The Politics of Discourse on Gendered Violence in Turkey, 1980-2005: From Family Disaster to Honor Killings

by

Ayşe Alnıaçık Birelma

B.A., Boğaziçi University, 2006

M.A., Boğaziçi University, 2008

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the

Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Pittsburgh

2022

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

This dissertation was presented

by

Ayşe Alnıaçık Birelma

It was defended on

March 30, 2022

and approved by

Nicole Constable, Professor, Anthropology

Sara Goodkind, Associate Professor, Social Work

Melanie Hughes, Professor, Sociology

Dissertation Director: Lisa D. Brush, Professor, Sociology

The Politics of Discourse on Gendered Violence in Turkey, 1980-2005: From Family Disaster to Honor Killings

Ayşe Alnıaçık Birelma, PhD

University of Pittsburgh, 2022

This dissertation is a case study of struggles over framing gendered violence as a political issue. This archival research covers twenty-five years of Turkish political discourse and explains how and why gendered violence has been spoken about under different names over time. Implications go beyond the specific case to broaden knowledge about gendered political struggles.

My dissertation contributes to the Turkish literature in three ways. First, I add the "family disaster" frame to research and analyses formerly limited to the "honor killings" frame. I discuss the early phase of mobilization against wife-beating and identify testimonial as a specific type of knowledge production that feminist pioneers used to target the family as a core patriarchal institution.

Second, I bring a social movement perspective into the analysis of the honor killings frame. I argue that this frame offered unexpected discursive and political opportunities for organizing a more inclusive anti-violence movement in Turkey. I show how the rising political significance of honor killings caught feminists in an ambivalent position. I explain the sources of feminist ambivalence and discuss efforts to overcome it. I show that Kurdish women activists won feminist credibility and solidarity in this phase by contributing a broader understanding of gendered violence and how to oppose it to the national women's movement community.

Third, I analyze the process of institutionalizing these two frames in the 1998 Family Protection Act and the 2004 Penal Code. I show how framings of gendered violence in Turkish

legislation were shaped by the women's movement as well as by the discursive and institutional context. Rather than viewing legal reforms as pure victories, I analyze them as mixed results of discursive struggles among diverse political actors.

My dissertation also offers broader insights applicable to gender and politics research beyond Turkey. First, I show how looking at multiple actors' discursive politics produces better accounts of why the interactions among variously positioned women, feminist politics, and state institutions go awry around the world. Second, by applying a social movement lens, analysts can reevaluate the (dis)advantages of tackling particular forms of gendered violence attributed to minoritized cultures in popular talk.

Table of contents

Abbreviations and acronyms

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
ANAP	Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
ÇATOM	Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezi (Multipurpose Community Center)
ÇYDD	Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği (Association for the Support of Contemporary Living)
DEHAP	Demokratik Halk Partisi (Democratic People's Party)
Diyanet	Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Presidency of Religious Affairs)
DYP	Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)
EKB	Emekçi Kadınlar Birliği (Union of Women Workers)
EU	European Union
IWRAW AP	International Women's Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific
İHD	İnsan Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Association)
İKKB	İstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Birliği (Istanbul Women's Organizations Union)
KAMER	Kadın Merkezi (Women's Center)
KİH	Kadının İnsan Hakları – Yeni Çözümler (Women's Human Rights – New Ways)
Mor Çatı	Mor Çatı Kadın Sığınağı Vakfı (Purple Roof Women's Shelter Foundation)
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
RP	Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)

SHÇEK	Sosyal Hizmetler ve Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu (Social Services and Child Protection Institute)
SHP	Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party)
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
US	United States
VAWA	Violence Against Women Act
WLUML	Women Living Under Muslim Laws

Preface

This dissertation could not have been written without the help of many people. I am deeply grateful to my advisor, Lisa D. Brush. She guided me with great care throughout all stages of this study. Thanks to Dr. Brush for her generosity of time and spirit and her efforts to make me a better scholar and writer. I learned a lot from Nicole Constable. Her course titled Politics and Poetics of Ethnography was so inspiring in choosing the subject of this research and writing this dissertation. Thanks to Dr. Constable for her inspirations and critical feedback. The other members of my committee – Melanie Hughes and Sara Goodkind – are also warmly thanked for their insights and encouragement.

My previous mentors – Ayşe Buğra, Fatoş Gökşen, Özlem Altan, and Deniz Yükseker – continued to sustain me during PhD education at Pittsburgh. Thanks for their encouragement and confidence. Thanks to Ayşen Üstübici and Ali Sipahi for enabling me to present pieces of this research in their universities.

I would like to thank Sebastián, Sam, Gabriel, Camilo, Başak, Laura, Ben, Danny, and Hillary who have been with me throughout my PhD journey in Pittsburgh. I cannot imagine how harder, boring, and joyless Pittsburgh would be without their friendship and love.

Thanks to many participants and organizers of the meetings at *Feminist Mekan*. I learned a lot from them. I very much appreciate Özengül and Nehir for their friendship that made me feel at home.

Special thanks to Sevecen and İlknur for their resilient friendship since the first days we met. They never let me alone. Thanks also to the friends at the *Ben de Harranlıyım* group - Filiz, Saim, Emre, and Başak.

Finally, I would like to thank my family, Alpkan and Rüzgar, and Alex who took care of Rüzgar while I was writing this dissertation. Thanks to life, which has given me Alpkan and Rüzgar.

1.0 Introduction

Gendered violence has been put into political discourse with different words and expressions at different times and spaces. Whereas feminists striving to underline the gendered origins of violent acts have used names such as wife-beating and femicide, gender-neutral names such as domestic violence and more recently, intimate partner violence, have been used in formal policy documents and wider academic works. Geography also matters in naming; the murder of a woman by her current or former husband or boyfriend or in-laws has gone under different names such as honor crimes, passion crimes, and dowry murders in different contexts.

This dissertation concerns the struggles over the recognition of gendered violence as a political issue in Turkey in the two and half decades following the 1980 military coup. Specifically, it traces the changes in discourse on gendered violence through two phases, starting with the notion of "family disaster" in 1980s and followed by expansive talk of "honor killings" in the 1990s and 2000s. My goal is to account for the fact that gendered violence has been spoken and written about under different names in different time periods. Influenced by Foucault's historical study (1978) on discourses on sex in modern societies, my empirical questions are as follows: Who has done the speaking? From which positions and viewpoints have they spoken? What have they said about it? What were the effects of power generated by what was said? What were the links between these discourses, these effects of power, and the affects that were invested by them? What knowledge was formed by this linkage? My purpose is to define the regime of power-knowledge-affect that sustained the discourse on gendered violence in each phase and to explain its transformation.

By tracing the twenty-five years of political accounts of gendered violence from family disaster to honor killings, I investigate two phases of discursive production and their

transformations. In the conclusion, I elaborate on the question of whether to credit this history to feminists' struggles over the recognition of gendered violence. Inspired by Fraser's work (2005) on the history of second-wave feminism in the U.S., I discuss the following questions: How should we understand the history of gendered violence talk? Is it a narrative of progress, according to which we have moved from a limited understanding of violence and gender equality, dominated by the framings of secular, middle-class, educated, heterosexual, and married Turkish women to a broader understanding of violence and gender equality, inclusive of the concerns of previously excluded groups like Islamist women, Kurdish women, never-married women, lesbians and transwomen? I support a broad and inclusive understanding, but I did not find this 'progress' narrative satisfactory. I show that it is too simplistic to think of this discursive shift as a story of feminist success. This account fails to situate discursive changes in broader historical and political contexts. Also, it does not consider how non-feminist authorities like elected or appointed state authorities have appropriated these discourses, and how they used and abused these frames in each phase. I propose a less congratulatory interpretation, which is multi-actored, contextualized, and open-ended.

In what follows, I review first the literature on political discourse and gendered violence and then I focus on research on gendered violence in Turkey. I discuss the relative attention scholars put on the efforts of and competition between state institutions and women's movements to shape the political talk on gendered violence. Scholars note varied problems in hegemonic discourses in the countries they study. My review indicates that this variation depends on the discursive and institutional contexts of these countries. Connected with the understanding of the gender component of violence and its relation to other inequalities in a specific locale, feminists' efforts to politicize violence have had unintended outcomes. The literatures across the global North

and South point to carceralism and culturalism as consequential examples. Along with this literature on political discourse, the literature on gendered violence in Turkey shapes my research focus and methods I use in this dissertation. I describe these in subsequent sections before outlining the content of the dissertation.

1.1 The study of political discourse and gendered violence

One of the basic premises of the sociology of knowledge is that concepts used to represent reality are socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Building on this premise, Somers (2008: 173) argues, "all of our knowledge, our logics, our theories, indeed our very reasoning practices, are marked indelibly (although often obscurely) with the signature of time, normativity, and institution building." Concepts not only represent social reality; they also shape the practices and/or human beings that they are supposed to signify. Hacking (1991: 254-255) describes a "feedback effect" between representations and practices, the two being made up spontaneously and continuously: "People act and decide under descriptions, and as new possibilities for description emerge, so do new kinds of action." This feedback effect is probably more pronounced when certain practices come under the scrutiny of politics – of states and/or social movements. Drawing on Fraser and Gordon's (1994: 310) argument that "a crucial element of politics … is the struggle to define social reality," this dissertation traces the social and political construction of reality and frames of gendered violence that have circulated in Turkish gender politics.

Research on states and gender politics demonstrates that a discourse-oriented focus addresses the political work and contestations over the interpretation of issues and needs that would otherwise seem natural, pre-discursive, and non-political (Adams & Padamsee, 2001;

Fraser, 1987; Haney, 2002). These studies point to the ways states govern gender by "producing, positioning, regarding, and rewarding women and men as different and unequal" (Brush, 2003: 85). Fraser (1987) and Haney (2002) underline the interpretative practices of states, in creating subject positions and institutional structures and matching up the two in ordinary acts of governance. They show that the governance of gender entails a series of efforts constituting boundary work. Whereas some practices and subjects are encoded as legitimate, worthy, and truly feminine or masculine, others are suspect as illegitimate and deviant requiring normalization; still others are deemed totally illegible or expendable. Adams and Padamsee (2001) advance the discourse-oriented study of gender politics, by conceptualizing gender regimes as composed of signs, subjects, strategies, and sanctions. Among these elements, they accentuate signs, defined as "prevailing images of and emotionally charged judgments about what counts as feminine and masculine" (Adams and Padamsee, 2001: 2). They state that signs might have multiple meanings, but only some are mobilized by state institutions or social movements competing in the field of discourse.

Other scholars advance the study of political discourse by drawing attention to feminist movements and their discursive politics. Briefly defined as "politics of meaning-making", discursive politics is a form of power feminists engage in through reinterpreting and reconstituting norms, beliefs, and practices (Katzenstein, 1994). Feminist movements are prolific in terms of discursive politics, ceaselessly creating new phrases and frames to speak and write about previously unnamed or misnamed situations in women's lives and gender relations. Engaging in a dialogue with social movement scholarship, feminist scholarship has been prolific, too, as many scholars offer distinct conceptual packages and models to study discursive practices of feminist movements in relation to states and counter-movements (Ferree & Merrill, 2000; Ferree, Rucht,

Gamson, & Gerhards, 2002; Naples, 2013). In their review of the literature, Ferree and Merrill (2000) point out the lack of a model explaining change in discourses and frames, besides noting the effect of successful framing in delimiting the options of other actors operating in the field of discourse. Ferree and her colleagues (2002: 20) introduce the concept of "discursive opportunity structure" to explain how politics and culture in a given locale shape and constrain actors and influence "who receives voice and what frames are easy or difficult to express." Similarly, Naples (2013) attends to the interactions among feminist frames, discursive fields, and institutional practices. She argues that framing options available to movement actors are bounded in a discursive field, and that movements sometimes manage to institutionalize frames through a process of subjugation, delegitimation, and/or cooptation.

Specific to discourses on gendered violence, the U.S. debate revolves around the issues of intersectionality, social control and carceralism, and the definition of the gender component of violence. Decades of feminist research criticizes the gender-blind conceptualization of violence according to a "family systems" paradigm that presupposes "gender symmetry" in intimate relations and obscures the understanding of motives and consequences of violent acts (Brush, 1990; Johnson, 2006). Arnold (2006) documents feminist mobilization of the wife beating frame that attributes the practice to gender norms and power inequalities between men and women, requiring societal and public action. Stark (2007) highlights the limitations of the gender-neutral domestic violence frame, which became hegemonic and institutionalized from 1980s onwards. Stark (2007: 10) argues that the discourse of domestic violence concealed the issue's "major components, dynamics, and effects, including the fact that it is neither 'domestic' nor primarily about 'violence.'" Drawing on his activist work with victims and perpetrators of abuse, Stark offers the concept of "coercive control" as a politically and empirically better fit between label and

reality. In contrast, Bumiller (2008) contests the U.S. feminist movement's framing of sexual violence as a "gender war." She highlights that this representation forfeited a more complex understanding of gendered violence as connected to inequalities of race and class, and underpinned cultural anxieties about security and crime. Studying the legislative process of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), Whittier (2016) attests to feminists' use of the frame of "gendered crime" as a coalition-building strategy and acknowledges many feminists' attempts to expand VAWA through an intersectional understanding of violence. Drawing on Naples's materialist discourse analysis, she argues that the discursive and institutional context of the Congress filtered out intersectional elements in feminist discourse.

The debate in the European context partly overlaps with the U.S. debate, as in the former, most researchers focus on the resonance of policy frames with the concept and goal of gender equality and the impact of Europeanization on national policy discourses (Kantola, 2006). Drawing on critical frame analysis (Lombardo, Meier, & Verloo, 2009: 3) that introduced the concepts of "fixing, stretching, shrinking and bending" to describe the processes of changes in the meaning of gender equality, Krizsan and Popa (2014) argue that most feminists in Central and Eastern European countries promoted an expansive understanding of domestic violence and gender equality to influence mainstream policy actors. Among the domestic violence frames, which varied along a "continuum" from gendered to degendered policy, an "individual rights frame" located at the degendered end of the continuum became dominant. In another article, Krizsan and Popa (2010) analyze the impact of Europeanization in the framing contests in these countries. They argue that in addition to formal conditionality criteria and funding, women's organizations have constructed and mobilized an idea of Europeanness that requires action against domestic violence to gain legitimacy for anti-violence policies.

Recent research on the European context focuses on intersectionality in gendered violence. However, the debate is more interlaced with the issues of culturalism and social inclusion, rather than carceralism and social control. Several researchers have critiqued the culturalist approach to gendered violence; that is what Razack (2004: 129) defines as "the violence … understood as originating entirely in culture, an approach that obscures the multiple factors that give rise to and sustain the violence." Focusing on Norway's responses to the issue of forced marriages, Razack underlines that culturalism obscures how racism aggravates patriarchy and violence towards women in immigrant communities under siege. Dustin and Phillips (2008) add that the culturalist approach highlights some forms of violence at the expense of normalizing other, mostly more common, forms of violence. Ticktin (2008) focuses on how the moment of recognition of sexual violence in France intersected with an increasing anxiety about policing national boundaries, annexing sexual violence to the language of border control. Similarly, Montoya and Agustín (2013) observe an increasingly cultural representation of gendered violence as a "foreign" problem in the EU context in the 2000s. This research also refers to the idea of Europeanness albeit as a strategy of exclusion, for example underscoring "honor killings" in reports on Turkey to question whether the country has adopted "European values."

Furthering this debate on intersectionality and gendered violence, Strid, Walby, and Armstrong (2013) underline that culturalization is not a necessary consequence of naming specific problems of violence. But it is a genuine risk, especially if policy language is degendered. They characterize the intersectionality debate as a debate on visibility, its main question being "what kind of intersections are made visible and how" (Strid, Walby, and Armstrong, 2013: 565). They offer the inclusion of voices of minoritized women in all policy processes as the strongest form of visibility leading to better-quality policy, especially if gender is kept visible in the diagnosis and

prognosis of violence. Some studies on Germany and Netherlands, where a debate on the frame of "honor-based violence" abounds, partially confirm this argument about intersectionality, culture, and the inclusion of minoritized women. Roggeband and Lettinga (2016) point to the selective inclusion of minority women's organizations in policy processes, arguing that their frames might be "bent" to fit nonfeminist agendas especially by right-wing and anti-immigrant political actors. Yurdakul and Korteweg (2019) observe the recent waning of this visibility in the Dutch case, as honor-based violence has been subsumed under an arguably gender- and culture-neutral frame, that is, "violence in dependency relations."

Research on political discourse on gendered violence in the Global South pioneered some themes now common in European research, especially culturalism and the travel and translation of gender equality norms. Mohanty (1988) criticizes western feminist discourse on male violence in the third world for characterizing and defining women of the non-West simply in terms of their victim status. Narayan (1997) criticizes representations of "dowry murders" as instances of "death by culture." In contrast, she argues, violence against mainstream Western women resists "cultural explanations." Similarly, Merry (2006: 11) contests the conception of culture as a static, homogeneous, bounded, and pre-political entity located "out there" in targeted communities, rather than "in here" in the offices of transnational policy communities doing human rights work. She argues for a non-essentialist view of culture to better understand the possibilities of change in local contexts and the work of intermediaries positioned between the global and the local. She offers the concept of "vernacularization" to define the work done by these intermediaries, whom she calls "knowledge brokers", people and institutions that appropriate, translate, and adopt of globally generated ideas into local contexts. Focusing on the construction of "honor crimes" as an Islamic cultural practice, Abu-Lughod (2011) adds the affective implications of cultural framing such as

hostility, disdain, and fear towards Muslim majority countries or immigrant communities originating in these countries as well as motives of "saving" women belonging to these communities. Last but not least, these studies highlight the selective production of data and knowledge on these culturalized forms of gendered violence, relating it to the discursive and material power differences between political actors including state and non-state institutions as well as transnational policy communities and donor agencies.

These works on political discourse and gendered violence give several directions to follow in a study of the politics of gendered violence. First, they indicate that feminist discursive politics should be studied in relation to discursive politics of other actors such as state institutions, political parties, counter-movements, and transnational gender politics and donor institutions. A relational, process-centered, and materialist analysis of the political discourse is most beneficial when it attends to the interactions among feminist frames, discursive fields, and institutional practices.

My survey of the literature further indicates that questions such as which frames get institutionalized, how, and why, might be complemented with the question of at what cost. This is because, the making of a political discourse involves contests and negotiations about the definition of the problem at hand and its solutions. The consequent framing of gendered violence is contingent upon power imbalances and relations among different policy actors. The question of 'at what costs' is important because the final shape of hegemonic political discourse often deviates from feminists' initial frameworks as well as intentions. This question points to the direction of analyzing the quality of frames in terms of defining the gender component of violence as well as issues of intersectionality.

Finally, this review points to the need of analyzing epistemic politics of gendered violence, especially its affective characteristics. Through producing knowledge about gendered violence,

political actors strive to shape the hegemonic discourse with their own motivations and interests. These knowledge practices shape their constituents' and audiences' reasoning as well as affective responses. Often, political actors mobilize different affects such as anger, hate, fear, grief, and solidarity to attract their constituents and audiences and weaken their competitors in the discursive field. Accordingly, it is this last major point that I take from this literature to analyze the Turkish discourse.

1.2 Research on gendered violence in Turkey

Until the 1990s, Turkish scholars of gender and women's studies paid only scant attention to violence, devoting only small sections of their works to the issue (Abadan-Unat, 1986; Esmer, 1993). The literature focusing exclusively on domestic violence has grown less through scholarly sociological and political analysis and more through the efforts of mental health and public health professionals (Yüksel, 1995). Mostly using a "family systems" paradigm and to a lesser extent the feminist "male violence" paradigm, some sociological studies have focused on the "acts of violence" that target women in heterosexual relations and assessed the prevalence and determinants of violence (Altınay & Arat, 2009; Brush, 1990). Other studies aimed attention at the Turkish state's responses to gendered violence and researched the development of anti-violence policies, state practices on the ground, and finally, political discourses.

Scholars use nationwide survey data to document the prevalence of violence and investigate the determinants of variation in prevalence rates across specific groups (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall & Furr, 2010; Altınay & Arat, 2009; Dasre, Greulich, & Inan, 2017; Ergöçmen, Yüksel-Kaptanoğlu, & Jansen, 2013; Yüksel-Kaptanoğlu, Türkyılmaz, & Heise, 2012). Using quantitative

research methods, some scholars also examine the attitudes of women towards violence and their practices in the face of violence. Comparing their findings with the results of previous state-sponsored research, Altınay and Arat (2009) confirm changing attitudes against violence, a rising awareness and decreasing tolerance of male violence in intimate relationships. However, based on answers given to behavior-type questions, Ergöçmen and her colleagues (2013) contend that not much has changed in terms of seeking help; women rarely appeal to state institutions when subjected to violence. The findings of these nationwide quantitative studies raise significant questions about the powers of state institutions to address gendered violence.

Studies focused directly on the state response to gendered violence mostly use qualitative methods to investigate the development of policies, practices, and discourses, albeit separately. In consensus with international comparative research (Alvarez, 2000; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Merry, 2006; Weldon, 2002), researchers interested in policy development investigate the roles of international institutions and gender equality discourses and feminists' use of these frameworks in confronting and pressuring the state (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2009, 2013; Dedeoğlu, 2012; Kandiyoti, 2010; Kardam, 2005). In fact, as several studies emphasize, gendered violence was a significant issue in the mobilization and institutionalization of the feminist movement in Turkey in the 1980s (Acuner, 2002; Işık, 2002; Sirman, 1989). From the very beginning, feminist activists prioritized reforming state policies and practices addressing male violence against women (Ekal, 2015). Aldıkaçtı-Marshall (2009) states that feminist activists held back from entering state institutional structures in order to maintain their organizational independence, simultaneously confronting and pressuring the state to reform its gender policies. By appealing to international gender policy structures (Kardam, 2005) and through "sustained pressure" (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2009), feminists succeeded in prompting the state to change its gender policies and legislations.

Regarding the impact of the European Union (EU) accession process on policy development, İlkkaracan and Ercevik-Amado (2011) suggest that it was limited and the reforms were driven primarily by the efforts of the local feminist movement. Özdemir (2014) adds that EU has been indirectly influential in local policy-making through changing domestic opportunity structures. Highlighting the role of the feminist movement in the development of anti-violence policies, these studies have passed over the question of how and to what extent different political and institutional actors, including the governing and opposition parties as well as state bureaucracy, came to adopt these pieces of legislation. Additionally, as Kandiyoti (2010) suggests, questions remain as to how secure the recent gender policy legislative efforts are and whether they could be followed by a roll back, a process of "masculinist restoration," making the *de facto* rights enjoyed by men *de jure* through new legislation.

In line with Kandiyoti's cautions, researchers focusing on on-the-ground state practices confirm that when women turn to them, state institutions mostly fail to offer them supportive services. These studies mostly prioritize shelters as research sites and offer different explanations for failure. For instance, Shively (2011a, 2011b) considers shelters as institutions designed to "provide refuge for victims of domestic violence" in Europe and North America, which were then "transplanted" into the Turkish state social service system. She argues that this Western feminist strategy however has not worked as expected in Turkey. She finds that women who were subjected to intimate partner violence constituted only a minority among the shelters' residents. The two shelters where she conducted her field research were serving a very diverse group of women, among whom only 10 percent had experienced something meeting the narrow definition of intimate partner violence. Most of the women were there because of economic disenfranchisement. These shelters were housing women who were displaced due to armed conflict between the

Turkish state and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), former prostitutes, women with addictions and mental or physical handicaps, and even international refugees from Somalia and Eritrea. Among many reasons she discusses to doubt the viability of shelters to specifically fight domestic violence in the Turkish context, she puts emphasis on women's perception of domestic violence as a "fact of life" or the "order of things" and their reluctance to appeal to state institutions in the face of violence.

In a different vein, Diner and Toktaş (2013) frame the main problems with the women's shelters in Turkey as their low numbers, capacities, and qualities.[1] Comparing Istanbul and Diyarbakır, the authors highlight the positive difference a strong women's movement and cooperation between the local state and women's organizations makes in terms of the sustainability of shelters. Ekal (2011, 2015) discusses shelters as bureaucratic state institutions because the vast majority of shelters are run by the state in Turkey unlike many other countries (Fábián, 2010; Wies & Haldane, 2011). Based on this difference, Ekal argues that shelters in Turkey do not represent "feminist solidarity" and do not aim to dismantle gendered power relations. Acting as a "substitute for the (natal) family," shelter staff, who are public employees, claim to offer "protection" to women (Ekal, 2015: 328). In turn, women are expected to show their gratitude to the staff, who are believed to represent the state. The ethnographic research of Babül (2015) on human rights training programs for state officials between 2007 and 2009 supports these observations on the assumed "benevolence" of state officials and "grateful obedience" of serviced women. Furthermore, Babül (2015: 123) states that public officials remain reluctant to intervene in the cases of domestic violence as they claim that what women want is having their husbands' "ears

[1] They report that in 2010, there were 58 shelters for a total capacity of 1,354 women in Turkey. In 2021, the number of shelters has risen to 149. Only one of these shelters is run by a non-governmental organization; that is, Mor Çatı (Kadının Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü, 2021).

pulled a little," not their conviction or divorce. Among these studies on state practices in Turkey, Ekal and Babül especially get beyond the questions of effectiveness and failure, as their works discuss what gender relations and politics these non-feminist practices produce.

A third group of studies on Turkish state's responses to gendered violence has focused on political discourses. Throughout these years of policy-making, a shift from "honor killings" to "violence against women" has occurred in official state discourses; no study has analyzed this change in state discourses thus far. Moreover, the literature provides no description or analysis of what preceded the honor killings frame. Instead, only "honor killings" as a discursive frame is invested with considerable theoretical development and political critique (C. Belge, 2008; Koğacıoğlu, 2004, 2011; Sirman, 2004). Other frames such as "violence against women" or the more recent "intimate partner violence" remain theoretically unelaborated. Following the conceptual trend in international scholarship, some scholars begin to discuss the concept of "intimate partner violence" in their studies on Turkey (Shively, 2011b; Uluocak, Gökulu, & Bilir, 2014). Yet, this concept of intimate partner violence, which would risk the familial imaginary of Turkish society (Akkan, 2017; Sirman, 2004; Yazıcı, 2012), has not entered in the state's vocabulary of gender politics.

Among the studies on honor killings in Turkey, most researchers question the usage of this frame because of its religious and racial connotations. For instance, Sev'er and Yurdakul (2001) criticize the invocations of religiosity in the discussions on honor killings, though they reproduce a racial-cultural usage of the honor killings frame by singling out a specific region in Turkey. They present honor killings as actions taking place in "backward, structurally disadvantaged, and rabidly patriarchal rural areas" almost always located in southeastern Turkey (988). According to these authors, traditional patriarchy prevails in these areas despite the Turkish state and army's

modernization campaigns; they characterize patriarchy as a "wounded dinosaur" still capable of great destruction. In their framework, social change, which has been left undertheorized in terms of gender and race, appears to be the most significant factor explaining honor killings. They consider the state and even the army responsible for controlling the pace of social change in these regions. The authors do not explicitly mention Kurdish ethnic identity in this study and ignore internal displacement and conflict between the Kurdish armed group PKK and the Turkish military.

Ahmetbeyzade (2008) and Belge (2008) define honor killings as "premediated murder of a woman by her male kin" happening predominantly among Kurdish communities. Nevertheless, their approach to the frame is more critical than Sev'er and Yurdakul. Both Ahmetbeyzade and Belge underline the roles of sovereign powers, namely the Turkish state and tribal powers, in the framing of these crimes. To explain honor killings, the authors use different theoretical frameworks and data, yet their analyses converge in focusing the sharing of power between state and regional actors. Honor killings are framed as "regional custom" in the context of 1) the state's unwillingness (Ahmetbeyzade, 2008) and incapacity (Belge, 2008) to prosecute these crimes and 2) tribe/clan power to maintain "living law" and condemn women in the name of restoring honor and gender order of the community. Belge highlights that this racial-cultural frame emerged in 1990s not due to increase in numbers[2] or change in the nature of violence, but rather because of the ways in which the Turkish state recognized the "cultural difference" of Kurds.

[2] In her study based on court records of Urfa, a southeastern city populated primarily by Kurds and Arabs, Belge finds that 80 murders were tried between 1974 and 1989, and 101 were tried between 1990 and 2005. She explains the increase in numbers with "greater state penetration and law enforcement in the villages over the years" (Belge, 2008: 53).

Koğacıoğlu (2004, 2011) and Sirman (2004) critique both popular and academic labeling of honor crimes as practices caused by (Kurdish) culture or tradition. Koğacıoğlu (2004) argues that these invocations hide structures of power and the role of institutions in perpetuating these practices. When they invoke tradition, institutions such as the state and judicial authorities evade responsibility, claim impotence, construct tradition as timeless and unchanging, and (re)produce the binary between the traditional and the modern. Koğacıoğlu (2011) contends that this discourse installs a boundary/discontinuity between Turkishness and Kurdishness, sanitizes Turkishness as "modern", and invents Kurdishness as "backwards." By associating honor crimes with a discrete Kurdish culture that is essentialized and blamed in turn, state discourse covers over the effects of capitalism, armed conflict, and androcentrism in the state bureaucracy. It also hides the prevalence of familial conduct in the Turkish public sphere that regulates bodies, identities, and actions of *all* women (Sirman, 2004).

The late Koğacıoğlu characterizes the way the Turkish state governs marginalized populations as having shifted from a developmentalist/assimilationist imaginary to a cultural/racial one. As one important aspect of the racial/cultural imaginary, that is, production of knowledge about the other, both state and popular discourses on honor killings and Kurdish custom have proliferated. The producers of this knowledge were selective in detail (Narayan, 1997), emotional in language, and pseudo-scientific in technical approach. Analyzing these discourses, Koğacıoğlu contends that the concept of honor killings deflected attention from state institutions and downplayed gendered violence that crosscuts class, status, and ethnic boundaries in Turkey. She did not forsee that the concept would drift out of the vocabulary of Turkish gender (and ethnic) politics. Yet, this is what happened from 2009 onwards. Both state and non-state actors (including

feminist groups) have stopped singling out honor killings. Instead, discussion of gendered violence currently revolves around a broader concept, that is "violence against women."

1.3 My research focus

How to explain the drifting away of this honor crimes frame and its replacement by the more generic violence against women frame from the vocabulary of Turkish gender (and ethnic) politics? Research for this dissertation started with this question and then accumulated more questions as I reviewed the broader research on political discourse and gendered violence in and beyond Turkey and collected and analyzed empirical data on Turkish political discourse from its inception in late 1980s onwards. I find that political talk on gendered violence started with a more overtly familial frame that located gendered violence within the context of the family, characterized with words such as discord, disaster, and/or terror in the family. The "honor killings" frame did not appear in core publications of feminist movement and parliamentary debates until mid/late 1990s. Feminist movement actors could formulate a gender critique of this frame in mid 2000s during their efforts to establish solidarity and a national network among women groups living in different regions in Turkey. Some feminists willing to underline the gender component of violence attempted to import the concept of "male violence" into the common sense and the dominant policy language; however, they failed as many other actors appropriate the more universalistic and less confrontational violence against women frame.

This basic empirical finding of three phases of discourse – from family disaster to honor killings and thence to violence against women – lead me to refine my research focus. Leaving the final phase to future research, in this dissertation, I focus on the first two phases of discursive

production and their transformations. Whereas my analysis of the first phase is limited to the shaping of discourse in the national scope, I discuss the honor killings phase at both transnational and national levels. I document different political actors' use of these frames and analyze the meanings they attributed to each. Drawing on the literature on political discourse and gendered violence in and beyond Turkey, I emphasize feminists' efforts to shape the political recognition of gendered violence in each phase. I also attend to other political actors' discursive politics, specifically how their strategies and tactics have influenced frame institutionalization. I also analyze the epistemic and legislative practices undertaken by state institutions. Regarding the transformations of the discourse, I ask: Which frames get institutionalized, how, and why? How did actors respond to discordant frame institutionalization; that is institutionalization that did not fit their original frameworks and intentions? Which factors mediated changes in these actors' discursive politics? To what extent did these transformations imply a change in these actors' understandings of gendered violence? These questions draw on the observation that multiple actors have a say in the discursive field. To sharpen the analysis of feminists' influence, I also ask the question of at what cost. This question moves beyond the progress or success narrative, albeit attractive at first glance, as only partially true for the feminist analysis of the development of national anti-violence policy.

1.4 Methods

To trace the political discourse on gendered violence, I conducted an archival study in state and non-state fields. This research included the compilation and analysis of (i) national parliamentary debates pertaining to gender-based violence, (ii) official reports, policy documents,

and legal regulations produced by state institutions and transnational gender policy bodies, and (iii) booklets, reports, magazines, press releases, etc. of women's organizations. Following the 1980 military coup, Turkey had general elections in 1983. The parliament reinstituted after the elections ratified CEDAW in 1985, which publicly committed Turkish state to align its gender politics with the international policy norm of equality between men and women (Berik, 1990). Ratification of CEDAW was followed by the establishment of new state institutions such as the Family Research Institute in 1989 and Directorate of Women's Problems and Status in 1990, which later turned into main sites of competing discourses on gendered violence. Synchronously, in the second half of 1980s, an independent women's movement was on the rise; its actors identified as feminists and brought gendered violence into the domain of political action (Sirman, 1989). The aftermath of the 1980 coup d'etat is the starting point for my archival research. I follow the production and distribution of discourse in four venues: by political parties represented in the parliament, by state institutions, by transnational gender policy institutions, and by women's organizations.

Data on parliamentary debates include the minutes of the hearings available in PDF format on the website of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). These are a rich data source, as various political actors (among which Islamist-nationalists, Kemalist-secularists, and Kurds were most vocal on the issue) joined in the debate to present their positions and viewpoints on gendered violence, to compete with each other's framings, and to shape policy outcomes [for the use of similar data in U.S. and E.U. contexts see Whittier (2016) and Krizsan and Popa (2014)]. I compiled the relevant sections of all parliamentary hearings when the participants discussed gendered violence through a keyword search of the minutes. Since the issue of gendered violence has been discussed under different names throughout these years, I used a variety of keywords

such as woman, family, honor, custom, violence, battery, rape, and homicide. I omitted hearings and sections of hearings that did not directly relate to gendered violence. I read the compiled data for understanding the context of the debates. On a second reading, I paid particular attention to the parliamentary hearings during which debates surrounding violence against women legislation (VAWA) and the Penal Code reform escalated and involved various political actors with diverse frames and motivations. This criterion helps me choose a sample of hearings to close-read by applying a mixture of inductive and analytical coding, using a qualitative data analysis software. My argument emerged during coding and analysis, as I could rethink existing theories in the literature in relation to empirical findings of my research.

The process of selecting transnational gender policy bodies, state institutions, women's organizations, and their relevant publications was straightforward. The UN archive available on the institutional website provides official records of both the debates in the General Assembly and Third Committee specialized on social, humanitarian, and cultural issues and final policy documents such as resolutions and special reports. Information regarding the national ministries and their respective units specializing on gendered violence policy has long been publicly available. These institutions have put forward their framing of gendered violence through various publications and regulations including research reports, strategy plans, protocols, bylaws, etc.

In sampling women's organizations' documents, I paid particular attention to encompassing a broad spectrum of women's organizations distinguished along feminist, religious, and ethnic lines (Arat, 2008). I surveyed feminist magazines such as *Feminist* (1987-1990), *Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs* (1988-1990), and *Pazartesi* (1996-2005); a pro-Islamic women's magazine *Kadın ve Aile* (1985-1996); and Kurdish women's periodicals such as *Roza* (1996-2000) and *Jujin* (1996-2000). Except for some issues of Kurdish women's periodicals, these magazines

are available online in PDF format. Among the documents produced by feminists and their allies, the most important are antiviolence campaign documents unfolding over time. I accessed many of the press releases analyzed in this dissertation thanks to some organizers of these campaigns. I conducted interviews with seven organizers to complement data available in these documents. Other sources of women's organizations' data include the annual reports of the pro-feminist Assembly of Women's Shelters and Consultation Centers since 1998, and the reports produced for evaluating Turkish state's practices in relation to UN and EU conventions on gendered violence. I applied the same analysis and coding procedure to the documents from state institutions and women's organizations.

