.\textsuperscript{235} Thus, while considerations of external pressure clearly played a role in Indian decision-making at the time, the extent to which that pressure was decisive is a subject of debate.

There is also one other incongruency in the historical record which warrants a brief discussion. As my post-1971 grand strategy analysis revealed, there were some indications that India attempted an inducive grand strategy with respect to Bangladesh. For a country whose grand strategy was generally predicated on persuasion, on first glance this seems odd. From the perspective of a theory that posits the web of relationships with which a country surrounds itself drives grand strategy, how India interacts with all of its neighbors should matter. Further, that treatment should be more or less consistent, lest it undermine the strategy. An external threat theory has no problem explaining this, as Bangladesh was so much weaker than India; India’s choice of whether and how to engage or ignore Bangladesh was immaterial. But if the power position of

\textsuperscript{233} Raghavan (2013, 251)  
\textsuperscript{234} Ganguly (1999, 36)  
\textsuperscript{235} Cohen and Dasgupta (2010, 9)
Bangladesh factored into Indian decision-making about how to engage, it suggests a focus more on external threat and power dynamics than a curated network of alliances, undermining support for the theory’s causal mechanism.

On the whole, there is a reasonable degree of support for a regional security architecture hypothesis in this case; India was clearly cognizant of the effects its actions were having on the regional security dynamics. There are two factors that undermine confidence in the causal mechanism in this instance. First, the extent to which regional security architecture dynamics determined Indian behavior is in question; there is a case to be made that practical, operational-level considerations influenced Indian decision-making. Second, there is no reason that India could not have asked the Soviet Union for more direct assistance in countering U.S. pressure, or press ahead and try and drag them along. The fact that it did not is somewhat problematic for this theory to explain, as there is no necessary reason it could not have acted more aggressively and tested the Soviet Union’s pledge of support. This reinforces the problem of theoretical indeterminacy inherent in external theories of grand strategy in this case. Indian behavior, while conforming to the theory’s expectations, displays some incongruencies under the surface that weakens confidence that the stipulated causal mechanism is at work.

4.2.1.3 Summary of externally oriented theories’ ability to describe the case

Both externally oriented theories are arguably congruent with this case and there is evidence suggesting their causal mechanisms may have been in play. However, the flaw in both externally oriented theories is in their indeterminacy; the same logic that justifies an expectation of grand strategic stability could be used to argue for grand strategic change, without any clearly specified criterion for expecting one or the other outcome to be dominant in this case study. Thus, while a credible argument can be made for both theories, a decisive one cannot, rendering support
weaker than it would otherwise be. Now, I will explore internally oriented theories’ ability to explain the case.

4.2.2 Internally oriented theories

This section examines how well a leadership theory and a strategic culture theory of grand strategic stability and change can explain Indian behavior after the 1971 Third Indo-Pakistan War. As above, I first determine whether the theoretical expectations are plausibly congruent with the case and identify what causal logic to look at. I then determine whether that causal logic is plausibly at work. I conclude with a brief summary of both theories’ ability to explain the case.

4.2.2.1 Leadership

A leadership theory of grand strategic form expects change when leaders and/or their preferences change and stability when they do not. In this instance, Gandhi is a constant throughout, and there is no reason to believe her preferences were affected one way or the other by the outcome of the war, or even by her brief ouster from power in 1977.236 In analyses of Gandhi’s leadership style throughout the period, scholars have put emphasis on her desire to centralize power in her own hands and consult with only a few trusted advisors.237 Many of the actions India took in the time period, including the exact timing of its nuclear test, have been attributed to Gandhi’s direction and preferences for concentrating political power.238 This suggests that Gandhi had a preference for realpolitik in both domestic and foreign policy that continued.

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236 Kapur (1988, 55)
237 Kapur (1994, 186-7)
238 Ganguly (1999, 160)
throughout the period. Thus, a leadership theory of grand strategy, predicated on the continuity of Gandhi and her grand strategic preferences throughout the period can plausibly be said to be congruent with the case.

In assessing the question about whether Gandhi and her preferences set Indian grand strategy, three incidents are typically cited in support of this argument. One is her handling of the 1971 conflict itself. In this interpretation, India’s decision to intervene in Pakistan was calculated almost from the beginning of the crisis, and the dramatic result served to secure Gandhi’s place atop Indian politics and victory in the parliamentary elections in 1972.239 This suggests Gandhi saw the opportunity to dismember Pakistan and secure India’s position in the region, and waited until conditions were right to take it. If this interpretation of Gandhi’s motivations is incorrect, however, it suggests that Gandhi was not the ‘militant Nehruvian’ some claim.240 The second event cited in support of a leadership theory is the timing of the 1974 Pokhran I nuclear test. Here, scholars point out that the exact timing of the test was dictated by Gandhi’s political calculus, and structural Indian weakness afterward prevented further ambition.241 The implication is the fallout from the test demonstrated to Gandhi that the limits of India’s coercive potential were reached and restrained her from further steps down that path. Other events that have been cited as part of this pattern are Gandhi’s 1974 decisions to simultaneously pull away slightly from the Soviet Union and re-engage with the United States in an effort to bolster India’s international position, with both efforts indicating that, at least when it came to the superpowers, India had not abandoned its persuasive grand strategy.242

239 Cordera (2014, 55)
240 Cohen (2002)
241 Ganguly (1999, 159-60 ), Ganguly and Pardesi (2009, 9-10)
242 Dixit (2004, 138)
Taken together, this evidence paints a compelling picture that Gandhi’s grand strategic preferences could have been the deciding factor in Indian grand strategy throughout this period. As a noted practitioner of realpolitik, Gandhi was able to maximize the tools at India’s disposal to great effect. In rebutting this narrative, some scholars have pointed out that India’s military buildup pre-dates Gandhi and was not directly influenced by her during her tenure. While slightly undermining the argument, this evidence does not serve to prove that Gandhi’s strategic preferences did not take full advantage of the earlier build-up, to India’s advantage. Thus, I conclude that a leadership theory may explain this case.

4.2.2.2 Strategic Culture

A strategic culture theory expects that grand strategies change as culture does and stability to result when it does not. After a victory as decisive as the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, it is entirely plausible that India’s strategic culture might begin to shift. It is equally plausible that the victory reinforced the existing culture. In either case, in the short-term stability is expected, as cultural change takes time to propagate. The empirical difference between the two is that, if the central paradigm of the culture shifts from pre-war to post-war, a strategic culture theory would expect a change in grand strategy over time; if the central paradigm remains the same, long term stability should result. Thus, while a strategic culture theory is congruent with the case, it remains to be seen if either of the stipulated causal mechanisms are at work.

A decisive victory has the potential to change attitudes towards the use of force, just as a loss did in the 1962 case, but it is implausible to expect a rapid shift in cultural beliefs. In order to account for the observed stability, the first hoop a strategic culture theory must pass is

243 Kapur (1988)
demonstrating evidence of its central paradigm. As established in Chapter 3, the central paradigm of Indian strategic culture at the time could plausibly be described as one which saw war as atypical, threat as variable-sum, and a limited role for force. To bolster the argument that this central paradigm was still in place, proponents of this class of theory might point to the decision-making of Indian leaders in both the run-up to the conflict, but also its resolution, as affirmative evidence. Pre-war, there is evidence that Gandhi, both publicly and privately, did not want to intervene militarily in the conflict in East Pakistan, given that it could create more problems for India than it solved. In fact, a number of scholars have cited Gandhi as preferring a political solution. Even if this interpretation of Gandhi’s motivations is incorrect, India initiated a unilateral cease fire during the 1971 conflict. This suggests that India’s central paradigm, which saw limited utility in the use of force, was still in existence during this period. This interpretation of India’s central paradigm is further buttressed by the fact that, post-war, India did not follow up on its first nuclear test for another 25 years. Had India’s strategic culture viewed war as inevitable, or the threat posed by its neighbors as zero-sum, then India should have acquired nuclear weapons as fast as possible. On the basis of this evidence, India can plausibly be said to have a central paradigm which favored the choice of a persuasive grand strategy at this time.

The central paradigm alone is not sufficient to determine whether a strategic culture logic was at work in this case. The other hoop that must be passed is to find proof both of the operational assumptions about when, how, and under what conditions the use of force is called for, and that they guided Indian behavior. Here, affirmative evidence of the preference of India’s strategic culture can be found in India’s push for a diplomatic resolution to the Kashmir question post-war,

244 Raghavan (2013, 60-1)
245 See, for instance: Sisson and Rose (1990)
246 Malhotra (1989, 140)
as opposed to taking it by force in war. While India was quite willing to opportunistically utilize force to pry East and West Pakistan apart, seizing territory by force would only create a wider conflict.\textsuperscript{247} Scholars have pointed out that the fact that the Indian army did not pursue a military solution, or even utilize the 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war captured in the fall of East Pakistan, as evidence of a pattern of strategic restraint on the part of India.\textsuperscript{248} Another piece of evidence that might be pointed to, as it relates to strategic restraint, is India’s decision to unilaterally end the war. A strategic culture theorist might contend that attempting to continue the war would be out of character for India; scholars such as Tanham have argued that India lacks an “expansionist military tradition.”\textsuperscript{249} The halt, and subsequent attempts by Gandhi to negotiate a settlement of the Kashmir question, can be interpreted as manifestations of this lack of an expansionist tradition. Taken together, these facts suggest that Indian strategic culture arguably saw limited utility in the use of force for deciding the outcome of disputes.

This interpretation of India’s actions during the war as a manifestation of India’s strategic culture begins to be called into question, however, when considering other scholarship on this topic, some of which suggests that more practical concerns at play. For instance, there is some debate about whether or not a seizure of Kashmir during this conflict was actually feasible, as there was a credible threat of U.S. intervention and any seizure of territory by India might have led to escalation.\textsuperscript{250} Others have suggested that India’s reliance on imported Soviet weaponry and its associated need to secure Soviet consent for the invasion was at play in India’s decision-making.\textsuperscript{251}

\textsuperscript{247} Raghavan (2013, 255)
\textsuperscript{248} Dasgupta and Cohen (2011, 165), Dasgupta (2012, 130)
\textsuperscript{249} Tanham (1992, 54)
\textsuperscript{250} Raghavan (2013, 255), Sisson and Rose (1990)
\textsuperscript{251} See, for instance: Haider (2009, 546), Dixit (2004, 134)
Thus, the evidence of the operational assumptions of India’s strategic culture being at work in the case is mixed, as there is a credible argument that more practical concerns were in play.

While there is some evidence in favor of strategic culture as an explanation for Indian behavior in this case, it is not entirely compelling. I can find evidence of the first half of a strategic culture theory’s expectation: a central paradigm which places a reduced emphasis on the use of force. When it comes to the operational level assumptions that dictate when and how force is used, however, the evidence is mixed. As such, I conclude that, while a strategic culture explanation may plausibly be said to be at work in this case, it is not completely convincingly.

4.2.2.3 Summary of internally oriented theories’ ability to describe the case

As demonstrated above, internally oriented theories of grand strategy formation and change perform much better than external ones. A leadership theory of grand strategic change is congruent with the case, and there is strong evidence that Gandhi’s grand strategic preferences remained stable throughout. A strategic culture theory of grand strategic form also presents a relatively robust potential explanation of the case, passing one of the necessary hoops it needs to, but there is mixed evidence for the second, leaving it unable to be eliminated as the mechanism at work but also not convincingly affirmed.

4.2.3 Organizational determinants of grand strategy

My theory contends that a state’s grand strategic form flows from the allocation of its money, manpower, and elite attention. It expects stability when either the pattern of resource allocation follows a similar trend over time or when there are mixed indicators and path
dependence precludes alteration. Pre-war, India had a largely persuasive grand strategy; it pursued a similar grand strategy post-war. As resource re-allocations are less likely after a victory, especially one that does not net a corresponding resource influx, the observed stability broadly congruent with my theory’s expectations. The remainder of this section explores the extent to which my theory can fully explain the case.

4.2.3.1 Pre-war state-level resources

During the pre-war period, Indian state-level resources grew at a relatively steady rate. As Figure 4.4 below demonstrates, GDP growth was on a relatively gentle trajectory. This creates a baseline expectation that I should observe relatively stable increases in organizational-level monetary resources over the period, all other things being equal. Manpower likewise grew steadily. The population of India grew from a general population just under 510 million total people in 1966 to around 568 million in 1971, while the number of military aged males, aged 15-64, grew from 145 million to just under 165 million during the same period.

![GDP of India 1966-1971 (Constant 2010 USD)](image)

Figure 4.4. GDP of India 1966-1971 (Constant 2010 USD)
Finally, when considering state-level elite attention, India was broadly consumed with regional goings-on. Table 4.1, which summarizes the top 10 foreign entities mentioned in *Times of India* headlines over the period, clearly demonstrates that Indian attention was primarily focused on its own region. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan appears prominently on the list, as India fought a war with Pakistan in 1965 and tensions between East and West Pakistan dominated headlines in the run-up to the 1971 war. Focus on the Vietnam war, which was in full swing during this period, also dominates, with events in China a distant third. Overall, these events generally continue the trends observed in Chapter 3, with the increased uptick in interest in Vietnam being an important but unsurprising exception. Given that there are no major surprises or large-scale discontinuities which require explanation, I will now examine how organizational-level resources were distributed in the pre-war years.
**Table 4.1.** List of top 10 foreign entities mentioned in Times of India headlines, 1966-1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word(s)</th>
<th>Total Number of Mentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Pak&quot; or &quot;Pakistan&quot;</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet nam or Viet Cong</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Chinese&quot; or &quot;China&quot;</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.3.2 Pre-war organizational level resources

All three types of organization examined in this dissertation show growth in their resourcing over the period, but all have notable dips in the 1967-1968 timeframe, as demonstrated in Figure 4.5. State-level monetary resources, as displayed in Figure 4.4, do record a minor dip in calendar year 1968, and so the temporary decline in organizational-level resources is likely related to the corresponding reduction in state-level resources. In 1966-67, appropriations for the coercive organization are just over 5.5 Billion 2010 USD, before sharply contracting around six percent to 5.2B, and ending at 5.7B at the end of fiscal year 1970-71; appropriations in the persuasive domain grow from around 175 Million 2010 USD in 1966-67 to around 225 Million by the end of the period. Inducive organizations followed a similar pattern, contracting nine percent before rebounding during this time. As before, the absolute value of the money and manpower allocated coercive organizations is orders of magnitude higher than allocations to the inducive and persuasive organizations. Trends in absolute levels of funding do not tell the whole story, however. When considering the *rate* of change, as opposed to the absolute value, persuasive efforts gained the most resources in the period, as demonstrated by Figure 4.6. The erratic jumps in resourcing
for the inducive organization are once again attributable to the frequent reorganizations this and affiliated ministries went through.

Figure 4.5. Money appropriated to select Indian organizations for the years 1966 – 1971
When considering organization-level manpower, Figure 4.7 shows the distribution of civilian personnel amongst the various ministries. Here, there is a continuation of the trends from the post-1962 analysis; personnel engaged in persuasive activities continue on a general downward trajectory while an increasing number of civilians are employed in coercive endeavors. The inducive ministry shows more volatility in personnel; it is only towards the end of this timeframe that the reorganizations of the inducive ministry noted earlier began to stabilize. Given these frequent reorganizations of the inducive organization(s), the significance of the observed jumps in resources in either money or manpower should be discounted; these are more likely explained through the ebb and flow of resources as part of the re-organization process than any desire to shift India’s grand strategy down an inducive path.
Figure 4.7. Personnel employed by various Indian organizations per year (1965-1971)
Finally, Table 4.2 clearly displays that Indian elite attention was fixated primarily on internal issues, as four of the top 5 bigrams reference internal Indian affairs. The fourth most common word pair is “West Bengal,” which is the Indian state that bordered East Pakistan, and this topic likely references the refugees that flowed from East Pakistan into India as the crisis intensified. That 80% of the bigrams are focused on domestic concerns is highly suggestive of the fact that not a great deal of resources, at least in the form of elite attention, were being paid to any particular grand strategy.

**Table 4.2.** List of top 10 bigrams in select Times of India abstracts between 1966-1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word 1</th>
<th>Word 2</th>
<th>Number of appearances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indira</td>
<td>Gandhi</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lok</td>
<td>Sabha</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhya</td>
<td>Pradesh</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet</td>
<td>Nam</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken together, the three resource indicators point in different directions. More money, by percentage increase, was being allocated towards persuasion, which suggests a relative emphasis on a persuasive grand strategy. However, more manpower was flowing towards coercive organizations, which would suggest pursuit of a coercive grand strategy. Meanwhile, elite attention was firmly fixated on domestic events, resulting in grand strategic paralysis. In such a case, my theoretical expectation is that, due to path dependence, India should default to its existing grand strategy. In situations where path dependence and increasing return logic dominates, the costs of switching from one option to another become increasingly difficult. India had been pursuing a
persuasive grand strategy in the period immediately prior to this one. With money pointing in the
direction of a persuasive grand strategy, and manpower pointed toward a coercive grand strategy,
additional resources, perhaps in the form of elite attention, would be needed to achieve this
strategic shift.

Because elite attention was overwhelming fixated on internal issues, a shift was not
possible. India’s prior grand strategy was persuasive, and my analysis of the documentary record
above reveals a corresponding persuasive grand strategy in the pre-war analysis of Indian grand
strategy; my theory explains why there was such continuity.

4.2.3.3 Post-war state-level resources

Post-war, Indian GDP continued to grow at a relatively constant, if slow, rate. Population
growth continued more or less at the same pace, ending the period with a total population of just
over 650 million, with 191 million men of military age. Interest in events in Pakistan, Vietnam,
and the newly created Bangladesh dominated public attention in the realm of foreign policy. In
short, India did not experience a dramatic shift in state-level resources that could account for any
sudden increases in organization-level resourcing as a result of the conflict. These data indicate
that India was firmly ensconced in its role as a middle power and its experience in the 1971 war
did not significantly alter the resources available to the country, even if it did enjoy a strong
regional position as a consequence of its victory.
4.2.3.4 Post-war organizational level resources

India’s distribution of organizational level resources tells a richer story than the relatively slow growth of Indian state-level resources at the time. In my analysis of Indian grand strategy in the post-war years, I identified a continuation of its persuasive grand strategy. I also pointed out
in my post-war analysis that one of India’s goals was to secure an advantageous relationship with the newly created Bangladesh. Figure 4.9 displays the money appropriated to various Indian ministries over the period. Similar to my examination of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, appropriations for coercive elements of power spike in the year of the conflict before beginning a downward trend afterwards and then ticking up slightly at the end of the period. Significantly, appropriations to India’s persuasive element of power jump up dramatically in the year after the war before settling into a higher baseline in the post-war years. Also of note is the rapid increase in appropriations for the inducive elements of power, with dramatic gains seen from 1972 onwards.

