he next decade could witness the end of the law review as we know it. At first glance, this contention might seem implausible - after all, the law review is the supreme institution of the contemporary American legal academy. Virtually all accredited law schools have one; quite a few have several. Law schools depend upon law reviews for publicity and prestige. Law professors depend upon law reviews for publication and promotion. Law students depend upon law reviews for education and employment. [i.2] The law review, however, is hardly an inevitable institution. It emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the product of the fortuitous interaction of academic circumstances and improvements in publishing technology. Today, new academic circumstances (not least among which is an increased professorial dissatisfaction with law reviews themselves) and new computer-mediated communications technologies (e.g. on-line services and the Internet) are coming together in a way that may soon lead to the demise of the familiar law review in favor of a more promising system of scholarly communication.
...new academic circumstances...and new computer-mediated communications technologies...are coming together in a way that may soon lead to the demise of the familiar law review.....
[i.3] In this article, I undertake a comprehensive re-assessment of the law review from the perspective of the present age of cyberspace. In Part I, I begin this re-assessment by investigating the academic and technological conditions that initially joined to generate the form. In Part II, I trace the course that criticism of the law review has taken since the institution's debut, showing how criticisms have grown in number, range and intensity to the point of their current crescendo; I explore why various criticisms arose when they did, and evaluate erstwhile (and, as it turns out, largely failed) attempts at reforming the law review system for the benefit of its academic and professional constituencies. In Part III, I examine how new computer-mediated communications technologies embodied in WEST LAW, LEXIS, and the Internet's so-called "electronic journals" have subtly begun to change and improve the law review system, even if those particular services do not and cannot cure the system's more profound ills. In Part IV, I offer a "modest proposal" for the electronic self-publishing of legal scholarship that would use the full potential of today's computer technology to overcome the editorial and material limitations of the law review format while providing legal scholars with an unprecedented range of intellectual and professional opportunities. In the Conclusion to this article, I consider what legal scholars, law school Deans and faculties, the American Association of Law Schools and even the editors of law reviews themselves might do to accelerate or at least accommodate the transition to the proposed system of electronic self-publication.
I. Hello to Law Reviews
[1.2] As a rendition of specific facts, this story is not
inaccurate, but as
an explanation of the initial development and popularization of the
law review it is nonetheless inadequate. It has two fundamental
failings. First, in focusing (however understandably) on the
particularities and personalities of Harvard, it downplays the extent
to which the law review served the general interests of the
university-based law school as an institution seeking to advance
itself in late nineteenth and early twentieth century America; even as
confined to Harvard, it presents the law review
as
the creature of
narrow legal considerations where there is at least circumstantial
evidence to suggest that broader scholarly concerns might also have
animated Ames, the colleagues who supported him, and perhaps his
precocious band of law students. Second, the traditional story
totally disregards contemporary technological developments in the
printing and publishing industry that in the late nineteenth century
made law school sponsorship of legal periodicals conceptually
plausible and financially practicable for the first time. As a result
of these two shortcomings, the law review has been portrayed more as a
happy serendipity or a legal peculiarity than as a complex but
rational product of its time. In the remainder of this section I will
argue for the last of these interpretations.
[1.3] In late nineteenth and early twentieth century
America,
university-based law schools were not nearly as populous, powerful and
prestigious as they are today. They were admittedly not new - law had
been taught at Harvard as early as 1815, and the university had
operated a separate law school since 1817.6 Neither were
university-based law schools all that rare any more; by the late
1880s, there were over 45 of them.7 For all their age and their
numbers, however, the schools were, by and large, marginal
institutions. They were marginal professionally: universally into the
1890s, and in many regions of the country through the 1900s, most
American lawyers still received their education by the more
traditional means of apprenticeship.8 In this context, formal legal
education was seen (at best) as a supplement to office training, not a
substitute for it.9
University-based law schools were also marginal
academically. Many (such as Harvard) existed on the intellectual and
physical outskirts of university campuses. Most counted for little in
their universities' overall academic reputations,10 and sometimes for less in their
budgets.11
[1.4] In this context, ambitious law professors sought
ways to advance their
institutions, their students and themselves. They had several implicit
(and sometimes explicit) goals. First, they wanted to provide their
students with a superior form of legal training that would positively
distinguish the latter from students trained only in law
firms.12 Second, they wanted
to develop their ties with the practicing
bar in a way that would increase the legitimacy of their schools and
enhance their own reputations in the professional legal community
which they served and in which most of them still worked
part-time. Third, they wanted to strengthen their connection with
alumni whose support promoted law school solvency, professional
goodwill and the employment of law graduates.13 Fourth, they wanted to improve their
academic status in their respective university settings.
[1.5] While legal academics were pursuing these goals,
contemporary
publishing technology was changing. In the last decades of the
nineteenth century, new high-speed rotary printing presses came into
general use.14 At the same
time, paper-making processes accelerated
thanks to the widespread substitution of ground woodpulp for
rags.15 Together, these
developments pushed printing and paper costs to
unprecedentedly low levels.16 Taking advantage of the savings,
established and new publishers flooded a waiting American market with
inexpensive books and magazines. In 1880, 2076 new books were
published in the United States; in 1884, over 4000; in 1895, over
5400.17 There were
approximately 3300 American periodicals in
publication in 1885; by 1890 that number had risen to more than 4400;
by 1895, there were approximately 5100 being produced across the
country.18 The explosion in
the available volume of printed matter
became the subject of public comment, and even public concern. In
1895, the editor of The Nation observed that the "multiplication and
cheapening of periodical literature within the past five years have
been extraordinary."19 In
1896, the editor of another journal concluded
(somewhat ironically, perhaps), that "this is a book-enslaved
generation. Too many books, too many newspapers, too many magazines -
too little reflection, too little originality."20
[1.6] Law was hardly immune from the lure of cheap
print. The number of new
law books - and reprints of old ones - published each year hit record
levels in the 1880s and 1890s.21 In 1880, 62 new law books were
published in the United States; in 1882, 261; in 1889, 410; in 1896,
507.22 Lawyers inevitably
complained about the burgeoning mass of texts
and precedents. In 1882, Chicago attorney J.L. High, writing in the
American Law Review, called the increase in materials "appalling": "so
far from strengthening the foundations upon which our jurisprudence as
a system is based, [it] has a well-defined tendency to weaken them by
the substitution of precedents for principles in the practical
administration of justice."23 For fear of missing something important or
being at a disadvantage, however, most lawyers continued to buy and
stock as many new law books as they could afford.
[1.7] The new technology lowered the cost of printing
legal periodicals to a
point where they could be sponsored by relatively impecunious law
schools.24 The flood of
periodicals which the new technology
facilitated also helped to create an intellectual and cultural
environment in which publishing a periodical seemed unremarkable, even
for law schools that would not previously have considered such an
ostensibly-ambitious and even pretentious undertaking. The fact that a
school- sponsored law journal might be feasible and credible, however,
was not enough to ensure that such an experiment would actually be
attempted. That final step required purpose as well as opportunity.
[1.8] Unfortunately, there is precious little
before-the-fact
evidence of
precisely which positive factors prompted law professors in a
significant number of American law schools to support the inauguration
of school-sponsored law reviews in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Contemporary circumstances and the range of
formal, after-the-fact justifications for publication strongly
suggest, however, that law professors at these schools believed that
law reviews were capable of advancing their aforementioned
institutional and personal goals in a variety of ways. First, a law
review could further the legal education of law students.25 At the most
general level, law students reading their school's law review would
presumably benefit from the writings of their professors, and perhaps
also their student colleagues. If law students were actually put in
charge of a law review, its educational and ultimately professional
value to them would be greater still. Acting as editors, they would
gain by evaluating and polishing the contributions of law professors
and practitioners. As contributors in their own right, their attention
would be focussed on recent developments in the case law, and they
would gain proficiency in legal analysis, research and
writing. Insofar as few if any of these opportunities were available
to apprentices working in law firms, working on a law review would
make law school graduates uniquely capable in an American legal
environment increasingly saturated with printed precedents, statutes
and texts.26 As a result,
those graduates would be more attractive to
potential employers, and the schools and professors that produced them
would gain prestige and profit.
[1.9] Coincidentally, making law school graduates more
attractive to law
firms by virtue of the formers' experience on school-sponsored law
journals offered a way to strengthen the connection between law
schools and the bar.27 Not
only could a student-edited law review
provide the bar with a pool of specially-trained recruits, but -
assuming it were staffed by the law students with the highest grades -
it could also provide a convenient criterion by which hiring attorneys
could identify the best and the brightest law graduates. This
criterion appeared increasingly attractive once schools such as
Harvard eliminated the formal "Honors" programs which had once served
the same "streaming" function.28 With or
without student editing, a
school-sponsored law journal could provide practitioners with a useful
professional service29 -
first, an additional medium through which they
could communicate with other practitioners, and second, a source from
which they could regularly glean information on new cases, new
legislation, and the broader implications of those. At a time when the
bar was being buried with more printed information and material than
it could readily assimilate, this latter function was potentially
critical: a law review could serve as a law digest, potentially saving
busy practitioners both time and the money they would otherwise have
spent on rapidly-outdated treatises, reports and statutes. Of course
commercial legal journals and digests were already available, but the
mass of information descending on the American legal community at the
turn of the century was such that more law journals offering analyses,
updates and reviews were always welcome. A law school that chose to
publish such a journal could gain increased professional recognition
and influence, as could the law professors whose writings appeared in
its pages.
[1.10] Third, a law review could address a law school's
institutional need to
gain and keep the support of alumni by providing a product that would
bring news of the school to their attention on a regular basis. More
pro-actively, it could also provide a forum in which they could
publish, correspond and generally maintain ties with one
another.30 A
school-sponsored law journal promised to be particularly useful as a
bonding mechanism when (as was already the case in a number of
prominent instances in the late nineteenth century) a law school's
graduates were scattered over a broad geographical area, limiting the
opportunities for face-to-face meeting and regular conversation. Of
course, the more that alumni felt connected to each other and to their
alma mater, the more likely they would be to hire their alma mater's
graduates, send their own sons (and even daughters) there, recommend
the school to friends, and (most importantly) contribute to its
coffers.
[1.11] Finally, a school-sponsored law journal could
enhance a law school's
academic and scientific reputation. In late nineteenth century
America, the focus of the academic community was starting to shift
from teaching to scholarship. The German model of post-secondary
education that was becoming increasingly influential in the United
States around this time encouraged universities to re-invent
themselves as producers (as opposed to merely conveyors) of research
and learning that would stimulate progress and reform.31 In 1876, Johns
Hopkins University was established as the first American "research
university." Consistent with the new emphasis on research, academics
in a wide range of disciplines turned to writing. Universities and
learned societies created numerous journals to contain the new
scholarship, which could not be absorbed (and in many instances would
not have been accepted) by then-existing commercial or learned
periodicals.32 The declining cost of print
facilitated and further
stimulated this process. The last quarter of the nineteenth century
witnessed the birth of such scholarly stalwarts as the American
Journal of Mathematics (1878), the American Chemical Journal (1879),
the American Journal of Philology (1880), the Journal of the American
Medical Association (1883), the Political Science Quarterly (1886),
Modern Language Notes (1886), the American Journal of Psychology
(1887), the Journal of Political Economy (1892), the American
Historical Review (1895), the Journal of Physical Chemistry (1896),
and the American Journal of Sociology (1896). Ultimately, a variety of
universities set up their own presses to facilitate the distribution
of their faculties' research products. Predictably, Johns Hopkins led
the way in 1891, followed by Chicago (1892), Columbia and the
University of California (both in 1893).33 All this activity created an
environment in which intellectual respectability was increasingly
associated with the sponsorship of journals and the practice of
publication.34 In this context, the inauguration
of a school-sponsored
law review could offer a university-based law school an unprecedented
academic opportunity. As the patron of a "learned" journal providing a
needed forum for its faculty's scholarship35
outside the traditional
confines of treatises36 and
commercial legal periodicals37, it could at
last make common academic cause with other progressive departments and
professional schools on its campus (even if its own journal were
student-edited).38 Even more
fundamentally, it could demonstrate that
the law was amenable to "scientific" study,39 and that a law school belonged in the university.