One difficulty peculiar to Turkish political context was accessing documents produced, in particular, by the state's women's machinery; its archive was gradually wiped out by successive directors, who were political appointees. As data on parliamentary debates attests, neglecting and disowning projects and their written documents was a common practice among newly appointed directors and ministries. I attribute this archival vacuum to "censoring" and "political manipulation" rather than simply "technical inadequacy"; it exemplifies an acute problem of state-making in Turkey (Ahıska, 2006). In contrast, the archive of the Family Research Institute, consisting of its publications since 1989, has been mostly available on its website. I could collect the documents of the state's women's machinery from some libraries and through an extensive search on the websites of national and international institutions that partnered with this machinery for different projects at different times.

My analysis of these documents centers on actors, contexts, temporality, and causality (Joyce, 2010) of change in discourse from "family disaster" to "honor killings." I make the two frames used to put gendered violence into political discourse in Turkey my objects of analysis.

Within Turkey, researchers have limited themselves to the frame of honor killings (Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Belge, 2008; Koğacıoğlu, 2004, 2011; Sirman, 2004). In contrast, the transnational literature has examined the intrafamily violence and honor killings frames, albeit separately (Abu-Lughod, 2011; Arnold, 2006; Connors, 2005). My initial aim was contributing to the literature on Turkey and extending the debate by focusing the erasure of the concept of honor killings from the language of gender politics in Turkey. The inductive approach led me to discover the earlier use of family violence frame in referring to acts of gendered violence. In these documents, this frame appeared with different words such as 'discord', 'dissolution', 'disaster' and 'terror' in the family besides expressions like wife-battering, incest, and marital rape. So, I coded statements with the family violence frame when they included a discussion of violent acts within the context of family. I included statements on honor killings whenever the actors used this frame, whether or not they invoked geography, ethnicity, culture, custom, and tradition in the making of violent acts.

Throughout the decades following the coup d'etat in 1980, both feminists and non-feminists have used these two frames, albeit attributing different meanings, mobilizing distinct affects, and offering conflicting causal explanations and policy solutions. Differences in usage of these frames by various actors escalated and became more apparent at times of change in discourse. Longitudinal data help excavate the influences of different political actors as they shift the discourse. Accounting for these influences, I could make process-based causal inferences as far as these data sources allow.

1.5 Dissertation outline

This dissertation is composed of three empirical chapters; one devoted to the family disaster frame, followed by two chapters on the honor killings frame. The next chapter looks at how gendered violence was initially put into political discourse in Turkey. I identify the main political actors of this first discursive phase as feminists, Islamists, and Kemalists. I discuss what gendered violence meant for each set of actors and how they sought to shape the understanding of the problem and its solutions. I identify the testimonial as the feminist strategy of knowledge production specific to this phase. I show the outcomes of this strategy regarding feminists' goals of defining the category of woman and constituting family as the principal institution of patriarchy. I underline that the discursive context and state's institutional shape were mostly characterized by the conflict between Kemalists and Islamists in this phase. I discuss the passage of the first legislation on gendered violence as a family protection act and interpret this act as an outcome of this specific conjuncture in which feminist criticism of the family was evaded in the hegemonic discourse on gendered violence.

Chapter three adds to the literature on the political discourse on honor killings the frame's pre-political usage in Turkey and abroad. I look at the Italian literature on honor crimes and discuss the frame's narrowing down in this country case. I show how the frame was politicized in 1990s transnationally and discuss the power-knowledge practices at the UN in which context EU countries often act in concert. I discuss to what extent transnationally active feminists might be held accountable for the frame's institutionalization with racist connotations. I interpret the drawbacks of this discourse as mainly resulting from the issue's turning into a matter of inter-state debate.

Chapter four focuses on the political discourse on honor killings in Turkey. I show how the rising political significance of honor killings with racial connotations caught feminists in an ambivalent position. I identify two sources of this ambivalence and demonstrate feminists' efforts to overcome them. Drawing on the analysis of encounters between Turkish feminists and the Kurdish women's movement, I discuss the efforts for and challenges in broadening the understanding of gendered violence. I highlight Kurdish women's activists' objection to the reduced scope of the honor killings frame and demonstrate their innovations with respect to both the understanding of honor killings and ways to object to and protest these practices. I show how their efforts influenced the national women's movement community campaigning for the Penal Code reform.

In Chapter five, I discuss how my project informs the understanding of political discourse on gendered violence in Turkey and highlight some broader insights applicable to contexts beyond Turkey.

2.0 Discord, disaster, and terror in the family: Domestication

Nurdan Gürbilek (2011), a cultural critic focusing on post-1980s Turkey, points to the "family tragedy" news dominating the front pages of newspapers. She explains this heightened visibility of gendered violence in terms of censorship; newspapers were forbidden to speak of politics and state violence following the military coup. Based on a conventional understanding of politics, she suggests that journalists who cannot write about politics fill the vacuum left by censorship with gendered violence, news that seems defeasibly non-political.

This chapter offers an alternative explanation to this visibility. I interpret it as a sign of a crucial political development, that fully emerged to the public view in the second half of 1980s, as feminists organized against wife-beating. In their efforts to gain recognition for gendered violence, feminists located violence in the context of the family and targeted it as the core institution of patriarchy. Analysis seeing the family as an institutional obstacle to the development of a feminist movement was plausible (Tekeli, 1986).

Besides feminists' willful attempts to initiate a critique of the family, another factor boasting the "crisis" of the Turkish family system on the political agenda was the sharpening of the struggles between Islamism and Kemalism, historically rival ideologies competing to occupy state power in Turkey. As Kandiyoti's (1989, 2016) works indicate, Islamists have long placed women at the center of their discursive politics. Its gender politics was to mark Islamists' difference from rival political movements. Gender politics was no less important for Kemalists, who took credit for early Republican reforms, which formally "emancipated" Turkish women (Kandiyoti, 1987; Toprak, 1990). They kept adhering to the goals of modernization and westernization, including equality between women and men in the public sphere and promoting

family as the "smallest unit of democracy." Islamists and Kemalists contributed to this discourse on the crisis of the family; both contrived to rescue the family from threats that each party attributed to the other. In this context, gendered violence gained visibility and a political meaning pertaining to the family; its main interlocutors were feminists, Islamists, and Kemalists.

2.1 Emergent feminist analysis of gendered violence

Wife-beating was a major issue in the resurgence of feminist theorization and mobilization in 1980s Turkey (Acuner, 2002; Işık, 2002; Sirman, 1989). The first street protests in Ankara and Istanbul were triggered by a court decision rejecting a battered pregnant woman's demand for divorce. Feminists in both cities decided to take to streets on the Mothers' Day, the second weekend of May 1987; however, only Ankara could muster a protest, with seven women carrying placards asking "Do you love your mother and beat your wife?" (*Annenizi seviyor karınızı dövüyor musunuz?*) (Timisi & Ağduk Gevrek, 2002). Istanbul caught up a week later with more than two thousand women. Their placard declared "Beating comes from family" (*Dayak Aileden Çıkmadır*).[3]

Ayşe (1987) used this slogan to title her article in the magazine *Feminist*; her rhetorical question was, if violence was everywhere, why are feminists opposing only male violence against women in the family? For Ayşe, as for many other feminists in Turkey at the time, domestic violence against women was different precisely because it was regarded as "legitimate." In the following pages of the magazine, Şirin Tekeli (1987) added "prevalence," arguing that wife

[3] They have revised the proverb "Beating comes from heaven" (*Dayak cennetten çıkmadır*).

beating was the most prevalent form of physical violence in society despite public authorities' ignoring it as a social problem. She called public attention to wife-beating, suggesting that it was more widespread than other types of violence that often excited public indignation such as torture of political prisoners or interpersonal violence in schools, streets, or coffeehouses. The 1988 campaign booklet titled *Bağır! Herkes Duysun* (Shout! Let Everyone Hear You), published by the group that organized the Istanbul march, also started with the proposition "Beating women in the family is prevalent and 'legitimate'" (Dayağa Karşı Kadın Dayanışması, 1988). Prevalence and legitimacy were central to the early feminist analysis of gendered violence (Yüksel, 1990).

At this early moment in the movement history, feminists were seeking to establish foundations from which feminist politics would gain momentum. The incidence of violence or its threat was set as the evidence of "women's oppression as a sex" (*cins olarak ezilmek*). They used violence to claim a common condition characterizing the category of woman and defined male violence against women as ubiquitous. When feminists emerged into the political field with this single issue of violence against women in the family, mostly leftist men and some women critiqued them for being particularistic and for not being "real" battered women. In a *Feminist* article, Vildan (1987) responded, "not all women are beaten, but this fact does not change the truth that each and every woman has felt the threat of being beaten." The 1988 campaign booklet further claimed that "battered women/nonbattered women difference is invalid." If male dominance might evolve into violence at any time and if women were forced to accept battery; then, these feminists claimed, "violence is the problem of all of us, not the problem of one of us" (Dayağa Karşı Dayanışma Kampanyası, 1988).

These feminist pioneers also used violence to diagnose the family (ayşe, 1987; Nazlı, 1988; Ovadia, 1987; Savran, 1989; Sedef, 1987; Tura, 1989). The *Women's Liberation Declaration*[4] defined family as under the auspices of the state and foundational to male dominated society. Like the military, schools, police stations, and prisons, the family was a hierarchical institution that involved power relations and entailed violence to express and maintain men's privilege and dominance. Violence was, therefore, inseparable from the institution of family. This framing finds its best expression in Ovadia's (1996) words: "Battery is not a disruption of family life, nor an undesirable accident. The family contains and assumes battery; battery may not exist in every family, but battery is possible in every family." Assumptions of love and privacy were what distinguished the family from other hierarchical institutions. These assumptions legitimated violence and isolated and silenced women. Still, when women dared to speak out, seek help, and resort to public institutions like police or courts, these institutions rendered these women's complaints null and void.

In addition to theorizing battery as a possibility, if not manifest reality, in every married woman's life, feminists also aimed at knowledge production, collecting "testimonies" from women subjected to violence. Feminists encouraged women to share their testimonies, published these testimonies in *Feminist* and the campaign booklet, and included a testimony section in almost all public events. As Ahmed and Stacey (2001: 2) noted, "one testifies when the truth is in doubt (when it has yet to be decided) and when an injustice has occurred." These feminists first needed to establish truth, before making justice claims.

[4] This declaration was drafted by feminists who participated in Feminist Weekend in Ankara in February 1989 (1. Feminist Haftasonu 11-12 Şubat, 1989). An English translation of the declaration is available online: https://cdn.atria.nl/epublications/fragen/WLIC-0000000000231.pdf

Women's testimonies were designed to undo what feminists viewed as highly political familial ideology – that is, a tendency to minimize, naturalize, and legitimize domestic violence. Using the testimonial form, these feminists moved women's suffering of violence into the public domain and broke the hold of the privacy of family. The ideology of familial privacy and companionate marriage promised women a "total and complete life" based on love, mutual responsibilities, and protection from harms (Sedef, 1987). These testimonies aimed at unmasking this discursive formation by showing that a husband might beat his wife for virtually any reason, or merely on a whim. Where familial discourses promised women protection by husbands, however, the testimonies showed serious physical and psychological harm done by husbands. Contrary to the familial myth that respected motherhood, several women testified to being beaten when pregnant. In several testimonies, battered women had asked help from their parents; contrary to familial ideology, parents rejected and abandoned their daughters.

Beverley (2000) identifies two characteristics of the testimonial that helps explain why as a writing style it suited the feminist politics of knowledge in this early phase of the movement. First, testimonial discourse has a metonymic character, it gives "the sense that the voice that is addressing us is a part that stands for a larger whole" (557). Readers of these testimonies were expected to recognize how each woman's story potentially resonated with all women (Paker, 1988). The goal was to abstract battery from the singular interaction between one woman and one man (Öztürk, 1988) and to demonstrate that it results from the common condition of woman (Yüksel, 1989). Accordingly, these testimonies constructed gendered violence as crosscutting class, educational status, regional, national, and East-West boundaries. They indicated that not only "the ignorant", "the sick", or "the drunken" beat their wives. Including a section titled "Women's struggles against battery in the West", the 1988 campaign booklet refuted the

underdevelopment and/or cultural backwardness explanation as the root cause of gendered violence (Dayağa Karşı Dayanışma Kampanyası, 1988). According to this representation, women of Turkey and women of "Western" countries share a common potential vulnerability. Men might allege any excuse from women's "failing their domestic duties" to "breaching of honor codes" for their violent behaviors, but the truth was that men instrumentally used violence to express and maintain their dominance over women anywhere in the world.

According to Beverley (2000), a second characteristic of the testimonial is intertwining "the desire of objectivity" and "the desire of solidarity", which again makes it suitable for feminist politics of knowledge. As the title of the campaign booklet - Shout! Let Everyone Hear You – suggested, speaking out about violence was the first step to be followed by women's solidarity in the struggle against male violence. These feminists defined women's solidarity as the only way of changing the condition of woman. Striving to become a social movement with its own name, they clung to the idea of solidarity rather than individual emancipation (Tekeli, 1986). The fliers and public statements addressed women as women and invited them to speak out about their experiences of violence and to act in solidarity with each other. The campaign booklet argued that women would gain self-confidence and determination to object to violence and men would refrain from resorting to violence, only if women established solidarity networks among themselves despite their differences (Dayağa Karşı Dayanışma Kampanyası, 1988).

Besides producing and disseminating testimonies, feminists organized spectacular protests that critiqued and contested familial ideology. To protest and prevent the establishment of the Family Research Institute, officially aimed at strengthening the family, about 30 feminists filed their divorce complaints collectively in December 1989 in Istanbul Courthouse (Karakuş, 2018). To protest Penal Code article no. 438, which reduced rape sentences by two-thirds when the

survivor was a prostitute/sex worker, feminists organized demonstrations at the Constitutional Court, brothels, and courthouses in four cities – Adana, Ankara, Istanbul, and İzmir. The Constitutional Court defended the article no. 438 with the statement that rape would inflict more harm to a "chaste woman" compared to a woman engaged in prostitution. In response, feminists rejected the legal definition of "chaste woman" and critiqued the chastity criteria with the slogan: "I don't want to be a chaste woman" (*İffetli kadın olmak istemiyorum*). With this campaign, feminists initiated a critique of honor on which they would elaborate later when honor killings frame dominated to the political language on gendered violence. In some communiques, they juxtaposed prostitution certificate and marriage certificate and claimed that they meant similar things for women ("438'e hayır basın açıklaması," 1990; ayşe, 1990; Ovadia, 1990; Savran, 1990). Whereas the marriage certificate exonerated men from any rape allegations in marriage, the prostitution certificate provided partial impunity for men (Arın, 1990).

After this initial mobilization around the wife-beating issue, feminists sought to expand the understanding of gendered violence by initiating a campaign against sexual harassment in streets, public transportation, and work places ("Bedenimiz bizimdir! Cinsel tacize hayır! Kampanyası," 1989). This campaign was relatively short-lived; feminist activists in 1990s focused their attention on institutionalization (Bora & Günal, 2002). The most concrete outcome of the feminist campaign about battery was the establishment of the *Mor Çatı Kadın Sığınağı Vakfı* (Purple Roof Women's Shelter Foundation, or Mor Çatı) in Istanbul in 1990. This was followed by two autonomous feminist initiatives founded in 1993; *Kadının İnsan Hakları - Yeni Çözümler* (Women's Human Rights – New Ways, or KİH) in Istanbul and *Kadın Dayanışma Vakfı* (Women's Solidarity Foundation) in Ankara.

In 1996, Mor Çatı published *Evdeki Terör* (Terror at Home) and KİH published *Sıcak Yuva Masalı* (A Tale of a Warm Home); both books were designed to replace the dominant familial ideology with this feminist view on the family (Mor Çatı, 1996; İlkkaracan, Gülçür, & Arın, 1996). Second, these books showed some signs of change regarding feminist politics of knowledge, as they blended testimonial writing style with a kind of scientificity and policy orientation. The first part of *Evdeki Terör* is titled "Knowledge of violence against women", starts with a methods section where the authors describe their preference for a "feminist method", claiming that "'scientific method' is insufficient as a means of eliminating overt sexism and covert androcentrism," citing Stanley and Wise (1990). The first part relies mostly on first-person accounts of violence and the third part includes the Mor Çatı volunteers' accounts of their feminist work; both maintained the testimonial writing style. Nevertheless, as a whole, the book – with its methods section and a second part composed of articles by anthropologists, psychologists, and lawyers – exemplifies feminism's ambivalent relation with science. *Sıcak Yuva Masalı* is a combination of testimonies of women subjected to abuse, scholarly written articles, policy notes, and a legal appendix. Dedicated to the survivors of violence, one author has defined the book as an "independent/feminist research-action project." Both books were published with support from international institutions, which might have influenced the editors' preferences for blending testimonial writing style with a more scientific mode.

Not surprisingly, at this early moment in the movement history nearly all articles published in *Feminist* and *Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs* magazines framed the dissolution of family as one major goal of feminism. *Pazartesi* magazine that feminists initiated in 1995 advanced this feminist politics of family with headlines such as "There is no life safety in marriage! Forbid marriage!" ("Evlilikte can güvenliği yok!," 1995). Battered women were also invited to move away from

marital attachments that reproduce violence. However, as Yüksel (1995), a feminist psychiatrist and one of founder of Mor Çatı, confirmed, the feminist concept of the family was incompatible with many battered women's understanding of and expectations from the family. The belief in the family as "the only route to happiness" was not easy to change. For instance, in the campaign booklet (Dayağa Karşı Dayanışma Kampanyası, 1988), Piraye started her testimony with the statement that she had seen "marriage as emancipation" because her childhood passed with batterers (her father and brother) and battered women (her mother, sister, and sister-in-law). But she concluded her testimony with "I believe in the possibility of marriage without battery." In a reader's letter published in *Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs,* the reader advocated for the "democratic family" based on idea that the family had played a peculiar role in Turkey post 1980 coup d'état; that it was the only collectivity that had protected individuals' rights and liberties against the state as well as the society (Çiçekçi, 1989). Analyzing the patterns of patriarchy in 1980s Turkey, Kandiyoti (1990) arrived at a similar conclusion, claiming that the belief in modern nuclear family as a liberating family model could not be treated as a dark joke. Rather, it was explicable in a context where the extended family, age-based hierarchies, and cultural pressures on cross-sex intimacies existed. Therefore, synchronously, it was emerging that the feminists' goal regarding the dissolution of the family was frankly utopian. Feminists setting their goal as the dissolution of the family were alone even in the community willing to hear their voices.

2.2 Islamist crusade for rescuing the family

The following words of an Islamist man, which was among the opinions collected by feminists at an event organized during the 1987 campaign against battery, best summarizes the

early Islamist position regarding gendered violence and its politics of knowledge: "Have you ever heard of a conscious … Muslim lady appealing to you against battery, let her join you, talk about something like that? … please learn Islam" (Dayağa Karşı Dayanışma Kampanyası, 1989).[5] According to this commentator, battery is foreign to Islam; no truly pious woman who "knows and practices Islam" would have a problem like battery. Second, the battery problem could be solved via Islamist pedagogy, that is by teaching and inviting to Islam (*tebliğ*).

If battery is not a problem of true Muslims, whose problem is it? The short answer located gendered violence in Western societies outside and individuals lacking faith inside. The early Islamist account of gendered violence either othered or minimized gendered violence. This could be considered a reflection of their position on the "women's question", as Demir's (1998) study on Islamist women's periodicals in 1990s indicates. For instance, focusing on feminism, the editorial of the April 1986 issue of *Kadın ve Aile* (Woman and Family) is titled "A Problem that is not Ours" (*Bizim Olmayan Problem*). It claimed that feminism, invented in the West, could not go beyond "humiliating, exploiting, and dragging her [the woman] into personality disorder." In contrast, it represented Islam as "positioning the woman as she deserves and protecting her rights in the most beautiful way." Another article in the same issue claimed that increasing equality between men and women in Western countries raised alcoholism, violence, and rape (Çelikkol, 1986). In the same issue, the article titled "Woman and Man are Equal" argued that Islam bestowed women and men equality in terms of humanity, worship, and dignity *(insanlık, kulluk, şeref ve haysiyet)* and separated their duties in the family to prevent conflict ("Kadın Erkek Eşittir," 1986). The same article acknowledged men's authority over women, but with the caveat that a man shall

[5] In Turkish: "*Şuanda hiç bir şuurlu … Müslüman Hanımın dayağa karşı aranıza geldiğini, bırakın size katılmasını böyle bir şeyden bahsettiğini duydunuz mu? … lütfen İslam'ı öğrenin*."

not despise a woman, or beat her at his will. This article concludes with cursing women who transgress God's will and rebel against men, and men who tyrannize women as well as those who attribute individuals' faults to Islam and who tarnish the image of Islam with their own faults.

In synchrony with feminist activism, several Islamists joined in this discursive field, establishing their own periodicals and publishing books in 1980s and 1990s. These writings did not elaborate on gendered violence per se, yet they touched on the issue while discussing feminism, women's rights, and the family. These writings idealized the Islamic family and the position of woman in Islam. Some of these writings embraced a didactic writing style, that is, counseling their readers about sustaining harmony in the family life. Others were polemical essays. Motivated to represent the "truth" about Islam, they included quotations from the Quran and hadiths, and told stories from the Prophet's time. With different levels of sophistication, they reproduced, albeit reversed, the binary structure of Orientalist thinking, depicting the West and the Islam as ontologically different. Per this thought, feminism might have originated as a "rightful" response to centuries of women's oppression in the West (Karanfil, 1994; Serim, 1994; Tozduman, 1990; Türinay, 1994). Yet, it belonged to the Western thought as it was a "conflictual" ideology and its central premise was the conflict between men and women. Therefore, these writers argued, feminism contrasted with "our culture" which abided by the "nature" and/or "creation" of women and men and was based on a belief in the "complementarity" between sexes.

This representation of gender was foundational for a religious defense of the family. For Ali Bulaç, a well-known Islamist figure with strong anti-feminist sentiments, the family represented both "the basis of resistance to destructive attacks by modern society" and "the possibility of resurrection to establish a whole new world" (Bulaç, 1987). On the other hand, Cihan Aktaş (1987), sometimes called a "Muslim feminist" against her will, acknowledged the problems

of the lived family. She also defended the family as an Islamic institution, attributing its problems to factors external to Islam, such as materialist modernist values and anti-woman traditions (Aktaş, 1992).

The Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP) and its conservative and nationalist allies conveyed a similar representation of gendered violence, the family, and feminism in the parliament established following the 1991 elections. In their speeches, these political actors mostly mobilized a very negative image of the family as being in a state of "moral collapse", while critiquing the coalition governments of the time involving Social Democratic Populist Party (*Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti*, SHP). The fact that the first minister they could force to resign was the SHP minister responsible for the family, women, and social services policies might indicate the intensity of opposition. These interlocutors held "Westernist" policies responsible for the crisis of the family, as crisis they symbolized with the "rise" of prostitution, obscene publications, alcoholism, violence, and divorce as well as the broadcasting of "immoral" commercials and shows like the American soap opera *Dallas* in Turkish television (TGNA, 16 January 1992). For instance, in 1994, an RP member could claim that "incest, which was observed in Europe, spread to Turkey" (TGNA, 16 November 1994). To substantiate these ideas, some interlocutors mentioned statistics about divorce, rape, homicide, AIDs, and similar phenomena that they claimed originated in the U.S. and European countries. They interpreted the UN's proclamation of 1994 as the "International Year of the Family" as further evidence that the West was belatedly coming to terms with family collapse. Packaging the ills of the family in moralistic talk against the West, these interlocutors also offered Islamic life/family as an antidote.

In the 1990s, though, Islamists, represented mainly by RP in the parliament, could not eschew being aligned with the "batterers." When an officer working in a RP municipality was

caught on air while beating his wife, RP members acknowledged this "family disaster" as a person's fault, and not attributable to a community (TGNA, 23 November 1993). A RP member also assessed this case as a way to defend the family, arguing that in televising the case, a family's privacy was breached. RP members were called "batterers" a second time in 1997 when the party led the coalition government, because they attempted to delay the passage of the first violence against women act during parliamentary debates. This time, the minister, a member of the junior coalition party, True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*, DYP), responsible for women and family policies, resigned in response. The minister along with women parliamentarians affiliated with other political parties gave a press conference in the parliament, promising the enactment of the law and indicting the RP for delay. One parliamentarian stated that "by passing this law, we will deprive Welfare Party members of the pleasure of beating their wives" (Kozanoğlu, 2014: 80).[6] Under the conditions of the military intervention on February 28, 1997, the RP had no alternative but to step back.[7] In the debates over the domestic violence act that followed, RP members could not openly call for a "no" vote. Yet, as I will examine more extensively later in this chapter, they scaled up the early family privacy argument as a critique of Kemalism and state power. They argued that this act exhibited the old and now archaic statist and totalitarian politics, expanding the state power against individuals and breaching the autonomy of the family.

[6] In Turkish: "*Bu yasayı çıkararak Refah Partilileri eşlerini dövme zevkinden mahrum bırakacağız*."
[7] On 28 February 1997, the National Security Council declared that secularism was under threat and issued a number of measures the government was forced to adopt. This declaration was later called as a "post-modern coup" because the military did not directly take over the government, rather it pressured the coalition parties to step down. The RP leader, Necmettin Erbakan, resigned on 18 June, 1997, and the Constitutional Court banned the RP from politics on 16 January, 1998. For a review of this era, see chapter 16 titled Years of Crisis, 1994-2002 in Zürcher's *Turkey A Modern History* (2017).

2.3 Kemalists' family as the smallest unit of democracy

Addressing gendered violence was not a straightforward task for Kemalists in 1980s and 1990s. Unlike feminists and Islamists, Kemalists could identify with the state as they were proud of early Republican reforms, especially the adoption of the Civil Code in 1926 and women's enfranchisement in 1934. Based on these reforms, Kemalist women were claiming that the Republic was a "women's rights revolution" (Çelikel, 1998). However, feminists organizing around the issue of gendered violence broke with years of accepting the Kemalist assertion that the modern state had ensured women's rights and equality between sexes (Arat, 1997; Durakbaşa, 1998; Kandiyoti, 1987, 1989; Toprak, 1990; White, 2003). For feminists, Kemalist politics of modernity had covered over male domination through creating an illusion of women's emancipation in the public realm (Savran & Tura, 1995). Even when polarization between Islamists and Kemalists increasingly characterized the discursive field and pressured feminists to take sides, feminists who organized around magazines or in small groups managed to sustain their ideological independence, constantly and tiresomely repeating why and how their politics *ought to be* different from each side.[8]

The ratification of CEDAW and related exposure of the Turkish state's gender politics to transnational gender policy monitoring was the second factor that undermined the Kemalist assertion on the nature of the modern state. When the state representative, a Kemalist scholar, painted a rosy picture of equality and nondiscrimination in her presentation of the first state report in 1990, the CEDAW Committee heavily criticized her for misrepresenting women's status in

[8] For this debate on how the fracture between Kemalism and Islamism caught feminists between a rock and hard place see the issues of *Pazartesi* magazine numbered 17, 18, 25, 27, 36.

Turkey and blaming women for their inequality (CEDAW, 1990). The Committee suggested that the state representative consult with local women's organizations in the next reporting period. The Kemalist discourse was increasingly losing credibility when, for instance, the rate of women members in the parliament could not reach even two percent and the Civil Code kept defining women's rights in familial terms and authorizing the husband as the "head" of the family.

It would be unfair to claim that Kemalist women had constantly overlooked these issues. Rather, as Necla Arat (2001), a well-known Kemalist feminist, observed, they felt like Sisyphus, incessantly preparing, proposing, and lobbying for legislative changes, winning lots of attention but never actually accomplishing anything. In this context, Kemalism might have become untenable for women if it had not been reinvented as an emancipatory ideology defending women's "vested" rights against "religious reaction" (*irtica*). Protection from gendered violence was not yet a vested right. However, it was gradually articulated into Kemalist discourse, so that the first VAWA was applauded as a significant step in the protection of secular values. The packaging of this act under the title of family protection was trivial compared to the perceived threat of religious reaction; Kemalists did not take in feminists' critique of the family.

In this era, Kemalists instrumentally equated women's rights with secularism and the West. For instance, they objected to the passage of women's machinery legislation in 1990, because the proposed legislation did not cite "Atatürk's principles" particularly secularism and modernity in the section on justification and goals. On the contrary, the legislation attempted to permit women's donning headscarves associated with Muslim piety at universities. The absence of this reference was against Kemalist gender lawmaking, which drew on a specific reading of history: Women's rights were not fought for but rather bestowed by Atatürk. It was habitual for Kemalist women in the parliament and in women's organizations to express their gratitude to Atatürk based on a belief

that they "owed" their existence to him (Y. Arat, 1997). Permitting headscarves in a bill which was supposed to improve "women's status" was seen as a "threat" to Kemalist women's existence. In these talks, Kemalists marshalled all anti-woman issues attributed to Islam such as polygyny, women's seclusion, the enforcement of chador, and women's secondary status in marriage. They mobilized "fear" by signifying the headscarf as a political backlash against modern, secular, enlightened ideal of Turkish woman.

Parliamentary debates indicate that headscarved women's mobilization against the ban through various protests including hunger strikes and widespread sit-ins from late 1980s onwards could not change Kemalists' position even incrementally (Çınar, 2005). On the contrary, the debate over headscarves consolidated Kemalist gender politics: secularism, canonized as a do-or-die issue, circumscribed Kemalist women's political power. When the RP-led coalition government proposed a Civil Code revision to the parliament, a Republican People's Party (CHP) member asserted that "the time has come for the government to understand that women's suffering is no longer caused only by inequalities between sexes but mostly by … the dangers that threaten our secular, democratic Republic, Atatürk's principles and revolutions" (TGNA, 14 May 1997).

In these years, Kemalist women established new organizations like the Association for the Support of Contemporary Living (*Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği* in Turkish, ÇYDD as Turkish acronym) and Istanbul Women's Organizations Union (*İstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Birliği* in Turkish, İKKB as Turkish acronym) that promoted the understanding of secularism as foundational to women's rights. They engaged in a politics of knowledge and national memory, organizing panels, exhibitions, and award ceremonies, publishing books, and mustering street protests against religious reaction and for commemorating Atatürk. For instance, İKKB was established to organize public events in specific days every year, such as February 17, the adoption

date of Civil Code; December 5, the date of constitutional amendment extending the right of suffrage to women; October 29, the foundation of Turkish Republic; and finally March 8, the International Women's Day (Moroğlu, 1999). As the book *Aydınlanmanın Kadınları* (Women of the Enlightenment) (N. Arat, 1998) implied, Kemalists felt obliged to reconstruct the benefits of the Republic for the girl child and the woman and convey their truth about the past and the present to future generations. Their peak performance was the women's march against sharia, which organized more than ten thousand marchers 13 days before the military intervention on 28 February 1997 (Mutluer, 2016).

Despite this polarization on issues related to women's public visibility, Kemalists could agree with Islamists on the indispensability of the family and support particular familialist policies. Feminists who filed divorce complaints collectively in December 1989 to protest the establishment of Family Research Institute, which officially aimed at strengthening the family, were isolated. For some Kemalist women, the establishment of such an institution was not problematic per se; rather, they were interested in the ideological composition of its cadres and activities. For example, when the Institute organized the First Family Council in 1990 under a religiously conservative administration, Necla Arat participated with a presentation advocating "modern family". Her session could include a statement on "the promotion of democratic family relations and reduction of gender-based differences" in the final council declaration (Aile Araştırma Kurumu, 1990). Similarly, the essays published in *Aydınlanmanın Kadınları* (1998) framed Kemalist family norms as "revolutionary" in terms overthrowing gender role differences and supporting the girl child so that she could equally participate in the public realm. These essays gave weight to provision of equal opportunities in education and employment on the condition that women don a modern, read non-headscarved, look. The representation of gender roles and the emphasis on equality in the

public realm indicate that these Kemalist women have adopted some liberal feminist views. Like liberal feminists, though, as established by Connell (1990), their vision of patriarchy was limited to sexism which might be cured through education and transformation of women's and men's minds. Needless to say, these essays barely mentioned violence, and when they did so, the context has always been imagined to be families other than the modern ones.

In these years, organized within the Istanbul Bar Association, Kemalist women campaigned to ban religious marriages and reform the Civil Code. For instance, when a popular singer publicized that she was religiously married, Women's Rights Commission of the Bar filed a legal complaint against her based on an article in the Criminal Code through which she might be prisoned up to three years. Their rationale was that this singer encouraged "separatism" in marriage organization and violated the Civil Code and secularism (Savran, 1995). The accusation of separatism was to equate religious marriage with Kurdish insurgency against the Turkish state and it meant that these Kemalist women regarded religious marriage as an issue of national security. For Kemalist women, it was the Civil Code adopted in 1926 which made the Republic a "women's rights revolution" since the new code purged religious elements from the legal system, outlawed polygamy and religious marriages, and granted women equal rights of divorce and inheritance (Çelikel, 1998). Their mission was to fulfill its revolutionary logic by pressuring the state to remove some articles that restrained women's rights on the basis of marital status. Based on this analysis, Kemalist women took the frontlines in the campaign for reform in Civil Code and its full implementation. Following the 28 February 1997 military intervention against the Islamist RP's coalition government, they upheld the relations with state institutions through lobbying activities for the new Civil Code (Interview with Nazan Moroğlu, October 25, 2017) and participating in

collective civil marriage ceremonies arranged by the state ministry that ran the women's machinery and the Family Research Institute (Türk Hukukçu Kadınlar Derneği, 2000).

These campaigns led to grotesque encounters between Kemalist women and feminists who were striving to sustain their ideological independence from both Islamism and Kemalism. For instance, Savran's response to the legal action against the singer's religious marriage was sarcastic, questioning whether these Kemalist lawyers considered their action as an example of "women's solidarity" (Savran, 1995). This essay and others published in *Pazartesi* criticized the Kemalist frame of modern and secular family as the "sneakiest" form of patriarchy, because it reproduced the "illusion" that the family was an institution based on free will and equality (Bora, 1998; Savran, 1997, 1998). For Savran and Tura (1995), the Kemalist politics of family missed a crucial "universal" fact regarding feminism that it emerged with modernity and as a critique of it, since male domination was hidden behind the cover of modernity through the separation of the public and the private. In their view, the critique of modernity was intrinsic to feminism and the terms modern or secular would never qualify the family for feminist political prescription. Bora (1998) interpreted feminists' cooperation with Kemalist women in the campaign for reform in Civil Code as an uncanny encounter since its vision was limited to "modern nuclear family" and contained the dangers of subjugation and cooptation by state feminism.

The parliamentary debates contribute to this picture by helping trace the debate between Islamists and Kemalists over the issue of family crisis. These debates indicate that Islamists and Kemalists laid claim to the "protection of the family" on different grounds. They competed for fashioning this institution in the image of their own ideas. For instance, whenever Islamists and their conservative and nationalist allies indicted the SHP in coalition government for dissolving and morally corrupting the family and neglecting the Family Research Institute, Kemalists labeled

the moral collapse argument as an anti-secularist distraction, yet conceded that the family was in a state of crisis. Citing 19th century French sociologist Auguste Comte, one SHP spokesman related the family crisis to social change, explained with social structural factors such as rural-to-urban migration, rapid population growth, poverty, and unemployment (TGNA, 30 November 1993). Per this view, social change should be accompanied with ideational change via education, a process that would render equality between sexes integral to the meaning of human rights and democracy.

Building on this discourse, the SHP minister in charge of gender policies argued that the family should be protected and refashioned to become the "smallest unit of democracy." In her speeches, the Minister evoked the wife-beating incident caught on air to represent the opposite of this ideal already performed by a man connected to Islamist RP (TGNA, 7 December 1993). She insisted that her party had not neglected the Family Research Institute, rather it reconciled the institute's knowledge practices with the state's women's machinery. It commissioned a series of research projects from sociologists and psychologists, some of whom were then self-identified feminists, to scientifically diagnose the problems of the family. Like Kemalist women mobilized around newly established non-governmental organizations, SHP in parliament only reluctantly acknowledged the feminist critique of the family and gendered violence. If the wife-beating incident did not implicate the Islamist RP, it would not tap into secular anxieties and SHP would probably not pay much attention to it in the parliamentary debates.

2.4 Statist knowledge production

In this context, gendered violence was constructed as an intelligible social problem that required social scientific research to explain its cause and outcomes and followed by evidence-based state policies. Since this discourse articulated gendered violence as a sign of family crisis, the Family Research Institute, rather than the state's women's machinery, incurred responsibility to conduct the first nationally representative research in 1994, followed by a second round of data collection and analysis in 1997 (Aile Araştırma Kurumu, 1995, 1998). Two research projects in four years might be misread as an indication of the state's commitment to understanding and eliminating violence. If contextualized within the power/knowledge struggles of 1990s, though, this fact would appear a manifestation of political party change in government. It attests the political nature of knowledge on the family and gendered violence. When the Islamist RP replaced the Kemalist SHP in the coalition government after the 1995 elections, it appointed new bureaucrats to the Institute, who in turn commissioned new research projects.