While by absolute value in both money and manpower the coercive organization dominates, when considering the relative investment, or percentage change, a more complex story unfolds. Figure 4.10 depicts relative changes in levels of spending and appears to show preferential investment in the inducive organization but, when one examines the data in further detail, this is not the case; dramatic year over year change occurs primarily in two fiscal years, 1966-67 and 1973-74. In the pre-war analysis, I noted that the large percentage change in 1966-67 was accounted for by reorganization, but what of the investment in 1973-74? In examining the speech which presented that year’s budget, Finance Minister Y.B. Chavan announced:

There are a number of ongoing schemes which form the core of the Plan and provide the necessary infrastructure for our industry and commerce. We have to find resources for these. The Plan provision for power is being increased from Rs.88 crores this year to Rs.115 crores next year. Provision for increasing production capacity in the field of fertilizers and chemicals is being fixed at Rs.134 crores, as against Rs.95 crores in the 1972-73 Plan. Honourable Members will agree with me that an increased supply of power and of such critical
inputs as fertilizers will have a highly favourable effect on the growth in agriculture and industry.\textsuperscript{252} This change in budgetary allocation is likely to have been more internally directed.\textsuperscript{253} When those years are discounted, the trend in relative emphasis in monetary investment is clearly on the persuasive organization.

Further reinforcing the relative persuasive focus is the fact that later in the same budget speech, Minister Chavan stated “On the non-Plan side due care has been taken to restrict the growth of expenditure to the minimum level. Defence expenditure is retained at the same level as in current year, namely, Rs.1600 crores.”\textsuperscript{254} Future iterations of the budget speech during this period would attribute growth generally to pay increases, and other benefits increases, as opposed to increases in materiel.\textsuperscript{255} This underscores the persuasive interpretation of Figure 4.10 provided above and reinforces the argument that Indian monetary resources were being preferentially sourced in the persuasive direction.

In my post-1971 grand strategy analysis, I highlighted evidence that India might be pursuing an inducive grand strategy with respect to Bangladesh. Obviously, a smoking-gun piece of evidence for this assertion would be statements by key leaders indicating that India planned to secure advantage in Bangladesh by way of monetary investments. One place to find such evidence is the yearly speech introducing the Union budget for India for that year. In the speech presenting the budget for 1972-3, Finance Minister Y.B. Chavan declared:

\begin{quote}
Honourable Members would appreciate that we have to assist the friendly people and Government of Bangladesh in their immediate
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{252} Chavan (1973, 7). Each year the Minister of Finance delivers a speech outlining the Government’s economic estimate and budgetary priorities for the coming year. A record of each of these speeches from the founding of the Indian republic to today can be found at: https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/bspeech.php

\textsuperscript{253} Recall that the organization responsible for inducive functions during this time was the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and, as such, some internal functions are unavoidably captured.

\textsuperscript{254} Chavan (1973, 9)

\textsuperscript{255} Subramaniam (1976, 10, 1975, 8), Patel (1977, 9), Chavan (1974b, 3, 1974a, 8)
task of reconstruction and rehabilitation. To the extent that we have
drawn upon the accumulated stocks in the economy and there has
been unusual wear and tear of our productive assets, these will have
to be made good. But above all, now that the refugees have been
able to return to their homes, we have to redirect our energies
increasingly to satisfy the aspirations of our own people.256

While suggestive that India was investing in Bangladesh, this evidence does not rise to the high
level required to confirm that the reason India was investing in Bangladesh was for inducive
reasons; it does not clearly demonstrate intent to persuade Bangladesh to support India through
monetary assistance, but it does lend some credence to the notion.

256 Chavan (1972, 1)
Figure 4.9. Money appropriated to select Indian organizations for years 1966-1977
Figure 4.10. Percent change year over year in appropriations to select Indian organizations 1966-1977

Figure 4.11 details personnel in the various ministries during the years in question, and represents a departure from the trends seen in the pre-war analysis. Personnel levels began to grow in both the inducive and persuasive ministries in the post-war period but, given the contraction of personnel seen in the pre-war time period, the total result is still a net loss in personnel for the persuasive organization. The significance of comparisons in numbers of inducive personnel pre- and post-war should be discounted due to the pre-war reorganizations. Civilian employees of the coercive organizations continue to rise, although at a much slower pace post-1972, which saw an increase of more than twelve percent pre-war and only two and a half percent post-war.
Figure 4.11. Personnel employed by select Indian organizations per year, 1965 – 1977
Table 4.4 lists the most frequently occurring pairs of words in the abstracts of articles surveyed. Of most interest in Table 4.4 is the complete lack of foreign policy topics listed amongst the Times of India abstracts surveyed in the post-war years. This is in sharp contrast to the post-1962 era, when there were a large number of foreign policy topics. The change is likely due to the deteriorating political situation in India during this period and the declaration of a state of emergency in the country by Gandhi in 1975. Just as in the pre-war analysis, money generally points toward a persuasive grand strategy, manpower points to a coercive one, and elite attention is being directed elsewhere. In such instances, path dependence should dominate and grand strategic stability should result.

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Given this is what the empirical record shows with respect to Indian grand strategy over this period of time, there is sufficient evidence to suggest my theory may be at work in the case, but not enough to rule out any of the other theories. While my theory clears the hoops it needs to, the available evidence does not rise to the level of being able to conclusively rule out alternatives. For example, the speeches by Minister Chavan are both suggestive of my causal mechanism at work. In one quote, it suggests India was clearly weighing its priorities because of limited resources, and minimizing investment in the coercive domain, but stops just short of indicating preferential
investment in the persuasive domain. In another, Minister Chavan talks about the need to assist Bangladesh, but is not specific enough to affirm the reason. Thus, while there is a solid amount of evidence in favor of the logic of my theory, it is not decisive.

4.3 Conclusion

In the wake of such an overwhelming victory, there are many potential expectations for Indian grand strategic direction, with certain theories having more or less explanatory power. India’s pre-war grand strategic direction was a persuasive grand strategy. My analysis of the documentary record revealed that, post-war, India continued to pursue a persuasive grand strategy. To explain the case, each theory must be able to explain both the form (stability) and rate of change (slow). Externally oriented theories, both external threat and regional security architecture, are plausibly congruent with the case, and there is some evidence to suggest their causal mechanisms might be at work. The trouble with these theories, however, is that, overall, they both offer indeterminant theoretical expectations about whether India’s grand strategy should change or remain stable during this period. Internally oriented theories fare better. A leadership-centric theory is also plausibly congruent with the case, with supporting evidence. A strategic culture theory is also congruent and plausibly at work in the case, but evidence for the operational level assumptions of that strategic culture is scant. My organizational determinants theory also provides a plausible explanation, but available evidence stops just short of the bar to eliminate rival hypotheses. Table 4.5 below summarizes the expectations of the theories and their ability to explain the case.
Table 4.5. Summary of rival explanations ability to explain the case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Externally Oriented</th>
<th>Internally Oriented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Threat</strong></td>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Security Architecture</strong></td>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership</strong></td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Culture</strong></td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Determinants</strong></td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expected Substantive Variance</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expectation met?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Causal Mechanism</strong></td>
<td>With threat</td>
<td>With leadership change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With security arrangements</td>
<td>With cultural change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expectation met?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explains the case?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As has been noted previously, the key problem with externally oriented theories is their indeterminacy; it is not clear whether they would necessarily call for either grand strategic stability or change in this instance, and credible arguments could be advanced for either course. This leaves them in somewhat problematic theoretical territory. Internally oriented theories, on the other hand, have relatively clean theoretical expectations of grand strategic stability. A leadership theory is plausibly at work, as Gandhi and her grand strategic preferences are both constants throughout. Strategic culture passes a majority, but not all, of the theoretical hoops required to demonstrate the causal mechanism, as there is no definitive affirmative evidence of India’s operational level assumptions about the use of force at work. There are also some open questions around the reasons for India’s behavior during and after the conflict which cannot be fully accounted for, namely, how revisionist scholarship has cast doubt on the narrative of a restrained India. Despite these open questions, I cannot fully rule out this theory.

My theory’s expectations are in line with the empirical record with regard to both the form and rate of change in Indian grand strategy. In the post-war period, India’s money, manpower, and
elite attention were split between the various different elements of power, with elite attention most notably not being allocated to foreign policy topics at all. In such cases, the path dependency and increasing returns logics of my theory forecast grand strategic stability. In cases such as this, the cost to choose alternative strategies are high. Unless sufficient resources are dedicated to an alternative strategy, the previous strategy (in this case a persuasive one) should continue to be dominant. Furthermore, my theory can add descriptive richness and highlight important nuances in Indian grand strategy, especially in the post-war era, by both offering a plausible explanation for the observed stability in grand strategy and advancing evidence that resourcing tradeoffs in line with my theoretical expectations were under consideration. While my organizational theory clears all of the theoretical hoops required to affirm it as plausibly at work, a lack of decisive evidence at key points means the evidence stops just short of being able to exclude alternate competing hypotheses.

As such, it appears that this case is somewhat overdetermined, with all of the theories’ causal mechanisms plausibly at work. While externally oriented theories remain in problematic territory because of their indeterminacy, internally oriented theories, and most notably strategic culture, have fared well across the two cases thus far. Likewise, my theory also performs at least as well as others. The coming chapter examines Indian grand strategy surrounding the 1999 Kargil crisis, which once again saw India and Pakistan come into conflict, this time with an indecisive result. Given the fact that this case involves a substantial leap forward in time, it provides an important test of a strategic culture argument; Indian strategic culture would have had plenty of time to shift in the intervening years. Finally, the case also completes all potential variations of war outcomes (loss, win, draw) and provides a robust test for all theories under examination.
5.0 The 1999 Kargil Crisis

My final case study examines India’s grand strategy around the turn of the millennium. The Kargil Crisis started in late 1999, after Pakistani army troops and paramilitary forces occupied Indian outposts that were abandoned during the winter months due to the inhospitable climate. After India became aware of the incursions, a response was mounted which ultimately saw Pakistani forces ejected from Indian territory. The Kargil Crisis is an attractive case primarily because it provides important variation in comparison to the other cases with respect to war outcome, geo-political landscape, and political party in power. As the conflict takes place almost 50 years after the founding of the Republic of India, it also serves as an important test for the strategic culture hypothesis, as sufficient time elapsed from both India’s colonial legacy and the death of the country’s influential first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to allow for potentially significant shifts of Indian strategic culture to have taken place.

5.1 Indian grand strategy and the Kargil Crisis

Pamulaparthi Venkata Narasimha Rao, more commonly known as P.V. Narasimha Rao, became the ninth person to serve as Prime Minister of India in June of 1991, roughly one month after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and six months before the fall of the Soviet Union. At the time, India was going through a dire balance of payments crisis; facing double digit inflation, a devaluation of its currency, and depleted foreign exchange reserves, India’s economy was in urgent
need of reform. During his tenure, which lasted from 1991 to 1996, Rao not only reformed the economy, but also Indian foreign policy. The sudden disappearance of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 left India without its primary provider of military aid and closest foreign policy partner. Rao’s government initiated the Look East policy, which sought to re-orient India away from Non-Alignment and towards affairs located in its own geographic region, with a particular focus on ‘economic diplomacy.’

After the Indian National Congress, the political party that had traditionally held the dominant political position in Indian politics, was defeated at the polls in 1996, India went through a revolving door of Prime Ministers for a period of about two years, ending with the second election of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) Atal Bihari Vajpayee as Prime Minister. Though he was of a different party than Rao, Vajpayee largely maintained the general direction of India’s foreign policy, and notably continued the Look East policy. Despite this continuity, scholars such as G.V.C. Naidu have noted that the policy went through at least three distinct phases: one of intense activity and engagement with countries in the region, a period of stagnation roughly coinciding with the financial troubles of 1997-1998, and finally a renewal of interest in the policy.

If Non-Alignment was a vision of a world order (i.e., free of destructive superpower competition, and receptive to Indian ideals such as anti-racialism) with some notion of how to get there (e.g., friendly relations with as many countries as possible, abjuring the use of force), the Look East policy represented a markedly different means to achieve Indian security, even if the

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257 Sangvikar, Pawar, and Pahurkar (2019, 1)
258 Chiriyankandath (2004, 199), Thakur (2007, 831)
259 Haokip (2014, 246)
260 Naidu (2004, 340)
end goal was the same. Whereas Non-Aligned Alignment sought to maintain friendly relations with as many countries as possible on a global stage, Look East sought to strategically target countries in India’s near abroad and increase Indian influence in the region. As Naidu describes it:

The Look East policy was a multi-faceted and multi-pronged approach to establish strategic links with many individual countries, evolve closer political links with ASEAN, and develop strong economic bonds with the region. Second, it was an attempt to carve a place for India in the larger Asia-Pacific. Third, the Look East policy was also meant to showcase India's economic potential for investments and trade. In a way, this policy also started influencing India's foreign policy significantly.²⁶¹

There is some debate about the ‘depth’ of both the Look East policy and strategic thinking, in India during some of this time period. For instance, regarding strategic thought, Narang and Staniland contend:

The coalition governments of 1989–1991, 1991–1996, and 1996–1998 were all weak collections of regional and national parties. It is impossible to derive any new strategic worldviews from their leaders, who gave remarkably little attention to foreign policy (the Gujral Doctrine outlining India’s stance toward its immediate neighborhood notwithstanding). Instead, they mouthed the same vague platitudes that had animated Indian leaders for decades.²⁶²

On the other hand, Staniland and Narang are quick to point out that this changes with the victory of the BJP.²⁶³ The Gujral doctrine was articulated by then-Foreign Minister, later Prime Minister, Inder Kumar Gujral. Gujral outlined “a set of five principles to guide the conduct of foreign relations with India’s immediate neighbors.”²⁶⁴ This set of principles included “initiating unilateral goodwill gestures towards India’s smaller regional neighbors.”²⁶⁵ Even if these gestures

²⁶¹ Naidu (2004, 337)
²⁶² Narang and Staniland (2012, 87, 2018, 87)
²⁶³ Narang and Staniland (2012, 87, 2018, 87)
²⁶⁴ Murthy (2008, 639)
²⁶⁵ Sridharan (2006, 80)
were unilateral, they are indicative of a transactory relationship, the hallmark of an inducive grand strategy. Chietigj Bajpaee also argues that the typical ‘phased’ descriptors of the Look East policy are not as clear cut as the general literature suggests, and belies an ‘aspirational’ as opposed to substantive change in the thrust of the policy.²⁶⁶ Others, such as Chiriyankandath, argue that India’s post-Cold War policy is best summed up not by the Look East policy, but rather by the decision to adopt nuclear weapons in 1998 and to thaw Indo-American relations.²⁶⁷

From the description above, there is some uncertainty about the overarching nature of India’s grand strategy at this time. This uncertainty offers an important opportunity for my approach to identifying grand strategic emphasis to shed light on the question. First, if the Look East policy, which aligns with an inducive grand strategy as I defined the concept in Chapter 2, was in fact India’s grand strategy, then the topics identified by my modeling should be dominated by words which suggest agreements or statements being made that involve the transfer of things such as money, goods, technical knowledge and the like. Alternatively, if Chiriyankandah’s assertion about India coercive bent in policy (i.e., defined by nuclear weapons and the US-Indian détente) is correct, I should observe evidence of these hard power concerns. Should Narang and Staniland’s assessment regarding the lack of attention to foreign policy concerns be correct, I should observe evidence of no particular grand strategy. My topic modelling, having demonstrated its capacity to identify Indian grand strategy in the earlier periods, when India’s approach was clearer than it was in the 1990s, should help resolve this debate.

²⁶⁶ Bajpaee (2017, 18)
²⁶⁷ Chiriyankandath (2004, 200)
5.1.1 Measuring grand strategy

Just as in the previous cases, latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) topic modeling is used to analyze statements, speeches, trade agreements, and other key documents released by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).268 The Foreign Affairs Record released annually by the MEA provides the data underpinning my analysis of India’s pre-Kargil Crisis grand strategy. The Foreign Affairs Record was discontinued in its original format in 1999, however, which means that my post-Kargil analysis draws on a similar, although slightly different, pool of documents. Despite these differences, which will be described further below, the two corpora are comparable.

As previously discussed, the Foreign Affairs Record contains a large assortment of press releases, transcripts of speeches by various Indian government officials, official statements, and texts of agreements made between India and other countries. In keeping with prior chapters, the data was scrubbed of any joint statements, or speeches attributed to non-Indians. The end result is a corpus of 1,452 documents spanning the years pre-Kargil years, 1994 to 1999, which is the largest selection of documents in all of the cases. The Foreign Affairs Record was discontinued, for reasons that are not immediately clear in 1999; in its place, the MEA began publishing the types of documents formerly contained in the Foreign Affairs Record in an online database on their website, sorted by year and document type. There are two caveats that warrant noting. One is that, because of the transition, information for the year 2000 is missing from the online data. Another is that there is a potential for significantly more noise in the data than had heretofore been the case. For example, the category of press releases now includes notices regarding all changes

268 As a reminder, topic modeling identifies a set number of topics from a dataset (corpus), where each topic is composed of a set of words, and each document is composed of a set of topics; it is a method to quickly and efficiently extract probable themes from large datasets, without having to read each individual document.
of ambassadors. As there is currently no method to download the documents in bulk, and the
government of India prohibits both data scraping and blocks Internet Protocol Addresses that
download large amounts of data in one session, I collected a smaller, more targeted set of
documents. I prioritized acquisition of speeches and statements from Indian leaders to ensure as
much compatibility with previous data as possible. As texts of agreements and major press releases
are missing from what was collected through this targeting strategy, it is possible that there is some
loss of fidelity.