[1.12] Of course, it was not altogether accidental that
students and
professors at the Harvard Law School were the first to realize the law
review's potential. James Barr Ames, the Harvard Law Review's
principal faculty supporter, was the first of a
new breed: the
fully-academic law professor with minimal practical experience,
appointed in the expectation that he would devote his career to
teaching and scholarship.40
Ames had begun scholarly work (mostly in
legal history) soon after joining the Harvard law faculty, but prior
to 1887, he lacked an obvious outlet for that work in the contemporary
legal journals.41 His Dean
and mentor, Christopher Columbus Langdell,
had developed a new pedagogical method - the case method - that he,
Ames, and their law students were anxious to celebrate and
publicize.42 Both Ames and
Langdell were operating in the midst of a
university that under the leadership of President Charles Eliot had
taken a backseat only to Johns Hopkins in its emphasis on research and
publication (and Johns Hopkins, of course, did not have a law
school).43 The Harvard Law
School had established its own Alumni
Association in 1886, and was looking for a means of keeping in touch
with graduates already scattered across a wide variety of American,
and even foreign jurisdictions. Last but not least, the same Alumni
Association - dominated by well-off Boston and New York lawyers - had
access to significant financial resources and was willing to use those
resources to advance the Law School's interests.44 In these
circumstances, the student proposal to create a law review seemed
especially sensible and attractive.45 At least some of Harvard's
ambitions for its review were explicitly articulated in a note to the
first issue (written, of course, by the student editors): "Our object,
primarily, is to set forth the work done in the school with which we
are connected, to furnish news of interest to those who have studied
law in Cambridge, and to give, if possible, to all who are interested
in the subject of legal education, some idea of what is done under the
Harvard system of instruction. Yet we are not without hopes that the
Review may be serviceable to the profession at large."46
[1.13] Ultimately the attraction of the school-sponsored
law journal was such
that shortly after the launching of the Harvard Law Review, other
journals began to appear under the sponsorship of other law
schools. The example and success of Harvard were certainly factors in
this trend,47 but the rapid
proliferation of law reviews in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries should not be considered as a
mere instance of "following the leader".48 Some of the same concerns and
interests that in the context of improved print technology had
apparently urged the Harvard law students and faculty towards journal
publication also spoke to students and legal scholars
elsewhere.49 In
1891, for example, the editors of the new Yale Law Journal launched
their effort with these words: "the graduates of the Yale Law
School...have lacked the esprit de corps, which is necessary for
effective unity. The formation of the Alumni Association was a step in
the right direction. The Law Journal is intended to be another. It
provides a common means of communication between the graduates and the
students, and its success should be a mark of the vitality of the
school."50 In 1917, the Minnesota Law
Review
opened its first issue by
observing that "the present position of the typical law school, as
compared with
the medical
school, is discreditable to the
former; its
influence with the profession is not what it ought to be. The law
review is one of the means by which the law school may make its
influence...felt....".51
Over time, the focus of justification for new
law reviews changed subtly as law schools gained prestige (making
bold declarations of institutional ambition superfluous), alumni
relations came to be fostered through other channels (making that
purpose of law review publication less important), and not publishing
a law review became more remarkable than publishing one (making
justifications as a whole less necessary, or at least less lengthy).
Functionality, however, continued to be seen as the key to a review's
potential success: as the editors of the George Washington Law Review
explained in their first issue, produced 45 years after Harvard's:
"Publication of a law review by any school is justified by the
additional contributions to legal literature which it stimulates and
the opportunities for better training to students which it
affords."52
[1.14] This brief history of the initial development and
popularization of
the law review suggests that the law review was very much the product
of its times53 - in
particular, the product of a conjunction of
contemporary academic circumstances and then-current technological
advances. Insofar as it had emerged in response to perceived goals, it
was potentially vulnerable to criticism as it tried to fulfill those
goals, and as those goals evolved. In the next section of this paper
I will trace the course that criticism of the law review has taken
over the years, I will investigate why various criticisms arose when
they did, and I will examine the structural and substantive reforms
that have attempted to preserve or advance the law review's position
in the ever-changing American legal academy.
[2.2] Criticisms of the law review have historically
tended
to come in
waves, each wave larger and more powerful than the last. The first,
weakest and most diffuse wave of criticism lasted roughly from 1905 to
1940, coinciding with much of the law review's initial period of
development and popularization. To some extent, the first wave was a
reaction against the relatively-rapid proliferation of
school-sponsored legal journals in the early decades of the twentieth
century. The numbers speak for themselves: in 1900 there were 7 law
reviews;54 in 1928, there
were 33;55 in 1937, there
were 50.56 As early as
1906, the faculty editors of the new state-oriented Illinois Law
Journal expressed the feeling that the "field for law reviews of a
general character is already overcrowded."57 Restraint, re-orientation
and specialization were said to be in order: in 1927, Illinois' Albert
Kocourek even went so far as to suggest that "the Harvard Law Review
might become what is consistent with its traditions, a journal of
legal history; the Yale Law Journal might become a journal of
jurisprudence; and the Columbia Law Review might become a journal of
commercial law."58
[2.3] The first wave of law review criticism was also a
by-product of the
gradual standardization of the law review format which had come with
the growing popularity and power of the genre. After a brief period of
experimentation from the late 1880s through 1900 during which the law
reviews carried such "unusual" things as school news, class notes,
etc., most fell into a set (and, to us, more familiar) structure:
leading articles, cases notes, and book reviews. They also settled
into a definable style: careful, plodding, rather heavily
footnoted. These developments did not sit well with everyone in the
legal professoriate; the dissatisfaction of critics only increased as
the reviews appeared to become more hidebound over time. In 1936, as
the fiftieth anniversary of the Harvard Law Review drew near, Yale's
Fred Rodell made it plain that he had had enough. In his Virginia
Law
Review article "Goodbye to Law Reviews"59 (which in later years would
ultimately, and perhaps ironically, become the most-cited law review
article on law reviews) he declared that there were two problems with
legal writing in general, and law review writing in particular: "One
is its style. The other is its content".60 Armed with a rapier wit and
a poison pen, Rodell decried the conservatism of editors and the
stultifying sameness of the law review format they
favored.61 He bewailed what
he regarded as the specious and largely
superfluous business of footnotes. More accurately than some of his
colleagues, friends and students might have wished, he attributed
these and other problems to the law review's nature as a product of
the collective self interest of career-conscious professors,
job-seeking students and idea-hoarding law firms.62 Rodell's disgust
with the existing system was such that he doubted whether he would
ever write a law review article again.63
[2.4] Student editorial control of law reviews was
another
early cause of
concern, especially after a number of prominent law schools which had
originally founded faculty-edited journals either gave up their
experiments (e.g. Iowa, in 1901) or radically reduced the degree of
faculty supervision (e.g. Wisconsin, during the late 1920s).64 Speaking
from the bench of the United States Supreme Court in 1911,
former
commercial law journal editor Oliver Wendell Holmes
Jr. dismissed law
reviews in general as "the work of boys".65 In 1927, the faculty editor
of the Illinois Law Review contended that "While preparation of case
notes by students is excellent training, and while the researches of
law students are valuable in gathering material, in classifying the
trend of decisions, and in presenting points of view...yet the bar is
entitled to more than that."66 Iowa law professor Clarence Updegraff
explicitly opined in 1929 that "the criticism and revision of leading
articles, at least in the majority of schools, should be a faculty
matter. The best of law students will scarcely be sufficiently well
prepared to decide in a close case whether a submitted article should
be published or not."67
[2.5] Finally, some of the criticisms made of law
reviews
in the 1930s in
particular were directly or indirectly induced by the rise of legal
realism, a broad school of jurisprudence that used social science
concepts to challenge traditional doctrinal styles of legal
analysis. The realist attack on "classical" legal thought became an
attack on the law reviews which had been born of, and in turn had
helped to nurture narrow, case-based legal theory. Fred Rodell did not
phrase his 1936 critique of law reviews in expressly realist terms,
but it is likely that his own realist outlook helped to shape his
negative attitude. Duke's David Cavers, although not a realist
himself, nonetheless reflected the impact of realism when he observed
in the same year that law reviews had a restricted "range of inquiry",
having confined themselves to the concerns of courts and lawyers
without reference to the social context of legal problems.68
[2.6] Largely because of the somewhat spotty and
disjointed nature of these
early reproaches of the law reviews, not to mention the paeans,
apologias and ripostes which more than counterbalanced them,69 the first
wave of criticism had only slight impact on the existing law review
structure. After the inauguration of the Illinois Law Review in 1906,
an increasing number of state-based law reviews (e.g. the California
Law Review and the Missouri Law Bulletin) began publication. In 1925,
the University of Chicago, the University of Illinois and Northwestern
University tried to avoid duplication of effort (not to mention
product) by sharing sponsorship of single law journal (the Illinois
Law Review) formerly published under the auspices of Northwestern
alone.70 A couple of law
reviews specializing in particular subjects
appeared in the 1930s (e.g. the George Washington Law Review,
specializing in federal public law; the Journal of Air Law, edited out
of Northwestern University and the University of Southern California
Schools of Law). In 1933, David Cavers and the Duke Law School
launched the faculty-edited (if still student-staffed) Journal of Law
and Contemporary Problems, an overtly-interdisciplinary publication
which pioneered a "symposium" format designed to foster
subject-specialization and thereby reduce redundancy across
reviews.71
[2.7] None of these reforms was particularly
fundamental
or successful,
however. The state-based law reviews were little more than smaller
versions of the general model; many of them actually evolved into
general publications in later years.72 The joint editorial arrangement of
the Illinois Law Review collapsed in 1932, when Northwestern law
students took it over. Despite some articulate arguments made on their
behalf,73 the number of
specialized law reviews remained small through
the 1940s, largely because of the limited scope for publicity that
they afforded to their sponsoring schools. For a variety of reasons
(not least of which was the legal academy's retreat from realism) the
Journal of Law and Contemporary Problems found it difficult to meet
its own interdisciplinary aspirations let alone inspire other reviews
to adopt a similar course. The symposium format was adopted by a few
law reviews,74 but was
quickly recognized, even by its inventor, as
being "not well suited for general use": "It compels a shifting of the
field of inquiry with each issue.... [and] it...... cannot provide an
always-available outlet for the writer who is working on a topic
which...does not happen to coincide with the current editorial
program."75
[2.8] The lack of significant or successful response to
the
first wave of
law review criticism facilitated the build-up of a second
wave. Perhaps predictably, this struck the law reviews in the 1950s
and early 1960s after a brief hiatus which had lasted through the war
and immediate post-war periods. Many second-wave complaints were
obviously the result of ongoing frustration. In 1952, for instance,
Illinois' John Cribbet complained that the law reviews were too
similar to one another; he called for "experimentation in every phase
of the review from the cover and format to the type of note and case
comment."76 The next year,
Judge Stanley Fuld of the New York Court of
Appeals chided law reviews for their plethora of footnotes and their
duplication of effort.77
Emory's Arthur S. Miller lamented the
"monotonous uniformity" of the journals in 1955, and pointedly
deplored the tendency of student note writers in different reviews to
seize upon the same cases, with the result that in some instances a
single case was noted nineteen or twenty times.78 In 1962, twenty-five
years after his first broadside against law reviews, Fred Rodell
himself returned to give them a second skewering. Asserting that "a
quarter century has wrought no revolution",79 he repeated his original
critique, and went on to suggest that the style of law review articles
had deteriorated even beyond the sad state in which he had found it in
the late 1930s.80
[2.9] Frustration with the lack of fundamental change
was
not, however, the
only factor behind the second wave of law review criticism. By the
1950s, the American legal academy had changed in ways that presented
not only new opportunities, but new problems. For one thing, there
were significantly more law reviews (76 in 1951, up from 55 in
1941). 81 In this context