A comparison between the two research projects reveals some points relevant for this study. In the 1994 research project, SHP appointed bureaucrats consulted with Mor Çatı volunteers, who had professional and feminist expertise on the topic, about designing the questionnaire and training interviewers. In 1994, cooperation with feminists was limited to pre-analysis phase; in 1997, feminists were completely absent. Both projects drew on the "family systems" paradigm, assumed gender symmetry in violent acts, included men and women in the sample, and not surprisingly, identified husbands as most frequent perpetrators of violence. The research reports differed in terms of policy recommendations, although both failed to meet feminists' expectations.

The 1994 research devised its policy suggestions partially in the light of the finding about the gender component of violence, but the recommendations rarely targeted men and were limited to solutions like increasing girls' education and women's skills for employability. This research mentioned supporting women's shelters as a viable policy option; however, it did not envisage shelter work as a state responsibility. Highlighting the mission of the "protection of family unity", the research offered family/marriage consultation centers as potentially most efficient state institutions to respond to family violence. The 1994 research also underlined that the state should avoid "family policing", literally not figuratively; the laws might clarify that family violence is a "crime" but the state's "primary objective should not be punishment."

The 1997 research lacked most of these policy recommendations. It found that male sex is a significant predictor of aggressive behavior; however, it did not carry this finding into policy recommendations. Rather, it highlighted violence against children in the family as the origin of a "vicious cycle" and framed child abuse as the main point of intervention to break the cycle. The research justified this claim by defining violence in adults as an element of personality, one of the characteristics determining behavior, and even culture. This framing of violence did not leave much to do except for judicial measures, as the report claimed. This does not mean that the report suggested criminal justice solutions. Rather it constructed partner violence as inescapable and postponed the solution to future generations via intervening into child-rearing practices in the present. The 1997 research might not have tested theories of human/animal nature and social learning cited thoroughly in the conceptual part of the report; still, its suggestions cohered with these theories in naturalizing and normalizing gendered violence. If there is a continuum from gendered to degendered framings of violence, as Krizsan and Popa (2014) suggested, the 1997 research could definitely be located at the degendered end of the continuum.

In these years, it was quite widespread among the political community to compare the epistemic practices of the Family Research Institute with the state's women's machinery. In these comparisons, feminists' influence over the women's machinery was especially at stake. For instance, in the parliament, one Islamist had accused Kemalist SHP of surrendering Turkey's gender politics to feminists who were "anti-cultural" and "facilitating moral collapse through waving the flag of sexual freedom" (TGNA, 23 October 1990, 23 November 1993). These qualifications might need modification, though it was true that the state's women's machinery involved some feminists in policy discussions and small-scale research projects even when the Islamist RP was in power.

Faced by the CEDAW Committee's harsh critique of their First Period Report in 1990, the state's women's machinery actively sought feminists' and women's organizations' contribution in the next reporting period, in 1996 (Acar, 2000). As a result, the state report covered gendered violence extensively, acknowledging its pervasiveness and the shortage of policy measures and practical mechanisms to stem violence. The state report largely followed the shadow report produced by Women's Human Rights – New Ways, known as KİH, which brought together a group of feminists, including some Mor Çatı members (İlkkaracan Ajas, 2008). Feminist academics who were involved in the debates on the state's report – some were present in the CEDAW Committee's meeting in New York in January 1997 – note that this reporting process directly influenced the Minister leading the Turkish delegation in the meeting (Acar, 2000; Altınay & Arat, 2009; İlkkaracan Ajas, 2008). The Committee applauded the Minister's presence in the meeting and the "frankness" of the report as indicators of "determined political will" among the state party. They observed that the Minister hastened the drafting of the first VAWA and its

legislative process in the parliament after this meeting despite strong opposition from the members of the coalition government ruled by the RP.

2.5 The Family Protection Act as the first VAWA

This first VAWA, enacted as the Family Protection Act in January 1998, was an outcome of feminist mobilization against gendered violence as well as the discursive struggles between Islamism and Kemalism. In these decades, feminists' influence on the institutional shape and legislative practices of the state were limited. Some feminists had strong reservations against privileging the state institutions and legislations in political mobilization. Their resentment against Kemalist state feminism led them to question working with or through state institutions even from a distance. They believed that mobilizing women for solidarity should be a priority since women's solidarity was the only way of changing the condition of woman (Ovadia, 1987). Pro-feminist public policies would follow logically from the actions and strength of feminist movement (Öztürk, 1988). Thus, the opening and closing sentences of early publications called for women's solidarity, rather than dictating pro-feminist policies to the state.

Nevertheless, the debate about the state's role in the struggle against gendered violence took different shape when these feminist pioneers brought into question the establishment of women's shelters to support women experiencing male violence. The campaign against battery published its second booklet, titled *Şimdi Sığınak İçin* (Now for the Shelter), in 1989 (Dayağa Karşı Dayanışma Kampanyası, 1989). In this booklet, advocates regarded opening a women's shelter an urgent need and claimed that local governments should support shelters for their residents along with all other services. However, they did not advocate the institutionalization of

shelters under the auspices of local governments. Rather, they held local governments responsible for providing support for women's collectivities and organizations that sought to establish and run shelters. This set up would guarantee the autonomy and longevity of shelters established as women's solidarity institutions rather than state's social service bureaus (Ekal, 2015). They had appropriated this idea about local governments through their visits to countries like Sweden, Germany and Austria to examine feminist shelter work (Mor Çatı, 1996).

However, these feminists' early efforts to establish autonomous women's shelters with the support from local governments failed. After promising talks with feminists, Bakırköy Municipality and Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, then run by SHP, established their own shelters, excluding feminists (Mor Çatı, 1996). These politicized shelters were closed by liberal right-wing Motherland Party (ANAP) and pro-Islamist Welfare Party (RP) after SHP lost local elections. In Ankara, feminist advocates collaborated with Altındağ Municipality and established a Woman's Solidarity Center in 1991 and an autonomous women's shelter in 1993 (Hanbay Çakır, 2007). This municipality also passed from SHP to RP in the 1994 local elections. The RP revoked the protocol agreement with feminists and sought to evict the shelter from a municipal building using every possible means. Following the publishing of the shelter address in a newspaper which compromised the safety and security of the shelter, feminists moved the shelter to a new address in 1996. The Independent Women's Initiative of Bursa (*Bursa Bağımsız Kadın Derneği*) had a similar exchange with the municipality, then run by ANAP (Mor Çatı, 2000). At first, the municipality conceded to collaborate with the Initiative for the founding of a women's solidarity center and a shelter. But later, the municipality ruined this collaboration by imposing to employ anti-feminist staff in the center. The failures of these shelter projects indicated the limitations of feminist politics in changing the institutional shape of the state.

Organizing a petition campaign to demand from the state a legislative change recognizing violence against women as a gendered crime had also come to the agenda at the initial stage of the movement ("Görüşmeyeli neler oldu?," 1988); however, it was not put into practice up until the minister submitted the first draft of the Family Protection Act to the Parliament in 1997. Not until the members of the coalition government ruled by the RP blocked the passage of the legislation, did a group of feminists organize a campaign centered on the legislative change addressing "violence in the family". Reflecting feminists' unease and skepticism about the state in this period, the campaign pamphlet was cautious in its support of the legislation. For instance, it acknowledged the limits of legislative action in eliminating violence "if property and power relations in the family and society were kept constant" ("Aile içi şiddete son," 1997). The campaign group staged several street protests in Istanbul that attracted significantly less turnout than the first march against wife beating in 1987. Two of the organizers of this campaign, nevertheless, consider the petition drive a success (Interview with Hülya Gülbahar and Zelal Ayman, October 7, 2017). In the absence of the Internet, they strove to spread it to various cities and accomplished a massive mobilization using telephones and faxes. This success brought the campaign to a meeting with the minister in Ankara at which activists from cities across the country presented the signed petitions. Hülya emphasizes the fact that the minister who was in dire need of public support to pass the legislation leaped at the opportunity to use these signatures in pressuring the parliament. Nevertheless, they failed to convince the minister to change the title of the draft legislation.

The first draft of the Family Protection Act also owes its existence to some feminists' use of "gender expertise" as a feminist strategy (Prügl, 2013). It followed the CEDAW review process through which the state's women's machinery developed its ties with some women's organizations when the Islamist RP was in power. The KİH, working within the framework of women's human

rights, was especially ambitious in terms of using CEDAW as leverage (İlkkaracan Ajas, 2008). It was connected to International Women's Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific (IWRAW AP), the regional office of a US-based nongovernmental organization, which has facilitated the participation of local women's organizations in CEDAW meetings since its founding in early 1990s (Merry, 2006). With support from IWRAW AP, KİH led the preparation of the first shadow report in 1996; participated in the CEDAW Committee's meeting in New York in January 1997; and received the training of UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) on the use of shadow reports in CEDAW's monitoring process.

Similar to transnationally connected Latin American women's organizations in these years, KİH cultivated its advocacy skills as well as "a pragmatic willingness to work within the system" in these encounters (Alvarez, 2000). The organization forged close ties with public officials in relevant institutions such as the state's central social service organization, SHÇEK (in Turkish, *Sosyal Hizmetler ve Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu*). For feminists, SHÇEK was a strategic institution to target, since it was running "women's guesthouses" in seven cities in 1997. If the state was going to expand its shelter services to women experiencing violence, these services would be institutionalized under the auspices of SHÇEK, as time proved.

KİH in collaboration with some feminist academics also made a number of contacts with the minister and lobbied for including preventive and protective orders in the legislation during the CEDAW review process (İlkkaracan Ajas, 2008). After a decade of activism, these actors could translate feminist knowledge on male violence against women in the family into applicable policy and made the minister approve most of its content, albeit not the package and the language. The feminist critique of the family was censored by packaging the legislation as a family protection act and using completely degendered language about violence. That was the same cost feminists in

faraway countries such as Chile had to pay, while "working within the system" for their first national anti-violence act (Alvarez, 2000). The Turkish minister's rationale was underwriting the passage of this legislation through a coalition government run by Islamist RP, a Justice Commission exclusively composed of men, and an increasingly duophonic parliament where secular Kemalist voices might be heard as the only alternative.

It is the cunning of Turkish political history that the legislation proposal was officially signed by the RP's leader, Necmettin Erbakan on March 26, 1997. It was one of the key pieces of legislation that was enforced on the Islamist RP, cornered by the pro-secular military through the so-called post-modern coup on February 28, 1997. This explains why some M.P.s of the RP heavily objected the legislation during debates in the parliament despite their leader's signature. They could not call for an open "no" vote, but they used all possible means to water down already limited legislation. Many RP members tried to cover over their discontent with the legislation by listing a number of technical issues which would prove a failure in the rollout of the legislation. Other critiques were forthright; they attacked to the core of the legislation and questioned the use of law-and-order solutions to eliminate violence in the family.

In the parliamentary debates, RP members described the legislation as abuse of state power, damaging Turkish-Islamic family unity and surrendering family to Western values. Similar to the ethnographic observations of Navaro-Yashin (1998) in the RP-run municipalities in these years, the RP members in the parliament used a discourse of "state-versus-society" through locating the RP in a separate realm of society that lacked power and oppressed by the monist authoritarianism of the secular Turkish state. For instance, Bahri Zengin interpreted this legislation as a continuation of totalitarian and statist policies in the early republican era which curbed individual autonomy and freedoms in family arrangements. With his emphasis on the history of military coups in

Turkey, he implied that this legislation was another case of the state's seizure of the powers of the people. Another RP member interpreted conflicts in the family as resulting from external interventions of for instance feminist ideas and the media, which "caused individuals who come together with their free will to become enemies and rivals to each other" (TGNA, 13 August 1997). Mehmet Emin Aydınbaş furthered this line of thought, arguing that interventionist policies, which aimed to "deliberately design society", broke down the "natural composition and evolution of society" (TGNA, 13 August 1997). He blamed the spread of family violence on these "unnatural interventions" in the family by the state in the name of modernity. Through these emphases on freedom, natural order, and state intervention, these Islamists revealed how they adapted Hayekian liberalism to the politics of the family. Like the former, they did not hesitate to use state power to shape families as they offered policy alternatives such as marriage credits, mortgages, and family education programs.

Though less articulated, another characteristic of RP's opposition to the legislation was minimizing gendered violence through expressing sympathy with husbands, even with those who drink alcohol. For instance, Nezir Aydın criticized criminalization of family violence, using the rhetoric of "poor guy" who "came home drunk, threw an insult on his wife, batter her up a bit, or slap her once" (TGNA, 14 January 1998). He claimed that the protection orders and the three to six months imprisonment in the case of their breach would not protect his family unity, rather these will further the dissolution of his family. Based on the argument that the legislation would magnify troubles in the family and increase divorce rate, RP offered an exemption to pardon the offenders in the first act of violation of protection orders (TGNA, 13 August 1997). Their filibuster delayed the voting on the bill but could not block its passage in January 1998. To end the debate, the minister, with support from coalition parties in the government, used an extremely unusual and

procedurally questionable law-making tactic. She revised the draft legislation by appending the article on imprisonment to the previous one that had already been approved in the parliament. Thereby, the minister evaded RP members' objections to legislation based on its carceral outcomes.

As Islamist RP refused to come to terms with gendered violence, choosing instead to minimize violence, it could not avoid aligning with batterers and therefore, lost this phase of the discursive battle to Kemalists. Moreover, the debates on this legislation contributed to the dissolution of the RP-led coalition government. The minister resigned from her post because her party, RP's coalition partner, did not back up the proposed legislation in the parliament. As the minister changed her party affiliation and appropriated Kemalist politics of family centered on the idiom of democratic family, she continued the same post in the newly formed government following the dissolution of the RP's coalition government. Thereby, Kemalists, whose vision of "women's rights" was then largely limited by an understanding of secularism that included women's "modern" appearance in the public sphere and inclusion in education and employment, gradually articulated women's protection from family violence into the project of secularism. They capitalized on Islamists' failure to acknowledge gendered violence as a pervasive reality of family relations and interpreted the legislation as a significant step in the protection of secular values. They did not adopt the feminists' critique of the family early on. Rather, they held onto the ideal of the democratic family to fend off Islamists' blows based on the moral collapse argument. At the end, the first VAWA turned out to be a family protection law.

2.6 Conclusion

In the initial mobilization against battery in the late 1980s, feminists pursued a testimonial strategy; they identified women and invited them to speak out against violence. The testimonial form, with its metonymic character and demand for solidarity interwoven with the claim of objectivity, served the feminist politics of knowledge. Feminists constituted violence as foundational for defining the category of woman and developing feminist politics. Drawing on women's testimonies of violence, they choose their prime target as the family and constituted it as the principal institution of patriarchy. They succeeded in inserting the issue of gendered violence into the political agenda; however, could they maintain its critical political meaning?

This chapter demonstrates that the discursive field and institutional context, which were mostly shaped by the debates between Kemalism and Islamism, filtered out the family critique in the feminist frame. The family was a matter of both conflict and consensus among Islamists and Kemalists. They disputed the determinants and outcomes of the family disaster and possible remedies; however, they agreed on the goal: "protection of family unity". Because both parties conceived gendered violence as a symptom of family crisis, when in power, they assigned the responsibility to produce knowledge on the issue to the Family Research Institute, rather than the state's women's machinery. In the nationally representative research projects conducted for three consecutive years, the Institute offered a partial expansion of state's control – or support, in its preferred language – of families as an efficient solution to family disaster. Neither research project endorsed law-and-order solutions, since these were considered overtly intrusive into the family and its authority structure. After all, the Constitution had determined the protection of the family as a state responsibility to its citizens and the Civil Code had approved unequal power relations in the family as legal by constituting the husband as the head of household.

In these decades, feminists had a limited influence on the institutional shape and legislative practices of the state. They strategized to ensure the autonomy and longevity of shelters and targeted local governments, rather than the central government, to gain monetary and infrastructural support for feminist shelter projects. In a context where gendered violence was becoming increasingly politicized, this maneuver proved futile. Only one municipality provided feminists with the necessary material support, which was cancelled when power changed hands in a subsequent election.

The political nature of gendered violence become more salient in some feminists' efforts to develop legislation on the issue. Reflecting feminists' unease and skepticism about the state in this early period, not all feminists pursued the strategy of law reform. Street protests demanding the enactment for the first VAWA remained weak compared with initial mobilization against wife-beating in 1987 and contemporary mobilizations to defend anti-violence legislations such as the Istanbul Convention and the national VAWA numbered 6284. Nevertheless, some feminists connected to transnational gender policy networks and formal women's organizations utilized "institutionalized tactics" such as a petition drive and legislative lobbying (Staggenborg, 1988). They used "gender expertise" strategically to convince state authorities of the necessity of legal reform (Prügl, 2013). Similar to feminist experiences in other contexts such as Latin America in these years, these tactics proved efficient in winning anti-violence legislation, though the legislation was subjected to "discursive maneuvers on the part of masculinist state" (Alvarez, 2000: 53). The new legislation enacted in January 1998 was titled as the Family Protection Act.

This chapter shows that the local institutional and discursive context curtailed feminists' power to give their preferred political meaning to gendered violence. Despite a decade-long feminist theorization and mobilization against of the family as the prime institution of patriarchy,

the family disaster frame was institutionalized as intrafamily violence. Whether Islamists or Kemalists, the legislators monotonously stated the ultimate objective as strengthening the family. Islamists argued that the family should be rescued from secular, Westernist state policies and even feminist influences, which they alleged sow the seeds of conflict in couples. They either ignored the widespread nature of gendered violence or downplayed cases of violence in which the RP was indicted. Early on, Kemalists acceded to the Islamist criticism based on the family crisis argument and held onto the family, promising to remake it as the smallest unit of democracy. However, they took advantage of Islamists' failure to recognize the rising political significance of gendered violence. Kemalists succeeded in presenting women's protection from violence as integral to the secular project in this period of political discourse.

This chapter attests to the prevalence of political talk on gendered violence as an issue related to the family before the politicization of honor killings in mid/late 1990s. It adds the family disaster frame to the limited Turkish literature on political discourse on gendered violence. In this early era, gendered violence, largely framed as a matter of family relations, lacked an intersectional analysis. With the effort to be a social movement with its own name and distinct from other social movements, feminists identified oppression as a common condition of being a woman and downplayed differences based on class, race, and sexuality. This situation, whose political effects were not noticed in the beginning, made its weight felt when gendered violence started to concern a diverse array of political movements in the global and local scales. Besides other things, the next chapters on the honor killings frame shows the political implications of such a lack and some feminists' efforts to fill it.

3.0 Honor killings: Culturalizing gendered violence

The "honor killings" frame did not appear in feminist publications and parliamentary debates until the second half of the 1990s. When the issue entered the Turkish political agenda, feminist organizations working in collaboration with international institutions such as the UN and the EU were officially invited to shape the parliamentary debate; they were granted expert positions on the investigation committees. An explicitly feminist critique of the honor killings frame emerged in Kurdish feminists' publications around this time and found its most articulate expression in Koğacıoğlu's articles a decade later. After years of discussion among feminists and women's organizations, this critique could be vocalized more widely as part of the efforts to establish solidarity and a national network among women's groups in different regions in Turkey.

The 1990s was also the decade when gendered violence became the number one transnational gender politics issue. At the end of 1990s, honor killings were added to the list of violent practices against women in the transnational discourse on gendered violence through the power/knowledge practices of institutions like the UN, the EU, and internationally active nongovernmental organizations. The term was listed as a traditional practice alongside with others such as female genital mutilation and dowry deaths. Similar to these practices, the particularity of honor killings among different types of gendered violence was derived from its definition as a cultural practice that belongs to certain communities who preserve it against the winds of change and even take it wherever they go. This interpretation saw honor killings as expressive of the cultures of these communities marked by durable patriarchy. In the large body of scholarship researchers have devoted to honor killings in the last two decades, only a few works questioned its political, discursive usages in culturalizing gendered violence. As Abu-Lughod (2011)

contemplated, in these works (including her own), gendered violence failed to remain the real object. Rather, honor killings served as the ground of political debate on issues such as imperialism, postcolonialism, cultural relativism vs. universalism, secularism, Islamophobia, assimilation, and so on.

This chapter explores the usages of the honor killings frame in two parts. The first part discusses the Mediterranean usage in scholarly works on pre-1990s Turkey and Mediterranean societies and exposes this usage in Turkey based on newspaper coverage of cases until the mid-1990s. The second part traces the global narrowing of the frame and its religious-cultural usage embedded in specifically UN and EU policies and practices. As part of the global story, I focus on the Italian case to demonstrate a trajectory of how a frame of gendered violence could gradually contract to indicate and indict immigrant communities. Then, I trace the use of honor killings frame in UN and EU documents to reveal the political work and contestations over narrowing down the honor killings frame and its interpretation as a cultural practice, especially prevalent in Muslim majority countries.

My analysis of the political discourse on honor killings departs from the existing literature in two ways. First, most of the scholarship on the honor killings frame, even critical studies, denies its existence in journalistic usage before it was brought under the scrutiny of transnational and national politics. I underline the Mediterranean associations of this early usage and call it prepolitical in the sense that this Mediterranean usage was not subject to discursive politics and controversy mobilizing state and non-state actors. In so doing, I uncover the politically constructed nature of the religious and racial usages of the frame developed abroad and later in Turkey as the next chapter demonstrates. I also undermine a specific implication of these political usages, that these practices were natural phenomena or truth out there in these communities – Muslims abroad

and Kurds in Turkey – waiting to be discovered and exposed to the public. Rather, I show that the meaning of honor killings frame was gradually narrowed down in 1990s through selective politicization of violent practices, previously left unspoken at the transnational and national scales. Compared to the Mediterranean usage, a smaller set of violent practices were spotlighted as honor killings in the religious and racial usages, as the frame was subjected to discursive politics. Despite this contraction in the form and number of violent practices the frame covered, I show how it pervaded the political talk over gendered violence on a global scale.

Second, I emphasize the politicization of the honor killings frame within the institutional context of UN and EU, where the debate mainly unfolds between member states. This attention on the institutionalized sphere with states as main actors makes my argument partially different from other critical studies. The way in which the honor killings frame became a subject of interstate debate had a significant effect on weakening its connotation with gendered violence. It turned into a debate on imperialism, independence, cultural authenticity, and Islamophobia, where the sides were easily drawn up as Islam vs. the West.

In the relevant sections, I demonstrate two factors that facilitated this political process. First, the Mediterranean understanding of honor killings shaped gender politics in countries with Muslim majority populations in terms of both ideas and criminal legislation. These countries were unprepared for the narrowing down of the notion of honor killings, especially by separating it from practices called passion killings. In these debates, whereas honor came to be understood as a collective cultural phenomenon restricted to certain communities, passion remained an individual emotion. The way in which state responsibility for gendered violence prevention was constructed in globally approved gender policy documents also had a role in this process. By reducing state ignorance to culture and religion, these documents failed to address most global response to

gendered violence; that is, its individualization and explanation with uncontrollable emotions. Based on this gender-salient gap in global normative responses to gendered violence, indicted states could consistently argue for the annulment of state responsibility in some cases of gendered violence without appeals to cultural arguments. Also, when these states were held accountable for restrictively defined honor killings, they were able to portray, Western states, their accusers, as imperialist and Islamophobic.

3.1 Pre-politicization: The Mediterranean usage

The honor killings frame was long used as an academic and journalistic concept in and beyond Turkey, before its politicization indicted a particular culture, equated to a particular religion and/or ethnicity, as intrinsic to gendered violence. This pre-political usage could be traced back to anthropological studies in the Mediterranean that emerged in 1960s and constructed honor and shame as essential rules of conduct constituting the Mediterranean culture area (Campbell, 1964; Peristiany, 1966; J. Schneider, 1971).[9] For instance, in her epic study *My Cousin, My Husband* originally published in French in 1966, Germaine Tillion (2007) refuted the religious explanation of "murders of honour" which attributed the practice to only Muslim societies. Rather, she cited several cases of brothers and husbands murdering women who were accused of sexual

[9] The fact that some Latin American countries, most notably Brazil, had condoned murders of women based on "legitimate defense of honour" till mid 1990s might be explained with the colonial influence of Northern Mediterranean countries (Caulfield, 1993). Even though Brazil's first post-independence Penal Code had removed this rule and adopted the crime of passion as a mitigating factor as early as the end of nineteenth century, the defense of honor for acquitting homicides remained in practice almost a century (Human Rights Watch, 1991).

promiscuity in order to substantiate her argument of the common characteristics of Mediterranean area that transcended apparently religious boundaries.

Safillos-Rothschild's (1969) study on honor crimes in Greece and Ergil's (1980) study on Turkey indicate that Mediterranean usage was even broader. Safillos-Rothschild defined honor crime as "any crime in which the offender claimed his [or her] motive to be an insult brought to (or a molestation of) his [or her] personal or family honour" (207-208). Similarly, Ergil defined the term as "an attack on the opponents' life by both men and women who deem themselves dishonored, that is, publicly disgraced and socially deprived of the identity to which they aspired" (410). These two conceptualizations of honor crimes were broad in terms of practices they covered. Both studies covered violent actions other than murder which was defined as "washing away the dishonor by blood."

A second characteristics of the Mediterranean usage that appears in these studies is related to the sex of offenders and victims. Mediterranean usage was broad also in terms of the sex of offenders and victims. In both studies, offenders were predominantly men. Nevertheless, more than a quarter of cases categorized and examined as honor crimes were committed by women. In the case of victims, women again constituted a minority, as in both studies approximately two thirds of the victims were male. Providing more numerical detail on the sex of offenders and victims, Ergil's study indicates that according to Mediterranean usage a typical honor crime was a male-to-male crime (43 percent of his cases), not a male-to-female one. A man might have murdered another man because the murdered had sexually assaulted his wife, his daughter, or himself. Or the murdered man might have been a lover of murderer's wife.

These studies indicate a third characteristic, that is, the honor motive had not been solely constructed of women's "inappropriate" sexual practices in the Mediterranean usage. Ergil had

listed the motives in examined cases as "husband-wife argument or strife in the family" (25%), "dishonoring act of woman" (22%), "self-protection" (14%), "verbal attack on ego" (14%), "jealousy" (13%), and "intra-family feud" (9%). Safillos-Rothschild did not provide this kind of detail, yet his study was also based on a broad definition of honor motive. In example, one of his examined honor crimes referred to a case in which "a man kills a woman because his masculine honour was insulted by her refusal of his amorous proposals" (215).

Finally, both studies invoked "tradition," which defined dishonor and reinforced honor crime as the proper restorative measure, yet they did not mention a particular religion or ethnicity as underlying tradition. They constructed honor crimes as predominantly a lower-class phenomenon, highlighting the prevalence of recent rural-to-urban migrants as main offenders in the cities. In line with this, they pointed out modernization in general, and education, urbanization, and capitalist development in particular to eliminate these practices in future.

3.1.1 The Mediterranean usage in Turkey

The survey of online archive of the newspaper *Milliyet* confirms the prevalence of the Mediterranean usage in Turkey till mid 1990s. The coined frame "murder in the name of honor" – in Turkish, "*namus için/uğruna cinayet*" – was first used in 1964 to refer to the enactment of two decrees in Iraq, one granting pardon to forty-three brothers who had killed their sisters and the other reducing all sentences for murders of honor to one year. From this usage in 1964 till May 1985 when the coined frame "honor killing" –in Turkish "*namus cinayeti*" – appeared in Milliyet, "murder in the name of honor" was used only four times, once each in 1967, 1971, 1983 and 1985. Only in the 1983 case, the offender was a man shooting his wife and her "lover." In the remaining cases, the offenders were women killing men who had assaulted them.

The analysis of information derived from the newspaper *Milliyet* indicates the years 1985 and 1996 as important inflection points in the journalistic usage of the honor killing frame. In 1985, the newspaper covered eighteen different cases of murder in which the offenders' motive was reported to be "saving" or "cleansing" their honor. This number equals to the number of cases reported in the previous four years and it suggests an increasing usage of this frame since 1985. The fact that *Milliyet* reported 178 cases between 1985 and 1995 confirms this quantitative shift in the usage of honor killings frame. Based on the analysis of the content of news, I find that a qualitative shift occurred in 1996 as honor crimes was linked to regional custom and Kurdish identity, or more broadly, culture. Since my data on the prevalence of the usage of honor killings in *Milliyet* does not cover the years after 1996, it does not show a numerical shift besides the beginning of a framing shift. However, a survey on two other newspapers between 1996 and 2000 finds 261 honor killings news in *Hürriyet* and 329 in *Sabah* in five years (Genç, 2001). These numbers may indicate the increasing prevalence a second time in 1996 following the qualitative shift in the honor killings frame, an important inflection point in the trendline.

In the May 1985 case, using the coined frame "honor killing" for the first time and in the headline, the offender was a woman, a married mother of two, living in a working-class neighborhood of Istanbul. She had killed a neighbor in a rape attempt. According to the news, after the event, she went to the police and told that "I don't regret, I saved my honor." This case might be considered as typical of the cases involving female offenders, which amounted to one third of the eighteen cases reported in 1985. Among these cases only another one-third fit with the restricted definition of honor killing, that is "the murder of a woman by members of her family who do not approve of her sexual behavior" (Abu-Lughod, 2011; Koğacıoğlu, 2011).

It is also interesting that the first case covered on January 1st, 1985, was about a Turkish woman in Cologne killing a rapist. Yet rather than the details of this case, the *Milliyet* news focused on its coverage in the Bild from the front page. Adding other high-profile cases involving Turkish migrants as victims in Germany, *Milliyet* reported that Turks attracted a lot media attention in Germany around that time. It also underlined that Bild reported the words of this woman's brother saying that "it would be up to me to clean the family honor, if she had not killed the dishonoring one."[10] The fact that *Milliyet* covered Bild's coverage of this case might be considered as a sign of early ethnification of the honor killing frame in Western Europe. It might also be interpreted that Bild and *Milliyet* cooperated in ethnification grouping this case with other law and order cases involving Turkish migrants, rather than relating it to the gendered violence cases involving German nationals.[11] The news about this case and another two taking place in Germany and France in 1986 and 1994 included detailed information about the families of victims or offenders, constructing this type of murder as inevitable, reinforced by the family code, and more broadly, culture. In these years, news reports on murders in Turkey did not include this kind of detailed information about the families of victims or offenders.

3.2 From Mediterranean to religious-cultural usage: Global contraction

In the 1980s, anthropological studies on the Mediterranean widely questioned the epistemological validity of the concepts of honor and shame in unifying and distinguishing the

[10] In Turkish: "*Eğer ablam namusunu kirleteni öldürmeseydi, aile şerefini temizlemek bana düşerdi*."
[11] Korteweg and Yurdakul (2009) focus on the media coverage of honor killings in 2005 in Germany and the Netherlands. The authors do not provide historical detail about the emergence of journalistic discourse linking ethnicity and gendered violence.

Mediterranean (Herzfeld, 1980). There was not much debate if these concepts were valid to understand the Islamic societies in the Middle East and North Africa; however, some claimed that the countries on the northern shore of the Mediterranean had changed so rapidly, resembling more with the rest of Europe (Pina-Cabral, 1989; Sacchi & Viazzo, 2013). Particular to my topic, the concept of honor killing seems to change meaning in the 1980s, too. The honor motive *fully* gave way to "passion" in popular culture and in the legal processing of murders of non-Muslim women in many northern Mediterranean countries. This led to narrowing the scope of honor killing and its connotations as experts and journalists construed it as a Muslim practice, alien and hostile to "Western" culture and normativity (Frevert, 2014). There is not a single study that examines this process with empirical data and in detail. Below, first, I review the Italian literature on honor killings and passion crimes in order to show how the frame of honor killings was narrowed globally to exclude murder of non-Muslim women by their current or ex intimate partners. Then, I discuss the UN and the EU as important international institutions in hardening the religious-cultural usage of honor killings at the transnational scale.

3.2.1 The rebirth of honor killings in Italy

Among northern Mediterranean countries, the literature on crimes of honor and/or passion in Italy is most relevant since its penal system kept the notions of both honor and passion until very recently. Turkey had adopted the 1889 Penal Code of Italy in 1926, and then revised some articles, again, by borrowing from the 1931 Penal Code of Italy in 1938 (Miller, 2007). Besides bearing numerous similarities with the Turkish debate on honor killings, the Italian case also illustrates how the notion of crimes of passion has surfaced to name murders of non-Muslim women in intimate relations as distinct from murders of Muslim women.

The cause of honor had already been codified as an extenuating circumstance to the crime of homicide in the 1889 Penal Code of Italy before the fascist regime expanded its applicability in 1931 (Bettiga-Boukerbout, 2005). Frevert (2014) points out that the fascist regime of Italy was not an exception, as its counterpart in Germany also openly reinstated the notion of family honor in legal practice in 1930s. The 1931 Penal Code of Italy rendered "unlawful sexual relations on the part of . . . spouse, daughter or sister" as an offence to "family honor" and provided lenient treatment for those who killed these categories of people in a "fit of fury."[12] A similar reduction in prison sentences applied to those who killed "the paramour of a spouse, daughter or sister." The code required a woman to be chaste if married and virgin if unmarried; and otherwise, it regarded the killing of her as partially excusable. Moreover, the code entwined the notions of honor and passion; the latter was used to translate the phenomena of "fit of fury", "heat of passion", "loss of control", or "extreme emotional distress" into legal languages (Abu Odeh, 1997; Spatz, 1991). The fit of fury defense might have ruled out premeditation in a murder, if some legal practitioners had not interpreted fury to last for days or weeks (De Cristofaro, 2018). This Italian Penal Code was revised in 1981, removing the notion of family honor but keeping the fit of fury defense. Frevert (2014: 251) explains this change with the increasing conception of honor as "too subjective and socially fraught" compared to passion which was still believed to be "more objective and natural." Only honor was regarded as an "anachronistic" moral and social value that ought to be eliminated.

[12] Bettiga-Boukerbout (2005: 234) provides the English translation of Article 587 of the 1931 Penal Code, as follows: "Whoever discovers unlawful sexual relations [i.e. sexual relations outside marriage] on the part of their spouse, daughter or sister and in the fit of fury occasioned by the offence to their or their family's honour causes their death, shall be punished with a prison term from three to seven years. Whoever, under the same circumstances, causes the death of the paramour of their spouse, daughter or sister shall be subjected to the same punishment. If in the same circumstances, the perpetrator causes to the above categories of people a personal injury, the penalties provided by Articles 582 and 583 shall be reduced to one third; if death occurs as a consequence of the injuries the penalty shall be a prison term of two to five years. Whoever, under the same circumstances, commits against the above categories of people the crime regulated by Article 581 shall not be subjected to any punishment."

Thirty years after this legislative change, the media continued to invoke love and passion in reporting murders of Italian women (Gius & Pina, 2014).

Historical studies indicate that from the 1960s onwards, the notions of honor and passion began to be part of a wider public discussion on family, regional custom, nation identity, and modernity in Italy (Cullen, 2016; Seymour, 2006). A variety of actors, including feminists and the Catholic Church, who were otherwise enemies, agreed that the family was in a state of crisis, and many advocated reform in family law and penal code as a solution (Seymour, 2006). In this context where divorce was illegal, honor killings might even be plotted as an Italian way of divorce, an easier way to get rid of an unwanted wife. Moreover, the Italian debate on honor killings in these decades associated these practices with the culture of Southern regions, particularly Sicily. As Cullen (2016: 101) observes, this discourse portrayed the national identity of Italy as at stake; the question was whether Italy was "'modern' and European or southern and 'traditional'". The media depicted Southern Italy as "African and medieval" and "backward in both time and temperament" (109, 111).

By the time of the legislative change in 1981, a widespread dislike of the notion of honor associated with morality was already established in Italy. Removing the list of categories of people whose murder had been codified as partially excusable, the new penal code separated murder of wives from other categories of women, sisters and daughters. With this change in sanctioning murders of women in intimate relations, Italian legislation fully adopted the crime of passion logic which was then seen as a Western phenomenon compared to honor as an Eastern one (Abu Odeh, 1997). The notion of passion has also been an object of critique; however, judicial authorities, the media, and perpetrators of violence alike have explained acts of violence in terms of excessive and uncontrollable passions for decades (Gius & Pina, 2014). Giomi (2016) underlines that this

emotive discourse has been so persistent; although the media borrowed the term femicide from the Italian feminist movement in 2010s, the narrative of romantic love has prevailed in news items on lethal intimate violence including Italian perpetrators.

