

**DIFFERENT FACTORS STRESSED BY DIFFERENT ACTORS: EU ENLARGEMENT
POLICY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD TURKEY**

by

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This thesis studies the differences between the European Union's (EU's) Enlargement Policy toward Turkey and the United States' (U.S.'s) Foreign Policy toward Turkey. Both actors have a strong relationship with Turkey but for different reasons. Turkey is a candidate country to the EU and is in the process of accession negotiations. It is also a key ally to the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners and its secular while Muslim identity, location, use as an energy transport route, and strong democracy make Turkey particularly important. In this thesis I argue that enlargement policy and foreign policy toward Turkey are shaped by three factors, geostrategic interests, culture, and economics, but the EU and U.S. place different stress on each factor. This is based on distinctions between the EU and U.S. including that enlargement policy consists of external, internal, and bilateral elements whereas foreign policy only includes external and bilateral elements. The EU approach toward Turkey via enlargement policy focuses strongly on all three factors: geostrategic interests, culture, and economics. Each factor is analyzed with respect to Turkey by each EU member-state, making member-states' decisions dependent on how membership will affect Turkey (externally), how Turkey will affect the EU as a whole (internally) and how Turkey will affect the member-states themselves (bilaterally). However, the U.S. foreign policy approach toward Turkey is constructed mainly on geostrategic interests. This difference in the factors shaping enlargement policy and foreign policy is rooted

in a distinction between the EU and U.S.: while Turkey could possibly accede to the EU, making it a full member of the Union, no such membership could ever be attained with the U.S.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	XI
PREFACE.....	XIII
1.0 INTRODUCTION.....	1
2.0 ENLARGEMENT POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND HOW IT WORKS 6	
2.1 HISTORY OF EU ENLARGEMENT TO TURKEY	10
2.2 MEMBER-STATE PERSPECTIVES ON ENLARGEMENT TO TURKEY VERSUS THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS.....	15
2.2.1 States in Support of Turkey’s Membership to the EU.....	16
2.2.1.1 United Kingdom (UK)	16
2.2.1.2 Poland.....	18
2.2.1.3 Greece.....	20
2.2.2 States Against Turkish Membership to the EU	21
2.2.2.1 Cyprus	21
2.2.2.2 Germany	25
2.2.2.3 France.....	28
3.0 FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD TURKEY, WHAT IS IT AND WHAT ARE THE AIMS?	32

4.0	FACTORS.....	44
4.1	FACTORS OF ENLARGEMENT.....	45
4.1.1	Geostrategic.....	45
	4.1.1.1 Voting in Favor.....	49
	4.1.1.2 Voting Against.....	53
4.1.2	Cultural.....	55
	4.1.2.1 Voting in Favor.....	62
	4.1.2.2 Voting Against.....	67
4.1.3	Economic.....	71
	4.1.3.1 Gross Domestic Product and Income.....	72
	4.1.3.2 Foreign Direct Investment.....	74
	4.1.3.3 Trade.....	77
	4.1.3.4 Population and Migration.....	78
	4.1.3.5 Voting in Favor.....	80
	4.1.3.6 Voting Against.....	85
4.2	FACTORS OF FOREIGN POLICY.....	86
4.2.1	Geostrategic.....	86
4.2.2	How the Factors Differ in Foreign Policy and Why (Why Culture and Economics Do Not Play as Large of a Role in U.S. Foreign Policy as They Do in EU Enlargement Policy).....	98
	4.2.2.1 Economy.....	99
	4.2.2.2 Culture.....	103
5.0	CONCLUSION.....	108

APPENDIX	111
BIBLIOGRAPHY	112

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: FDI Inflow to Turkey from the EU and U.S. (Turkey PMISPA).....	75
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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: FDI Inflow* to Turkey (Turkey PMISPA).....	75
--	----

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP: Adalet ve Kalkinma (Justice and Development Party) (Turkey)
BERR: UK Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
CCT: Common Customs Tariff
CDU: Christian Democratic Union (EU Member States Political Party/ Germany)
CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)
DoD: Department of Defense (U.S.)
DIKO: Dimokratikó Kómma (The Democratic Party of Cyprus)
DG: Directorate-General
DG ECFIN: Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (EU)
DG ELARG: Directorate General for Enlargement (EU)
ECJ: European Court of Justice
EEC: European Economic Community
EMU: European Monetary Union
EU: European Union
FCS: Foreign Commercial Service (within U.S. Department of Commerce)
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
FDP: Free Democratic Party (Germany)
FTA: Free Trade Area
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force (NATO)
JHA: Justice and Home Affairs
MEP: Member of European Parliament (EU)
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals (UN)
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEC: National Economic Council (U.S.)
NGO: Non-governmental Organization
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC: Organisation of The Islamic Conference
PKK: Kurdistan Workers Party (Turkey)
PPP: Purchasing Power Parity
PPS: Purchasing Power Standard
QMV: Qualified Majority Voting
SDP: Social Democratic Party (EU Member-States Political Party/Germany)
UK: United Kingdom
UN: United Nations
UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

U.S.: United States

USTR: United States Trade Representative

PREFACE

“There are two Mustafa Kemals. One is the flesh-and-bone Mustafa Kemal who now stands before you and who will pass away. The other is you, all of you here who will go to the far corners of our land to spread the ideals which must be defended with your lives if necessary. I stand for the nation's dreams, and my life's work is to make them come true.”

-Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Ankara Emniyet Müdürlüğü)

While Atatürk may have passed away, his legacy lives on in the aspirations, government, and hearts of the Turkish people. Here I would like to acknowledge those that have served as my inspiration, just as Atatürk had done for his people. Firstly, to Dr. Sbragia, who not only introduced my love for the European Union, but who has served as my mentor over the past two years. Without your help and guidance, not only within this thesis but in my academic development, I would not be the student I am today. To Dr. Linden, Dr. Mitsos, and Dr. Shuster, whose guidance has encouraged me to become a more critical thinker and who have devoted their time and thoughts to my educational pursuits. Thank you for your constant encouragement during this endeavor. I would also like to thank the staff of University Honors College, whose interest in undergraduate achievement inspired me to pursue this degree. I am grateful to the staff at the United States Mission to the European Union, who have given me the opportunity to not only practice my skills learned in the classroom but to venture beyond borders and find a lifetime of opportunity to enjoy.

To my family, thank you for your unwavering support, questions, and genuine interest in this project. I would like to dedicate this work to my younger siblings, Tripp, Jenn, and Ricky, whose love and friendship have had a profound impact on my life. Embrace the opportunities

around you, jump at experiences, and always say yes. Success does not always come from thinking, but from taking a chance.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

With 2010 comes the dawn of a new decade. We are starting a new chapter that takes into account September 11, the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union (EU) in 2004, a new American President, and a rapidly developing Turkey. This decade is the time in which the United Nations (UN) hopes to usher in the success of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. It is the time for a change in energy and climate change policies as shown by the EU's 20/20 by 2020 Policy. And it is, possibly, the time for a new step toward multilateralism: the accession of Turkey to the EU and a strong U.S. tie to a predominantly Muslim country.

Oddly enough, unlike past historical eras, borders and boundaries are becoming indistinct and isolationism has become impossible. No state, in the dawn of this new decade, can afford to "go it alone", not even the United States (U.S.). As governments' policies work toward goals that permeate many states, international actors must work together, either bilaterally or multilaterally, to create solutions. Therefore the EU and U.S. find themselves in a position to act toward Turkey, to find resolutions to global problems, and to create stronger ties.

Turkey has nestled itself between the auspices of the EU and the U.S. It seeks to please both actors and works bilaterally with both on many occasions. Yet, the EU and U.S. are two different international actors. While the EU's relationship to Turkey is via enlargement policy, the U.S. acts from foreign policy. These different policy approaches are driven by numerous

factors. For the EU these factors include geostrategy, culture, and economics, whereas, for the U.S., foreign policy is driven mainly by geostrategy.

These approaches largely stem from the key difference between the EU and the U.S. While the U.S. is a state, the EU is an international organization (IO). The EU is made up of 27 European states operating under an EU governing system. While on some subject matters member states make decisions by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), enlargement uses a more intergovernmental approach in which each of the 27 states receives one vote and unanimity is necessary for enlargement to take place. Hence, all 27 EU member-states must vote “yes” in order to allow for Turkey’s membership to the EU, and one “no” vote can void this possibility. While this vote will not occur in the near future, it is important to understand that it will take place as each member-state of the EU has strong feelings on Turkish membership, with states such as the UK, Greece, and Poland advocating for Turkish membership while others, including Cyprus, France, and Germany, vehemently oppose it. In steps of the membership process as well, including the opening and closing of chapters of the *acquis*, etc., all EU member-states must vote using the same unanimous voting system in order to proceed. Therefore, each EU member-state, regardless of size, population, or reason for voting “yes” or “no”, is all-powerful in enlargement policy. Because the EU is an international organization consisting of sovereign states, each state receives one vote in the enlargement process, and each member-state has veto power.

EU member-states base their votes on external, internal, and bilateral elements. Externally, the states observe how membership will affect Turkey’s political system, economy, culture, geostrategy, relations with other countries including neighboring states in the Near East and Caucasus, etc. The states decide if membership is in the best interest of Turkey based on

these factors. The states then look internally to decide if Turkish membership is in the best interest of the future of the EU. Additionally, EU member-states assess how Turkish membership will affect their individual state and its bilateral relationship with Turkey. Thus bilateral elements and those internal to the EU overall are what strongly drive member-states' opinions on Turkish membership, as Turkey's membership in the EU would upset the current balance of the EU and would have an impact on all member-states as well as the structure of the EU itself. Turkish membership would mean an inclusion of Turkish migrants, a predominantly Muslim state in the EU, a different history than Europe, extending EU borders to the Near East including unstable states (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Georgia), conflicts with Armenia, and a new member-state with a population around the size of Germany (giving Turkey more votes in QMV than all other 26 states except Germany). Since Turkish membership includes so many facets, and each facet will have an impact on each member-state and will inevitably change the state to some extent, Turkish membership is extremely controversial. The major factors that EU member-states base their decisions on include geostrategy, culture, and economics. These internal and bilateral elements explain how the EU functions as an IO and how decisions are made based on the internal impacts of Turkish membership in the EU as well as Turkey's bilateral relations with each member-state.

The U.S. is drastically different than the EU in its policy toward Turkey because it is not an IO and is a state. Because the U.S. does not require the acquiescence of 27 states to create foreign policy, its policy is more unified. U.S. foreign policy is constitutionally directed by the President of the United States, and depending on the types of agreements signed, can include the consent of the Senate. Executive Agreements can be made solely by the President, but Treaties must be ratified by the Senate and Congressional-Executive Agreements require a Joint-

Resolution from Congress. Congress can also work from a more bottom-up strategy without the initiative of the President, passing resolutions to influence foreign policy decision-making in the executive (this is seen currently by House Resolution 106 highlighted later). Foreign policy bureaucracies, such as the State Department and the Department of Defense, interest groups, and non-governmental organizations, among others, also attempt to influence U.S. foreign policy. Since the executive branch has the most say in foreign policy, with the legislative branch having lesser influence, the President is the major foreign policy decision-maker for the U.S., as compared to the 27 actors needed to create EU enlargement policy. In the U.S., actors other than the President can seek to influence foreign policy and can harm a President's initiatives, but they cannot entirely derail a policy-plan as one of the EU member-states can, needing unanimity to move forward in enlargement negotiations. In creating U.S. foreign policy the U.S. also takes into account external and bilateral effects as the U.S. looks at how it can better Turkey while simultaneously benefitting the U.S. and its overall relationship with Turkey. However, the U.S. does not consider internal factors, unique to the Turkey-EU relationship, as U.S. policy is bilateral and does not involve actors other than the U.S. and Turkey. Externally, the U.S. looks at how it can better Turkey militarily, economically, and strategically, to sustain a stable nation in an otherwise volatile region. The U.S. also seeks its own bilateral gains in working with Turkey including using Turkish land for air bases, using Turkey as a transport route to Iraq, working with Turkish forces in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), etc. So the U.S. considers geostrategic factors more in its policy than culture and economics. The key difference then between EU enlargement policy and U.S. foreign policy is that the U.S. is a state and acts mostly under the initiative of the President, whereas the EU requires a unanimous vote of all 27 member-states for enlargement to take place.

This paper seeks to explain the EU and U.S. approaches toward Turkey and why they differ based on the factors driving them. I will first define and illustrate the differences between enlargement policy and foreign policy. I will then investigate the factors driving these policies to explain EU and U.S. actions towards Turkey and why they do not emphasize the same goals. Lastly, I will demonstrate that while the EU takes geostrategic interests, culture, and economics into account in enlargement policy, U.S. foreign policy is based largely on geostrategic interests with less emphasis on economics and culture.

2.0 ENLARGEMENT POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND HOW IT WORKS

Enlargement policy, simply stated, is the policy by which a state joins the EU (Friis 2005, 179). The European Union guidelines outlined in the Treaty of Amsterdam explain the terms of accession. Article 6(1) states that “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States” (Consolidated TEU 2002, 11). Article 49 explains that “any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union” (Consolidated TEU 2002, 31). Furthermore, the subsequent Copenhagen Criteria establish the criteria that a country must meet in order to become a member-state of the European Union. These include three criteria:

1. Political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the respect for and protection of minorities;
2. Economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
3. Acceptance of the Community *acquis*: ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union (Europa 2010c).

As the Copenhagen Criteria highlights, a candidate country must be able to abide by and implement the *acquis communitarie*. The *acquis* includes the objectives and law of the EU, consisting of the treaties on which the EU was founded (Rome, Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and now Lisbon); regulations, directives, decisions,

recommendations, and opinions from the treaties; other acts including resolutions, statements, recommendations, and guidelines whether legally bonding or not; joint actions, common positions, declarations, and conclusions on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA); international agreements that the EU is party to; and the decisions and case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of First Instance (European Commission 2005, 4). The Negotiating Framework also explains that these criteria must be implemented in a timely and effective fashion as well. A European state that can fulfill the criteria of the *acquis* as well as the Copenhagen Criteria should, at some point, be able to join the EU.

However, the process of joining the EU is not purely external. While a state may possess these credentials to join, enlargement also has internal and bilateral affects. Enlargement is judged from three angles. Current member-states view the applicant externally, deciding if it fulfills the criteria. They also look internally at how an applicant will affect the future of the EU and bilaterally at how an applicant will affect the bilateral relationships between the applicant country and each member-state. However, the membership process does not dictate that member-states should take into account bilateral issues when voting; in fact, member-states are not supposed to do so. Nevertheless, bilateral issues ultimately do affect how member-states vote, regardless of the fact that they are not supposed to vote with bilateral issues in mind. Lykke Friis explains how enlargement encompasses internal and external factors.

However, if one tries to put one of the classical labels—foreign or domestic (internal) policy—on this process, it becomes far more intriguing...On one hand enlargement is very much foreign policy if we define that broadly as the EU's action towards non-members and the outside world. Understood in this way enlargement is a key foreign policy tool: accepting a new, potentially unstable democracy and shoring up its political and economic health can be the ultimate and most efficient foreign policy response from a Union seeking to secure its borders...

‘On the other hand, enlargement is shaped by and itself shapes internal policy in profound ways. Bringing in new countries requires the EU to reform various internal policies, practices, and institutions to accommodate newcomers (Friis 2005, 179).

Friis also argues that enlargement changes the EU internally in three ways: institutionally (voting), policy agenda reform and setting, and policy towards new neighbors and border expansion (Friis 2005, 179-80).

As the EU takes on more and more members, it will have to reform internally as well. Hence when member-states vote on accession candidates, they take into account how the applicant will affect the future of the EU. As Graham Avery, Secretary General of the Trans European Policy Studies Association, notes:

Enlargement is much more than foreign policy: enlargement is the process whereby the *external* becomes *internal*. It is about how non-member countries become members, and shape the development of the EU itself. In accepting new partners, and deciding the conditions under which they join, existing members define the EU’s future composition and collective identity. In that sense, enlargement could better be described as ‘existential’ policy: the EU determines its own nature whenever it chooses to (or not to) enlarge its membership (Avery 2008, 180).

Enlargement policy is therefore not just the process by which a state joins the EU. Rather it is the process by which a state reforms to meet the criteria to join the EU, while the EU considers whether taking on such a member will positively impact the internal structure and culture of the future of the Union. Furthermore, because the EU is an IO made up of 27 states, it not only will affect the EU internally but also the member-states relations with the candidate country bilaterally. When a new state accedes, the relationship between each member-state and the former candidate country is likely to change; hence member-states often vote on how a country’s possible membership will affect the member-state within its borders, whether it be because of migration, economics, etc. Overall, member-states make decisions on membership based on external, internal, and bilateral factors.

Enlargement therefore is a lengthy process. The process starts with an applicant country, Turkey in this case, submitting an application for membership to the EU. The Council of Ministers then confirms the applicant's candidate status and asks the Commission for an opinion. The Commission then gives its opinion to the Council, and, if the Commission agrees, the Council opens accession negotiations. Negotiations then begin with intergovernmental conferences between the applicant and the member-states. The Commission and the applicant then screen the *acquis* to see what problems need to be resolved. The EU can then decide to open chapters of the *acquis* and the applicant will present a position. In response, the Commission will issue a "common position" and the Council can choose to approve it. If approved and agreement is reached on the chapter, the EU can close it. Turkey currently lies in this stage. Some chapters are open and being negotiated, one is closed, and some are blocked or suspended. If Turkey is able to close all chapters, the EU and Turkey would create a Treaty of Accession. The Commission would then issue an opinion on the Treaty, followed by the Parliament. If agreed upon, Turkey and the member-states of the EU would sign the treaty. The member-states would then ratify the treaty based on their national procedures for doing so, some of which may be by referenda (Avery 2008, 186). The treaty would then come into force.

However, the hardest part of this process, besides negotiating chapters, is the last two steps: signing and ratifying the treaty. In this process each EU member-state has veto power and one vote against membership would result in a failure of accession. This is where enlargement policy is shown to be external, internal, and bilateral: while member-states assess how the applicant can conform to the necessary criteria (external), they also weigh the pros and cons of the impact of accession both within their country (bilateral) and within the EU (internal). If one country feels that the applicant could jeopardize the future health of their country or the Union it

can veto membership and the state cannot accede. Again, while internal and external factors are supposed to be taken into account, bilateral factors are not supposed to be considered when voting. However, regardless of this rule, bilateral issues are regularly taken into account even though the member-states are not supposed to do so.

2.1 HISTORY OF EU ENLARGEMENT TO TURKEY

Turkey's attempt to join the EU dates back to September of 1959 when Turkey first applied for associate membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), seven years after its entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (DG ELARG 2010). Four years later in September of 1963 the Ankara Agreement was signed between the EU and Turkey, which established the future of Turkish-EU relations: a Customs Union followed by eventual membership. This agreement was also supplemented with the signing of a financial protocol in 1963 and an Additional Protocol and second financial protocol signed for the Customs Union in November of 1970 (DG ELARG 2010). However, due to political instability in Turkey, further proceedings on membership did not take place again until April of 1987 when Turkey submitted its application for full membership to the EEC, still prior to the implementation of the Customs Union (DG ELARG 2010). This application was rejected two years later, but the EU still offered a Customs Union which came into action following finalization by the Turkey-EU Association Council in 1995 (LaGro and Jørgensen 2007b, 5; DG ELARG 2010). This Customs Union is said to be beneficial to Turkey in two ways: it has not only allowed for a Free Trade Area (FTA) between the EU and Turkey, but also, according to The Atlantic Council, it should allow for easier negotiation of trade chapters of the *acquis* thereby speeding up accession negotiations in

these areas. The Atlantic Council has instead found that “The more difficult chapters are likely to be those dealing with EU funds—or that deal with very intrusive and specific regulations, such as home and judicial affairs, financial matters, environment, and transport” (Atlantic Council 2004, 21).

By December of 1997, following the implementation of the Customs Union, the EU declared that Turkey was eligible to become an EU member at the Luxembourg European Council and in December of 1999, at the EU-Helsinki Council, the EU deemed Turkey an EU Candidate Country and noted that it was to be on equal footing with all other candidate countries for membership (DG ELARG 2010). In March of 2001 the Accession Partnership for Turkey was established by the Council and later adopted by the Commission. Turkey responded by creating the “National Program for the Adoption of the EU *acquis*” to prepare for negotiations (Atlantic 2004, 3). In May of 2003 the Revised Accession Partnership was adopted by the EU. In October of 2004 the Commission presented its recommendations on Turkey’s membership progress and in Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, the Commission found that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria and recommended opening accession negotiations¹ (European Union 2007). The Commission also created a paper entitled “Issues Arising from Turkey’s Membership Perspective” which outlined prospective issues for the future (DG ELARG 2010). Two months later the European Council outlined the conditions for the opening of accession negotiations (DG ELARG 2010). The Commission then adopted “Communication on the civil-society dialogue between EU and Candidate countries” in June 2005 (DG ELARG 2010).

¹ In order to open accession negotiations the political criteria of the Copenhagen Criteria must be fulfilled.

It was not until October of 2005 that the Council adopted a Negotiating Framework for Turkey and opened the formal accession negotiations, a year after the Commission determined that Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria. The negotiations began with a screening of the *acquis*. The Negotiating Framework explains that compliance with the *acquis* includes:

the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties on which the Union is founded; legislation and decisions adopted pursuant to the Treaties, and the case law of the Court of Justice; other acts, legally binding or not, adopted within the Union framework, such as interinstitutional agreements, resolutions, statements, recommendations, guidelines; joint actions, common positions, declarations, conclusions and other acts within the framework of the common foreign and security policy; joint actions, joint positions, conventions signed, resolutions, statements and other acts agreed within the framework of justice and home affairs; international agreements concluded by the Communities jointly with their Member States, the Union, and those concluded by the Member States among themselves with regard to Union activities (European Commission 2005, 4)

Therefore, in order to become a full member of the EU, Turkey must transform the *acquis* into national law in a timely and effective fashion. In December of 2005 the Council adopted a revised Accession Partnership. The first chapter of negotiations was opened in June of 2006, Chapter 25: Science and Research, and was closed the same month. This is the only chapter of the *acquis* to be closed so far of the 33 chapters (see Appendix)².

However, progress was halted in December of 2006, when the Council decided that eight chapters would be suspended until the 2005 Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement was implemented, which stated that among other things, that Turkey must open its ports to Cyprus (DG ELARG 2010). Therefore, the following chapters may not be opened, nor others provisionally closed, until Turkey implements this Protocol: Chapter 1: Free Movement of

² While the Appendix lists 35 chapters, two of the chapters noted, chapters 34 and 35, are not legislation chapters.