Chicago's Alan Mewett could and did repeat the
old saw about "too many law reviews",82 giving it a new spin by
suggesting that the plethora of scholarly outlets made articles in any
one subject area hard to find, even with the aid of the Index to Legal
Periodicals.83 Mewett
argued that marginal law reviews which had to
solicit articles or which had difficulty in meeting deadlines deserved
to be shut down; he advised authors to accelerate this process by
boycotting these journals in the first place.84
[2.10] Increased pressure to research and publish
provided another reason for
American law professors to focus more critical attention on law
reviews in the 1950s and early 1960s. A certain pressure or at least
incentive to publish had of course existed in legal academia since the
inception of law reviews in the late nineteenth century, but only
after 1950 did the push towards publication become generally
significant. To some extent, law schools in these years caught up with
other university schools and departments which in the early 1940s had
fallen victim to the "publish or perish" approach to tenure and
promotion.85 In part also, legal research
became
more important because
the continued multiplication of law reviews made publication more
convenient, and even made it necessary to the survival of some of the
lesser reviews.86 In 1957, Wisconsin's Willard
Hurst called for more
financial and personal resources to support law professors' research
efforts.87 In 1959, the American Association of
Law Schools (AALS) went
so far as to adopt a formal "Research Standard," declaring for the
first time that "Faculty members have an important responsibility to
advance as well as to transmit ordered knowledge."88
[2.11] Renewed criticism of the law review system was
also prompted by the
fact that by the 1950s and 1960s almost all the law reviews had become
formally independent from law faculties. At the University of
Michigan, for instance, faculty control had begun to ebb in the early
1940s; by 1952, students had taken over most editorial
responsibilities, with faculty serving only in an advisory
capacity.89
Developments like this led Alan Mewett to declare that law students
had "no place on a law review at all".90 Columbia's Arthur Nussbaum
conceded that student editing might have been a good idea in an
earlier, simpler, more doctrinal time, but
"the situation
has
changed...Such matters as, say, labor law, taxation law, corporation
and trust law, public control of business, etc. are steadily
developing new and intricate problems; legal philosophy is being paid
far more attention than in the past; the expanding relationship among
the countries of Western civilization, and this country's leading role
within that orbit, render necessary in many more cases than ever
before the investigation of international and foreign law. Students
may not have acquired the knowledge and maturity to handle those
trends adequately as independent editors."91
[2.12] Finally, at least one second-wave complaint
about
law reviews was
prompted by a new egalitarianism which gained strength both inside and
outside law schools in the 1950s and early 1960s. A number of
commentators openly wondered why, if law review experience was so
pedagogically and professionally valuable, it should be limited to
that small section of the law school who received high first year
grades. The question appears to have been raised for the first time
in the mid-1940s,92 but it
in the 1950s and early 1960s it was raised
again. As law schools in these years adopted much more selective
admissions policies,93 singling out some
students over others became
more problematic. Judge Stanley Fuld found it "a pity that many more
students cannot share in [the law review], that some rotating system
has not been devised to allow for a broader participation in review
work."94 In 1956, the Dean of Northwestern,
Harold Havinghurst,
suggested that this could be done by allowing for law review
publication of some of the better student papers being produced in new
seminar-style law school courses.95
[2.13] Partly because of its greater intensity, the second
wave of law review
criticisms ultimately had more impact than had the first
wave. Certainly law reviews still had more than their share of
plaudits and unrepentant proponents through this period,96 but starting
in the 1950s and continuing into the 1970s, change was in the air in
law schools and law review offices across the county. Like the
criticisms, some of the changes were extensions of earlier initiatives
rather than entirely new departures. Symposium issues, for instance,
continued to gain in popularity, as did specialist (mostly
faculty-edited) journals such as the American Journal of Legal History
(1957), the Journal of Law and Economics (1958), the Supreme Court
Review (1960), the Journal of Urban Law (1966), 97 and the Journal of
Legal Studies (1972). Other changes were more novel. In the 1960s and
1970s, law review membership was increasingly offered to students who
won writing competitions in addition to those with high first year
grades.98 Some law reviews also experimented
with new formats: the
Wisconsin Law Review, for example, launched a "Commentary" section
affording authors "an opportunity to discuss and evaluate issues
important to the profession which can not be dealt with comfortably in
the format of a traditional leading article."99
Much to the delight of
John Cribbet, the bright-colored cover even made its debut on the
front of the Stanford Law Review.100
[2.14] Again, however, the changes were less than
revolutionary. The numbers
of law reviews continued to increase. Occasional experiments
notwithstanding, the traditional structure of law review issues
survived mostly intact. The practice of student-editing continued to
predominate, limiting the feasibility of symposia and specialist
journals which almost by definition required faculty
supervision. Thanks to writing competitions, a greater number and
greater range of students made law review, but an internal hierarchy
soon developed which favored individuals who had "graded" on.101 For
these and other reasons, discontent with law reviews continued to
simmer through the early 1980s.102
[2.15] In the mid-1980s, that simmering discontent
exploded into a third wave
(or, perhaps more accurately, a "tsunami", i.e. tidal wave) of
criticism which has not only been sustained to date but has in fact
gained in size and intensity. More articles assailing law reviews,
containing more pages of criticism and more vitriolic language have
appeared in the last ten years than had appeared in the entire corpus
of law review literature prior to 1985. A number have been written by
highly- respected scholars, most notably Roger Cramton,103 Richard Posner104
and James
Lindgren.105 In the last two years
alone, the law review system
has been the focus of two entire law review symposium issues and one
extended "Exchange;" in June 1995, the growing controversy over the
operation and reform of law reviews even drew the attention of
America's principal academic weekly, the Chronicle of Higher
Education, which devoted a cover story to it. 106
[2.16] Many factors have contributed to this latest
critical
onslaught. First
and most obviously, the absolute number of law reviews has skyrocketed
in the past thirty years. It is not so much that certain law schools
have decided to publish a law review for the first time - rather, many
schools with well-established law reviews have for reasons internal
(e.g. extending student participation) and external (e.g. the
development of sub-fields which "flagship" reviews were unable or
unwilling to cover) begun to publish one or more supplementary
journals focusing on particular subject areas.107 The "elite" law
schools have inaugurated numerous new publications: in the last three
decades Harvard has started 9 that survive to this day (in addition to
the Harvard Law Review),108 Berkeley has started 8,109 Columbia and
Georgetown have started 7,110 and Yale has
started 5. Other "lesser" law
schools have also been very active: Tulane, for instance, now boasts 6
law reviews, Notre Dame boasts 5, and Temple boasts 4.112 The
consequences of these trends for law review publishing as a whole have
been predictable. In 1966, there were 102 school-affiliated law
reviews.113 In 1981,
there were more than 180.114 In 1990, there were 307.115
Today, in 1995, there are (by one count) 382.116 This unprecedented
proliferation of school- sponsored legal periodicals has led to
renewed complaints not only about sheer volume,117 but also about the low
or at best uneven quality of many law reviews. Even more
significantly, it has prompted concern about the high cost to law
schools and law school libraries of fueling and sustaining such an
elaborate system at a time when an increasing number of universities
and law schools are operating under budget constraints.118
[2.17] Second and most significantly, the pressure on
legal academics to
publish, to publish more and to publish more frequently has become
much greater in the last ten to twenty years. We have seen that this
pressure had already increased in the 1950s and early 1960s. In the
mid-1970s, however, scholarship took on unprecedented importance as a
measure of academic worth. As competition for good students and good
professors increased,119
and as legal educators took an interdisciplinary
turn (see infra) which brought them under the influence of more
research- oriented arts and humanities departments, law schools
increasingly required that members of their faculties produce a
substantial quality of respectable written work - generally, two or
three law review articles - to obtain tenure, and several more to
obtain promotion. Concomitantly, the number of law professors denied
tenure because of poor or inadequate legal scholarship rose
dramatically: in 1968-1973, for instance, only 8 tenure denials were
substantially attributable to faculty dissatisfaction with candidates'
scholarship; in 1973-78, scholarship considerations played a role in
24 tenure denials.120
Since the early 1980s, scholarship has become even
more central in the tenure and promotion process.121 This has meant that
law review editors, acting in their capacities as primary gatekeepers
and streamers of legal scholarship, have incidentally but inevitably
acquired a critical degree of control over law professors' careers and
reputations.
[2.18] In this predicament, law professors have
understandably become more
critical of law review operation in general. Many negative comments
have focussed on how articles are selected for publication. The
concern here is not so much that dubious and/or arbitrary student
decision- making prevents any given article from being published
somewhere, but that it may compromise an article's chances of getting
publishing in "leading" law reviews where it is more likely to be
noticed122 and
appreciated.123 Professors
have alleged that student editors
are incompetent to judge academic contributions to an
ever-more-complex field,124 and often rely on irrelevant "secondary"
criteria, such as the reputation and/or background of the
author,125 the
prestige of his or her institution,126 or the number of prominent names
the author can drop in an "acknowledgments" footnote.127 They have
asserted that students are inherently conservative128 (or, alternatively,
faddish129) in their
publication choices, preferring the familiar to the
truly original. They have alleged that students at elite law schools
in particular130 are unduly biased in favor of
faculty at their own
institutions.131 They have expressed
resentment at having more or less to
beg the editors of higher-ranking reviews for "expedited reads" of an
article after it has been accepted elsewhere; they have publicly
chafed under the burden of the short deadlines imposed by the
understandably-nervous editors of law reviews extending offers.132
[2.19] An increasing number of professors have also
complained about student
editing of articles after selection.133 They have expressed concern that
their manuscripts are not just reviewed for oversights but are
substantively rewritten, often by rule-obsessed editors having a
less-than- perfect sense of either literary style or the legal subject
at hand.134 They have voiced their
frustration
with having to watch out
for and correct the factual and grammatical errors that are frequently
(if innocently) imported into their texts in this process.135 They have
taken offense at how some law review editors have treated them: they
have variously called the attitudes and practices of student editors
"infuriating,"136
"officious,"137 and
arrogant,138 and some have
called for the creation of formal codes of ethics to govern
editor-author relationships no longer defined by student deference and
respect.139
[2.20] Some legal scholars have even lamented how
long it takes for a law
review article to be first accepted, and then published.140 This
lamentation is not as insignificant as it might seem; in a highly
competitive scholarly marketplace - not to mention a rapidly-changing
legal environment - the academic and professional worth of an article
may be radically diminished if for one reason or another it comes out
"late",141 and especially
if it comes out after a similar article in a
competing journal. One prominent cause of delays (as well as other
problems - see supra) has ironically been the professorial practice of
making simultaneous submissions to multiple law reviews - a strategy
originally adopted to ensure rapid article placement. Nowadays, a
simultaneous mailing to twenty or more journals is not unusual; if the
initial response is not what the author hopes, another twenty copies
may be sent out, and so on. The results of such a strategy for
individual reviews - especially reviews at the elite schools - have
been catastrophic.142 In
1983, for instance, it was calculated that the
top 10% of law reviews received over 200, and sometimes over 300
unsolicited manuscripts each per year.143 In 1995, it was estimated that
the "elite journals" were swamped by as many as 1200 annual
submissions.144 In this
situation law professors have had to endure
longer and longer waits before receiving word on the fate of their
submissions. In some instances, and especially at some times of year
(generally late fall or early spring) law professors wait only to be
told that a law review has "filled up", which either forces the
professor to go to another review or (what is worse) forces the
article to be temporarily withdrawn from a generally- saturated
market. Even after an article is selected and edited, publication may
be postponed for weeks or even months because there is a problem with
a particular law review "issue": another legal scholar has been tardy
in correcting proofs, student notes and comments are late, or there
are problems or delays at the printer.145 All of this inevitably adds up to
frustration.