In this context, the concept of honor has returned to Italian discourse only to describe violence against minority women, particularly immigrants from Muslim communities (Bormioli, Costantini, Costantini, Oancea, & Pederzini, 2017; Meini, 2017). This rejuvenation of the frame of honor killing specifically with cultural religious connotations was not unique to Italy. In fact, the reports of an EU-funded project, provocatively titled *Honour Ambassadors against Shame Practices* (HASP), hint that this religious-cultural usage of honor killings might have arrived in Italy through the activities of non-governmental organizations with transnational linkages. Applied in five European countries (Italy, Spain, Greece, Bulgaria, and the UK), this project explains its rationale with reference to the EU and UN resolutions on honor crimes in 2000s. Echoing these institutions' initial approach as traditional harmful practices, this project constructs "honour related violence" as an aggregate category combining acts such as forced marriages, female genital mutilation, and murders for "honour related reasons."[13] The latter would have remained ambiguous, if the project did not relate them to migrant communities. To the contrary, it is overtly stated in one project report, that migrants "took their tradition and practices to the new countries and started executing them there" (Tisheva & Macheva, 2017: 5). The national report of Italy mostly shares these characteristics, as it considers the problem to belong to immigrant communities (Bormioli et al., 2017).

[13] For "honour related reasons," the comparative report gives such examples: "dressing or behaving in a westernised manner, falling in love with somebody not chosen by their family, rejecting a forced marriage, initiating divorce, or being lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, queer, intersex, or asexual" (Tisheva & Macheva, 2017: 5).

3.2.2 The UN and the EU

Studies on global feminism indicate that gendered violence became the number one transnational gender politics issue in the mid-1990s (Alvarez, 2000; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Scholars explain this with concerted – rather than spontaneous - efforts of transnational activists, who developed "norms of inclusivity" to overcome divisions emerging out of issues such as development, social justice, race, and religion (Weldon, 2006) and constructed gendered violence as a universal political issue to ensure cooperation among activists from different regions (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). UN conferences, particularly the 1993 conference on human rights in Vienna and the 1995 conference in Beijing, were significant because women's organizations in different countries and across continents organized around this issue and pressed international governance bodies to develop a universal normative response. To break with the peripheral positioning of gender issues in international governance bodies and to construct "state responsibility" against gendered violence, transnational activists reframed women's rights as human rights (Bunch, 1990; Cook, 1994; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). The global petition campaign, organized by the Center for Women's Global Leadership at Rutgers in 1993, demonstrates the rapid success of this frame. Calling on the UN to recognize gendered violence as a human rights violation, the campaign gathered around half a million signatures in 123 countries including Turkey, which contributed twenty-thousand signatures (Fried, 1994).

Initially, the UN, like feminists in many countries, focused on violence against women in the family, and then broadened its scope of action (Connors, 2005). The UN declaration on violence against women (A/RES/48/104) enacted in 1993 was the first decisive outcome of these efforts. It underlined the "need" to develop a comprehensive understanding of violence, iterating that the definition provided in the declaration should be considered incomplete, because it might

not be including all possible forms of violence against women on earth. New forms of gender violence were to be added each year since the UN appointed a special rapporteur to expand the knowledge on gendered violence through reporting on different country cases. Internationally active nongovernmental organizations also strategized to expand the definition of the term. The most expansive definition of violence against women was reached at the outcome document (A/RES/S-23/3) of a special session for reviewing post-Beijing developments in 2000. The result was a long list of practices adding up "all forms of commercial sexual exploitation, as well as economic exploitation, including trafficking in women and children, female infanticide, crimes committed in the name of honour, crimes committed in the name of passion, racially motivated crimes, abduction and sale of children, dowry-related violence and deaths, acid attacks and harmful traditional or customary practices, such as female genital mutilation, early and forced marriages" (A/RES/S-23/3: 37) With this move, crimes of honor along with those of passion were introduced in a UN document. These should have, then, become part of "agreed upon language" suggesting consensus among different states and rendering further debate on wording needless (Merry, 2006). However, things developed differently when some states pushed to "put words into action" as a Netherlands representative told in a meeting of the special session (A/S-23/PV.4).

In the early 1990s, UN documents mentioned the term "defence of honour" as a legal concept justifying assault or murder of female family members and urged states to remove related articles from penal codes. The aggregate category of "traditional harmful practices," which was constructed in the late 1980s, included practices such as forced marriages, female genital mutilation, dowry deaths, sati, son preference, and even acid attacks but not "honor killings" until the late 1990s. The term entered into UN documents through the reports of special rapporteurs who were supposed to act as "eyes and ears" of the Commission on Human Rights (Merry, 2006).

The rapporteur on "traditional practices affecting the health of women and children" was first to address honor killings in her 1998 report, followed by rapporteurs on "extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions" and "violence against women, its causes and consequences" in their 1999 reports. Indicating the volume and complexity of the debate and, probably, hinting difficulty in arriving at a common understanding of honor killings among UN bodies, special rapporteurs on "religious intolerance" and "independence of judges and lawyers" also raised the issue in their reports.

Two facts seem to shift the terms of the debate explicitly towards Islam vs. the West. The first one included a murder of a woman in 1999 in Pakistan, the second one the broadcasting of a documentary *Crimes of Honour* in 2000 at the UN headquarters. A gunman, hired by her family, shot Samia Sarwar in the office of her lawyers, Hina Jilani and Asma Jahangir in Lahore. Samia was separated from her husband for four years and seeking for a divorce, which her family, a wealthy and locally powerful one, regarded as a dishonoring act. Samia's mother, promising to provide her with necessary documentation for divorce, instead, escorted the gunman to the law office. This case might have escaped notice as an unexceptional murder of an ordinary woman, except for the fact that Asma Jahangir was a UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings at that time. The murder was followed by death threats to Jahangir, who had been attending a regular session of UN's Commission on Human Rights at the time of murder. According to an action alert prepared by internationally active women's and human rights organizations, a religious group claimed that Jahangir "takes the small problems of Pakistan to international forums and creates a bad name for Pakistan" and demanded that the government of Pakistan punish her or else they would kill her themselves ("Work Against Honor Killings of Women Puts Human Rights Defenders at Risk," 1999). The action alert called on the authorities of Pakistan and United Nations

for an urgent response, several protests of women's groups took place in Pakistan, newspapers[14] based in the US and Britain reported on these events, non-governmental organizations published reports, the EU issued a statement on honor killings in Pakistan, and the government of Pakistan and other Pakistani political actors responded to these parties.

In the context of events sparked by Samia's murder, the religious groups that took it upon themselves to silence the protests, some Pakistani political agents and governmental representatives, and several commentators in newspapers all framed this murder as a debate of Islam versus the West. For instance, a religious group called for a demonstration against those protesting the murder and the state's collusion. The group interpreted the murder and its aftermath as "a dirty conspiracy against Islam, Pakistan, family life" (Goldenberg, 1999). Aligning with this interpretation, some senators in the House legitimized honor killings as part of tribal and cultural traditions and religious precepts; one senator even disparagingly called Jahangir and Jilani "girls in jeans" to delegitimize them as adolescent and Westernized (Ruane, 2000). After all, marking feminists as newcomers and culturally inauthentic has been centuries-old practice in discursive struggles over gender in postcolonial contexts (Narayan, 1997). In a different vein, Judy Mann (1999), writing in the *Washington Post*'s Lifestyle section, called honor killings, illustrated by Samia's murder, "the dirty little secret of the Islamic world." She concluded that the state's ignoring these killings would lead to a "ruinous reputation" for Pakistan around the world. Her article constitutes an early example of "outsourcing patriarchy," which would later become abundant in journalistic discourse on honor killings in US and Europe (Grewal, 2013). Demanding accountability from Pakistan, Mann, a self-identified feminist journalist known for her

[14] See the following references Galpin (1999), Gannon (2000), Goldenberg (1999), and Mann (1999).

commentaries on women in Afghanistan, reproduced the relations of domination between states at the transnational scale (Russo, 2018).

The EU statement addressed to the UN (A/53/1045) was careful not to mention religion or particularly Islam. Instead, it called on the government of Pakistan to prevent and prosecute these murders and to assert its disapproval of such practices. The Pakistani government's one-page response to the UN (A/54/387), however, largely framed the murder and its aftermath as a debate on Islam intrinsic to its national identity versus the EU. It perceived the EU's statement as "all the more unacceptable" because it was "targeting" Pakistan over an "isolated" incident. Furthermore, the government of Pakistan, positioning itself as speaking for Islam, expressed that this murder did not have religious sanction and added that "[w]omen enjoy a special and indeed elevated status in our religion." How, then, did the government of Pakistan explain Samia's murder? In short, culture – officials cast the killing as the result of "abhorrent customs which [sic] are a residue from the past and inconsistent with contemporary norms and indeed also with Islamic teachings." Just months after these debates, General Musharraf, coming to power via a coup in October 1999, announced 2000 the Year of Human Rights and specifically denounced honor killings (Ruane, 2000). In Samia's case, though, police and legal officials still took no action; the gunman had already been killed by the security guard of the law office and her parents were not prosecuted.

The second fact that shifted the terms of the debate explicitly towards Islam versus the West included screening of a documentary, *Crimes of Honour*[15] by Shelley Saywell, at the UN headquarters in New York. This documentary film was the first among others on honor killings which would win their producers prestigious awards, such as an Emmy. Filmed in Jordan and on the West Bank, it started with the image of a mosque and the sound of the call to prayer (Sen,

[15] The trailer is available online: https://www.filmplatform.net/product/crimes-of-honour/

2005). The film presented a man who murdered his sister telling how he read from the Quran as she was dying (Laviosa, 2010). In response, Malaysia, representing the Organization of the Islamic Conference at the UN, wrote a letter (A/C.3/55/4) in October 2000 denouncing the film as a "vivid example of discrimination, prejudice and stereotyping of Islam." It did not deny the occurrence of such practices among Muslim communities, but it rejected singling out Islam. It refused any linkage "between the killing of women and girls under any societal or communal banner, including in the name of passion, honour or race, and the teachings, practices and values of Islam."

The tension at the UN was further escalated as Netherlands proposed a resolution (A/C.3/55/L.11) targeting honor killings and indicting states that condone these practices for human rights violations. Simultaneously, Pakistan proposed an alternative resolution (A/C.3/55/L.13), using the "agreed upon language" in the Beijing+5 document. Accordingly, Pakistan's resolution buried crimes of honor as well as those of passion on a lengthy list of violent practices. It expressed "deep concern" at their persistence and reaffirmed that these practices comprise a "grave" human rights violation. Despite its lip service to human rights language, this resolution did not challenge states. Rather, it preferred to be affirmative by acknowledging the governments that took some action and urging them to do more. Moreover, it asked the special rapporteur on violence against women to "place equal emphasis" on all violent practices.

Contrary to the majority of UN texts that "paper over" substantive differences between states (Merry, 2006), the records of meetings when these resolutions were on the agenda show a tense discussion over honor killings in relation to Islam, crimes of passion, and state accountability. Pakistan and Jordan, with support from many Muslim-majority countries, strongly repudiated the Netherlands's resolution. For Qatar's delegate, it was a part of "constant attacks against Islam" (A/55/PV.81). The wording of the resolution avoided any reference to religion or particularly

Islam. However, Netherlands started circulating the draft immediately following the screening of the particular documentary at the UN. For Netherlands, it was a "fitting moment" (A/C.3/55/SR.43), but for its opponents as well as the special rapporteur on traditional practices it was an "unfortunate" start (A/C.3/55/SR.46; E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/27). Many delegates from Muslim-majority countries, positioning themselves as offended by the tenor of events, gave passionate speeches rejecting any connection between Islam and honor killings. Netherlands and its supporters did not respond to this defensiveness in their speeches.

A second objection to Netherlands' resolution derived from the putative overlap between passion and honor as reasons for gendered violence. Delegates of Pakistan, Jordan, and many other states argued that practices that were categorized as passion crimes in some parts of the worlds were regarded as honor crimes elsewhere. Two facts might have made this perception possible. First, as Sen (2005) suggests, since these delegates rejected any connection between crimes of honor and Islam, they could consistently associate the former with the crimes of passion. Second, these countries were already prosecuting these practices according to their modern laws that largely imitated the European penal codes of nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Frevert, 2014; Spatz, 1991). The commonsensical view that Muslim majority countries belonged to a "separate legal universe" was unjustified in the light of comparative legal history (Mayer, 1995: 433). For instance, article 340 of Jordanian Penal Code was borrowed from French Penal Code of 1810 and Ottoman Code of 1858, which Abu Odeh (2010: 914) finds "surprisingly harmonious" in providing full or partial excuse to perpetrators of such practices. In Pakistan, the provision of "grave and sudden provocation" was omitted with the introduction of Islamic Qisas and Diyat Ordinance in 1991; however, courts continued to apply this provision to reduce sentences for honor killings.

Jilani and Ahmed (2004) states that judicial authorities explained their practice with both Islamic injunctions and the legacy of British law in the subcontinent.

With support from others, Jordan's delegate's solution to this controversy was adding "premeditated" before each "crimes against women in the name of honor" phrase in the Netherlands' resolution to leave out practices which might be deemed as passion crimes anywhere in the world. Accordingly, honor crimes might have been perceived as a larger set which covered a smaller set constituting passion crimes. The difference between the two sets was significant, because it consisted of the most high-profile honor killings: the killings of women for alleged sexual misbehaviors, mainly by under-age males of families, following "family council" decisions. This type of killings came to dominate public imaginary about honor killings through newspaper coverage and women's and human rights activism. These sources also shaped expert knowledge, since UN's special rapporteurs on extrajudicial killings, violence against women, and traditional practices relied on these sources to identify the specificity of honor killings (E/CN.4/2000/3; E/CN.4/2002/83; E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/41). The emphasis on these narrowly construed cases was consequential for the reduced scope of the honor killings frame.

A third objection to the Netherlands's resolution derived from its clear indictment of states for human rights violation on the grounds of failure to prevent honor killings. One might think that this objection would lie at the heart of the whole controversy, if the debate had not included religion, particularly Islam, as a red flag. Again, several delegates of Muslim-majority countries were unyielding. They attempted to water down state accountability envisaged in the resolution. Interestingly, in their arguments, these delegates relied on the overlap between crimes of passion and crimes of honor, rather than the treatment of the latter as an issue of tradition, culture, or religion. Jordan's delegate repeatedly asked, "how States could exercise due diligence to prevent

crimes committed in a sudden fit of rage" (A/C.3/55/SR.46). He meant that states might be held responsible to prevent "premeditated" honor crimes, but not spontaneous, passion/honor killings. In a subtle way, Jordan's delegate was pointing out the unequal distribution of accountability demands at the transnational scale, which almost always reproduced unequal relations of power between states.

This final objection might have revealed a gender-salient gap in the UN's framing of state responsibility. The 1993 declaration on violence against women partially preempted states' evading responsibility, expressing that states "should not invoke any custom, tradition or religious consideration to avoid their obligations" (A/RES/48/104). Once seen as a feminist success, this perspective was limited to urging states to treat gendered violence in a secular and modern way. Based on the liberal assumption that a secular and modern state would be neutral and assume accountability for the security of its all citizens, the Declaration reduced state ignorance to culture and religion. However, as the Jordanian delegate implied and the literature on gendered violence supports, most global response to femicide has been to individualize violence and explain it with emotions – heat of passion, fit of fury, extreme emotional disturbance, loss of self-control, etc. Nourse (1997) highlights how persistent this response has been even in the face of various feminist legal victories in the U.S. context. Persistent appeal to questions about the perpetrator of violence, i.e. his relationship to the woman and his state of mind in the situation, as providing a "natural" excuse for gendered violence, might transcend national, cultural, and religious boundaries. This might explain why Jordan's delegate, like other dissenters, did not need to appeal to culture and religion, while arguing for the annulment of state responsibility in some cases of gendered violence.

Contrary to these dissenters' arguments, the Netherlands revised its resolution by editing out the concept of passion and, thereby, hardening the separation of the meanings of passion and honor. The Netherlands and its supporters could evade explaining the reason behind this change and they could even maintain their silence about whether passion killings are as unjustified as honor killings. At the very least, the resistance to considering the connections between murders in the name of honor and passion might be explained by global inequalities, i.e., the power of these countries in imposing language on others (Merry, 2006). More needs to be highlighted. As Frevert (2014: 245) suggests, it reflects a kind of "historical amnesia" on the part of European political actors. Forgetting the popular acceptance of the notion of honor and its reflections in European penal codes until very recently was effective for reducing the scope of honor killings. Once passion, seen as a natural, individual emotion, was delinked from honor, the latter could be consistently converted into a foreign phenomenon, a cultural value specific to Muslim communities. That is how the reluctance to make connections between passion and honor helps mold honor killings into what Narayan (1997) calls "death by culture."

3.3 Conclusion

The cultural turn in the political discourse on gendered violence was an outcome of transnational politicization of the issue in 1990s. This turn was possible, because at the transnational scale, culture was mostly used to mean the local and as the opposite of the global, as Merry (2006) shows. A shallow usage, indeed, that led to the construction and misrecognition of particular forms of violence as originating in culture and belonging to discrete communities. Bunch and Fried (1996) imply that transnational activists wrongfully reproduced this negative usage of

culture, when faced with the Vatican, some Islamist governments, and others who sought to deny the universality of women's rights using culture as an excuse. As Weldon (2006) argues, the initial goal of transnational feminist networks might have been reaching a broader account of gendered violence and moving the discussion of gendered violence forward by showing its universality despite the fact that it goes by different names in different contexts. Or, they might have aimed to mobilize the transnational community to hold *all and every* state responsible for adequate measures against gendered violence. However, the power imbalances at the transnational scale made more powerful states assume the position of both judge and jury over those lacking power in these debates over expanding the definition of gendered violence. Powerful states definitely had more discretion in defining what kind of violence required transnational attention, what constituted an honor crime, how it was different than a passion crime, or what reasons were behind honor crimes. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that while transnational feminist networks aimed to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of gendered violence, they could not eliminate the political cost that strong states would capitalize on the failures of weak states to "correctly" address gendered violence.

Whether some internationally organizing women used these efforts for purposes other than ensuring inclusivity and transnational solidarity in late 1990s, when the term honor crimes entered in the UN language, is a legitimate question, especially after 9/11 events. Russo (2018), for instance, points out that the Feminist Majority Foundation, a US-based liberal feminist organization, hardly aimed at these goals. Rather, it used gendered violence in Muslim contexts as evidence of "western superiority and righteousness" and unquestioningly supported US imperialism and war (Russo, 2018: 186). Abu-Lughod (2011) characterizes the feminist campaigners affiliated with Muslim societies and feminist organizations such as Women Living

Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) as uncritically embracing the restricted definition of honor killings despite their vigilance on racism. My argument partially differs from these researchers' arguments. I emphasize the politicization of the honor killings frame within the institutional context of UN and EU, where the political debate unfolds between the representatives of member states, rather than among feminists with different political orientations and priorities. When the honor killings frame turned into an issue of inter-state debate, its connotation of gendered violence was weakened, if not totally lost. Rather, it was used and abused in debates over imperialism, universalism, cultural authenticity, and Islamophobia.

This chapter adds to the literature on the political discourse on honor killings, the Mediterranean usage of the frame in which women as well as men engage in killing in the name of honor, the latter being defined broadly including non-sex/gender related elements. I call this usage prepolitical to the extent that it was prevalent in an era when violence was not seen as a gender politics matter either in Turkey or abroad. At the transnational scale, honor killings were added to the list of violent practices against women in late 1990s, more than a decade after the recognition of gendered violence as a gender politics matter. As this chapter exposes, throughout this process the meaning of the honor killings frame was narrowed down transnationally as it came to specify Muslim women as the victims killed by their male-kin for real or alleged illegitimate sexual practices. Explaining the scale of the shift, power/knowledge practices of institutions like the UN and the EU were influential in this narrowing down and stabilizing the meaning of the term. Despite the shrinking in the form and number of violent practices covered in the religious-cultural usage of the frame, it cornered the political talk over gendered violence at the global scale. The more it became a talk over culture, Islam, and imperialism, the less attention was paid to types of gendered violence which are considerably more common and transcend national and religious

boundaries. For instance, practices called crimes of passion became such a type of gendered violence for which state responsibility in prevention remained relatively less accentuated. Also, indicted states could use this discursive context in their attempts to water down state responsibility.

The significance of scales in the analysis of political discourse will be even clearer in the next chapter, in which I discuss political discourse on honor killings in Turkey. At the national scale, the sides of the debate transformed as honor killings became a political issue between state actors and (feminist or not) women's organizations. Depending on the characteristics and strength of the feminist movement, the debate might have a different outcome such as arriving a more universalist framing of gendered violence.

4.0 Cultural framing of gendered violence in Turkey

In this chapter, I contextualize honor killings as a hegemonic frame in a specific phase of the political discourse on gendered violence, preceded by family disaster and followed by violence against women in Turkey. This nation-specific contextualization enables me to identify the characteristics of political discourse on gendered violence fixated on honor killings frame compared with other frames: family disaster and violence against women. I show that in contrast to these frames, the political discourse centered on honor killings frame accentuates culture as the root cause of gendered violence. Since this discourse makes culture rather than power the primary connotation of gendered violence, the dangers it holds for feminist politics outweigh its possibilities. The net cost depends on the characteristics and strength of the feminist mobilization vis-à-vis other political actors that have stakes in coloring the hegemonic discourse on gendered violence according to their own grievances and priorities.

In this chapter, I show that honor killings discourse in Turkey gave visibility to local variations in gendered violence and opened the discursive field to actors previously marginalized in feminist mobilization against gendered violence. Kurdish feminists and women's organizations became active agents in this phase of political discourse, compared to the family disaster phase, during which their voices were unheard. In fact, a major problem of early feminist mobilization against gendered violence, the lack of "movement inclusiveness" (Roychowdhury, 2016), became apparent and gradually resolved in this phase when the culturalist honor killings frame dominated the political talk on gendered violence. Accordingly, my study supports Strid and her colleagues' argument (2013) regarding the benefits of intersectional understanding of gendered violence on

the condition that gender is kept visible in the diagnosis and prognosis of violence. I contribute to their work, by showing that rather than state authorities, Turkish and Kurdish feminists' determination kept gender and power visible in the analysis of and struggle against violence.

On the other hand, my study also supports more critical accounts of the honor killings frame. I show that political discourse centered on honor killings frame prioritizes lethal and spectacular forms of violence, at the expense of normalizing other, mostly more common, forms of violence (Abu-Lughod, 2011; Dustin & Phillips, 2008; Narayan, 1997). Second, this discourse reproduces a static, homogenous, bounded, and deterministic understanding of culture located out there in communities, marked as inferior and traditional as opposed to superior and modern in terms of values and ideas about gender (Ertürk, 2009; Koğacıoğlu, 2004; Merry, 2006; Razack, 2004). Third, depending on the actor formulating it, culturalist discourse either constitutes state authorities as impotent and blameless in addressing gender violence (Koğacıoğlu, 2011) or prescribes spectacular punishment as the only effective remedy. Whether these dangers might outweigh the benefits of the culturalist honor killing frame is contingent on the discursive and institutional context, especially the character and power of feminist mobilization. In the Turkish context, if the net cost of using culturalist frames was eventually nonnegative, it was thanks to the feminist mobilization that retained the power analysis of gendered violence and succeeded in bridging differences and establishing solidarity networks among women. I imply that Turkish and Kurdish feminists could replace culturalist account of violence with a more universal one after about a decade of mobilization against honor killings.

4.1 Sevda Gök's murder: An opening in the discursive field

As I mentioned in the previous chapter, my analysis of *Milliyet* data indicates a second inflection point in the journalistic usage of the honor killing frame in 1996. In February 1996, a woman named Sevda Gök was murdered by her cousin in Şanlıurfa, a multiethnic city on the Southeastern border of Turkey. This murder inflamed a debate over whether it was correct to categorize this case as an honor killing. For more than a month, *Milliyet* kept this murder high on the agenda, publishing interviews and commentaries in addition to news stories composed of journalists' field observations from the city. "The throat of honor was cut," "Feminist riot against slaughterer," "Customary killing ordinary occurrence!" "What kind of a society is this?" "Who killed Sevda?" and "M.T. is guilty?" are some of the headlines under which this murder was reported.[16] The questions in the headlines might sound rhetorical, as if no answer were expected or answers were already clear to the public they addressed. On the contrary, these questions were sincere; their posing indicates an opening in the discursive field and invitation to political actors to diagnose who or what was to blame.

The *Milliyet* data indicate at least two different accounts that emerged in the coverage of this case. According to one account, represented by the Mor Çatı lawyer Canan Arın in the pages of *Milliyet*, this case had to be related to other cases of familial violence occurring in Turkish society. Arın had applied to the court to represent Mor Çatı in the litigation as an intervener on the grounds that this case harmed Mor Çatı, because it was a women's organization aiming at solidarity with women against violence. It was the first case in which feminists attempted to use litigation in

[16] In Turkish: "*Namusun boğazı kesilmişti," "Caniye feminist isyanı," "Töre cinayeti vakayı adiye!" "Bu ne biçim toplum?"" Sevda'yı kim öldürdü?" "M.T. mi suçlu?"*

an organized way and the court rejected her application. In her interview published in *Milliyet*, Arın combined this case with other types of gendered violence, even battery, on the grounds that "tolerance of violence is the root of all violence." Thus, she implied, "zero tolerance" was the only justifiable response to all forms of violence against women. Indeed, "Zero Tolerance to Violence" was the title of campaign Mor Çatı initiated around this time. Arın concluded that the concept of honor required wide discussion, as many kept asking "what would happen to honor" if no circumstances or conditions justified violence. Her account represents one position in feminists' framing of gendered violence: Arın connects all types of violence to a continuum from a supposedly mundane slap to brutal murder. In refusing to treat this murder as exceptional, this position also reveals the character of the second position: those who would insist on the "radical otherness"[17] of this case, indeed all cases framed as honor killings. Arın's comfort with the possible elimination of the notion of honor from the social life of gender is also significant; it indicates feminists' disinterest in the concept, reminding one of the slogans of the campaign on chastity in 1990: I don't want to be a chaste woman.

The second position belongs to Vildan Yirmibeşoğlu, a lawyer who has worn many hats in her professional and activist career in the women's movement - the founder of pro-Kemalist Association for the Support of Contemporary Living (ÇYDD, Turkish acronym) in Gaziantep and the head of legal office of the Gaziantep Municipality and then human rights desk of Istanbul Governor. She was also an active member of the Women's Platform on the Penal Code that I discuss later in this chapter. Similar to Arın, she applied to the court to represent ÇYDD in the

[17] I borrow this idea of "radical otherness" from Kandiyoti's essay, titled "Gender, Power and Contestation" (1998), in which she revisits her early work on bargaining with patriarchy. She uses the concept of radical otherness to point out a potential analytical and political flaw in postcolonial gender studies. She states that "allocating Third World Women to a world of radical 'otherness' . . . forecloses comparisons and makes any discussion of inequality . . . both irrelevant and meaningless" (143).

litigation as an intervener and the court rejected her application as well. In her interview published in *Milliyet,* she insisted that rather than honor, economic reasons –particularly dowry – underlie this murder and similar cases, which were frequent occurrences in the region. She called the region a "slaughterhouse" for women, where killing of women was ordinary and normal, an imperative of tradition and custom. She implied that state institutions should take action against local powers and establish a mechanism to protect women's lives and rescue them from the region. In her later interviews and a book titled *Toprağa Düşen Sevdalar*, Yirmibeşoğlu (2007) constructed this case and others occurring in the region as customary killings committed under the pretext of honor. In her view, these practices might be seen as "a challenge from local culture and traditional authority to the state and the Laws of the Republic." In contrast to Arın, Yirmibeşoğlu considered this case as radically different from other cases of gendered violence happening in the rest of Turkey. She used this case, also, to attribute a radical inferiority to the region, its people and its culture, out of step with the Turkish nation-state and its modern legislation. Her introducing the idea of custom to obscure, if not absolve, the implication of honor is also significant. This indicates a very different gender politics than the one introduced above based on the negation of chastity.

Actually, what Koğacıoğlu (2004, 2011) discusses in her works is this second position on honor killings with strong racial and cultural connotations. My research shows that this position was just one among the three versions that circulated in the political discourse from the late 1990s through the mid-2000s. The reproduction of this racial-cultural usage in official state documents, the codification of "custom killings" in the revised 2004 Penal Code, and the 2006 Prime Ministry Memorandum, entitled as "Measures to be Taken to Prevent Custom and Honor Killings and Violence against Women and Children" all show that this usage became hegemonic in the Turkish context. This racial-cultural usage of honor killings could also be named the statist frame, since

state institutions under the influence of political parties with competing ideological backgrounds (i.e., Kemalism and Islamism) adopted it unquestioningly. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), which had its roots in the Islamist RP, embraced this frame in 2000s, sponsored research producing knowledge on custom and honor killings, and mobilized campaigns involving a variety of actors from imams of mosques to soldiers of the army. Similarly, the Republican People's Party (CHP) embraced this culturalist frame and applauded the codification of custom killings in the revised Penal Code.

Turkish feminists' position on honor killings as briefly introduced above and the articulation of honor killings by the Kurdish women's movement constitute the other versions of framing honor killings that constituted the contested and contradictory political discourse in this period. For instance, *Milliyet* listed Berivan Bozkurt, the chair of a newly established and short-lived Kurdish women's organization called *Özgürlükçü Kadınlar Vakfı* (Women's Foundation for Freedom)[18] among the observers of the trial of Sevda Gök's murder. However, *Milliyet,* a mainstream newspaper ever since, did not report on how Bozkurt's account of honor killings was different from the statist frame introduced above. For my purposes tracing the changes in political discourse, the non-statists accounts of Turkish feminists and Kurdish women's movement are as important as the statist account.

In what follows, I focus on feminists' trouble arriving at a consensus about how to address honor killings. Naming this as feminist ambivalence, I identify its two sources: the difficulty of devising a feminist statement about lethal violence and, second, the limitations of original understanding of gendered violence developed in the early phase of the movement. While

[18] This organization was established in 1995. See the interview with the founders who listed opening women's shelters in the region among the goals of the organization ("Kürt Rozalar Yaratmak," 1996).

ambivalence paralyzed feminists, the structures of power in the Turkish national context shaped the process of politicization of honor killings, its racialization and reduction to "custom killings", and its placement at the center of the politics of gender violence. This process, as so well analyzed by Koğacıoğlu, involves a variety of state and non-state actors mobilizing ethnic difference to reduce the apparent scope of honor killings. Journalistic accounts of honor killings were especially effective in the framing of Kurdish ethnic difference as custom, contrasting with and resisting the Turkish national collective. In contrast to Koğacıoğlu, though, I show 1) how and why Turkish feminists were dissatisfied by such politicization of honor killings and 2) the resistance of Kurdish feminists to the racial-cultural framing of honor killings. These empirical contributions draw on the analysis of the encounters between Turkish feminists and the Kurdish women's movement. I analyze the effect of the initiative of KAMER (Turkish acronym for *Kadın Merkezi*, Women's Center in English), a professional women's organization constituted predominantly by Kurdish women, to come to terms with honor killings; the organization first shaped the regional women's movement community and then framed the larger national mobilization against honor killings. I conclude this chapter with Penal Code activism and discuss its outcomes with regards to feminist mobilization against lethal violence.

4.2 Feminist ambivalence

Honor had been an issue that sparked feminist mobilization as early as the late 1980s. In fact, the first legal victory feminists won in this cycle of protest was about the rape law that considered rape of sex workers partially excusable on the grounds of chastity. Like the Italian Penal Code, the 1926 Turkish Code regarded rape as a "crime against public morality and family

order" and article 438 reduced sentences by two-thirds if the woman raped was a sex worker. The debate on this article started after a local court applied to the Constitutional Court for its annulment on the basis that it contradicted with the constitutional principle of equality before law. The Constitutional Court rejected the local court's appeal to rescind this article by arguing that rape would cause less harm to an "unchaste woman" compared to a "chaste woman." Second, it claimed to protect "chaste" women from rape by authorizing harsher sentences. The publication of this decision in the *Resmi Gazete* in January 1990 was followed by protests by feminists, some socialists, sex workers, and several other political actors, which led the government to annul the article in the parliament in November 1990.

In their campaigns, in addition to demanding recognition of the bodily integrity and protection from sexual violence for sex workers, feminists focused on the meaning of honor and chastity in relation to patriarchy and family. They rejected the Constitutional Court's pretext of protecting chaste women. Their argument critiqued the law's imposition of "masculinist protection" (Young, 2003); the legal practice placed the burden of proof of chastity on women. Articles published in *Feminist* and *Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs* insisted that to be recognized as chaste, a woman had to accept the guardianship of a man – a father, husband or brother; obeying his rules and restricting her presence in public spaces (Ovadia, 1990; Savran, 1990; Yelda, 1990). If honor code could only promise masculinist protection to women, then it was logical to refuse the identity of chaste woman.

Other than this fleeting attention to honor in the early era of mobilization, the concept remained theoretically unelaborated in Turkish feminists' political vocabulary. Sevda Gök's murder and its journalistic aftermath, though, led feminists to discuss the analytical and political utility of the concept, as it was constructed in the honor killings frame. Replete with ambivalence,

these discussions show feminists' difficulty in organizing against lethal violence on the one hand and on the other, limitations of the initial articulation of gendered violence in the previous period. Some institutionalized actors of the women's movement readily embraced the honor killings frame. However, feminists organized around magazines such as *Pazartesi* wavered between two stances, invoking the frame only to underline its associations with patriarchy and rejecting it because of its racist implications.

4.2.1 Difficulties in organizing against lethal violence

In *Pazartesi* magazine, the initial reaction to the murder of Sevda Gök was to publish it on the cover with the blaring headline "Honor Killing in Urfa. The victim is sixteen, the murderer is fourteen years old." The April 1996 issue reported on interviews with a variety of individuals in Urfa such as Sevda's parents, the convicted 14-year-old's cousin, Sevda's friends at the state girls' dormitory, a prosecutor, and a local journalist (Düzkan & Koçali, 1996). Overall, the editors' position on people's understandings of this murder were surprisingly wishy washy. Compared to the articles on battery and rape frequently published in the magazine, the editors lacked a decisive "take" on this murder. In May 1996 issue, they even defined their use of the phrase honor killings as a "blunder" and noted that they had forgotten to put honor in scare quotes to indicate their criticism of the concept ("Merhaba," 1996). When Oruç Serin, another 16-year-old woman who gave birth to a child out of wedlock, was killed in Gaziantep three months later, *Pazartesi* reported this murder in the back cover without naming it as an honor killing ("Sevdi, sevişti, bir çocuk doğurdu, intihara zorlandı etmeyince öldürüldü," 1996). These reports illustrate that for some feminists, honor killings frame was not a preferred terminology early on.

If these feminists would not concede to the emergent discursive politics articulating the racist-culturalist interpretation of the honor killings frame, they had to invent their own vocabulary to give an alternative meaning to the murders of women. Unsurprisingly, the concept of femicide, in Turkish *kadın kıyımı*, came into the spotlight, emphasizing the gendered nature of lethal violence as well as its "ubiquity and systematicity" ("Merhaba," 1997). Similar to the Palestinian researcher and activist Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian (UNIFEM, 2000), some Turkish feminists advocated using the concept of femicide to redefine practices otherwise called honor killings as early as 1997. Yet, compared to Shalhoub-Kevorkian's work (2001) on "honor killings as femicide", Turkish feminists' discussion of these concepts, as available in the publications of women's organizations, remained preliminary in late 1990s. Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2001, 2003) reasoned that the concept of honor and the coined honor killing frame thereof, is elastic and ambiguous, because the stereotypical behaviors that might constitute violations of family honor could be named only retroactively. It is generally the offender, seeking to justify his violence, who defines his act as an honor killing. In contrast, the concept of femicide is universal and it helps confront cultural identities implanted with colonialism and gender oppression.[19] Such an elaborated critique of the honor killings frame would eventually become available in Turkish political discourse in subsequent years, thanks to Kurdish feminists' interventions.

