Pastrian, Nicolas
(2024)
Essays on Behavioral Mechanism Design.
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.
(Unpublished)
This is the latest version of this item.
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays contributing to the literature on behavioral mechanism design. In Chapter 1, I examine a monopolist screening problem in which some buyers always report their private valuation truthfully. I show that the optimal mechanism involves two types of contracts: products with identical quality but different prices targeting different types of buyers with the same valuation, and products with a single price tag targeting buyers with the same valuation regardless of their type. In Chapter 2, I study the surplus extraction problem in mechanism design problems with correlated information and consideration sets. I identify the key elements that determine whether full surplus extraction could be guaranteed in this setting and discuss some applications and limitations of the proposed model. Finally, in Chapter 3, I study a monopolist's product line design problem with search frictions, where consumers evaluate a random subset of price-quality pairs, limiting the capacity of the monopolist to control over the options observed by consumers. I show that the interaction between asymmetric information and search frictions induces the monopolist to prefer an unbalanced menu, in which some products are more salient than others. Moreover, salience and quality will be correlated in the optimal menu, either reinforcing or reducing the distortions generated by asymmetric information only.
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Details
| Item Type: |
University of Pittsburgh ETD
|
| Status: |
Unpublished |
| Creators/Authors: |
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| ETD Committee: |
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| Date: |
27 August 2024 |
| Date Type: |
Publication |
| Defense Date: |
17 May 2024 |
| Approval Date: |
27 August 2024 |
| Submission Date: |
30 July 2024 |
| Access Restriction: |
No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately. |
| Number of Pages: |
103 |
| Institution: |
University of Pittsburgh |
| Schools and Programs: |
Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > Economics |
| Degree: |
PhD - Doctor of Philosophy |
| Thesis Type: |
Doctoral Dissertation |
| Refereed: |
Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: |
mechanism design, economic theory, behavioral economics |
| Date Deposited: |
27 Aug 2024 13:24 |
| Last Modified: |
27 Aug 2024 13:24 |
| URI: |
http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/46793 |
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Essays on Behavioral Mechanism Design. (deposited 27 Aug 2024 13:24)
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