[2.21] Third, the number and intensity of criticisms of
law reviews have
increased due to changing patterns of student-faculty interaction in
contemporary American law schools. Even in those instances where
students had taken over formal control of faculty-run publications,
they had continued to seek advice from faculty on editorial and policy
matters. 146 The tradition
of student- faculty consultation had resulted
in what one writer (perhaps somewhat ambitiously and nostalgically)
has called "peer-review...of a sort", a practice which encouraged most
(albeit certainly not all) law professors to preserve their faith in
the law review as a scholarly institution.147 By the early-1980s,
however, this practice had largely ceased.148 The last phase of
student-faculty disengagement had begun in the later 1960s, when
student editors directly or indirectly influenced by the rebellious
atmosphere on many campuses became notably reluctant to defer or even
consult their former faculty mentors.149 Those students still seeking
editorial guidance from their professors in the 1970s and early 1980s
found that in the increasingly charged academic atmosphere of the
time, the latter no longer agreed on the nature or qualities of good
scholarship.150 Under
increasing pressure to write, many professors
moreover lacked the time or the inclination to read others'
submissions or give quality advice.151 In this context, the editorial
process was left "in the hands of young people with little experience
in evaluating legal skills, few standards by which to do so, natural
naivete, and scant regard for the institutional future."152
[2.22] In the process of asserting their own
independence from faculty
supervision, the student editors of contemporary law reviews have
become more assertive in their general dealings with faculty
authors. For instance, they have increasingly refused to provide
rejected law review authors with substantive written or even oral
reasons for their rejection. There is little documentary evidence as
to when this practice began, but anecdotes suggest that it by the late
1970s it had died out at all but a few institutions, accelerated
perhaps by the aforementioned professorial strategy of multiple
submissions. Students were too pressed and too stressed to provide
reasons or feedback. This deprived faculty of useful input153 and
unfortunately helped to create an atmosphere in which it was easy to
impute improper selection motives to student editors who no longer
made even a pretense of offering evidence to the contrary. Growing
student assertiveness has also been manifested in the recent turn
towards substantial editorial re-writing of submissions. Before the
1970s, significant student re-writes at all but the most elite law
reviews were rarely contemplated, let alone attempted: as one veteran
of legal scholarship put it "student editors tended to exercise
substantial restraint in the editing process. Errors in grammar and
usage were corrected, and suggestions for deletions, additions and
reorganization made... [As a result] most faculty members actually
could recognize their own work when it appeared in print...".154
[2.23] The plethora of manuscripts, the amount of work
consequently demanded
of today's student editors and the virtually-complete independence of
those editors from law faculty have together given rise to a fourth
cause of contemporary law review criticism: doubts about the
traditionally- assumed pedagogical value of law review
service. Predictably, many of these doubts have been articulated by
law professors with other axes to grind. In 1986, for instance, Roger
Cramton contended that sheparding manuscripts through a group-decision
process and
running writing competitions for new
staffers "have few
educational benefits for anyone and do not contribute in any way to
publication of student notes or editing of lead articles."155 Doubts
about the educational benefits of law review have, however, also been
raised by law students themselves. In 1988, a recently graduated Notes
editor of the Georgetown Law Journal concluded that "the law review's
academic and creative value is overstated. Many students leave law
review with little more to show for their two-year membership than
bluebook proficiency."156
In 1990, a disaffected senior articles editor
from the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics bemoaned a more general
and even more pedagogically-awkward problem: "I've barely opened my
casebooks because the journal takes too much time; I've skipped
classes because the journal takes so much time."157 In other words, law
review was actually interfering with this editor's education.
[2.24] A fifth reason why criticisms of law reviews have
multiplied
dramatically of late relates to law's recent "interdisciplinary
turn":158
the scholarly shift towards studies of law and economics, feminist
jurisprudence, law and society, critical race theory, postmodern legal
studies, etc. The causes of this turn are still being
debated. Changing political and ideological circumstances - the civil
rights movement, the women's movement, etc. - have certainly played a
role, as has the recent intellectual vigor of such specific
disciplines as economics, philosophy and history, not to mention the
general restlessness experienced by many members of law school
faculties after a period of dominant doctrinalism. To some extent, the
interdisciplinary turn has also been the product of population shifts
in the legal academy - in particular, the influx of a high number of
former liberal arts students who since the early 1970s have gone into
the relatively-open field of law and law teaching instead of taking
more economically-risky Ph.D.s and then assuming professorships in arts
and humanities departments.159 Whatever its origins, the
interdisciplinary turn in legal studies has prompted professorial
objections to the judgments of law review editors who, for all their
raw interest, have little or no graduate training in other
disciplines: Richard Posner, for instance, has recently observed that
"Few student editors, certainly not enough to go around, are competent
to evaluate nondoctrinal scholarship."160 Indirectly, the
interdisciplinary turn has stimulated criticism of the status quo by
sensitizing legal academics to the scholarly practices of other
fields, where student control of academic publishing is unknown and
indeed, ridiculed. It is no accident that James Lindgren, whose
interests run from law and sociology to legal history, has lately
written that "in other parts of the academy, legal journals are
considered a joke. Scholars elsewhere frequently can't believe that,
for almost all our major academic journals, we let students without
advanced degrees select manuscripts."161
[2.25] Sixth, law reviews have come in for more
criticism as more law review
writers have ceased writing about professional, doctrinal and local
issues. In part, this development is a result of the just-discussed
interdisciplinary turn. It is also, however, a product of the recent
fall-off in the number of practitioners and judges - as opposed to law
professors - writing for (or allowed to publish in) law
reviews,162 and
of the understandable ambitions of a variety of "lesser" law schools
to raise their institutional and scholarly sights above the horizon of
their own states and regions. In these circumstances, law reviews
have been accused of having become increasingly irrelevant for the
practicing bar and the judiciary, two of their traditional
constituencies.163
Several prominent members of the American bench have
openly expressed their frustration with this situation. In a recent
article in the Michigan Law Review, Judge Harry Edwards of the US
Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit volunteered his opinion that "our
law reviews are full of mediocre interdisciplinary articles."164 Judge
Laurence Silberman of the DC Circuit has even slammed the law reviews
from the bench, accusing them of being "dominated by [the] rather
exotic offerings of increasingly out-of-touch faculty
members...".165
[2.26] Seventh, criticisms of law reviews have
multiplied because in the last
fifteen years, law professors have tended to produce articles that are
on average longer and more heavily-annotated than those written, say,
forty years ago.166 In part, this lengthening
and substantiating process
has been prompted by the desire of assistant and associate law
professors to demonstrate their scholarly capabilities to increasingly
demanding tenure and promotion committees,167 not to mention increasingly
selective law review boards;168 in part, it has
been driven by the need
of law professors in general to differentiate their individual
submissions from those of an increasingly large number of scholarly
competitors;169 and in part, it has been
encouraged by some professors'
implicit recognition that interdisciplinary articles coming before law
student editors (not to mention other law professors) often require
more extended explanation and documentation than they would coming
into the hands of academics in the arts, humanities and social
sciences.170 It has also been suggested that
student editors have
actively contributed to the problems of length and extended footnoting
through an overenthusiastic adherence to Bluebook form and a
concomitant desire to impress their editorial board colleagues by
displays of footnote finesse. Unfortunately, the presence of longer
and more heavily documented articles in law reviews has attracted the
ire of many impatient and/or aesthetically-displeased readers from
both inside and outside the professoriate.171
In 1983, the desire for
more concise, more visually-attractive and more lively articles was a
major factor prompting Professor Richard Stewart of the Harvard law
faculty to author an internal memorandum recommending the creation of
a faculty-edited law journal.172
[2.27] Finally, law reviews have become more
controversial as law students'
social attitudes and writing abilities have changed. Egalitarianism
has continued to work its magic on law review boards, an increasing
number of whose members have lost faith in both "grading on" and
"writing on" as impartial arbiters of merit.173
By the late 1970s, the
Stanford and Yale law reviews had opened themselves up to student
volunteers.174 In the 1980s, many
student-edited legal journals formally
or informally embraced affirmative action as a way of extending the
benefit of law review participation to more women, minorities and
other persons from disadvantaged backgrounds (including the poor, the
disabled, and gays and lesbians). This trend began with a
controversial policy decision at the Harvard Law Review in
1981;175 by
1983, eight law reviews had formally followed suit.176 Also since the
early 1980s, more and more students have become involved in the law
review editing process via the multiplication of specialty
journals. At least some academic commentators have alleged that these
developments have significantly "watered down" the already-dubious
editorial quality of the law reviews.177 This
accusation has become even
more serious in light of what most law professors regard as a general
decline in the writing abilities of today's law students. This decline
has allegedly been reflected in both the poor quality of many
editorial re-writes and editors' increasingly slavish devotion
(presumably born of uncertainty and inexperience) to the technical
standards of the Bluebook or some other style manual.178
[2.28] Even in the face of all these developments and
the (sometimes severe)
criticisms they have encouraged, certain law professors, legal
practitioners and an increasing number of law students have insisted
on coming to the law review's defense one more time.179 These defenses
have not, however, precluded significant attempts to further reform
the law review system.180 One reform has
entailed the formal or informal
adoption of editorial policies more explicitly deferential to faculty
authors: in 1994, for instance, the articles editors of the University
of Chicago Law Review publicly promised to show "substantial
deference", by which they meant that they would respect the author's
"voice" and would give the author final say on whether suggested
changes would be made.181 A second
reform,
recently inaugurated in the
offices of the Yale Law Journal, has substituted "blind" article
selection for the traditional "full disclosure" variety in an effort
to avoid the appearance of bias.182 A third
reform has involved a greater
tolerance of (and in some instances, even a formal encouragement of)
non-traditional styles of scholarship and academic writing, especially
those favoring brevity. In 1985, for instance, the University of
Michigan Law Review inaugurated a "Correspondence" section allowing
its readers an opportunity to formally react to articles appearing in
its pages.183 Later the same year, the
Harvard Law Review started a
"Commentary" section featuring brief comments by legal scholars on
topical issues,184 while Yale launched
"Essay" and "Dialogue" sections
that offered legal scholars new ways to present and respond to
ideas. More recently, a number of journals have published
fictionalized or actual dialogues, playscripts, and even poetry185 in an
effort to expand their stylistic range. A fourth, somewhat-more
traditional reform has resulted in an increasing number of
student-edited law reviews adopting a symposium format in the hopes of
making their contents more appealing (and more noticeable) to
well-defined academic and professional constituencies.186 A fifth reform
has been entrepreneurial in orientation: recognizing their precarious
position in both a saturated academic community and an
austerity-ridden institutional environment, "spin off" law reviews
such as the Yale Journal of Law & Regulation have consciously
undertaken to market themselves to a broader buying and subscribing
public.187 This initiative has inevitably made
their substance and style
more colloquial.188 A sixth reform has been
even more radical: the
inauguration of an increasing number of faculty-edited law journals
(mostly specialized or symposium-based) pointedly providing peer
review, feedback, the guidance of experienced editors, stylistic
flexibility, timely publication and/or other advantages not generally
offered by student-edited law reviews.189 Some of these publications -
such as the University of Minnesota Law School's Constitutional
Commentary and the University of Florida's Florida Tax Review - are
brand new. Others - such as the University of San Diego's Journal of
Contemporary Legal Issues and the Chicago-Kent Law Review190 - have come
into being after complete or partial faculty "take-overs" of studentedited
publications.191
[2.29] The latest reforms of the law review system may
be improvements, but
for all the hope and hype attending them it is unlikely that they will
prove all that effective in the long run. "Editorial deference" is a
notoriously vague concept that (judging by anecdotal evidence) is more
often the exception rather than the norm. Notwithstanding its apparent
success at Yale,192 the
"blind read" selection strategy is time-consuming
and hardly fool-proof insofar as authors can reveal themselves and
their schools in multiple ways;193 besides, although blind reading
removes a temptation, it does nothing to positively raise the
standards of the student selection process. Dialogues, poems, essays
and letters are marginal formats which to date have instilled little
enthusiasm in tenure and promotion committees. The symposium format,
while a standard "fix" for certain law review problems, also has
equally-standard problems.194 Making law reviews into profit-seeking
institutions runs the risk, over time, of undermining their primarily
academic mission. However attractive faculty-edited journals might be
in the abstract, few law professors have the time or the inclination
(without substantial economic or professional reward) to do quality
editing or prompt refereeing when they might be writing articles or
books themselves;195 it is not irrelevant in
this connection that despite
the proliferation of faculty-edited reviews in the last decade, two
very high-profile experiments in faculty editing announced in the
mid-1980s (one at Harvard, and the other under the auspices of the
AALS)196 failed
ignominiously before they even began.197 Judging from
experiences outside legal academia, and even from reported experiences
inside it, it must also be admitted that faculty journals have
editorial weaknesses of their own: they can easily become hidebound,
they can be "captured" by particular viewpoints or schools of thought,
and their editors can select articles on scholastically-illegitimate
or arbitrary grounds.198
The putative ascendency of faculty-edited
journals might even compromise law professors' ability to get their
work placed: in all likelihood, a faculty-dominated law review system
would mean that fewer outlets would be available for the same amount
of scholarly output.199
[2.30] More important for present purposes, the
efficacy of all these reforms
is ultimately limited by most of them having been attempted within the
physical and intellectual confines of traditional print
technology. Having lost sight of how technology contributed to the
creation and development of law reviews in the first place, all but a
few would-be reformers have to this point failed to consider how new
technologies - in particular, computer-mediated communication
technologies - might be deployed to break the impasses of the current
law review system.