Goods; Chapter 3: Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services; Chapter 9: Financial Services; Chapter 11: Agriculture and Rural Development; Chapter 13: Fisheries; Chapter 14: Transport Policy; Chapter 29: Customs Union; and Chapter 30: External Relations (Turkey 2009 Progress Report). While these chapters have been suspended, others have been opened but cannot be closed until Turkey implements the Protocol. Additionally, France has blocked five chapters (one of which is not an official legislation chapter, Chapter 34: Institutions) and Germany and Austria have blocked three (EurActiv 2009b). In March 2007 negotiations opened on Chapter 20: Enterprise and Industrial Policy, and in June negotiations opened on Chapter 32: Financial Control, and Chapter 18: Statistics. In December of 2007 Negotiations were further opened on Chapter 21: Trans-European Networks, and Chapter 28: Consumer and Health Protection (DG ELARG 2010). The council adopted another revised Accession Partnership for Turkey in February of 2008 (DG ELARG). Further negotiations have opened Chapter 7: Intellectual Property Law, and Chapter 6: Company Law, in June 2008, Chapter 4: Free Movement of Capital, and Chapter 10: Information Society and Media, on December 19, 2008, and Chapter 16: Taxation, on June 30, 2009 (DG ELARG 2010; European Commission 2009a; Council 2009b). This was followed in August of 2009 by the opening of Chapter 27: Environment (Pop 2009). In December of 2009, Cyprus blocked six more chapters, when Turkey did not implement the Ankara Protocol, including Chapter 2: Freedom of Movement for Workers; Chapter 15: Energy; Chapter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights; Chapter 24: Justice, Freedom and Security; Chapter 26: Education and Culture; and Chapter 31: Foreign, Security and Defense Policy (CPS 2009, 2). Overall, of the 33 legislative chapters of the *acquis*, this leaves eleven chapters open, one closed, eight suspended, nine previously blocked, and four that have yet to be negotiated (see Appendix).

Chapter negotiations involve a timely and in-depth process. Negotiations are carried out by representatives from the Council of Ministers with some involvement of the Commission and the Parliament, along with the negotiators from Turkey including Turkey's Chief Negotiator Egemen Bağış (Jørgensen 2007, 16). First each chapter goes through a screening or "analytical examination" when the Commission explains the *acquis* to Turkey, and Turkey explains its policy to the Commission. Chapters cannot be opened then until there is enough compliance between the applicants' policies and the necessary criteria to fulfill the chapter. When compliance is in order the Council votes to open the chapter. In this process all EU member-states must agree to open each chapter and the benchmarks for closure of the chapters. Each member-state has veto power in this respect, so one "no" vote can block the opening of a chapter (Akçapar 2007, 166). When all states agree unanimously to open a chapter in the Council, the Commission prepares the chapters. When negotiations are finished and the candidate country is in complete compliance with the chapter the Council can vote to close it. In order for the chapter to be closed the Council must vote unanimously to close it or else it will remain open. Hence each member-state has tremendous power in accession negotiations in that it has veto power both in opening and closing negotiations of each chapter.

The history of Turkish membership again shows how enlargement policy is unique in that it is external, internal, and bilateral. The EU member-states take into account many factors in voting, including not only how membership will affect Turkey, but, more importantly as they may argue, how Turkish membership will affect them as member-states (bilaterally) and the EU as a whole (internally) regardless of the fact that bilateral issues are not supposed to be taken into account when voting. Turkey, in its pursuit of membership, must also recognize the nature of this process as well. There are certain factors that are uncontrollable, and, even if Turkey meets

the *acquis* and Copenhagen Criteria in full, the EU member-states may still veto Turkey's membership. Factors like population size and religion, assets of Turkey that are intrinsic and are unlikely to change, can be a hindrance to the membership process. Hence Turkey and the EU see membership from different perspectives. "For Turkey, EU membership represents acceptance into the European club and also a guarantee of modernizations and reform. For the EU, this debate is not just about Turkey, but the future of Europe and the scope of its integration process" (Atlantic 2004, 2). Both Turkey and EU member-states look not only externally at how membership will change the other, but internally at how it will change the organization, and bilaterally at how it will change each member-state's individual relationship with Turkey. Since the Enlargement process is unique and complicated, all actors involved will work to push different agendas. Turkey will work to conform to the *acquis* and Copenhagen Criteria. EU member-states that favor Turkish enlargement will push to open, negotiate, and close chapters. Those states that do not favor its membership will be able to stalemate parts of the process.

2.2 MEMBER-STATE PERSPECTIVES ON ENLARGEMENT TO TURKEY VERSUS THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS

As explained earlier, the Enlargement Process involves an intergovernmental voting process whereby each state receives one vote and therefore each state has veto power as unanimity is required for opening chapters, closing them, and deciding on Turkey's accession to the EU. Since Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) is not used in this process, the opinions of each member-state of the EU matter, regardless of its population size or voting power in QMV. Since each state has equal voting power in this process the reservations of each state must be taken into

account. While some states strongly advocate for Turkey's membership to the EU, others strongly oppose it.

2.2.1 States in Support of Turkey's Membership to the EU

Some states are in support of Turkey's bid to join the EU. While some like the UK strongly support Turkish membership, other states still have reservations but support membership, such as Poland. Others, such as Greece, advocate membership in order to solve domestic disputes with Turkey.

2.2.1.1 United Kingdom (UK)

The UK strongly supports a Turkey entrenched in the European Union. As long as Turkey is able to meet the accession criteria, meet human rights standards, and abide by the separation of powers between the government and the military, the UK will continue to fight for Turkish membership. UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband cited the UK's reasons for supporting membership on a number of levels in his speech "Strong Britain in a Strong Europe." He noted Turkey's geostrategic location as a transit country for energy. He also explained that Turkey is a transit country for criminals and drugs but if Turkey is brought into the EU these problems could be fought internally which would help to secure Turkey and the EU. Furthermore, Miliband explained that any member-state qualms about keeping Turkey out of the EU due to religion and culture would be detrimental to the Union as the EU is, in part, based on unifying countries and including them regardless of differences, not excluding them because of differences. A representative of EurActiv who covered the speech wrote that "Miliband said that being European is about values, not race or religion, and therefore having a Muslim country with

a secular public realm can only strengthen the Union” (EurActiv 2009c). Miliband also explained that Turkey’s membership could lead to economic gains for the Union’s current members. Regardless of integrating Turkey’s large population into the EU framework, the UK believes that opening the EU to Turkey would benefit all. Miliband stated,

No-one believes that in the next twenty years the EU could or should double in size again. But if we fail to use our power to break down the barriers between the EU and its neighbours, freeing up trade, investment, and travel, and welcoming new members, we will all—not just aspirant members—pay a significant price. The figures actually speak volumes here—in less than 10 years trade between the old and new member states grew almost threefold (EurActiv 2009c)

Hence, regardless of others member-states’ worries about the enlargement of the Union from a population of almost 492 million people to nearly 569 million, the UK sees Turkish membership as a more promising future, allowing for more investment in the EU and more freedom of movement for Turkish citizens (CIA EU 2009; CIA Turkey 2009). For these reasons the UK continues to strongly support Turkish membership.

The UK’s support for Turkish membership also stems from the UK’s preference to widen or broaden the Union as opposed to deepen the Union. Over the years, as some states have fought to deepen European integration, moving toward a more supranational EU, the UK has fought to broaden the EU by including new members. Since deepening involves a closer merging of sovereignty and widening involves taking on new members, it is hard to do both at once. This is why the UK fights for a more enlarged Union; it believes that, should the EU take on more members, it will not be able to deepen, a fear that the UK has always held as it would require yielding more of its sovereignty to the EU. According to Rachman,

The wideners, epitomized by former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher (Delors’s arch enemy), were keen to expand the membership of the EU to include all the post-Communist countries of eastern and central Europe. They wanted to spread the political and economic benefits of EU membership as broadly as possible, but they were also often attracted to EU enlargement for other, more self-serving reasons. They believed that the larger the EU was,

the more diverse it would become, and the more difficult it would be to achieve the deepeners' goal of a united Europe (Rachman 2006, 51).

This preference for widening over deepening also influences the UK's decision to support Turkish membership. As Rachman states, not only does the UK want to "spread the political and economic benefits of EU membership" to Turkey, but it also hopes to avoid deepening by supporting widening.

Despite the UK's premise that widening will prevent deepening, the EU sees the two processes as complementary. According to Karp and Bowler, "For the European Commission in particular, the process of enlargement (broadening) is part of the process of integration and acts as a complement to the development of a stronger role for the EU and its institutions or deepening of integration" (Karp and Bowler 2006, 369). However, Karp and Bowler note that regardless of the EU's opinions on widening and deepening, EU member-states still see widening and deepening as different, opposing processes. Hence, despite the EU's intentions of widening and deepening, the UK sees Turkish membership as beneficial to both the future of the EU as well as the well-being of the UK because by enlarging the EU's membership to Turkey deepening will be prevented.

2.2.1.2 Poland

Poland is also a supporter of Turkish membership, but does not support Turkish membership as strongly as the UK. Poland has stated that it will support Turkish membership in order to build a stronger Union. In a meeting in 2006 between former Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Meller and then Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, the two spoke of improving economic and defense relations between Turkey and Poland. Meller stated that Poland has supported, and will continue to support, Turkish accession to the EU (Daily World EU News

2006). Poland also stated that the same accession criteria that applied to Poland in the 2004 enlargement should be applied to Turkey, with no further restrictions on Turkish membership, which some other EU member-states have advocated. While Poland has been skeptical about the EU's ability to absorb a country with such a large population, the Polish government has stated that this should not be a factor influencing membership and therefore member-states should not vote on Turkish membership based on this concern (EurActiv 2010). However, Poland has been wary of Turkish membership for cost reasons. Poland believes that if Turkey is to join the EU Turkey will need a substantial amount of subsidies (EurActiv 2010). A Polish Member of the European Parliament (MEP), Konrad Szymański, stated that "Turkish admission would likely provoke 'a full-scale crisis of agricultural policy and cohesion policy'" (Weisband et. al. 2008, 61). Furthermore, he explained that reforming these areas solely to accommodate Turkish accession would be wrong, even though many agree that the areas are in need of reform. Other Polish representatives have stated other concerns. Another Polish MEP, Jan Tadeusz Masiel, sees cultural problems with accession. He stated that "Turkish accession was not a matter of 'whether Turkey does or does not already meet the EU's requirements. It is a matter of whether we want a Muslim Turkey in a Europe that was built on Christian values'" (Weisband et. al. 2008, 62). Despite these concerns, each party in power in recent years has supported Turkish membership, although party divides in Poland yield different views of membership (Forysinski and Osiewicz 3-6). While some in Poland are skeptical of the EU's ability to absorb such a large population, Turkey's need for subsidies, and Turkey's culture, the government in Poland has continued to support Turkish membership regardless.

2.2.1.3 Greece

Turkey has long been known as Greece's foe, having quarrels over Cyprus and territorial disputes. Greece has complained of Turkish military aircrafts invading Greek airspace, and this problem has only worsened over the past year. A new complaint came from Greece that these jets are now endangering Greek flight paths and are flying too low over Greek territory (EurActiv 2009d). Tensions have also arisen over Greece's large number of illegal immigrants traveling to Greece via Turkey. "Greece recently obtained EU support regarding illegal immigration to its territory via its border with Turkey, a situation seen by Brussels as 'endangering Greek democracy'" (EurActiv 2009d). NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has noted that such disputes over airspace and immigration are a hindrance to NATO performance. He explained that "ongoing tensions between the two countries are endangering NATO and EU missions in Afghanistan and Somalia by putting ground troops at risk" (EurActiv 2009d). These disputes are a constant strain on the Greek-Turkish relationship.

Despite these disputes, Greece advocates Turkish membership to the EU. While the two have quarreled for long parts of their history, Greece believes that rejecting Turkish membership would only exacerbate tensions in the relationship. Instead, Greece has found that if it supports Turkish membership both Greece and Turkey will benefit. Applying the *acquis*, the Copenhagen Criteria, and the Ankara Agreement and Ankara Protocols, should help resolve some of the Greek-Turkish issues, including Cyprus and territorial disputes. Hence by advocating membership Greece is subjecting Turkey to Europeanization which would improve relations. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis explains the Greek reasoning for supporting membership.

The way to resolve the Cyprus issue and bilateral disputes was by means no more of coercion through ostracization but by exposing Turkey to the influence of Europeanization through bringing into closer cooperation with European institutions and supporting its eventual full membership. It was understood that Turkey's democratic consolidation and welfare was to

Greece's national interest, because unlike perhaps other EU member states, Greece could simply not afford to ignore Turkey. Greece's exorbitant defense expenditure was already a heavy price paid for the lack of any progress, which could only become heavier if Turkey lost interest in EU membership...A democratizing, economically growing Turkey would comprise a much better neighbor and potential partner for Greece than a Turkey turned inwards, entangled in domestic strife or ruled by military or Islamist regime...The best way to promote Turkey's democratization was by facilitating its European integration (Grigoriadis 2008, 157).

From the Greek perspective, if Turkey is to be brought into the EU it would resolve disputes between Greece and Turkey while ensuring Turkey's democratic future. Having Turkey as a democratic neighbor would also ensure Greek security, as explained by Angelos Sepos. "The 'democratic peace' thesis that a more Europeanized and democratized Turkey will also be more cooperative, moderate and peaceful in its foreign policy underpinned this shift in Greece foreign policy" toward supporting Turkish membership (Sepos 2008, 130). Hence, the Greek government believes it is in their national interest to support Turkish membership, regardless of the troubled years before. Turkish membership could put disputes to rest and ensure Greek security.

2.2.2 States Against Turkish Membership to the EU

While some states such as the UK, Greece, and Poland support Turkey's membership bid, other states are vehemently against it, including Cyprus, Germany, and France.

2.2.2.1 Cyprus

In the case of Turkish membership Cyprus does not act like Greece and instead does not support Turkey's EU bid. While Cyprus also has historical issues and disputes with Turkey, Cyprus stands firm on rejecting Turkish membership. Turkey and Cyprus have argued over how

to best resolve the conflict between communities on Cyprus and achieve reunification under UN auspices. The Ankara Protocol was meant to extend the EU-Turkey Customs Union to the new member-states of 2004, including opening Turkish ports and airbases to Cyprus. Furthermore, it outlined that Turkey and Cyprus should try to normalize relations, promote “good neighbourly relations, the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the contribution to the peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem,” according to Cypriot Foreign Affairs Minister Markos Kyprianou (EurActiv 2009b). The larger issues have yet to be resolved but of most immediate importance, Turkey has not opened its ports or recognized the government of Cyprus. In 2006, the Council blocked eight chapters of the *acquis* due to the Cyprus disputes and Turkey’s noncompliance with the Ankara Protocol. Three years later, when the Ankara Protocol still was not implemented and Turkey continued to close its airbases and ports to Cyprus, Cyprus blocked six more chapters. In discussion, Kyprianou claims that Cyprus is open to Turkish accession negotiations and has proven so in allowing for negotiations to take place in the first place; yet, in practice it is clear that Cyprus is firmly against Turkish membership by blocking chapters (EurActiv 2009b). This situation is currently at a standstill because Turkey will only agree to open its ports when the economic and trade sanctions on Northern Cyprus are lifted, but Cyprus has prevented this from happening (CPS 2009, 2).

While Cyprus and Turkey continue to work on negotiations, accession talks are stalled in some areas by the process. There is a glimmer of hope for a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus dispute though as

polls show that most Cypriots want the talks to succeed, even if they are sceptical about that happening. Negotiations over the past year have gone relatively well. After the victory of pro-compromise Demetris Christofias in the February 2008 Greek Cypriot presidential election, he and his likeminded Turkish Cypriot counterpart, Mehmet Ali Talat, have worked through the issues in more than 40 meetings (ICG 2009).

With more than 40 meetings taking place in a year and the friendly relations between Christofias and Ali Talat some see an eventual solution in the future. However, many dispute that regardless of the talks there will be no fruitful outcome. And while most Greek Cypriots would like to see a solution to the Cyprus disputes, most still would not support Turkish membership to the EU.

A Eurobarometer poll published in July 2006 showed that 68 percent of Greek Cypriots opposed Turkish membership to the European Union, and only 26 percent were in favor, even if Turkey ‘complied with all the conditions set by the European Union.’ In this case, and although not a formal condition for accession, this would suggest that most Greek Cypriots would oppose Turkish membership even if the Cyprus problem were solved (Ker-Lindsay 2007, 77).

Hence even if Cyprus negotiations do have positive results, these results will not necessarily yield Cypriot support for Turkish accession to the EU if public opinion is taken into account.

Cypriot rejection of Turkey in the EU is based on the argument of leverage. While Greece used to promote such a policy but has since moved to support Turkish membership in order to yield a more peaceful relationship, Cyprus is still using leverage as its policy (Ker-Lindsay 2007). The thought behind this process is that Cyprus holds the “high cards,” so to speak, in this poker hand. Cyprus is already an EU member and therefore has veto power in Turkish accession. Instead of being a cooperative, compromising partner in solving issues, Cyprus sees its position as one of power and uses leverage to try to force Turkey to concede to its demands. Turkey, on the other hand, sees the relationship as one of compromise. Cyprus’ leverage policy was exemplified by the Papadopoulos administration.

The Greek Cypriot administration of Tassos Papadopoulos has not followed the same approach [as Greece]. Instead, it still adopts a rigid approach towards handling what is generally termed ‘the national issue’ and adheres to the old Greek policy that Turkey’s EU accession process should be used as leverage over Ankara. Most obviously, this has been seen in the continual threats made by the Greek Cypriot leader to veto Turkey’s EU accession path unless certain specific steps are taken. This was first seen in advance of the December 2004 European Council, where a decision was taken to announce the date for the commencement of membership talks with Turkey. Thereafter, the veto was threatened on

several other occasions, including the attempt to block the start of talks on the Chapter on Science and Research of the *acquis communautaire* in June 2006 (Ker Lindsay 2007, 75).

The incumbent president, Dimitris Christofias, of the same party as Papadopoulos (the Democratic Party, Dimokratikó Kómma (DIKO)), has noted that this major goal in his administration will be to create a peaceful solution in Cyprus. He has followed in the footsteps of the Papadopoulos administration, continuing to use leverage where possible, and when not achieving its goal vetoing Turkey's progression in accession. While veto power was threatened under the Papadopoulos administration, it was used in the Christofias administration in December of 2009 when Cyprus blocked the opening of six chapters of the *acquis* until the Ankara Protocol is implemented in full (CPS 2009, 2). Because of Cyprus' approach of using leverage in negotiations while Turkey prefers compromise, negotiations are stalled in some areas.

Cyprus has been hindering the Turkish accession process for some time (see Sepos 2008), and it does not look like this policy of leverage will change soon, as most Cypriots do not want it to. According to Ker-Lindsay,

It appears as if the Greek Cypriots sincerely believe that leverage will work for them in a way it did not for Greece...In the minds of most Greek Cypriots, unless there is a solution, there really is no point in trying to foster a better relationship with Turkey. Unlike Greece, which has tried to pursue better relations with Turkey despite differences that exist, most Greek Cypriots are uninterested in, if not wholly opposed to, the idea of developing economic ties with a country that occupies part of their land. Nor is there a strategic interest in cooperating with Ankara at a regional level (Ker-Lindsay 2007, 79).

As noted earlier, even if a solution is reached, it is likely that most Cypriots still will not support Turkish membership and furthermore, have no economic or strategic interest in wanting to do so.

It must be noted that while the Cypriot government, in practice, does not support Turkish membership, to maintain some degree of cordiality with Turkey, the government often does not

voice this and instead uses a soft, lofty, and promise-less support for a “European Turkey.” Cypriot Foreign Affairs Minister Markos Kyprianou has voiced this belief. He stated,

‘Turkey will always be there, and will always be as big, and Cyprus will always be there, just as small. So it is in our interest to have a European Turkey. Not just Turkey in Europe – we want a Turkey that thinks, feels, acts and behaves as a member state of the European Union, not as a guest having a free ride’ (EurActiv 2009b)

While Cyprus makes comments as such, they are empty words as evidenced by the Cypriot history of blocking chapters both directly as in December 2009 or indirectly as seen through the Council’s suspension of eight chapters. These statements of “support” are just part of the larger leverage policy to make Turkey conform to Cyprus’ desire for a Cypriot approved “European Turkey.” This shows how Cyprus uses its national interest as the backbone of its veto power and “Greek Cypriots have become the most visible technical obstacle to Turkey’s EU accession process and have eagerly used all the levers available to them to pursue what they see as their national interest and need for justice” (ICG 2009). In order for Cyprus to ever even consider Turkish membership as a real possibility, Turkey would have to implement the Ankara Protocol and Cyprus disputes would have to be peacefully settled.

2.2.2.2 Germany

Germany’s position on Turkish membership varies by party. While Germany was once an advocate of Turkish membership, the current German government is only in favor of a “privileged partnership” with Turkey. While the Social Democratic Party (SDP) has supported Turkish membership, the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) will only accept a “privileged partnership” (EurActiv 2010; Kramer 2006). The current coalition partner of the CDU, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) is also critical of accession (EurActiv 2010). With the CDU and FDP having the current say in government, Chancellor Merkel (CDU) will only stand for a

“privileged partnership” for Turkey. However, the idea of a “privileged partnership” is something created by the CDU that has been criticized by both Turkey and EU members.

Germany stands against Turkish membership for different reasons. First, Germany is home to around three million Turks, and around 1.2 million of them have become German citizens (EurActiv 2009a). However, the Turks in Germany are not fully integrated and tend to live in their own communities. This seclusion has made German public opinion of Turkish membership rather low, believing that the Turks are too different culturally from Germans and Europeans. Additionally, with the largest Turkish population in the EU thus far, Germany, like other countries, is worried about a future wave of migration if Turkey is to accede. According to Kramer, “There is a general fear that the EU would experience another wave of labor migration from Turkey induced by considerable differences in the level of development which could negatively impact on the social fabric of member states, especially Germany” (Kramer 2006, 30).

Furthermore, Guido Westerwelle, the Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor of Germany has stated that the Turkish economy would only prove to be a hindrance to the EU and member-states, as the Turkish economy is poorer than that of the other member-states and would not allow for a comfortable integration into the EU (McElroy 2009). Ironically, Turkey and Germany have been close trading partners. “Germany remains Turkey's most important economic and commercial partner within the EU. The volume of bilateral trade, worth 14 billion Euros annually, has doubled in the past ten years. Nearly 14% of Turkey's exports go to Germany, while 17% of Germany's total exports go to Turkey” (EurActiv 2010). While Turkey and Germany have had a strong economic relationship, Germany is still against Turkish membership believing that the poor Turkish economy will negatively affect the EU and its member-states, including Germany.