The January 1997 issue of *Pazartesi* was devoted to making visible and defining the concept of femicide. Drawing on Radford and Russell's edited volume *Femicide: The Politics of Women Killing* (1992), Tura (1997) listed witch craze, lesbicide (in Turkish *lezbiyen kıyımı*), female infanticide, sati, snuff porn, killing of wives, and racist murders of women and etc. as

[19] Furthermore, Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2003: 601) argued that the honor killings frame suppresses the complexity of gendered violence in Palestinian society and obscures "how historical legacy, ethnicity, class, politics, and gender mutually construct one another to create the crime of femicide."

historical and national varieties of femicide and attributed a political nature of these murders. She defined domestic murder either in the form of "'honor' killings, 'family executions' or battery that escalates into murder" as the most common and particular manifestation of femicide in Turkey. Besides noting this particularity, Tura called for a political response to femicide. In her view, Turkish feminists ought to begin exposing the universality of misogyny and the patriarchal system that makes killing of women "possible, easy and legitimate."

Nevertheless, Tura repeated Radford and Russell's (1992: 4-5) views about the difficulty of addressing femicide and mentioned the "finality" and sensitivity of murder as well as the potential accusation of making "political capital" out of people's grief. As I discussed in the previous chapter on the family disaster frame, early feminist work on gendered violence centered on the strategy of speaking out about violence, to be followed naturally by women's solidarity. The shelter politics drawing on radical feminist ideas of women's liberation presupposed a woman surviving and emerging from violence and demanding a life free of violence (Ekal, 2011; Weiner, 1991). In cases of femicide, whose voice would be allowed to resound? Dead women, famously, tell no tales. Who would be included in and supported through solidarity networks? Solidarity was too late for the murdered. Furthermore, how feminists would evade the accusation of exploiting people's grief for political gain? Tura acknowledged these questions, but also left them unanswered.

There is more to it than these questions imply and the magazine *Pazartesi* lets slip into print. A feminist who has been active in the movement against gendered violence throughout these years articulates the difficulty of addressing lethal violence in relation to feminist critique of family (Interview with Filiz Karakuş, March 31, 2018). In her view, not only the murderer, let's say a husband, but also the parents of the deceased woman often have responsibility in her plight. Her

parents might have pressured her to stay in an abusive relationship or they might have not offered help, even when she sought it. Filiz adds that in most femicide cases, the parents are seeking legalized vengeance. The parents' concerns sideline or even obstruct feminist objectives in the fight against femicide. How have feminists formulated their objectives?

According to a feminist lawyer and activist who has been working on cases of gendered violence such as rape, femicide, and women who murdered their abusers in self-defense, feminist litigation aims at exposing the patriarchal nature of the state and its laws both in texts and in practices (Interview with Perihan Meşeli, September 28, 2017). She emphasizes that throughout these years of activism, feminists learned to reject populist opportunities that might be gained by promoting or allowing family members of murdered women to become influential subjects of litigation campaigns, like being spokespersons in press conferences after trial sessions. It was highly likely that centering activism on families of murdered women would impose a kind of "politics of pity" on feminists (Boltanski, 1999).[20] In that scenario, families' demands for urgent retribution, largely in the form of severe punishments, might prevail over feminists' strategic goals such as unmasking the patriarchal rationale behind penalty reduction due to "unjust provocation." Or feminists might be aiming to demonstrate state complicity with a murderer, that the state institutions failed to provide the deceased with protective and supportive services while she was alive to benefit from these. Centering activism on the character of a deceased woman or her family's demands might hinder these objectives. Except for some clues, these difficulties of addressing lethal violence cannot be traced fully from the extant feminist publications of late

[20] In his book *Distant Suffering*, Boltanski (1999: 5) compares politics of pity with politics of justice. "For a politics of pity", he writes "the urgency of the action needing to be taken to bring an end to the suffering invoked always prevails over considerations of justice."

1990s. Probably, feminists could elaborate on these difficulties by learning from their own experience in the fight against lethal violence.

In a context where lethal violence received increasingly popular attention, feminist activists could not resist this issue and overcame their reluctance bit by bit. Mor Çatı initiated the first feminist campaign on lethal violence in November 1997, almost a decade after the campaign against wife-beating. This campaign defined murder of women by their intimates as "political murders" ("Mor Çatılı Kadınlardan Çağrı: Politik Cinayetleri Teşhir Edelim," 1997). It urged women to monitor trials and attend funerals collectively. Other than raising voices and exposing lethal violence, the campaign call did not define any objective. It is significant that this campaign did not openly call for severe punishments. In the following months, the *Pazartesi* magazine reported murder and rape cases under the title that reads "Which punishment will assuage our anger?"[21] Again, what sounds like a rhetorical question, in fact, manifests feminist ambivalence in addressing lethal violence.

Feminist politics have included defining gendered violence as a crime and exposing the patriarchal nature of the state and its laws, which regard women's lives as disposable. This critical stance against the state notwithstanding, international and local feminist movements pursued political campaigns that targeted state reform and aimed to use policy and state institutions to eliminate gendered violence. In these efforts, providing security for abused women (i.e. shelters and restraining orders) and disciplining offenders (i.e. batterer intervention programs) emerged as alternative mechanisms to punishing offenders through incarceration (Merry, 2001). Mostly on the books, the first two mechanisms, security and discipline, were supported by the threat of punishment; offenders who reject to conform with these mechanisms would be incarcerated.

---

[21] In Turkish: "*Hangi ceza öfkemizi yatıştıracak*?"

Researchers have assessed these mechanisms of security, discipline, and punishment on the grounds of efficacy, whether or not they produce desired outcomes such as empowerment of women and elimination of gendered violence. Despite their different perspectives and explanations, they have agreed on the critique of the carceral outcomes of feminists' engagement with the state (Bernstein, 2012; Brush, 2013; Bumiller, 2008; Goodmark, 2012; Richie, 2012; E. M. Schneider, 2000; Whittier, 2016). These studies are empirically focused on domestic violence and sexual violence in the U.S., a country which might be categorized as the epitome of strong racialized penal state (Roychowdhury, 2016).[22] When it comes to fatal violence, even these critical studies problematize state's uneven and negligent response to gendered violence rather than state's involvement. For instance, in *Arrested Justice*, Richie (2012: 30-32, 37-38) writes about how law enforcement agencies' neglect of violence against Black women led to the murder of eleven women in Ohio. Similarly, Goodmark (2012: 92-93) refers to a case known as *Town of Castle Rock v. Jessica Gonzales*, in which police officers failed to implement a protection order against an ex-husband, that led to the death of three daughters of a woman of Native American and Latino descent.

Fighting against femicide would be a lost cause for feminists if they did not render femicide as an issue of state accountability. First, state institutions could be held responsible for their actions before a murder such as neglecting a woman's complaint, ignoring a death threat, sending a woman back to abusive setting, or refusing to provide a safe place. For instance, before Sevda Gök's murder, despite Sevda's having escaped from her family and taken refuge in the police station, the

[22] Acknowledging the wisdom of this critical approach to feminist engagement with the criminal justice system, Roychowdhury shifts the geography from the U.S. to India and questions the validity of this approach. She argues that Indian state with its weak legal arm houses both significant opportunities and threats for feminist politics around sexual violence.

police officers had returned her to the family. Second, state institutions could be held responsible for their actions after a murder, for instance, if they fail to produce a fair and just prosecution. Again, the aftermath of Sevda Gök's murder exemplifies this. The judicial authorities fast-tracked the case and sentenced the underage offender to two and half years without prosecuting the family elders' involvement in the murder. These were state practices ex ante and ex post, that made murder of women "possible, easy and legitimate," as the feminist analysis suggested.

When Turkish feminists finally overcame their ambivalence in addressing lethal violence, they targeted the state. For instance, following the televised airing of two violence scenes, a gun attack against the well-known artist, Derya Tuna, and the stabbing of Ayşegül Porsuk, Mor Çatı (2002) led a number of women's organizations to issue a press release titled "End to male violence, brutality, and murders!" in October 2002. Pairing lethal violence with other forms of violence, this press release objected to the normalization of gendered violence and called out state institutions. It was also significant that the press release pointed to the gender of the perpetrators of violence, rather than the victims. Similarly, in a protest organized following the murder of Güldünya Tören in Istanbul in 2004, feminists carried a banner that read "We want shelter, not a grave!"[23] Güldünya was murdered in a public hospital where she was recovering from the first armed attack. Similar to Sevda, she had gone to a police station to ask for protection, before the first attack. At the hospital before she died, again, she had told police officials the attackers' names and demanded protection. Based on these, feminists produced a pamphlet indicting a number of state officers responsible for murder and demanded that they stand trial and punished. In the subsequent feminist night march on March 8, in addition to demanding economic and social service resources from the state, protestors carried a banner accusing the state of complicity with men: "The man shoots, the

[23] In Turkish: "*Mezar değil, sığınak istiyoruz!*"

state protects! We want shelter, not a grave!"[24] As feminists worked out their ambivalence, they reached the solution of denouncing the state as an accomplice of male violence while at the same time appealing to it for providing resources to preclude violence.

4.2.2 Limitations of the initial articulation of gendered violence

A second reason that feminists lagged behind mainstream political actors and media in articulating their own response to the honor killings frame might be related to the initial construction of gendered violence as a problem of each and every woman regardless of class, ethnicity, educational status, or religiosity. As discussed in the previous chapter, feminist pioneers of anti-violence mobilization were committed to universalism; they regarded the incidence of violence or its threat as the evidence of "women's oppression as a sex" and therefore foundational for feminist politics. Their aim was to isolate violence from the singular characteristics of a woman, a man or a specific couple and show that it stems from the common condition of being a woman. The testimonial form, with its metonymic assumption that each woman's story potentially resonated with all women, served this purpose. To ensure their claim that "violence is the problem of all of us", they might have disregarded how other inequalities and their institutional manifestations shapeshift gendered violence and state responses.

In this respect, there are certain parallels between initial mobilizations against gendered violence in the United States and Turkey. Richie (2012) states that U.S. feminists' organizing around the idiom of "it could happen to anyone" had some unintended and dangerous outcomes as they failed to develop a contextualized understanding of violence and glossed over particular

[24] In Turkish: "*Erkek vuruyor devlet koruyor, mezar değil sığınak istiyoruz!*"

manifestations of gendered violence against marginalized women. In Richie's words (2012: 92-93), "anyone" came to mean "white, middle class women" whose suffering was made visible in activist campaigns to prove the gendered essence of violence and its "class and race neutrality." Similarly, Turkish feminists were rhetorically committed to universalism and they tended toward essentialism, rather than situating what it means to be a woman within particular institutional and social contexts. They were practically and theoretically unprepared to face the contracted honor killings frame that saw related practices as expressive of Kurdish culture.

Feminists' embrace of gender essentialism in the early era might be understandable given their strategic need of becoming an autonomous political movement with its own name and constituency. In that sense, early feminist mobilization in Turkey also shared some similarities with its counterpart in West Germany, since in both cases autonomy became an indispensable principle in movement politics (Ferree, 2012). In Turkey, autonomy referred to both political and organizational independence from other organized movements such as the socialist left, Kemalists, and the growing Kurdish movement. A strong and unwavering emphasis on how male domination takes shape in the private sphere served feminists' strategic need of marking their difference.

In magazines such as *Feminist*, *Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs,* and *Pazartesi*, the tone of the articles was remarkably furious, if not sarcastic, when reporting on cases on gendered violence among other social movement communities. For instance, Heval (1996), reporting on her witnessing a Kurdish man's wife-beating on a bus trip, titled her piece "Fraternity for peoples, battery for woman!"[25] Heval was furious, since she then encountered this man in a meeting where the crowd was shouting slogans calling for peoples' fraternity, equality, and justice. Heval questioned whether these demands were exclusive to men and whether fraternity meant only the

[25] In Turkish, "*Halklara kardeşlik, kadına dayak*!"

brotherhood of Turkish and Kurdish men. Two years later, Çınar (1998) titled her essay "Strike for public employees, battery for woman"[26] where she shared her testimony to battery. The offender was her ex-partner, who was a senior member of a left-leaning public employee union confederation that had been campaigning for civil servants' right to strike. The situation befalling her was "tragicomical" as the offender had also been responsible for managing the activities of the confederation's Women's Commission. Similar to Heval, Çınar questioned the sincerity and credibility of justice claims of other social movements, which some might, in theory, consider potential allies to the feminist movement. Such stories were to demonstrate that violence had a gendered essence, it was not accidental or dependent on circumstances. Whatever a person's social location in terms of class, ethnicity or religion, his political views might not cancel out the possibility of gendered violence. He might easily hold on to the privacy argument, like any and every ordinary man.

Several articles published in *Pazartesi* in the late 1990s, yet, evince an increasing concern about racism among feminists. Kurdish women's establishment of separate organizations and magazines seems to provide part of the drive for feminists' close engagement with the Kurdish issue. In addition, some Turkish feminists and political activist Kurdish women, some self-identified as feminists, joined their efforts to establish the Women for Peace Initiative in 1996. *Pazartesi* opened its doors to Kurdish women, through publishing interviews with the editors of these magazines and representatives of these organizations and reporting on the effects of armed conflict on women in the region. A specific knowledge was formed as a result of these encounters, which articulated Kurdish women's difference on the one hand, and on the other demonstrated the will to solidarity of both parties. To gain feminist credibility, politically active Kurdish women

[26] In Turkish, "*Memura grev, kadına dayak*."

were urged to address familial violence and gender inequalities among Kurdish communities. When they did so, their activities were covered with an appreciative tone in the magazine. In response, politically active Kurdish women demanded from Turkish feminists and women's rights activists to recognize racist state practices and uneven effects of war on their lives. Reproachful statements often escalating to the point where Turkish feminists were accused of racism and colonialism as they were "women of sovereign nation" accompanied to these demands for solidarity (Maltepe Kadın Evinden, 1998; Sema, 1998). If these movements were to enter into a coalition the meaning of gendered violence had to expand to cover state's violence against Kurdish women besides intrafamily violence. Needless to say, if ethnic identity made a difference in the type and severity of the occurrence of familial violence, its meaning had to be reworked too.

4.3 Uneven encounters between movements

It is possible to follow the efforts of some feminists to establish a closer relationship with the rising Kurdish women's movement in the pages of *Pazartesi*. For instance, the issue of the month following the lengthy coverage of Sevda Gök's murder was devoted to the uneven effects of war on women ("Savaşa Hayır," 1996). The magazine focused on an array of ways war victimizes women such as death, rape, forced migration, widowhood, and loss of family members. It reported the testimonies of state violence that Kurdish women shared in a meeting organized by Women for Peace Initiative in Istanbul. These and other reports acknowledged Kurdish women's suffering as mothers and wives on the one hand, and on the other critiqued the politics of constraining women to these familial roles. Accordingly, the magazine highlighted sexual violation of Kurdish women, its actuality or constant threat, as articulated in these testimonies. For

feminists, obviously, these narratives of the state's sexual violence showed the limitations of the discourse of family that valorizes Kurdish women's pain and agency as only mothers and wives.

There did not exist any data on the prevalence of the state's sexual violence against Kurdish women in 1990s, though many reports in *Pazartesi* and other venues indicate that this type of violence was among systematic state practices in the region despite their being covered by a veil of silence. For the editor of *Yeni Politika*, a pro-Kurdish daily banned by the Turkish state for supporting separatism in 1995, who spoke to *Pazartesi*, Kurdish women and men belatedly started to speak out against militarized rape (Eralp, 1995). Reporting sexual violence was dangerous; women and their families risked their reputation in the community. The editor added that even killing of violated women for saving family honor had been among families' responses to militarized sexual assault. She shared her observation that this practice of killing violated women to conceal sexual violence was changing in a decade or so. This change required a discursive operation that would alter the meaning of honor and its field of signification. Thus, it is not a mere coincidence that in these years, the Kurdish political movement strove to resignify honor through pointing to "homeland" rather than "female body", as Çağlayan (2012) demonstrates. This process facilitated women's massive participation in the movement (Açık, 2014; Çağlayan, 2007, 2012). Following the increasing visibility of women in Kurdish politics with a variety of subject positions such as armed fighters, members of the parliament, practitioners of civil disobedience, mothers, widows as well as women's rights activists, a number of survivors of sexual violence could break the silence by publicly speaking up and making official complaints against state officials.

Attention to wartime sexual abuse was also center stage in transnational gender politics of the time. Turkey was among the countries whose government officials were inculpated for systematically using rape or its threat against Kurdish civilians in Southeastern region to maintain

what they considered “national security” (Enloe, 2000). Sexual torture and forced virginity exams were among state’s sexual practices against political detainees who were investigated by anti-terror police as “enemies of the state” throughout Turkey (Parla, 2001). Human rights activists brought these incidents of the state’s sexual violence under the scrutiny of international politics (Human Rights Watch, 1994; Amnesty International, 1995, 2003). They got support from transnational organizations such as Amnesty International and Women’s World Day of Prayer to found *Gözaltında Cinsel Taciz ve Tecavüze Karşı Hukuki Yardım Bürosu* (Legal Aid Office Against Sexual Harassment and Rape in Custody) in 1997 (Bor, 2020; Mater, 1997). The Office quickly became a local hub of producing knowledge about incidents of state’s sexual violence, publicizing these incidents, and processing violated women’s legal complaints in Turkish courts and European Court of Human Rights (Gözaltında Cinsel Taciz, 1999; Keskin & Yurtsever, 2006). Also, the Office mobilized a network of health and legal professionals, some self-identified as feminist, to take part in these cases using their expertise in the fields of gendered violence and human rights laws.

Remziye Dinç was one of these women who had spoken about rape by village guards (in Turkish, *köy korucuları*), state-employed Kurdish militia. Following her legal complaint, some feminists from Istanbul joined political activists from human rights and Kurdish women’s organizations and established *Savaşta Tecavüze Karşı Kadın Girişimi* (Women’s Initiative against Rape in War) in January 1997 (“Çağrı,” 1997). In order to support Remziye and pressure the state officials to acknowledge sexual violence against Kurdish women, they travelled to Batman to watch legal proceedings in the courthouse. Besides Remziye’s statement against the village guards, the child she bore as a result of rape and the psychological report officially prepared by Şahika Yüksel, a feminist psychiatrist and one of founders of Mor Çatı, were presented as evidence

(Keskin, 1998). Nevertheless, the judges failed to acknowledge the violence, instead sided with the perpetrators by mocking Remziye's mental health ("Batman'da bir tecavüz olayı!," 1997). In another case, that same year, the victim was a ten-year-old Kurdish girl in Diyarbakır. The rapist was again a village guard and the court again refused to recognize violence on the grounds of lack of evidence. After watching the hearing, activists from Women's Initiative against Rape in War responded with a press conference stating that "rape is directed against the woman's body with a racist purpose, and masculinity is used as a weapon" ("Tecavüzcü korucu serbest," 1997). For these activists, sexual violations of Kurdish women by state officials were different precisely because racist motives underlay these practices. If these women spoke up and made legal complaints against state officials, they were indicted as enemies of the state. Often these women and their families were forced to leave their villages, neighborhoods, or the country, becoming refugees (Gözaltında Cinsel Taciz, 1999).

Campaigning against state sexual violence using the state's own means and mechanisms – its legislations, courts, forensic medicine departments, etc. - proved to be inconclusive in all cases (Halavut, 2013). Not even a single state official has been punished as a perpetrator of sexual violence since the establishment of the Office in 1997, as Eren Keskin, a feminist human rights lawyer and one of the founders of the Office, explains (Eren, 2021). Nevertheless, the activities of the Office demonstrated that Kurdish women have been disproportionately affected by the state's sexual violence. In its first year, among sixty six women who applied to the Office requesting legal assistance, forty-three women identified as Kurd (Gözaltında Cinsel Taciz, 1999). From 1997 till 2021, the total number of applicants rose to 721, of which 567 were Kurdish women (Eren, 2021). Similarly, a report by Amnesty International (2003) on sexual violence against women under custody in Turkey stressed that Kurdish women were at higher risk of being subjected to sexual

violence by state officials. State sexual violence against Kurdish women was also observed in a regionally representative quantitative study, which focused on women's sexuality in eastern Turkey (P. İlkkaracan & Women for Women's Human Rights, 1998). The percentage of women who were subjected to sexual harassment by state officials was two percent, a small but striking number given the significance of the fact it measures.

The definition of gendered violence could have expanded as a result of these efforts to publicize the state's sexual violence. The pamphlet for the November 25, 1997, demonstration might be seen as one of the first steps in this direction. By presenting workplaces, schools, streets, jails, and wars as settings of all forms of violence, from verbal intimidation to rape and murder, it sought to transcend the previous framework of gendered violence confined to the sphere of intimate relationships and the family ("25 Kasım Dünya Kadına Yönelik Şiddete Son Günü," 1997). Whereas the pamphlet was unequivocal in terms of addressing state sexual violence, it used scare quotes around the term of honor killings, indicating feminist ambivalence. Citing the state's sexual violence among the list of types of gendered violence became an established practice this way, especially in collective demonstrations on the international observance days, March 8 and November 25, in the following years. In contrast, honor killings would remain in scare quotes in these pamphlets for a couple of years, until professional women's organizations embraced this frame.

In 1999, the Office in cooperation with Emekçi Kadınlar Birliği (Union of Women Workers; Turkish acronym, EKB), a socialist women's organization, initiated a campaign that focused on sexual harassment and rape of women in state custody (Emekçi Kadınlar Birliği, 2001). Several feminists and women's groups joined the campaign, except professional feminist institutions such as Istanbul-based Mor Çatı and Women's Human Rights – New Ways (KİH) and

Ankara-based Foundation for Women's Solidarity. The issue of intrafamily violence was a priority for these institutions and they continued to target state reform both to enforce anti-violence laws and to improve the state's social services for women who had experienced violence. Mor Çatı, by foregrounding the establishment of women's shelters, and KİH, by working through the rights discourse and aiming at pro-women legislative gains, were able to engage in constructive relations with relevant state institutions. Cooperation between security forces of the state and Foundation for Women's Solidarity was more direct as the organization implemented a UNDP-funded project titled "Our Friend at the Police Station" (in Turkish, *Karakoldaki Dostumuz*) to train police officers about intrafamily violence and represent the police in a more positive light when there were a lot of sexual violence, mistreatment, and torture allegations against the police (Kadın Dayanışma Vakfı, 2007). In contrast, individuals who were involved in the campaign against state sexual violence were subjected to aggressive state practices. A lawsuit was filed against the organizers of the campaign, in which the prosecutor demanded a total of 294 years in prison on the charge of "insulting and defaming the military and security forces of the state"[27] (Cerav, 2001). Under continuous state pressure, feminist activism for peace and against state violence remained peripheral within the women's movement. Basically, movement organizations were forced to narrow their activism to the issue of intrafamily violence if they wanted to avoid being criminalized.

On another note, many feminists regarded holding a critical stance against intrafamily violence as a litmus test to determine whether other political movements deserve feminist credibility and solidarity. For example, feminists who distanced themselves from the campaign against state sexual violence criticized the leading organization EKB's use of this campaign to

[27] In Turkish: "*devletin askeri ve emniyet kuvvetlerini tahkir ve tezyif etmek.*"

propagate socialism. For them, EKB's viewpoint about the issue was narrow, because it resisted connecting state sexual violence against women to gendered violence in intimate relations, which they assumed would remain in practice even after a systemic change towards socialism (Cerav, 2000). Similarly, some feminists accused the Kurdish movement of instrumentalism; that is its appeal to women's right to be free from violence was not substantive, but only a means to a different end. These feminists, critical of Kurdish movement's instrumentalism, referred to the movement actors' ignorance, if not trivialization, of violence against women in the family. For instance, to legitimize separate organizing for March 8, 1998, a group of feminists referred to the story of a Kurdish woman, Cemile Ayhan, who had thrown herself and her three kids into the Euphrates River in March 1993 (Maltepe Kadın Evinden, 1998). Cemile was religiously married to a man who constantly beat her throughout their relationship. Suicide was her escape route from patriarchal oppression. These feminists juxtaposed Cemile with guerrilla women who burnt themselves to protest state oppression in 1990s and in this way became "goddesses" to be emulated by Kurdish women according to the movement's political discourse (Çağlayan, 2012). For these feminists, the Kurdish movement ignored women like Cemile as it postponed demands for women's rights within Kurdish communities and excluded women's emancipation from the priorities of the movement agenda.

Not all commentaries on the Kurdish movement published in *Pazartesi* were so critical, though. Still, the desire to encourage women within the Kurdish movement to take a firm stand against gendered violence in intimate relationships was always prominent. Whenever a Kurdish organization addressed intrafamily violence, *Pazartesi* covered its activities extensively and with an appreciative tone (Koçali, 1998; Yüksel, 1998). Except for these gestures, feminists who organized around magazines like *Pazartesi* or in small informal groups hesitated to address

intrafamily violence within Kurdish communities. This was also true of lethal violence, framed as honor killings and linked to regional custom and Kurdish identity in popular journalistic discourse since the murder of Sevda Gök in 1996. In this context, within the women's movement only some professional women's organizations embraced the honor killings frame, specifically its accentuation of culture in explaining gendered violence.

4.4 Honor killings as a topic of professional women's organizations

Within the scope of this dissertation, Sevda Gök's murder represents a critical event in Das's use of the term (1995). Following this event, a new political discourse came into being that redefined culture/tradition/custom as the root cause of gendered violence. The murder and media coverage also motivated a change in the institutional domain of gender politics. For instance, it gave birth to a new women's organization, Anakültür, which was established by some Istanbul-based feminists in 1997 to bridge the distance between women of the Southeast (described as predominantly Kurdish, some Arabic, and a few Assyrian) and state institutions by facilitating their inclusion in nationalist local development projects (Orhun, 2002). For its activities in the region, Anakültür worked with multipurpose community centers, in Turkish *Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezleri* (ÇATOM), designed and established by the central state to be "satellite" institutions in Haney's (2010) sense. The centers mixed state and non-state in terms of staffing, budget, and rules of operation and social interaction. Çatoms recruited their staff from the community; staff therefore knew the regional languages like Kurdish and Arabic. In the centers, attendees were allowed to speak Kurdish, but the language of instruction was Turkish, as teaching women Turkish language and literacy was among the centers' major objectives (Harris & Atalan, 2002). Çatoms also offered

their participants family planning trainings to regulate population growth in the region. Another training program of the community centers was on crafts such as sewing and embroidery, known for their gendered nature and low-wage potential (Harris & Atalan, 2002). Because of these characteristics, Çatoms were subjected to severe critiques of colonialism and assimilationism published in *Pazartesi* and the Kurdish women's magazines such as *Jujin* (Açık, 2014; Canan, 1998; Düzkan, 1998; Karayazgan, 1998; Sema, 1998). Yet, these critiques did not lead Anakültür to shy away from working with Çatoms. Instead, Anakültür used the community centers as its base to reach out women of the region. According to the founder of Anakültür, Ceylan Orhun, such feminist criticism of Çatoms was out of place, because women of the region lacked even a fundamental human right, that is the right to life, as the murder of Sevda Gök proved (Düzkan, 1998). For Orhun, this murder meant the radical otherness of the women of the region, whose salvation required the intervention of people like her – culturally alien to the region and its traditions (Orhun, 2002).

In cooperation with Çatoms, Anakültür organized "Love Feasts" in memory of Sevda Gök on every March 8th in several cities of the region for five years until the closure of the organization. These celebrations brought together not only thousands of women in the region but also ministers, members of the parliament, local governors, and security forces of the state. To celebrate its fifth-year anniversary, Anakültür organized an essay contest, for which women were expected to write on the meaning of March 8th, International Women's Day. These essays were published in a collection titled *Unheard Voice*, with funding provided by Global Fund for Women (Anakültür, 2002). Besides being an unusual form of action with respect to the existing repertoire of the women's movement which emerged in 1980s emphasizing solidarity rather than competition between women, the result of the contest was significant in terms of the content of the winning

essays. Prizes were awarded to those who used Turkish most fluently and who framed woman of the region as a category with an essential attribute of ignorance, lacking conscious choices over her fertility, unaware of her human rights, and restricted to home. None of the essays published in the collection invoked ethnic identity other than Turkishness, racism, militarism, or the ongoing armed conflict to describe women's problems in the region. Instead, many expressed their gratitude to Çatoms, Anakültür, and even Atatürk for granting and teaching them about women's rights and March 8th. Anakültür was also active in terms of lobbying in both local, national, and international levels. It was one of the organizations that attended the UN's special session organized for reviewing post-Beijing developments in 2000, where the honor killings frame first entered an official document as a specific type of violence against women that the UN was concerned with.

As crystalized in the practices of Anakültür, within the women's movement, organizations that embraced the culturalist honor killings frame early on were those linked to the political mainstream including both the state institutions and transnational donor agencies. In other words, the acceptance of this frame lent these organizations "mainstream credibility" similar to what Richie (2012) observed in the leadership of U.S. antiviolence movement turning its back on the critiques of structural racism while striving to get support from elite power holders. Besides Anakültür's activities, another example from the Turkish context involves a panel series on "custom killings" organized by Ankara-based Women's Solidarity Foundation in cooperation with the state's women's machinery in 1999. In the proceedings published by the state's women's machinery with funding provided by UNDP, the category of honor killings was discussed within the framework of "custom" prevailing in the southeast and east different from the rest of Turkey (Kadının Statüsü ve Sorunları Genel Müdürlüğü, 1999). Yet, as an early example of knowledge production about custom, Kurdish ethnic identity was not invoked in the proceedings. Instead, the

proceedings focused implicitly on Kurdish ethnicity by restricting the talk on honor killings to custom and thence to eastern or southeastern regions. Despite this focus on the region, the proceedings omitted any discussion of armed conflict and racism, specifically how these interfered with the so-called custom originating honor killings. The connections between custom, honor killings, armed conflict, and racism would remain obscure, until Kurdish women activists came to terms with honor killings.

4.4.1 KAMER's work on honor killings

Among professional women's organizations that embraced the culturalist honor killings frame, Women's Center (*Kadın Merkezi* in Turkish, KAMER as Turkish acronym) stands out as an alternative example. This organization could walk a fine line by forging a local feminist critique of honor killings without falling into the racism trap. KAMER was established in 1997 by Nebahat Akkoç, who had lived through state violence on several occasions while she was in state custody as a political detainee in 1990s. Akkoç had been a member of Human Rights Association (*İnsan Hakları Derneği* in Turkish, İHD as Turkish acronym), before her interest in gendered violence grew and she became involved in KİH's regional research on the effects of official, religious, and customary laws on women's lives in March 1996 (C. Belge, 2012). This research was carried out as part of an international project directed by Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) with funding for the field study in the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey provided by Netherlands Organization for International Development Cooperation (P. İlkkaracan & Women for Women's Human Rights, 1998). As discussed in chapter two, KİH's work was pivotal for the translation of women's human rights discourse and the related UN language on gendered violence into the Turkish political landscape. For this research, the field researchers, all recruited from the

region, received extensive trainings on the basics of interviewing and sampling as well as the women's human rights perspective promoted by KİH (P. İlkkaracan & Women for Women's Human Rights, 1998). In the biographical interview composed by Ceren Belge (2012), Akkoç clarifies that this research project, which lasted more than a year, was crucial for her settling on the idea of establishing an independent women's organization specialized on intrafamily violence in the region. Akkoç was familiar with state violence both from her work at the İHD and from her own personal experience. Nevertheless, she says, this research shocked her by showing the extent to which women were habituated to intrafamily violence, considering it a fact of life (Uçan Süpürge, 2002). In this context, where organizing in civil society was shaped by political violence springing from armed ethnic conflict, organizers and observers viewed intrafamily violence as apolitical and trivial, and therefore an odd target for mobilization (KAMER, 2011). The absence of any regional civil society organization that devoted its efforts to the issue of intrafamily violence further motivated Akkoç to establish KAMER.

Similar to women's organizations founded in Istanbul and Ankara, KAMER adhered to the idea of organizational autonomy, though it was loaded differently in the context of armed conflict between the Turkish state and PKK. Neither side of the conflict believed in KAMER's autonomy, and both sides even accused Akkoç and thereby KAMER of treason (C. Belge, 2012). From the state's perspective, Akkoç had already been a terrorist, a follower of PKK, as her political activism before the founding of KAMER and her legal complaints against state institutions in Turkish courts and the European Court of Human Rights evinced. According to Akkoç, the support of the European Commission Delegation to Turkey was crucial to lend KAMER some legitimacy in the eyes of state institutions (Y. Arat & Altınay, 2015; C. Belge, 2012). Despite several attempts to

criminalize KAMER, the Delegation continued to provide KAMER with financial assistance, joined its meetings as a co-organizer, and represented itself at the highest level in these meetings.

Akkoç's relations with the local Kurdish political community were no less contentious; she was accused of collaborating with the state and contributing to racism. Having embraced the women's human rights perspective and international feminist response to intrafamily violence, KAMER was not categorically opposed to working within the system, which would involve cooperation with state institutions, most importantly and questionably security forces of the state. Compared to KİH, which probably had a role in KAMER's cultivation of this strategic willingness to work with state institutions, KAMER was acting in a local context shaped by armed conflict, making this issue more fractious. Nevertheless, KAMER took this risk. It could stay financially independent from the state, as most of its activities were funded by international donor agencies such as European Commission, Open Society, and development agencies and consulates of various European countries. KAMER's acknowledging ethnic identities in the region and its contextually appropriate structure provided part of the cover the organization needed against the accusations of state-sponsored feminism, openly attributed to Anakültür. Unlike Anakültür, KAMER was established by a group of women of the region led by Akkoç. Accordingly, it provided a different visibility to women of the region, who appeared only as voiceless victims to be rescued by others in Anakültür's discourse.

KAMER's way of engagement with pro-feminist networks active at the national and local scales also bolstered its reputation as an independent women's organization. Akkoç was a vocal critic of patronizing attempts among the national women's movement community to "educate" or "save" women of the region (Uçan Süpürge, 2002). For her, feminists in western cities of Turkey might have a decade more experience with organizing and anti-violence work. This experience,

however, did not qualify them to assume superiority when in contact with the women of the region. KAMER was willing to "take advantage of this [experience] without getting hurt, … experiencing racism" (Koçali, 1998). Relations between women's organizations, like relations between women, should be based on principles of solidarity and equality, as each party have things to learn from each other (Uçan Süpürge, 2002). KAMER nurtured its vigilance on these issues through its interactions with other women's organizations, some of which turned out well. KAMER was able to establish solidaristic relations with women's organizations such as Istanbul-based Mor Çatı and Ankara-based Women's Solidarity Foundation, Turkish pioneers of feminist shelter work, which provided support and offered trainings to KAMER's volunteers about ways of processing cases of intrafamily violence. Nevertheless, its relationship with KİH, with which it shared the women's human rights discourse, was subject to conflicts. KİH even went to court for one of these conflicts (C. Belge, 2012). Accordingly, in addition to being in the crosshairs of both state institutions and the local Kurdish political community, KAMER endured tension in its relations with the national women's movement community before its inception of work against honor killings.

KAMER started to work on "killings in the name of honor" (in Turkish, *namus adına işlenen cinayetler*) – that is the organization's preferred terminology – in 2003, almost six years after its founding. In its institutional narrative, KAMER casts this regrettable delay in terms of a "blindness" caused by the "normalization" of these murders even in the eyes of a woman organization specialized in intrafamily violence (C. Belge, 2012). The timing of KAMER's interest on honor killings is also meaningful if looked through the global trajectory of politicization of the honor killings. It followed the murder of Fadime Şahindal in Sweden in January 2002, which magnified the public attention of this issue worldwide and turned the gazes of European politicians on not only immigrant communities in Europe but also the Kurdish-populated regions in Iraq and

Turkey (Başer, 2013; Begikhani, 2005; Bredal, 2005; Mojab, 2004). In her visit to Diyarbakır, Anna Lindh, the Swedish Foreign Minister, announced her country's donation of twenty-five thousand dollars to KAMER to be used for its project addressing honor killings (C. Belge, 2012). Between 2003 and 2006, KAMER received additional financial support from institutions such as the Consulate General of Sweden in Istanbul, the Embassy of Switzerland, Open Society Institute, and the European Commission to carry out its activities on this subject. Besides producing knowledge on honor killings and increasing public awareness, KAMER's project aimed at preventing anticipated killings in the name of honor. For this latter goal, KAMER cooperated with a variety of local and national state institutions including but not limited to security forces, social services, and regional offices of religious affairs.