[2.31] In fact, of course, computer-mediated
communications technologies are
already at work in the legal academy. Not only are they subtlely
changing how law reviews are used, but they are (for the most part)
increasing the latters' scholarly and professional value. They are
even meeting some of the criticisms lately articulated by the law
review's detractors. In the next section of this article, I will
explore the development of two manifestations of these computer
technologies - on- line databases (LEXIS/WESTLAW) and Internet
electronic journals - with a view to demonstrating both their impact
and their limitations as new forms of scholarly communication in law.
[3.2] In these circumstances, an eclectic variety of
lawyers, legal
academics and law librarians looked to emerging computer technology to
facilitate the storage, accessing and distribution of legal
information.205 Computers
had been developed for military purposes
during World War II; in the mid-1950s they had entered the commercial
market. Here, then, was a likely tool for the times: one which could
eventually make the mountains of paper law physically manageable
again, which could make retrieval of legal information faster, cheaper
and more accurate than ever before,206 and which into the bargain could
create entirely new legal communication and research strategies.
[3.3] The first successful experiments in what we now
call
"computer-assisted legal research" (CALR) were performed in the late
1950s and early 1960s by
John Horty,
Director of the University of
Pittsburgh Health Law Center and (from 1960)
an adjunct professor at
the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. In an effort to facilitate
research into the public health laws of Pennsylvania, Horty had the
texts of all the relevant statutes207 coded onto punch-cards and then put
on computer tapes where they could be rapidly searched and retrieved
by keyword (technically "Key Words in Combination", or KWIC).208 In
1960, Horty demonstrated his search and retrieval system at the Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association;209 in later years, he extended
his root database to include the texts of all Pennsylvania statutes,
the opinions of the Pennsylvania Attorney General on education, the
complete statutes of New York, health law statutes from eleven other
states, and even decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas.210
[3.4] Horty's system was ingenious and remarkable in
many ways, but it had
significant technical limitations. In 1967, these limitations prompted
the Ohio State Bar Association to create a not- for-profit corporation
called Ohio Bar Automated Research (OBAR), which in turn contracted
with an Ohio company called Data Corporation for the development of an
improved variety of legal research
software.211 In 1969, Data Corporation
was acquired by Mead Corporation; a subsidiary of the latter, Mead
Data Central, continued the OBAR project
and eventually acquired
all rights to it from OBAR itself. By 1972, Mead Data Central had produced
a second-generation version of the OBAR software which retained many
of the best features of the Horty system. In April 1973, a modified
version of this software (together with dedicated hardware) was
introduced to the American legal community under the name LEXIS. LEXIS
initially offered its subscribers a database of full-text federal
statutes and case law, a federal tax library, and selected state
databases (including, of course, Ohio); in 1980, it expanded to give
its subscribers access to NEXIS, a huge database of news and business
information.
[3.5] The same year that LEXIS went on-line, the West
Publishing Company
began work on a CALR system of its own called WESTLAW. The first
WESTLAW system - based on West's famous headnotes - went into
operation in April 1975,
but it was not until
December 1976 that
West
undertook a full text service that could effectively compete with
LEXIS. Software problems complicated the development of WESTLAW to the
point where, in 1980, it was thoroughly redesigned. In the meantime,
as well as afterwards, West pursued an aggressive program of database
enhancement which allowed its subscribers to access more and more case
law, more state databases, and more research options outside of the
traditional West system.
[3.6] Originally, neither LEXIS or WESTLAW carried
law review articles,
despite the fact that law reviews were contributing to the
proliferation of legal literature almost as much as courts and
legislatures. The initial disinclination of both services to include
law review material can be attributed to several factors. First, the
primary commercial targets for both LEXIS and WESTLAW - practicing
attorneys - used law reviews far less frequently than they used case
law and statutes; as commercial endeavors, it made sense for both
systems to place more emphasis on the development of the more relevant
case and statute-searching services. Second, law review material was
not as massive nor as badly indexed as case and statutory material -
it was therefore in less need of a technological fix. Third, law
review material was copyrighted, whereas judicial decisions and
statutes were not; legal access to law review material was therefore
limited, making it more difficult and potentially more expensive to
provide.
[3.7] In 1982, however, both LEXIS and WESTLAW
decided to enter the law
review arena. In all likelihood, they had multiple motivations for
their decisions. First, they had an interest in broadening their own
scope as legal information providers. Secondly, they had an interest
in broadening their clientele: including law reviews in their
databases would make their services more useful and hence more
attractive to law professors and law students. Third, they presumably
saw a business opportunity in an area which had become increasingly
complex and confused in the wake of the radical expansion of law
review literature that had begun in the 1970s and which, in the early
1980s, showed every sign of continuing. LEXIS and WESTLAW nonetheless
adopted different market strategies in making law review articles
available electronically. LEXIS chose the "intensive" route, covering
all articles in thirty selected legal journals. WESTLAW chose to be
"extensive", i.e. to include more law reviews but to be selective in
choosing which articles in those reviews were actually
included.212 Both
strategies had obvious limitations, but WESTLAW's proved particularly
problematic because researchers could not be sure that they were
getting all relevant articles in the law reviews WESTLAW carried. This
inevitably created pressure to check manually through the same
material, a frustrating situation that LEXIS avoided by definition
(although its limitations obviously required manual searching of law
reviews not included in its database). WESTLAW subsequently decided to
offer full coverage of the top law journals, and since the mid-1980s
both LEXIS and WESTLAW have extended their range of law review
coverage, with WESTLAW enjoying a slight edge as of this writing.
[3.8] Together, LEXIS and WESTLAW have subtlely
changed the way in which law
review material is distributed, accessed, and employed by many members
of the American legal community.213 Most of these changes have made law
reviews more useful. First, LEXIS and WESTLAW allow
virtually-immediate access to law review articles upon publication;
where once a law professor or practicing lawyer had to wait for the
arrival of the printed journal in the mail, or (after arrival) wait
his or her turn on the internal routing list, he or she can now read a
law review article as soon as it officially released to the database
companies. Second, LEXIS and WESTLAW offer unprecedentedly convenient
access to published law review material: articles, notes and comments
can be read from the convenience of a reader's desk at almost any time
of the day or night. Third, LEXIS and WESTLAW provide guaranteed
access: a law professor or other legal researcher is no longer at the
mercy of other readers or borrowers who remove a needed law review
volume from its appointed place in the law library. Fourth, LEXIS and
WESTLAW allow for specific (keyword) searches of law review materials.
Fifth, LEXIS and WESTLAW make it much easier for law professors to
bring their ideas to members of the legal profession who otherwise
might subscribe to only a handful of printed law reviews.214 Finally,
using LEXIS and WESTLAW search strategies, legal academics in
particular can check how often particular articles have been discussed
or cited, giving them (for good or ill) a more accurate sense of
trends in legal literature and legal thought.215
[3.9] Some of the changes in law review distribution
and usage prompted by
LEXIS and WESTLAW address some of the complaints that have been made
about (printed) law reviews (an observation which, inter alia,
acknowledges the good business judgment of the database companies in
extending their coverage to law reviews in the first place). Most
obviously, the electronic databases relieve the physical burden of the
current law review system; no longer need law professors drown in a
sea of paper every month, or every quarter. At the same time, at least
under current WESTLAW and LEXIS licensing arrangements, the databases
potentially lower the mounting cost of keeping up with legal
scholarship; a school that subscribes to WESTLAW and/or LEXIS has the
option of discontinuing its subscription to the printed version, or at
least cutting back on the number of redundant copies (of high-profile
reviews in particular) that it regularly orders.
[3.10] LEXIS and WESTLAW, however, do nothing to
address the more substantive
problems plaguing today's law review system. They provide new ways of
delivering and accessing scholarship, but they leave the institutional
structure of the law reviews intact. They do not supplant existing
editorial boards, nor do they change the way in which members of those
boards select and edit articles. They are dependent on existing
publication schedules at individual schools. They are, in other words,
conservative information technologies which do not fundamentally
challenge or improve the present scheme of scholarly communication.
[3.11] It may be argued that the inherent conservatism
of LEXIS and WESTLAW
has indirectly contributed to the development of a new form of
computer-mediated legal scholarship: the electronic law
journal. Electronic journals (or e-journals) in general are creatures
of the Internet,
a loose system of interconnected world-wide computer
networks that can trace its origins to the American military ARPANET
(Advanced Research Projects Agency network) of the late
1960s.216 E-journals were
initially conceived (and in more conservative
quarters, are still regarded) as electronic editions of print journals
or newsletters that would simply duplicate - or, perhaps more
accurately, try to duplicate - all or part of their printed content
electronically and would then distribute that duplicated content to
subscribers having Internet access.217 At first instance, this
distribution was accomplished through electronic mail ("e-mail"), then
(from 1992) through a more sophisticated Internet retrieval system
called "gopher".
Today, more and more print journals (such as
Modern Language
Notes and the British
Medical Journal) are being made
available electronically on the World
Wide Web. This revolutionary and
rapidly-growing218 Internet platform not only has the
capacity to
understand and carry its predecessors, but can additionally support
multimedia (text, images,
sound
and video) and "hypertext"
(a revolutionary "reading" method which allows Web users to "link" from
document to document by following key-word, phrase, or icon
connections embedded in particular Web "pages"219). Growing confidence in
the electronic medium has meanwhile encouraged the creation - and even
faster proliferation - of a second generation of electronic journals
which are solely electronic, having no print equivalents. Many of
these - such as Psycoloquy 220 and Postmodern
Culture - are similarly
accessible via the Web and are positioned, at least theoretically, to
present information in ways which print technology cannot. They
moreover have the ability to update their contents not just by
producing new material, but by correcting and revising material
already placed on line (something that print-derived e-journals cannot
do even in their electronic versions, which by definition have to be
print-based).
[3.12] The first American law review to be distributed
electronically in full-text
outside of LEXIS and WESTLAW221 was the Federal
Communications Law Journal (Indiana University, Bloomington), which in 1994 began
to provide a Web version of its current
printed issue. As of February 1996, the same strategy had been adopted
by the
Indiana Journal of
Global Legal Studies, the Cornell Law
Review, the Hastings
Womens Law Journal, the Villanova Law Review,
the Villanova
Environmental Law Journal, the Florida State Law
Review, and the Cardozo Arts and
Entertainment Law
Journal; other such undertakings were forthcoming.
[3.13] By being offered on the Web, virtually all these
journals make legal
literature available to a national, international and
interdisciplinary public much broader potentially than that which has
access to (and/or can afford) LEXIS or WESTLAW service. Also by
virtue of their chosen platform, these print-derived electronic law
reviews can take some advantage of multimedia and hypertext to
facilitate access to footnotes and lead readers to other sources and
types of documentation and legal information. Ultimately, however,
these electronic versions of traditional printed law reviews represent
only limited progress over LEXIS and WESTLAW. Their format is
necessarily driven (i.e. constrained) by the format of the print
medium on which they are based. They cannot range too far from that
(by, say, adding or changing information) without destroying their
identities and a good part of their value. The fact that they
constitute an additional burden on editorial staffs over and above
that already imposed by their printed versions has also meant in some
instances that far from coming out earlier and being distributed
faster than their print equivalents, they actually come out much
later, making them inferior to LEXIS and WESTLAW distribution at least
in this respect.222
[3.14] In 1995, four second-generation electronic law
reviews emerged that
had no print versions: the National Journal of Sexual
Orientation Law (founded by Mary Sylla, a law student at the University of North
Carolina),
the Journal of
Online Law (edited by Professor Trotter Hardy at the
William and Mary Law School), the Richmond Journal of Law and
Technology (edited by law students at the University of Richmond), and
the Michigan
Telecommunications and Technology Law Review (jointly
edited by students at the University of Michigan Law School and the
University of Michigan Business School). These journals have a far
greater potential to change and improve the way in which legal
scholarship is distributed, accessed and even done. In the first
place, they are not grounded to a print format at all - articles
appearing in them can be specifically designed for Internet
distribution and access. They can take advantage of multimedia and
hypertext, not to mention the potential for updating, correction and
revision of material that is inherent in a purely-electronic
medium. They can solicit and archive e-mail from readers, thereby
fostering academic dialogue. Second, because they have far less
physical and economic overhead then either print law reviews or their
electronic equivalents (which have to bear the overhead both of
themselves and their printed source), they are far less expensive to
produce and distribute. Editors and managers do not have to pay
printers for their services. In turn, "subscribers" do not have to pay
for access. Third - by their virtue of their lesser overhead combined
with their technological convenience - purely electronic law journals
are relatively more likely (at least in the long run) to be controlled
and edited by otherwise busy and individually-impoverished law
faculty. They therefore promise to address the "problem" of student
editing. Fourth, the pure electronic law reviews are not bound to
publish on a particular schedule, or at a particular length. If they
have a good article, they can distribute it immediately;223 if they have
bad articles, they do not have to include them as necessary
"filler".224 Under these
conditions, authors need not be hung up in
publication delays caused by the tardiness of other authors or
problems with the printer, and readers need not be inundated with
mediocre material.