In recent meetings between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan, the disagreements between German and Turkish policies were shown. Merkel and Erdoğan disagreed over Cyprus negotiations, with Merkel advocating that Turkey should recognize the Cypriot government, as Turkey is the only country to recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (BBC 2010b). Further disagreements were shown over Iran. Whereas Germany is in support of sanctions toward Iran, the Turkish government thinks that diplomacy is the only way to maintain a friendly relationship with its neighbor in order to achieve greater peace on an international scale (BBC 2010b). Erdoğan has explained that sanctions would only prove to be counter-productive to these efforts and therefore Turkey will not take part in the sanctions that many other countries have implemented (BBC 2010b). Furthermore, the Turkish argument to work diplomatically with Iran goes beyond peace and includes the need to sustain Turkey's economic partnership with, cultural exchanges with, and energy from Iran. Iran does 10 billion dollars worth of trade with Turkey, sent around one million tourists to Turkey in 2009 alone, and is Turkey's second largest natural gas supplier after Russia (Anatolia News Agency 2010; PressTV 2010; Kreyenbühl 2007).

These disagreements have only exacerbated the tensions already created by the promotion of a "privileged partnership" by Germany. Turkey's Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bağış has noted that this offer of a "privileged partnership" is "Very insulting. Because it does not exist. There is no legal foundation for it" (EurActiv 2009a). There is no such thing as a "privileged partnership" with the EU, and, if anything, this privileged partnership would likely only allow for closer economic ties which the EU and Turkey already have through a Customs Union (Tacar 2007, 126). Yet Germany continues to only support a "privileged partnership" for Turkey as opposed to membership. Turkey on the other hand, will

have to wait and has said that it will do so patiently. As Bağış said, “It took us 40 years just to get a date to start accession talks. We did not give up. We were committed, we were decided, and we were patient. And today, we are even more committed, more decided and more patient than ever” (EurActiv 2009a). Turkey will continue to work toward membership and implementing the *acquis*, despite Germany’s current position against membership.

2.2.2.3 France

France has many of the same issues with Turkish accession as Germany. The term “privileged partnership,” created by the German CDU party, has now become the advocacy plan of the French as well, with President Sarkozy calling for a “privileged partnership,” not accession. Yet Sarkozy states that he trusts in the other member-states to make the best decision for the Union’s future as a whole, vowing that he will attempt not to block chapters if there is no need. Sarkozy stated that, “If the 27 undertake this crucial discussion about the future of our Union, France will not oppose opening new chapters in negotiations between the Union and Turkey in the coming months and years” (EurActiv 2007). However, although this was his first statement that acknowledged even the possibility of Turkish membership, he noted “I don’t want to be a hypocrite. Everybody knows I’m only favourable to an association” (EurActiv 2007). Despite Sarkozy’s statements that he will not oppose opening new chapters, France has blocked the opening of five chapters of the *acquis* in the Turkish accession process (EurActiv 2009b). So while Sarkozy says France will not block chapters these statements should be taken lightly as France is continuing to block the opening of chapters.

Sarkozy still has noted that he will stand strong for promoting a different type of relationship that entails less than membership. Sarkozy told German newspaper *Bild am Sonntag*: “We need a well-organised Europe [...] That means we cannot expand without borders.

We shouldn't make any empty promises to Turkey.' As an alternative, Sarkozy proposed to create a large joint economic area, noting that a similar concept might work to bind Russia closer to the EU" (EurActiv 2009e). However, this is much like the Customs Union that already exists. In a similar fashion, Sarkozy states that he would like a "privileged partnership" but there is no such concept in the EU. Without a legal framework for this Sarkozy is, in fact, offering nothing more to Turkey than what it already has: a Customs Union. Turkish officials have long stated that this idea of promoting a "privileged partnership" is insulting as no such idea has any legal standing in the EU. In the fall of 2009, the French agreed to stop using the phrase "privileged partnership" as the Turks have taken offense to a promise that is indeed empty (EurActiv 2009a). Yet, just because the French have vowed to discontinue the use of the phrase, they still propose to offer something less than membership to Turkey.

One of the most simple reasons that Turkey should not be allowed to join the EU, according to some member-states including France, is that geographically Turkey barely falls within what is considered to be Europe. Many consider Turkey to fall within the Near East, with only the Western-most tip, including Istanbul, falling within Europe. As Kramer states,

The most simple but, nevertheless, weighty argument is that Turkey geographically does not belong to Europe and thus is not a European country being eligible for EU membership. Added to this, one can often find the argument that Turkey due to its political and cultural-ideological history is not part of the history of European civilization which also prevents the possibility of eventual membership. Turkey as the 'other' cannot become an EU member (Kramer 2006, 29).

The idea that Turkey is not located in Europe can create cultural rifts between how Europeans see themselves and others. Even with the 2004 enlargement member-states stated that even though the post-communist states were geographically European, they had a different sense of European history and identity. This same message applies to Turkey, but is even stronger as most of Turkey geographically can be seen as lying outside of Europe. Some state that only

three percent of Turkey's land area lies within Europe (Dismorr 2008, 29-30). Sarkozy has echoed this belief in stating, "Europe has been lying about its borders. Turkey is in Asia Minor and not in Europe" (EurActiv 2010). The idea that Turkey is not European is the reason that some states, like France, claim to oppose its membership. This more simple argument could also be seen as an excuse though, as to not insult Turkey for other reasons that states, including France, may reject its membership. For instance, telling Turkey its culture and Muslim population are too different from Europe, or that it is too poor and would hurt the economies of other member-states, can be insulting. Highlighting a factor that relies on Turkey's geographical location, could be an excuse for opposing Turkish membership as to avoid more controversial reasons to reject Turkish membership.

Turkey's geographical location brings up another point of contention: identity. If Turkey lies more toward the Near East and Asia, the French question whether Europeans and Turks can have the same identities. This was a question in the 2004 enlargement as well. Some member-states argue that Turkish membership will change the cultural fabric of the EU. As Kramer explains, "The fear prevails that either the integration process would be lethally jeopardized by Turkish entry or that the EU/Europe would become too much 'Muslim' in that case and would lose its civilizational direction [sic]" (Kramer 2006, 26). This issue has been of concern to the French as France has the largest Muslim population in the EU and France's Muslim population is not very well integrated, which makes Turkish membership less enticing. Furthermore, the "the largely anti-Islamic far right has been making significant advances on the French political scene - against a backdrop of growing public reluctance to admit new members to the EU" (EurActiv 2010). The mix of the anti-Islamic party with a public that has its own share of largely Muslim identity has created an even more difficult situation for Turkish membership.

Furthermore, these perceived differences between European culture and identity and Turkish culture and identity, are transforming into political concerns as well. As Kramer explains, the

perception of Turkey's 'otherness' is also behind the prominent argument that Turkish membership would dilute the EU past recognition as has been expressed by Girard d'Estaing's [former President of France] famous statement that this would mean 'the end of the EU as a political union.' More concretely, it is feared that Turkey's 'different political culture' would lead to constant problems in EU decision-making and in the implementation of EU decisions among an overwhelming Muslim population. Related to this argument is another more political one: There is a concern that Turkish national interests will dominate the EU's agenda as the country would be the largest member state at the time of accession with respective great influence in institutions and decision-making procedures (Kramer 2006, 29)

Because of Turkey's sheer size and population, Turkey will gain the same amount of votes as Germany in QMV, allowing for Turkey to have more votes than all 26 other states including France, except Germany. Hence, as Kramer argues, not only will the politics of the EU be changed as Turkey's political culture is different than that of Europe's, but Turkey will have more voting power in the Union than other states, giving a certain predisposition to certain issues. While QMV tries to correct for this by not only needing a two-thirds majority in votes but also enough votes to represent 66 percent of the EU population, there is still considerably more weight given to Turkey.

Because some countries are vehemently against Turkey joining the EU, for cultural, economic, geostrategic issues, etc., they have the ability to stalemate the enlargement process since votes are taken intergovernmentally and unanimity is necessary to push forward with negotiations. With countries such as Cyprus, Germany, and France opposing Turkish membership, negotiations have become a slow, complicated process.

3.0 FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD TURKEY, WHAT IS IT AND WHAT ARE THE AIMS?

U.S. foreign policy towards Turkey has long been one of friendship and advocacy. From the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1974 to U.S.-Turkish relations today, the U.S. government has always aimed to strengthen the relationship, even at times at the expense of others. As Henry Kissinger stated, Turkey was even more important to the U.S. than some other allies (Kissinger 1999, 255).

Although Congress instituted an arms embargo after the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, President Ford continued to be supportive of Turkey and aimed to fight the embargo. The embargo was lifted in 1978 but the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey still needed time to normalize. From 1978-1980 violence broke out throughout Turkey in numerous provinces, resulting in the installment of martial law (Library of Congress, Federal Research Division 2008, 4). The military announced that the state had stopped functioning correctly and subsequently dissolved the parliament, suspended political parties, arrested political party leaders, and declared a state of emergency (Zürcher 2004, 278). The military claimed to have imposed martial law in the interest of democracy by “saving democracy from the politicians” (Zürcher 2004, 278). In 1982 a new Constitution was created and established by referendum which created a seven-year presidency and limited parliament to one house (BBC 2010c). By 1987 martial law had been repealed in all provinces.

In 1990 the U.S. entered the Persian Gulf War with other UN allies, and Turkey allowed U.S.-led forces to launch air strikes from Turkish bases (BBC 2010c). By 1992, 20,000 Turkish troops entered Northern Iraq to fight the PKK. Throughout the 1990's the AKP government implemented reforms which granted more rights to women, allowed for the ability to broadcast in Kurdish, and abolished the death penalty. As Turkey became more democratic it became even more important to the U.S. than it was under President Ford. Moving from a communist to post-communist era changed U.S. concerns about Turkey: from Turkey falling to communism to Turkey becoming Eastern instead of Western. In order to keep Turkey Western, the U.S. has continued to support Turkey.

However, tensions rose after 2003 when the U.S. declared war on Iraq. Unlike the first Gulf War, Turkey did not allow the U.S. to use Turkish land for a second front. "Largely in response to public opposition to the war in Turkey and the lack of a clear UN-mandate, the Turkish parliament refused to approve U.S. use of the country's territory to invade Iraq" (Kirişçi, Tocci, and Walker 2010, 5). This created rifts between Turkey and the U.S. While Turkey eventually did allow the U.S. to use its airspace, airports, harbors, and military bases and have allowed "noncombat logistical needs" to flow through Turkey, there is still a sour memory of the initial rejection (Akçapar 2007, 157). Turkey has also contributed to the war in Iraq, but for its own reasoning. Migdalovitz explains that "Because it has battled PKK separatists for so long, Turkey's overriding goal regarding Iraq is to preserve its neighbor's territorial integrity in order to prevent the emergence of an independent Iraqi Kurdish state that could serve as a model for Turkey's Kurds or more permanent haven for the PKK" (Migdalovitz 2008, 5). Yet, the U.S. conceives the Kurdish region of Iraq as being less of a problem than the Turks do because the region's autonomy is seen as a promising feature to the U.S. However, this aspect worried the

Turks that the U.S. would sponsor an independent Kurdish region. This fear has since begun to fade though as the U.S. moved to withdraw from Iraq and Turkey changed its own policies (Kirişci, Tocci, and Walker 2010, 16). Unlike in Iraq, the U.S. and Turkey have worked well together in Afghanistan (a NATO mission) and Turkey has led the International Security Assistance Force twice.

The Turkey-U.S. relationship is important for many reasons, but it is especially important when framed by today's time period. In the last forty years, the United States has become increasingly involved in the Middle East. From the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to the First Gulf War, the War in Iraq, the War in Afghanistan etc. the U.S. has developed a presence in the region. Turkey has also served as a major energy transport state, and is therefore important to the EU and the U.S. Whether the U.S. involvement is to promote democracy, uphold human rights standards, or create peace in a more turbulent region, the U.S. is sure to be an actor.

One of the ways the U.S. is involved is by using Turkey as a model of stability in an otherwise rocky region. Turkey is a stable democracy with a secular government, a flourishing economy, and increasing adherence to human rights standards. While in many ways Turkey is like its neighbors in parts of its history, its culture, and its religion, it has an air of "Europeanness" to it as well. In this way, by being a Westernized country almost situated in the Near East, it can become a model for its neighbors. While the EU and U.S. seek to increase democracy, human rights efforts, and peace in Turkey's region, they can have a hard time doing so as they do not share similar backgrounds or relationships with these states. Other countries in the region can relate to Turkey, unlike the EU and U.S., so it is possible that, through Turkey, these countries can change. Talk of such reforms at the Organisation of The Islamic Conference shows Turkey's ability to do so.

Since a Turkish national was elected as secretary-general of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there have been efforts to pursue similar projects among the members. Turkey worked hard to include ‘good governance’ and ‘expansion of political participation’ in the OIC’s Ten Year Program of Action in 2005 and its Charter at the Dakar Summit in March 2008. There are also a growing number of Turkish NGOs engaged in cultural, educational, environmental, and women projects and of influential business organizations that interact with their counterparts abroad, promoting the diffusion of liberal market values (Kirişci, Tocci, and Walker 2010, 18).

By bearing a similar Islamic background, Turkey was able to bring these reforms to discussion at the OIC. This is a feat that the U.S. alone could not achieve due to its lack of connection with Turkey’s neighbors. Hence the U.S. sees Turkey as an actor that can enable such change in the region and has upheld friendly relations with Turkey in order to do so. This explains why President Ford did not support the arms embargo and why President Obama does not support House Resolution 106: if the Turkey-U.S. relationship falters the U.S. can lose this geostrategic edge to use Turkey as a model for democracy in its region.

The U.S. also maintains a strong relationship with Turkey through its direct involvement in the region. Turkey allows the U.S. to use Turkish land and airspace. As noted, Turkey now allows for supplies to flow through Turkey to Iraq and allows the U.S. and other forces to use its harbors, airports, airspace, and establish military bases. Additionally, the continued use of U.S. Incirlik air base in Turkey has been extremely helpful to both U.S. and European forces in the region. Furthermore, the majority of U.S. aid given to Turkey is issued for military purposes. Hence the U.S. uses Turkey logistically for military purposes, but still wants to use Turkey to promote stability in the region. The United States’ direct involvement in the region and its need for Turkey’s airspace, airports, harbors, and land use for military bases and as a transport route to Iraq, as well as its need for access to oil, influences U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey. However, initially Turkey would not allow the U.S. to use these assets during the War in Iraq.

Therefore, while the U.S. and Turkey do cooperate in this area now, there is still a sense of bitterness from the first rejection of the U.S. to use Turkish land and airspace.

For this reason, the White House has made considerable efforts to constantly maintain a strong relationship with Turkey. Under President Bush, Turkey was recognized as being increasingly democratic and upholding similar Western ideals as the U.S. outlined in the “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership” concluded by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and then Foreign Minister Gül. Under the Obama administration, Turkey has become an even more prominent ally. On President Obama’s first overseas trip he chose to travel to Turkey and spoke to the Turkish Parliament to emphasize the importance of the U.S.-Turkish relationship (White House 2009b). President Obama and Prime Minister Erdoğan have met to continue to strengthen this relationship. In a meeting on December 7, 2009 in the White House, President Obama praised the Turkey-U.S. relationship and its partnership through NATO, highlighting how the countries have worked together in Afghanistan (where both have troops), how Turkey has supported the U.S. in Iraq, and how the U.S. and Turkey have aimed to try to resolve the financial crisis at the G20 summit. He also praised Turkey’s efforts in normalizing Turkish-Armenian relations, integrating minorities, and fighting terrorism. Additionally, in promoting regional peace, President Obama said that Turkey is a critical player in helping to move Iran in a more peaceful direction. According to the President, “given Turkey's history as a secular democratic state that respects the rule of law, but is also a majority Muslim nation, it plays a critical role I think in helping to shape mutual understanding and stability and peace not only in its neighborhood but around the world” (White House 2009a). Furthermore, President Obama pledged to continue to strengthen the U.S.-Turkey relationship throughout his Presidency, stating that he is “incredibly optimistic

about the prospect of stronger and stronger ties between the United States and Turkey that will be based not only on our NATO relationship, our military-to-military relationship, our strategic relationship, but also increasing economic ties” (White House 2009a). While the U.S. relationship with Turkey is primarily geostrategic, the U.S. and Turkey are looking to create and strengthen economic ties as well.

Prime Minister Erdoğan explained that Turkey will work toward becoming the model state in the region as promoted by the U.S. He stated that Turkey will try to play its part to promote peace, democracy, and stability. Prime Minister Erdoğan explained that,

The fact that the President visited Turkey on his first overseas trip and that he described and characterized Turkish-U.S. relations as a model partnership has been very important for us politically and in the process that we all look forward to in the future as well. And important steps are now being taken in order to continue to build on our bilateral relations so as to give greater meaning to the term "model partnership." Of course, there are many sides to the development of this relationship -- be it in the economic area, in the areas of science, art, technology, political areas and military areas (White House 2009a).

These “areas” will only strengthen the Turkish and U.S. ties. The Prime Minister also noted that he and the President discussed energy and the Nabucco pipeline and the Middle East peace process. He explained that Turkey will play its part in negotiations between Israel and its neighbors in order to create peace in the region as a whole. He told President Obama and the press that “We stand ready as Turkey to do whatever we can do with respect to relations between Israel and the Palestinians, and Israel and Syria, because I do believe that, first and foremost, the United States, too, has important responsibility in trying to achieve global peace” (White House 2009a). These discussions between President Obama and Prime Minister Erdoğan explain the U.S. goals towards Turkey: to create a strong relationship which helps to promote peace and democracy in the region, uphold a strong NATO, military-to-military, strategic relationship, increase economic ties and trade, secure energy, and settle Middle-Eastern disputes. Hence the

U.S. tries to mold the U.S.-Turkey relationship to reflect these factors, and to have the two countries working in unison on these issues as a united force. These policies promote a strong relationship between the two.

Despite the positive messages conveyed by President Obama and Prime Minister Erdoğan, U.S. and Turkish policies are not entirely in alignment with these goals. Firstly, while Turkey looks to the U.S. for support, Turkey has its own decision making process, and over the past twenty years Turkey has become increasingly democratic and has developed its own voice in international affairs, at times rejecting the United States' opinions. Kirişci, Tocci, and Walker have found that "The upshot and irony of this increasingly democratic Turkey is a growing readiness to diverge and say 'no' to the United States or the European Union when their policies have been perceived as countering Turkish interests" (2010, 12). This open rejection of the U.S. can be more of a problem for the U.S. than the EU. If Turkey diverges from EU desires it will be harder to attain membership. Therefore, Turkey tries not to do so. However, Turkey has less to lose if its policies diverge from the policies of the U.S. as it cannot accede to the U.S. This gives Turkey more independence with respect to the U.S., although divergent policy choices can still negatively affect the U.S.-Turkey relationship. Furthermore, as Turkey becomes more democratic and a stronger figure in its region Turkey does not have to act as the "model state" of the West as the U.S. hopes it will. As Turkey becomes more democratic, it can choose whether to be Western or Eastern, but the U.S. constantly tries to push Turkey Westward. Kirişci, Tocci, and Walker state that, "as Turkey democratizes and gains in self-confidence, it can no longer necessarily be expected to act like Washington. Turkey can no longer be taken for granted as its identity and survival are not as self-evidently entirely bound up in the West anymore" (2010, 15). While the U.S. conceptualizes the idea of "losing" Turkey it will have to work harder to

“keep” Turkey as Turkey is becoming “more European” and “more democratic” but also “more conservative and Islam-friendly, and, increasingly, more nationalist” (Kirişçi, Tocci, and Walker 2010, 15).

Furthermore, the U.S. and Turkey are deterring some of the goals that they claim to work toward. While President Obama welcomes dialogue between Turkey and Armenia, Congress is impeding the U.S.’s stance on reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia. With Congress attempting to pass House Resolution 106, recognizing the Armenian genocide by the Turks, negotiations between Turkey and Armenia could be damaged. While this is Congress’ initiative, and is opposed by the President, U.S. foreign policy in this area is nevertheless hindered by Congress’ actions. In March 2010 the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved the resolution and Turkey recalled its ambassador to the U.S. While the ambassador has since returned in April 2010, the symbolism of recalling Turkey’s ambassador still stings and harms the U.S.-Turkey relationship (Johnson 2010). (See section 4.2.2.2 for more detail on Armenia and House Resolution 106.) With respect to the Middle East, Turkey is not necessarily acting in way the U.S. might want. While Prime Minister Erdoğan has pledged Turkey to working toward peace in the Middle East and helping to facilitate negotiations with Israel and its neighbors, Turkey-Israel relations have not been very good recently. While Turkey had played an important role in negotiations between Israel and Syria, Turkey and Israel must first repair their own ties before Turkey can again play a broker.

Conflicts between Turkey and Israel began when Turkey criticized Israeli action in Gaza. According to BBC News, “Turkey has long been an ally of Israel, but relations have deteriorated as Ankara has repeatedly criticised Israel for its offensive in Gaza a year ago” (BBC 2010a). Recently, Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Danny Ayalon, met with Turkish Ambassador

Ahmet Oguz Celikkol, over the Turkish television show *Valley of the Wolves* which depicts Israeli intelligence agents kidnapping babies in order to convert them to Judaism. At this meeting Israel was not diplomatic, seating the Turkish ambassador much lower than the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister in order to make Israel look “stronger” in photos, presenting only the Israeli flag, not the Turkish flag, and not smiling nor shaking hands (BBC 2010a). This act of diplomatic disrespect only frayed Israeli and Turkish ties more. “In a statement, the [Turkish] ministry said it awaited ‘an explanation and apology’ for the ‘attitude’ of Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon. ‘We invite the Israeli foreign ministry to respect the rules of diplomatic courtesy,’ the statement said. (BBC 2010a). Despite the Turkish call for an apology “Mr Ayalon was unapologetic. ‘In terms of the diplomatic tactics available, this was the minimum that was warranted given the repeated provocation by political and other players in Turkey,’ he said, according to Reuters” (BBC 2010a). Ayalon later did admit that his actions were inappropriate and Israel sent a written apology to Turkey. Yet, after receiving the apology, Prime Minister Erdoğan still called upon Israel to work harder to help create peace in the Middle East (Elci and Fisher-Ilan 2010). While this issue may seem petty, this disrespect is only halting peace in the Middle East even more and has contributed negatively to Turkish-U.S. relations. Furthermore, Turkey has since recalled its ambassador to Israel for reasons that were not disclosed and intends to replace him with another diplomat (Jerusalem Post 2010). In order to work with the U.S. toward peace in the Middle East as Prime Minister Erdoğan said Turkey would, Turkey must work to move past such petty acts to be more respected in its neighborhood and to work with the U.S. Furthermore, Turkish engagement with Hamas disregarded the approach of the so-called Quartet—the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia—which had set conditions for Hamas to meet before it would be engaged by the international community. Those

conditions include: disavowing violence, recognizing Israel, and recognizing prior agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (Migdalovitz 2008, 7-8). Both the EU and U.S., as well as the other Quartet members, identify Hamas as a terrorist group.

