Ali, Arden
(2010)
Evidence for Moral Knowledge.
Undergraduate Thesis, University of Pittsburgh.
(Unpublished)
Abstract
My aim in this thesis is to examine two sources of plausibility for moral anti-realism. First, I address some popular arguments that appeal to moral disagreement, ultimately finding that the route from disagreement to anti-realism is less clear than it might seem. Second, I outline one particular argument from moral luck, which highlights the inexplicable coincidence of our moral beliefs and objective moral fact. In response to this argument, I show how our moral sentiments can serve as a specific kind of evidence for moral knowledge, namely evidence that connects our moral opinions non-accidentally with objective moral fact. In that way, on the view developed in this thesis, our moral sentiments make objective moral knowledge possible.
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Details
| Item Type: |
University of Pittsburgh ETD
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| Status: |
Unpublished |
| Creators/Authors: |
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| ETD Committee: |
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| Date: |
12 May 2010 |
| Date Type: |
Completion |
| Defense Date: |
16 April 2010 |
| Approval Date: |
12 May 2010 |
| Submission Date: |
20 April 2010 |
| Access Restriction: |
No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately. |
| Institution: |
University of Pittsburgh |
| Schools and Programs: |
David C. Frederick Honors College |
| Degree: |
BPhil - Bachelor of Philosophy |
| Thesis Type: |
Undergraduate Thesis |
| Refereed: |
Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: |
anti-realism; dispositions; McDowell; moral disagreement; moral epistemology; moral luck; objectivity; sentiments |
| Other ID: |
http://etd.library.pitt.edu/ETD/available/etd-04202010-183558/, etd-04202010-183558 |
| Date Deposited: |
10 Nov 2011 19:39 |
| Last Modified: |
15 Nov 2016 13:41 |
| URI: |
http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/7383 |
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