[3.15] In the context of these observations one might
plausibly conclude that
nirvana is nigh - that purely electronic law reviews provide the
ultimate alternative for law professors (and others) suffering under
the limitations of the present law review system. But such a
conclusion would be premature and, I would argue, incorrect. Even
purely electronic law reviews have serious problems as presently
constructed, some of which might only be exacerbated were those
reviews to become the foundation of a new structure of scholarly
communication in law. To begin, the number of purely-electronic American law
reviews can currently be counted on the fingers of one hand, and there
are few signs of the imminent and radical expansion of the
genre. Moreover, all of the electronic law reviews now in operation
are highly subject-specific, and three of them deal with technology
itself. In this context, it may be quite some time before most legal
scholars can reap the advantages that purely electronic publication
would seem to promise. In the second place, the purely electronic law
reviews that do exist are not taking full advantage of their
medium.225 A
comprehensive check of the current and back issues of the relevant
legal journals reveals that they have not as yet made any use of
multimedia, nor have they taken more than marginal advantage of
hypertext. On a less obvious level, they are still releasing material
in "issues" that ape the necessary periodicity of print
publications. Even if they formally allow their authors to take
advantage of their more malleable electronic format by making changes
to articles after publication, those changes cannot be made
spontaneously by the author herself; rather, they must first be
submitted to and then implemented by the reviews (creating an ironic
bias against change). In the third place, the purely electronic law
journals are still burdened by problematic editorial structures. Three
of the existing purely-electronic American law reviews are
student-edited. They therefore suffer from many of the same editorial
limitations as traditional print-based student law reviews. The other
two electronic American law journals are faculty-edited, but - as was
emphasized earlier in another context - few law faculty members have
the time or the inclination to edit a journal and do it well. The
number of faculty members having the time, inclination, and the
computer skills required to work comfortably in the new medium is even
lower; relatively less effort may be required to edit an electronic as
opposed to a print publication (in part because printers are not
involved), but that effort still comes at a personal opportunity cost,
which in turn imposes an implicit financial cost (in lost teaching and
scholarship-production hours, not to mention staff support) on
sponsoring institutions. Even if faculty members were able and could
be persuaded to take on electronic editorial responsibilities "en
masse", it is highly likely that (again, as we saw in another context)
the outlets for scholarly publication would be radically reduced, a
development that could have a devastating impact on the careers of
many legal scholars, not to mention on legal literature as a
whole. Finally, faculty- edited electronic law journals are as
vulnerable to intellectual capture and co-option as any print
review. These eventualities could have serious intellectual
consequences for the entire American legal community.
[3.16] The last two general problems of current,
purely-electronic law
reviews - not taking full advantage of the new medium and their
retention of traditional editorial structures - may be mutually
reinforcing. Student law review editors have repeatedly been accused
of being editorially-conservative; in this context, it is unlikely
that they will unilaterally promote technologically-radical forms of
scholarship. Here, as elsewhere, their "credibility" in the legal and
law review communities at large is at stake. Faculty-editing is also
an inherently conservative force. The process of peer-review and
selection, one of the "advantages" touted by the faculty- edited
electronic law reviews, may - even in relatively "forward looking"
technological environments - encourage the publication of pieces that
fit easily into generally-accepted norms and conform with the ordinary
stylistic expectations of editors and especially peer-reviewers (who
will not necessarily be as computer-literate as the authors of
articles in on-line law journals). On an even more fundamental level,
student and faculty editors of the new electronic law reviews may
ultimately shy away from experimentation for fear that that would
contribute to the failure of their initiatives (something that looks
too different from the print "norm" may not be accepted or
cited226). The
greater the number of people involved in these initiatives as editors,
peer reviewers, etc. (i.e. the more there is to lose), the more
conservative a given review (electronic or otherwise) is likely to
be. In this context, electronic law reviews may be very slow to
realize their technological promise, a hesitancy which may
significantly retard the progress of legal scholarship and, arguably,
legal thought.227
[3.17] In light of these critical limitations on both the
actual and
potential performance of purely- electronic law journals in
particular, I believe we can do better. Modern computer-mediated
communications technology, in particular the World Wide Web, offers us
not only a new platform for legal scholarship, but also a
radically-new method for producing and distributing it which at a
stroke could remove most of the editorial frustrations and
administrative bottlenecks of the old print-based (and even the new
electronically-based) law review system. In the next section of this
paper I identify this method and show how it might be used to redefine
the practice and the process of American legal scholarship in the
twenty-first century.
[4.2] In the decades and centuries following the
inauguration of the first
printed scholarly journals in 1665,229 scholars were able to reach many
more people with their ideas, in a form that was both more legible and
more stylistically consistent than any series of handwritten
communiques. In order to do this, however, scholars had to surrender
to editors a certain amount of control over how and even what
information was disseminated. After all, print was a scarce material
and cultural resource. As the quality and speed of print technology
improved, as more and more scholars came to appreciate the
professional advantages of print publication, and as they produced
more and more scholarship, the journal editors who controlled access
to print acquired more and more power over the scholarship selection
and publishing process. Scholars had little choice but to tolerate
this situation. Both sides "knew the score": without the approval and
assistance of editors, scholars' work would not get printed, and
therefore would remain essentially unknown.
[4.3] In Part II of this article, we
saw that over
time, legal scholars have
become increasingly displeased and frustrated with the law review
system. Many law professors have variously accused law reviews of
being too arbitrary, too slow, too error-prone, or too heavy-handed;
they have blamed law reviews for running articles that are too
conventional, too long, too heavily footnoted or otherwise
problematic. At bottom, all these accusations are complaints about
editorial practices, the editorial process or the material results of
working within a given editorial system. The identity of the law
review editors - students or faculty members - has done little to
alter the fact of complaints; it has merely determined their details.
[4.4] Today, however, new computer-mediated
communications technologies, the
more conservative manifestations of which I considered in Part III of this article, provide law professors and
other scholars with a way of breaking out of the editorial bind. For
the first time in the history of legal scholarship, one medium in
particular - the World Wide Web - provides a practical and attractive
means by which law professors can take complete control of the
production and dissemination of their own scholarly work.
[4.5] The case for the self-publishing of legal
scholarship on the Web is
clear and strong. Law professors working at terminals with an Internet
connection to the Web need not worry any more about whether the
subject of a piece is too esoteric, too doctrinal, too complicated or
even too impolitic for law review editors; we are free to write and
publish on the topics of our choice. This freedom might give us a
useful antidote to the substantive (conservative or "trendy") sameness
of the reviews as they now exist. On the Web, we need not endure
months of frustrating or embarrassing delay while our papers are
judged, peer-reviewed, edited or printed in formal journals; we can
disseminate our work instantly, as soon as we are satisfied with
it. Our work can appear when we want it to, as opposed to when someone
else's printing and publication schedule allows it to appear. On the
Web, we are under no compulsion to tolerate the indignities and
inaccuracies of line-editing: we can present our own work in our own
terms, in our own "voice", in our own words, in our own ways. On the
Web, we need not cater to the technologically- conservative
expectations of peer-reviewers or even of editors themselves; on the
Web, we can "push the envelope", constructing our presentations in
what we regard as the most technologically-effective manner. On the
Web, we need not turn our backs on our own work once it is printed,
without the benefit of revision, correction or change; we can
conveniently and immediately improve our own articles days, months or
even years after initial publication, without going through an
editorial middleman. On the Web, we can even save money: if the
practice of Web self-publishing becomes sufficiently generalized, our
institutions will no longer have to spend hundreds of thousands of
dollars paying for both the publication of our own (print or
electronic) law reviews and our subscriptions to the law reviews of
others.
[4.6] While freeing legal scholars from inconvenient and
occasionally-oppressive editorial controls, self- publishing on the
Web also brings with it all the general advantages of Web publication
(some of which I mentioned in passing while reviewing the advantages
of electronic journal publication in Part III).
On the Web, our ideas
need no longer be circumscribed by the national or intra- disciplinary
circulation of particular law reviews; we can present our work to an
international and interdisciplinary public. An article on war crimes,
for instance, can be easily read by a legal scholar in Italy, or a
sociologist at Berkeley. The latter possibility is an especially
attractive prospect in this age of "interdisciplinary" legal
scholarship: rather than hope that a law review article somehow leaks
out into greater academia where it can have a truly-interdisciplinary
impact, legal scholarship can be made readily available to researchers
from multiple fields who would otherwise never see a law review. On
the Web, we are no longer limited by the lineal nature of print or the
physical limits of the article format; we can use the Web's
hypertext
capacity to set our ideas in a broader substantive context,
incidentally allowing interested readers to follow particular threads
of our analysis.230 If we are discussing the
Supreme Court's decision in
Roe v. Wade, for instance, we can provide a hypertext link instantly
connecting the reader to the full
text of that decision. Not only is
the use of hypertext likely to have explicit scholarly and
informational benefits, but it may even encourage new and different
ways to think about law consistent with hypertext's non-lineal and
anti-authorial nature.231 On the Web, we no
longer have to defer to the
sensory limitations of the print medium; we can communicate our ideas
and information with media and combinations of media that printed law
reviews either cannot deal with or can deal with only with
difficulty. For instance, an article on the Magna Carta might provide
readers not only with the
text of the famous thirteenth-century
English charter, but also with a full color (and, in this instance,
magnifiable) image of
the manuscript in the British
Library. An article on Roe v. Wade might connect to a recording of the oral arguments in that case. An
article on the
O.J. Simpson trial might
include not only links to the
trial transcripts, but also pictures
from the trial, audio
clips
of the legal
arguments, and even
video
from the court proceedings. Far beyond making our scholarship
more entertaining (a not-insignificant achievement in itself), such
strategies promise to open up rich new vistas of legal academic
inquiry. On the Web, senses, sounds, images, colors, movements
and
performances can all come to center stage. Legal rhetoric, legal
gesture, legal ritual, legal proxemics, legal architecture, legal
iconography
and other
audio-visual practices and
phenomena that are
not easily captured or described in print232 will become more amenable to
study and intelligent discussion. The pictorial and even the aural
dimensions of legal documents which print has reduced to
purely-textual artifacts (e.g. illuminated medieval legal manuscripts
and even the Declaration of Independence, which recent research has
revealed to have been originally composed for oral
proclamation233) will
at long last be recovered and recreated. Individuals working in the
legal system or otherwise involved in the legal process as judges,
lawyers,
clients,
witnesses
or family
members will be heard and seen
for themselves in legal scholarship, instead of being (re-)presented
and (mis-)understood through the filter of words written on a page.
Given the technological means, some of us might even choose to
personally step before the microphone and/or the camera, creating
multimedia Web "scholarship" that in its supra-textual aspects might
resemble "teaching", thereby breaking down the sharp, debilitating
split that has long existed between these forms of academic
communication. Finally, after we publish on the Web, we do not have
to wait in our offices for someone to take the time to write to us or
to make the psychological effort to call with comments of criticism or
praise; the built-in electronic mail capacities of the Web allow and
encourage our readers to provide meaningful and timely feedback to us
at the touch of a button,234 comments which we can use as the basis of
revision of the original article and/or append to the original
document for the enlightenment and benefit of other readers and
evaluators. Instead of being dead-on-arrival, every article we write
on the Web can be a living creature, capable of interactivity, growth
and evolution.