While Turkey and the U.S. are working toward creating an even stronger partnership as shown by meetings between President Obama and President Gül as well as between other Turkish and American government officials, the actions of Turkey and the U.S. occasionally do not align with these goals. Instances such as House Resolution 106 as well as Turkey's relations with Israel and Hamas show that Turkish and American actions do not always coincide with their words. These differences complicate foreign policy as they can hinder the achievement of certain goals. (For instance, House Resolution 106 could hurt the prospect of negotiations between Turkey and Armenia but President Obama states that the U.S. would like to see Turkish-Armenian negotiations take place and succeed.) Despite President Obama's words and formal foreign policy statements, certain actions can complicate U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey by going against the President's goals.

While the U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey aims to facilitate working together on certain goals, despite certain actions, the President alone cannot create foreign policy. Article II, section 2 of the Constitution outlines the President's power. "He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors" (Constitution). He also has the power to appoint his Cabinet members, including the Secretary of State, currently held by Hillary Clinton. The Secretary of the State and the Ambassadors are the President's diplomatic links to other countries in American foreign policy. Treaties with such countries are made between the President and

another state, but they must be ratified by two-thirds of the Senate. The President also has the ability to make Executive Agreements. The President can also work jointly with Congress to make Congressional-Executive agreements which can pass through a Joint Resolution by the House of Representatives and the Senate. Foreign policy is therefore made by both the President and Congress, although the President has more power in creating foreign policy because he does not always need the consent of Congress as seen by Executive Agreements. Congress can also take a bottom-up strategy, passing resolutions in order to try to influence foreign policy. This can be seen by House Resolution 106 on the Armenian genocide, discussed later. Think-tanks and lobbying groups can also try and influence foreign policy. Bureaucracies involved in foreign policy, such as the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the Commerce Department, also try to gain the ear of the President and influence foreign policy. Hence while foreign policy is formally made by the President and Congress it also comes about by the influence of think-tanks, lobbying groups, and bureaucracies involved in foreign policy. However, these groups often lack the ability to strongly influence foreign policy as each of the 27 member-states in the EU can in EU enlargement policy. Therefore, whereas within the EU one member-state can completely derail the enlargement process, in the U.S. the President has more leeway to make decisions and while these decisions can be harmed by other actors involved they cannot be completely derailed by them. This is shown by how U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey can be harmed by certain actions. For instance, while President Obama has stressed his want for diplomatic negotiations between Turkey and Armenia, House Resolution 106 will make this increasingly difficult. Congress' action, however, will not entirely derail President Obama's support for diplomatic negotiations between Turkey and Armenia although it will likely harm it. Other actors in the U.S. may influence foreign policy, yet the President still

holds the most foreign policy power and it is unlikely that his actions and words can be completely derailed, though they can be harmed, by other actors.

4.0 FACTORS

In the previous sections the differences between enlargement policy and foreign policy are explained. While enlargement policy deals with external, internal, and bilateral elements that will affect the EU, the EU member-states and the candidate country, foreign policy is externally and bilaterally based. In the EU bilateral issues are not supposed to be taken into account when voting, but are considered on a regular basis. Such bilateral issues also affect U.S. foreign policy. Since accession is not a possibility, internal factors do not exist for the U.S. and therefore do not influence the U.S. foreign policy. For the EU, Turkish membership will affect its internal structure and culture and Turkish-EU relations in the future, whereas U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey does not entail internal matters as Turkey cannot accede. Since enlargement policy and foreign policy are so different, they take different factors into account. Both enlargement policy and foreign policy include geostrategic, cultural, and economic factors, but cultural and economic are more apparent in enlargement policy and are less influential on foreign policy.

4.1 FACTORS OF ENLARGEMENT

4.1.1 Geostrategic

Geostrategy is the geographical strategy of one country toward another. Geostrategy is important because it is not just the consideration of a logical game-plan to achieve a country's goals, but it contains a specific location to apply this policy to. Geostrategy therefore is the directional strategy of one state or actor to another, for instance, the EU or U.S. to Turkey. This strategy can incorporate different types of relationships: military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and geographical relationships. However, it is mostly related the most prominent types of relationships: military and diplomatic. According to Jakub Grygiel, a professor at the Paul. H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University,

More precisely, geostrategy describes where a state concentrates its efforts by projecting military power and directing diplomatic activity. The underlying assumption is that states have limited resources and are unable, even if they are willing, to conduct a *tous azimuths* foreign policy. Instead they must focus politically and militarily on specific areas of the world. Geostrategy describes this foreign-policy thrust of a state and does not deal with motivations or decision-making processes. The geostrategy of a state, therefore, is not necessarily motivated by geographic or geopolitical factors. A state may project power to a location because of ideological reasons, interest groups, or simply the whim of its leader (Grygiel 2006, 22)

Because of geostrategic efforts to impose a certain goal on a certain actor, geostrategy can be motivated by many factors. Often times these factors are broader concepts of what many countries consider "good," such as democracy, rule of law, upholding human rights, capitalism, sovereignty, freedoms.

For the EU, geostrategy ties closely with enlargement as the borders of the EU are fluid and can be changed via accession. Hence, the EU's strategy toward a candidate country has domestic implications in the candidate country, such as Turkey. As Walters notes, this

geostrategy of the EU aims to promote democracy, good governance, and capitalism among its borders to create a more peaceful and stable region.

The geostrategy of the expansionary frontier represents the spatial manifestation of liberal globalisation and good governance. This is to extend the norms and institutions of market capitalism and liberal democracy into the former territories of communism and state planning...The tactic is to draw these countries into a 'wider zone of stability and prosperity'. The task of the border is to manage this process (Walters 2004, 692).

Through geostrategy the EU tries to transform Turkey into a more stable neighbor, which directly affects the EU's internal security. Hence the EU's enlargement policy toward Turkey contains geostrategic elements that affect both Turkey and the EU. For instance, these geostrategic elements take into account Turkey's geographic location in regards to its neighbors, the use of Turkey as a means of transit to these countries, the Turkish military, Turkey as a model in its region, Turkey as a transport country for energy, etc.

Turkey is also looked at through a geostrategic lens because it transports energy from the East to the EU. Turkey's geostrategic importance is heightened by the large amounts of oil and gas it could transport to the EU. The EU efforts to decrease reliance on Russian gas also highlight Turkey's geostrategic importance as well as Turkey can provide alternate routes for oil and gas from other countries. While Turkey does not have enormous resources itself, within Turkey are natural gas and oil pipelines that pump oil and gas from the Caspian Region and Russia and provide these resources to Western markets. According to Akçapar, "Since the 1990s, with strong U.S. encouragement and support, Turkey has established itself firmly on the so-called 'East-West Transportation Corridor,' which is an oil and gas export route from the Caspian Region through Georgia and Turkey to Western markets" (Akçapar 2007, 46). Turkey is capable of doing so through its pipelines, such as the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which provides oil from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey, the Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum natural gas

pipeline, which follows a similar route, and the Blue Stream pipeline, which provides natural gas from Russia to Turkey. While these three pipelines end in Turkey, this natural gas and oil could be transported to Europe through pipelines such as the Turkey-Greece natural gas pipeline. Additionally, with closer ties between the EU and Turkey in the membership process more transport routes are being planned for. The Nabucco Pipeline, which is a proposed natural gas pipeline from the Caspian to Europe meant to decrease dependence on Russian gas, has been ratified by Turkey, Bulgaria, and Hungary thus far and it is estimated it will be fully operational by 2014 (EUBusiness 2010). Furthermore, “350,000 barrels of oil flow daily from Iraq to Turkey via the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline—mainly for international shipping” (Migdalovitz 2008, 6). The gas and oil is then pipelined to Europe through pipelines such as the Turkey-Greece pipeline, as well as other oil and gas pipelines or shipped to other countries such as the U.S. According to Akçapar, eighteen pipelines carrying oil and natural gas, exist, are being planned for, or are under construction, and “some 7 percent of the global energy supply or one out of every sixteen barrels of oil will be transported through Turkey once all these pipelines are complete” (Akçapar 2007, 46). These pipelines will help to decrease European dependence on Russian oil and gas and make Turkey a crucial geostrategic partner for the EU.

Furthermore, the geostrategic importance of Turkey is seen by just how much it can transport from the Caspian Region, which features those countries near or bordering the Caspian Sea including Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Azerbaijan. From this region alone “it is estimated that Turkey will carry two hundred billion barrels of crude oil and eighteen trillion cubic meters of natural gas just from the Caspian to Europe and other markets” (Akçapar 2007, 47). When looking at the EU’s lack of oil and gas resources compared to what they consume, it is possible to see why the Turkish pipelines are so vital to EU-Turkish relations.

Turkey's abilities to transport energy show its geostrategic importance to the EU because of the EU's need for oil and gas.

Much of the reason that Turkey is looked at through a geostrategic lens by EU member-states is its position and relationship with its neighbors. By possibly expanding the EU's borders to encompass Turkey, the EU would be bringing on new neighbors including Georgia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. As noted before, while Turkey does have ties to these countries, it also has ties to the Western countries in the EU. Hence, Turkey sits atop a geostrategic pinnacle, providing a link from the West to the Caucasus and Near East. As Akçapar explains,

Turkey is a sizable and hyperdynamic secularly and democratically governed Muslim nation that sits atop multiple geostrategic and cultural fault lines and is moving determinedly closer to integration with core Europe and the West at a time when the menace of a clash of civilizations is said to loom over global society. Having once marched on Europe with legions of janissaries, this country now promises to be a Janus, who in Roman mythology was the god of doors, gateways, and beginnings ensuring good endings. Turkey will be bridging or even centering the different worlds of the west and east (Akçapar 2007, 12).

Akçapar's analysis is affirmed by the UK's stance toward Turkish membership because of geostrategic factors as noted by former UK Minister for Europe Jim Murphy's speech entitled "Why Turkish Accession is important for the European Union's future" (See section 4.1.1.1). In this respect Turkey is becoming the gateway from the EU to these unstable neighbors. Because Turkey acts as this gateway, there is contention as to whether Turkey should be able to join the EU. While some member-states believe that this connection to these states will be good and will help to reform them and create peace in the region, other member-states feel that the EU and its states are putting themselves at risk. Hence some states will vote to accept Turkey into the EU to create peace in the region and ensure the safety of the EU, whereas others will vote to reject Turkey's membership because they believe this will actually put the safety of the EU states in jeopardy. The Atlantic Council echoes this belief:

Some in Europe will be tempted to make Turkey into a barrier—a *cordon sanitaire*—that keeps those instabilities distant from EU borders. Others will argue that the more volatile circumstances make it even more crucial that Turkey be brought into the safety of the Union, where it can continue on its current democratic and stable path (Atlantic 2004, 16).

Hence geostrategy is a factor of Turkish membership and votes do rely on this factor. Some states may vote in favor of Turkish membership because of geostrategic reasons, whereas others may vote against it with the same factor in mind.

4.1.1.1 Voting in Favor

Some member-states argue that the EU cannot afford to “lose” Turkey and therefore must push for its membership. They hold that member-states should encourage Turkey to reform so that it will become more European. Gordon and Taşpınar reassert Turkey’s geostrategic location and explain why the EU cannot afford to lose Turkey.

‘A quick look at the map clearly illustrates the geostrategic stakes involved in keeping Turkey on a European track. It is not only the most advanced democracy in the Islamic world, but it also shares its southern borders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. In the Caucasus, Turkey borders Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia and thereby serves as an energy corridor through which the vast oil and gas reserves of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea pass to the West’ (Gordon and Taşpınar in Akçapar 2007, 148).

Hence Turkey is a geostrategic gem for some EU member-states. States argue that Turkey must stay on a European path to become a model in its region while providing energy from the region to the EU. Hence Turkey provides for the security of the EU by acting as a buffer zone from its neighboring states. Member-states voting for Turkish accession because of geostrategic factors can argue that in order to have peace in Turkey’s region and security against the EU borders, Turkey must be brought into the EU. Furthermore, some even argue that Turkey is one of the leading geostrategic partners that the EU has:

A brief survey of those regions to which Turkey is adjacent gives a clear indication of its huge relevance to EU security matters if the Union continues to seek stability on its new borders and a broader role as a global player...Carl Bildt, the Swedish Foreign Minister, has

argued that location—alone—makes Turkey the EU’s second most important strategic partner after the United States (Stanley 2009, 7-8).

If the EU’s second most important strategic partner is Turkey, the EU cannot afford to reject Turkey’s membership in the EU.

It can also be argued that EU member-states support Turkish membership based on geostrategy by looking at Turkish membership in the future instead of in the present and determining what would happen if the EU were to “lose” Turkey by rejecting its membership. There are only two options in the future of Turkish membership: Turkey will become a member of the EU, or Turkey will not. Many argue that if the EU is to “lose” Turkey, Turkey will become more like its Muslim neighbors. Furthermore, Turkey is already on the periphery of the current EU, and unrest in Turkey can be harmful to the EU. Therefore, some states try to push for Turkish membership by arguing that, for security reasons, the EU cannot afford to lose Turkey. Tocci explains that even before Turkey was deemed a candidate country some EU states were already arguing for some sort of partnership with Turkey to pull it closer to the West out of a fear of “losing” Turkey. She states that “by 1994, with the lack of progress in EU-Turkey relations, Turkey’s reaction to Cyprus’ accession process, and its apparent drift towards political Islam, the majority of member states felt that a positive step towards Turkey was imperative” (Tocci 2004, 131). When states calculate the cost of “losing” Turkey and Turkey drifting East as opposed to West, some worry and begin to tighten the reins in order to keep Turkey grounded in Western society. This was recently argued by Sweden during its term in the Presidency.

European Union Term Presidency, Sweden’s Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, called on the EU not to close its doors to certain candidate countries, including Turkey. During the EP’s General Assembly session of enlargement process, Bildt stated closing the doors to these countries would be a historical mistake on the part of the EU. Bildt continued that challenging reform processes await those countries and the EU shall keep its doors open, otherwise, alternative doors can open which might lead to dangerous results (CPS 2009, 4).

As Bildt notes, while many may not like the idea of Turkey joining the EU, rejecting Turkish membership would be much more detrimental. Since there are only two choices, for Turkey to join the EU, in which the EU would “win” Turkey, or not join and thus “lose” Turkey, some states argue that joining will bring greater geostrategic gains. Many states believe this because they see “winning” Turkey as better than “losing” Turkey; they believe that if the EU “loses” its neighbor, Turkey, Turkey could turn to the East and could become unstable.

Stanley nicely sums up why Turkey’s geostrategic importance makes Turkish accession a necessity to ensure a safer EU. He writes,

Turkey’s geo-strategic position makes it an actor of vital importance to the EU. Historically it has always been a hub and crossroads of North-South and East-West dialogue, trade, movement and conflict. It sits adjacent to areas whose continued stability is essential to the Union, and astride energy transit routes and other lines of communication that are of fundamental economic and military importance. Turkey’s sizeable armed forces are already interoperable with those of other EU members, and their addition to the EU’s order of battle would offer a sizeable uplift in hard power. This could be enhanced by access to Turkey’s bases and infrastructure adjacent to strategically sensitive areas, and the freeing of NATO capabilities that are currently denied owing to slow progress in Turkey’s accession (Stanley 2009, 28).

Turkish membership bridges EU and Turkish dialogue, trade, movement, energy transit, diplomacy, military abilities, etc. These are all elements of geostrategy, and another reason for why some states fight to ensure eventual Turkish membership.

One such state is the UK. The UK has vocalized its strong support of Turkish membership, and the former UK Minister for Europe, Jim Murphy, said that the first benefit of Turkish membership would be geostrategy. In his speech entitled, “Why Turkish Accession is important for the European Union’s future” he “highlighted mutual benefits for both sides [the UK and Turkey], but noted it was ‘crucial [...] to map out how both will benefit from Turkish accession’ (House 2008, 7-8). He said:

‘The first mutual benefit is strategic: Turkey as a crossroads between East and West, Islam and Christianity, has more than symbolic value. Turkey has a better set of relations in the Middle East than any existing EU member. This will bring a new dimension to the EU’s foreign policy. And both of us, Europe and Turkey need security in the region.’ As the Minister noted, in addition to security benefits, accession offers political stability to Turkey and greater influence for Turkey through the EU (House 2008, 7-8).

Here Murphy argues that geostrategy plays a key role in Turkish membership because Turkey bridges the EU and Turkey’s neighbors, provides security, and promotes political stability. Additionally, if Turkey becomes a member-state Turkey will be able to have more prominence and influence in its region by being a part of the EU. Therefore, Turkey’s connection with its region will only grow stronger via accession and Turkey will, in ways, become the EU’s “poster child” for reform for other countries in the region.

Part of the reason that the Murphy argues that Turkey has this ability is because of its similar background to some of the other countries in the region. Part of this background is the Muslim identity of Turkey. While Turkey is technically a secular democracy, almost 99 percent of the Turkish population is Muslim. The EU is mostly Christian, creating a divide between the states in Turkey’s region that are Muslim and the Christian identity of the EU. By bringing Turkey into the EU the EU would be able to work more closely with its new neighbors as there would be a linkage in backgrounds via religion from Turkey as a new member-state to the neighboring countries. Turkey would be seen as the spokes-country for the benefit of reform. As Stanley explains:

Turkey’s standing as a democratic, Muslim state operating within a successful EU system would also offer other modernising Muslim countries an example of how to achieve a balance between democracy, religion and trade in which Islamic faith could be preserved without reducing the ability to inter-act with the EU or the wider West. Finally, membership would also add resonance to efforts to assure EU members’ own Muslim minorities of the multi-cultural tolerance of their parent societies (Stanley 2009, 29).

By bringing Turkey into the EU, the EU would be linked to its possible neighbors in Turkey's region. However, using Turkey as an example to the region has been rejected and resented by many Turks, including the present government (Arnett 2008). This geostrategic aim to bridge this gap is endorsed by some EU member-states, such as the UK, which believe that Turkish membership is first and foremost a question of geostrategy.

4.1.1.2 Voting Against

While some member-states argue that Turkey should join the EU for geostrategic purposes, other EU member-states argue that Turkish accession to the EU should be rejected on the grounds of geostrategy. Security and location are the biggest geostrategic factors driving this argument. Turkey's location puts it in a hotbed of unrest and could put the EU at risk. According to Stanley it is "necessary to touch upon some of the risks or threats that could attend Turkey's entry. These include the very nature of Turkey's strategic culture, the potential for placing the EU at greater risk by seeking new borders adjacent to instability, and the impact of Turkey's soft power upon the EU itself" (Stanley 2009, 26). These security risks and threats include "frozen conflicts, energy security, environmental concerns, weak border control, poor governance and organised crime" (Stanley 2009, 8). While there are many reasons that states argue that Turkey should join the EU for geostrategic factors, this reason alone can cause an EU member-state to vote against Turkish membership.

Concerns arise from these threats, and while some states believe that Turkey can be a model in its region that encourages reform, some states argue that even if Turkey joins, the region may not change. Hence instead of expanding its borders to reforming states, the EU could expand its borders to states in unrest. Furthermore, this could lead to greater involvement with and in these states.

Concern over the EU moving closer to instability and thus placing itself at greater risk of involvement has greater credibility; Turkey shares borders with Georgia, Syria, Iraq and Iran, and has previously demonstrated its preparedness to cross borders in pursuit of its own security needs (Stanley 2009, 26).

As Stanley notes, Turkey has “demonstrated its preparedness to cross borders” when national security it jeopardized. This more militarized approach to neighbors is a key worry of some EU member-states. The EU is a group of twenty-seven peaceful countries that rarely engage in international conflict and EU member-states take part in more peacekeeping missions than combat missions. Furthermore, only some of the EU members are also NATO members, so some EU member-states are not involved in the collective security framework of Article V and can stay away from military involvement. With a more militarized state like Turkey some member-states worry that Turkey will bring fighting into the EU.

Some other states argue that, while geostategy is an important factor, it is not the deciding factor. In later sections culture and economics will be covered as other grounds for advocating or voting against Turkey membership. Some states find these arguments to be stronger. This does not mean that geostrategy is not a factor in deciding if Turkey should join the EU or not, it just means that geostrategy may have less influence on the decision-making in the EU than do culture and economics. Tocci found that during Cypriot accession negotiations,

All member states were keen to retain strong economic, political and security relations with Turkey, as a large, growing and strategically located NATO ally. Yet most member states did not support Turkey’s full membership. An appreciation of Turkey’s strategic importance was insufficient to persuade the member states to embrace Turkey as a full member of the EU (Tocci 2004, 131).

Hence while geostrategy is important, it is not enough of a reason for some member-states to vote in favor of or against Turkish membership. Therefore most EU member-state positions will be based not solely off of geostrategic factors alone but also off of cultural and economic factors as well.

In sum, while some states will vote for Turkish membership based on geostategy, others will vote against it for the same reason. Yet geostrategic interests will not be the deciding factor for all states. Stanley summarizes the argument that while geostrategy may not be the deciding factor, it will inevitably still be taken into consideration and will definitely hold weight in the decision making process. He states:

Security alone is unlikely to be the key issue upon which a decision will be taken to accept Turkey into the EU. Compliance with the EU's *acquis* and continued adherence to the 'Copenhagen Criteria' will remain essential pre-requisites. However, despite the removal of Cold War threats to European nations, security and stability remain essential to the continued survival of the EU project. Turkey, functioning as an equal member of the Union, possesses many of the capabilities, tools and sources of power that are of intrinsic value to the EU's expanded security agenda (Stanley 2009, 27-28).

Security is one of the most important aims of geostrategy, but regardless geostrategy will not be only the deciding factor. In the following sections (4.1.2 and 4.1.3) other factors (Cultural and Economic) influencing states to vote for or against Turkish membership will be explained.

4.1.2 Cultural

Geostrategic interests will not be the only deciding factor in Turkish membership and Turkish culture will become a more prominent factor in the future. As Kramer explains, geostrategic, political, cultural, and economic factors all influence member-state opinions on Turkish membership.