The organization reports that from January 2003 through the end of 2006, it prevented the murder of 156 women whose lives were under threat (KAMER, 2006). Şemse Allak and Kadriye Demirel, who were murdered in 2003, had also appealed to KAMER, though the organization's efforts fell short in their cases. KAMER took on their cases while they were in the hospital, severely injured. KAMER ended its four-year long project at the end of 2006, announcing that it achieved the majority of its goals. A key factor in deciding success was the publication of the Prime Ministry circular, entitled "Measures to be Taken to Prevent Custom and Honor Killings and Violence Against Women and Children." This circular was expected to mobilize national and local state institutions to establish and lead permanent mechanisms addressing this issue. Nevertheless, as with any circular, this one had only limited effectiveness. In subsequent years, women who were under death threat kept appealing KAMER. In 2011, the organization reported that the total number of applicants requesting support rose to 750, among whom three were murdered (KAMER, 2011). Indicating that not much has changed since the publication of the

circular, KAMER gave this most recent report the same title as the 2006 report: *We Can Stop This*. The organization reiterated its belief that these killings were not inevitable if each party took its own responsibility.

Throughout four years of activism against honor killings, KAMER articulated an elaborate understanding of honor killings, which had been, otherwise, openly attributed to Kurdish culture and ethnic identity in popular national talk and to Islam in transnational talk on gendered violence. For Akkoç (2003), concerns about racism should not silence feminists belonging to a racialized minority, not prevent their doing political work on specific problems women face in their communities. Having overcome the feminist ambivalence regarding lethal violence against women and the reduced scope of honor killings frame, KAMER devised an experiential definition of honor killings. The organization attended to its universality as a type of gendered violence and its particularism as manifested in the region. For this interpretative work, the organization took cases of anticipated honor killings as its starting point and investigated the details of each using a gendered lens. Compared to Mor Çatı, KAMER had a similar albeit more nuanced commitment to universalism in its analysis of gendered violence. Along with universalist statements about gender inequality and patriarchal domination, KAMER's discourse always emphasized that gendered violence might shapeshift both qualitatively and quantitatively with respect to societies, cultures, and regions. Several of KAMER's publications reiterated that gendered violence could manifest differently from one family to the other in the same building, because rules and boundaries that confine a woman's actions might be set differently in each (KAMER, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006, 2011). For KAMER, a woman's perceived or alleged disobedience to these rules and boundaries lay at the heart of gendered violence, and honor killings were not different in that sense. With this experiential definition of honor killings, KAMER refuted the commonsense victim-precipitation

understanding of honor killings, that loss of virginity or illicit sexual conduct underlay these violent practices. The organization reported that only in a minority of cases, disobedience attributed to women involved their breach of rules to sexuality.

In its work against honor killings, KAMER set its priority as preventing murders. This might be seen as a radical goal on the one hand. On the other hand, KAMER had to move beyond the radicalism of the new women's movement that emerged in late 1980s. The organization set aside confrontational tactics and did not hesitate to contact and act in concert with families, state institutions, and local power holders with whom KAMER shared little if nothing in terms of political identity and ideology. For instance, if a woman's demand for forgiveness would resolve her conflict with her family and override the family members' decision to kill her, then KAMER facilitated the excuse process even if it involved anti-feminist elements such as using a moral language reproducing women's secondary status in the family and repressive honor code in the community. Especially in its contacts with the male members of families, the organization strove not to challenge masculinity to avoid backlash and focus on long-term change (Pervizat, 2003). For KAMER, pro-feminist change of mindsets required more time than the typical two- to four months interval between the family's accusing a woman of disobedience and her murder in an honor killing case. For KAMER's voice not to be excluded and shut down, the organization avoided women's human rights discourse in their contacts with lay members of local community (Akkoç, 2004).

Despite feminist criticism, KAMER also collaborated with local religious authorities on a case-by-case basis if the organization observed them to be influential agents capable of convincing families and communities about the illegitimacy and unrighteousness of honor killings. KAMER insisted on this strategy to the extent that it published the full press release of the Presidency of

Religious Affairs (in Turkish, *Diyanet*) on March 8, 2004, in its annual project report (KAMER, 2004b). As if written to legitimize KAMER's strategy, this press release rooted "honor or custom killings" in the "perceptions and sanctions of the patriarchal mentality about women, prioritizing or centering man's being and rights." This was possible because the Presidency was then held by Ali Bardakoğlu, in whose term the institution was opened to liberal feminist influences (Mutluer, 2018; Tütüncü, 2010). These included recruiting women to its rank of preachers, advocating gender equality, seeing women's rights as human rights, and viewing sexism as remediable through education and change of mindsets. Nevertheless, printing a press release by *Diyanet* in a feminist organization's publication was a highly unusual activity in light of the radicalism of 1980s and 90s women's movement. KAMER's cooperation with the state's security forces was also exceptional, as in some cases of honor killings, the police and gendarme asked for KAMER's support when it should have been the other way around.

In its eight years of activism against honor killings, KAMER published five Turkish-English bilingual reports in which the organization articulated its view on honor killings and summarized applicants' stories case by case (KAMER, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006, 2011). These reports also provided descriptive statistics about demographics of applicants and perpetrators of gendered violence, narratives of experience of violence, and details of applicants' interaction with KAMER and state institutions. These reports ensured the anonymity of the applicants and provided details of their stories to the extent these details were believed to improve both the understanding of honor killings and policies and mechanisms to stop them. In contrast to the statist knowledge production on honor killings as analyzed by Koğacıoğlu (2004, 2011) and the journalistic accounts (Faraç, 1998; Önal, 2012) belonging to the genre of "pulp nonfiction" (Abu-Lughod, 2013), KAMER's reports did not sensationalize women's stories. These reports also cautioned their

readers regarding the racist interpretation of honor killings in Turkey or abroad as somehow expressive of Kurdish culture or Islam.

The 2011 report, which analyzed the data of applicants since 2003, indicated that the mother-tongue of 18,8 percent of the applicants (78 women) was Turkish (KAMER, 2011). Given that KAMER operated in cities where Kurds make up the majority of population, this ratio of Turkish applicants might be more than expected. Besides providing this demographic information, KAMER's reports reiterated that honor killings could not be defined as exclusively a problem of Kurds. In addition, KAMER indicated that if Kurdish identity makes a difference, it might be in terms of difficulty of resolving an intrafamily conflict that would turn into a murder, because Kurdish women rarely access resources. Besides decades-long political violence, economic poverty, poor educational opportunities, and high rates of illiteracy that prevailed in the region, language was also seen as a barrier for women to access support. Accordingly, KAMER proposed state institutions to make resources available in Kurdish and Zazaki languages to reach out Kurdish women. It cooperated with TRT6, the state-run Kurdish TV channel, to prepare and broadcast twelve TV programs, which were informative about women's rights and ways to recognize and bolster them.

KAMER's efforts to address honor killings without falling into the trap of racism were also observable in its discussion of vocabulary, particularly the concepts of honor and custom, in its reports. KAMER strictly rejected calling murders of women in the region as "custom killings", because the organization perceived that this conceptualization led to attributing these practices to a particular ethnic or religious group. The organization insisted on using the concept of honor, however hesitantly. It put the term honor in scare quotes, at first as killings in the *name* of "honor" (*namus adına işlenen cinayetler*) and then as killings under the *guise* of "honor" (*namus kisvesi*

altında işlenen cinayetler). KAMER explained its rationale for this conceptual transition from the first to the second by the fact that the perpetrators of these violent practices used the term honor to disguise rather than express their true motives.

The fact that KAMER avoided developing a feminist critique of the concept of honor was meaningful in terms of its political goals and strategy as well as the characteristics of the discursive and institutional field in which the organization operated. For KAMER, ensuring women's right to be free from violence was a universal goal that could be reached through devising a local strategy. In her biographical interview (C. Belge, 2012), Akkoç suggested that discourse was the most important element of such a strategy to be successful: a woman's organization should pay attention to discursive boundaries in a local context and frame its issues accordingly. Comparing Mor Çatı with KAMER, Akkoç argued that the former risked marginalization since it pursued an uncompromising stance regarding the translation and interpretation of universal feminist language according to Turkish context. Akkoç had a point there; since Mor Çatı emerged out of the feminist resurgence of late 1980s, its politics was shaped by the ethos of "organizing one's own" which, as Roth (2004) describes, would make an organization less interested in establishing or entering coalitions. From its founding onwards, Mor Çatı resisted going beyond the small group form and branching. This ethos and the resulting disinterest in coalition politics also explain why Mor Çatı long refused to bend universal feminist discourse to fit with local circumstances and make visible inequalities other than gender in its understanding of gendered violence.

In contrast, KAMER abandoned the feminist organizing form in small groups early on as it desired to establish branches in each city located in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. It sought coalitions with a wide range of organizations that would acknowledge preventing anticipated honor killings as a common cause regardless of their distance from or even hatred of feminism.

The organization's strategy to reach broadest possible coalition in the local would be stalemated if it had developed an uncompromising critique of the concept of honor. As a discursive maneuver to neutralize potential opponents, KAMER preferred to retain the positive connotations of the concept of honor and argued that it might be redefined so that "dishonorable" would be used to describe "thieves, scammers, murderers, rapists, abusers, tricksters, and slanderers" (KAMER, 2005).

Despite its distance from discursive radicalism, KAMER activists joined with other women activists in Diyarbakır invented a radical form of protest against honor killings: they claimed the body of a deceased woman, Şemse Allak, for burial and performing funeral rites. KAMER was involved in the case of Şemse Allak while she was in a coma at the hospital after five-months-pregnant Şemse and her religious spouse were stoned and stabbed by her family in November 2002 (Pope, 2012). For seven months till her death in June 2003, KAMER took care of Şemse at the hospital and raised the profile of the case as part of the organization's awareness-raising activities in the honor killings project. KAMER's initiative impacted the local political community to the extent that Çağlayan (2007) reports Şemse's room at the hospital became a public space where women from several political organizations in the region gathered. Since Şemse's family disavowed her while she was in a coma and after her death, according to different records, around twenty to fifty women activists organized her funeral and buried her to the Cemetery of the Unknown (in Turkish, *Kimsesizler Mezarlığı*) with the help of municipal workers (Gözke, 2003; KAMER, 2004a). Doing so, they not only transgressed gendered Islamic rituals, but also incited a strong passionate politics against honor killings, expressing their pain and anger as well as autonomy and resoluteness.

This radical form of protest might be seen as a sign of change in the trajectory of the struggle against honor killings in the region; later, women's organizations affiliated with the mainstream of Kurdish political movement joined KAMER's efforts. When Kadriye Demirel was killed in November 2003, the members of DEHAP's Women Branch[28] organized a sit-in in Diyarbakır and convinced Kadriye's mother to claim the body ("Kadınlar 'recm'i lanetledi," 2003). Different newspapers reported that around 250 to 500 women participated in Kadriye's funeral, carried the body for burial, and performed the funeral prayer while men stood in rows at the back ("Kadınlar Kadriye'yi omuzlarında taşıdı," 2003; "Kadınlar omuzladı," 2003). Two more appalling cases contributed to the momentum. The case of N.Ç. involved forced prostitution and multiple men's (including senior local state officials) rape of a 12 years-old child in Mardin, which made news in February 2003. Another involved four police officer's abduction, torture, and rape of the head of DEHAP's Women Branch in Istanbul in June 14, 2003 (Demir Gürsel, 2014; KHRP, 2003).

These events sparked furious reaction among the women activists of the Kurdish political community, as they responded with a robust declaration opposing state violence and intrafamily violence in unison ("Demokratik ve Barışçıl bir Dünya için Kadın Katliamlarına ve Her Türlü Şiddete Hayır," 2003). Hundreds of women from different cities in the region gathered in Mardin to participate in the release of the declaration on November 28, 2003, despite the visible threat of heavily armed security forces. The declaration expressed their rage: they had reached the end of their tether and were feeling "great anger." Different than the statist accounts, this declaration did not isolate honor killings from other forms of gendered violence and violence arising from the ethnic conflict in the region. Rather, it warned that an isolated account of "honor-custom killings"

[28] DEHAP is the Turkish acronym of Democratic People's Party, the pro-Kurdish political party of the time.

– as framed in the declaration – would be incomplete and lead to misconceptions. It offered a systemic analysis of gendered violence as attributable to the ways patriarchy shaped social reality in the region, intensified by state politics of colonialist policies and conflict rather than democracy and peace. In line with this analysis, the declaration ended with a list of demands on the state combining demands by the women's movement pertaining to gendered violence and the Penal Code with demands by the Kurdish movement for peace and democracy.

In the following months, *Pazartesi* published several commentaries by Kurdish women activists connecting honor-custom killings to armed conflict in the region (M. Yılmaz & Demir, 2004a, 2004b). In these commentaries, the category of honor killings was articulated as patriarchal backlash against women's mobilization and its destabilization of gender norms in the region. These activists interpreted the severity or the rage of this backlash as an outcome of Turkish state's support of tribal structures of power in the region by granting tribal leaders exclusive rights to maintain the patriarchal gender order of the community. In the academic literature, the work of Ahmetbeyzade (2008: 200) comes closer to this interpretation of honor killings by stressing the sharing of sovereign powers between the state and tribes in the region and defining the category of honor killings as "a form of state-controlled gender discriminatory legal violence against women." However, Ahmetbeyzade's account lacks the emphasis these women activists put on their own effect. In this research, I rely on Kurdish women's activists' analysis. KAMER's work and its repercussions in the wider Kurdish women's movement demonstrate how the struggle against familial violence grew from the periphery and into the mainstream of the Kurdish movement community. Second, the strategy of raising political significance of honor killings despite or thanks to its racist connotations enabled Kurdish women to turn into active agents in this phase of political discourse, compared to the family disaster phase, during which their voices

were unheard. Their influences were also observed in the shaping of national feminist mobilization against honor killings during the Penal Code reform, as I discuss in the following section.

4.4.2 Penal Code activism and outcomes

Before feminist activism against gendered violence was sparked by brutal cases, women's organizations across Turkey had been organizing a campaign around the issue of Civil Code reform and had established a working group led by KİH to prepare for the upcoming Penal Code reform (Anıl et al., 2005). The Civil Code campaign was titled "No to economic violence" as it had only one demand: the removal of a clause restricting the equal division of matrimonial property in the case of divorce to property acquired after January 1, 2002, the date of effect of the new Civil Code (Sönmez, 2003). Organizing a national petition drive, the campaign group obtained around thirty-five thousand signatures, which were sent to the parliament. Then, the Civil Code campaign faded without a success, as the high-profile violence cases mentioned above and the speeding up of the Penal Code reform weighed on women's organizations and provoked a change in the movement's agenda. In the process, the concepts of honor and custom gained new political significances. These concepts had long served as benchmarks against which crimes against women were judged in the then-current Penal Code, adapted from the Italian Penal Code in 1926. The ebb and flow of the Penal Code reform process from 2002 through 2004 can be read through the meanings given to these concepts in several drafts prepared by different governments and commissions in the parliament and by women's organizations. Besides persistently pressuring the state and seeking the support of the transnational bodies of European Union and United Nations (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2009; P. İlkkaracan, 2010), women's organizations turned these brutal cases of gendered violence into rallying points for collective action targeting the Penal Code reform.

Following the death of Şemse Allak at the hospital on June 7, 2003, Mor Çatı issued a press statement connecting Şemse's murder to the AKP's Penal Code draft sent to the parliament on May 23 (Mor Çatı, 2003). While preparing this draft, Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym, AKP), coming to power in November 2002, disregarded all gender-related revisions made in the drafting process during the three-months term of Aysel Çelikel as the independent pre-election Minister of Justice between August and November. Çelikel was a founding member of pro-Kemalist ÇYDD, a jurist and an academician, who also participated in the working group coordinated by KİH devoted to women's human's right perspective to be reflected in the Penal Code reform. Women's organizations considered her appointment as a "positive surprise", organized several meetings with the Minister, and joined the drafting commission established under the Ministry of Justice (Anıl et al., 2005). Under Çelikel's personal direction, the commission's draft included most of the demands of the working group. Nevertheless, the AKP's government ignored these efforts, wound back the Penal Code draft, and restored almost all gender-related articles of the previous draft. Known as Dönmezer's draft, after Sulhi Dönmezer, the jurist who directed the drafting of the code, this draft conserved the gendered rationale of the code. The draft considered sexual violence against women and children under a subheading "Crimes against sexual integrity and customs of morality" (*Cinsel bütünlüğe ve edep törelerine karşı suçlar*) grouped under the section titled "Crimes against society" rather than "Crimes against individuals" (TGNA, 14 September 2004). The code clauses and their justifications repeatedly referred to gendered constructs such as shame, modesty, and chastity (*ar, haya, ve iffet*) through which the draft denied sexual and bodily autonomy and rights to women. Like the then-current code, it objectified women's bodies as belonging to society (P. İlkkaracan, 2010). In the press statement, dated June 11, 2003, addressing Şemse's death, Mor Çatı rebuked the penal code draft

as an attempt to seize women's bodies and lives. Interestingly, this press release did not express any demands on the state; rather, written in an angry voice, it summarized what would happen if the Penal Code draft passed without a change in the parliament. As in Kurdish women's activists' declaration and Mor Çatı's statement, anger became the most frequently expressed emotion in many pamphlets and press releases written to make feminist interventions to the Penal Code reform process. Similar to the pattern observed in other movements (Gould, 2004), the feeling and expression of anger indicated both a qualitative and quantitative change in the women's movement against lethal violence. Indeed, activists were overcoming their ambivalence and turning toward more militant direct-action campaigns.

From June 2003 until the passing of the Penal Code in September 2004, women's organizations and independent feminists organized numerous street protests in major cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Mardin, Diyarbakır, Bursa, Çanakkale, Mersin, Adana, Van, and Eskişehir, mostly triggered by the murders of women catching public attention. Initially, activists adopted such slogans as "Honor killings are political!", "We will not be anyone's honor!", and "We are all Şemse, we are all Gülbahar!" In addition to politicizing honor killings and claiming women's bodily rights, these protesters expressed that they shared a common identity with women subjected to violence either in the family or at the hands of state officials. The names in the last slogan either multiplied or changed with new murders. Organized under the name of Women against Sexual Violence, protesters in Istanbul sent hundreds of letters to the Justice Sub-commission established in the parliament to review and revise the AKP's Penal Code draft ("Kadın milletvekilleri tecavüze ortak olmayın!," 2004). Activists focused on the draft code's patriarchal definition of sexual violence as a crime against social mores and denial of women's bodily autonomy only until more news broke about murders of women. Through effective lobbying, Women's Platform on the Penal

Code achieved its first victory with the legal recognition of sexual violence as a crime against individuals during the debates in Justice Sub-commission. With this change, Turkish legislation adopted the liberal "individual rights frame" that has been dominant in Europe in handling violence against women (Krizsan and Popa, 2014).

Penal Code reform also constituted a ground for the take-off of the legislative activism in the country's history of LGBT rights movement (V. Yılmaz & Demirbaş, 2014). Among other demands, emphasizing the inclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity as grounds for discrimination, LamdbaIstanbul and KaosGL joined women's organizations' efforts. LGBT activists reached out to the commission in the parliament two times, once on their own and then as participants of Women's Platform on the Penal Code (Erol, 2004). LamdbaIstanbul also organized street protests that involved sending faxes to the heads of the governing and opposition parties, AKP and CHP, and the Minister of Justice urging them to recognize the demands of "millions of homosexual citizens" ("TCK değişsin!," 2004). As a result of these efforts, whereas the Justice Sub-commission included sexual orientation in the anti-discrimination clause of the revised draft, the minister Cemil Çiçek with support from the majority of Justice Commission's members later removed it, arguing that gender as a ground of discrimination might cover homosexuals, too (Erol, 2004).

The Platform's campaign intensified following the media appearances of Sulhi Dönmezer, after whom the draft was named, and Doğan Soyaslan, an adviser of the Ministry of Justice and a member of the drafting committee. In these appearances, these jurists defended arguments women activists viewed as deeply problematic. For example, the two jurists argued that marital rape was inconceivable as a crime and if it is criminalized, women would pour into courts with fake claims. They proposed marriage with a rapist would save the violated woman or child from being excluded

from society and becoming a prostitute; as no man would want to marry a woman who is not a virgin, marrying the rapist was a benefit to her and she would get accustomed in time. They invoked the old saw of "provocation", claiming that if a man who saw his wife with another man in the street committed a crime, he should be considered provoked because he would believe that his wife stained his honor (P. İlkkaracan, 2010; "Tecavüzcüyle evlenme fuhuşu önler," 2003). These arguments might have been considered as gaffes or jokes if they were not written into the AKP's draft code and expressed by influential jurists like Dönmezer and Soyaslan. But it quickly became clear that these were in fact generalizations drawn from patriarchal ideas about Turkish society and culture.

Dönmezer was a pioneer of criminal law in Turkey and honored as "Professor of Professors" by Aydınlar Ocağı, an influential group of right-wing intellectuals who engineered the concept of Turkish-Islamic synthesis and some of whom held chief positions in AKP (Şen, 2010). Ağırdemir, a lawyer and one of members of Women's Platform on the Penal Code, describes his authority as unbreachable (Interview with Ayten Ağırdemir, October 13, 2017). She adds that except for women jurists and journalists aligned with the platform, nobody dared to contradict him. The commentary about Dönmezer and Soyaslan published in *Pazartesi* was headlined "Let Mr. Professor get used to the rapist!" (*Tecavüzcüye Professor Bey alışsın!*) and attached a photo of the Ministry of Justice kissing the hand of Dönmezer to show his respect (Koç, 2003). The confrontation between these jurists and feminists involved libel suits against a columnist who implied that these jurists might be "psychopaths" because of these ideas written into the draft code (Önderoğlu, 2004). Dönmezer quit the Sub-commission early on, sensing the turning of the tide against his ideas, which in fact had shaped penal codes in east and west throughout modern history, as I discussed in the previous chapter.

Compared to Dönmezer, Soyaslan was a relatively easy target. His defense of the penal code draft along with his reputation fell apart more scandalously. On a TV program, the reporter dared to ask Soyaslan what he would do if his daughter was raped: Would he marry her off to the rapist? Pınar İlkkaracan (2010) underlines that his exceptionalist response, "No, but I'm different, I am a professor", sparked public outcry. He lost face almost literally to the extent that before and after the court hearing of the libel suit he felt the need to cover his face as if he were the accused ashamed of his crime (H. Öztürk, 2003). Feminists further consolidated their position on the offensive, by collecting and publicizing Soyaslan's supposedly lawful but in fact scandalous statements about immodesty and rape from his book. A newspaper published these statements with a headline "The quirky professor made women mad again" (*Olay profesör kadınları yine kızdırdı*) (Akşam, 2004). The news report included quoted interpretations of these statements by some members of the Women's Platform, indicating that the Platform successfully gained a "standing" in the mass media who treated the Platform as "an actor with voice, not merely as an object being discussed by others" (Ferree et al., 2002: 13). In contrast, Dönmezer and Soyaslan lost their standing as the media and organizers increasingly treated their opinions as expressions of their "obsessions" with women's honor and virginity (Gülbahar, 2004; P. İlkkaracan, 2010; Mengi, 2003).

In demonstrations following the outbreak of murder news, the slogan "We want shelter, not a grave" came to the fore. Mainstream media outlets generated the statist account of honor killings by packaging these murders as custom killings relegated to Kurdish culture (Koğacıoğlu, 2011). Condemning these murders became a way to vent hostility against Kurdish ethnic identity. At the same time, condemnation conveyed the moral shock and anger among activists striving to target state institutions, especially the parliament then preoccupied with revising the Penal Code.

Activists who convened under the Platform against Violence against Women in Istanbul emphasized the category of "honor killings" rather than "custom killings" (Karakuş, 2021). For instance, the Platform mustered a street demonstration on the Mothers' Day with around two hundred women carrying a banner proclaiming "Honor killings, harassment, rape… We won't celebrate Mothers' Day." Compared to more orderly protest forms such as collectively petitioning the municipalities for the establishment of women's shelters, street demonstrations staged after murder news or organized in international observance days such as November 25th and March 8th attracted more women. The mobilization addressing the Penal Code reform reached its peak with a march to the Parliament in September 2004. Around six hundred women, many of whom travelled from different cities to the capital Ankara, participated in this march (B. Belge, 2004a). The lead banner proclaimed, "Our bodies and sexualities belong to us."

Inspired by Kurdish women's activism against honor killings, feminists in Istanbul and Antalya also sought to turn some women's funerals into political demonstrations. Following the murders of Güldünya Tören in February and Nuran Halitoğulları in April 2004, feminist activists in Istanbul mobilized immediately to organize political funerals, though their efforts fell short, as state institutions convinced families to claim these women's bodies (N. Işık, 2004). Güldünya was buried in her hometown, Bitlis, with around five thousand participants in her funeral, according to *Sabah*'s news report (Acay & Özügüzel, 2004). The crowd was impressive; it included many local powerholders including the mayor, the district governor, the provincial and district muftis, and the tribal authorities. The newspaper *Hurriyet* published the news of the funeral, headlined "State ceremony for Güldünya the victim of custom" ("Töre kurbanı Güldünya'ya devlet töreni," 2004). The headline of *Sabah,* which claimed that the head of *Diyanet* could not catch the funeral because of delays in his international travel, was "Queue to Farewell Güldünya" (Acay & Özügüzel, 2004).

Note that, *Sabah* published a tribe leader's claim that this was not a custom killing since the brothers committed murder without a family council's decision. His proof was the crowd at the funeral, which was constituted predominantly by the tribe's members. At the ceremony, the district mufti also condemned the murder, expressing that neither custom nor religion would approve it. These statements together with the crowd are early examples of how politics amplified the "feedback effect" between practices and frames in the case of honor killings (Hacking, 1991). Feminists' discursive politics to define the social and political reality of gendered violence influenced their competitors in the field of discourse, who could not resist revising their talk and changing their actions. It changed the usual course of events that follow an honor killing. Güldünya's body was not left at the morgue; it was not reduced to a "corpse without any attachment to society" (Ahmetbeyzade, 2008: 190). At the discursive level, the local power holders including state and non-state did not stand behind and legitimate the murder.

In contrast to the applauding tone of mainstream newspapers of the state's and community's treatment of Güldünya's funeral, though, *Pazartesi* ran a story about the funeral with a feminist headline "We want shelter, not a grave!" and complained that around fifty women watched Güldünya's funeral from a distance, in silence (B. Demir, 2004). The headline was borrowed from women's demonstrations mustered at city centers and in front of the state institutions feminists sought to hold accountable for her fate. And it became one of the most prominent slogans during the Penal Code reform process. Feminists also filed legal complaints collectively against the ministries of Justice, the Interior, Health, and the state ministry responsible of women on the grounds that they failed to protect Güldünya. Feminist lawyers who had established the Women's Rights Implementation Center under the Istanbul Bar Association took the lead in organizing this demonstration. The press statement they read in front of the Bakırköy

Courthouse on March 2, started with words "We women are angry, disappointed, furious! We are in black" ("Güldünya'nın köyünde kimse olayı konuşmak istemiyor," 2004). In this statement, they listed three demands: provision of adequate number of women's shelters, consideration of honor motive as an aggravating rather than mitigating circumstance in a murder, and immediate passage of the new Penal Code in the parliament with required changes.

In several other protests organized with same demands, activists directed their anger specifically against state institutions, diversifing ways to express their anger, and moving towards more disruptive types of action in unusual locations. For instance, around a hundred activists gathered to demonstrate in front of Zincirlikuyu Graveyard on March 6 (Şakir, 2021). They wore black clothes and badges with the slogan "We are angry." They carried a banner proclaiming again that they did not want graves but shelters. Following the denial of Güldal Akşit, the AKP's minister responsible for women and family affairs, that there was any connection between Güldünya's murder and the drastically low number[29] of women's shelters, around twenty feminists snuck into AKP's Women Council gathered for the international women's day in a luxury hotel on March 7th and disrupted the minister's speech (Başak, 2004a). They unfurled a banner proclaiming "Conservatism sided with man against woman" and indicted AKP for conservatist policies reinforcing women's dependency on their husbands. In the subsequent feminist night march on March 8, in addition to demanding economic and social service resources from the state, protestors carried a banner accusing the state of complicity with men: "The man shoots, the state protects! We want shelter, not a grave!"[30]

[29] At the time, there were only 13 women's shelters across Turkey, a drastically low number given that the pro-feminist Assembly of Women's Shelters and Consultation Centers had been demanding from the state to set up "at least three thousand" shelters for women since its third annual meeting in 2000 (Ekal & Taylı, 2012).
[30] In Turkish: "Erkek vuruyor devlet koruyor, mezar değil sığınak istiyoruz!"

Another attempt to organize a political funeral came from Antalya Women's Information and Solidarity Center. Following a news report in *Özgür Gündem* that the body of Telya Zaman remained unclaimed in the morgue of the state hospital due to "custom", the Center stepped in and organized her funeral rites (Nilgün, 2004). The activists' aim was to show that she was not alone, and she deserved respect and dignity. Also they were motivated to draw attention to women's murders and suicides in the name of honor. They succeeded: *Hürriyet*, known as the Turkish flagship newspaper, published a story about the funeral in the front page (Kocaer, 2004). The reason Telya's case garnered attention was not self-evident. Her case did not fit the scenario of gendered violence against a "sympathetic victim" by a "folk devil" and was therefore unlikely to capture public attention and augment mobilization (Roychowdhury, 2016: 86). Telya Zaman was a 30-year-old Kurdish woman who had abandoned her husband and children in Istanbul and migrated to Antalya where she paired up with a bar owner and worked as a bar-girl (*konsomatris*). She feared being killed by her family members on the grounds of her breaching of customs, and according to police records, she committed suicide using the bar owner's gun.

The surprising success of this protest action despite Telya's background confirms many observations of the scholarship on emotions and the body in social movements. As activists label their feelings, they shape the emotional culture of their collectivity (Jasper, 2011). Depending on which emotions are felt and expressed, the collectivity might turn inwards to respond to its constituents' needs or outwards to reach out others and confront their opponents. During the Penal Code reform process, activists in different cities repeatedly reiterated their indignation, especially addressing it to the state. Either they accused the state of murders of women, or they called for new policies. They underlined the strength of this feeling, expressing in many pamphlets that they could not see the upcoming March 8th as a day of celebration. Political funeral as a type of protest

action fits in this emotional culture of collectivity perfectly. Analyzing ACT UP's political funerals in 1990s, in which AIDS activists held initially the ashes of their loved ones and then actual dead bodies, Gould (2004) argues that through this type of direct action anger became legitimate and legible to activists. Protests articulating emotion – anger in particular - encouraged more militant actions and displaced other emotions such as fear and shame, which discouraged confrontational tactics. The frequency, types, and geographical spread of protest actions throughout the Penal Code reform process support Gould's claim regarding the feeling and expression of anger in the context of social movements.

In addition, because funerals center the body of a dead person they helped feminists to reclaim women's bodies and to depict them as deserving respect and dignity. Similar to what Sasson-Levy and Rapoport's (2003) observations in the Women in Black movement in Israel, the body is inescapably the message in a political funeral. Through these funerals, activists first in Kurdish regions and then in other cities throughout Turkey gave a new political valence to women's bodies being violated and then rejected by their families and communities (Self, 2013). If they had not stepped in to organize these funerals, the bodies would be buried in a Cemetery of the Unknown, a burial site for social and political outcasts such as homeless people, victims of honor killings and transgender people whose bodies were unclaimed by their blood families and those labeled as terrorists or refugees (Zengin, 2019). Moreover, like protesting bodies, women carrying the coffin was a symbolically powerful image, transgressing gendered Islamic norms of burial. Compared to highly structured, routinized types of protests such as traditional marches and rallies (Juris, 2008), these political funerals not only intensified activists' emotions and their attachments to the cause but also enabled them to communicate their strong dissent as well as autonomy and courage to fight against the understanding of the honor.

The funeral of Nuran Halitoğulları was the last one that feminists in Istanbul sought to turn into a political demonstration during the process of Penal Code reform. Nuran was abducted and raped for four days. After police officers found her in the house where she was held, they returned her to the family. According to the *Hürriyet's* report, her father and her brother killed her, following the decision of the "family council" composed of thirty-two persons (Söz, 2004). The father, with the help of an uncle, buried her body to hide it from the police and then reported that she was missing. In the police investigation, the father confessed that he killed his daughter to save family honor and added that he would like to kill the rapist, too, but could not because the police protected him very well while he was transferred to prison. In *Pazartesi*, Başak (2004b) described their initial reaction to the news as "No words can express the pain, anger, and dissent when we heard about Nuran's death. … The first thing that came to our mind was not to leave her funeral to her killers. They forfeited that right." Nevertheless, Nuran's family had "kidnapped" the body for burial before a group of feminists arrived in the Council of Forensic Medicine, where the body remained for two days. Despite the risk of encountering and clashing with the family members, feminists ventured forth to the cemetery. There, they opened the now famous banner proclaiming that they wanted shelter, not a grave and made a press statement denouncing honor killings and expressing the urgency of a legislative change identifying honor motive as an aggravating factor in homicide. The family members countered the feminists' press statement and claimed that it was not a custom killing; rather, the father committed murder individually and under heavy provocation, losing his sanity and self-control while discussing the rape with his daughter. Once again, as in the aftermath of Güldünya's murder, this instance shows how feminist discursive politics and resolute action moved their opponents in the field of discourse. Informed by a lawyer and worried that the new Penal Code might no longer grant sentence reductions to honor and

custom pleas, family members strategized to plead for insanity for the father in front of the press. In this way, they adopted the most recent and universal response to femicide, that is individualizing violence and explaining it with emotions. Also, they indicated what would be the next focus in feminists' struggle against femicides: the "unjust provocation" clause of the new Penal Code, which deviously evaded to mention the concept of honor.

When new Penal Code passed in September 2004, it included many demands of women's movement, most importantly the definition of sexual violence as a crime against individuals. The new code also defined the motive of custom as an aggravated factor in homicide; however the new Penal Code left out the honor motive. Only the justification of the unjust provocation clause mentioned "honor killings," indicating a correction in the implementation of the clause in "intrafamily killings." It suggested that the leniency of the law should only be granted to those who kill a person "in a state of anger or severe distress caused by an unjust act."[31] The justification further exemplified that if a father or a brother killed a daughter or a sister because she was a rape victim, then the offender should not be granted reduced sentence. She was not a perpetrator but a victim of another person's, the rapist's, unjust act. But what would happen for instance in the case of an "adulterous" woman? Would her murderer receive reduced sentences? Would adultery constitute an unjust act?

It became clear in the parliamentary debates that AKP intentionally left out the example of adultery when describing what an unjust act is in the code and its justification. When Gaye Erbatur, a member of opposition party and also the Women's Platform on the Penal Code, applauded the revision to the unjust provocation clause claiming that it would no longer apply to all cases of

[31] An English translation of the new Penal Code, adopted on September 26, 2004, is available online: https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/6453/file/Turkey_CC_2004_am2016_en.pdf

honor killings, an AKP member of the parliament, Bekir Bozdağ, responded that her interpretation was incorrect and misleading (TGNA, 14 September 2004). According to him, the code left the implementation of the clause to judge's discretion as judges would evaluate each murder case by case and decide whether adultery constitutes an unjust act. Bozdağ went further and argued that even in murders committed with the motive of custom the unjust provocation clause might apply if the case under consideration involved an unjust act. He implied that specific to fatal violence against women there was not much of a success in the Penal Code reform for the opposition party and the women's movement.

Regarding the new Penal Code as a defeat for the AKP in its relatively early years in government might not be seen as an exaggeration. The original draft, aka Dönmezer draft, with five hundred and two clauses, was tossed away in the Justice Sub-commission, which prepared a new draft with three hundred and forty-six clauses almost from scratch. Despite the AKP's last minute efforts to withdraw this whole draft on the basis that it did not criminalize adultery, eventually it bowed to the pressures of mainly the EU and the threat of an economic crisis. Pınar İlkkaracan (2010: 211) notes that if allowed to fester, this crisis would be "the first one triggered by an issue concerning sexuality" in the country's history.

In her book on the rape law reform in the U.S., Corrigan (2013) criticizes the literature's treatment of this case as a success story. Similarly, the Turkish literature treats the new Penal Code as an exemplary case of success for the women's movement (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2009; Anıl et al., 2005; P. İlkkaracan, 2010). But a question hangs over this success if attention is focused on the case of lethal violence. While rewriting the draft, the Justice Sub-commission was under constant monitoring of the Women's Platform and the Platform achieved almost all of its gains in the Sub-commission. Besides the recognition of women's bodily autonomy, the new code also

criminalized marital rape and repealed the marriage exemption that previously absolved a rapist of his crime. In this way, feminists had won two of three battles they raged with the aforementioned jurists. Only lost was the definition of the honor motive as an aggravating circumstance in homicide or ruling out the unjust provocation clause in honor killings. In that sense, for the women's movement the new Penal Code turned out to be partial failure with respect to the legal processing of gendered violence, especially fatal violence against women. By not spelling out the concept of honor as a potential motive with clear judicial results, the code itself left a gap that gave judges, prosecutors, police as well as perpetrators a large room to maneuver.