Despite these limitations, the assembled statements still yield a dataset of almost 400
documents, which is roughly the same size at the dataset for the pre-Sino-Indian War analysis. In
keeping with the other cases considered in this dissertation, I used \textit{k-means clustering} to determine
how many topics to model for each time period. Pre-1999, the model identified two very different
numbers of potential topics, either two or six. While in previous cases I noted sharp drop-offs in
the sum of squares when going from one topic to two, the bend at two topics is remarkable.
Although difficult to detect with the naked eye, there is another knee in the curve where the slope
alters at six topics. For the sake of analytic and descriptive richness, six topics were chosen, to
avoid reading too much into too few topics. Post-1999, three topics were identified.\footnote{In order to ensure that either choice did not represent affect my results, I ran the analysis for both two and six
topics; the results were broadly similar and will be discussed in more detail in section 5.1.2. I also present the results
of both figures, to allow the reader to draw their own conclusions.} The results
of this analysis can be seen graphed below in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1. Estimated number of clusters for topic modeling
5.1.2 Pre-1999 grand strategy analysis

I defined the Look East policy as an inducive grand strategy, which means that, if it was India’s grand strategy at this point in time, there should be strong evidence of transactory suasion in the form of economic and diplomatic agreements as well as the primacy of words related to these topics. Alternatively, if India was adopting a coercive grand strategy, there should be coercive language, and an emphasis on hard power. If Narang and Staniland are correct, no discernable grand strategy should be identifiable. Figure 5.2 shows the results of my topic modeling for the Pre-Kargil years. As can be seen, the corpus contains topics related to economic, cultural, and educational transactions at a significantly greater frequency than was observed in either of my previous case studies. This lends credence to the claim that Look East was India’s grand strategy as this time. I noted earlier that, per k-means clustering, the number of topics for this time period appeared to be either two or six. The results of an analysis with only two topics does not significantly from the reported results with six topics. The addition of four additional topics, however, does allow for both greater descriptive richness and, while allowing for some consideration of India’s coercive efforts in the foreign policy domain, ultimately reinforces the preeminence of the Look East policy as the encapsulation of Indian grand strategy. Without these additional topics, the Look East policy completely dominates the topics.
Topics 1, 3, 4, and 6 are all strongly indicative of an inducive grand strategy, being overwhelmingly related to topics of international agreements on trade, and international development. Topics 1 and 3 are broadly alike, with a similar mixture of words between the two.
It is important to remember that the numbering of the topics is arbitrary; the most notable difference between the two is that Topic 1 refers to topics covered in bilateral discussions and meetings while Topic 3 draws primarily from India’s engagement(s) in multi-lateral venues over the time period.\textsuperscript{270} An important aspect of the Look East policy was engagement not only on a bilateral level with the countries in India’s near abroad, but also in placing increasing emphasis on multi-lateral forums such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).\textsuperscript{271} Both of these topics, and terms they contain, are strongly indicative of an inducive grand strategy.

Topics 4 and 6 refer to different types of agreements signed over this time period. For instance, Topic 4 appears to be investment and contracting services agreements, as evidenced by the strong association of the terms “contracting,” “agreement,” and “investment” with the topic. Topic 6 relates to the exchange of personnel, and provision of training, featuring the terms “exchange,” “development,” “training,” “cultural,” “education,” and “programme.” These interpretations are generally bolstered by looking at the documents most associated with each topic. A noteworthy point emerging from this examination is that these topics appear to refer to agreements made between India and developed countries such as the United States, the European Commission, and Russian Federation amongst others.

\textsuperscript{270} Top documents associated with Topic 1 include: “President's visit to Germany, Portugal, Luxembourg and Turkey,” “Visit of H.E. Mr. Kim Young Sam, President of the Republic of Korea to India,” and “Visit of President of India to Oman, Poland, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic and Italy.” Some of the top document titles for Topic 3 are: “Speech of Prime Minister Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee at Asia Society, New York,” “Statement by H.E. Mr. Sharad Pawar, Member of Parliament, Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha at the General Debate of the First Committee at New York,” and “Statement by External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee at UN General Assembly,” although it is important to note that not all documents in the top 10 relate to multi-lateral forums. This is likely due to the fact that the number of topics being modeled could be two or six, and the larger number of categories means a lower chance of stark contrasts between the two.

\textsuperscript{271} Andersen (2001, 768). It is also important to note that this enthusiasm did not extend to the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Andersen (2001, 769)
Topic 2 is drawn from documents about India’s views of how the international environment changed in the post-Cold War world, and more specifically relates to its acquisition of nuclear weapons and verbal rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is evidenced by the terms “nuclear,” “weapons,” and “disarmament,” amongst others. When looking at the document-topic matrix, the top two documents are drawn from Narasimha Rao’s Prime ministership, several years before the country formally announced itself as a nuclear power with their Pokhran II nuclear test.

It is tempting to classify Topic 5 as relating to issues originating in bilateral discussions between India and Pakistan, especially as the number one term associated with the topic is “Pakistan.” In fact, the document-topic matrix reveals that the documents most associated with these topics are overwhelmingly regionally focused. The relatively weak associations of the rest of the terms in the topic is evidenced by the relatively low beta for the others. This suggests that the additional topics identified by my k-means analysis saw significantly diminishing returns. As can be seen in Figure 5.3, Topics 3 and 5 completely disappear from view when the number of topics is reduced; this bolsters my assessment that they are only weakly represented as topics in the corpus.

Taken together, Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 paint a picture of a fairly comprehensive and coherent inductive grand strategy, which seems to largely bear out both the Look East policy and its extension, the Gujral Doctrine, as the orienting policy of pre-Kargil India. This analysis casts serious doubt on the argument that Indian foreign policy, over this timeframe at least, is best understood and described through the lens of its improving relations with the United States and its

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272 For instance, the top five documents associated with this term are: “First ASEAN - India Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting,” “Details of Deliberation of the Seventeenth Session of the Council of Ministers of SAARC,” “Second Meeting of the ASEAN-India Joint Sectoral CooperationCommittee (AIJSCC)” [SIC], “Foreign Secretary Level Discussions in Male,” and “Participation of India in ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference.”
acquisition of nuclear weapons. While these are undoubtedly important events, such an argument appears to fly in the face of the manifold engagements India was having throughout the world, and particularly in its near abroad. I now turn to an examination of its grand strategy post-Kargil.
Figure 5.3. Topic Modeling results for India's 1994-1999 Foreign Affairs Record entries (two topics)
5.1.3 Post-1999 grand strategy analysis

Relations between India and Pakistan hit new lows in 1998, when, within the span of 17 days, both countries announced they had conducted successful nuclear weapons tests.²⁷³ However, in less than a year, relations appeared to be on the upswing as the two countries signed the Lahore Declaration. Although technically only a declaration between the two prime ministers and an additional “memorandum of understanding,” the document laid out several confidence building measures aimed at reducing the risk of inadvertent war between the two countries.²⁷⁴ One important measure was an agreement to consult on nuclear and conventional doctrines:

The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional [sic] fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.²⁷⁵

After signing the declaration, speaking at a banquet hosted by Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan, Prime Minister Vajpayee, said of the declaration and bilateral dialogue:

We have also discussed those areas of relationship on which we do not see eye to eye. That is only inevitable. As we seek to resolve issues, we have to be conscious that there is nothing which cannot be solved through goodwill and direct dialogue. That is the only path.²⁷⁶

While on the surface this seemed like positive news, any hope for the Lahore Declaration to translate into sustained momentum for improved relations between the two countries was not to last. In just under three months, the two countries would be at war high in the mountains of Kashmir.

²⁷³ Wallace (1998, 386)
²⁷⁴ Pattanaik (1999, 86)
²⁷⁶ Vajpayee (1999)
Pakistan had been engaged in a proxy war in Kashmir for much of the 1980s and onward, which saw numerous acts of terrorism and violence sweep the region. This activity saw a dramatic increase in the early months of 1999.\textsuperscript{277} Indian defenses in the mountainous parts of the Kargil district consisted largely of a string of border positions, which were typically left abandoned during the winter months, as the weather can be extremely inhospitable during that time.\textsuperscript{278} Once the Indian army heard word of heavy shelling along the border region and Pakistani infiltration along the Line of Control, they sent two patrols to the area, which were promptly wiped out.\textsuperscript{279} What followed was a spiral of conflict that saw initial Indian setbacks, but eventually resulted in the expulsion of all Pakistani troops from Indian-controlled territory.\textsuperscript{280}

Despite the fact that the Indian armed forces were ultimately victorious, the Kargil Crisis generated a large outcry within India. This outcry centered on the initial ineffectiveness of the armed forces to retake the heights and the fact that the forces were caught off guard.\textsuperscript{281} That preparation for the infiltration had occurred almost concurrently with the signing of the Lahore declaration came as another shock to India.\textsuperscript{282} It also came as a strategic surprise, despite intelligence reports indicating that an operation in the region might be occurring, and forced a rethinking of the defense management system.\textsuperscript{283} Thus, while Kargil was technically an Indian battlefield victory, it represented a strategic shock to the nation’s system. For the analytic purposes of this dissertation, Kargil represents a more neutral war outcome. Thus, the Kargil crisis’ aftermath serves as another potential inflection point for Indian grand strategy.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{277} Malik (2006, 28-31, 33)
\item \textsuperscript{278} Qadir (2002, 25)
\item \textsuperscript{279} Anand (1999, 1054)
\item \textsuperscript{280} Lambeth (2012, 303)
\item \textsuperscript{281} Basrur (2002, 40-41)
\item \textsuperscript{282} Basrur (2002)
\item \textsuperscript{283} Prasad (2019)
\end{itemize}
When looking at the corpus of documents compiled for the years immediately after the Kargil Crisis (i.e., 2001-2004, as documents from 2000 are absent from the record), my k-means analysis rather unambiguously pointed toward three topics as the number to be modeled. Figure 5.4 displays the results of my topic modeling, which seem on their face to point towards continuity in Indian grand strategy. It is important to remember that the order of the topics is determined by the model and position in the chart does not imply an ordinal topic ranking.
Figure 5.4. Topic Modeling results for selected Indian leadership speeches from 2001-2004

Topic 1 is drawn primarily from speeches by Indian leaders, largely to and in international forums, although it is interesting to note that the top three documents associated with this topic are all speeches by various Indian Presidents to joint sessions of the Indian parliament. That terms
such as “economic,” “trade,” “development,” and “cooperation” all rank fairly highly along with terms such as “region,” “SAARC (South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation),” and “Asia” suggest continuity with topics seen in the pre-war analysis. Particularly notable is that, despite the fact that the data source of the corpus having changed slightly, many of the same topics still emerged.

Topic 2 appears to be similar to Topic 1, as evidenced by the fact that many of the same terms appear. The terms “economic,” “cooperation,” “development,” and “Asia” all appear as associated with each topic. Given the fact that LDA allows for non-exclusivity of terms to topics, this suggests that something else may be driving the divide between topics. The terms “bilateral,” and “ASEAN” in Topic 2 and the term “SAARC” in Topic 1 suggests that the divide may be best construed as similar topics addressing slightly different regional audiences. The similarity between the two topics is striking, even without an ability to more finely separate the topics. The similarity suggests that the pursuit of advantageous deals was a primary tool of Indian statecraft, which is a hallmark of an inducive grand strategy.

Topic 3 is distinct in that it reflects major world events during this time period in its focus on the threat of terrorism. Terrorism is an issue India had been dealing with for a long time, given the history of its conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir region. The terms “terrorism,” “war,” “global,” and “Pakistan” all but confirm this. It might be tempting for Western readers to arrange some of these words into the phrase “global war on terrorism,” a popular phrase utilized by the George W. Bush Administration to describe its objectives at the time, but this would be incorrect. In fact, the two most frequent bigrams (pair of words) associated with the term “terrorism” are “international terrorism,” and “border terrorism.” Given the fact that the Kashmir region had been experiencing border terrorism for years, it is straightforward to conclude that Topic 3 reflects
India’s attempts to highlight its ongoing struggle with Pakistan and draw international support towards its position.

Taking a step back and looking at these three topics as a whole, I conclude that these represent a broad continuation of Indian grand strategy post-Kargil, with a slight shift in focus highlighting the tensions with Pakistan. Considering that this period of time saw two major invasions in the region, one of which was in India’s near abroad and involved its arch-rival, Pakistan, it is reasonable to assume Indian leaders would want to discuss Pakistan’s record as an alleged sponsor for terrorism. The other was the United States invasion of Afghanistan. This suggests that the general thrust of India’s grand strategy was not significantly altered by the Kargil crisis, despite the outcry it generated within the country.

**5.2 Potential explanations**

In the previous section, I determined that India’s essentially inducive grand strategy persisted throughout the period. Given the narrative of the aftermath of the Kargil Crisis in India, and the Kargil Review Commission that was assembled in its wake, this stability might first come as a surprise. Yet, my analysis of the past two case studies showed that Indian grand strategy remained markedly consistent in the face of both positive and negative shocks, even when many leading theories would suggest it should be otherwise. This continuity around the Kargil Crisis is thus perhaps to be expected. Like previous chapters, the balance of this section explores the three competing types of explanations for grand strategic change: external drivers, internal drivers, and organizational determinants.
To reiterate, in order to explain the case, a theory must be able to account for both the *form* change takes as well as the *rate* at which change occurs. A theory can call for change in grand strategic form, but expect short-term grand strategic stability; theories which operate on longer time scales, such as strategic culture, will expect to observe short term stability while change percolates through the system. If a given theory fails to describe either the form or the rate of change, it is incongruent with the case. After this congruence test, remaining theories are scrutinized via process tracing to determine which best fit the facts of the case.

### 5.2.1 Externally oriented theories

This section explores whether or not either of the two externally oriented theories can plausibly explain India’s observed grand strategic stability. As in previous chapters, first an assessment is made about whether or not the expectations of the theory are congruent with the empirical record. If they are, I then attempt to find evidence of the theory’s causal mechanism at work. The section concludes with a brief summary of the findings for this class of theory.

#### 5.2.1.1 External Threat

External threat theories expect grand strategic change with and at the rate of changes in threat. Since India was technically victorious in the Kargil crisis but the outcome saw both countries revert to the pre-war status quo, it could be argued that the Kargil Crisis did not change the objective balance of power between the two nations. As the relationship between India’s pre- and post-war grand strategy is best described by stability, this understanding of constancy in India’s strategic environment suggests would suggest congruence between the theory’s expectations and the empirical record.
This apparent congruence between the theory and the empirical record is called into question, however, when digging deeper into how the Indians perceived their conventional and nuclear security environment in the wake of the Kargil Crisis. Focusing first on the conventional balance of power between the two countries reveals that the Indians believed there were some significant changes in the level of external threat they faced. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, India set up a review committee in order to dissect the intelligence failures that led to the Kargil Crisis and to unpack India’s performance in the conflict. The prologue of the report succinctly states that “Yet India was not militarily well prepared [for the conflict]. There were critical gaps in the Armed Forces’ inventory.” The Commission’s recommendations further went on to detail a large number of recommended changes to the Indian intelligence and defense establishment in order to prevent such a crisis from occurring again.

Further doubt is cast on the assertion that Kargil did not substantially alter the conventional balance of power between the two nations when considering what the government of India did after it received the recommendations of the review commission. After the commission submitted its report, the government of India convened a Group of Ministers to follow up on the finding of the Kargil review commission and determine how to implement them. As the Group of Ministers final report states, it viewed its remit as touching upon all of India’s security apparatus:

It noted that its mandate was substantially wider than that of the [Kargil Review Commission]. While the [Kargil Review Commission] had been required to review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in Kargil district and to recommend measures necessary to safeguard national security against such armed intrusions, the [Group of Ministers] was, inter alia, required to review the national security system in its entirety and to formulate specific proposals for implementation. Conscious of the scope and extent of the holistic nature of its remit, the [Group of Ministers] saw in it a historic opportunity to review all aspects of the national

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284 Kargil Review Committee (2000, 23)
security system, impinging not only on external threats but also on internal threats.\textsuperscript{285}

This significant restructuring of the bureaucratic apparatus and military command structure would call for greater joint integration and the creation of entirely new positions to strengthen planning.\textsuperscript{286}

The Kargil crisis also exposed deficiencies in India’s capabilities. Most telling is Gen V.P. Malik’s reflections on the tenth anniversary of the Kargil Crisis, where he notes:

Due to a continuous lack of budgetary support, new raisings of regular units and Rashtriya Rifles, and an extremely tedious procurement system, many of our bottom line holdings and reserves were in a depleted state at the time of the war. We had shortages of weapons, equipment, even the clothing required for high-altitude warfare. The war also highlighted gross inadequacies in the nation’s surveillance capability. Aerial imagery, except from the Aviation Research Centre, was non-existent.\textsuperscript{287}

This underscores that India realized it was ill-prepared to fight this kind of conflict again in the future. Thus, while India was technically able to defeat Pakistan, Kargil exposed significant weaknesses that needed to be redressed. Taken together with the considerable bureaucratic reforms that were called for, it undermines the argument that Kargil did not alter the perception of the conventional balance between the two nations. Given this, I conclude that there was actually a change in the perceptions of the conventional balance of power after the Kargil Crisis and, accordingly, an external threat theory of grand strategic form cannot fully account for the stability observed in the case.

But what of the balance of nuclear power between the two countries? If that was stable, perhaps that would explain India’s observed grand strategic stability. For this explanation to be the correct one, I would expect to find evidence in India’s Kargil post-mortems about the primacy

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{285} Advani et al. (2001, 2)
\item \textsuperscript{286} Mukherjee (2016, 23-5)
\item \textsuperscript{287} Malik (2009, 355)
\end{itemize}
of nuclear weapons in underwriting its security. Instead, it seems that India drew the opposite conclusion. As the Group of Ministers report states:

Thus, while India needs to ensure credible nuclear deterrence to prevent the possibility of a nuclear misadventure by its potential adversaries, it has to simultaneously maintain adequate and duly modernized conventional forces which are properly managed, led and equipped to take advantage of the [Revolution in Military Affairs] and which can take care of any possible conventional conflicts.  

This quote suggests that Indian thinking was focused on maintaining nuclear weapons to prevent being overmatched by its adversaries and not as the primary force driving the balance of power between the two rivals. Furthermore, scholars such as Kapur have argued that it was precisely the nuclear balance of power between India and Pakistan that increased the possibility of limited conventional war between the two countries.  

This is further underscored by the Kargil Review Committee’s report, which contends that the conventional balance of power is of paramount importance, stating:

> It is also argued that a policy of “no first use” and a commitment to only retaliatory use of nuclear weapons will, in fact imply an enhanced level of conventional military capability. The goal must be to raise the nuclear threshold to as high a level as feasible.