The fears [of membership] are based on a number of arguments which can broadly be divided in political-ideological ones and in economic-social ones. All of them are derived from the conviction that Turkey is too large, too poor and too Muslim in order to fit into the EU scheme. They have gained in prominence and public impact by the growing so-called enlargement fatigue as a consequence of the failure of the French and Dutch referendums about the Constitutional Treaty which has led to a general skepticism concerning any further enlargement among a large part of the European public and political elite alike" (Kramer 2006, 29).

Fears of Turkish membership are expressed by government officials and the people who will have the right to make these worries heard in referenda in some countries such as France and Austria. Much of the reason for skepticism about Turkish membership among the people is based on another factor which holds weight: culture. Yet some member-states advocate for Turkish membership because of cultural factors. Murphy, Jordan-Bychkov, and Bychkova Jordan define culture as “a community of people who hold numerous features of belief, behavior, and overall way of life in common, including ideology, technology, social institutions, and material possessions” (Murphy et. al. 2009, 7). Culture can therefore include identity, ethnicity, religion, customs, food, tradition, language, and history within a geographically set location. Hence, EU member-states have cultures, the EU has a culture, and Turkey has a culture. Turkey’s application to the EU raises cultural questions focusing on the differences between European culture and Turkish culture. Such questions include:

Is the European Union only for Europeans? Is Turkey a European country? The Turks once threatened Europe’s very existence, conquering the Balkan Peninsula and 3 times laying siege to Wien, a city that is the very epitome of Europe. They destroyed the Greek empire, annexed all of its lands, and built a mosque atop the Parthenon in Athínai, the very symbol of classical Greece. Can Europeans forget those old memories? Forget that Turks speak an alien language and adhere to an alien religion—Islam? Forget the centuries of warfare required to drive Turks back to the small foothold they now hold in Europe around Istanbul, the former Greek Constantinople? Forget the genocide committed by the Turks against Christian Armenians in 1915? Forget the Turkish invasion of the dominantly Greek island nation of Cyprus in the 1970s and their continued military presence there? Can Europe forgive the ongoing brutal suppression of the Kurds, a separatist minority in Turkey? As one EU diplomat recently said, ‘if you want to kill support for EU expansion and enlargement, just talk Turkey...’ (Jordan-Bychkov and Bychkova Jordan 2002, 220).

Turkish membership therefore is culturally charged, and takes into account not only current differences but past historical relations between Turkey and Europe. To further understand this issue, the differences between European and Turkish culture must be explained.

The EU is made up of 27 member-states each claiming a different history, language, culture, background, custom, etc. than the others. This makes the EU seemingly heterogeneous and lacking a common culture. However, culture can expand beyond borders, and can become a melting pot of histories, languages, backgrounds, customs, etc. Murphy, Jordan-Bychkov, and Bychkova Jordan define the EU as a “culture area” “a region that is thought of as the homeland of a people who hold numerous beliefs, behaviors, and overall ways of life in common, including ideology, technology, social institutions, and material possessions” (Murphy et. al. 2009, 403). Hence while the EU is diverse, it still claims common linkages and a common culture. Yet they also explain that this culture therefore is vague and lacks definite borders as to where European culture seems to begin and end.

Despite the historical significance of the three previously described human characteristics—religion, race, and language—in conceptualizations of Europe as a human entity, they are no more helpful than physical characteristics in delimiting Europe geographically...There is no boundary in the east separating areas that do not have those three characteristics from areas where they are present (Murphy et. al. 2009, 8).

Hence European culture has no set geographic limitation but still has a common set of cultural traits.

Jordan-Bychkov and Bychkova Jordan further explain the commonalities among European states as a whole. “If Europe is to be defined in terms of human characteristics, then the three basic criteria of religion, language, and race hardly suffice, for European culture is complex and has changed remarkably through time” (Jordan-Bychkov and Bychkova Jordan 2002, 12). They claim that the following defining features must be added to religion, language, and race in defining European culture: “A well-educated population...A healthy population...Stabilized population size...A wealthy population...An urbanized population...An industrialized economy...A dense transportation network...Freely elected governments...[and]

Part of the European zone of continuous settlement” (Jordan-Bychkov and Bychkova Jordan 2002, 12-13). They then substantiate each one of these criterion with explanations. (The “European zone of continuous settlement” generally demands that all areas of “Europe” should be densely populated and served by transportation networks, with all habitations being five or less kilometers away from one another in six directions and all roads and railroads not further than 16 to 32 kilometers from one another in three directions (Jordan-Bychkov and Bychkova Jordan 2002, 163).)

Taking into account these 12 criteria of European culture, it is seen that while Europe is demographically large and engulfs people of varied backgrounds, there is still homogeneity in the culture. According to Jordan-Bychov and Bychova Jordan, “By this necessary personal definition, then, Europe includes that part of the Eastern Hemisphere where people are not merely Christian, Caucasian, and Indo-European, but also educated, free, healthy, individualistic, wealthy, materialistic, mobile, urbanized, employed preponderantly in industry, and demographically stable” (Jordan-Bychkov and Bychkova Jordan 2002, 13). Furthermore, Eurobarometer statistics prove complementary to this sense of European identity as more and more EU citizens are primarily characterizing themselves as EU citizens and secondarily as citizens of their country (Jordan-Bychkov and Bychkova Jordan 2002, 220). Of course certain countries identify as more national than others, but overall European citizens are beginning to call themselves European, as opposed to a citizen of a certain country of the EU-27. As Turkey has been drawn closer to the EU as well, more and more Turks have considered themselves European. However, as the enlargement process drones on, some, such as Jose Ignacio Torreblanca, state that Turkey is losing faith in the EU and now only 30 percent of Turks perceive themselves as Europeans (Torreblanca 2009).

This European identity is further defined by people who uphold certain values as well. Many of the values defining European culture are those values that the European Union promotes throughout the world. “David Gress refers to this European culture complex as ‘a synthesis of democracy, capitalism, science, human rights,...individual autonomy, and the power of unfettered human reason’” (Jordan-Bychkov and Bychkova Jordan 2002, 13). These values are common amongst all EU member-states, and hence help to create a common sense of European Identity. A Finnish academician, Tom Moring echoes this claim. He explains that since European culture incorporates 27 states, each with its own cultures within, European culture is vague, and therefore European culture can be defined by its commonalities. Therefore, “the union offers a pragmatic federal identity based on peace, prosperity, and democracy” (Jordan Bychkov and Bychkova Jordan 2002, 220-221). The common EU values of peace, prosperity, and democracy are therefore considered to be part of overarching European culture as well. Turkey as a secular, democratic, prospering country will be considered from this view of European culture as well, as EU member-states will evaluate how European Turkey is and based on this whether it should join the EU.

European culture is also defined by religion as well. While all countries in the EU are secular, the EU still is seen by its member-states as well as by outsiders as a “Christian club.” The majority of EU citizens are Christian. This does not mean that other religions are not tolerated, but it does mean that other religions are looked upon as “foreign” to the Union. This concept of other religions as being the “other” has sparked political debate in the EU over whether the EU should become an exclusively Christian Union, and actually create and substantiate the “Christian club” that others have referred to.

In the early 2000s, a vigorous debate developed over whether the preamble to a proposed constitution for the EU should include reference to the area’s Christian heritage. Although

not ultimately accepted, the debate revealed the degree to which there remains at least an historical sense of Europe being a Christian realm. And social fault lines still follow religious lines, affecting relations between Spaniards and Arabs, Greeks and Turks, Russians and Chechens, Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, and on and on (Murphy et. al. 2009, 8).

This tends to make up the most common objection to Turkish membership on cultural grounds: religion. Most of Europe is a Christian society and this has led to the debates noted. Many Europeans are skeptical of Turkish membership because of religion (see section 4.1.2.2 Voting Against). While the country is a secular country, it contains a 99 percent Muslim population. This large Muslim population and the problems some EU member-states have had with Turkish immigration and Muslim integration cause some states to be very critical of Turkish membership on these grounds.

The concerns of some member-states are that Turkish culture is too different from European culture. European culture includes a common religion (Christianity), language (the working languages of the EU are English, French, and German), race (Caucasian), a well-educated, healthy society, a stable population size, wealth, urbanization, an industrialized economy, transportation, free elections, and being part of the “European zone of continuous settlement.” European culture also has an emphasis on democracy, capitalism, peace, prosperity, human rights, autonomy, and reason. Turkish culture is different from European culture, although it does have some similarities. The Turks do uphold this emphasis on the values of democracy, capitalism, peace, prosperity, human rights, autonomy, and reason, and have begun to advocate them more throughout the country as seen through Turkey’s reforms in order to conform to the EU *acquis* in its membership bid. The Turks also have a common religion (Islam) and language (Turkish). To some extent Turks perceive themselves as part of a common community. Turkish society is becoming better educated; is healthier; is maintaining a stable population size with a large, young population; is becoming wealthier, more urbanized, and a

more industrialized economy; has transportation and free elections; and is part of the “European zone of continuous settlement.” Therefore the main claims of Turkey’s difference in culture largely stem from its religion and language, as many traits otherwise are similar between Turkey and the EU. Turkish culture, broadly defined, includes the legacy of Atatürk, the Turkish language, and Islam in a secular country. Turkish culture also entails finding a balance between more traditional rural societies and urban societies as seen by the government’s efforts to educate girls in boarding schools in Anatolia.

Today’s Turkish culture is largely shaped by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder and leader of Turkey. Atatürk’s goal was to become “a civilized nation” grounded in secularism and European principles (Dismorr 2008, 25). His motto “peace at home, peace in the world” has become the motto of Turkey today, and is Turkey’s goal currently just as it was in the 1920’s and 30’s. The current ideological heirs of Atatürk are Kemalists. Ann Dismorr, former Swedish Ambassador to Turkey from 2001 to 2005 explains the ideology of the Kemalists.

This almost century-old ideology (from 1919) has no strict definition, leaving it open to different interpretations. As time has passed, the basic principle has been to try to follow whatever Atatürk would have wanted. The core values are those of Turkish nationalism and secularism (Dismorr 2008, 22).

This Turkish nationalism takes pride in Turkish culture, while also promoting those parts of Turkey that are European in nature. However, Dismorr also explains that ethnic rifts can often be seen instead of national unity. She wrote “a rift between Turks and Kurdish nationalists or separatists often overshadows the fact that a large majority feel a strong pride in being Turkish, united by history, culture, and language” (Dismorr 2008, 33). The Turks have a strong sense of nationalism but, again, this is nationalism in a European sense. These values that Turkey highlights as the “good” values that make up Turkey are Western: democracy, secularism, human rights, freedoms, capitalism, etc.

Furthermore, many Turks see themselves as European and see commonalities between Turkey and the EU. According to Dismorr:

The quest to join the EU has given Turkey a sense of common destiny. ‘We consider ourselves both European and Asian and view this duality to be an asset,’ stated former Foreign Minister Cem before a crucial EU summit in 1997. He emphasized that Turkey had lived for seven hundred years of its history in Europe and as a European power” (Dismorr 2008, 34).

The Turkish government sees its location as a geostrategic asset linking Europe to Asia but emphasizes that Turkey sees itself as a European state, grounded in the same principles as European culture. The differences between European and Turkish culture are largely that of language and the most contentious point of Turkish accession in relation to culture: religion.

4.1.2.1 Voting in Favor

The biggest debates over Turkish culture stem from whether Turkey is considered “European” and Turkey’s Muslim identity. While these points are seen as negative attributes to some EU member-states, according to other states they would benefit the EU.

The EU has a culture program to increase cultural awareness throughout the EU. According to the European Commission, “The EU’s Culture programme (2007-2013) has a budget of €400 million for projects and initiatives to celebrate Europe’s cultural diversity and enhance our shared cultural heritage through the development of cross-border co-operation between cultural operators and institutions” (European Commission 2009b). This program has three objectives: “to promote cross-border mobility of those working in the cultural sector; to encourage the transnational circulation of cultural and artistic output; and to foster intercultural dialogue” (European Commission 2009b). Hence, the EU supports cultural awareness and diversity, aiming to make its citizens, as well as other people, aware of other cultures. This awareness is raised through educational programs, art exhibits, shows, etc. Since the EU claims

to “enhance our shared cultural heritage” and promote learning of different cultures, Turkey’s accession is seen by some as a positive attribute. The UK position has emphasized this as Miliband has stated that the EU was culturally built on common values, not a common race or religion, and therefore the more diverse the community the stronger it will become (Miliband 2009). Turkey boasts a unique culture which can be emphasized by the Commission in its promotion of cultural awareness and understanding to strengthen the community.

Turkey’s culture is already being promoted by the EU while still in accession negotiations. Istanbul is the European Capital of Culture for 2010. “The European Capital of Culture is designated by the European Union for a period of one calendar year during which it is given a chance to showcase its cultural life and cultural development” (Istanbul 2010). Such cities are chosen with two goals in mind: to promote the culture of the city while at the same time enhancing socio-economic development (Istanbul 2010). Hence, the duality of this program will heighten cultural awareness of Turkey within Europe while also economically benefitting Turkey. It is hoped that people learn through this program, that “As Turkey moves ahead with the process of its candidacy for the European Union, the projects to be realized will demonstrate that Istanbul, the symbol of the country, has been interacting with European culture for hundreds of years” (Istanbul 2010). This program therefore is in line with two things earlier discussed in this section. Firstly, that the EU Culture Programme enhances cultural awareness which is evident through programs like the European Capital of Culture Program. Secondly, the promotion of Turkey’s culture could strengthen the fabric of the EU by promoting diversity.

It is interesting to note previous European Capital of Culture cities that were not part of EU member-states when they were a European Capital of Culture. When holding the title of a European Capital of Culture the following cities were not in the EU: Bergen, Norway (2000);

Krakow, Poland (2000); Reykjavik, Iceland (2000); Prague, Czech Republic (2000); and Stavanger, Norway (2008). Of these states, only Poland and the Czech Republic were candidate countries when holding this title, both of which have since acceded. This leaves promise for Turkey as the only two countries to hold candidate country status while home to cities bearing the title of a European Capital of Culture have since joined the EU. This benefit of being a European Capital of Culture could help to alleviate cultural claims against Turkish membership as Poland and the Czech Republic were able to reform and accede. Being a European Capital of Culture could be a positive reason for Turkish accession to the EU as it shows the commonalities yet uniqueness of Turkey's culture as compared to Europe's.

Turkey's culture is also a positive attribute to the negotiation process because Turkey is a secular state. While 99 percent of Turks are Muslim, the state is still secular. Turkey therefore is different from its Muslim neighbors. As Dismorr notes,

Turkey is alone in the Islamic world in its strict separation of religion and state. The secular order and the role of religion in society are outlined in articles 14 and 24 of the Turkish Constitution from the early 1980s. These articles are often quoted in public debates. The US Constitution is probably the only other constitution in the world that enjoys such familiarity among its citizens (Dismorr 2008, 30).

While Turkey is often compared to its Muslim neighbors in both positive and negative lights (as noted in Section 4.1.1 on geostrategy), it is different from these states in its strict separation of state and religion. To liken Turkey to the U.S. shows its strength as a free, secular democracy.

Some of the advocates for Turkish membership, such as the UK, do so on cultural grounds. For instance, as noted earlier, some states support Turkish membership on geostrategic grounds as Turkey will be capable of building a relationship between the EU and its region. It is hoped that this relationship would help to foster democracy in the region and lead to peace. This

ability is not only based on Turkey's location though; it is based on Turkey's religion. As Stanley explains, Turkey's

ability to exert influence through this activity [diplomacy] is heightened by its historic, cultural and religious bonds with the various regional actors. Ethnic and linguistic linkages abound, and although they are not of themselves decisive, they allow levels of understanding and insight that are unique. In matters of religion, Islam is a defining issue for many of the regional actors, and despite local suspicions that stem from Turkey's Ottoman past, a Muslim Turkey is able to engage in inter-state relations with other Muslim nations with a more profound understanding of the politico-religious nuances that will apply. Membership to the EU would render such insights even more accessible to the community, and would offset any charges of the EU constituting a Christian Club that was unprepared to accept Muslim nations as equals (Stanley 2009, 28-29).

This hope was echoed by former UK Minister for Europe, Jim Murphy. However, this geostrategic benefit would not be possible without Turkish culture, a factor of which is Turkey's 99 percent Muslim population which allows it to connect with its neighbors. While other EU member-states see this Muslim identity as a negative attribute and a hindrance to the EU, it is a positive attribute to some states such as the UK as it is this link (being a Muslim nation) that will allow Turkey to connect with its neighbors and help spread democracy and peace in the region. Hence, states that believe that this is a positive link may vote in favor of Turkish accession.

David Miliband, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the UK, echoed this support for Turkey and its culture as a positive attribute on the grounds of Turkish membership. He noted Turkey's geostrategic importance, but even more its cultural importance to a Union that is meant to support common values while accepting differences. On October 26, 2009, he gave a speech entitled "Strong Britain in a Strong Europe" in which he explains why Turkey's membership in the EU would be good, based on geostrategic grounds, and more largely based on Turkey's culture. Below is part of the transcript.

I know there are people who are uncertain about wider membership [of the EU], including for Turkey's. But I believe that most of the concerns are based on a static and frankly out of date view of what modern Turkey is. Turkey is an emerging giant on our doorstep. If we are

to ensure we have more than one source of energy from the East, Turkey will be vital. If we want to tackle drugs and international crime routes we likewise have to bring Turkey into the family of EU countries. And perhaps above all, if we want to show that being European is about values not race or religion, having a Muslim country with a secular public realm within the EU can only strengthen us. There are many issues still to resolve, and the obligations are not just on the EU, but if Turkey reached the standards we have set on human rights, addressed the role of the military and the separation of powers, it would be unconscionable, in my view, for us to turn them down for EU membership (Miliband 2009).

Hence, some states, like the UK, support Turkey's membership due to cultural factors. Miliband explains that Turkey's membership would only strengthen the basis of the EU and what the EU is supposed to support—common values, not differences.

Other states, including France and Germany, argue against Turkish membership mostly on religious reasons, although language has also been cited. Yet some find these arguments ill-founded and state that states should not veto on such cultural issues such as language. Dismorr negates the argument that the Turkish language makes Turkey a less European country. As she explains, the roots of Turkish are close to that of Finnish, Hungarian, and Estonian, which are all EU member-states.

When language and geography are used against Turkey becoming an EU member the arguments are flawed. 'Turkish is not an Indo-European language,' emphasized one of the most vocal opponents of a Turkish EU membership, former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. This argument has been overtaken by events. Finland has been an EU member since 1995 and Finnish is not an Indo-European language but is closely related to Turkish. So are Hungarian and Estonian, two more recent additions to the list of official EU languages (Dismorr 2008, 29).

The religious argument is also opposed by many. As stated earlier, the UK believes that this would be an unjustified argument in light of the EU's goal for closer integration and an understanding of cultures. Bildt has also argued that this would be discrimination by not allowing Turkey in just because of Muslim beliefs.

Replying [sic] a question by extreme right-wing deputies who oppose Turkey's membership, Bildt said it is understandable that Turkey is found 'too big' and 'too Muslim'; however, Article 49 of the EU Treaty on membership does not provide any criteria about religion nor

mentions internal problems or size of a candidate country. He added; excluding Muslim citizens solely because of their beliefs would be wrong (CPS 2009, 4).

From a moral standpoint, Bildt argues that voting against Turkish membership in this respect would be discrimination; this is ironic as discrimination should be something the EU opposes, not practices. While these arguments are made by states opposing Turkish membership, states in favor of Turkish accession continue to counter-argue them.

4.1.2.2 Voting Against

Other states, including France and Germany, stand strongly opposed to Turkish membership to the EU based on cultural factors. Barry Buzan, a professor at the London School of Economics argues two points adopted from Martin Wight. Firstly, “that *a shared culture is a precondition for the formation of a society of states.*” The second being, “that *a society of states lacking a shared culture because it has expanded beyond its original base will be unstable*” (Buzan 2010, 1). He explains that if cultures are diverse then the societies that encompass them can only be weakly integrated (Buzan 2010, 6). While the EU is made up of diverse states, it is currently stable. However, Buzan’s adoption of Wight explains why some EU member-states may view Turkey’s membership as a source of instability for the EU in the future because of Turkey’s culture.

Part of Turkey’s culture—religion—makes many EU member-states oppose membership. Because membership will make borders between Turkey and current member-states fluid, unless there are restrictions, more Turks will be able to migrate to other EU countries. These newcomers have often been linked to economic, social, and political problems. According to Geddes, “There’s little to suggest that Muslim immigrants were any more or less assimilable, but in the context of economic, social and political crises, it was not too difficult for links to be made

between these problems and the presence of immigrant newcomers” (Geddes 2003, 56). Regardless of this lack of a link, people connect these crises to immigration. Member-states fear such immigration from Turkey if Turkey is to accede because many member-states already house many Turks and Muslims who have not yet assimilated. According to Dismorr, in 2008 around 20 million Muslims lived in EU member-states and Islam was the fastest growing religion (Dismorr 2008, 10). Furthermore, Noiriel cites that “There has been a longstanding tradition in France—and other European countries, for that matter—to view as problematic the cultural or ethnic identity of new migrants (Noiriel, 1996)” (Geddes 2003, 56). Hence, link or not, people associate Muslim immigration with crises and non-assimilation.

Many member states have cited Turkey’s Muslim population and a fear of immigration as a cause for their opposition to Turkish membership. EurActiv has found that,

Cultural and religious differences are perhaps the most sensitive of all the arguments raised against Turkish accession to the bloc, with several conservative European leaders, most notably France's President Nicolas Sarkozy and Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel, making the case for the EU as a 'Christian club'. Both leaders can rely on large support from citizens of their own countries (EurActiv 2009f).

Many have attributed this French and German argument to an inability to integrate their immigrants. For instance:

Scholars often refer to France's failure to integrate its five million-strong Muslim immigrant community when looking for reasons to explain its staunch anti-Turkey stance. Although only 400,000 of France's Muslims are Turks, people do not distinguish between nationalities, French commentator Dominique Moisi says. ‘For the average Frenchman, a Turk is an Arab,’ while every new riot in the suburbs involving Arabs nurtures the 'no' camp, Moisi argues. The Pew Center's 2005 and 2006 Global Attitude Polls support this argument, suggesting that citizens in EU countries with high percentages of Muslim immigrants adopt negative attitudes towards people practising Islam (EurActiv 2009f).