The new Penal Code incited a litigation-based strategy, pushing feminists to the courts to actively monitor the implementation of the code and pressure the judges not to apply unjust provocation clause case-by-case. Definitely, the success of this strategy depended on the power of feminism to attract and organize enough interested lawyers with expertise in the legal processing of lethal violence. But there were other barriers to turn the original failure in the Penal Code reform into success in implementation. Corrigan (2013: 17) suggests a list of possible barriers; that litigation strategies might "narrow or distort claims about injustice, obstruct or divert political organizing, and produce pyrrhic victories and empty promises." For instance, the law itself required feminist lawyers first to struggle to be officially accepted as an intervener in courts processing murder cases. Only a lawyer who represents a "person injured by the crime", that means a family member of the deceased, has legal standing in court hearings. In other words, it forces upon feminist lawyers the almost impossible task of convincing a family member, whom they hold complicit with the murder, to recruit their legal assistance. Lawyers applying to the courts to represent women's organizations or bar associations as injured parties have been rejected by the courts until very recently (Baytok, 2012). In Güldünya's case, feminists pursued this strategy and

gained presence in court hearings by arranging a group of lawyers to apply for being interveners in each hearing (B. Belge, 2004b). Kayar, one of the applicant lawyers, expresses that despite the court formally rejected these applications, it allowed the lawyers to watch hearings from the plaintiff's desk (Interview with Habibe Yılmaz Kayar, October 4, 2017). Given the masculine sociability characterizing Turkish courtrooms (Koğacıoğlu, 2011), feminist lawyers probably did not receive that much respect in cases failing to capture public attention.

Second, I would like to underline the narrowing or distorting effect of litigation as a feminist strategy to achieve justice. This point considers the goal of severe punishment that the litigation strategy imposes on the feminists and questions its desirability. During the penal code reform, feminists underlined the demand for women's shelters rather than severe punishments even following the femicide cases. Hülya Gülbahar, following the guilty verdict and severe sentence in Nuran's case, the other high-profile murder case, attempted to clarify to the press the Women's Platform's objective in relation to carceralism. She stated that the Plaform's expectation from the courts was to shape public opinion about crimes against women; so that people will know the state will act consistently in legal processing of every murder of women and grant sentences "heavy and clear enough to be deterrent" (Durukan, 2005). Whether this objective is legible to the audience that feminist lawyers address is questionable. According to Perihan Meşeli, a feminist lawyer and activist who has been involved in feminist litigation campaigns since 2008, there was ambivalence about the demand of severe sentencing even among the women's movement community (Interview with Perihan Meşeli, September 28, 2017). My observations at the 21st annual meeting of the Assembly of Women's Shelters and Consultation Centers that took place in November 2018 support her interpretation.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the relative belatedness of the women's movement in Turkey in coming to terms with lethal violence in the mobilization against gendered violence. Compared to the family disaster phase, in which the women's movement was the principal initiator of the discourse on intrafamily violence, in the honor killing phase, women's organizations sought to change the discourse only after it was mostly shaped by popular and journalistic accounts that accentuated Kurdish ethnic identity and culture and reduced the scope of honor killings to customary murders. I have explained this belatedness with two factors: the first is the difficulty of the issue of lethal violence in term of devising a unified feminist statement about it and the second is a flaw in the original understanding of gendered violence that failed to view it intersectionally, that is, as structured by inequalities other than gender. These factors rendered the initial feminist position about the honor killings frame deeply ambivalent. In their quest to arrive at a politically productive consensus about how to frame lethal violence, the concept of femicide was spelled out as an alternative, scare quotes were put around the concept of honor, and the terms of honor and custom were used either interchangeably or adjacently. Compared to this ambivalence among the members of women's movement community, the statist account was straightforward in calling Kurdish community out through directing the blame onto custom.

The literature on the honor killings frame clearly establishes the success of this statist account; however, it leaves unexplained the responses of Turkish and Kurdish women's movements to such politicization of honor killings. In this chapter, I have contributed to this literature by examining the encounters between Turkish and Kurdish women's movements, and their initially distinct but later overlapping mobilization against honor killings. Movement and media sources allow me to trace the initiation of the struggle against familial violence on the

periphery and its subsequent mainstreaming in the Kurdish political community. Kurdish women activists reworked and expanded the meaning of gendered violence on several ways. First, they emphasized the state's sexual violence against women and showed that Kurdish women have been disproportionately affected. Mobilization against familial violence, specifically honor killings, within the Kurdish community followed the activism against state violence and was crucial to the feminist credibility of the Kurdish women's movement. KAMER pioneered a gendered analysis of honor killings by explaining these practices in terms of women's perceived or alleged disobedience to the rules and boundaries confining their actions. Kurdish women activists aligned with the mainstream of Kurdish political community followed by framing honor killings as patriarchal backlash against women's mobilization and its destabilization of gender norms in the region.

Besides reworking the meaning of honor killings, Kurdish women activists also invented a new type of action, the political funeral. This novel protest idiom inspired their Turkish counterparts who had resolved their former ambivalence and were searching for influential ways to express their strong dissent. They sought to add political funeral to their repertoire of claim making. Drawing on the social movement scholarship on emotions and the body, I have analyzed how the feeling of anger became legible to activists and then their audiences. Anger helped activists gain standing in the debates over the Penal Code reform. The political funeral was a great fit. Claiming and burying the bodies of murdered women both expressed feminist rage and also eloquently deliver the movement's main claim: women's bodies are their own and deserve respect and dignity in life as well as in death.

In addition to this novel protest action, women's organizations also exerted effective pressure on the governing and opposition parties in the parliament through using classic social

movement repertoire such as lobbying, press statements, petitioning, faxing, and demonstrations. The literature interprets the women's campaign for the new Penal Code as a success story. My focus on lethal violence indicates that this success was only partial. The relative belatedness of women's movement to come to terms with the issue of lethal violence and to develop a thorough critique of the concept of honor coexisted with the success of the statist account in relegating honor killings to Kurdish custom. This racist framing was reflected in the new Penal Code, which considered the motive of "custom" but not "honor" as an aggravating circumstance in homicide. By evading a statement about honor as a potential motive in homicide with clear judicial results and coding of the unjust provocation clause, the new Penal Code left a gap that gave judges, prosecutors, and police as well as perpetrators room to maneuver and evade accountability for femicide. It also incited a litigation-based strategy among the women's movement community, pushing them to courts to monitor the implementation of the new Penal Code case by case.

5.0 Conclusion

In this dissertation, I advance theorizing about discursive politics on gendered violence in Turkey in three ways. First, I add the "family disaster" frame to the literature on Turkey whose focus was previously limited to the "honor killings" frame. Second, I bring in the social movement perspective into the analysis of honor killings discourse and show Turkish and Kurdish feminists' and women activists' troubles in and efforts for reconstituting the discourse. Third, I reveal how frame institutionalization was related to the power and characteristics of the women's movement as well as the discursive and institutional context of the country. These contributions draw on an archival analysis of the power-knowledge-affect practices of multiple actors that shaped the discourse on gendered violence in two phases.

In the literature on 1980s' feminist mobilization in Turkey, it is well established that gendered violence constituted a principal issue. Also, the literature traces feminists' strategizing for the establishment of women's shelters and their troubles in confronting and convincing central and local state bodies to take gendered violence seriously. However, no attention is paid to feminists' discursive politics, its characteristics in terms of meanings attributed to gendered violence, and its implications for the mobilization and state policy making. This dissertation adds to the literature the family disaster frame that prevailed in an early period before the rise of honor killings frame. In addition to feminists' discursive politics, I analyze other political and institutional factors that shaped this initial discourse on gendered violence.

The literature on the political discourse on honor killings in Turkey is well developed. In particular, Koğacıoğlu shows dynamics that politicize honor killings. She also analyzes the power-knowledge practices of a select group of institutions – judicial and other state institutions, the

governing Justice and Development Party, the European Union, and international and national news media, in framing honor killings as cultural practices. My dissertation builds on her work in three ways. First, I show that the honor killings frame was long used as an academic and journalistic concept in and beyond Turkey before it was subject to discursive politics and controversy mobilizing state and non-state actors. This finding underlines the significance of her argument calling attention to institutional knowledge practices in framing honor killings with racist connotations. Second, I show how and why some Turkish feminists were reluctant to embrace this frame. What I call feminist ambivalence in this dissertation refers to feminists' trouble in arriving at a unity about how to address lethal violence and an understanding of how gendered violence is structured by inequalities other than gender. This contribution has far-reaching implications because the intersectional character of gendered violence, feminist politics, and state institutions structure political discourse around the world. Finally, I expand Koğacıoğlu's work by focusing on Kurdish women's activism against both the reality of these violent practices and their labelling with the honor killings frame reduced to customary murders.

My social movement-based contributions to the literature on honor killings discourse might incite a reevaluation of the (dis)advantages of tackling particular forms of gendered violence attributed to minoritized cultures in popular talk. I show that the culturalist honor killings frame opened the discursive field to actors previously marginalized in feminist mobilization against gendered violence. In the family disaster phase, the ethnic composition of the women's movement was not much a question. This contrasted with the honor killings phase, in which movement inclusiveness appeared as a problem. When the culturalist honor killings frame dominated the political talk on gendered violence, it motivated feminists to consider the issue of intersectionality in structuring gendered violence and ensure cooperation among activists with different ethnic

backgrounds and from different regions. Kurdish women activists won feminist credibility and solidarity by engaging with gendered violence within Kurdish communities. They contributed to national women's movement community not only with numbers in demonstrations but also with a broader understanding of gendered violence and alternative ways to oppose it. Taking into account these movement-related outcomes, I suggest that, especially compared to the family disaster frame, the culturalist honor killing frame offered some unexpected discursive and political opportunities for a more inclusive anti-violence movement.

My final contribution to the literature on Turkey rests on the analysis of the process of the two frames' institutionalization in legislation. I analyze two pieces of legislation: the 1998 Family Protection Act and the new Penal Code of 2004. I show how framings of gendered violence in these pieces of legislation were shaped by the women's movement as well as the discursive and institutional context of the country. I interpret this legislation as partial gains won by the women's movement in each phase. I imply that these legislations might, as well, be interpreted as partial failures to the extent that they bear the influence of other actors and discursive struggles between them. This argument draws on the observation that once gendered violence was rendered as a political issue, it started to concern various actors who joined the discursive field with their own motivations and interests.

The Family Protection Act was a partial gain obtained by the initial feminist mobilization against wife-beating. I illuminate how the testimonial as a specific type of knowledge production suited feminist priorities in this early phase of the movement. Feminists collected women's testimonies to undermine a highly political familial ideology that minimizes, naturalizes, and legitimizes domestic violence. Second, these testimonies expressed the desire for women's solidarity, which feminist pioneers considered to be as the most effective way to change the

condition of woman. Using the testimonial strategy, feminists succeeded in bringing the issue of gendered violence into the public domain; however, they could not preserve its critical political meaning. They were acting in a political context characterized by the polarization between Islamists and Kemalists, for whom the family was a contentious issue. Whereas Islamists failed to acknowledge gendered violence as a pervasive reality of family relations, Kemalists capitalized on this failure and defended state reform on the issue as a significant step in the protection of secular values. Kemalists relied on the gender expertise of professional women's organizations pushing for the violence against women act; however, they did not adopt the early feminist critique of the family. I explain the packaging of this act under the title of family protection with this political conjuncture.

In a parallel analysis of the new Penal Code adopted in 2004, I found that Kurdish women activists were vital actors. Compared to the family disaster phase, in the honor killings phase, feminists and women's organizations lagged behind other actors in articulating a political statement regarding the issue. I illuminate how the initial feminist position regarding honor killings was deeply ambivalent because it was framed as expressive of the cultural backwardness of Kurdish communities, a.k.a. custom, in the popular and journalistic discourse. A possibly unintended outcome of this framing was the opening of this discursive field on gendered violence to Kurdish women activists. Their efforts to reconstitute this discourse and broaden the understanding of gendered violence influenced the national women's movement community. They incited a passionate politics against honor killings in which activists directed their anger specifically against state institutions and diversified ways of expressing this feeling. However, these efforts fell short in achieving their preferred institutionalization of the honor killings frame in the new Penal Code. The two-party parliament composed of the governing pro-Islamic AKP

and the main opposition pro-Kemalist CHP considered the motive of "custom" but not "honor" as an aggravating circumstance in homicide. Similarly, the unjust provocation clause did not include an exception regarding the motive of honor. I explain this legislative outcome with the relative belatedness of women's movement to develop a thorough critique of the concept of honor that coexisted with the success of the mainstream political actors in relegating honor killings to Kurdish custom.

My dissertation also offers some broader insights applicable to research beyond Turkey. In this dissertation, I offer a rich description of how the framings of gendered violence in two periods were contingent upon power imbalances and relations among different political actors in the Turkish case. Obviously, these political actors and the shaping of the interactions between them are specific to Turkey. Yet my findings regarding *frame institutionalization* are applicable to other countries. I suggest analyzing multiple actors' discursive politics. I underline the significance of focusing on the characteristics and the strength of the women's movement in relation to the discursive and institutional context of the country. The final shape of the frames in policy texts and legislations will deviate from feminists' initial discourse and intentions. Therefore, asking such questions "to what extent" and "at what cost" is important. Answers to these questions should better include the analysis of how these frames refer to the gender component of violence as well as the issues of intersectionality. In this way, one can understand better the ways in which the interactions between variously positioned women, feminist politics, and state institutions go awry around the world and result in racism and culturalism as widely discussed in the literature. These are the most general insights I draw out from studying the Turkish case.

In concluding this dissertation, I would like to underline a specific contribution to global research on the honor killings discourse. I discuss the honor killings frame in local, national, and

transnational scales and show similarities of discursive politics employed by different political actors at different scales. Attention to different scales helps overcome two predicaments of critical thought on culturalist accounts of gendered violence. Obsessed with documenting the failures of the "Big Bad West", as Narayan (1997) states, one might refuse to recognize that political actors who are marginal to the mainstream West on a transnational scale engage in similar techniques of (mis)representation on a national scale where they dominate. The reduced scope of the honor killings frame to custom killings to indict Kurdishness in Turkey is such an example. Whereas the honor killings frame was (ab)used in the transnational discourse, for instance to question Turkey's readiness to adopt modern European values and become an EU member, in the national discourse, Kurdish community were implicated for maintaining customs to the detriment of women. To keep the focus on the issues of gendered violence and power and to arrive at a better judgement about culturalist accounts of violence, I argue that one should analyze both transnational, national, and local discourses.

The second predicament considers the question of whether naming specific types of gendered violence necessarily leads to disadvantages for minoritized communities. By coming to terms with honor killings and taking a firm stand against gendered violence in intimate relations, Kurdish women activists analyzed, criticized, and overcame the racist state frame in which they were only offered the victim role. It took time, but at the end, they neither minimized or othered the problem, nor refused to judge it. They referred to colonialism, racism, and ongoing armed conflict to explain the severity of familial violence, particularly honor killings in the region. They kept gender in sight by establishing relations between these issues and patriarchy. This effort by Kurdish women activists might have not changed the course of racist frame institutionalization in the Turkish case, yet it definitively altered the shape of the national women's movement. Their

visibility and impact within the women's movement community increased and the movement become more inclusive. This social movement-related outcome should not be overlooked. Afterall, hope rests on the capacity of the women's movement if we are going to arrive a better understanding of gendered violence and ways to eliminate it.

Bibliography

1. Feminist Haftasonu 11-12 Şubat 1989. (1989). Ankara.

25 Kasım Dünya Kadına Yönelik Şiddete Son Günü. (1997). *Pazartesi, 33*, 32.

438'e hayır basın açıklaması. (1990). *Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs, 10*, 6-7.

Abadan-Unat, N. (1986). *Women in the developing world: Evidence from Turkey*. Colorado: University of Denver Press.

Abu Odeh, L. (1997). Comparatively speaking: The "honor" of the "East" and the "passion" of the "West". *Utah Law Review, 2*, 287-307.

Abu Odeh, L. (2010). Honor killings and the construction of gender in Arab societies. *The American Journal of Comparative Law, 58* (4), 911-952.

Abu-Lughod, L. (2011). Seductions of the 'honor crime'. *differences, 22* (1), 17-63.

Abu-Lughod, L. (2013). *Do muslim women need saving?* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Acar, F. (2000). Turkey. In M. McPhedran, S. Bazilli, M. Erickson, & A. Byrnes (Eds.), *The first CEDAW impact study* (pp. 203-214). Toronto: Centre for Feminist Research, York University and The International Women's Right Project.

Acay, M., & Özügüzel, M. (2004, March 1). Güldünya'ya veda kuyruğu. *Sabah*. Retrieved September 3, 2021, from http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/03/01/gnd121.html

Açık, N. (2014). Re-defining the role of women within the Kurdish national movement in Turkey in the 1990s. In C. Güneş & W. Zeydanlıoğlu (Eds.), *The Kurdish question in Turkey: New perspectives on conflict, representation and reconciliation* (pp. 114-137). London: Routledge.

Acuner, S. (2002). 90'li yıllar ve resmi düzeyde kurumsallaşmanın doğuş aşamaları. In A. Bora & A. Gunal (Eds.), *90'larda Türkiye'de feminizm* (pp. 125–158). İstanbul: İletisim.

Adams, J., & Padamsee, T. (2001). Signs and regimes: Rereading feminist work on welfare states. *Social Politics, 8* (1), 1-23.

Ahıska, M. (2006). Occidentalism and registers of truth: The politics of archives in Turkey. *New Perspectives on Turkey, 34*, 9-29.

Ahmed, S., & Stacey, J. (2001). Testimonial cultures: An introduction. *Cultural Values, 5* (1), 1-6.

Ahmetbeyzade, C. (2008). Gendering necropolitics: The juridical-political sociality of honor killings in Turkey. *Journal of Human Rights, 7* (3), 187-206.

Aile Araştırma Kurumu. (1990). *I. Aile Şurası bildirileri*. Ankara: T. C. Başkakanlık Aile Araştırma Kurumu Başkanlığı Yayınları.

Aile Araştırma Kurumu. (1995). *Aile içi şiddetin sebep ve sonuçları*. Ankara: T. C. Başbakanlık Aile Araştırma Kurumu Yayınları.

Aile Araştırma Kurumu. (1998). *Aile içinde ve toplumsal alanda şiddet.* Ankara: T. C. Başbakanlık Aile Araştırma Kurumu Yayınları.

Aile içi şiddete son. (1997). *Pazartesi, 32*, 11.

Aile ve Kadın. (1986). Bizim olmayan problem. *Kadın ve Aile, 13*, 2.

Akkan, B. (2017). The politics of care in Turkey: Sacred familialism in a changing political context. *Social Politics, 25* (1), 72-91.

Akkoç, N. (2003). *Ka-mer since its foundation.* Paper presented at the Syposium on Violence against Women and the Way of Struggle, 11 October, 2003, Istanbul.

Akkoç, N. (2004). The cultural basis of violence in the name of honour. In S. Mojab & N. Abdo (Eds.), *Violence in the name of honour theoretical and political challenges* (pp. 113-125). Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press.

Akşam. (2004). Olay profesör kadınları yine kızdırdı. Retrieved September 3, 2021, from http://habervitrini.com/olay-profesor-kadinlari-yine-kizdirdi/102075

Aktaş, C. (1987). Nokta'ya cevap: Feminizmi hiç onaylamıyorum. *İktibas, 131-132* (7), 18-19.

Aktaş, C. (1992). *Modernizmin evsizliği ve ailenin gerekliliği*. İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları.

Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, G. (2009). Authenticating gender policies through sustained-pressure: The strategy behind the success of Turkish feminists. *Social Politics, 16* (3), 358-378.

Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, G. (2013). *Shaping gender policy in Turkey*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, G., & Furr, L. A. (2010). Factors that affect women's attitudes toward domestic violence in Turkey. *Violence and Victims, 25* (2), 265-277.

Altınay, A. G., & Arat, Y. (2009). *Violence against women in Turkey: A nationwide survey*. Istanbul: Punto.

Alvarez, S. E. (2000). Translating the global effects of transnational organizing on local feminist discourses and practices in Latin America. *Meridians, 1* (1), 29-67.

Amnesty International. (1995). *Human's rights are women's rights*. London: Amnesty International Publications.

Amnesty International. (2003). *Turkey end sexual violence against women in custody!* London: Amnesty International.

Anakültür. (2002) *Duyulmayan ses: Güneydoğulu kadınlar anlatıyor. Unheard voice: Voices of women from the southeast.* Istanbul: Anakültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği.

Anıl, E., Arın, C., Berktay, A., Bingöllü, M., İlkkaracan, P., & Ercevik-Amado, L. (2005). *Turkish Civil and Penal Code reforms from a gender perspective: The success of two nationwide campaigns*. Istanbul: Women for Women's Human Rights (WWHR) – NEW WAYS.

Arat, N. (2001). *Siyaset, kadın ve irtica*. İstanbul: Say Yayınları.

Arat, N. (Ed.) (1998). *Aydınlanmanın kadınları*. İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitap Kulübü.

Arat, Y. (1997). The project of modernity and women in Turkey. In S. Bozdoğan & R. Kasaba (Eds.), *Rethinking modernity and national identity in Turkey* (pp. 95-112). Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Arat, Y. (2008). Contestation and collaboration: Women's struggles for empowerment in Turkey. In R. Kasaba (Ed.), *The Cambridge history of Turkey: Turkey in the modern world* (pp. 388-418). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Arat, Y., & Altınay, A. G. (2015). KAMER, a women's center and an experiment in cultivating cosmopolitan norms. *Women's Studies International Forum, 49*, 12-19.

Arın, C. (1990). Türk hukukunda kadının yeri. *Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs, 12*, 35-37.

Arnold, G. (2006). The social construction of wife beating in political discourse. *Iowa Journal of Communication, 38* (1), 27-54.

ayşe. (1987). Dayak aileden çıkmadır. *Feminist, 2*, 8-9.

ayşe. (1990). Sevgili Stella. *Feminist, 7*, 23-24.

Babül, E. (2015). The paradox of protection: Human rights, the masculinist state, and the moral economy of gratitude in Turkey. *American Ethnologist, 42* (1), 116-130.

Başak. (2004a). Feministlerin AKP icraatı. *Pazartesi, 89*, 13.

Başak. (2004b). Yeter artık! *Pazartesi, 90*, 10.

Başer, B. (2013). *The Kurdish diaspora in Europe: Identity formation and political activism*. Istanbul: Boğaziçi University-TÜSİAD Foreign Policy Forum.

Batman'da bir tecavüz olayı! (1997). *Milliyet*. Retrieved October 3, 2021, from https://www.milliyet.com.tr/the-others/batmanda-bir-tecavuz-olayi-5392984

Baytok, C. (2012). *Political vigilance in court rooms: Feminist interventions in the field of law.* (M.A.). Boğaziçi University, Istanbul.

Bedenimiz bizimdir! Cinsel tacize hayır! Kampanyası. (1989). *Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs, 9*, 14-33.

Begikhani, N. (2005). Honour-based violence among the Kurds: the case of Iraqi Kurdistan. In L. Welchman & S. Hossain (Eds.), *Honour: Crimes, paradigms, and violence against women* (pp. 209-229). New York; London: Zed Books.

Belge, B. (2004a). Bedenimiz Cinselliğimiz Bizimdir. *Bianet*. Retrieved September 7, 2021, from https://bianet.org/bianet/kadin/43053-bedenimiz-cinselligimiz-bizimdir

Belge, B. (2004b). Güldünya Tören Davasını AİHMe Götürürüz. *Bianet*. Retrieved October 3, 2021, from https://bianet.org/bianet/kadin/47296-guldunya-toren-davasini-aihme-gotururuz

Belge, C. (2008). *Whose law: Clans, honor killings and state-minority relations in Turkey and Israel.* (PhD). University of Washington,

Belge, C. (2012). *OHAL'de feminizm: Nebahat Akkoç anlatıyor*. Ankara: Ayizi Yayınları.

Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). *The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. New York: Doubleday.

Berik, G. (1990). State policy in the 1980s and the future of women's rights in Turkey. *New Perspectives on Turkey, 4*, 81-96.

Bernstein, E. (2012). Carceral politics as gender justice? The "traffic in women" and neoliberal circuits of crime, sex, and rights. *Theory and Society, 41* (3), 233-259.

Bettiga-Boukerbout, M. G. (2005). 'Crimes of honor' in the Italian Penal Code: An analysis of history and reform. In L. Welchman & S. Hossain (Eds.), *Honour: Crimes, paradigms and violence against women* (pp. 230-244). London, New York: Zed Books.

Beverley, J. (2000). Testimonio, subalternity, and narrative authority. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (pp. 555-565). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Boltanski, L. (1999). *Distant suffering: Morality, media and politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bor, G. (2020). Eren Keskin. In Atlas (Ed.), *Profiles*. Retrived September 15, 2021, from https://www.atlaswomen.org/profiles/2020/3/19/eren-keskin

Bora, A. (1998). Bulunduğumuz yol. *Pazartesi, 36*, 2-3.

Bora, A., & Günal, A. (2002). *90'larda Türkiye'de feminizm*. İstanbul: İletişim.

Bormioli, S., Costantini, M. C., Costantini, M. P., Oancea, D., & Pederzini, G. (2017). *Honour related violence in Italy*. Retrieved March 2, 2021, from http://hasp-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/O-1.1_HRV_in_Italy_EN.pdf

Bredal, A. (2005). Tackling forced marriages in the Nordic countries: Between women's rights and immigration control. In L. Welchman & S. Hossain (Eds.), *Honour: Crimes, paradigms, and violence against women* (pp. 332-353). New York; London: Zed Books.

Brush, L. D. (1990). Violent acts and injurious outcomes in married couples: Methodological issues in the national survey of families and households. *Gender and Society, 4* (1), 56-67.

Brush, L. D. (2003). *Gender and governance*. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.

Brush, L. D. (2013). The law, gendered abuse, and the limits and possibilities of feminist theory. *Tulsa Law Review, 49* (2), 355-366.

Bulaç, A. (1987). Kadın ve şehir. *Kadın ve Aile, 33*, 14-15.

Bumiller, K. (2008). *In an abusive state: How neoliberalism appropriated the feminist movement against sexual violence*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Bunch, C. (1990). Women's rights as human rights: Toward a re-vision of human rights. *Human Rights Quarterly, 12* (4), 486-498.

Bunch, C., & Fried, S. T. (1996). Beijing '95: Moving women's human rights from margin to center. *Signs, 22* (1), 200-204.

Çağlayan, H. (2007). *Analar, yoldaşlar, tanrıçalar: Kürt hareketinde kadınlar ve kadın kimliğinin oluşumu*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Çağlayan, H. (2012). From Kawa the blacksmith to Ishtar the goddess: Gender constructions in ideological-political discourses of the Kurdish movement in post-1980 Turkey. *European Journal of Turkish Studies, 14*, 1-28.

Çağrı. (1997). *Pazartesi, 23*, 6.

Campbell, J. K. (1964). *Honour family and patronage*. London: Oxford University Press.

Canan. (1998). İkinci kez dağ çiçekleri yaratılmak isteniyor. *Jujin, 7*, 2-5.

Caulfield, S. (1993). Getting into trouble: Dishonest women, modern girls, and women-men in the conceptual language of "Vida policial", 1925-1927. *Signs, 19* (1), 146-176.

CEDAW. (1990). *Summary record of the 161st meeting.* Committee on the elimination of discrimination against women, 29 January 1990, New York. File no. CEDAW/C/SR.l61.

Çelikel, A. (1998). Cumhuriyetimizin 75. tılının düşündürdükleri. In N. Arat (Ed.), *Aydınlanmanın kadınları* (pp. 41-49). İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları.

Çelikkol, A. (1986). Kadının başına ne dertler açıldı. *Kadın ve Aile, 13*, 12.

Cerav, N. (2000). Gözaltında cinsel taciz ve tecavüz kurultayı hedefine ulaştı mı? *Pazartesi, 64*, 4-5.

Cerav, N. (2001). Mağdur kadınlar yargılanıyor! *Pazartesi, 73*, 13.

Çiçekçi, C. (1989). Tepkilerin niteliği ve aile kurumunun demokratikleşmesi gereği. *Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs, 9*, 39-40.

Çınar, A. (2005). *Modernity, Islam and secularism in Turkey*. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press.

Çınar, Ü. (1998). Memura grev, kadına dayak. *Pazartesi, 38*, 6.

Connell, R. (1990). The state, gender, and sexual politics: Theory and appraisal. *Theory and Society, 19* (5), 507-544.

Connors, J. (2005). United Nations approaches to 'crimes of honour'. In L. Welchman & S. Hossain (Eds.), *'Honour': Crimes, paradigms and violence against women* (pp. 22-41). London: Zed Books.

Cook, R. J. (1994). State responsibility for violations of women's human rights. *Harvard Human Rights Journal, 7*, 125-175.

Corrigan, R. (2013). *Up against a wall rape reform and the failure of success*. New York: NYU Press.

Cullen, N. (2016). The case of Franca Viola: Debating gender, nation and modernity in 1960s Italy. *Contemporary European History, 25* (1), 97-115.

Das, V. (1995). *Critical events: An anthropological perspective on contemporary India*. Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press.

Dasre, A., Greulich, A., & Inan, C. (2017). *Combating domestic violence against women in Turkey: The role of women's economic empowerment.* Paper presented at the CES Working Papers <halshs-01660703>, Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.

Dayağa Karşı Dayanışma Kampanyası. (1988). *Bağır! Herkes duysun*. İstanbul: Kadın Çevresi Yayınları.

Dayağa Karşı Dayanışma Kampanyası. (1989). *Şimdi sığınak için*. İstanbul: K. Yayınları.

De Cristofaro, E. (2018). The crime of honor: An italian story. *Historia et ius, 14*, 1-12.

Dedeoğlu, S. (2012). Equality, protection or discrimination: Gender equality policies in Turkey. *Social Politics, 19* (2), 269-290.

Demir, B. (2004). Mezar değil sığınak! *Pazartesi, 88*, 4.

Demir Gürsel, E. (2014). N.Ç. davası: Tecavüze razı olmak ve kadınların ahlakı. In E. Çelebi, D. Havlioğlu, & E. Kayaalp (Eds.), *Sınır bilgisi: Siyasal iktidar, toplumsal mekan ve kadına yönelik şiddet* (pp. 137-161). Ankara: Ayizi Kitap.

Demir, H. (1998). *İslamcı kadının aynadaki sureti*. İstanbul: Sel Yayıncılık.

Demokratik ve barışçıl bir dünya için kadın katliamlarına ve her türlü şiddete hayır. (2003).

Diner, C., & Toktaş, Ş. (2013). Women's shelters in Turkey: A qualitative study on shortcomings of policy making and implementation. *Violence against Women, 19* (3), 338-355.

Durakbaşa, A. (1998). Kemalism as identity politics in Turkey. In Z. F. Arat (Ed.), *Deconstructing images of the Turkish woman* (pp. 139-157). New York: St. Martin's Press.

Durukan, A. (2005). Nuran davasında indirimsiz ceza, örnek olsun. *Bianet*. Retrieved October, 4, 2021, from https://bianet.org/bianet/kadin/68112-nuran-davasinda-indirimsiz-ceza-ornek-olsun

Dustin, M., & Phillips, A. (2008). Whose agenda is it? Abuses of women and abuses of 'culture' in Britain. *Ethnicities, 8* (3), 405-424.

Düzkan, A. (1998). Devletin eli uzanıyor mu, kalkıyor mu? *Pazartesi, 37*, 2-5.

Düzkan, A., & Koçali, F. (1996). Kaçtı boğazı kesildi. *Pazartesi, 13*, 2-4.

Ekal, B. (2011). Women's shelters and municipalities in Turkey: Between solidarity and nenevolence. *EchoGéo, 16,* 1-13.

Ekal, B. (2015). Women's shelters as state institutions. In M. Aymes, B. Gourisse, & É. Massicard (Eds.), *Order and compromise: Government practices in Turkey from the late Ottoman Empire to the early 21st century* (pp. 317-332). Leiden, Boston: Brill.

Ekal, B., & Taylı, Ü. (2012). *Sığınaksız bir dünya*. İstanbul: Mor Çatı Yayınları.

Emekçi Kadınlar Birliği. (2001). *Ses ve cesaret: Uluslararası gözaltında cinsel taciz ve tecavüze hayır kurultayı, 10-11 Haziran 2000*. İstanbul: Emekçi Kadınlar Birliği.

Enloe, C. (2000). *Maneuvers: The international politics of militarizing women's lives*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Eralp, H. (1995). Tecavuzler gizleniyor. *Pazartesi, 6*, 11.

Eren, H. (2021, September 5). Gözaltında cinsel işkence devlet politikası. *Jinnews*. Retrieved September 8, 2021, from http://jinnews32.xyz/TUM-HABERLER/content/view/171381

Ergil, D. (1980). A sociological-analysis of honor crimes in Turkey. *Balkan Studies, 21* (2), 404-439.

Ergöçmen, B. A., Yüksel-Kaptanoğlu, İ., & Jansen, H. A. F. M. (2013). Intimate partner violence and the relation between help-seeking behavior and the severity and frequency of physical violence among women in Turkey. *Violence against Women, 19* (9), 1151-1174.

Erol, A. (2004, August 29). TCK ve cinsel yönelim. *Radikal*. Retrieved October 6, 2021, from http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal2/tck-ve-cinsel-yonelim-871758/

Ertürk, Y. (2009). Towards a post-patriarchal gender order. *Sociologisk Forskning, 46* (4), 58-67.

Esmer, Y. (1993). Algılama ve anlatımda eşlerarası farklılıklar. In N. Arat (Ed.), *Kadın ve cinsellik* (pp. 97-119). Istanbul: Say Yayınları.

Evlilikte can güvenliği yok! (1995). *Pazartesi, 8*, 1.

Fábián, K. (2010). *Domestic violence in postcommunist states: Local activism, national policies, and global forces*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Faraç, M. (1998). *Töre Kıskacında Kadın*. Istanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları.

Ferree, M. M. (2012). *Varieties of feminism: German gender politics in global perspective*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Ferree, M. M., & Merrill, D. A. (2000). Hot movements, cold cognition: Thinking about social movements in gendered frames. *Contemporary Sociology, 29* (3), 454-462.

Ferree, M. M., Rucht, D., Gamson, W. A., & Gerhards, J. (2002). *Shaping abortion discourses: Democracy and the public sphere in Germany and the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Foucault, M. (1978). *The history of sexuality volume 1: An introduction*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Fraser, N. (1987). Women, welfare and the politics of need interpretation. *Hypatia, 2* (1), 103-121.

Fraser, N. (2005). Mapping the feminist imagination: From redistribution to recognition to representation. *Constellations, 12* (3), 295-307.

Fraser, N., & Gordon, L. (1994). A genealogy of dependency: Tracing a keyword of the US welfare state. *Signs, 19* (2), 309-336.

Frevert, U. (2014). Honour and/or/as passion: Historical trajectories of legal defenses. *Rechtsgeschichte - Legal History, 22*, 245-255.

Fried, S. T. (Ed.) (1994). *The indivisibility of women's human rights: A continuing dialogue*. New Jersey: Center for Women's Global Leadership, Rutgers University.

Galpin, R. (1999, 8 April). Woman's 'honour' killing draws protests in Pakistan. *Guardian*. Retrieved March 25, 2021, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/apr/08/14

Gannon, K. (2000, July 9). A Woman Sacrificed for Honor of Her Family. *Los Angeles Times*. Retrieved March 25, 2021, from https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-jul-09-mn-50070-story.html

Genç, S. (2001). *Namus cinayetlerinin yazılı basına yansıması.* (M.A). Istanbul University, Istanbul.

Giomi, E. (2016). Comment on Bandelli and Porcelli/1. Against moral panic, in defence of data. *Sociologica, 2*, 1-10.

Gius, C., & Pina, L. (2014). "I loved her so much, but I killed her" Romantic love as a representational frame for intimate partner femicide in three Italian newspapers. *ESSACHESS–Journal for Communication Studies, 7* (2), 53-75.

Goldenberg, S. (1999, 27 May). A question of honour. *Guardian*. Retrieved March 25, 2021, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/may/27/gender.uk1

Goodmark, L. (2012). *A troubled marriage: Domestic violence and the legal system*. New York: New York University.