While the Kargil Review Committee’s position does not necessarily reflect the official position of the Government of India, the fact that its opinions were drawn from discussions with Indian officials, amongst others, suggests it is indicative of the general thinking of decisionmakers during

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288 Advani et al. (2001, 8)  
289 Kapur (2003, 81). There has been a large amount of scholarly interest in the Kargil Crisis as an example of the Stability-Instability paradox; put simply, this paradox states that because of the potential stability inherent in a nuclear crisis where both actors fear potential destruction, there is increased crisis instability in conflicts that remain below the nuclear threshold. For a sample of such literature, including as it pertains to the Kargil Crisis, see: Watterson (2017), Rajagopalan (2006), Panday (2011), Sultan (2014), Early and Asal (2018), Ganguly (1995)  
290 Kargil Review Committee (2000, 180)
the time. The available evidence thus severely weakens the argument for stability in the nuclear balance of power serving as a driver of India’s observed grand strategic stability.

A closer examination of the conventional and nuclear balance of power that obtained on the subcontinent thus reveals that India did believe the nature and severity of the external threat it faced changed after the Kargil Crisis. As such, an external threat theory simply cannot account for Indian grand strategic stability in the wake of the fight. It may be discarded as a potential explanation for Indian grand strategy in this time period.

### 5.2.1.2 Regional Security Architecture

A theory of grand strategic change predicated on regional security architecture predicts stability if the balance of alliances and diplomatic support, especially amongst the key players within the system, are generally stable. On one hand, the outcome of Kargil Crisis represents no fundamental change in the balance amongst the key regional players if one only considers India, Pakistan, and China. However, if one considers the role played by the United States and how it changed over the period, there is good reason to believe that the theory might anticipate change in this case. Historically, Pakistan enjoyed diplomatic and military support from the United States while India received military support, primarily in the form of equipment, from the (then) Soviet Union. The United States’ backing of India in the Kargil crisis marked the beginning of a change in how the world’s only remaining superpower engaged in the region.\(^{291}\)

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\(^{291}\) For more general discussions of how the Kargil crisis either redefined the US-Indian security relationship, or played a decisive role in the conflict, see, for instance: Bommakanti (2011), Chiriyankandath (2004, 207), Lavoy (2009, 29), Riedel (2019), Tellis, Fair, and Medby (2001, 53)
Scholars such as Chiriyankandath have pointed out that, from India’s economic opening in the early 1990s and onwards, U.S.-Indian ties gradually deepened before the Crisis. Furthermore, the structural factors identified in the pre-war period began to accelerate post-war, only increasingly the potential for cooperation. As Ganguly and Scobell pointed out in 2005:

[India’s] economic growth over the past decade has been robust, its political institutions have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of myriad domestic challenges, and its military prowess is steadily increasing. Finally, the country has, for all practical purposes, abandoned its hoary commitments to nonalignment. These factors in concert make conditions propitious for the emergence of a U.S.-India strategic partnership.292

Joint U.S.-Indian naval exercises began in the early 1990s as well—something that was previously unthinkable—and U.S. support in Kargil only opened the door wider for further cooperation.293 Air exercises followed in 2002 and picked up in 2004, and the U.S. and India signed a framework for cooperation on military issues in 2005.294 Despite the fact that the U.S. was also heavily reliant on Pakistan at the time to support the logistics of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, any increased U.S.-Indian cooperation represented a sea change for the region. For a pattern of relationships that had been well-defined for decades by the US and Pakistan on one side and India and the Soviet Union/Russia on the other, the rapid increase and deepening of U.S. engagement with India during this period represents an unprecedented change.

While the benefit of hindsight may make it seem obvious that this strategic partnership was doomed to never fully materialize, that failure was not necessarily clear at the time. Although the U.S. and India had had occasion to cooperate in the past, that cooperation had been sporadic and infrequent. The period after the Kargil crisis saw both deeper and more frequent engagement

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292 Ganguly and Scobell (2005, 37)
293 Chiriyankandath (2004, 207-8)
294 Latif (2012, 2)
between the two countries. It is clear that from the early 1990s onward, and especially around the
time of the Kargil crisis, the trajectory of relationships in the region was beginning to
fundamentally change. In cases like this, a regional security architecture theory expects change
due to the change in the balance of engagement in the region. This expectation of change is
incongruent with the observed grand strategic stability. Thus, a regional security architecture
hypothesis may be discarded as a potential explanation of India’s grand strategic form over this
period.

5.2.1.3 Summary of externally oriented theories’ ability to describe the case

Both external threat and regional security architecture fail to account for Indian grand
strategic stability around the Kargil Crisis. The flaw with an external threat account is the theory’s
expectations of change. While focusing on the nuclear balance of power between India and
Pakistan could forecast stability in Indian grand strategy, India’s perceptions of change in the
conventional balance between the two countries would forecast grand strategic change. Given that
India was more focused on the impact of the crisis on the conventional balance of power, the theory
cannot account for the observed grand strategic stability. A regional security architecture theory
performs even more poorly, as Kargil marked a watershed moment for the region’s patterns of
alliances and support, as the U.S. not only sided with India, but deepened its engagement post-
war. Under the logic of this theory, change should result. Instead, stability is observed and the
claims’ predictions are incongruent with the empirical record.
5.2.2 Internally oriented theories

In this section, I explore internally oriented theories’ ability to describe Indian grand strategic stability around the Kargil crisis. Both theories are scrutinized for how their theoretical expectations match the empirical record and for evidence that their causal mechanisms may be at work. I conclude with a brief summary of my findings.

5.2.2.1 Leadership

Theories that posit that leaders and their preferences dictate grand strategy expect stability if grand strategic preferences remain stable even while leaders themselves vary. There were five different Prime Ministers over the time period covered by this case.\footnote{The list of Prime Ministers who held office in the period covered by the case were: P.V. Narasimha Rao, H.D. Deve Gowda, Inder Kumar Gujral, Atal Behari Vajpayee, and Manmohan Singh. While the pace of leadership turnover was fairly rapid in this period, one of the Prime Ministers between 1996 and 1998 was Vajpayee himself, although his first tenure lasted less than a month. The next two Prime Ministers, H.D. Deve Gowda, and Gujral, each held office for under a year. In mid-2004, at the tail end of the period, Manmohan Singh assumed the Prime Ministership.} Despite what appears to be high turnover, there is little reason to suspect that the leaders held fundamentally different grand strategic preference. As was discussed in the examination of Indian grand strategy during the period, Rao, Gujral, and Vajpayee all fundamentally supported inducive grand strategies. This leaves Gowda and Singh to consider in greater detail, both of whose tenure was also generally marked by adherence to previously established foreign policy preferences.\footnote{Kapur (2013, 5943, 6851)}

In assessing precisely whether or not continuity of leaders’ preference accounts for the stability in the case, special attention should be paid to the tenure of Gowda, who held office between June 1996 and April 1997. In describing Gowda’s tenure, Kapur states:

Once again India was faced with the spectacle that the architecture of India’s foreign policy was constructed elsewhere: by I.K. Gujral,
whose nomination as Foreign Minister had been decided by the coalition partners over which Deve Gowda had no Control.

From all indications it would seem that the new Prime Minister had accepted that India’s foreign policy would be left in the hands of the Foreign Minister.\textsuperscript{297}

While Gujral clearly preferred an inducive grand strategy, which aligns with the general theoretical expectation of grand strategic stability, that it was Gujral’s preferences that were dictating grand strategy, and not Gowda’s, is somewhat problematic for the analytical power of this specific claim. For a theory that stipulates leaders and their preferences dictate grand strategy, this is a clear case where a leader’s preferences did not set grand strategy. There are two different ways this can be interpreted. At worst, Gowda’s tenure suggests that other factors may actually determine the strategy. Although exactly how a given leader arrives at their preference for a particular grand strategy is not necessarily relevant, what is problematic in this instance is that Gowda had no influence. Thus, an uncharitable reading of this evidence would be that Gowda did not set the strategy at all. It suggests that additional information may be needed to identify which leaders’ preferences matter most, and under what conditions; in this case, the leader(s) whose preference mattered most were Gowda’s coalition partners, and it was their preferences that dictated the strategy. While this is not sufficient to discount the theory, it does undermine its explanatory power.

This leaves only the question of whether Singh’s preferences can be said to align with his predecessors’ preferences for an inducive grand strategy. In contrast to Gowda, Singh’s preferences are much easier to determine. Early on in his tenure, Singh addressed the Lok Sabha on the topic of foreign policy, where he stated:

\textsuperscript{297} Kapur (2013, 5943)
My meetings with Asian leaders in Bandung also gave me yet another opportunity to reiterate India's commitment to the 'Look East Policy' and to closer relations with the countries of South-East and East Asia. We are committed to work with ASEAN and with East Asian Countries to make the 21st century a truly Asian Century.  

This clearly demonstrates that Singh endorsed Look East as the preferred strategy for India. On the basis of this evidence, it is relatively safe to conclude that, at least until the end of the time period under consideration, Singh’s preferences can be said to be similar to his predecessors.

Given the available evidence, it appears that a leadership theory of grand strategic form is broadly congruent with the case, given the apparent stability of both Indian leaders’ grand strategic preferences and the country’s grand strategy. All but one of the leaders in the case clearly shared similar grand strategic preferences; the weight of evidence suggests that a leadership theory may plausibly be at work in this case. While the constraints on Gowda’s ability to influence foreign policy during his tenure as prime minister are not necessarily fatal, it does call into question the theory’s ability to fully account for the empirical record. As such, there is reason to believe that a leadership theory may be at work in the case, even if the evidence is not as strong as might otherwise be.

5.2.2.2 Strategic Culture

A strategic culture theory expects stability and change in grand strategy to track with alterations in dominant cultural beliefs. When those cultural beliefs are static, stability should result; when they are not, change should occur. In the short term, however, such a theory generally

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298 Singh (2005)
299 For other examples of Singh’s preferences for this strategic approach, see (for instance): Sundaram (2013, 172), Saint-Mézard (2016, 178)
expects continuity; as previously discussed, culture takes time to change. There are two crucial hoops that need to be cleared in order to show that strategic culture is at work. The first is the existence of the country’s ‘central paradigm,’ which is its views on the role of war, nature of its adversary, and the efficacy of force. Identification of this central paradigm, and its congruence with India’s inductive grand strategy, serves as the first hoop a strategic culture theory must pass.

The second is a “limited, ranked set of grand-strategic preferences,” which dictates how a country will respond to a given crisis and should be stable across sources, and time. Thus, the second hoop is that this set of preferences remains stable despite the increase in threat, or in this case threat perception, created by the weaknesses uncovered by Indian performance in the Kargil Crisis. If there is evidence to pass these two hoops, a strategic culture approach may be at work in this case. Alternatively, signs of rapid change in grand strategic preference or rank-ordering would provide evidence that this class of theory is not at work.

To begin determining if a strategic culture theory is at work, a central paradigm must first be identified consistent with the inductive grand strategy identified earlier. As shown in Chapters 3 and 4, there were few changes in the central paradigm of India’s strategic culture between 1960 and 1976. The hallmarks of this stable central paradigm were: war is an aberration, threats can be considered variable sum, and there is limited utility for the role of force. Some scholars have argued that Non-Alignment, even at this late date, still represented the dominant vein of Indian strategic culture, suggesting that some version of the previous central paradigm remained fundamentally intact. Additionally, strategic culture theorists might point to additional supporting evidence like the Lahore Declaration, which sought to restrain nuclear competition with Pakistan.

300 Johnston (1995, 46)
301 Johnston (1995, 48)
reduce mis- understandings, and reiterate “the determination of both countries to implementing the Shimla (sic) Agreement in letter and spirit.” The Simla agreement technically ended the Third Indo-Pakistan War by calling for a peaceful resolution to the two countries’ border dispute, but did not bind them to any particular process or course of action and was never fully implemented. While this can be interpreted as maintenance of India’s central paradigm, a more cynical read might be either that it is an example of ‘cheap talk’ or driven primarily by the desire to reduce chances of misperception that could escalate to a nuclear exchange. Given that a coherent central paradigm exists and remains consistent across all three cases, it is reasonable to conclude that a strategic culture explanation passes this hoop.

Next, evidence needs to be found of the ‘second half’ of strategic culture: the ranked set of preferences, which affect operational level details of a country’s strategic culture. Take for instance the Gujral doctrine, which in some ways could be considered the progenitor of the Look East policy. As laid out in Section 5.1, the Look East policy was firmly anchored in the Gujral Doctrine, which was articulated by Prime Minister Inder Kumal Gujral in September of 1997:

The “Gujral Doctrine”, if I may call it so, states that, first, with its neighbours like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity, but gives and accommodates what it can in good faith and trust. Second, we believe that no South Asian country should allow its territory to be used against the interests of another country of the region. Third, that none should interfere in the internal affairs of another. Fourth, all South Asian countries must respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. And finally, they should settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations.

The continuation of these fundamental themes throughout the period is evidence of a set of ranked grand-strategic preferences whereby India preferred to focus on its near abroad, primarily through

302 Government of India and Goverment of Pakistan (1999)
303 Gujral (1997)
a transactory lens. Second, it lays out a policy of non-interference, and a preference for bi-lateral
dispute resolution. This represents a fairly concrete articulation of operational level assumptions.
As such, a strategic culture explanation can be said to clear this hoop as well, even if there is some
question as the dominance of this vein of thought, given the dispute in the secondary literature
about the lingering ghost of Non-Alingment in Indian foreign policy.

However, similar to the period surrounding the 1962 Sino-Indian war, a strategic culture
explanation cannot fully account for the historical record in this case. Much like in the aftermath
of the Sino-India War, India after Kargil conducted notable reforms aimed at addressing internal
balancing against Pakistan (i.e., the Kargil Review Commission). In the two cases, India’s central
paradigm remained the same while its operational level execution of that paradigm shifted from
the implementation of a persuasive grand strategy to the use of an inducive approach. If the same
central paradigm can allow for two opposing grand strategies, it calls into question whether or not
the paradigm is at work, or if grand strategy is wholly a function of operational level assumptions.
This provides further evidence that a strategic culture hypothesis, as posited by Johnston, may
require updating or require refining, as a near identical central paradigm of the culture seems to
allow for opposing grand strategic forms. Notwithstanding, a strategic culture explanation does
pass the requisite hoops, and so cannot be conclusively ruled out, even if its ability to fully explain
the empirical record may fall short.

5.2.2.3 Summary of internally oriented theories’ ability to describe the case

In contrast to externally oriented theories, both leadership and strategic culture are
plausibly at work in the case. A leadership theory’s explanatory power is somewhat weakened by
the twin facts that during Gowda’s tenure it was actually his Foreign Minister preferences that
dominated and Gowda had no control over the appointment. A strategic culture theory is also
plausibly at work in this case, although this case raises questions about how a near identical central paradigm of strategic culture can yield two opposing grand strategic forms. Despite these reservations about both internally oriented theories’ ability to fully explain the empirical record, the available evidence is not sufficient to exclude them.

5.2.3 Organization determinants of grand strategy

My theory expects change at a rate consistent with rate of change in the pattern of resource allocation amongst the various organizations. When that pattern is generally stable, or indicators are mixed, stability should result. Since the relationship between India’s pre- and post-war grand strategy is best described by stability, for my theory to be congruent and explanatory, the empirical record would need to show stability or mixed patterns of organizational resourcing. The remainder of this section unpacks the available evidence to determine if this is the case. I do so by first examining the pre-war resource distribution at the state and organizational level, to set a baseline expectation for the observed inducive grand strategy. Then, I explore the post-war distribution of resources to determine if my theory might account for the observed stability.
5.2.3.1 Pre-war state-level resources

As discussed in Chapter 2, my theory’s causal logic begins at the level of resources available to the state; how it chooses to allocate those resources to various organizations dictates the country’s choice of grand strategy. As Figure 5.5 demonstrates, Indian GDP was steadily increasing, with the country having started to see results from the economic restructuring that took place in the early 1990s. India’s GDP at the time puts it squarely in the middle power category, with countries like the Russian Federation, Australia, and the Netherlands. It also suggests that India had sufficient resources to allocate towards external affairs. India’s population, on the other hand, had for years been the second largest in the world, with over one billion people in 1999. The military recruiting pool, which I have defined as males between the ages of 15 and 64, was around 326 million, which would have still made India the second most populous country on the planet.304 This suggests that, relative to the other countries mentioned, there were fewer resources per capita.

Figure 5.5. GDP of India 1994-1999 (Constant 2010 USD)

304 The World Bank Group (2018d, 2018c)
Elite attention at the state-level is operationalized by analyzing the headlines of articles from *The Times of India*, which traditionally has been India’s widest circulating English language newspaper. As Table 5.1 below shows, Indian attention in the foreign affairs realm suggests that its attention was occupied primarily with goings-on in the United States and events in neighboring Pakistan and China. Given India’s historical focus on these latter areas, this is in line with the other case studies reported in this dissertation.

**Table 5.1.** List of top 10 foreign entities mentioned in Times of India headlines, 1994-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word(s)</th>
<th>Total Number of Mentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Pak&quot;, &quot;Pakistan&quot;, or &quot;Pakistani&quot;</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmir</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubai</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What may at first appear to unusual is the low number of mentions of other countries as well as how precipitous the drop-off appears to be between mentions of the U.S. and Pakistan and the rest of this list. I interpret this as signaling that India, as it frequently is, was paying more attention to internal affairs; this is unsurprising given the frequent changes in government. It is clear that, in the pre-war period, India was possessed of modest but not inconsiderable monetary resources and a very large pool of manpower while its elite attention was mostly focused inward with foreign considerations dominated by the near abroad.
5.2.3.2 Pre-war organizational-level resources

In the cases examined thus far, one of the factors complicating comparisons between coercive, inducive, and persuasive organizations was that the inducive organization(s) underwent frequent re-organization and realignment. This caused observed levels of manpower and monetary resources to jump around erratically as various parts of the organization were detached and subsequently reattached over time. In this period, there was no such challenge; inducive organizational realignments are relatively clean, making for more straightforward comparisons.

