Springle, Alison Ann
(2021)
Intentionality: A Problem-Solving Approach.
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.
(Unpublished)
Abstract
Language, maps, pictures, and models all exhibit “intentionality”—they’re “about” something. Many philosophers hold that the intentionality of these sorts of representations can only be understood against the background of a more fundamental kind of intentionality, namely, the intentionality of psychological representations such as beliefs, desires, and intentions.
Alas, the intentionality of psychological representations has proven an elusive creature. I diagnose and critique two widespread assumptions as the underlying cause: (1) That all representations have constitutive alethic success conditions (i.e., truth, veridicality, accuracy, or satisfaction conditions), and (2) That the intentionality of action derives from psychological intentionality.
I develop and defend a unified “practical epistemic access” analysis of representation and a “problem-solving” account of intentional action. The problem-solving account analyses the means-end form of intentional action in terms of the notion of an “application-accountable solution to a practical problem.” On this view, an intentional action is a process that functions to non-accidentally satisfy a need for flourishing. Needs for flourishing define “practical problems,” and intentional actions are the processes that function to solve them. On the practical epistemic access analysis, representations constitutively function to position agents to appropriately intentionally respond to facts. So representations are a kind of ability or capacity for intentional actions. I develop a detailed account of fundamental psychological representations in terms of “embodied instructive representations.” These are a hitherto overlooked species of representation. They function to provide direct practical epistemic access to facts and have constitutive appropriateness conditions rather than alethic success conditions. They are in this way distinct from the more familiar “surrogative” species of representation. The latter function to provide indirect practical epistemic access and alethic success conditions figure as a constitutive aspect of their appropriateness conditions.
So, against assumption (2), I argue that the intentional directedness of actions cannot be explained as deriving from the intentionality of psychological states. Quite the contrary, psychological intentionality is fundamentally rooted in the intentional directedness of actions. And in light of this, against assumption (1), I argue that fundamental psychological representations have constitutive appropriateness conditions, not alethic success conditions.
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Details
| Item Type: |
University of Pittsburgh ETD
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| Status: |
Unpublished |
| Creators/Authors: |
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| ETD Committee: |
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| Date: |
18 December 2021 |
| Date Type: |
Publication |
| Defense Date: |
18 November 2021 |
| Approval Date: |
13 September 2024 |
| Submission Date: |
10 December 2021 |
| Access Restriction: |
No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately. |
| Number of Pages: |
337 |
| Institution: |
University of Pittsburgh |
| Schools and Programs: |
Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > Philosophy |
| Degree: |
PhD - Doctor of Philosophy |
| Thesis Type: |
Doctoral Dissertation |
| Refereed: |
Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: |
Intentionality
Representation
Action
Psychology |
| Date Deposited: |
13 Sep 2024 18:57 |
| Last Modified: |
13 Sep 2024 19:07 |
| URI: |
http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/42048 |
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