This is true in Germany also which has the highest Turkish population outside of Turkey. While riots in Germany are less likely than they are in France, German public opinion of the Turkish population is negative. This has partially been attributed to the strictly religious Turks that live

in Germany, unlike the more relaxed, urban, religious societies in Turkey's cities. These strict practices have made public opinion even more negative as 45 honor killings have taken place on German soil since 1996 (EurActiv 2009f). Such strict religious adherence has already caused some member-states to fight for more open religious policies in those states with less-well integrated Islamic populations. While the UK has around 1.5 million Muslims who are well integrated into society, France has a less integrated population (EurActiv 2009f). Hence, "France and Britain apply opposite policies, with France bringing in a recent ban on religious symbols, like headscarves, in public schools" (Dismorr 2008, 23). These current problems with Muslim populations worry countries with lesser-integrated populations like France and Germany because they fear a larger Muslim influx from Turkey if Turkey is to accede. Cook and Sherwood-Randall explain this concern: "If Turkey were to become a member of the European Union, it would have the largest Muslim population in the organization and one in three Europeans would be Muslim. In some quarters, these demographic projections fuel xenophobic and specifically anti-Turkish sentiments" (Cook and Sherwood-Randall 2006, 14).

France and Germany have noted their open opposition to Turkish membership on this cultural case, arguing for a "privileged partnership" which would not include the Turks directly in the EU framework as a full member-state. Thus with member-states having veto power this cultural issue weighs heavily on the prospect of Turkish membership. Since culture is intrinsic to Turkish society and will not be changed by adherence to the *acquis* the issue of culture likely will not change in the future. Unlike other factors concerning membership, such as Turkey's economy, which may change in the future, culture will not.

Others argue that on cultural grounds Turkish membership would weaken Turkey's ability to play the model state. Some member-states argue that Turkish membership would be

beneficial to the EU, Turkey, and Turkey's neighborhood because Turkey would be seen as a model state, pushing for democratic and capitalist reforms in its region. As noted earlier, Turkey's unique relationship with its neighbors makes this possible and no other EU member-state has this advantage. This relationship is mostly based on a common Muslim identity. Herein lies the problem. When pushing for Turkey as a model for its region this approach undermines the effort to make Turkey seem European. Instead the approach exacerbates this difference, making Turkey a model because it is Muslim, painted starkly against a Christian Europe. This qualm is shown by France and Germany which have outwardly expressed their worries with Turkey because it is a Muslim country. So using Turkey as a model in its region can actually backfire because this approach highlights the differences between Turkey and Europe. Hence some member-states can explain that this model state approach contradicts EU member-states' desires to Europeanize Turkey by making Turkey seem starkly different than EU states. These differences can then lead to states voting against Turkish membership or the opening of chapters and hindering the accession negotiations.

Like the geostrategic argument surrounding Turkey's membership to the EU, culture is also a factor influencing how states vote on Turkish membership. The culture debate can highlight why Turkey's membership would be positive as proved by arguments from the UK: it would enhance cultural dialogue and understanding in the EU while providing a link from the EU to its Muslim neighbors in Turkey's region because of religious commonalities between the region and Turkey. Contrarily, Turkey's membership is often looked at from a negative perspective by states like France and Germany which believe that Turkish membership in the EU would be detrimental to the future of the EU because of Turkey's 99 percent Muslim population. The Turkish cultural debate and its influence on membership will become more prominent as

Turkey adheres to more of the criteria for membership because even if Turkey meets all membership criteria eventually, the cultural debate will still be visible. Dismorr explains how the Turkish cultural debate will become more prominent in the future.

The controversial and emotional debate on Turkish identity will remain in the spotlight for a number of reasons. The unfolding EU process is one. The increasing divide between the secular establishment and the Islamic-rooted government is another. The uncertainty of the future of neighbouring Iraq and the growing assertiveness and impatience among its Kurds is an additional contributing factor to the burning issue of Turkish identity. This will not change any time soon (Dismorr 2008, 35).

Because Turkey's culture will not change, regardless of its adherence to the *acquis* and Copenhagen Criteria, it is likely that the cultural debate will be a deciding factor in voting on Turkish membership to the EU.

4.1.3 Economic

Another issue of contention over whether Turkey should or should not join the EU is the Turkish economy. While Turkey will have to abide by the *acquis* and it will become part of the European Monetary Union (EMU) with accession, its economy is poorer than that of most-member states. Although the economy would grow upon accession many states still worry that Turkey's accession will have a negative economic impact on them and on the Union as a whole.

In order to join the EU Turkey must first overcome certain economic issues. According to LaGro, these issues include:

improving economic governance: alignment with the *acquis* and its implementation during the accession negotiations; sustaining macroeconomic stability; balancing existing regional disparities; increasing trade with the EU: extension of customs union towards agriculture and services; sustaining foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and increasing them to comparable levels with the size of the Turkish economy; sustaining high growth level; investing in the education of the young population; [and] improving global competitiveness (LaGro 2007, 97).

If Turkey reforms these areas and complies with and implements the *acquis*, Turkey will be qualified to join the EU. However, EU member-states will be the key decision-makers in whether Turkey eventually is to join the EU and while some member-states may support Turkish membership and vote for it from an economic standpoint, other states, even after reform, may still veto Turkish membership because of its economy.

4.1.3.1 Gross Domestic Product and Income

In terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Turkey's economy is doing rather well. Turkey has the highest economic growth rates among countries in the EU and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with real time economic growth at three times the EU average (Akçapar 2007, 20). Therefore, Turkey's economic potential is high. Furthermore, the Commission estimated that in the coming years Turkey's GDP would continue to increase, and with accession it will increase even more as part of the EMU (Issues 2004). As Akçapar notes, Turkey will benefit the EU as well. "Already among the twenty largest economies in the world, with a service sector constituting 65 percent of GDP and a public procurement market of over \$40 billion and growing, Turkey offers high economic potential for the EU" (Akçapar 2007, 20). Furthermore, a 2004 study showed that if Turkey were to accede in 2015, it would contribute a larger portion of GDP to the EU than it would today. Estimating that there was annual growth of 5% of GDP, if Turkey were to accede in 2015, Turkey's GDP would constitute 2.9% of GDP (EurActiv 2004). This study showed that both the GDP of Turkey and the GDP of the EU overall will rise, allowing economic benefits for Turkey if it were to accede. However, in 2009 there was a six percent contraction of Turkey's GDP but it is expected that Turkey will meet its five percent expansion rate in 2010 (Lovasz and Bryant 2010). Therefore, the study's conclusions may hold true with regard to Turkish GDP.

While Turkish GDP is high and Turkey constitutes a middle-income economy, GDP per capita is low compared to other EU member-states. According to the Commission, “The GDP per capita in terms of Purchasing Power (PPS) was in 2003 at 28.5% of the EU-25 average, comparable to the level of Bulgaria and Romania. Measured in current prices in 2003, the Turkish GDP was equivalent to about 2% of the GDP of EU-25 or just half of the ten new Member States” (Issues 2004, 13). Per capita GDP has stayed just as low since 2003. In 2009, Turkey’s per capita GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) was \$11,200, which was poorer than all 27 EU member-states and the EU average of \$32,600. While Turkish GDP is high, ranking 18th in the world, per-capita GDP is low at 98th, making Turkey poorer than other member-states (CIA Country Comparison 2009a). Additionally, this low GDP per capita shows relative poverty in some areas of Turkey as compared to others. In 2004 the Commission concluded:

The richest region Kocaeli, an important manufacturing location, has a GDP per capita of more than 90% above the national average (46% of the EU-25 average). At the other end of the scale, the poorest regions Agri and Van have only about one third of the national GDP per capita (8% of the EU-25 average). These income disparities are reflected in the sectoral structure of the regions. The richer regions have important shares of production and employment in manufacturing and services whereas in most of the other regions agriculture is the most important source of income and employment (Issues 2004, 13).

These regional differences also concern EU member-states as certain areas of Turkey are much poorer than others. These differences would not only affect the EU and its member-states’ economies, but could cause migration out of Turkey to member-states as well if Turkey is to accede.


Overall Turkish GDP is promising, but per capita GDP shows signs of disparity among regions and people. If Turkey is to join the EU it was estimated that its GDP will continue to grow and there would be a significant increase in GDP with a boost in productivity and price competition (Issues 2004, 15). However, while accession can lead to a largely increased

economy in terms of GDP, this effect in economics will be lower on the EU. The EU will benefit from this membership in terms of GDP, but only mildly compared to Turkey's increase. As of 2009, Turkey's GDP in PPP was \$863,300,000,000, which is around one-sixteenth of the EU's GDP in PPP of \$14,510,000,000,000 (CIA Country Comparison 2009b). Hence the economic effects of Turkish membership in terms of GDP would be asymmetric with Turkey benefitting much more than the EU. While Turkey's GDP and economy will benefit from membership, the effect on the EU member-states will be less than it will be for Turkey.

4.1.3.2 Foreign Direct Investment

According to the Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Investment Support and Promotion Agency, Turkey's inflow of FDI has steadily increased since 2002, with a minor decrease in 2008, likely due to the worldwide financial crisis. According to the Commission's "Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges" Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, FDI in Turkey decreased during the second half of 2008, yet, "the economic downturn in the Western Balkans and Turkey in 2009 is of the same magnitude as the EU average, but less severe than in the EU Member States that were most affected. However, in all countries the macroeconomic situation remains fragile" (Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009, 3). Upon the opening of formal accession negotiations in 2005 though, inflow of FDI to Turkey more than tripled (Turkey PMISPA). These statistics are seen in Figure 1, shown below. Furthermore, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Prospects Survey, 2008-2010, Turkey is the 15th most attractive FDI destination in the world (Turkey PMISPA).

Figure 1: FDI Inflow* to Turkey (Turkey PMISPA)



*Billion USD

Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey

Of this FDI, the largest amounts flow from the U.S., EU, and Arab Gulf countries into Turkey (Turkey PMISPA). According to Table 1 FDI from the EU and U.S. continues to increase (despite a decrease from 2007-2008 from the U.S. and a slight decrease from the EU). Additionally, this table shows how FDI from these countries increased upon the formal acceptance to open negotiations with Turkey in 2005.

Table 1: FDI Inflow to Turkey from the EU and U.S. (Turkey PMISPA)

(million USD)							
Countries	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
European Union	455	565	1,027	5,006	14,489	12,600	11,309
USA	2	52	36	88	848	4,212	864

The prospective of membership has led to an increase in FDI, especially from the EU. As seen in Table 1, from 2005 to 2006 alone FDI from the EU increased almost \$10 million. Furthermore, studies from the 2004 accession of 10 new EU member-states have proven that prospective membership increases FDI from the EU to the candidate country.

As witnessed by the ten new Member States, which joined the EU in May 2004, the perspective of EU membership triggers substantial FDI by EU companies. While the situation is not fully comparable because some of the FDI flows to the new Member States were related to the privatisation of state-owned companies, the implementation of the *acquis* and of the institutional framework of the EU boosts investors' confidence to explore new market opportunities. Furthermore, upon accession, spending from EU Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund on physical and human capital would also improve the conditions for private investment. Higher and growing FDI inflows into Turkey would lead to capital accumulation as well as to a renewal of the capital stock and a transfer of technology, a key component of increases in the growth potential (Issues 2004, 15).

As seen by these states, Turkey's FDI will continue to increase as a candidate country, with more EU companies investing in Turkey. The Commission found that when a country implements the *acquis* and the institutional framework, EU companies have more confidence investing there. Hence, the more Turkey implements the *acquis* the more FDI it will attract. The Atlantic Council has also found that eventual membership itself may trigger "an influx of foreign direct investment that in turn will lead to the economic take-off some believe is just over the horizon" (Atlantic 2004, 4).

FDI is also increasing from non-EU economies as well, including the U.S., due to Turkey's reforms. According to the Atlantic Council,

Accession will have the concrete benefit of anchoring the growing Turkish economy in a relatively transparent legal and regulatory framework; one that provides access to the large EU market and offers the predictability sought after by the business community, including those in the U.S. business community seeking new opportunities for investment (Atlantic 2004, 23).

Akçapar also notes that such reform will help to attract FDI because businesses will feel more secure investing in Turkey's economy. He writes, "The business community will also sooner or later step in more prominently as it realizes that reforms in the rule of law, transparency, accountability, and democratization actually help increase security for investments and commerce" (Akçapar 2007, 111). The UK House of Commons affirms Akçapar's argument and states that greater FDI to Turkey will increase the size of the Turkish economy and create

employment opportunities in Turkey (House of Commons 2008, 11). These benefits explain why some states believe in Turkish membership as FDI to Turkey is continuously rising and it is likely it will rise in years to come as Turkey comes closer to membership by implementing the *acquis* in full.

4.1.3.3 Trade

The current Customs Union between the EU and Turkey facilitates trade between the EU bloc and Turkey with no tariffs. However, the Customs Union does enact a Common Customs Tariff (CCT) on third-parties importing into the Customs Union. This Customs Union was partially enacted as a stepping-stone to membership which would facilitate easier accession negotiations, especially in the economic realm. While this Customs Union has been very beneficial, it does not cover agriculture, public procurement, and services. With membership these areas would be included and the Commission reported that “Trade integration will deepen further through the removal of tariffs in areas not currently covered (e.g. agriculture,) as well as the reduction of non-tariff barriers through the implementation of the *acquis*” (Issues 2004, 14). Furthermore, the Commission found that not only will deeper trade integration occur as Turkey progresses toward membership, but an increase in trade flows will occur as well. “It can be expected that further trade liberalization, in those areas not covered by the Customs Union, will lead to a further increase in trade flows. Also the abolition of customs controls and some other technical barriers to trade would bring about an additional, albeit small, trade creation” (Issues 2004, 14-15). While trade would increase between the EU and Turkey if Turkey is to accede, some reports state that the increase in trade would be very low as most trade is already covered under the Customs Union. The Atlantic Council echoes that “Because the customs union has already lowered tariffs, the level of trade with the EU is unlikely to increase much” (Atlantic

2004, 4). Nevertheless, economic factors to EU membership do include a potential increase in trade between the EU and Turkey.

4.1.3.4 Population and Migration

Other elements of the economic factor affecting Turkish membership to the EU are the differences between the Turkish population and the EU population and migration. When compared to the EU, Turkey has a population just smaller than Germany, making it larger in terms of population than 26 of the 27 member-states. There are many repercussions with such a large population. Firstly, in terms of QMV, if Turkey is to accede it will receive as many votes in QMV as Germany, giving Turkey a larger voice in voting than all other member-states except Germany. Those states like the UK, France, and Italy, which have the most voting power after Germany now due to population, will have less weight than Turkey if Turkey accedes. This can make older member-states uneasy.

Secondly, the Turkish population is not only large but young. In 2007, around 30 percent of Turkey's population of over 70 million was "below the age of fifteen, and these young people are living through a period of close alignment with European standards and norms, including in the educational sector" (Akçapar 2007, 22). On the other hand the EU's population is aging and has a lower birth rate than Turkey. In 2009 Turkey's population growth rate was 1.312 percent, higher than the population growth rates of each EU member-state, and the EU average of 0.108 percent (CIA Country Comparison 2009c; CIA EU 2009). Hence if Turkey were to join the EU now with its population of 76,805,524, Turkey would constitute around seven percent of the EU population (CIA Turkey 2009). Additionally, it is estimated that Turkey's population will increase to 85 million by 2030 (Akçapar 2007, 21). By 2050, *The Economist* predicts that the

median age in Europe, at the rate that the EU's population is aging now, will be 52.7 years old (Kagan 2004, 89).

Turkey's growing, young population, and the EU's decline in growth and aging population will affect migration. With an older population in the EU, over the years younger workers will be needed to take over for some of the retiring workers, leading to a migration influx. Furthermore, the Turkish population has already proven to be very productive. Two-thirds of the Turkish population live in large cities. "In these cities, over 80% of total value added is generated" (Issues 2004, 13). Additionally, Akçapar argues that Turkey's younger population is becoming more European so these people "will be more naturally compatible than those who do not benefit from the opportunities of an accession candidate" (Akçapar 2007, 22). This young and "more European" population coupled with the EU's aging population will have migration implications.

With a young population in Turkey and an aging population in the EU, there will be demographic pressures causing migration into the EU. Migration has already been an issue of concern, as

Turkey experienced significant outward migration after the early 1960s, when active recruiting by some European countries took place. Since the 1980s, the flow of net migration from Turkey to abroad amounts to some 40 000-60 000 persons per year, which is about 0.2% of the current labour force. In 2002, about 3 million Turkish nationals were officially registered in the EU-15 (Issues 2004, 13-14).

Today it is said that there are 4.5 million Turks living in the EU (Independent Commission on Turkey 2009, 36). It is estimated that these numbers will rise with membership due to the population differences. Akçapar explained that "With negative demographic pressures all over the EU, the European labor market would probably be a magnet for young laborers from outside the Union" including Turkey, leading to an influx in migration to the EU (Akçapar 2007, 21).

He explains though that regardless of membership this demographic pressure will still subsist and people will want to migrate. Furthermore, he argues, that if Turkey does not join the EU there may be less employment opportunities than in Europe, so this growing Turkish youth population will try to migrate anyway. Others (Erzan, Kuzubaş, and Yıldız 2004) argue that migration would not be such a problem, as evidenced by Greece, Portugal, and Spain (Akçapar 2007, 22). In these countries although migration was expected the actual number of migrants was below the expectation. When these countries implemented the *acquis* and acceded to the EU, their economies had grown which eliminated some of the migration pressure. However it is likely that migration will still occur to some extent.

Migration proves to be an issue of concern for many reasons. Some states and scholars argue that Turkish enlargement “would upset the social cohesion of European societies, increase criminality, and take away the jobs of the remaining European youth” (Akçapar 2007, 21). These are the greatest worries about migration. As seen by the cultural argument above, and problems integrating the large Turkish and Muslim populations in some of the countries, an influx of Turkish migrants will not be welcomed by some states. Furthermore, other states worry that criminality, including drug trade, will increase if the EU expands its borders to Turkey which would allow for migration. Lastly, Europeans may prefer that their job market stays open to their own, albeit small, youth population, as opposed to giving the jobs to the growing Turkish youth population.

4.1.3.5 Voting in Favor

Some states and scholars have agreed that Turkish membership would be beneficial to the EU, its member-states, and Turkey based on these four economic elements (GDP, FDI, trade, and population and migration). The UK is a strong advocate of Turkish membership for

economic reasons. The section on GDP highlighted Turkey's large economy and its growth rate being three times the EU average. The UK House of Commons Business and Enterprise Committee emphasizes Turkey's prospering economy, but has some reservations about per capita GDP in Turkey.

It is clear that there will need to be considerable economic reform within Turkey before it can join the EU, but there are no insurmountable economic barriers to its eventual accession. The picture is mixed. Turkey's GDP was \$663 billion in 2007, making it the 17th largest in the world and the 7th largest in Europe. Turkey's economy is well over half the size of the states which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 combined, and two-thirds bigger again than Poland, the largest economy in that group (which ranks 22nd globally). On the other hand, on a per capita basis Turkey's GDP ranks only 53rd, above only Mexico in the 30-member Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and slightly below Poland (House of Commons 2008, 8).

Overall though, the UK states that Turkey is capable of complying with all economic areas of the *acquis* and the UK will continue to support Turkish membership on economic grounds. The UK also realizes that these reforms may be a long and arduous process, and with no clear accession date for the future, some economic benefits are still somewhat vague. The Business and Enterprise Committee at the UK House of Commons stated:

The UK Government has little doubt that Turkey's accession would be economically beneficial to both parties. BERR [UK Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform] told us that the 'direct net economic benefits would be positive but asymmetric', with Turkey benefiting proportionately more than the EU. BERR acknowledged that there are inherent difficulties in predicting the economic impact of accession, given the lack of a definite timescale for Turkey's accession, and consequent 'obvious difficulties in predicting the precise economic impact' (House of Commons 2008, 10).

However, knowing that all economic boundaries are able to be overcome and knowing the economic benefits, the UK will continue to support Turkish membership.

Other studies support the UK's claim of economic benefits. As noted earlier, estimating that there is annual growth of 5 percent of GDP, if Turkey were to accede in 2015, Turkey's GDP would constitute 2.9 percent of EU GDP (EurActiv 2004); however, Brookings has found

that Turkey “is a stable country with a growing economy of 7.5 percent over the last five years, [and] \$30 billion of foreign direct investment in 2007 only” (Brookings 2008, 33). Hence, Turkish GDP would actually constitute more than 2.9 percent of EU GDP if it keeps growing at the rate of 7.5 percent which would increase the overall GDP of the EU. If the overall GDP of the EU improves, the member-states will also benefit from an increase in GDP in their own countries. This increase in GDP will also benefit Turkey. The Commission has estimated that enlargement will add between a 1.3 to 2.1 percent increase in GDP every year to new member-states and a 0.7 percent increase in GDP to existing EU member-states (Leonard 2005, 80). Hence if Turkey accedes it may likely experience an increase in GDP between 1.3 to 2.1 percent. EU member-states, while they will benefit, will benefit to a lesser extent than Turkey as their GDP may only increase 0.7 percent. Thus, Turkey’s increasing GDP will be beneficial to overall EU GDP. Because of these benefits the UK has expressed its support for Turkish membership as seen through the House of Commons Report as well as Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Miliband’s remarks (see section 2.2.1.1).

Additionally, Turkish FDI would contribute to the overall economic power of the EU and is another basis for the UK’s support of Turkish membership. The Single Market alone, without the inclusion of Turkey “has also led to a doubling of Foreign Direct Investment in the EU, and the competition has forced prices for consumers down to record levels (with air prices falling by over 40% and phone prices by over half) (Leonard 2005, 81).³ Whereas the Single Market has doubled FDI, Turkey’s accession will continue to contribute to an increase in FDI.

The UK also has emphasized that the increase in trade as well as the attraction of labor would be beneficial to the EU, despite other states’ worries about migration. Secretary Miliband,

³ Leonard cites European Commission (2003), *The Internal Market: Ten Years Without Frontiers*, Brussels.

as noted earlier, explained that Turkish membership would be beneficial in terms of trade, stating that the figures speak for themselves—“in less than 10 years trade between the old and new member states grew almost threefold” (EurActiv 2009c). Furthermore, the House of Commons noted that the increase in the size of the internal market would benefit the EU, its member-states and Turkey. BERR reported “that accession would ‘increase the size of the EU internal market and will enable further trade integration through the removal of trade restrictions [and] the abolition of customs controls and some other technical barriers to trade’” (House of Commons 2008, 10). While the Turkey-EU Customs Union has eliminated trade restrictions it does not cover agriculture, public procurement, and services. This economic boost in the EU would bolster both the European and Turkish economies. Furthermore, the UK has stated that the increased population within the internal market would be a positive, not negative change. Many member-states oppose Turkish membership because of migration, but the UK sees this as a benefit to the EU, not a detriment. The House of Commons stated that Turkish accession “would also increase the population of the EU’s internal market, increasing the number of customers for EU firms and offering economies of scale and gains from competition. EU consumers would gain from cheaper imports” (House of Commons 2008, 10-11). By looking at migration as a positive change within the Union, the UK supports Turkish membership.