As Figure 5.6 demonstrates, budgets for the organizations tasked with carrying out persuasive and coercive functions slightly increased over the period, while the top line budget for the inducive organization appeared to shrink slightly, before remaining flat. Given that the country seems to have been pursuing an inducive grand strategy, this seems incongruent. However, when one considers the fact that in 1998 India conducted its second nuclear test and declared itself a nuclear power, things become clearer. It is very likely that India’s nuclear test is the primary driver of the increase in funding for both the persuasive and coercive organizations, which implies a response to a discrete event as opposed to signaling a grand strategic shift.305 A deeper look inside the coercive budgets also show that capital outlays made up a substantial portion of the budget, which could be a result of the loss of the Soviet Union as its chief arms provider, as capital outlays are typically maintenance or upgrade expenditures.306 Additionally, given that this increase in capital expenditure occurred in the year immediately prior to the nuclear test, the bump in 1997-

305 Scholars such as Bhumitra Chakma (2005) point out that given India’s nuclear ambiguity it is not clear at what point before the nuclear test India had actively developed a nuclear weapon, as opposed to maintaining a rapid breakout posture.
98 is likely at least partially attributable to that effort. It is not entirely clear what causes the
anomalous spike in funding for persuasive organizations in 1998-1999 but, given that it occurs in
the same year as the nuclear test, it very likely is related. Afterwards, funding returns to its
generally linear trend, which suggests that it is likely this increase in funding was tied to Indian
diplomatic efforts in the wake of its nuclear test and its attempts to manage the diplomatic
repercussions rather than signaling the beginning of a sea change in Indian grand strategy.
Discounting this anomalous event, funding for the persuasive ministry grew an average of three
percent per year.

Funding for the inducive ministry decreases sharply in 1994-5, both in absolute and
percentage terms. After this contraction, however, the inducive ministry grew around three percent
a year. The contraction was very likely caused by the fact that, from 1991 to 1994, India was
investing heavily in efforts to boost its economy, and the inducive organization had a strong role
to play there. This suggests that my window for data capture may be too narrow in this particular
instance to fully describe the inducive nature of India’s grand strategy. In the previous case, which
occurred almost 20 years prior, in the post-war period the inducive ministry was seeing investment
increases of around 25% per year. The total share of monetary resources allocated to the inducive
ministry drops from approximately 19% in 1976 to only around 4% in 1994, with the coercive
domain accounting for the difference.

This alone does not tell the whole story. If one considers the next fiscal year, 1977-1978,
the inducive ministry’s share of the total continues to grow from 1976-1977 to around 23% in
1977-1978. This suggests that the trend in post-Kargil monetary resources for the inducive
ministry generally continued its upward momentum for some meaningful period of time, and the
data from fiscal year 1977-1978 underscores this. Thus, there is reason to assume that this trend
continued for some, but not all, of the intervening twenty years, and helps to establish that an inducive grand strategy is plausible. While this evidence suggests an inducive grand strategy may be in play, it is not definitive proof.
Figure 5.6. Money appropriated to select Indian organizations for the years 1994-1999
When considering the manpower available to these organizations, Figure 5.8 lays out the distribution of civilian personnel at these organizations in 1991 and 1995. While the data is unfortunately incomplete due to India’s decision to abandon yearly central government employee censuses, there are at least a couple of data points for the pre-war years. Civilian employment at both the coercive and inducive organizations dropped while employment at the persuasive organization remained essentially flat in years when census data was available (1991, 1995). The 45% decrease in personnel experienced by the inducive organization between 1991 and 1995 is the largest reduction amongst the three.

Here the passage of time between the Third Indo-Pakistan War and the Kargil Crisis is revealing, although comparing the personnel data from the Kargil Crisis to the data from the Third Indo-Pakistan War must be done with caution. Appropriations for the various ministries are generally reported in a more disaggregated form, which allows for highly targeted datasets which
are reasonably comparable across time. This is not necessarily the case for manpower. In the 2001 *Census of Central Government Employees*, personnel are aggregated across the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, with no ability to disaggregate them. In 1991 and 1995, these figures are reported separately, but were aggregated in order to systematically compare the pre- and post-war data for the Kargil Crisis for the purposes of this dissertation. Thus, while the personnel numbers presented in the figures for the two cases (Third Indo-Pakistan War, Kargil Crisis) are internally consistent and can be compared within case, comparing the figures between cases is not straightforward.

To enable such a comparison, the data presented in this paragraph considers only personnel assigned to the Ministry of Commerce in 1991. Doing so creates the most straightforward comparison between the two cases as possible, but it means the figures in this paragraph are not comparable with post-2001 data. The inducive organization’s personnel grew 97% between 1976 and 1991. This is in contrast to 1976 to 1991 personnel growth rates of -1% for the persuasive organization, and a 5% increase in personnel in the coercive domain. This growth in inducive manpower allocations from 1976 to 1991 points toward an inducive grand strategy. This fact is underscored if you look at the share of total personnel between the three domains. The inducive organization accounted for only 1.3% of the total manpower across the three domains in 1976. In 1991, the inducive organization saw that share grow to 2.4%, almost doubling in allocation. This growth in personnel further establishes the case for an inducive grand strategy.
Figure 5.8. Personnel employed by various Indian organizations per year (1991-1995)
Finally, where was elite attention was focused on during this time period? This analysis maintains the approach of previous chapters, where I examine the abstracts of the articles, utilizing bigrams instead of unigrams and opening the aperture beyond the names of foreign entities, which were the indicators used to assess state-level elite attention. This allows for a richer description of where Indian elite attention was focused and reveals the specific organizations and issues to which it paid the most attention. Table 5.2 reinforces the notion that Indian elite attention was predominantly focused on internal affairs during this time period, which is in line with the way high level elite attention was focused in the previous section(s) and years.

### Table 5.2. List of top 10 bigrams in select Times of India abstracts between 1994-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word 1</th>
<th>Word 2</th>
<th>Number of appearances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Minister</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiv Sena</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janata party</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lok Sabha</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bharatiya Janata</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narasimha Rao</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress President</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party BJP</td>
<td>16</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Viewed only in the five-year window being utilized for my pre-war analysis, these three indicators, when combined, present somewhat of a mixed bag for an organizational determinants’ perspective. When these numbers are put into their proper historical context, there are clear signs of an organizational determinant theory at work. Although the relative trend for money between 1976 and 1994, in both absolute and relative terms, points away from the inducive organization, there is reason to believe that the increases in investment continued for some time after 1976. On the other hand, the trend in manpower points clearly in the inducive direction. Elite attention is once again firmly fixated on internal events, and may be discounted. Considering the trend of investments in monetary resources post-1976, and the increase in manpower in the inducive
organization between 1976 and 1991, it is plausible that an inducive grand strategy may be in play. This raises the bar for evidence in the post-war period, however. Given that the grand strategic relationship is characterized by stability, I would expect to observe relative stability in resources, with any increases primarily going to the inducive organization(s). Any deviation from this expectation would weaken confidence in my theory’s explanatory power.

5.2.3.3 Post-war state-level resources

In the aftermath of the Kargil Crisis, India’s growth rate, bolstered by the economic reforms undertaken earlier in the decade, began to accelerate, increasing in real terms almost 70 percent between 1994 and 2004. This represents the potential for a substantial influx in organizational resources. India’s population likewise continued to grow, ending with a total population of 1.1 billion (and just over 360 million military-aged males).\(^{307}\) Elite attention is also generally stable, with events in Pakistan, the U.S., and the disputed Kashmir region being high on the list. The only notable addition is the increased frequency of mentions of Afghanistan, which is unsurprising given the September 11th, 2001, terror attacks and subsequent U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.

\(^{307}\) The World Bank Group (2018d, 2018c)
Figure 5.9. GDP of India 1994-2004 (Constant 2010 USD)

Table 5.3. List of top 10 foreign entities mentioned in Times of India headlines, 1999-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word(s)</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Pak&quot; or &quot;Pak's&quot;</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmir</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musharraf</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghan</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osama</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.3.4 Post-war organization-level resources

India’s state-level resources were generally increasing, and its organizational resourcing decisions in the post-Kargil period were both straightforward and in line with my theoretical expectations. Resources, in the form of money, increased across all three organizations, but most
markedly in the inducive organization. That organization witnessed a 68% increase in appropriated funding in the period between fiscal years ‘00- ‘01 to ‘04-’05. Increases for the persuasive and coercive organizations over the same time period were only 27% and 17% respectively. Figure 5.11 further underscores that the relative pattern of investment in monetary resources is in favor of the inducive organization, which sees a much larger relative investment in three of the five years, greatly outstripping the relative increases in the other two domains.
Figure 5.10. Money appropriated to select Indian organizations for the years 1994-2004
Manpower, in contrast to monetary allocations, decreased across the board, as Figure 5.12 demonstrates. The coercive organizations saw the largest decrease, with a loss of almost 30% of their personnel over the period of 1995 to 2006. It is important to recall that the personnel being counted here are limited to civilian personnel. India’s armed forces saw a modest 5% growth from 2001 to 2004, but remained constant after that.  

The civilian portion of the coercive workforce was not so lucky. It is unclear what prompted such a large-scale downsizing in coercive organization personnel at this time, but the fact that all three sectors saw fairly significant downturns suggests that a reclassification in any one organization is not to blame. It is possible that the 2004 return to power of the Indian National Congress (in the form of a coalition government, of which it was the head) resulted in departures. The inducive organization shed approximately 19% of its manpower, while the persuasive organization saw a modest 10% increase in personnel.

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309 Mukherjee (2011, 32)
Figure 5.12. Personnel employed by various Indian organizations per year (1991-2006)
Finally, organizational-level elite attention remained firmly fixated on internal events. As Table 5.4 below shows, there was some increased interest in Pakistan, as the increase in references to Pervez Musharraf are a notable change from Table 5.2, but this is directly in line with my theoretical expectations of focus given that, post-Kargil, Indian grand strategy also pivoted somewhat more towards Pakistan. If anything, this focus suggests a move toward a coercive grand strategy.

**Table 5.4.** List of top 10 bigrams in select Times of India abstracts between 2000-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word 1</th>
<th>Word 2</th>
<th>Number of appearances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Atal</td>
<td>68(^{310})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pervez</td>
<td>Musharraf</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonia</td>
<td>Gandhi</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>Prime</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen</td>
<td>Pervez</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme</td>
<td>Court</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George</td>
<td>Fernandes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pre-war, I demonstrated that the trajectory of resource allocation in the years between the 1972 and 1999 case pointed in the direction of an inducive grand strategy. Post-Kargil, monetary resources increased dramatically in favor of an inducive grand strategy while personnel trends pointed somewhat in favor of a persuasive grand strategy. Elite attention, while primarily internally directed, was if anything pointed weakly in the coercive direction. This is another case where the path dependence component of my theory comes into play. Here, my theory expects stability as no one organization was receiving a preferential allocation of all three resources. If anything, given just how dramatic the relative increase in inducive funding was, that strategy may be expected to

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\(^{310}\) This total includes variants of Atal Behari/Bihari Vajpayee, who was Prime Minister of India during the entire period from 1999-2004.
come into sharper focus, which is precisely what is observed. Thus, I conclude that my theory passes the necessary hoops and is a plausible explanation for the case, even if there are some doubts about its ability to fully explain the case.

5.3 Conclusion

Which of the theories can provide the best explanation for India’s grand strategic stability around the Kargil Crisis? In this case, three theories are potential candidates while two others outright fail. Based on the available evidence, a leadership theory, strategic culture, and my organizational determinants may plausibly be at work. Both an external threat and a regional security architecture explanation greatly disappoint in the Kargil case, as they cannot account for the observed stability in the face of the changes that surrounded the Kargil crisis. Table 5.5 provides an overview of the various theories’ expectations and how they performed.
Table 5.5. Summary of rival theories ability to explain the case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Substantive Variance</th>
<th>Externally Oriented</th>
<th>Internally Oriented</th>
<th>Organizational Determinants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External Threat</td>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Security Architecture</td>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Culture</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Determinants</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expectation met?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Causal Mechanism</td>
<td>With threat</td>
<td>With security arrangements</td>
<td>With leadership change</td>
<td>With cultural change</td>
<td>With organization resourcing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expectation met?</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explains the case?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some Doubts</td>
<td>Some Doubts</td>
<td>Some Doubts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When surveying the three macro-level explanations, the most surprising failure is that of externally-oriented theories. The flaw with external threat is its incongruence with the stability observed in India’s grand strategy. The change in India’s perception of Pakistan’s conventional threat suggests grand strategic change, as India was caught off-guard for the type of threat Pakistan was posing even though it was undeniably the more powerful actor in the dyad. Focusing solely on the nuclear balance could suggest grand strategic stability, but India’s Kargil post-mortems reveal that nuclear stability did not factor large in its leaders’ thinking. A regional security architecture approach unraveled even faster as, for the first time, the U.S. sided with India over Pakistan, altering the balance of arrangements in the region. For a theory that posits that such relationships determine grand strategy, that Indian grand strategy did not change in response to this opening was notable, given the depth and vigor with which the U.S. engaged India in the post-war period. While it may be unreasonable to assume that the rate of change would be swift given the two countries’ history, it is still problematic that I observed an inductive grand strategy prior to U.S. involvement and found even stronger evidence of such an approach post-war.
As far as internally oriented theories are concerned, a leadership theory of grand strategic change is plausibly at work in the case, although there is some question about Gowda’s tenure. Strategic culture continues to be a robust theory which cannot be ruled out as potentially in operation. The Gujral doctrine, and the Look East Policy that came after it, demonstrated consistency with the central paradigm of India’s strategic culture, even if its operational execution had changed from a Nehruvian persuasive grand strategy to an inducive grand strategy. The fact that a single central paradigm can yield two fundamentally different grand strategies is somewhat problematic, but not enough to discount it as a potential explanation of the case.

My organizational determinants theory of grand strategy had its theoretical expectations met and is likewise able to posit a potential explanation for the case. While the initial window of observation for the pre-war period was too narrow to clearly identify an inducive grand strategy, looking back over the intervening years between the Third Indo-Pakistan War and the Kargil Crisis helped establish a plausible expectation of an inducive grand strategy. Post-war, the data suggest that stability should result because of path dependence, as money, manpower, and elite attention were slightly muddled. As such, it is a potentially viable explanation for Indian behavior in the case, even if there are some doubts about its ability to fully explain the case.

This concludes my set of three primary observations of Indian grand strategy. In the next chapter, I explore a set of three miniature case studies. The three cases I explore are Australia around the Vietnam War, Pakistan around the Third Indo-Pakistan War, and finally the Netherlands around Operation Trikora. My emphasis will be on conducting a plausibility probe of my theory in each of the cases. These mini-cases provide an opportunity to provisionally assess the generalizability of my theory by briefly applying it to cases outside of the Indian context.
6.0 Three Additional Cases of Interest

This chapter investigates the generalizability of my theory by applying it to cases identified in Chapter 2 as potential candidates for testing my organizational determinants theory. The cases were not rejected for any flaws on their own, but rather due to the virtues of a within-case analysis. Specifically, holding constant the country, and thus many variables typically used for assessing the robustness and generalizability of a theory, offered the most direct opportunity to attack the notoriously tricky problem of analyzing grand strategy. The major drawback to a within-case approach, however, is the danger of a lack of generalizability, specifically because so many variables are held constant. In the series of cases that follow, I redress this weakness by performing a brief examination of three non-Indian cases, by suggesting what my theory would expect, provisionally assessing the congruence of my theory and the empirical record, and discussing possible data sources that could yield the information necessary for further testing of my theory’s power in the cases in future research.

The chapter is organized into three substantive sections, each covering a different case. Within each section, I discuss the background of the case before I explain what it adds to an analysis of my theory. I then examine secondary literature on the case in order to determine each country’s pre- and post-war grand strategy, and if the relationship between the two is better characterized by stability or change. I then analyze a sub-set of my independent variables to determine plausible congruence between the case and my theory before discussing any implications for rival hypotheses. I end each section by identifying where the data required to fully test my theory may reside.
6.1 Australian grand strategy around the Vietnam War

The first case to consider in assessing the generalizability of my claim is Australian grand strategy surrounding the Vietnam War.\(^{311}\) Australia was firmly in the ranks of middle powers around the time of the Vietnam War, with a total GDP placing it below India but above Mexico.\(^{312}\) While, unlike other cases in consideration, Australia did not have any territory involved in the war, it felt uneasy about the potential for communism to spread closer to its borders.\(^{313}\) This case is a particularly significant test of my theory because it represents a potentially easy test for a number of alternative hypotheses, chief amongst them regional security architecture. The remainder of this section briefly describes the history of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War, identifies Australia’s likely pre- and post-war grand strategy, performs a preliminary assessment of congruence with my theory, and finally identifies potential sources for data necessary for testing my theory in depth.

Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War can be traced, in part, back to both its regional interests and concerns over the commitments of its most important ally, the United States, to defend Australia should the need arise.\(^{314}\) Australia’s presence in Vietnam grew rapidly from 30 military advisers in 1962 to a battalion in 1965, eventually reaching a peak of just under 6,900 soldiers in May of 1969.\(^{315}\) During the war, Australian forces operated in the U.S. III Corps’ area of responsibility and conducted many of the same missions as American forces, even if their capabilities were not identical.\(^{316}\) As the situation in Vietnam deteriorated, a robust anti-war

\(^{311}\) My thanks to Sir Lawrence Freedman for suggesting this case as a possible testing ground.
\(^{312}\) United Nations Statistics Division (2016)
\(^{313}\) Vandenbosch and Vandenbosch (2014, 109)
\(^{314}\) Cox and O’Connor (2012, 175-6)
\(^{316}\) Grey (2008, 243-247)
movement grew back in Australia.\textsuperscript{317} Ultimately, Australian forces left more or less in tandem with their American counterparts, and completely withdrew from the conflict in 1972.\textsuperscript{318}

This case is a relatively tough test for my theory, as regional security architecture is a leading theory for explaining any observed change in the Australian grand strategy. In the wake of the Vietnam War, Australia’s main ally in the region, the United States, was forced to retrench and the credibility of its security guarantees to Australia were in question.\textsuperscript{319} Furthermore, Australia undertook defense reforms in the wake of its withdrawal from Vietnam, with an eye towards being more self-reliant.\textsuperscript{320} As such, any potential variation in the dependent variable could very plausibly be explained by a change in the American security commitment to Australia or the region at large, making this case a tough test for my theory and an excellent candidate for future research.