[4.7] The existence of a good prima facie case for the
self-publishing of
legal scholarship on the Web does not mean, however, that proponents
of continuing the editorial status quo have no possible
counter-arguments. For instance, they might say that edited law
reviews provide important quality control, without which the legal
community would be flooded with sub-standard legal writing. There are
at least three responses to this. First, most law professors who are
inclined to publish are already writing at or near capacity;
productivity would doubtless increase if professors did not have to
spend time dealing with law review editors and their re-writes, but a
quantum increase in the pages of writing generated is
unlikely. Second, "flooding" by self-published electronic papers is
not a problem in the same sense that flooding by printed papers is. In
an electronic system, no one is going to be buried in paper who does
not want to be. Given electronic searching, no one has to laboriously
flip through pages and pages of unwanted articles to get to the one he
or she wants to find. The Web could in fact absorb a gigantic number
of scholarly contributions without individual legal scholars or
researchers becoming inconvenienced by or even conscious of such a
development.235 Third,
"quality control" would not suffer under the
self-publishing proposal. We have already seen that the current law
review system operates with minimal quality control in the
generally-accepted ("peer-review") sense of that term: there are still
very few faculty-edited law journals, and it is at least questionable
whether the second- and third-year editors of the student- run reviews
make or can make accurate qualitative (as opposed to institutionally-,
reputationally-, or stylistically-related) judgments about any but the
most familiar or doctrinal brands of legal scholarship. In this
context the elimination of what now passes for "quality control" might
actually be an improvement. The point is moot, however, for Web
self-publishing and significant, professorially-undertaken quality
control are in fact highly compatible. To a large extent, quality
control in a self-publishing environment will be
self-imposed. Individual legal scholars, knowing that their work will
be presented in exactly the form in which they leave it, will be
strongly encouraged to review their arguments, their facts and their
texts carefully in circumstances where they can no longer leave those
tasks to student editors. For the same purpose of avoiding public
embarrassment (as well as to simply improve their scholarly products)
many will doubtless choose to continue the current practice of
informally circulating drafts to friends and colleagues, thereby
ensuring to themselves the benefit of pre-publication
feedback. Quality-control might also be provided after the fact by
reader comments that the new technology could
"attach" to any
given
self-published article; positive comments would probably make an
article more significant, while negative comments (or no comments)
would probably encourage its marginalization. In effect, this would be
a new and improved form of (post-hoc) peer-review, where the "peers"
would be individuals sufficiently interested and informed about the
article's subject matter to have read the article voluntarily, and
where the review would rate an article without (as in the current
system) forcing its perhaps-premature or unfortunate suppression if
the reviewers' verdict were negative.235a
Individual law faculty might even go so far as to compile
lists of (and links to) recommended articles on their own
Web "home pages", thereby
providing quality- based bibliographic guidance for colleagues in
search of that.
[4.8] A variant of the "no quality control" argument
might be that
self-publishing on the Web would destroy the existing technical
standards for law review writing which have been implicitly and
explicitly created by generations of print law review editors and
which are now being carried on (with some adjustments) by their
successors working in electronic formats. This is theoretically
possible, but probably not likely in the short term - self-published
scholars (like the editors of purely electronic law reviews, albeit to
a lesser extent) have at least some incentive to adhere to prevailing
conventions so as to render their work acceptable. Even assuming that
standards did collapse, however, would that be such a bad thing? The
historical record of law review criticism - going back to Fred Rodell
and beyond - would suggest not. The freedom that would come with Web
self-publishing could eventually prompt a lot of fresh air to blow
across a fairly arid stylistic terrain. New formats would appear; new
types of presentation would be tried. But of course style is not all
that is at stake here. Less obviously, but perhaps more importantly,
so is the Bluebook. The Bluebook, however, has many limitations and
critics already. Its demise, or at least its decline, would not be
disastrous so long as legal academics make an honest effort to make
their references understood, which is ultimately in their own
interest. Indeed, freedom from Bluebook conventions would likely make
some citations (especially to foreign and non-legal materials) more
rather than less intelligible.236 Proponents of Web self-publishing might
even argue that the Bluebook is largely irrelevant in a Web
environment - as that environment develops and information is added to
it, footnotes and references as we now know them are likely (in many,
if not in all instances) to be replaced by direct hypertext links to
the cited material. In other words, instead of dropping a
conventionalized footnote (in appropriate Bluebook style) to, say, Stephen Shriffin's article
"Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence and the Meaning of America" in the November 1994 issue
of the Cornell
Law Review, a
Web-based paper would
link
directly to that article.237 No footnote, and
no Bluebook required.
[4.9] A second major argument that might be advanced
against Web publishing
by defenders of edited law reviews might be that only journals (be
they in print or electronic form) are capable of efficiently bringing
legal scholarship to the attention of legal readers; in this analysis,
independently-published legal scholarship would be lost in a sea of
information. At the moment, these statements have some truth to
them. However, two points might be made. First, printed scholarship
(even when produced in journal form) is itself often lost in a sea of
(printed) information, despite the best efforts of the indexing
services. Second, electronic law journals are particularly hard to
find unless you know what to look for. Together, these points mean
that edited law reviews themselves cannot guarantee that scholars will
find readers, or that readers will find scholars.
The potential problem of "unfindable self-published legal scholarship"
could be solved, however, if a legal academic institution - most
obviously, the AALS - created and maintained a Web site to which all
law professors could submit or "link" their scholarly work. This site
would be somewhat similar to an electronic archive insofar as scholars
and others would access it to look for articles. At the same time, it
would be different insofar as articles would not actually have to be
stored there (although some could be), but could rather be stored by
individuals on their own individual or institutional home pages (in
which case the central site would serve as a "pointer"). Such a
central site, made electronically searchable by category and keyword,
could provide a legal researcher with a convenient listing of an
individual scholar's writings, articles citing a particular case,
articles in a particular field, etc. There is no technological reason
why such a site could not be supplemented by an electronic
notification service whereby individuals interested in particular
information could be notified whenever a new article relevant to them
was submitted to or linked to the site, or when an existing article
they had previously accessed was updated, corrected or otherwise
revised. The result would be a system which would be more accurate,
more accessible and more flexible than anything that exists today in
the context of formal periodical publication. If an academic
institution were to construct an electronic archive of self-published
scholarship, it could also set (and enforce) minimal access and
conduct standards to ensure that only authorized individuals
(e.g. lawyers and academics) submit materials to the archive, and that
"flaming" or other objectionable behavior does not disrupt the
necessary decorum of academic debate. It might also enter into
co-operative agreements with other institutions fulfilling similar
tasks in other disciplines so as to facilitate the free exchange of
information.
[4.10] Third, at least some proponents of edited law
reviews are likely to
point out that only a small fraction of legal scholars are on the Web
or even on the Internet in general - and so electronic
self-publishing is not a practicable alternative, there being too few
electronic writers and/or too few electronic readers to make it
academically advantageous. The argument is problematic, however,
insofar as there is every indication that more and more American law
professors and lawyers are gaining Web access as their law schools and
law firms come on-line in increasing numbers.238 The group of potential
readers for (and writers of) self-published Web scholarship is
therefore growing all the time, and growing rapidly. In this context,
the original point becomes somewhat akin to a hypothetical argument
that might have been made (with unfortunate long- term results)
against printing scholarship at the outset of scholarly journals:
"let's stick to writing letters because not all scholars have access
to printing facilities or printed materials".
[4.11] A variant of this argument would be: even if law
professors are coming
on line, it is too technically difficult for most of them to publish
on the Internet directly. Once there might have been something to be
said for this argument, but given recent developments in Web
publishing, it should not be taken that seriously. In the first place,
the Web's publishing language - HTML
("Hypertext Markup Language") can
be learned in a few hours (it is much easier, in fact, than the other
"computer languages" such as Fortran, Basic, C, etc. that some of us
were introduced to in school or in college). Once one learns the
rudiments of HTML, materials that a law professor has already put into
computer in a standard word-processing format (e.g. Microsoft Word,
Word Perfect) can be made HTML-compatible almost instantly, without
even having to be re-typed. In other words, with only a little more
effort, the rewards of writing one's scholarship on computer to begin
with (which virtually all of us do these days) can be radically
increased. In the second place, a wide range of software packages
known as HTML
"editors" is now available which enable one to create
Web documents easily and quickly without ever learning HTML itself.
[4.12] Fourth, traditionalists preferring edited law
reviews in general and
printed law reviews in particular might argue that a system of
self-publishing on the Web would incidentally condemn legal academics
to the physically-uncomfortable fate of having to read an increasing
amount of new legal scholarship on computers. The visual limitations
of computer screens are well known,239 as is the inconvenience attendant
upon having to sit down at a terminal (as opposed to your favorite
armchair) in order to read a computer-based work.240 While granting both
these points under current technological circumstances, multi-chrome
screens with greater resolution and less glare have been - and are
being - developed that go a long way to solving the first
problem.241
Miniaturization is already helping to make computer technology more
portable (witness laptops), pointing the way towards a solution for
the second.242 Finally,
the fact that a legal article or some other
document is initially published on line does not mean that it cannot
be accessed or used by a would-be reader in printed form - all one has
to do is download the relevant piece to a printer, whereupon it
assumes all the familiar, even cozy qualities of the traditional
printed format.
[4.13] In a related vein, traditionalists might argue that
computer-published
articles are less aesthetically pleasing than print pieces, and that
therefore self-published scholarship will look prohibitively worse
than its print equivalent. This might have been true once, but today
it is at the very least debatable. With the aid of popular "browsers"
(Mosaic
and Netscape
in particular), the Web is an increasingly
reader-friendly visual environment; it is, in fact, much more legible
than LEXIS or WESTLAW, substituting traditional Roman style letters
for harsh, "computerish" typefaces. On standard (13-15 inch) computer
screens, moreover, the letters and words of Web documents generally
appear much larger than they do in most printed law reviews.
[4.14] A fifth argument against self-publishing on the
Web might focus on the
likelihood that - if the strategy proved attractive and successful -
it would deprive students in particular of the benefits of editing a
law review. The problems with this argument should already be
apparent. As we saw in Part II of this article, many law professors
and even some law students have argued that the educational value that
students derive from the editing exercise is, if not minimal, at least
dubious. As a result, there may be little to be lost by the decline
and potentially the fall of the law review as an institution. Indeed,
there may be something to be gained: if law review work were largely
eliminated, law students would have more time for classes, studying, and
getting the benefits of a formal legal education. Any "missed
opportunity" for student training in legal research and writing that
might be caused by the elimination of the law review could probably be
more than counterbalanced by the institution of upper-level legal
writing programs and/or working with individual students to make their
own papers publishable. Even apart from this, direct professorial
publishing on the Web would not in itself prevent law students from
continuing to publish a law review, if they or others deemed the
educational experience sufficiently useful and important. Law students
might, for instance, turn to publishing print or electronic law
journals for themselves, using them as vehicles for circulating the
best in student papers from their own law schools to the legal
community at large. Institutionally, this would probably be much
better than allowing unrestricted student legal publication in, say,
an AALS-supervised archive.
[4.15] Of course, moving towards self-publishing of
legal scholarship on the
Web would equally deprive faculty editors and peer reviewers of their
roles in the current law review system. Here too there would seem to
be an ostensible loss: editing and reviewing may provide at least some
law professors with professional stimulation and connections. In the
long run, however, the same individuals would likely benefit from the
change. With no law review to run and no submissions to review, law
professors could (and perhaps would be prompted to) get on with their
own writing, which after all is the primary route to professional and
institutional advancement in the legal academy. They could save time;
their institutions would save money. If erstwhile reviewers really did
want to spend time telling others what they think of their work, that
option would still be available to them via what I earlier described
as "post hoc" peer review; indeed, this peer review, for the peer
reviewers, would be less a form of peer review in the private, limited
sense of the term, than it would (by definition) be a publication in
itself. In this context, peer reviewers could finally have their cake
and eat it too (i.e. do peer review and get formal scholarly credit
for doing that), which might result in a better quality of criticism.
[4.16] A sixth, and perhaps the most frank argument
that defenders of edited
law reviews might make against Web self-publishing would focus on the
loss of incidental prestige to authors, editors and institutions that
would likely be caused by the adoption of such a strategy. If legal
scholars published themselves, they would by definition be deprived of
the "halo effect" of a "good" placement in a "reputable" law
review. If legal scholars published themselves, the publishing
institutions (not to mention the editors of the institutions' reviews)
would moreover be unable to claim the benefit of any reflected glory.