Additionally, Akçapar suggests that rejecting Turkish membership because of immigrants could backfire. As many have noted, “losing Turkey” would be the worst option in the debate about Turkish membership. If states like Germany and France reject Turkey based on economic factors including immigration, in effect they are contributing to a possible loss of Turkey. Akçapar writes: “Rejection of Turkey’s EU membership is probably the second worst possible remedy one could use to address the question of immigration. The worst, of course, is trying to

expel them or cave in to the racism that existed in several societies long before the arrival of the Turks or the Muslims” (Akçapar 2007, 26). Although Akçapar says this could be detrimental, Germany and France are still threatened by Turkish membership because of immigration and could reject Turkey’s membership on economic grounds.

Overall some EU states support Turkish membership to the EU for economic reasons.

They do so firstly for the benefit to the EU. According to the Commission,

Overall, EU Member States’ economies would benefit from the accession of Turkey, albeit only slightly. An acceleration of growth in Turkey should give a positive impulse to EU25 exports. Investment opportunities for EU companies are expected to increase as a result of an improved investment climate due to Turkey’s accession perspective. A possible increase in labour supply, stemming from migration from Turkey, could contribute to some additional growth (Issues 2004, 16).

Here the Commission substantiates the UK’s claims on the benefit of Turkish accession economically although it notes that the benefit will be much greater for Turkey than for the EU and its member-states. Member-states that support membership do so secondly for the long-term benefit to Turkey itself, which, in turn, should be beneficial to all in the single market. The

Commission reports:

Turkey would benefit substantially from its accession to the EU. Accession should boost Turkey’s growth essentially via increased trade, higher investment due to higher FDI inflows, and higher productivity growth due to a shift in the sectoral composition of output and the implementation of structural reforms in line with the more competitive EU internal market environment. In spite of the significant stimulus which this growth acceleration would give to Turkish economic development, the catching-up process of Turkey’s income levels with the EU is expected to last several decades (Issues 2004, 15-16).

Furthermore Turks see economic benefits and migration as the two main reasons to join the EU (Atlantic 2004, 5). Overall Turkish membership can be economically beneficial to the EU, its member-states, and Turkey and some states will choose to vote for Turkish membership to the EU because of the economic benefits expected.

4.1.3.6 Voting Against

Other member-states threaten to veto Turkey's accession based on economic elements. One such state is Germany which has good economic relations with Turkey (see section 2.2.2.2) but still opposes membership on an economic basis. Trade between Turkey and Germany has doubled in the last ten years, amounting to 14 billion Euros annually (EurActiv 2010). Additionally "the number of German companies operating in Turkey more than doubled to 3,000 in the three years after 2005, as Turkish German business people moved quickly to take advantage of Turkey's new potential" (Independent Commission on Turkey 2009, 40). Regardless of these increases, Turkey's low per capita GDP and income is worrisome and shows the disparities of wealth throughout the country seen by the urban-rural divide (see section 4.1.3.1). These disparities could appear in the EU if Turkey is to accede according to the Commission. "Taking into account the low income levels of Turkish regions as compared to the EU average, Turkey's accession would statistically increase regional disparities in the EU" (Issues 2004, 16). Having a poorer per capita GDP than any other member-state and the impact of disparities of wealth have worried some states, including Germany, that Turkish membership could upset the stability of the current EU.

The largest economic reason for Turkish rejection is migration. Europe is home to 4.5 million Turks, 3 million of which live in Germany. Of those 3 million, 1.2 million are citizens of Germany (EurActiv 2009a; Independent Commission on Turkey 2009, 36). The Turks living in Germany constitute around two-thirds of the Turkish population in the EU and Germany's Turkish population has not been well integrated. Hence with problems already, Germany does not want to accept Turkish membership on an economic level as it may only lead to greater migration of Muslim Turks into EU countries. This worry is echoed by France. While on a

cultural basis France and Germany argue against Turkish migration because of religious reasons, both states are also worried about employment. The Independent Commission on Turkey has found that unemployment in Turkey coupled with a fear of immigration in Germany worries Germans that jobs in Germany will be given to Turks (Independent Commission on Turkey 2009). The second economic element influencing a possible rejection of Turkish membership is development funding. Kramer explains that in addition to the social effects of membership there are economic effects.

In addition, due to Turkey's low level of development in relation to the EU's average, huge money transfers are foreseen in terms of EU structural funds and agricultural support mechanism which could cause a total breakdown of the Union's financial system. In short, social and economic costs of an eventual Turkish membership are seen as unbearable for the EU (Kramer 2006, 30).

Hence both migration and funding, as well as problems differences in per capita GDP and income, influence some member states to reject Turkish membership.

4.2 FACTORS OF FOREIGN POLICY

4.2.1 Geostrategic

U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey is more detached than that of Europe. The EU offers Turkey a prospect of membership that the U.S. cannot. Since Turkey cannot join the U.S., certain factors, such as economics and culture, are less weighty in U.S. foreign policy decision making. However, as seen above, they are immensely important to the Turkey-EU relationship as the culture and economy of Turkey could become part of the culture and economy of the EU if Turkey were to join. Lacking this insider ability, the U.S. places less emphasis on its foreign

policy in these areas. Furthermore, in the U.S., power in foreign policy is different than that of EU enlargement voting. While the EU membership process gives veto power to each member-state, U.S. foreign policy does not include such a power. Again, the President can act unilaterally as the sole representative of the U.S. in foreign policy by making Executive Agreements. The President can also make Treaties which require ratification by two-thirds of the Senate or Congressional-Executive Agreements which require consent by a Joint Resolution from Congress. Congress can also act from a bottom-up strategy to pass resolutions to influence foreign policy. Foreign policy bureaucracies as well as think-tanks and nongovernmental organizations also lobby the White House and Congress to influence foreign policy. Yet veto power is not present in U.S. foreign policy so no power in the U.S. can solely block negotiations as they can in EU enlargement policy. Keeping this difference in mind is necessary in understanding how U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey is made and why it is different than EU enlargement policy.

U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey tries to influence Turkey's domestic and foreign policies in order to promote U.S. geostrategic interests. Domestically, the U.S. seeks to keep Turkey democratic and free and closer to alignment with EU policies outlined in the *acquis*. In relation to foreign powers, the U.S. aims to have Turkey's foreign policies reflect U.S. goals toward Turkey's region. Turkey's relations with neighbors have also been echoed by an internal voice: Atatürk. According to Cook and Sherwood-Randall, Turkey aims to fulfill Atatürk's prophecy of "Peace at home, peace in the world" through Turkey's foreign policy toward its neighbors.

This principle has translated into Turkish efforts to maintain good relations with its neighbors to the south and east regardless of their character. Since coming to office in 2002, the AK Party leadership has made a particular effort to further develop Ankara's ties with the Islamic world. While Prime Minister Erdogan, Foreign Minister Gul, and other party leaders have

discarded the anti-Western posture that was long a staple of their predecessors in Turkey's Islamist movement, they have not abandoned other traditional features of the Turkish-Islamist conception of foreign policy, notably the pursuit of a deepening of relations with Ankara's Arab neighbors and the wider Muslim world (Cook and Sherwood-Randall 2006, 18).

Hence this aphorism ties Turkey to its Southern and Eastern neighbors and the rest of the Muslim world. Since the U.S. tries to influence Turkey's Eastern neighbors, Turkey's tie to them is important to the U.S. The AKP has also increased relations with the EU and U.S., as seen by Erdoğan and Gül's interactions with Western leaders. In addition to supporting Turkey's relations with its Eastern neighbors, the U.S. also supports Turkey's interaction with the EU and its prospective membership. President Bush stated at a NATO summit in Istanbul in 2004 that Atatürk's legacy has led to Turkey's increasing diplomacy with its neighbors and the U.S. would support such actions:

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had a vision of Turkey as a strong nation among other European nations. That dream can be realized by this generation of Turks. America believes that as a European power, Turkey belongs in the European Union. Your membership would also be a crucial advance in relations between the Muslim world and the West, because you are part of both. Including Turkey in the EU would prove that Europe is not the exclusive club of a single religion, and it would expose the 'clash of civilizations' as a passing myth of history (Office of the Prime Minister 2004).

This agreement between Turkey and the U.S. on Turkish foreign and domestic policies has allowed for a strong Turkish-American relationship to flourish and grow stronger throughout the years. This foreign policy of the United States toward Turkey is based heavily on what Turkey can do in its region as a promoter of democracy, as a peaceful secular nation, a military stronghold, a vital energy transport state, and a diplomatic actor. Therefore the U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey is heavily based on geostrategic factors.

As early as the 1970's the U.S. realized Turkey's future as a leader in its region and has since placed great geostrategic emphasis on the U.S.-Turkey relationship. Following the Cold

War and the beginning of the fight to keep Turkey “West,” Turkey started to emerge as a leading nation. In 1974 President Ford echoed Turkey’s geostrategic importance to the U.S. during the Cold War after Turkey invaded Cyprus for a second time following a military coup over President Makarios led by the Greek military occupation on the island. President Ford realized that if Congress were to alienate Turkey by implementing an arms embargo there would be “farreaching and damaging effects on the security and hence the political stability of all the countries in the region. It [the embargo] will affect adversely not only Western security but the strategic situation in the Middle East.” He further stated that if the U.S. was to alienate Turkey it “cannot be in the interest of the United States to take action that will jeopardize the system on which our relations in the Eastern Mediterranean have been based for 28 years” (Library of Congress in Van Hook 617). When sanctions were implemented the administration tried to convince Congress to repeal them, and these sanctions did hurt the U.S.-Turkey relationship.

Since then the Turkish-American relationship has strengthened and has continued to promote the U.S. geostrategic interests, becoming especially strong in the last decade under the Turkish AKP administration. Yet, as noted in section 3.0 tensions over Iraq, Armenia, and the Middle East still have damaging effects on the relationship. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon has explained Turkey’s vital partnership with the U.S. in his recent address “The United States and Turkey: A View from the Obama Administration.” During this speech he highlighted not only Turkey’s important partnership with the U.S. but also its Western neighbors in Europe and its Eastern neighbors in the Near East and Caucasus. He explained,

Turkey is an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic alliance and has been for decades. Throughout that time it has always maintained strong relations with its neighbors to the west as well as its neighbors to the east. It is also reaching out in new ways. Turkey has always had multiple identities. But what binds the United States and Turkey together are shared interests, shared

values, and a commitment to partnership. We believe that Turkey is and wants to remain anchored in the Euro-Atlantic community (Gordon 2010).

Assistant Secretary Gordon later goes on to explain what binds Turkey to the United States and what these “shared interests, shared values, and...commitment to partnership” are. They are geostrategic goals to be implemented in the region, including winning the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, securing energy to the West, fighting terrorism, promoting democracy, enhancing human rights standards, etc. He stated,

When you consider all of the things I have talked about today – from Afghanistan to the Middle East to the European Union to energy security – it becomes clear that the alliance between the United States and Turkey is founded on a firm base of diverse and deep shared interests. And when one considers so many of the pressing challenges in the world today, it becomes equally clear that U.S.-Turkish cooperation can be a force for immense progress (Gordon 2010).

These goals emphasize the U.S.’s geostrategic interest in Turkey. This progress also includes how Turkey can help to shape the world it lives in and how it can be a regional leader, a geostrategic goal of the U.S.

Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall of the Council on Foreign Relations have identified one of the major challenges to U.S. foreign policy as the “growing schism between the West and the Islamic world,” which places more emphasis on the United States’ geostrategic interests in Turkey. Because of this divergence, “the relationship between the United States and Turkey—a Western-oriented, democratizing Muslim country—is strategically more important than ever. Turkey has the potential to be an invaluable partner as Washington endeavors to chart an effective course in its relations with the Muslim world” (Cook and Sherwood-Randall 2006, 3). Hence the problems between the West and Turkey’s backyard, the “Islamic world”, according to Cook and Sherwood-Randall, can be ameliorated by a geostrategic partnership between the U.S. and Turkey. Cook and Sherwood-Randall also outline how

Turkey's relationship with the U.S. in terms of foreign policy is based largely on geostrategic interests of the U.S. and how the U.S. and Turkey have worked together thus far to overcome common goals.

Turkey remains an ally whose strategic perspective remains largely aligned with that of the United States. Turkey has been oriented toward the West for more than half a century and is taking further steps to cement this perspective through its pursuit of EU membership, a process that Washington supports in the face of mounting European concerns about the benefits of Turkish accession. Both Ankara and Washington back a unified, federal Iraq—albeit for different reasons—and there is consensus between both governments on the need to confront global terrorism and Islamist extremism. Turkey has also used its good offices to support the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and has supported, in both words and deeds, the Bush administration's efforts to promote democratic change in the Arab world. Finally, both Washington and Ankara share interests in the stability and economic development of the Caucasus and Central Asia (Cook and Sherwood-Randall 2006, 4).

These goals are the common interests that Gordon talks about that the U.S. and Turkey share which are largely geostrategic.

President Obama and Prime Minister Erdoğan have also recently agreed on the U.S.-Turkish geostrategic goals during their meeting at the White House on December 7, 2009. The discussions between President Obama and Prime Minister Erdoğan explain the common U.S.-Turkish goals in the region reflected by the U.S.'s geostrategically aimed foreign policy toward Turkey. These goals include continuing to foster a stronger U.S.-Turkey relationship which helps to promote peace and democracy in the region; upholding a strong NATO; promoting a military-to-military, strategic relationship; increasing economic ties and trade; securing energy; and settling Middle-Eastern disputes. The U.S. and Turkey work in unison to achieve these goals. Furthermore, Turkey plays an even stronger role when NATO is considered, as the Turkish military is second to the U.S. in NATO. Kuniholm has found that “Turkey gives NATO an out-of-area capacity that has been of significant benefit since the Gulf War. Thus, the Turkish strategic role is increasingly valuable—particularly to the United States, whose international

responsibilities and capacities to project power give it a greater strategic interest in Turkey than its EU allies” (Kuniholm 2000, 11; see Abramowitz 2000 page 159 for further detail). These geostrategic issues make-up the foreign policy of the U.S. toward Turkey.

When studying the basic elements of the U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey the main element related to Turkey’s importance is location. This is why U.S. foreign policy does not promote a strategic relationship, but rather a geostrategic relationship. While this has been touched upon in previous parts of this thesis, Turkey’s location should always be under review to fully understand its unique real-estate. Turkey’s geostrategic standpoint is important to the U.S. in order to achieve U.S. objectives in Turkey’s broader region. Turkey lies in the midst of a collision of regions—it borders the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. These regions, which have been politically unstable in the past, boast a number of problems from political instability to human rights violations, low economic growth to harboring terrorist organizations such as the PKK, al-Qaeda, and Hamas. Situated in such a volatile crossroads, Turkey is the beacon of stability. As Gordon stated in his speech:

Few countries play such a crucial role in such a diverse set of important areas. How many countries have borders with as diverse an array of countries as Turkey – Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. With its combination of strategic, economic, and cultural links, Turkey’s influence touches such vital concerns of both our countries as the stability of the Middle East and relations with the broader Islamic world, relations with the Caucasus and Black Sea region, the transit of energy from the Caspian Basin to Europe, the security and development of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and the maintenance of strong ties to Europe and the Trans-Atlantic alliance. The geography that I have just mentioned spans some of the most sensitive and significant parts of the globe and in every one of these areas U.S.-Turkish cooperation can be a force for progress (Gordon 2010).

Secretary of Defense Gates has also echoed Assistant Secretary of State Gordon’s analysis of Turkey’s *sui generis* geographical location. He stated,

I think that Turkey is in a unique position. It is a member of the NATO alliance and is the southeastern anchor of the alliance. It is geographically located in the Middle East but also in Central Asia. It has historic and cultural ties with Central Asia so I think Turkey is in a

very good place to work with all different parties on a variety of different issues where it has special access in a sense of a place at the table, if you will, from Europe to Central Asia to the Middle East. I think that Turkey's taking that on and playing a constructive role in all of those areas is a very positive thing (U.S. DOS 2010a).

As the Secretary of Defense and Assistant Secretary of State point out, Turkey's location is pivotal because of the actors around it. It is not solely its bridging of continents nor its location in relation to strategic waterways, but the relations it has with the surrounding countries. As Menon and Wimbush explain, "Turkey remains exceptionally important to the United States, arguably even more so than during the Cold War...It abuts, or is proximate to, countries pivotal to American foreign policy and national security, whether allies and friends, adversaries, or loci of instability" (Menon and Wimbush 2007, 131). Therefore they define the U.S.-Turkey relationship as being mainly based on eight geostrategic factors/goals: 1. Turkey's location puts it in a hotbed of instability; 2. Turkey borders critical waterways; 3. lessening dependence on Russian energy pipelines; 4. Turkey's energy ties with Georgia and Azerbaijan; 5. The Turkey-U.S. alliance shows that America does not oppose Islam but rather Islamic extremists that promote and demonstrate terrorism; 6. Turkey's help in stabilizing and promoting democracy in Iraq; 7. a bilateral effort to fight terrorism; 8. a commitment between Turkey and the U.S. to promote stability and economic advancement in war-torn countries (Menon and Wimbush 2007, 131-133).

The U.S. has had an interest in trying to reform this region by bringing democracy and the rule of law to ensure freedom of the people and growth, while stabilizing energy resources and fighting terrorism. However, this interference has not always been taken to nicely. For instance, while Operation Iraqi Freedom may have had some of these goals in mind, many in the region and elsewhere question whether the U.S. has the authority to attempt to install a democratic government in a country that may not be requesting it. While Turkey also aims to

create a stable democratic region, the Turkish-American relationship has been strained by the War in Iraq. As Ambassador Dismorr explains,

Turkish democratization fitted [sic] in well with the central aim of the Bush administration's foreign policy: to promote democracy in the Middle East. However, the war in Iraq has severely dented the traditionally close ties between Ankara and Washington. Turkey's sensational refusal to facilitate the US-led invasion in 2003 shook the foundations of the relationships with the two NATO allies [U.S. and UK] (Dismorr 2008, 11).

This strain is strong and it affects the U.S.-Turkey relationship. The Iraq War and the U.S. interest in direct involvement in reforming Turkey's region portray the U.S. geostrategic interests in the region and its further involvement in creating stability. As the European Commission had analyzed:

Turkey has strong economic, political and military links with the United States. Both Turkey-US relations and EU-US relations have been exposed to challenges in the aftermath of the Iraq war. Turkey's relevance to the United States has changed in the last 15 years; the US was in the past dependent on Turkey's military capabilities and geo-strategic location, but now appreciates more its role as a factor for stability in a potentially unstable region (Issues 2004, 10).

Stability is reflected by the U.S. geostrategic aims in its foreign policy toward Turkey.

The U.S. uses Turkey as the "poster child" for the region; hence, Turkey is of geostrategic interests to the U.S. By reforming to EU standards, and affiliating itself with the West by being a Candidate Country in the EU, Turkey is increasingly democratic and holds similar Western ideals as the U.S. The U.S. believes that Turkey can show to other countries in the region that democracy, capitalism, freedom, trade, etc. are "good" characteristics, while dictatorship, human rights violations, suppression of opinions are "bad," because Turkey has taken on "good" characteristics and is becoming more successful and prosperous as it moves closer to accession. The U.S. does not only want Turkey to promote these values but to engage in them with the region as well, whether by helping others with democratic reform or engaging in trade. Turkey allows for the U.S. to spread its interests in democracy, capitalism, and rule of

law indirectly by using Turkey as the communication medium as opposed to the U.S. While other countries in the region may not be able to affiliate with the U.S., they may see their country and Turkey being rather similar, allowing for emulation to ensue. It is Turkey's understanding of and connection to its neighbors and the region that make Turkey capable of playing the role model and hoping that other countries will emulate Turkey. President Bush explained how Turkey helps with the U.S. interests because of its special relationship with the region. He stated,

This land has always been important for its geography – here at the meeting place of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Now Turkey has assumed even greater historical importance, because of your character as a nation. Turkey is a strong, secular democracy, a majority Muslim society, and a close ally of free nations. Your country, with 150 years of democratic and social reform, stands as a model to others, and as Europe's bridge to the wider world. Your success is vital to a future of progress and peace in Europe and in the broader Middle East – and the Republic of Turkey can depend on the support and friendship of the United States (Office of the Prime Minister 2004).

These hopes of Turkey acting as a role model for its region were also emphasized by President Obama in his December meeting with Prime Minister Erdoğan. Turkey playing a role model demonstrates its geostrategic value to the U.S.

As noted earlier, Turkey is also geostrategically important to the U.S. because of the energy it transports. Migdalovitz of the Congressional Research Service wrote “A stable Turkey is important to the United States mainly for geostrategic reasons. Turkey is situated amid the troubled Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East regions and is a critical energy and transit hub between Central Asia/the Caucasus and Europe” (Migdalovitz 2008, 1). By being an energy transporting region for oil and gas Turkey is of prime importance to the U.S. Turkey is also vital to the U.S. as the U.S. would like to decrease reliance on Russian gas and Turkey provides a viable transport route from other nations. Turkey's abilities to transport energy show its geostrategic importance not only to U.S. goals in this case, but also EU goals.

U.S. geostrategic interests are also addressed in the U.S. involvement in Turkey's accession to the EU. The U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey often reflects geostrategic interests in order to bring about security for the West. The Atlantic Council has found that

Because of this long-standing security relationship, the U.S. perspective on Turkey's accession to the European Union has always been dominated by strategic considerations. Given Turkey's geopolitical importance, the United States has been keenly interested in its political and economic stability. The view has been long prevailed in Washington that closer ties between Turkey and the EU—including membership—would enhance Turkey's political stability and promote economic growth, as well as help ensure a strong, democratic Turkey on the doorstep of a sometimes turbulent Middle East and Central Asia (Atlantic 2004, 9).

This has been the official policy of the U.S. toward Turkish membership to the EU since the beginning of Turkey's application to the EU. The U.S. has always strongly supported Turkish membership in order to keep Turkey a prosperous and growing economy and democracy while remaining stable within an unstable region. However, as evidenced in this thesis, EU member-states have strong, differing opinions on Turkish membership. While the U.S. recognizes that it does not have voting power in Turkish membership, it both silently and actively pushes for Turkey's membership. According to McGuire and Smith,

Since the Turkish application for membership in the late 1980s, US support for Turkish accession to the EU—essentially on geostrategic grounds—has been constant, while within the EU there have been distinct differences of opinion leading to a succession of attempts to put off the time at which any decision might have to be made (Buzan and Diez 1999). Thus during the 1990s it become almost a ritual for the EU (and especially members such as France or Austria) to express grave doubts about the Union's capacity to absorb Turkey, while US representatives pressed privately (and often not to privately) for Turkey to be granted candidate status (McGuire and Smith 2008, 222-223).