Post-World War II, Australia had aligned itself closely with the foreign policy of Great Britain. After Britain’s recognition of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1950, however, Australia’s anti-communist stance and non-recognition of the CCP began to more closely resemble the United States’ policies in the region.\textsuperscript{321} Characterizing Australian pre-war grand strategy is thus relatively straightforward. Australia’s most important relationship was its military tie to the United States, and it sent forces overseas in the period before the war; Australia appears to have been pursuing a coercive grand strategy.\textsuperscript{322}

\textsuperscript{317} Grey (2008, 248)
\textsuperscript{318} Stockings (2010, 192)
\textsuperscript{319} Millar (1978, 218)
\textsuperscript{320} Edwards (2014, 300)
\textsuperscript{321} Vandenbosch and Vandenbosch (2014, 109)
\textsuperscript{322} See Grey (2008, 220-254) for a detailed description of Australia’s involvement in Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia during this period. It is also important to readers to remember that, in my taxonomy, coercive is not synonymous with aggressive; it is concerned with deriving security primarily through the use, or threat, of force, and/or reliance on military forces and relationships.
After the Vietnam War and the United States’ relative withdrawal from the region, Australia was presented with an opportunity to undertake a grand strategic pivot. Yet, post-war, Australia’s grand strategy showed very little change. Australia’s foreign policy and its security continued to be dominated by the U.S.-Australian alliance.\(^{323}\) The shift in approach was to withdraw a majority, if not all, of its forces deployed in countries around the region and instead provide greater military assistance and training to Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia.\(^{324}\) Accordingly, while some aspects of the manifestation of Australia’s grand strategy changed from a focus on active military deployments and interventionism toward providing advisors and military aid, the broad contours of its coercive substance stayed largely the same.

Figure 6.1. GDP of Australia 1960-1977 (Constant 2010 USD)\(^{325}\)

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\(^{323}\) Grey (2008, 258)

\(^{324}\) Gyngell (2017, 119)

\(^{325}\) The World Bank Group (2020).
If Australia’s grand strategy remained stable, I expect to observe similar stability in state-level resources, and consistent preference for distributing resources to coercive entities over the pre- and post-war time period. There was a shift in the manifestation of Australia’s coercive grand strategy from overseas troop deployments to provision of military aid. Given this, my theory does not expect increases in coercive manpower, but rather increased coercive budgets. Significant shifts in resourcing away from the coercive organization would suggest that my theory could not explain Australian grand strategic stability in this era. Figure 6.1 displays Australia’s GDP for a number of years before the war, during their involvement, and for 5 years afterwards. This data shows relatively steady GDP growth. Military age population growth likewise remains fairly consistent, with Australia’s population of males age 15-64 went from 3.2 million in 1960 to 4.6 million in 1977. Given this was a peripheral war that did not directly threaten Australian territory or resources, I would not expect to observe radical resource shifts tied to their participation in the conflict.

Organizational-level resource allocation patterns of money and power in the coercive domain are in line with my expectations above. Figure 6.2 shows Australia’s approximate defense expenditures from 1961 to 1977, and shows a continued increase in the post-war period. While preliminary data from the entirety of the pre-war period was not available, the post-war pattern is consistent with the trends expected by my theory. Figure 6.3, which shows military personnel during the same period, further underscores this post-war trend. Australia underwent a troop drawn down post-war. Australia disbanded its version of the draft in 1972, however there was a continued

326 Because of the unusual length of the Vietnam War, I have presented data for the entire period of the war, and the five years after to avoid choosing an arbitrary break point. However, data prior to 1960 is generally unavailable.
increase in coercive organization expenditures.\textsuperscript{327} It appears from the available empirical record that my theory is congruent with the case.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure62.png}
\caption{Approximate military expenditure of Australia 1961-1977 (2010 USD)\textsuperscript{328}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{327} Doyle, Grey, and Pierce (2002, 163)
In considering the Australian case, there are a number of potentially significant explanatory challenges for rival hypotheses to overcome. For example, on its face, this seems to be yet another instance in which a regional security architecture explanation struggles to account for grand strategic choice. Not only had British Commonwealth forces generally withdrawn from the region prior to Vietnam, Australia’s main ally—the United States—had also withdrawn from the region, leaving it to shoulder a larger part of the burden. Yet, Australian grand strategy appears stable, running contrary to the theory’s expectations. An external threat theory might provide better explanatory power; while the Vietnam conflict did not constitute an *existential* threat, the threat from global Communism did, which would give Australia a reason to continue with its previous grand strategy. Finally, the preliminary evidence I have gathered suggests that, while strategic culture may have driven Australian grand strategic decision-making, there are some open questions

that require further examination to make a proper determination. For instance, I noted a shift from more active deployments in other nations to more assistance and training. This may represent the first steps on the path toward a persuasive grand strategy, as it represents a shift away from the harder power elements of a coercive grand strategy. If so, it implies a rate of change faster than a strategic culture predicts, but as of now this remains speculative. Given just this quick look at the competing hypotheses, it appears that my theory may be the most compelling potential explanation.

In order to properly test my theory, and indeed to determine its ability to explain the case, more information is needed on both Australian grand strategy, which was sketched in the above paragraphs, and organizational level resources, in the form of money, manpower, and elite attention. The next few paragraphs outline where future researchers can look for data to build upon the preliminary analysis conducted here. Operationalizing the dependent variable, Australian grand strategy, in the manner undertaken in this dissertation requires a large volume of data. Not all countries are as notoriously bureaucratic as India, and thus a ready set of data such as the Foreign Affairs Record may not always be available. This is a problem relatively easily overcome in the Australian case. Australia’s archives contain extensive records of all of its Prime Ministers and their cabinets, with some even having their own research guides. The total volume of data, required, however, can vary depending on how one defines the start of Australia’s participation in the conflict. Australia began its involvement in Vietnam in 1962 with the provision of 30 trainers, so choosing that start point means that ideally a full dataset would include data from 1957. However, if one chooses the commitment of Australian combat forces, which was in 1965, it would require only data from 1960 onward. Australia began withdrawal of its forces in Vietnam in 1970,
with its final exit coming in 1972.\textsuperscript{330} Thus a complete dataset requires data somewhere between the years of 1957 to 1977. Data on Gross Domestic Product, Consumer Price Index, and the like can become problematic to find prior to 1960. Thus, in order to ensure sufficient data exists to conduct an analysis relatively comparable to that which I presented in the case studies on India, I have focused my preliminary efforts on identifying data on Australian grand strategy and state- and organization-level resources from approximately 1960 to 1977.

A search of the National Archives of Australia reveals that a first source of data on Australian grand strategy during this time period may be found there.\textsuperscript{331} During the period in question, Australia had six Prime Ministers, most with relatively short tenures.\textsuperscript{332} Of these six, there are research guides to the archives of Harold Holt, Gough Whitlam, and Malcolm Fraser.\textsuperscript{333} These guides suggest that the files may contain a single omnibus akin to the \textit{Foreign Affairs Record}. What is more likely, however, is a collection of speeches, communiques, and the like more akin to the corpus I assembled for Chapter 5. Furthermore, the research guides suggest that the documents span the time period required.\textsuperscript{334} A further search of the electronic holdings of the National Archives of Australia indicate that speeches by the remaining prime ministers and their cabinets, for which there are currently no research guides, are also available; Figure 6.4 is an example of one such holding. Finally, to supplement these sources, Australia’s Department of the Prime Ministers and Cabinet hosts a detailed list of transcripts of Australian government speeches from the 1940s to 2015, which are freely available online.\textsuperscript{335} The benefit of supplementing the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Millar (1978, xix-xx)
\item The National Archive of Australia’s website can be reached at: https://www.naa.gov.au/ (as of 9/23/2020)
\item The six prime ministers were (in order): Harold Holt, John McEwen, John Gorton, William McMahon, Gough Whitlam, and Malcolm Fraser.
\item National Archives of Australia (2020)
\item Hocking et al. (2016, 74), Masters and Wood (2012, 70-75), Pemberton (2003, 95)
\item These records can be found at: primeministers.moadoph.gov.au/collections/pm-transcripts (as of 9/23/2020)
\end{thebibliography}

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information available from the Department of Prime Ministers and Cabinet with archival research is that it creates both a more robust data foundation and increases the potential for unveiling smoking gun evidence of my theory in action. Taken together, these resources should yield a more than a sufficient corpus to analyze Australian grand strategy during the period. Now, I will turn my attention to identifying data sources to measure my theory’s independent variables at both the state- and organizational-level.

Figure 6.4. Example record of Australian Prime Minister John Gorton's speeches

336 National Archives of Australia. NAA: M533, 112. Image is used courtesy of the National Archives of Australia.
As I previously identified state-level money and manpower during my congruence testing, the only missing indicator to test my theory is to locate a suitable data source from which to measure elite attention. Operationalization of elite attention at the country level is fairly straightforward, with *The Sydney Morning Herald* offering digital archives from 1955 to 1995. While the full articles are available for a fee, the free search function suggests that one could utilize *The Herald’s* metadata to create a corpus of headlines similar to those which I produced for my full case studies.\(^{337}\) When measuring elite attention at the country level I utilized headlines, and so that serves as the minimum data requirement.

Turning to the organization-level independent variables, elite attention is perhaps the most straightforward to specify, as it can be assessed through an analysis of the metadata of *The Herald*, using the identical methodology I detailed in Chapter 2; at the organization-level, I utilized abstracts of articles to measure elite attention. Money can be operationalized in a similarly straightforward manner, as the Government of Australia hosts an extensive digital archive of its appropriations bills, as well as budgets and speeches containing important background information on said speeches.\(^{338}\) Finally, manpower appears to present the trickiest of the three variables to operationalize. I was unable to locate manpower data at the organization level similar to that which was used in the Indian cases examined earlier, though Australia’s budgets do contain civil salaries for defense professionals, so it is possible that these records exist and may be found by either requesting them directly from the relevant organization(s) or examining other supplementary budget documents.

\(^{337}\) The archive can be searched for free at: https://archives.smh.com.au/. *The Sydney Morning Herald* has both an extensive digital archive, wide readership, is the closest major metropol to Canberra, and is considered by many to an authoritative source for the New South Wales region, which completely encloses the Canberra region. Wei et al. (2015)

\(^{338}\) This archive currently resides online at: https://archive.budget.gov.au/ (as of 09/23/2020)
In this section, I have demonstrated that my organizational determinants theory is plausibly congruent with the case. My preliminary research suggests that there are likely relatively easily obtainable data that can be used to replicate my methodology and fully test my theory. As this case presents a relatively tough test for my theory, looking at Australian grand strategy around Vietnam makes a logical starting place for any follow-on research on an organizational determinants of grand strategy theory.

6.2 Pakistani grand strategy around the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War

After Partition with India, Pakistan was one country divided into two non-contiguous “wings,” East and West Pakistan. While East Pakistan was more populous, West Pakistan was both territorially larger and politically more influential. This imbalance across the two wings led to an increasingly acrimonious series of internal disputes and, ultimately, an election that would have put a coalition of (primarily) East Pakistani political parties into power in East Pakistan. West Pakistan refused to accept this outcome, and began a brutal campaign of repression of East Pakistan by the Pakistani military. 339 East Pakistan declared independence as the nation of Bangladesh shortly thereafter. From the outset, India had been allowing refugees onto its territory, as well as amassing troops at both of its borders with Pakistan. The specter of Indian intervention in the conflict prevented more robust attacks by the Pakistani military on Bangladesh for several months. Ultimately, however, the situation deteriorated to the point where the Pakistani military opted for a preemptive strike on India in an attempt to forestall what it believed to be an inevitable overt

339 Haider (2009, 539)
Indian intervention in Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{340} In a somewhat ironic twist, the preemptive attack triggered the feared intervention by Indian forces, which rapidly defeated the Pakistani troops in Bangladesh and ensured the permanent division of Pakistan into two independent states.

This is an analytically intriguing case for several reasons. It represents the inverse of the conflict analyzed in Chapter 4, looking at Pakistani grand strategy in the 1971 Third Indo-Pakistan War. Additionally, the case expands the war outcome variable to cover not only a battlefield loss (as in the 1962 Sino-Indian War), but also, for the first time, a dramatic loss in territory and resources, as East and West Pakistan were sundered into Bangladesh and Pakistan. As such, it serves as a very stark break from the \textit{status quo ante} and represents a relatively rare example in modern history of a case where, if any event were to offer a state an opportunity to break from its prior grand strategy, it would be in such an instance. Thus, this case provides a robust test of both my methodology as well as allows for a wide range of potential variation in the dependent variable, as there are many potential ways Pakistani grand strategy could reorient after such a devastating defeat.

Pre-war, Pakistan pursued what, on the surface, appears to be a fairly straightforward coercive grand strategy. As Ahmed has noted. “Since independence, Pakistan’s foreign policy has pursued two major objectives: security through military capability and economic development.”\textsuperscript{341} He goes on to say, even more bluntly, “The Pakistani elites’ approach to security, especially in the context of Afghanistan and India, revolved around military threats…”\textsuperscript{342} To facilitate this grand strategy, Pakistan had effectively been under either martial law or military rule for at least a decade

\textsuperscript{340} Schofield (2000, 142)
\textsuperscript{341} Ahmed (2012, 318)
\textsuperscript{342} Ahmed (2012, 318)
in the years leading up to the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. At the same time, Pakistan’s diplomatic capabilities were diminishing: it did not even have a foreign minister.³⁴³

Post-war, despite the dramatic change in the composition of the government after Pakistan’s defeat brought down the military dictatorship and re-established civilian rule, there appears to be little change in the country’s coercive grand strategy. As Ahmed asserted above, the general tenor of Pakistan’s foreign policy leans in a coercive direction. Other scholars have noted that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto did reorient some aspects of Pakistan’s foreign policy in the wake of the defeat, such as withdrawing from SEATO.³⁴⁴ The chance that a civilian government would abandon a coercive grand strategy was not to be; as others point out, the weakened military position of Pakistan relative to India post-1971 was directly tied to an increase in the size of Pakistan’s armed forces, and the decision to pursue nuclear weapons.³⁴⁵ This evidence indicates a shift in preference from Pakistan utilizing external balancing to trying to internally balance against India. As with Australia, it appears that continuity, with some adjustments in specific operational emphasis, was the fate of Pakistani grand strategy in the wake of its defeat.

In this case, my theory would expect to observe a shift in Pakistani grand strategy only if there were corresponding shifts in resource allocation amongst the organizations which executed Pakistani grand strategy. Because Pakistani grand strategy was characterized by continuity over the period, and the analysis above suggests Pakistan adopted an internal balancing approach, my theory would expect money, manpower, and elite attention to shift further in favor of the coercive

³⁴³ Schofield (2000, 142) citing Choudhury (1974). It should be noted that not having a foreign minister, in and of itself is not necessarily a problem, as Jawaharlal Nehru famously functioned as both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister due to his intense interest in foreign affairs. However, in this case, the military dictator at the time, Yahya Khan, had the foreign minister fired, and simply never bothered to replace him. Choudhury (1973)
³⁴⁴ A. Ahmed (2017)
³⁴⁵ S. Ahmed (1999, 183-4)
organization. This is because internal balancing requires a greater dedication of resources to coercive elements of grand strategy in order to build capability; had Pakistan chosen to adopt a persuasive or inducive grand strategy instead, the investment pattern would look very different.

From the readily available data, my theory appears congruent with the case. Figure 6.5 shows that the GDP of Pakistan plummeted when the united Pakistan was sundered into Pakistan and Bangladesh. Given the dramatic loss in GDP, I would expect to observe some downturn in all ministries, as tax revenue from East Pakistan was no longer available; any increase in spending off the baseline, or preferential shielding from across-the-board cuts would be particularly notable. The population of military aged males likewise dropped, from a peak of roughly 65.5 million in 1971, to approximately 19.5 million in 1976.\textsuperscript{346} Given that Pakistan’s civil service was notoriously powerful, how they dealt with these shake ups at the organizational level is especially revealing.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{gdp_of_pakistan.png}
\caption{GDP of Pakistan 1966-1976 (Constant 2010 USD)}\textsuperscript{347}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{346} The World Bank Group (2018c)
\textsuperscript{347} Note: The available World Bank data presents data for Bangladesh and Pakistan as separate, even when they were part of a united Pakistan. For this preliminary analysis, I have aggregated the figures from 1966 to 1971, and report only the numbers for (the former West) Pakistan after that. The World Bank Group (2020)
Figure 6.6. Approximate Military Expenditure of Pakistan 1966-1976 (2010 USD)\textsuperscript{348}

Figure 6.7. Approximate Number of Pakistani Military Personnel 1966-1976 (Tens of Thousands)\textsuperscript{349}


Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 show Pakistani military expenditure and personnel in the period five years pre-, and post-war. Figure 6.6 mirrors the dip in Figure 6.5, but shows significant reinvestment in the military in the post-war period. Pakistani military personnel numbers continued to grow despite the split, probably due to the fact that Pakistani military personnel were mostly drawn from West Pakistan before the war. Taking these two datapoints together, they appear directly in line with my theoretical expectations, as I observe a generally stable trend in manpower with continued growth in military spending. Given this preliminary data, it appears that my organizational determinants theory is congruent with the case.

What then, are the potential implications of this case for rival hypotheses? Pakistani grand strategic choices are a fairly easy test for the external theories of grand strategic change, as they should be most likely to explain the case. From an external threat perspective, stability should result, as a united Pakistan was already existentially threatened by India, and the loss of East Pakistan left it weaker and more threatened than before. Thus, there should be evidence of a clear link between this increase in threat and Pakistani actions. Regional security architecture is also a plausible explanation for the case, because the reliability of Pakistan’s security arrangements changed post-war as the United States sided with India. Given this change in the regional security architecture, Pakistan’s choice grand strategic stability can potentially be explained by its pivot towards internal balancing.

As for internal theories, this case appears to pose yet a problem for the leadership theory, as Pakistan changed from a military dictatorship to a civilian government; the continuity in grand strategy, and particularly the continued reliance on a coercive grand strategy, is difficult to explain. This case also has implications for a strategic culture argument. There are several factors which complicate an analysis of Pakistani strategic culture in this case, as the internal composition of the
state shifted when non-defense civilians regained the presidency. Even if one accepts that the change from military to civilian leadership did not change Pakistani strategic culture by itself, the rapid shift from external balancing to internal balancing is difficult for a strategic culture hypothesis to explain, leaving its ability to fully explain the variation in the case in doubt.