Gould, D. B. (2004). Passionate political processes: Bringing emotions back into the study of social movements. In J. Goodwin & J. M. Jasper (Eds.), *Rethinking social movements: Structure, meaning, and emotion* (pp. 155-176). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Görüşmeyeli neler oldu? (1988). *Feminist, 4*, 34.

Gözaltında Cinsel Taciz ve Tecavüze Karşı Hukuki Yardım Bürosu (1999). *Kadılara yönelik devlet kaynaklı cinsel şiddet uluslararası seminer notları*. İstanbul: Doz Yayınevi.

Gözke, Ö. (2003, June 24). Taşlanan Allaka kadınlardan cenaze töreni. *Bianet*. Retrieved October, 13, 2021, from https://bianet.org/kadin/siyaset/20395-taslanan-allaka-kadinlardan-cenaze-toreni

Grewal, I. (2013). Outsourcing patriarchy feminist encounters, transnational mediations and the crime of 'honour killings'. *International Feminist Journal of Politics, 15* (1), 1-19.

Gülbahar, H. (2004). Namus takıntısı. *Pazartesi, 93*, 10.

Güldünya'nın köyünde kimse olayı konuşmak istemiyor. (2004, March 3). *Hürriyet*. Retrieved October 5, 2021, from https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/guldunyanin-koyunde-kimse-olayi-konusmak-istemiyor-38575828

Gürbilek, N. (2011). *The new cultural climate in Turkey: Living in a shop window*. London; New York: Zed Books.

Hacking, I. (1991). The making and molding of child abuse. *Critical Inquiry, 17* (2), 253-288.

Halavut, H. (2013). Gözaltında tecavüz: Devletin arzusu, hazzın iktidarı ve dilin sınırları. *Toplum ve Kuram, 8*, 245-264.

Hanbay Çakır, E. (2007, 16-18 March 2007). *Kadın Dayanışma Vakfı.* Paper presented at the Aile İçinde Kadına Yönelik Şiddetle Mücadelede Deneyimler Öncelikler İşbirlikleri Atölyesi, Ankara.

Haney, L. (2002). *Inventing the needy: Gender and the politics of welfare in Hungary*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Haney, L. (2010). *Offending women: Power, punishment, and the regulation of desire*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Harris, L. M., & Atalan, N. (2002). Developing women's spaces: Evaluation of the importance of sex-segregated spaces for gender and development goals in southeastern Turkey. *Kadın/Woman 2000, 3* (2), 17–46.

Herzfeld, M. (1980). Honour and shame: Problems in the comparative analysis of moral systems. *Man, 15* (2), 339-351.

Heval. (1996). Halklara kardeşlik, kadına dayak! *Pazartesi, 11*, 14.

Human Rights Watch. (1991). *Criminal injustice violence against women in Brazil*. United States of America: Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch. (1994). *A matter of power: State's control of women's virginity in Turkey* (Vol. 6). New York, Washighton: Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project.

İlkkaracan Ajas, İ. (2008). *Birleşmiş Milletler CEDAW sürecinde sivil toplum örgütleri ile savunuculuk ve lobicilik Türkiye gölge raporları: 1997 & 2005 deneyimleri*. İstanbul: Kadının İnsan Hakları (KİH) - Yeni Çözümler Derneği.

İlkkaracan, P. (2010). Re/forming the Penal Code in Turkey from a gender perspective: The case of a successful campaign. In J. Gaventa & R. McGee (Eds.), *Citizen action and national policy reform: Making change happen* (pp. 195-216). London, New York: Zed Books.

İlkkaracan, P., & Ercevik-Amado, L. (2011). Legal reforms on violence against women in Turkey. In M. Ennaji & F. Sadiqi (Eds.), *Gender and violence in the Middle East*. London and New York: Routledge.

İlkkaracan, P., Gülçür, L., & Arın, C. (1996). *Sıcak yuva masalı: Aile içi şiddet ve cinsel taciz*. Istanbul: Metis.

İlkkaracan, P., & Women for Women's Human Rights (1998). Exploring the context of women's sexuality in eastern Turkey. *Reproductive Health Matters, 6* (12), 66-75.

Interview with Ayten Ağırdemir, October 13, 2017.

Interview with Filiz Karakuş, March 31, 2018.

Interview with Habibe Yılmaz Kayar, October 4, 2017.

Interview with Hülya Gülbahar and Zelal Ayman, October 7, 2017.

Interview with Nazan Moroğlu, October 25, 2017.

Interview with Perihan Meşeli, September 28, 2017.

Işık, N. (2004, March 6). Hükümet ve diyanet anlasın diye! *Bianet*. Retrieved October 8, 2021, from https://m.bianet.org/bianet/print/30536-hukumet-ve-diyanet-anlasin-diye

Işık, S. N. (2002). 1990'larda kadına yönelik aile içi şiddetle mücadele hareketi içinde oluşmuş bazı gözlem ve düşünceler. In A. Bora & A. Günal (Eds.), *90'larda Türkiye'de feminizm*. İstanbul: İletişim.

Jasper, J. M. (2011). Emotions and social movements: Twenty years of theory and research. *Annual Review of Sociology, 37* (1), 285-303.

Jilani, H., & Ahmed, E. M. (2004). Violence against women: The legal system and institutional responses in Pakistan. In S. Goonesekere (Ed.), *Violence, law and women's rights in South Asia* (pp. 148-206). New Delhi, California: Sage Publications.

Johnson, M. P. (2006). Conflict and control: Gender symmetry and asymmetry in domestic violence. *Violence against Women, 12* (11), 1003-1018.

Joyce, P. (2010). The state, politics and problematics of government. *The British Journal of Sociology, 61* (1), 305-310.

Juris, J. S. (2008). Performing politics: Image, embodiment, and affective solidarity during anti-corporate globalization protests. *Ethnography, 9* (1), 61-97.

Kadın Dayanışma Vakfı. (2007). *Aile içinde kadına yönelik şiddetle mücadelede deneyimler öncelikler işbirlikleri atölyesi.* Ankara Aldino Otel 16-18 March, 2007. Ankara: Kadın Dayanışma Vakfı.

Kadın erkek eşittir. (1986). *Kadın ve Aile, 13*, 7.

Kadın milletvekilleri tecavüze ortak olmayın! (2004). *Pazartesi, 87*, 3.

Kadının Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü. (2021). *Kadına yönelik şiddetle mücadele IV. ulusal eylem planı (2021-2025)*. Ankara: T. C. Aile ve Sosyal Hizmetler Bakanlığı.

Kadın Statüsü ve Sorunları Genel Müdürlüğü (Ed.) (1999). *Töre cinayetleri panel bildirileri*. Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Kadının Statüsü ve Sorunları Genel Müdürlüğü.

Kadınlar 'recm'i lanetledi. (2003, November 17). *Evrensel*. Retrieved October 9, 2021, from https://www.evrensel.net/haber/145390/kadinlar-recm-i-lanetledi

Kadınlar Kadriye'yi omuzlarında taşıdı. (2003, November 18). *Evrensel*. Retrieved October 9, 2021, from https://www.evrensel.net/haber/145418/kadinlar-kadriye-yi-omuzlarinda-tasidi

Kadınlar omuzladı. (2003, November 19). *Milliyet*. Retrieved October 9, 2021, from https://www.milliyet.com.tr/pembenar/kadinlar-omuzladi-5139132

Kadınların kurtuluşu bildirgesi. (1989). *Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs, 6*, 6.

KAMER. (2004a). *We will not get used to! Killings in the name of "honour" 2003 report*. Diyarbakır: Kadın Merkezi.

KAMER. (2004b). *No nore "if only's": Killings in the name of "honour" 2004 report*. Diyarbakır: Kadın Merkezi.

KAMER. (2005). *Who's to blame? Killings in the name of "honour" 2005 report*. Diyarbakır: Kadın Merkezi.

KAMER. (2006). *We can stop this: Killings committed in the name of "honor" 2006 report.* Diyarbakır: Kadın Merkezi.

KAMER. (2011). *We can stop this*. Diyarbakır: Kadın Merkezi.

Kandiyoti, D. (1987). Emancipated but unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish case. *Feminist Studies, 13* (2), 317-338.

Kandiyoti, D. (1989). Women and the Turkish state: Political actors or symbolic pawns? In N. Yuval-Davis & F. Anthias (Eds.), *Woman-Nation-State* (pp. 126-149). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kandiyoti, D. (1990). Ataerkil örüntüler: Türk toplumunda erkek egemenliğinin çözümlenmesine yönelik notlar. In Ş. Tekeli (Ed.), *1980'ler Türkiyesi'nde kadın bakış açısından kadınlar* (6th ed., pp. 327-340). Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Kandiyoti, D. (1998). Gender, power, and contestation: Rethinking bargaining with patriarchy. In R. Pearson & C. Jackson (Eds.), *Feminist visions of development: Gender analysis and policy*. London: Routledge.

Kandiyoti, D. (2010). Gender and women's studies in Turkey: A moment of reflection? *New Perspectives on Turkey, 43*, 165-176.

Kandiyoti, D. (2016). Locating the politics of gender: Patriarchy, neo-liberal governance and violence in Turkey. *Research and Policy on Turkey, 1* (2), 103-118.

Kantola, J. (2006). Transnational and national gender equality politics: The European Union's impact on domestic violence debates in Britain and Finland. In S. Hellsten, A. M. Holli, & K. Daskalova (Eds.), *Women's citizenship and political rights* (pp. 154-178). New York; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Karakuş, F. (Producer). (2018, February 10, 2019). 2 Kasım 1990: Aileyi güçlendirip, kadınları güçsüzleştiren yasalara karşı feminist kadınlardan boşanma eylemi. *Tarihimizden*. Retrieved from https://catlakzemin.com/2-kasim-1990-aileyi-guclendirip-kadinlari-gucsuzlestiren-yasalara-karsi-feminist-kadinlardan-bosanma-eylemi/

Karakuş, F. (2021). 9 Mayıs 2004: Namus cinayetleri, taciz, tecavüz… Anneler Günü'nü kutlamıyoruz. *Çatlakzemin*. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://catlakzemin.com/9-mayis-2004-namus-cinayetleri-taciz-tecavuz-anneler-gununu-kutlamiyoruz/

Karanfil, C. (1994). Erkek kadının kurdu mu? *Kadın ve Aile, 107*, 21-22.

Karayazgan, A. G. (1998). 'Biz kadınlar' diyememek bir türlü…. *Pazartesi, 38*, 8-10.

Kardam, N. (2005). *Turkey's engagement with global women's human rights*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Katzenstein, M. F. (1994). Discursive politics and feminist activism in the Catholic Church. In M. M. Ferree & P. Y. Martin (Eds.), *Feminist organizations: Harvest of the new women's movement* (pp. 35-52). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists beyond borders*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Keskin, E. (1998). Deliller yok sayıldı. *Pazartesi, 40*, 9.

Keskin, E., & Yurtsever, L. (2006). *Hepsi gerçek devlet kaynaklı cinsel şiddet*. Istanbul: Gözaltında Cinsel Taciz ve Tecavüze Karşı Hukuki Yardım Bürosu, Punto.

KHRP. (2003). *Trial observation report*. London: Kurdish Human Rights Project.

Koç, H. (2003). Tecavüzcüye Professor Bey alışsın! *Pazartesi, 84*, 14.

Kocaer, S. (2004, April 7). Son yolculukta. *Hürriyet*. Retrieved October 16, 2021, from https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/telya-yi-son-yolculuga-kadinlar-ugurladi-215754

Koçali, F. (1998). Şiddete karşı Ka-mer. *Pazartesi, 41*, 9.

Koğacıoğlu, D. (2004). The tradition effect: Framing honor crimes in Turkey. *differences, 15* (2), 119-151.

Koğacıoğlu, D. (2011). Knowledge, practice, and political community: The making of the "custom" in Turkey. *differences, 22* (1), 172-228.

Korteweg, A., & Yurdakul, G. (2009). Islam, gender, and immigrant integration: Boundary drawing in discourses on honour killing in the Netherlands and Germany. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 32* (2), 218-238.

Kozanoğlu, Z. (2014). *Işılay Saygın hizmete adanmış bir ömür*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap.

Krizsan, A., & Popa, R. (2010). Europeanization in making policies against domestic violence in Central and Eastern Europe. *Social Politics, 17* (3), 379-406.

Krizsan, A., & Popa, R. M. (2014). Frames in contestation: Gendering domestic violence policies in five Central and Eastern European countries. *Violence against Women, 20* (7), 758-782.

Kürt Rozalar yaratmak. (1996). *rêheval, 1* (5), 20-22.

Laviosa, F. (2010). "Death is the fairest cover for her shame": Framing Honor Killings. In F. Laviosa & L. Mulvey (Eds.), *Visions of struggle in women's filmmaking in the Mediterranean* (pp. 185-212). New York: Palgrave.

Lombardo, E., Meier, P., & Verloo, M. (2009). *The discursive politics of gender equality*. London: Routledge.

Maltepe Kadın Evinden Derya, Emine, Füsun, Gülay, Güzin, Havva, Mado, Melahat, Nur, Nuran, Nuray, Olcay, Şöhret. (1998). Bu miting yapılmalı mıydı? *Pazartesi, 38*, 10-11.

Mann, J. (1999, October 6). A matter of honor vs. justice. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved March 5, 2021, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1999/10/06/a-matter-of-honor-vs-justice/4fcc2df2-d1ba-4f9f-ab82-ebdad21a124f/

Mater, N. (1997, Nov 24, 1997). Rights-Turkey: Women unite against sexual assault in custody. *Interpress Service News Agency*. Retrieved August, 19, 2021, from http://www.ipsnews.net/1997/11/rights-turkey-women-unite-against-sexual-assault-in-custody/

Mayer, A. E. (1995). Reform of personal status laws in North Africa: A problem of Islamic or Mediterranean laws? *Middle East Journal, 49* (3), 432–446.

Meini, B. (2017). Domestic violence: An epidemic which demolishes the myth of the traditional Italian family. In D. S. Peterson & J. A. Schroeder (Eds.), *Domestic violence in international context* (pp. 90-106). London, New York: Routledge.

Mengi, R. (2003, October 18). Takıntılı profesör. *Vatan*. Retrieved October, 13, 2021, from https://www.gazetevatan.com/yazarlar/ruhat-mengi/takintili-profesor-15998

Merhaba. (1996). *Pazartesi, 14*, 1.

Merhaba. (1997). *Pazartesi, 22*, 1.

Merry, S. E. (2001). Spatial governmentality and the new urban social order: Controlling gender violence through law. *American Anthropologist, 103* (1), 16-29.

Merry, S. E. (2006). *Human rights and gender violence: Translating international law into local justice*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Miller, R. A. (2007). Rights, reproduction, sexuality, and citizenship in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. *Signs, 32* (2), 347-373.

Mohanty, C. T. (1988). Under Western eyes: Feminist scholarship and colonial discourses. *Feminist Review, 30,* 61-88.

Mojab, S. (2004). The particularity of 'honour' and the universality of 'killing': From early warning signs to feminist pedagogy. In S. Mojab & N. Abdo (Eds.), *Violence in the name of honour theoretical and political challenges* (pp. 15-37). Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press.

Montoya, C., & Agustín, L. R. (2013). The othering of domestic violence: The EU and cultural framings of violence against women. *Social Politics, 20* (4), 534-557.

Mor Çatı. (1996). *Evdeki terör kadına yönelik şiddet*. Istanbul: Mor Çatı Yayınları.

Mor Çatı. (2000). *Kadın sığınakları I. ve II. kurultayları*. İstanbul: Mor Çatı Yayınları.

Mor Çatı. (2002). Erkek şiddetine, vahşetine ve cinayetlerine son!

Mor Çatı.(2003). Basına, kamuoyuna, ilgililere, ilgisizlere, duyarlı ve duyarsızlara, yetkililere, etkililere.

Mor Çatılı kadınlardan çağrı: Politik cinayetleri teşhir edelim. (1997). *Pazartesi, 33,* 6.

Moroğlu, N. (1999). *Kadınlarımızla birlikte 10 yıl: İ.Ü. Kadın Sorunları Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi ve Kadın Araştırmaları Derneği (1989-1999)*. Istanbul.

Mutluer, N. (2016). Kemalist feminists in the era of the AK Party. In Ü. Cizre (Ed.), *The Turkish AK Party and its leader* (pp. 40-74). London, New York: Routledge.

Mutluer, N. (2018). Diyanet's role in building the 'yeni (new) milli' in the AKP era. *European Journal of Turkish Studies, 27,* 71-94.

Naples, N. A. (2013). "It's not fair!": Discursive politics, social justice and feminist praxis SWS feminist lecture. *Gender & Society, 27* (2), 133-157.

Narayan, U. (1997). *Dislocating cultures: Identities, traditions, and Third-World feminism*. New York: Routledge.

Navaro-Yashin, Y. (1998). Uses and abuses of "state and civil society" in contemporary Turkey. *New Perspectives on Turkey, 18,* 1-22.

Nazlı, F. (1988). Aşk budur. *Feminist, 4,* 24-27.

Nilgün. (2004). Kimsesizler mezarlığına yolculuk. *Pazartesi, 90,* 12-13.

Nourse, V. (1997). Passion's progress: Modern law reform and the provocation defense. *The Yale Law Journal, 106* (5), 1331-1448.

Önal, A. (2012). *Namus cinayetleri*. İstanbul: İstanbul Kültür Üniversitesi.

Önderoğlu, E. (2004). Mengiye TCK Tasarısından Tazminat Cezası. *Bianet*. Retrieved October, 16, 2021, from https://bianet.org/bianet/kadin/30259-mengiye-tck-tasarisindan-tazminat-cezasi

Orhun, C. (2002). A femicide started Anakültür. *Women & Environments International Magazine, 56/57*, 45-46.

Ovadia, S. (1987). Kadınlar, dayağa karşı dayanışmaya! *Feminist, 3*, 10-11.

Ovadia, S. (1990). 'Bütün kadınlar 438'e karşı!'. *Feminist, 7*, 21-22.

Ovadia, S. (1996). Egemen kültüre somut karşı çıkışlar: Mor Çatı. In *Evdeki terör kadına yönelik şiddet* (pp. 175-178). Istanbul: Mor Çatı Yayınları.

Özdemir, B. (2014). The role of the EU in Turkey's legislative reforms for eliminating violence against women: A bottom-up approach. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 16* (1), 119-136.

Öztürk, H. (2003, December 12). Utandı! *Vatan*. Retrieved October 21, 2021, from https://www.gazetevatan.com/gundem/utandi-19761

Öztürk, S. (1988). Taraflı bir kitap tanıtma yazısı: 'Bağır Herkes Duysun!'. *Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs, 1*, 68-70.

Paker, B. (1988). Kadın örgütlenmesinde bir dönüm noktası: Dayağa karşı kampanya. *Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs, 1*, 25-28.

Parla, A. (2001). The "honor" of the state: Virginity examinations in Turkey. *Feminist Studies, 27* (1), 65-88.

Peristiany, J. G. (1966). *Honour and shame: The values of Mediterranean society*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Pervizat, L. (2003). In the name of honor. *Human Rights Dialogue, 2* (10), 30-31.

Pina-Cabral, J. d. (1989). The Mediterranean as a category of regional comparison: A critical view. *Current Anthropology, 30* (3), 399-406.

Pope, N. (2012). *Honor killings in the twenty-first century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Prügl, E. (2013). Gender expertise as feminist strategy. In G. Çaglar, E. Prügl, & S. Zwingel (Eds.), *Feminist strategies in international governance* (pp. 57-73). London and New York: Routledge.

Radford, J., & Russell, D. E. H. (1992). *Femicide: The politics of woman killling*. New York: Twayne Publishers.

Razack, S. H. (2004). Imperilled Muslim women, dangerous Muslim men and civilised Europeans: Legal and social responses to forced marriages. *Feminist Legal Studies, 12* (2), 129-174.

Resmi Gazete (1990). *Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararı. Esas Sayısı: 1988/4. Karar Sayısı: 1989/3. Karar Günü: 12.1.1989*. Tarih-sayı: 10.01.1990-20398.

Richie, B., E. (2012). *Arrested justice: Black women, violence, and America's prison nation*. New York: NYU Press.

Roggeband, C., & Lettinga, D. (2016). In defence of gender equality? Comparing the political debates about headscarves and honor-related crimes in France and the Netherlands. *Social Politics, 23* (2), 239-262.

Roth, B. (2004). *Separate roads to feminism: Black, Chicana, and white feminist movements in America's second wave*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Roychowdhury, P. (2016). Over the law: Rape and the seduction of popular politics. *Gender & Society, 30* (1), 80-94.

Ruane, R. A. (2000). Murder in the name of honor: Violence against women in Jordan and Pakistan. *Emory International Law Review, 14* (3), 1523-1580.

Russo, A. (2018). *Feminist accountability: Disrupting violence and transforming power*. New York: New York University Press.

Sabat, R. A. (2013). Translating international norms: Filters to combating violence against women in Lebanon. In G. Cağlar, E. Prügl, & S. Zwingel (Eds.), *Feminist strategies in international governance* (pp. 143-160). London: Routledge.

Sacchi, P., & Viazzo, P. P. (2013). Honour, history, and the history of Mediterranean anthropology. *Journal of Mediterranean Studies, 22* (2), 275-291.

Safilios-Rothschild, C. (1969). 'Honour' crimes in contemporary Greece. *The British Journal of Sociology, 20* (2), 205-218.

Şakir, Ş. (2021). 6 Mart 2004: "Mezar değil sığınak istiyoruz" eylemi. *Çatlakzemin*. Retrieved October, 17, 2021, from https://catlakzemin.com/6-mart-2004-mezar-degil-siginak-istiyoruz-eylemi/

Sasson-Levy, O., & Rapoport, T. (2003). Body, gender, and knowledge in protest movements: The Israeli case. *Gender and Society, 17* (3), 379-403.

Savaşa hayır. (1996). *Pazartesi, 14*, 2-5.

Savran, G. (1989). Ailenin sorgulanması. *Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs, 7*, 57-59.

Savran, G. (1990). 'İffetli kadın' olmak istemiyorum. *Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs, 10*, 11.

Savran, G. (1995). Evlilik kurumuna bölücülük. *Pazartesi, 6*, 10.

Savran, G. (1997). Kadınlar, şeriat ve çağdaşlık üzerine. *Pazartesi, 24*, 10.

Savran, G. (1998). Yolun neresindeyiz? *Pazartesi, 36*, 3-4.

Savran, G., & Tura, N. (1995). Çağdaşlaşma söylemine teslim olamayız. *Pazartesi, 18*, 11.

Schneider, E. M. (2000). *Battered women and feminist lawmaking*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Schneider, J. (1971). Of vigilance and virgins: Honor, shame and access to resources in Mediterranean societies. *Ethnology, 10* (1), 1-24.

Sedef. (1987). Feminizmin adı. *Feminist, 1*, 4-6.

Self, R. O. (2013). Bodies Count: The '60s Body in American Politics. In D. J. Sherman (Ed.), *The long 1968: Revisions and new perspectives* (pp. 239-269). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Sema. (1998). Kolonyalist 'Türk feminizmi'. *Pazartesi, 39*, 14.

Şen, M. (2010). Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the rise of the Justice and Development Party. *Turkish Studies, 11* (1), 59-84.

Sen, P. (2005). 'Crimes of honour', value and meaning. In L. Welchman & S. Hossain (Eds.), *'Honour': Crimes, paradigms and violence against women* (pp. 42-63). London: Zed Books.

Serim, E. (1994). Sahte feminizm. *Kadın ve Aile, 107*, 30.

Sev'er, A., & Yurdakul, G. (2001). Culture of honor, culture of change a feminist analysis of honor killings in rural Turkey. *Violence against Women, 7* (9), 964-998.

Sevdi, sevişti, bir çocuk doğurdu, intihara zorlandı etmeyince öldürüldü. (1996). *Pazartesi, 16*.

Seymour, M. (2006). *Debating divorce in Italy: Marriage and the making of modern Italians, 1860-1974*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. (2001). Redefining and confronting "honor killings" as femicide. In C. Meillon (Ed.), *Holding on the promise: Women's human rights and the Beijing+5 review* (pp. 66-72). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Center for Women's Global Leadership.

Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. (2003). Reexamining femicide: Breaking the silence and crossing "scientific" borders. *Signs, 28* (2), 581-608.

Shively, K. (2011a). 'We couldn't just throw her in the street': Gendered violence and women's shelters in Turkey. In J. R. Wies & H. J. Haldane (Eds.), *Anthropology at the front lines of gender-based violence* (pp. 71-90). Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press.

Shively, K. (2011b). When domestic violence is not 'intimate partner violence': Cases from Turkey and elsewhere. *Practicing Anthropology, 33* (3), 13-16.

Sirman, N. (1989). Turkish feminism: A short history. *New Perspectives on Turkey, 3* (1), 1-34.

Sirman, N. (2004). Kinship, politics and love: Honour in post-colonial contexts–The case of Turkey. In S. Mojab & N. Abdo (Eds.), *Violence in the name of honour: theoretical and political challenges* (pp. 39-56). Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University.

Somers, M. R. (2008). *Genealogies of citizenship: Markets, statelessness, and the right to have rights*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sönmez, N. (2003). Emeğimizin hakkını ararken. *Pazartesi, 84*, 18.

Söz, C. (2004, April 28). Baba, töre için 14 yaşındaki kızı Nuran'ı telle boğdu. *Hürriyet*. Retrieved October 21, 2021, from https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/baba-tore-icin-14-yasindaki-kizi-nuran-i-telle-bogdu-221294

Spatz, M. (1991). A "lesser" crime: A comparative study of legal defenses for men who kill their wives. *Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, 24* (4), 597.

Staggenborg, S. (1988). The consequences of professionalization and formalization in the pro-choice movement. *American Sociological Review, 53* (4), 585-605.

Stanley, L., & Wise, S. (1990). Method, methodology and epistemology in feminist research processes. In L. Stanley (Ed.), *Feminist praxis: Research, theory, and epistemology in feminist sociology* (pp. 20-60). London; New York: Routledge.

Stark, E. (2007). *Coercive control: How men entrap women in personal life*. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Strid, S., Walby, S., & Armstrong, J. (2013). Intersectionality and multiple inequalities: Visibility in British policy on violence against women. *Social Politics, 20* (4), 558-581.

TCK değişsin! (2004). *Pazartesi, 94*, 7.

Tecavüzcü korucu serbest. (1997). *Pazartesi, 26*, 9.

Tecavüzcüyle evlenme fuhuşu önler. (2003, November 20). *Milliyet*. Retrieved October 4, 2021, from https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/tecavuzcuyle-evlenme-fuhusu-onler-5139080

Tekeli, Ş. (1986). Emergence of the feminist movement in Turkey. In D. Dahlerup (Ed.), *The new Women's movement: Feminism and political power in Europe and the USA* (pp. 179-199). London: Sage Publications.

Tekeli, Ş. (1987). Kadın ve yaşam. *Feminist, 2*, 10-11.

TGNA. (7 December 1993). *Term 19, Year 3, Session 37*. Minutes. Turkish Grand National Assembly.

TGNA. (13 August 1997). Term 20, Year 2, Session 134. Minutes. Turkish Grand National Assembly.

TGNA. (14 January 1998). *Term 20, Year 3, Session 42*. Minutes. Turkish Grand National Assembly.

TGNA. (14 May 1997). *Term 20, Year 2, Session 93*. Minutes. Turkish Grand National Assembly.

TGNA. (14 September 2004). *Term 22, Year 2, Session 119*. Minutes. Turkish Grand National Assembly.

TGNA. (16 January 1992). *Term 19, Year 1, Session 27*. Minutes. Turkish Grand National Assembly.

TGNA. (16 November 1994). *Term 19, Year 4, Session 36*. Minutes. Turkish Grand National Assembly.

TGNA. (23 November 1993). *Term 19, Year 3, Session 31*. Minutes. Turkish Grand National Assembly.

TGNA. (23 October 1990). *Term 18, Year 4, Session 23*. Minutes. Turkish Grand National Assembly.

TGNA. (30 November 1993). *Term 19, Year 3, Session 34*. Minutes. Turkish Grand National Assembly.

Ticktin, M. (2008). Sexual violence as the language of border control: Where French feminist and anti-immigrant rhetoric meet. *Signs, 33* (4), 863-889.

Tillion, G. (2007). *My cousin, my husband: Clans and kinship in Mediterranean societies*. London: Saqi Books.

Timisi, N., & Ağduk Gevrek, M. (2002). 1980'ler Türkiye'sinde feminist hareket: Ankara çevresi. In A. Bora & A. Günal (Eds.), *90'larda Türkiye'de feminizm* (pp. 13-39). Ankara: İletişim.

Tisheva, G., & Macheva, Z. (2017). *Mapping HRV practices against women comparative analysis*. Retrieved March 7, 2021, from http://hasp-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/O-1.2_Comparative_Report_EN.pdf

Toprak, B. (1990). Emancipated but unliberated women in Turkey: The impact of Islam. In F. Özbay (Ed.), *Women, family and social change in Turkey* (pp. 39-49). Bangkok: Unesco.

Töre kurbanı Güldünya'ya devlet töreni. (2004, February 29). *Hürriyet*. Retrieved October 12, 2021, from https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/tore-kurbani-guldunyaya-devlet-toreni-38574533

Tozduman, A. Z. (1990). Batılı kadının zavallığı. *Kadın ve Aile, 60*, 23-24.

Tura, N. (1989). Demokratik ailenin olanaksızlığı üzerine. *Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs, 9*, 42-45.

Tura, N. (1997). Kadın kıyımı her yerde. *Pazartesi, 22*, 2-5.

Türinay, N. (1994). Kadınlar üzerine politika. *Kadın ve Aile, 107*, 16-18.

Türk Hukukçu Kadınlar Derneği. (2000) *1998-2000 yönetim dönemi faaliyet raporu*. Istanbul: Türk Hukukçu Kadınlar Derneği.

Tütüncü, F. (2010). The women preachers of the secular state: The politics of preaching at the intersection of gender, ethnicity and sovereignty in Turkey. *Middle Eastern Studies, 46* (4), 595-614.

Uçan Süpürge. (2002). *Güneydoğu'da kadın: Sorunlar, kuruluşlar, işbirliği ve iletişim*. Ankara: Uçan Süpürge.

Uluocak, Ş., Gökulu, G., & Bilir, O. (2014). A strategic starting point for the elimination of violence against women: Intimate partner violence. *International Journal of Human Sciences, 11* (2), 362-387.

UNIFEM. (2000). Fighting femicide against Palestinian women. Retrieved March 17, 2021, from https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-199542/

United Nations. (1993). *Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women*. Resolution no. A/RES/48/104.

United Nations. (1999). *Statement on Pakistan issued on 13 August 1999 by the Presidency of the European Union.* File no. A/53/1045.

United Nations. (1999). *Statement of the Government of Pakistan issued in Islamabad on 21 September 1999*. File no. A/54/387.

United Nations. (2000). *Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Report of the special rapporteur, Ms. Asma Jahangir, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution, 1999/35, 25 January 2000*. File no. E/CN.4/2000/3.

United Nations. (2000). *Further actions and initiatives to implement the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action*. Resolution no. A/RES/S-23/3.

United Nations. (2000). *Twenty-third special session, 4th meeting, 6 June 2000, official records.* File no. A/S-23/PV.4.

United Nations. (2000). *Netherlands: draft resolution. Traditional or customary practices amounting to crimes against women, including crimes committed in the name of honour.* File no. A/C.3/55/L.11.

United Nations. (2000). *Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Comoros, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Fiji, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jordan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Panama, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of*

Tanzania and Viet Nam: draft resolution. Elimination of all forms of violence and crimes against women. File no. A/C.3/55/L.13.

United Nations. (2000). *Letter dated 3 October 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General*. File no. A/C.3/55/4.

United Nations. (2000). *Third Committee, summary record of the 43rd meeting, 1 November 2000*. File no. A/C.3/55/SR.43.

United Nations. (2000). *Third Committee, summary record of the 46th meeting, 3 November 2000*. File no. A/C.3/55/SR.46.

United Nations. (2000). *Fifty-fifth session, 81st plenary meeting, Monday, 4 December 2000, official records*. File no. A/55/PV.81.

United Nations. (2001). *Fifth report on the situation regarding the elimination of traditional practices affecting the health of women and the girl child, produced by Mrs. Halima Embarek Warzazi pursuant to Sub-Commission resolution 2000/10, 4 July 2001*. File no. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/27.

United Nations. (2002). *Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/49, 31 January 2002*. File no. E/CN.4/2002/83.

United Nations. (2004). *Eighth report on the situation regarding the elimination of traditional practices affecting the health of women and the girl child, prepared by Ms. Halima Embarek Warzazi, 17 June 2004*. File no: E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/41.

Vildan. (1987). Hep birlikte yürüdük ama biz niye yürüdük? *Feminist, 3*, 6-7.

Weiner, M. H. (1991). From dollars to sense: A critique of government funding for the battered women's shelter movement. *Law & Inequality, 9* (2), 185-277.

Weldon, S. L. (2002). *Protest, Policy, and the Problem of Violence against Women a Cross-national Comparison*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Weldon, S. L. (2006). Inclusion, solidarity, and social movements: The global movement against gender violence. *Perspectives on Politics, 4* (1), 55-74.

White, J. B. (2003). State feminism, modernization, and the Turkish republican woman. *NWSA Journal, 15* (3), 145-159.

Whittier, N. (2016). Carceral and intersectional feminism in Congress: The Violence Against Women Act, discourse, and policy. *Gender & Society, 30* (5), 791-818.

Wies, J. R., & Haldane, H. J. (2011). *Anthropology at the front lines of gender-based violence*. Nashville, Tenn: Vanderbilt University Press.

Work against honor killings of women puts human rights defenders at risk. (1999). Statement prepared by the Center for Women's Global Leadership, the International Human Rights Law Group and the International Womens Tribune Centre in collaboration with a coalition of other human rights organizations. April, 9, 1999. Retrieved March, 17, 2021, from https://web.archive.org/web/20040308175905/http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter/hkillingsstmt.html

Yazıcı, B. (2012). The return to the family: Welfare, state, and politics of the family in Turkey. *Anthropological Quarterly, 85* (1), 103-140.

Yelda. (1990). Mağdureleri cezalandırın! *Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs, 10*, 8-10.

Yılmaz, M., & Demir, B. (2004a). Kadınlar güçlendikçe şiddet artıyor. *Pazartesi, 88*, 22-23.

Yılmaz, M., & Demir, B. (2004b). Töreyi kim besliyor? *Pazartesi, 87*, 8-9.

Yılmaz, V., & Demirbaş, H. B. (2014). Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nde lezbiyen, gey, biseksüel ve trans (LGBT) hakları gündeminin ortaya çıkışı ve gelişimi: 2008-2014. *Alternatif Politika, 7* (2), 230-256.

Yirmibeşoğlu, V. (2007). *Toprağa düşen sevdalar*. Istanbul: Hürriyet Gazetesi.

Young, Iris M. (2003). The logic of masculinist protection: Reflections on the current security state. *Signs, 29* (1), 1-25.

Yüksel, Ş. (1989). Kadınlara yönelik şiddet. *Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs, 7*, 60-62.

Yüksel, Ş. (1990). Eş dayağı ve dayağa karşı dayanışma kampanyası. In Ş. Tekeli (Ed.), *1980'ler Türkiye'sinde kadın bakış açısından kadınlar* (pp. 303-310). Istanbul: İletişim.

Yüksel, Ş. (1995). A Comparison of violent and non-violent families. In S. Tekeli (Ed.), *Women in modern Turkish society* (pp. 275-287). London; New Jersey: Zed Books.

Yüksel, Ş. (1998). Bölge'de kadınlar şiddete karşı *Pazartesi, 35*, 15.

Yüksel-Kaptanoğlu, İ., Türkyılmaz, A. S., & Heise, L. (2012). What puts women at risk of violence from their husbands? Findings from a large, nationally representative survey in Turkey. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 27* (14), 2743-2769.

Yurdakul, G., & Korteweg, A. C. (2019). State responsibility and differential inclusion: Addressing honor-based violence in the Netherlands and Germany. *Social Politics, 27* (2), 187–211.

Zengin, A. (2019). The afterlife of gender: Sovereignty, intimacy, and Muslim funerals of transgender people in Turkey. *Cultural Anthropology, 34* (1), 78-102.

Zürcher, E. J. (2017). *Turkey a modern history*. London, New York: I.B. Tauris.