McGuire and Smith further explain that this move into the EU would allow for not only a European benefit but also an American benefit. They explain that the U.S. push for membership acted as “an extension that could be seen as benefiting the US through insertion into the union of a major NATO ally and one with a key geostrategic position on the eastern edge of the ‘new Europe’ (Buzan and Diez 1999)” (McGuire and Smith 2008, 210). Hence by pushing for Turkish

membership to the EU the U.S. is supporting its own interests by aiming to entrench Turkey in a European system. In this respect, Turkey would be “won” by both the West, including the EU and the U.S., if it accedes. This would allow for Turkey to continue to be a stable and strong leader in its region. However, if Turkey does not accede Cook and Sherwood-Randall explain how the both the EU and U.S. could “lose” Turkey. They state,

Should Ankara’s bid for EU membership fail, there is significant risk that the country will become unmoored from the West and look elsewhere for strategic advantage and opportunity. In this scenario, Turkey’s democratic development would be slowed or even reversed while Turkish nationalism intensifies and compels the Turks to seek alternative partners in Russia and the Islamic world (Cook and Sherwood-Randall 2006, 14).

Hence for geostrategic purposes, the U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey also emphasizes Turkish membership to the EU in order to maintain strong relations with Turkey to prevent from ever “losing” Turkey in the future.

Overall, Turkey is of extreme geostrategic importance to the U.S. Scholars and states have questioned the ability to “lose” Turkey, making the U.S. pull even tighter on the strings of the relationship. In a recent question asked to Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon, he explained Turkey’s salience to American geostrategic interests. During his trip to Ankara, a reporter asked him, “What was the number one issue with your contacts in Ankara, and...what can we expect to be on the agenda during Prime Minister Erdogan's visit to the United States?” Gordon’s response strongly explains the argument that Turkey’s importance as a geostrategic ally is critical to U.S. interests. He stated,

Turkey is so important on so many issues, it’s impossible to rank them...When you sit back and think about the importance of the Iran nuclear issue, the importance of Afghanistan where we have our troops fighting and dying and spending so much money together, when you think about the importance of Middle East peace and the consequences for the region, when you think about Turkey’s relations with Europe, when you think about the Armenian issue, when you think about energy -- Turkey just happens to be in a place where so many of our critical foreign policy and national security issues cross. And it’s just impossible and serves no purpose to try to rank them, because immediately you would look at the other issue and say well that’s equally important. So, we have to talk about all of them, and we do talk

about all of them and that is also the answer to your second question. On the agenda for the PM and the President will be all of these critical issues that I mentioned and no doubt some more (U.S. DOS 2009c).

Overall, these issues dominate the agenda as they promote U.S. geostrategic interests in Turkey's region which can be accomplished by a U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey which reflects them. U.S. foreign policy is strongly based on these geostrategic interests, and for this reason, the President and Congress attempt to shape this policy in order to receive the greatest geostrategic benefits from Turkey including Turkish stability, democracy, and leading by example.

4.2.2 How the Factors Differ in Foreign Policy and Why (Why Culture and Economics Do Not Play as Large of a Role in U.S. Foreign Policy as They Do in EU Enlargement Policy)

Other factors that make up foreign policy and enlargement policy, such as economics and culture as compared to geostrategy, do not play as much of an active role in U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey because no actor in the U.S. government, Congress nor the President, would advocate heavily for or against economic and cultural interests in Turkey. As shown in previous sections, the most important factors considered in shaping policies are those that are heavily contested. For instance, in the EU, states will argue against Turkish membership and threaten to veto on issues of geostrategy, economics, and culture. In the U.S. though, no actor would advocate against a foreign policy alliance with Turkey because of its poorer economic status as compared to the U.S., nor its difference in culture from the U.S. While these may be reasons to veto membership to the EU according to EU member-states, these are not reasons to discontinue or weaken the U.S.-Turkey foreign policy relationship according to the U.S. government. This is primarily based on the difference between enlargement policy and foreign policy. While U.S. foreign policy aims to advocate U.S. interests toward Turkey, enlargement policy negotiates

membership to the EU; hence U.S. foreign policy is a more bilaterally and externally based policy which affects Turkey, and enlargement policy is external, internal, and bilateral as Turkey's geostrategic situation, economy, and culture would be directly integrated into the EU.

4.2.2.1 Economy

Economics do not play as large of a role in U.S. foreign policy as do geostrategic interests. Especially since 2001, the U.S. focus in foreign policy has heavily emphasized security matters primarily, and economic matters secondarily but to a much lesser extent. As Cook and Sherwood-Randall state "Although there are existing bodies within the U.S. departments of Commerce, Defense, State, and Treasury that are charged with managing the U.S.-Turkey relationship, they have had little energy or focus since 2001" (Cook and Sherwood-Randall 2006, 29). This is because we are living in an age of high politics in which the President of the U.S. plays a more direct role in formulating foreign policy. Another reason as to why economics have less bearing on foreign policy relationships are the channels by which economics are managed internationally through the U.S. While diplomacy is conducted by the State Department and the President, and military actions by the Department of Defense and the President, economic institutions are decentralized. The economic relationship with Turkey is managed by the United States Trade Representative, the National Economic Council (NEC), the Department of Commerce (and its Foreign Commercial Service (FCS)), the Department of the Treasury, the Department of State, and Congress. This decentralization is consistent with more American values of laissez-faire economics, free enterprise, and democratic capitalism which demand lesser government involvement in economic regulation. Hence, decentralization makes negotiating foreign policy cumbersome so foreign policy is not as directed toward economics.

Economics play less of a role in U.S. foreign policy as compared to EU enlargement policy. Since Turkey cannot accede to the U.S. as it can to the EU, the U.S. will not feel the same effects on its economy as the EU will. However, the U.S. has sought to promote a strong economic partnership through the “Turkey-United States Economic Partnership Commission Action Plan” which seeks to “Encourag[e] Trade, Investment, and an Innovative Society,” promote “Regional Leadership and Cooperation,” “Encourag[e] Energy Cooperation and Efficiency,” build “Ties between U.S. and Turkish Business,” and create a “Contact Group” between the U.S. State Department and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (U.S. DOS 2007). While these goals are essential to closer economic relations between Turkey and the U.S., Turkey and the U.S. are more closely linked by political and military affairs, as seen by the U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey which reflects mostly geostrategic aims.

Both President Gül and President Obama noted this lack of economics involved in U.S. foreign policy at their meeting in December 2009 in contrast to the heavy weight put on geostrategic interests. Following the meeting, President Gül stated, “We have had opportunity to review the strategic dimension of our relations. Most of our relations seem to be on a military and political dimension, but we are also determined to move forward on the economic dimension of our relations...These are areas which we place importance on” (U.S. DOS 2009e). President Obama echoed this claim that geostrategic interests were given much more emphasis in U.S. foreign policy. He stated,

And as President Gul noted, we also talked about business and commerce, because all too often the U.S.-Turkish relationship has been characterized just by military issues and yet there's enormous possibilities for us to grow the economy and to make sure that trade between our countries and commerce and the lines of communication between our two countries continually strengthen, because we think that that's going to be good for Turkey, but it's also going to be good for the United States (U.S. DOS 2009e).

Hence both President's Obama and Gül recognized the need for greater economic cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey. While these plans to increase economic cooperation in the future may take place, economics still have less of a bearing than geostrategic interests on the current U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey.

In order to strengthen the economic dimension of U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey, in December 2009 U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Kirk, Secretary of Commerce Locke, and Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey Ali Babacan announced the "Framework for Strategic Economic and Commercial Cooperation." Ambassador Kirk expressed his hopes for the Framework. He stated,

U.S. economic ties with Turkey are strong. However, they have room for significant growth, given Turkey's development as a market in its own right, and its emerging role as a regional business hub. President Obama and President Gul in April committed to finding new ways to promote bilateral economic relations and we intend to use this new Framework process to advance that goal (U.S. DOS 2009b).

It is hoped that through the Framework this goal will be attained through more government-to-government economic cooperation, involving the private sector, as well as increasing trade and investment flows to Turkey and the U.S. While the U.S.-Turkey economic relationship is strong, it could be stronger and is not nearly as strong as the geostrategic relationship. As of the announcement of the Framework, trade with Turkey in goods made Turkey the United States' 39th largest trading partner. In 2008, U.S.-Turkey trade amounted to \$14.6 billion (\$10 billion in U.S. exports to Turkey and \$4.6 billion in imports from Turkey to the U.S.) (U.S. DOS 2009b). Of these imports to the U.S., U.S. imports of oil and gas from Turkey amounted to 2,933,000 barrels in 2009 alone (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2009). Considering the U.S. dependence on foreign oil and gas for energy purposes, Turkey is an important trading partner for the U.S. As of 2008 U.S. FDI in Turkey was \$6.1 billion and in 2007 Turkish FDI in the

U.S. was \$218 million (U.S. DOS 2009b). While these statistics show strong economic ties, considering Turkey's geostrategic importance to the U.S. these numbers should be higher. Turkey is certainly higher than 39th on a geostrategic scale, and Turkish trade with the U.S. could amount to more. Although oil and gas imports from Turkey help to provide for energy in the U.S., if the U.S.-Turkey trade relationship is increased perhaps more trade of energy providing materials can take place. Hence this Framework aims to increase the economic ties between Turkey and the U.S. and place more emphasis on the U.S. economic relationship with Turkey as laid out by U.S. foreign policy.

Yet there are still challenges to increasing this economic dimension. As noted earlier, the decentralization of U.S. foreign economic policy makes policymaking and enforcement increasingly difficult. It has been announced that this Framework will involve the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the State Department (U.S.), the Department of Commerce (U.S.), the Department of Energy (U.S.), the Treasury Undersecretariat (Turkey), Foreign Trade Undersecretariat (Turkey), the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (Turkey), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Turkey). Additionally, these groups manage the current bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, the Economic Partnership Commission, and the Energy Working Group (U.S. DOS 2009b). While the new Framework does aim to enhance the U.S.-Turkey economic relationship, it is being managed by eight actors. As noted earlier, with more decentralization in policy actors it is harder to create these policies and to enforce them. While the new Framework places emphasis on "regular coordination and review" to create a stronger economic relationship, the Framework could prove to be inefficient with so many actors.

The weakness of the U.S.-Turkey economic relationship shows how U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey is more strictly geostrategically oriented than economically oriented. While the economic relationship between Turkey and the EU is important to EU member-states, Turkey's economy has much less bearing on U.S. foreign policy. This is because while enlargement policy involves integrating the Turkish economy within the European market, no such integration must take place between Turkey and the U.S. in foreign policy. Because Turkey cannot accede to the U.S. there is much less bearing on Turkey's economic relationship with the U.S. Contrarily, Turkey's economy is of prime importance to EU enlargement policy. Furthermore, since 2001 the U.S. has become more security oriented in foreign policy; hence geostrategy is the goal of U.S. foreign policy and economic factors are much less important.

4.2.2.2 Culture

Another factor that is given less prominence in U.S. foreign policy is culture. While U.S. foreign policy focuses heavily on geostrategic factors it places little emphasis on culture. This too is unlike EU enlargement policy as EU enlargement policy strongly emphasizes Turkey's culture. Some EU member-states have threatened to veto Turkish accession on the basis of Turkey's culture, stating that Turkey's Muslim population is "too different" than that of Europe. They also claim that some states already have problems integrating their current Muslim population and a new influx of Muslim migrants would prove to be a larger problem. Furthermore, they argue that Turkish workers will be willing to work for lower wages, taking jobs from the original population.

The U.S. does not need to take this factor into such consideration in its foreign policy as the Turkish population will not become part of the American population by acceding to the United States. Hence culture shapes enlargement policy and how EU member-states will vote,

whereas it has a lesser effect on U.S. foreign policy and neither Congress nor the President puts strong emphasis on cultural factors because Turkey's culture is rarely mentioned in foreign policy.

U.S. government actions show that U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey has little to do with culture. For instance, Assistant Secretary of State Gordon's speech, entitled "The United States and Turkey: A View from the Obama Administration," highlights a majority of U.S. geostrategic interests in Turkey and rarely references culture. In this speech he highlights U.S. geostrategic interests in Turkey's region, including location, energy, Iraq, the military, Afghanistan, NATO, fighting terrorism, EU accession, diplomacy, Cyprus negotiations, Iran, peace in the Middle East, and promoting democracy. He devotes only one sentence of this speech to economics, which reinforces the past point that economic factors are very loosely involved in U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey. And he mentions Turkey's culture only three times: once in reference to Turkey's Muslim population and how this can foster relationships with other states and how Turkey can be a model for these states; once about the Turkish-Armenian conflict; and once about democratic and human rights reforms. While Gordon places importance on these cultural references, he notes that Turkey must continue to reform in terms of human rights and religious freedom in order to become a more democratic "modern nation" (Gordon 2010). Yet by only briefly mentioning culture three times during a 21 minute speech, Assistant Secretary Gordon draws attention to the fact that very little of U.S. foreign policy is devoted to economic and cultural issues and the vast majority is in promotion of geostrategic interests.

That being said, while the U.S. foreign policy says little about culture, the issue of Turkish culture has become a recent factor in U.S. legislation. This legislation could change the

U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey and can demonstrate how U.S. foreign policy could have a cultural focus in the future. The U.S. Congress is paying more attention to House Resolution 106, titled “Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution.” The Resolution was introduced in 2007 by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives to recognize the 1915 killings of Armenians within the Ottoman Empire as genocide. While Turkey has arisen out of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey denies the events as “genocide.” While it is a non-binding resolution, the Turks still are greatly insulted by even the introduction of this resolution. In 2007, following lobbying by President Bush, the resolution was not voted on by the House in full. “In October 2007, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives approved a resolution recognizing the Armenian massacre in 1915 in Anatolia as genocide. Though the resolution was never brought to the House floor, it ignited fierce bitterness in Turkish public opinion” (Göksel 2009, 35). The Turks responded to the action of the introduction by the House Foreign Affairs Committee by recalling their Ambassador and the U.S. worried that Turkey would cut off access to Turkish air bases that were linked to the mission in Iraq (Associated Press 2010). The House Foreign Affairs Committee again supported the Resolution after a 23-22 vote on March 4, 2010. Turkey responded by recalling its ambassador to the U.S. as well as explaining that this vote could have detrimental effects on the U.S.-Turkey relationship. “We condemn this draft resolution, accusing the Turkish nation with a crime that it has not committed,” said the Turkish government. “This decision, which could adversely affect our co-operation on a wide common agenda with the US, also regrettably attests to a lack of strategic vision” (Dombey and Strauss 2010). Recognizing this adverse effect, President Obama and Secretary Clinton, both before and after the vote, have been lobbying Congress not to pass the Resolution for fear that this would jeopardize both the U.S.-Turkey

relationship as well as potential negotiations between Turkey and Armenia. While Turkey's ambassador to the U.S. has since returned to the United States, the symbolism of Turkey recalling its ambassador still hangs overhead and strains the Turkey-U.S. relationship.

In October of 2009 Turkey and Armenia signed protocols to open diplomatic relations and the Turkish-Armenian border but have yet to ratify them (Gordon 2010). The worry in the Obama administration is that this House Resolution can damage the initiative for diplomatic relations between the two countries as well stall progress on opening the border between Turkey and Armenia (Associated Press 2010). As noted by the Turkish government, this could also damage the U.S.-Turkey relationship as seen by the recall of the Turkish ambassador. The U.S. position toward Turkish-Armenian relations has been that "normalization should take place without preconditions and within a reasonable timeframe...We remain ready to work closely with both governments in support of normalization, a historic process that will contribute to peace, security and stability throughout the region," according to State Department Spokesperson Ian Kelly (U.S. DOS 2009d). Hence U.S. Presidential administrations have attempted to stay out of the historical backgrounds between the countries, deciding not to classify the events of 1915 in order to keep the U.S.-Turkey relationship stable and to further negotiations between Turkey and Armenia. This can be seen by both President Bush's and President Obama's lobbying against the House Resolution (Associated Press 2010). In response to a question about the events of 1915 Secretary of State Clinton stated "I do not think it is for any other country to determine how two countries resolve matters between them, to the extent that actions that the United States might take could disrupt this process. Therefore, both President Obama and I have made clear, both last year and again this year, that we do not believe any action by the Congress is appropriate, and we oppose it" (U.S. DOS 2010c). While both the Bush and Obama

administrations have lobbied against Congressional approval to this resolution, the resolution still remains in the House. This resolution shows how Congress can use a more bottom-up approach to shape U.S. foreign policy, even without the support of the President. By passing resolutions, even though they are not approved by the Presidential administration, Congress can play a role in U.S. foreign policy.

This resolution demonstrates that while culture plays a small role in U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey at the moment, it can become much more prominent in foreign policy in the future. If Congress is to pass this Resolution, the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey can wane. In this respect, this historical issue (which is a part of a country's culture) can cause a difference in foreign policy. Overall though, U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey does not take culture into account. As Secretary Clinton has noted, this is a bilateral issue between Turkey and Armenia that the U.S. should not intervene in unless the U.S. is helping to foster negotiations between the two countries. Hence the official foreign policy is to advocate for negotiations. Congress' action is not part of this official foreign policy but it could alter the U.S.-Turkey relationship. U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey, while it does not place much emphasis on culture and places great weight on geostrategic interests, can be influenced by culture to some extent. This is unlike EU enlargement policy which is largely affected by Turkey's culture as Turkish membership would make Turkey's culture part of the EU.

5.0 CONCLUSION

EU enlargement policy and U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey stress different factors. EU member-states stress geostrategic interests, culture, and economics as the main reasons for and against Turkish membership. Some, like the UK, Poland, and Greece, have supported Turkish membership to the EU on these grounds. Others, such as Cyprus, Germany, and France, have vehemently opposed it and have threatened to veto membership because of these factors. The U.S., a supporter of Turkish membership, shapes its foreign policy differently, advocating geostrategic interests with less weight on economics and culture. This difference in the factors shaping enlargement policy and foreign policy is rooted in a distinction between the EU and U.S.: while Turkey could possibly accede to the EU, making it a full member of the Union, no such membership could ever be attained with the U.S. The EU's doors remain open to its surrounding neighbors that meet the *acquis*, but the U.S. will not allow for the fusion of another state with the U.S. Since Turkey cannot accede to the U.S. it is less closely tied to economic and cultural issues as Turkey's culture and economy will not change the domestic character of the U.S. This membership is possible within the EU framework, and because of this possibility, Turkey's accession, on some level, would alter the dynamic of the current EU on geostrategic, economic, and cultural levels. Hence, since Turkey cannot accede to the U.S., U.S. foreign policy is based largely on geostrategic interests; since it can join the European Union, EU enlargement policy incorporates not only geostrategic interests but economic and cultural factors

as well. These influencing factors will shape how the EU and U.S. act toward Turkey as well as how Turkey moves forward into the next decade.

Furthermore, the relationship is different because of the types of actors that the EU and U.S. are and therefore how decisions are constructed. While the U.S. is a state, the EU is a *sui generis* IO. Because of this difference U.S. foreign policy is largely conducted through the executive branch, having some influence from Congress (legislative branch), foreign policy bureaucracies (situated in the executive branch), think-tanks, NGOs, etc. EU enlargement policy is constructed through 27 different states. So while U.S. foreign policy is more easily made and lies mostly within the hands of the President, is it unlikely foreign policy toward Turkey could be completely derailed by other influencing actors. With the EU the situation is different as each state has veto power, so enlargement policy can be derailed by each state. Hence different factors are stressed because of who constructs the policies. Since most of the U.S. foreign policy rests in the power of the executive, geostrategic interests are of utmost importance and economics and culture are less influential. However, since each of the 27 member-states of the EU has veto power and since the member-states take into account not only Turkey's geostrategic importance but its culture and economy as well, culture and economy play a more important role in EU enlargement policy than U.S. foreign policy. While Turkey will continue to play an important role in U.S. foreign policy and EU enlargement policy, these policies will be made differently and therefore will stress different factors with respect to Turkey.

In this new decade it is likely that Turkey will be driven to the forefront of international relations. While it maintains a strong relationship with the U.S., it also is negotiating accession to the EU. There is no set timeline for Turkish accession, nor can anyone predict whether it will actually take place, despite reform to meet the *acquis*. But as Turkey moves closer to the EU and

as the U.S. continues to be involved in Turkey's backyard, Turkey will become increasingly important on the international stage. As Ambassador Dismorr stated, "Turkey will remain in the headlines on a wide range of topics: European and Middle Eastern politics; the Kurdish and other human rights issues; changing US-Turkish relations; terrorism; bridging the divide between the West and Islam; demographics; and its potential as the next economic miracle" (Dismorr 2008, 17). In the foreseeable future, Turkey will remain at the forefront of the agenda on both sides of the Atlantic.

APPENDIX

CHAPTERS OF THE ACQUIS AND TURKEY'S PROGRESSION

1. Free Movement of Goods*
2. Freedom of Movement for Workers, *blocked by Cyprus (12/2009)*
3. Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services*
4. Free Movement of Capital, *opened*
5. Public Procurement
6. Company Law, *opened*
7. Intellectual Property Law, *opened*
8. Competition Policy
9. Financial Services*
10. Information Society and Media, *opened*
11. Agriculture and Rural Development*, *also blocked by France*
12. Food Safety, Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy
13. Fisheries*
14. Transport Policy*
15. Energy, *blocked by Cyprus (12/2009)*
16. Taxation, *opened*
17. Economic and Monetary Policy, *blocked by France (06/2007)*
18. Statistics, *opened*
19. Social Policy and Employment
20. Enterprise and Industrial Policy, *opened*
21. Trans-European Networks, *opened*
22. Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments, *blocked by France*
23. Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, *blocked by Cyprus (12/2009)*
24. Justice, Freedom and Security, *blocked by Cyprus (12/2009)*
25. Science and Research, *opened and closed*
26. Education and Culture, *blocked by Cyprus (12/2009)*
27. Environment, *opened*
28. Consumer and Health Protection, *opened*
29. Customs Union*
30. External Relations*
31. Foreign, Security and Defense Policy, *blocked by Cyprus (12/2009)*
32. Financial Control, *opened*
33. Financial and Budgetary Provisions, *blocked by France*
34. Institutions†, *blocked by France*
35. Other Issues†

*Denotes chapters suspended in 2006 by the Council of Ministers until the 2005 Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement is implemented

†Not official legislation chapters.

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