Having outlined the general contours of the case, Pakistan’s pre- and post-war grand strategies, preliminary evidence of congruence between the case and my theory, and implications of the case for competing theories, I now turn to identifying data sources which could be used to fully operationalize the dependent and independent variables required to test my claim in more detail. There are many diverse sources from which the necessary corpus of documents can be created to test Pakistan’s apparent and persistent coercive grand strategy. For instance, the National Archives of Pakistan have records of debates held in the National Assembly covering the entire period from 1967 to 1977, sometimes listed day by day, sometimes by month. There are also extensive collections of diaries, speeches, and statements made by the Pakistani Presidents. For example, Ayub Khan, the military dictator of Pakistani from 1958 to 1969, has an extensive body of speeches published. Compilations of speeches by the next Presidents of Pakistan—Yahya Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and Fazal Chaudhry—are comparatively harder to find, but some published books of their speeches do exist, and it is likely that more might be found in Pakistan’s archive. Finally, the journal Pakistan Horizon, published by the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, contains documents of note in the back of its quarterly issues, which cover the entire period. These documents are very similar to the corpus created for assessing Indian grand

350 National Archives of Pakistan (2009, 18 – 28)
351 Examples of the published material available which might be of use in this case are: Baxter (2007), Ayub Khan and Ghani (2010), Ayub Khan (1969)
strategy in this dissertation, though slightly fewer in quantity. Additionally, it is worth noting that these are only the English language speeches; more may be available in Urdu. When combined, these resources represent a potentially robust corpus with which it should be possible to assess whether or not Pakistani grand strategy was indeed coercive during the relevant time period.

Similar to Australia, money and manpower figures at the country level for Pakistan can be found via the World Bank. Elite attention, however, is somewhat more problematic. The challenge lies not in the dearth of data, but rather in the effort required to digitize existing records. The National Archives of Pakistan has extensive newspaper holdings from a number of papers in Pakistan covering the period in question, including *The Dawn*, *Morning News*, and *The Pakistan Times*. Only some of these have been converted to microfilm, however, with *The Pakistan Times* and *The Dawn* having the most robust presence in microfilm archives. It is possible that wider archives exist either in Urdu or that, as digitization efforts increase, metadata archives like those available in the Australian and Indian cases may become available. Thus, while comparable data exists to operationalize elite attention in a fashion similar to that employed in earlier chapters, considerable effort would need to be undertaken to execute it.

Of the three independent variables of my theory, elite attention and money are again straightforward to operationalize at the organization-level. Assuming a digitization effort has been undertaken to access *The Dawn’s* headlines, one would likewise have access to the abstracts

353 Pakistan Horizon can be found online at: https://www.piia.org.pk/pak-horizon/archives or via JSTOR
354 Of the three, *The Dawn* possesses the widest readership of English-language newspapers, which are favored by Pakistani elites. Siraj (2009, 44)
355 Information on the National Archives of Pakistan’s holdings can be found online at: https://archives.gov.pk/pdf/Newspapers.pdf (as of 09/23/2020).
356 Both the United States Library of Congress, and the New York Public Library possess microfilm holdings of *The Dawn* which cover most (if not all) of this era and, as such, this represents yet another potential source of the requisite material.
required to operationalize elite attention. At the organizational level, monetary allocations likely can be found for most of the period in question on the “Budget of the central government of Pakistan,” which was published yearly from 1951 to 1972.\textsuperscript{357} After 1972, the “Annual Budget Statement of the Central Government” provides the necessary information.\textsuperscript{358}

While I have not been able to identify conclusive proof of the existence of organizational level manpower data, there are a number of indications such data very likely exists. In his work on ruling elites and administrative reforms, Khan points to several pay commissions that were undertaken in Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s, which suggests records on numbers of personnel do exist. Khan also notes, however, that the power of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was such that it was able to successfully block the release of at least one of those pay commission reports for years.\textsuperscript{359} This suggests that at least some data on the number of civil service personnel employed in the relevant organizations exist, but that it is very likely either not available or buried in reports for political reasons. For instance, Wilder reports that in the period from 1949 to 2009 there were over 20 studies done on administrative reform in Pakistan, but that Pakistan’s bureaucracy has remained much more powerful than its general democratic institutions, impeding access to potentially sensitive or controversial information such as personnel and pay data.\textsuperscript{360} However, given the extent to which civil service in Pakistan has been studied, it is possible that such data, or at least some relevant data points, may exist in the public domain.\textsuperscript{361}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item This holding is available via the National Library of Australia, and the record (including years available) can be accessed at: https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3408474 (as of 09/23/2020).
\item This holding is available via the United States Library of Congress, and the record (including years available) can be access at: https://lccn.loc.gov/73930495 (as of 09/23/2020).
\item Khan (1980, 745)
\item Wilder (2009, 20-1)
\item Some examples of the literature looking at civil service reform throughout the years are: Wilder (2009), Khan (1980), Gorvine (1965)
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
While I was not able to easily identify data sources for this case that are perfectly parallel to those used in other cases considered, it is likely that within Pakistan’s archive usable data does exist; of all the countries examined in this dissertation, Pakistan’s digitization and online cataloging lags the furthest behind. Manpower data, at least on the civilian personnel side, has been the hardest to identify. However, of the three variables in my theory, it is the least likely to see dramatic change given the fact that Pakistan’s civil service enjoyed power and bureaucratic pull similar to India’s. Additionally, as an authoritarian state for a significant portion of the time under question, even being able to identify a significant portion of the datasets required to test my theory bodes well; given that both my theory and methodology require large amounts of data to be properly tested, if sufficient data can be found even in authoritarian regimes prone to data obfuscation, it suggests both my theory and method can be applied to a much larger and more generalizable set of cases than the case of India alone would suggest.

6.3 The Netherlands grand strategy around Operation Trikora

The Netherlands’ attempt to decolonize what was known as the Dutch East Indies was a fraught endeavor. First, Indonesia declared independence from the Netherlands in 1945 and, after a five-year struggle, was successfully recognized by both the Netherlands and the entire international community as a sovereign state. One of the remnants of the Dutch East Indies that the Netherlands was able to hold onto, however, was the western half of the island of New Guinea, then known as West Papua. Over a 17-year period from 1945 until 1962, Indonesia remained at

362 Steedly (2013)
loggerheads with the Netherlands over West Papua’s fate; the former sought to quickly incorporate the territory into Indonesia while the latter aimed for gradual decolonization and independence. While this dispute took place primarily in the diplomatic arena, Indonesia executed a military operation in 1961 to take the territory by force, which came to be known as Operation Trikora. A full-scale military invasion did not take place, but Indonesian troops did attempt to infiltrate the island and the fighting culminated in the Battle of the Arafura Sea in early 1962, which saw the sinking of an Indonesia patrol boat and the death of a prominent Indonesian military officer.

When considering the scope of conflicts examined in this dissertation, this case is perhaps most similar to the Australian case examined earlier in this chapter, as it represents another example of a middle power engaged in a peripheral conflict. An important variation in this case, however, is that it represents the only instance of a conflict between a former colony (Indonesia) and its colonizer (the Netherlands). As a relatively minor conflict involving a country that was in the decolonization process anyway, it presents a tough test; this case serves as a least-likely case for any theories expecting grand strategic change.

This case also provides desirable variation in selection criteria. First and foremost, as alluded to earlier, the Netherlands was a colonial power, and all previously considered states were former colonies. Two other important distinctions of note are, first, that this case represents the first application of my theory to a Western power, and, second, it represents the first application to a country which is not a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. If a within-case analysis represented the strongest research design to test my theory in this dissertation, as it held many

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363 Viartasiwi (2018, 142)
364 Garcia Palomero (2014, 374)
365 Saltford (2003, 17)
366 Viartasiwi (2018, 146)
potentially confounding variables constant, this case adds important diversity that can bolster confidence in the generalizability of my theory.367

Prior to World War II, the Netherlands pursued the twin strategies of neutrality in European affairs and mercantilism abroad. When it did begin to engage in a more activist foreign policy again, it was in the context of decolonization abroad and the ravages of post-World War II Europe at home.368 Hallmarks of this newly emergent activist foreign policy were involvement in international organizations and an emphasis on diplomacy and foreign aid. In the post-World War II period, the Netherlands was focused on providing aid for economic development in order to secure its business interests, especially with less powerful countries or its colonies.369 For example, Hoebink notes that one of the initial pushes for expansion of Dutch foreign aid came from employers’ organizations for economic reasons.370 This use of transactional suasion, whether for moral or economic reasons, is a hallmark of what I call inducive grand strategies; as such, the Netherland’s pre-war grand strategy can best be characterized as inducive.

Post-Operation Trikora, the Netherlands’ grand strategy remained relatively unchanged as an inducive grand strategy. While Heldring notes that the Netherlands was becoming a more idealistic, activist force in foreign policy in the late 1960s and 1970s, this does not imply that its grand strategy was shifting in a persuasiv direction.371 Despite a shift in motivation from economic self-interest to more idealistic pursuits, the use of aid as a key tool of Dutch foreign policy did not change. In the late 1960s and into the 1970s, the Netherlands began to invest a

367 Bleijenbergh (2010)
368 Heldring (1978, 410)
369 Spitz, Muskens, and van Ewijk (2013, 10)
370 Hoebink (1999, 182)
371 Heldring (1978, 412)
significant portion (around 1.2 percent of GNP) in foreign aid. Baehr points out that the Netherlands was consistent in utilizing its development aid to advance concepts such as human rights, but that it still sought to use aid as a means of influencing behavior. Thus, by my definition, the Netherlands continued an inducive grand strategy. Given that the relationship is best characterized by stability, and the fact that this was a peripheral conflict for the Dutch, I generally expect to observe little in the way of deviation from pre-war patterns of investment.

![GDP of the Netherlands 1960-1967 (Constant 2010 USD)](image)

Figure 6.8. GDP of the Netherlands 1960-1967 (Constant 2010 USD)

While preliminary data is not available for the entire period, as reliable pre-1960 data are difficult to come by, there is enough to at least preliminarily suggest congruence between the case and my theory. When considering data at the state level, Figure 6.8 confirms that the rather abrupt end to its decolonization of West Papua did not materially affect the resources available to the country. Military aged males also show nothing to indicate a disjuncture in grand strategic form, with the population growing from roughly 3.5 million in 1960 to 3.9 million in 1967, which

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372 Baehr (1982, 44)
373 Baehr (1982, 45)
374 The World Bank Group (2020)
indicates a largely stable population pool.\textsuperscript{375} While there is overwhelming support for continuity in an inductive grand strategy in this instance, what remains to be found is evidence of congruence.\textsuperscript{376}

At the organization level, comprehensive historical foreign aid budgets for the Netherlands reaching that far back do not appear to be readily available in English. Despite this, there are some budgetary numbers available. Dutch foreign aid grew from $2.9 million in 1955 to $63.1 million in 1962 before backsliding for several years, only to regain its previous high in 1966.\textsuperscript{377} Given that the decline in aid was tied to the loss of West Papua, but still recovered after the period both underscores the inductive nature of the Netherland’s grand strategy: it was aiming to use economic tools to achieve political effect. Furthermore, while it is somewhat surprising that I observe some fluctuation in resourcing, there are strong indications that elite attention was still directed that way. For instance, the Dutch only began providing foreign aid to other countries in 1949. By 1965, foreign aid had become important enough to warrant a Minister of Development Cooperation, even if the program was still reliant on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{378} As such, it appears my theory is congruent with the case.

The observed stability in Dutch grand strategy is relatively easy to explain from an external threat perspective; given the limited nature of the conflict that it took place half a world away, and that the Netherlands was in the process of decolonizing Western Papua anyway, there was no existential threat to the Dutch. Likewise, a regional security architecture approach would point out

\textsuperscript{375} The World Bank Group (2018c)
\textsuperscript{376} The question of the reasons for giving aid, both for the international community at large and for the Netherlands specifically, has been the subject of a lot of scholarly attention. For a sample of this scholarship, and that which generally contends the Dutch gave foreign aid during this period primarily for transactory reasons (which indicates an inductive grand strategy) see: Arens (2003), Alesina and Dollar (2000), van der Veen (2011), Hoebink (1999), Spitz, Muskens, and van Ewijk (2013)
\textsuperscript{377} (Arens, 460) citing Kuitenbrouwer (1994)
\textsuperscript{378} Kazimierczuk (2015, 7)
that there was no change in the Cold War balance of power in the Netherlands immediate vicinity, and a conflict over West Papua represents a peripheral conflict. A leadership theory of grand strategic stability and change appears to take a blow, as the Netherlands had multiple prime ministers of different parties over the years of the case. It is theoretically possible that the prime ministers and differing parties all had similar grand strategic preferences. However, a leadership theory suggests that grand strategy changes as leaders (or their preferences) change, and such homogeneity of thought suggests either an incomplete theory or another variable at work, like strategic culture or external threat. Strategic culture also takes a blow as a viable explanation; Dutch colonial ambitions were quickly set aside after Indonesian independence and foreign aid rapidly gained prominence as a tool of Dutch statecraft.379 Given the fact that the Dutch kept detailed records that are widely available, this case represents one of the strongest additional cases on which to test my theory against a strategic culture argument.

Despite the extensive records kept by the Dutch, there are some challenges to being able to begin identifying data that could be used to code the variables employed by my theory. As I do not speak Dutch, my ability to comprehensively search is limited, but I have endeavored to identify as many potential sources of data as possible. Assessment of the substance of Dutch grand strategy during the relevant time period should be possible given that the Netherlands has a robust archive of government papers open to researchers. There were six Prime Ministers between 1956 to 1967, which covers roughly the time period in question, and the National Archives of the Netherlands has extensive records for more than half of them.380 There also appears to be extensive holdings

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379 Dierikx (2016, 640)
380 The archives contain extensive records of the papers of Prime Ministers Drees, Beel, de Quay, and Marijnen. I was unable to locate archives for Prime Ministers Cals and Zijlstra, but this should not be taken as evidence that such archives do not exist. For specific records, see (for instance): Bervoets and Kaajan (1978), Gaemers (2007)
on Dutch colonial administration, especially during the decolonization period, and those holdings include specific information on the Indonesian campaign against Dutch New Guinea.\footnote{Centrale Archief Selectiedienst (1997)} Taken together, this suggests that there is a wealth of information that would allow for the creation of a robust corpus of documents to analyze in order to determine Dutch grand strategy. Additionally, the presence of such a large archive leaves open the possibility of finding smoking gun evidence of one or another theory at work, buried in the papers containing more robust discussion of reasons for decisions.

Data at the country level should likewise be relatively easy to obtain. The World Bank generally has the requisite manpower and GDP data for the Netherlands over the time period in question.\footnote{The World Bank Group (2018b, 2018d)} For elite attention, the archives of either of the Netherlands’ two leading ‘elite’ newspapers, \textit{de Volkskrant}, or \textit{NRC Handelsblad}, will provide a wealth of material, with \textit{de Volkstrant} likely to be the slightly more useful because of its larger circulation.\footnote{Janssen (1999, 333)} Holdings for \textit{de Volkstrant} exist from 1948 through 1960, although they are listed as incomplete, meaning that there could be some missing coverage.\footnote{The most complete available holding in the Americas seems to belong to the Library of Congress, which can be found here: https://lccn.loc.gov/sn90017951. A search of the National Library of the Netherlands, as well as the National Archive of the Netherlands did not turn up listings for the newspaper, but that may simply be due to the language barrier.} Fortunately, the Library of Congress does have complete microfilm archives of \textit{NRC Handelsblad} from 1948 to 1970, which provides a backup source of data should the missing years for \textit{de Volkskrant} be unlocatable.\footnote{A link to the Library of Congress’s holdings of NRC Handelsblad can be found here: https://lccn.loc.gov/sn95058062} In fact, it would be valuable to measure both papers, should the remaining archives of \textit{de Volkskrant} be located, in order to help rule out any impact of political bias in reporting.
Data sources for money and manpower at the organizational level are also available. The National Archive of the Netherlands appears to have both budgetary data and personnel statistics, located under the Directorate-General for the National Budget of the Ministry of Finance (Directoraat-Generaal Rijksberging van het Ministerie van Financiën). According to the finding aid provided by the National Archive, there are records from the Office of Personnel Statistics (Inrichting personeelsstatistiek) from 1960-1973, which is missing a couple of the years required to cover the case, but there may be further leads located elsewhere in the boxes. Additionally, there are promising indications that budgetary data exists as well, as there are extensive records of Budget Calls (Begrotingsaanschrijvingen) and general budgetary information.

In summary, this case presents a relatively tough test for theories of grand strategic change, primarily because there does not appear to have been any meaningful change nor would any change be obviously related to the conflict. While the outcome may have multiple potential explanations at first glance, there exists a wide range of data sources which could be tapped in order to measure the variables in my theory and other theories to better understand the relative power of each claim. In addition, the case adds diversity on a number of important axes and, if explored further, it could bolster confidence in the generalizability of my theory. In any future testing of my organizational determinants theory, or really any theories of grand strategic change, this represents a potentially rich case to explore.

386 Centrale Archief Selectiedienst (2010, 26)
387 Centrale Archief Selectiedienst (2010, 25 – 28). Reference to general budgetary information (in Dutch): Serie circulaires aan de ministeries (I Begroting / algemeen; IA zgn. blauwe boekje; IB Suppletoire begrotingen; II overige regelingen inzake de Rijkscomptabilititeit, III Personeels-aangelegenheden; IV Rijksgebouwendienst; V Voorschriften t.a.v. andere uitgavencategorieën; VI Diversen).
6.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I explored three different cases in brief: Australian grand strategy in the wake of the Vietnam War; Pakistani grand strategy around the third Indo-Pakistan War, and the Netherlands grand strategy around Operation Trikora. The focus of this chapter was on determining my theory’s plausible congruence with each country’s grand strategy over time, fleshing out what makes them attractive cases for future research, and identifying datasets which could be of use to future researchers looking to further probe my theory. In doing so, I have addressed a key structural weakness in my within-case research design—generalizability—and a potential methodological constraint in the data-intensive requirements of my theory. By identifying additional cases and data sources, I have demonstrated that both my theory and my methodology can be applied beyond the case of India. Furthermore, I have laid out a plausible path for future research by identifying several more tests which could help determine whether or not my theory stands up to additional empirical scrutiny. Having done so, in the next chapter I provide summary analysis of the evidence for my organizational determinants theory of grand strategy and some concluding thoughts.
7.0 Conclusion

In this chapter, I present a brief review of all of the cases considered in this dissertation, summarizing how well each of the competing explanations fares, before looking across the set of cases. The discussion then addresses the questions about grand strategy posed in the introduction. I also touch upon the implications of my research for a debate on Indian grand strategy. Finally, I provide a set of more general conclusions and offer areas for future research.

7.1 Summary of Findings

In this section, I provide a brief summary of each case and present an overview of my findings before concluding by looking across the range of cases. Of the five theories of grand strategic stability and change considered in this dissertation, three stand out as more viable than the others: leadership, strategic culture, and my organizational determinants arguments. Of these three, strategic culture and organizational determinants are most consistently useful in understanding the form and rate of change observed in grand strategy.

7.1.1 The 1962 Sino-Indian War

The first case centers on India’s grand strategy around the 1962 Sino-Indian War. This war took place less than 20 years after the founding of India, when its first and most influential Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was in power. Here, Nehru’s famous grand strategy of Non-Alignment
is correctly identified by topic modeling as a persuasive grand strategy, which corresponds with the description in the secondary literature and validates my methodological approach. India’s pre- and post-war grand strategic approach is essentially stable, though there are some signs of a shift towards a more coercive grand strategy after the conflict. Looking across the competing explanations, an external threat theory is only partially able to explain the case as, while stability is plausibly anticipated by the claim, it is problematic for the theory that India did not focus more effort on addressing the Chinese threat after having lost the war. This leaves regional security architecture, leadership, strategic culture, and my organizational determinants theory as potential explanations of the case. Table 7.1 below summarizes the results of my analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Externally Oriented</th>
<th>Internally Oriented</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expected Grand Strategic Variance</strong></td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expectation met?</strong></td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Causal Mechanism</strong></td>
<td>With threat</td>
<td>With security arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expectation met?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explains the case?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A regional security architecture hypothesis cannot explain the case because India failed to utilize the web of relationships it had built post-war to help address the increase in threat from the Chinese; India chose to internally balance instead. There is no mechanism specified by the theory
to govern why this should be the case, especially because Non-Alignment was a strategy which was built on managing the web of alliances and security commitments in the region. A leadership theory provides a potential explanation, given the leaders in question generally shared the same grand strategic preferences. However, the theory has no plausible mechanism which accounts for Indian behavior. Previously, China had been identified as a threat to Indian security, but Indian leaders chose a persuasive grand strategy. Post-war, they chose to internally balance, primarily against China. It is unclear why Indian leaders would update their preferences only vis-à-vis China, but not Pakistan as well. This casts some doubt on a leadership theory’s ability to explain the case.

Strategic culture is an explanation that generally provides a robust explanation of the case, as the slight shift in the form of grand strategy could be indicative of either a nascent shift towards a more coercive grand strategy or normal variance within a band of acceptable grand strategic approaches defined by the country’s central strategic paradigm. Finally, my organizational determinants theory fares the best, as it both explains the stability in grand strategy and accounts for the rate of change. My theory accounts for the stability in grand strategic form, by pointing to continuation in monetary resourcing trends post-war. My theory also explains the shift towards a coercive grand strategy, given that personnel employed in the coercive domain increase relative to the other domains; this expectation is validated by a corresponding increase in coercive language in the post-war grand strategic analysis. As such, my theory outperforms its rivals in this case.

7.1.2 The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War

The second case examines Indian grand strategy around the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. This case has a less well articulated grand strategy, as there is debate in the literature over Prime
Minister Gandhi’s grand strategy at the time. Some scholars argue that Gandhi is better thought of as a Machiavellian realist, while others suggest that her grand strategy was simply a coercive twist on Non-Alignment. This latter interpretation is generally in agreement with the observations coming out of the Sino-Indian War. My analysis, drawing on insights from hundreds of primary-source documents, determined that the pre-war grand strategy did have some coercive elements, but is still best characterized as a persuasive one. India’s post-war grand strategy was also identified as persuasive, with a slight shift away from the coercive undertones detected pre-war. Overall, India’s grand strategy during this period was best characterized by stability.

An external threat theory does not clearly expect either stability or change given the dramatic reduction in the threat India faced from Pakistan and thus offers little insight into the case. Comparatively, there is more robust support for a regional security architecture theory, but there are some doubts about the extent to which the constellation of alliances and diplomatic support in the region factored in to Indian decision making. Internally oriented theories fare somewhat better in this regard, with both a leadership theory and strategic culture theory predicting stability. Gandhi and the stability of her grand strategic preference provide a reasonable explanation of the case. Strategic culture theory is also plausibly at work, although there is relatively scant evidence that the operational assumptions of India’s central paradigm are actually observable in this case. Finally, my organizational determinates theory is able to explain both the form and rate of change. Pre-war, the relative emphasis of money was on the persuasive domain. Post-war, the resource indicators were mixed, indicating grand strategic stability should result, which is precisely what is observed. My theory also has the added benefit of providing an explanation of why topic modeling showed a narrower focus for Indian grand strategy in the post-
war period by demonstrating elite attention was focused on internal, rather than external, matters. Table 7.2 below summarizes the results of my analysis.

### Table 7.2. Summary of rival theories' ability to explain the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Externally Oriented</th>
<th>Internally Oriented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Threat</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Security Architecture</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership</strong></td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Culture</strong></td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Determinants</strong></td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expected Substantive Variance</strong></td>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expectation met?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Causal Mechanism</strong></td>
<td>With threat</td>
<td>With security arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With leadership change</td>
<td>With cultural change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expectation met?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explains the case?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.1.3 The 1999 Kargil Crisis

The final case examines Indian grand strategy around the 1999 Kargil conflict, which resulted in a strategic stalemate. In this case, the questions revolve around how to define Indian grand strategy at the time, as the literature proposes both the inducive Look East policy and the more traditional persuasive Non-Alignment may have been in operation. Here, topic modeling validates the Look East policy as both India’s grand strategy and inducive in form, bringing clarity to the scholarly debate. These results further underscore the promise of the methodology for identifying a country’s grand strategy. Post-war, the results of my analysis showed a continuation
of an inducive grand strategy, which means that Indian grand strategy in this period is best characterized by stability.

Table 7.3. Summary of rival theories ability to explain the 1999 Kargil Crisis Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Threat</th>
<th>Regional Security Architecture</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Strategic Culture</th>
<th>Organizational Determinants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expected Substantive Variance</strong></td>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expectation met?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Causal Mechanism</strong></td>
<td>With threat</td>
<td>With security arrangements</td>
<td>With leadership change</td>
<td>With cultural change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expectation met?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explains the case?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some Doubts</td>
<td>Some Doubts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3 summarizes my findings in the analysis of rival hypotheses, and highlights that two theories that are unable to meet theoretical expectations. An external threat theory fails to account for India’s grand strategic stability because Kargil altered Indian perceptions of the conventional balance of power on the subcontinent. A regional security architecture hypothesis fails because, in the Kargil Crisis, Pakistan’s most powerful ally, the United States, actually shifted support to India and thus this theory would expect India’s grand strategy to change. Leadership and strategic culture provide plausible explanations, but there are questions about a leadership theory’s ability to account for the tenure of Prime Minister Gowda, whose preferences were not clearly reflected in India’s choice of grand strategy. There is also evidence that a strategic culture theory might be at work. However, despite the central paradigm of Indian strategic culture being identical across all three cases examined in this dissertation, in this case, an inducive, not
persuasive, grand strategy is observed. It is problematic that the identical strategic core can seemingly yield two opposing grand strategies at different points in time. Finally, my organizational determinants theory provides another plausible explanation for the case, even if there are some doubts about its ability to fully explain the case. The initial window of observation used to identify India’s pre-war grand strategy, by not capturing the whole of the country’s grand strategic development between the Third Indo-Pakistan War and the Kargil Crisis, seems too narrow to clearly establish the warrant for an inducive grand strategy. Post-war, India resourced coercive, inducive, and persuasive organizations differently with money, manpower, and elite attention, creating a muddle in terms of organizational determinants and indicating that path dependence should dominate; the resultant expectation of stability is validated by the continuation of an inducive grand strategy after the war.

7.1.4 Mini-case study results

Three mini-case studies were conducted to assess the generalizability of my theory to non-Indian contexts: Australian grand strategy around the Vietnam War, Pakistani grand strategy around the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, and the Netherlands’ grand strategy around Operation Trikora. My theory appears plausibly congruent with the broad outlines of the historical record in each case. I also identified data sources that can be of use to future scholars looking to apply my theory and methodology to these cases. Combined, these efforts help redress the potential criticism of the intense data requirements required for replicating my methodology. Collectively, these cases demonstrate that both my theory and my method can be generalized beyond the single case of India.
7.1.5 Synthesis of findings

Of the five theories of grand strategic stability and change under consideration, two are clearly less analytically useful than the others. External threat theory is indeterminate in its expectations of grand strategic stability and change in all three of my primary cases. A theory that cannot make clear predictions about grand strategic stability and change cannot be relied upon to explain any such developments. Regional security architecture also fares poorly across the range of cases, having been rejected in the Kargil case and weakened by indeterminacy in the other two. Leadership preference is a potentially viable explanation across the broad range of cases, but the incongruence between Gowda’s preferences in the Kargil case is somewhat problematic. This leaves strategic culture and my organizational determinants theory, which generally perform the best across the range of cases. My case studies collectively raise an important question about strategic culture, as it is unclear how or why a single central paradigm can or should yield two opposing grand strategies. This is not necessarily a fatal flaw in the theory, but it is a call for more research. My organizational determinants theory performs as well as, if not better, than the other theories considered across the board, although in the Kargil case does raise questions about the proper length of the data window required to properly contextualize the relative strength of the organizations. Since my theory outperforms many of the leading theories of grand strategic stability and change, and perform equally as well, if not better than competitors it appears to be a valuable potential explanation for grand strategic stability and change.
7.2 Implications of this dissertation for arguments regarding understanding grand strategy

In my introductory chapter, I highlighted three open questions in the field of grand strategy: does grand strategy exist in practice; can we know grand strategy in real time; and, what causes states to adopt the grand strategies they do? I have found answers for two of them and shed light on the third.

7.2.1 Grand strategy exists in practice

One of the most fundamental questions in the academic study of grand strategy centers on whether it actually exists in practice. Grand strategic nihilists vigorously assert that the concept has no practical meaning; if it exists at all, they contend, it is a theoretical construct rather than an observable phenomenon. The results of my dissertation severely weaken this line of argumentation by finding specific evidence of India’s grand strategy over time. I did so by utilizing a novel methodology and dataset to identify their articulation of that strategy. Through the use of topic modeling, I was able to identify the specific Indian theory of security suggested by other scholars in all instances. This is compelling evidence that grand strategy is not merely a theoretical construct, but that it exists in practice.

7.2.2 Grand strategy is knowable in real time

Some grand strategic skeptics believe that a country’s choice of strategy can only fully be known in retrospect. Here too, topic modeling provides a useful tool for the real time identification of grand strategy. While in my cases I focused on historical events, this method can easily be
applied to the current day; in fact, given the rapid advances in modern computing and the ease of access to machine readable files, a research project using my methodology to analyze current grand strategies would have a vast array of data to work with. For instance, the website for the White House routine publishes transcripts of remarks by the United States President, as well as statements and press releases on a variety of topics, including foreign policy. These documents, along with others, could be collected and analyzed to identify the American grand strategic form, and even detect perturbations and change in real time. Charges that grand strategy only has retrospective coherence are unwarranted.

7.2.3 What causes states to adopt the strategies they do?

My organizational determinants theory of grand strategy can provide insight into when to expect grand strategic stability and change. In many cases, my theory outperforms other leading theories, such as regional security and external threat. My theory’s closest competitor is the strategic culture hypothesis; both theories highlight the power of path dependence in grand strategy, noting that, once a country goes down a particular strategic path, it will usually continue absent an extremely large shock. A strategic culture theory emphasizes the role of people, and their beliefs. My organizational determinants theory focuses on money, manpower, and elite attention. The difference in variables between the two theories has interesting implications for how, and the rate at which, policy makers can effect change.

Strategic culture is a diffuse theory that, by Johnston’s definition, takes into consideration the culture’s attitude towards utilizing force. It follows that the way to effect grand strategic change is to change a culture’s beliefs about the best course of action. While this makes intuitive sense, the empirical record examined in this dissertation cases some doubt on the claim. Specifically, in 

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the period surrounding the Kargil Crisis, India’s central paradigm of strategic culture was the same as in earlier periods. Yet, the resultant grand strategy was driven by a set of operational assumptions that diverged significantly from the previously considered cases, and resulted in an inducive, rather than persuasive, grand strategy being adopted. It is problematic that the same strategic culture can yield opposing grand strategies. Finally, strategic culture theory implies that rapid change is unlikely given the diffuse nature of culture and the difficulty in achieving broad cultural change. Stability should almost always be expected. My organizational determinants theory allows for the possibility of more rapid change than a strategic culture theory, as there are potentially more numerous ways to effect change.

7.3 On Nehru’s Shadow

One pervasive debate in the literature is on the proposition that Nehru’s legacy casts such a long shadow that Indian grand strategy is constrained because of the legacy of Non-Alignment. The essence of the argument is that Indian grand strategy has never fully emerged from Nehruvian Non-Alignment. Chaulia epitomizes this perspective, contending:

The leitmotif of my essay is that 37 years after [Nehru] relinquished his obsessive and officious grasp over India, the worldview and epistemic parameters he bequeathed live on despite changing winds of domestic politico-ideological forces. Political actors with radically non-Nehruvian ideologies may control levers of power and decision-making, but the quintessence of Indian foreign policy was laid out by the original helmsman.388

388 Chaulia (2002, 215-6)
Rauch similarly raises the point that some believe Indian leaders have felt pressure to at least pay rhetorical homage to Nehruvian ideals. My research has something useful to add to this debate. My findings reinforce the claim advanced by Rauch and others that the grand strategy of Non-Alignment, as envisioned by Nehru, was distinctive from the concept of being non-aligned. As I noted in Chapter 3, Non-Alignment has to do with a very specific set of foreign policy ideas and is a persuasive form of grand strategy. Being non-aligned has to do with not taking sides between the competing superpowers. However, my analysis also shows that, while there was an Indian preference for persuasive grand strategies in two of the three cases, there was also a clear shift to an inducive grand strategy in the late 1990s, all while India still remained ‘non-aligned’ between the post-Cold War superpower in the United States and emerging challengers in Russia, and China. Thus, I conclude from the available evidence that, while Nehru remains an important symbolic figure for India, Indian leaders have been charting their own course for longer than some in the field suggest.

7.4 Concluding thoughts and areas for future research

This dissertation, when looked at as a whole, points to two other, more general conclusions about grand strategy and my organizational determinants theory. One particularly noteworthy observation is that, in all three cases, despite variation in war outcomes, grand strategic stability is observed. This stability came in the face of stunning victory (India 1971), dramatic loss (India 1962, Pakistan 1971), tie (India 1999), and negligible defeat (Australia 1972, Netherlands 1962).

389 Rauch (2008, 2)
It is clear, at least from the cases examined, that external theories outright fail to explain this lack of change. As noted by Silove, this may be because most external theories operate at the level of the international system, while grand strategy may primarily be a product of a state-level phenomena.\textsuperscript{390} This is not a new observation, as scholars such as Porter have noted that grand strategy is notoriously resistant to change.\textsuperscript{391}

Porter suggests that a combination of a state’s “power” (as measured by economic size and military capability) and “habit” (defined as unexamined underlying assumptions) cause grand strategic paralysis, at least in the case of the United States.\textsuperscript{392} In some ways, this argument is similar to my own, as habit as defined by Porter can be seen as a variant of elite attention, while power is similar to the concept I advance of resources, and more specifically money. The evidence provided in my dissertation has implications for the generalizability of Porter’s theory, as I provide many examples of fluctuations of power and the potential for fluctuation in habit, albeit in a middle power context. In the cases of the Clinton and (early) Trump administration Porter looks at, my organizational determinants theory would also predict stability. My theory would expect that stability would be driven by the overwhelming volume of resources provided to the Department of Defense, especially in comparison to those allocated to the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development. There is thus more work that could be done on organizational determinants to see how portable it is to other contexts, and how it bolsters and expands on existing scholarship.

Looking across the primary cases in this dissertation, there are suggestions about how to further refine my theory moving forward. In Chapter 2, I advance three resources—money,

\textsuperscript{390} Silove (2017, 4)  
\textsuperscript{391} Porter (2018)  
\textsuperscript{392} Porter (2018, 11)
manpower, and elite attention—as my primary independent variables, as they were hypothesized to be the most likely to make a difference at the state level. The results of my analysis consistently bear out the notion that these three variables were not created equal, with money being the most important of the three and manpower not far behind, although it is not always clear how personnel equate across the various organizations, even if the focus is only on relative rates of change. The connection between elite attention and grand strategic form and change is less obvious. Future tests of the theory could modify how elite attention is handled. This could be done either through simply omitting elite attention, or perhaps finding a different operationalization.

My research also has potentially interesting implications for policy-makers. I have provided a clear set of theoretical expectations that could potentially be used to anticipate or effect grand strategic change. For instance, policymakers or scholars who want insight into the evolution of a given country’s grand strategy might do well to observe the trends in relative resource allocation across the relevant organizations. Alternatively, those desiring change in grand strategic direction have a plausible set of levers, in the form of money and manpower, with which they could use to affect change. The path dependent nature of grand strategy highlighted by my theory, however, cautions that this change may be difficult to achieve.

Future work on my organizational determinants theory of grand strategy should also expand the number of cases under examination. As I described in Chapter 6, there are a number of potentially interesting cases that could be examined with the methodology described herein and scrutinized to determine whether the factors identified by my theory are at work. While it is true that the data requirements to execute this work are high, they are not an insurmountable barrier. Expanding the set of cases under examination to other middle powers would yield yet further
insights into the constraints driving middle power grand strategies, and test whether my theory holds up under additional examination.

Another, potentially more ambitious, research program would be to look at countries higher up the power ladder to determine whether or not they are constrained by organizational determinants the same way middle powers are. The reasons for selecting middle powers in this dissertation were to increase inference and highlight most likely cases where grand strategy might exist. Having lent additional credence to the existence of grand strategy, it would be a valuable addition to the literature to determine whether my theory might be in operation in countries with more resources and potentially more diffuse elite attention. But, for now, this work will have to remain the future.
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