But these points, even if powerful,243 are surely specious. "Halo
effects" are intellectually suspect - surely serious scholars would
agree that scholarly articles should ultimately be assessed on their own
merit, rather than according to the prestige of the law review in
which they appear, especially when the law reviews exercise little if
any true quality control. In this context, eliminating the "halo
effect" of placement would remove a significant temptation in the way
of free and fair evaluation of scholarship, while at the same time
(re- )focusing the attention of law professors on doing their
scholarly work for its own sake, rather than playing the placement
"game".244 Secondly,
self-publishing would not end all prestige benefits
for institutions: law schools would presumably continue to derive
status from the published product of their own professors, if not from
the prestige of a home journal publishing the works of others.
[4.17] Finally, supporters of edited law reviews (either
in print or
electronic form) might just throw up their hands at the notion of
professorial self-publishing on the Web, saying: "the whole idea's
just crazy; it's science-fiction; it would never work." But the
general idea (or something very much like it) has already been
implemented by individual scholars all over the world. It has become
standard procedure in at least one discipline and is making practical
headway in several others. Highly credible commentators and
committees have lately recommended it for even wider academic
application. The present argument for the self-publication of legal
scholarship on the Web would not be complete without some description
of each of these initiatives.
[4.18] Very soon after the World Wide Web was
developed (and with increasing
frequency after the release of Mosaic and Netscape), individual
academics in a variety of different disciplines realized its enormous
professional and scholarly potential. Without waiting for their
colleagues to "catch up" or for their academic associations to
formally endorse their actions, scholars in such fields as computer
science, mathematics,
physics, public health,
classics,
media
theory
and even law began
putting portions of their work directly on-line for
the world to see. Some of these materials were electronic
"post-prints" of papers that had
already been formally published
elsewhere. Others were abstracts of those papers. A few enterprising
scholars even took the next logical step and began to put
"unpublished" papers on-line, some with a view to getting feedback
prior to seeking formal publication in traditional media, others under
the assumption that distributing a piece on the Web made other
publication redundant. These practices are becoming more and more
common as more and more academics enter the Web and realize what it
can do for them and for their ideas.
[4.19] Some academic disciplines have nonetheless
made more organized
progress in the direction of electronic self-publication than have
others. In the early 1990s, physics took the lead in this respect and
has kept it ever since. In May 1991, David Mermin, a disgruntled but
prescient academic columnist for Physics Today, openly declared that
"The time is overdue to abolish journals and re-organize the way we do
business".245 He proposed
that physicists e-mail their work to a "central
clearinghouse" which would then post that work on an electronic
bulletin board for perusal and downloading by others as
necessary.246 Physicist Paul
Ginsparg of the
Los
Alamos National
Laboratory took concrete action in August of the same year:
frustrated
by the prevailing system of scholarly communication in high-energy
physics in particular, where - as elsewhere in the sciences - delays
and difficulties inherent in the existing system of peer-reviewed
journals had stimulated the circulation of expensive, self-published
paper "pre-prints", he created what he called a "pre-print electronic archive" to which
individual physicists could send electronic versions
of their pre-prints prior to formal publication. As constructed, this
fully-automated archive was active as well as passive: not only did it
make papers available for access by e-mail, "FTP" (file transfer
protocol) and (eventually) World Wide Web, but it used e-mail to
notify "subscribers" of new submissions.247 Ginsparg's
system has since become so successful that in
high-energy physics, the electronic
pre-print archive has not only replaced the practice of circulating
paper pre-prints, but has largely superseded the formal printed
journals as "primary disseminators of research information."248
Ginsparg's archiving software has meanwhile been applied to some
twenty-five other research disciplines ranging from other areas of
physics (astrophysics, condensed matter theory, quantum physics,
chemical physics, etc.) through mathematics,
economics, computational
linguistics all the way to oceanic sciences;249 a similar program has
recently been used in Japan to create an international database of
self-published pre- prints in philosophy.250
[4.20] In several major fields where a lesser amount of
practical progress
has been made, electronic self- publication of scholarship has lately
come highly recommended. For instance, in May of 1995, a team of
public health professionals and information specialists (including
managers at AT&T and NASA) headed by Ronald Laporte
of the University
of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public Health proposed a
Ginsparg-style system of electronic self-publication for the health
sciences. In an article in the British Medical Journal provocatively
entitled "The
Death of Biomedical Journals", Laporte et al. detailed
the editorial and financial limitations of the current biomedical
periodical structure. They described their work on a "Global Health
Information Server" (part of the Global Health
Network) that would
facilitate distribution and exchange of biomedical research by
eliminating journals and preliminary peer review in favor of
electronic archiving of revisable self-published papers with comments
provided post hoc by interested readers. Issuing a clarion call for
radical, liberating change, Laporte concluded that "it is time that
scientists begin to take control of their research
communication."251
Laporte's proposal prompted a spirited response from the editors of
the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine, who argued that the
lack of preliminary peer-review in his system not only threatened to
undermine "time tested traditions", but might potentially cost lives
or cause physical harm to patients whose doctors read
inadequately-reviewed literature.252 At the
same time, the Journal moved
to pre-emptively stifle any scholarly migration to the Global Health
Information Server or other similar electronic archive by issuing an
ill-disguised threat: "posting a manuscript....on a host computer to
which anyone on the Internet can gain access will constitute prior
publication" rendering an article ineligible for publication by the
Journal itself.253 Even in this context,
Laporte's program has garnered
significant support, both nationally and internationally. To the
extent that it remains controversial,
its greatest problems would by
definition not be encountered in legal scholarship, which has neither
a significant peer-review system to lose nor runs the risk of causing
death or physical harm if quality control becomes problematic
(although I have already argued that post-hoc peer review would make
such a development unlikely).
[4.21] Systems or proposals for reform of scholarly
communication that make
sense in one or more disciplines admittedly may not be automatically
appropriate for another having significantly different traditions,
characteristics or sensibilities. The existence of the paper pre-print
system in high energy physics, for instance, made it easier to create
an electronic archive of self-published scholarship existing outside
the traditional bounds of the printed physics journals. Having said
that, however, this article has clearly demonstrated that internal
professional circumstances - and not just the abstract existence of a
technology - make Web self-publishing a particularly attractive option
for the legal academy. The potential in law of the general idea of
electronic self- publication, if not its specific application to the
World Wide Web, has notably been recognized by at least one group of
legal information specialists. In 1993, the Interim Report
of a joint
committee established by the University of Dayton School of Law and
Mead Data Central to study the role and potential of computer
technology in legal education suggested (apparently inspired by some
of the musings of Cornell law professor Peter Martin) that, in the
future, "Law reviews may be replaced by direct access data bases to
which faculty contribute their scholarly work.... "Direct" publishing
of scholarly material ...provides a fast and efficient arena for
scholarly debate and discussion. This shift away from hard copy to
on-line availability raises a number of questions about the future
role of student-edited law reviews."254 Not having been specifically
charged with the task of re-examining legal scholarship, the committee
made its comments only in passing, but they nonetheless lend credence
to the present proposal.
[4.22] The self-publishing of legal scholarship on the
Web might not be
altogether without its own difficulties and challenges (especially in
the short term, when the relevant technology is still evolving), but
the theoretical and practical analysis offered here suggests that in
the context of the multiple problems plaguing the contemporary law
review system, the professional and intellectual benefits of such a
scheme would be well worth the risks. The question therefore becomes:
what can the members of the American legal academy - administrators,
professors and even law students - do to make this "modest proposal" a
reality?
[v.2] Given the range of benefits that self-publication of
legal scholarship
on the Web would bestow on legal scholars and the legal community as a
whole, it is theoretically possible that the practice will develop
spontaneously (as, to some extent, it already has), slowly gaining
popularity until it becomes the scholarly norm. There are, however,
steps that can be taken to accelerate and enrich this otherwise
gradual process. The precise nature of these steps depends in large
part on who is taking them.
[v.3] Individual law professors, for instance, can
promote Web-based legal
publishing by putting their own papers on line as soon as
possible. Individuals who retain copyright to their published pieces
can put their existing scholarship on line immediately. Those who have
granted copyright to law reviews can either negotiate with those
reviews to regain copyright so as to allow on-line publication of
their full texts, or, at the very least, they can post abstracts of
their published pieces. Those in the process of writing legal
scholarship might consider putting that on-line themselves as soon as
it is completed to their satisfaction. This need not preclude later
publication of their work in a printed or electronic law journal -
indeed, on-line release could be perfectly compatible with that
insofar as Web publication would probably elicit feedback that would
improve the printed product, and moreover would allow scholars to
reach what are now two relatively-distinct audiences. Over the years,
however, legal scholars will probably discover (as an increasing
number of scholars in other fields have already found) that a
two-track publication system is awkward, unstable and ultimately
self-defeating. Writers used to working on the Web will eventually
find the absolute or relative fixity of their formally-published
products frustrating, and in order to meet criticism, maintain the
integrity or extend the shelf-life of those products will likely opt
to revise their Web-based versions after (as well as before) formal
publication. Readers will inevitably be drawn to the most up-to-date
version of any given article, and will therefore stop using or
referring to articles in their formally-published forms once those have
been superseded by electronic revision. Together, these developments
will make law review publication increasingly unattractive (indeed,
unnecessary) as a professional option.
[v.4] Law deans and law faculties as a whole,
meanwhile, should encourage or
at least recognize the scholarly value of self-published legal
scholarship. If they do
not endorse or support the practice, preferring
publication through the old established channels of the law reviews,
their inaction will make Web publication impractical or at least
unattractive for precisely those members of the legal professoriate
who are otherwise most likely to take advantage of and gain from it:
younger, more computer-literate legal scholars under significant
pressure to publish. On the other hand, if they intervene positively,
they will encourage their younger and more ambitious faculty members
to unprecedented heights of productivity and, very likely, creativity.
[v.5] As I indicated in the previous section of this
Article, the American
Association of Law Schools might play a highly constructive - indeed,
a critical - part in any movement towards Web-based self-publishing by
exploring the possibilities for establishing an automated, but
supervised Web site which would archive and link the new corpus of
self-published legal scholarship.255 At least
initially, it might be
worthwhile to explore the potential applicability to law of some
variation of Paul Ginsparg's archival physics software (which, it
should be recalled, has already been successfully exported into other
disciplinary fields). If the AALS is unwilling or unable to take the
general initiative, a single American law school might consider
providing such a site as a service to both the legal professoriate and
the wider legal community. The cost of such an undertaking would be
well within the means of even a non-elite school, given a pre-existing
Web connection: Ginsparg's own experiment was undertaken on a
shoestring (if never formally established) budget, covering a few
hours of programming labor plus hard disk space on an existing machine
(valued in 1991 at under $5000) which ran and continued to run other
programs.256 A small
investment here could have a very big payoff: given
the critical position the site-sponsoring law school would likely come
to occupy in the broader constellation of American legal scholarship
and information, such a school might make a considerable name for
itself in the age of cyberspace, just as Harvard made a name for
itself in the hey-day of cheap print by inaugurating its law
review. The institutional boost to the site-sponsoring school would be
that much greater if its faculty, like the Harvard faculty in the
early years of the Harvard Law Review, made a special point of
publishing or (in the case of already-printed pieces over which
copyright has been retained) re-publishing its own scholarship on the
site. In that way, the site-sponsoring school could seize the
technological high-ground, insofar as inquisitive and ambitious
scholars from other law schools, other disciplines and other countries
drawn to the site for its potential and its convenience would (if the
site were properly constructed) encounter the sponsoring school's
intellectual products, perhaps for the first time.
[v.6] Last but not least, even the editors of
contemporary law reviews have
a positive role they can play in the transition to a new system of
electronically self-published legal scholarship (obviously, they could
choose to play a negative role - in particular, by embracing the
strategy of the "pre-emptive strike" already launched by the New
England Journal of Medicine against self-published scholarship in the
health sciences - although it is to be hoped that scholarly
responsibility and even their own self-interests as law students and
law professors will prevail over the simple instinct for institutional
self-preservation257). Far
from voluntarily and immediately folding up,
they should continue their incipient efforts to place their published
scholarship on the Web; not only, in fact, should they put on whatever
new scholarship that continues to appear in their pages over the next
few years, but they should put on a complete run of their back issues
(perhaps making the articles in those issues hypertext-compatible by
converting into hyperlinks their footnotes and their citations to
other articles in the same journal). Such a strategy would have two
important results: first, it would make the Web a better (and more
frequently-used) resource for legal scholarship (which would in turn
help to subtlely acclimate legal scholars to the idea of using it as a
publishing base); and, second, it would make the Web a richer
publishing tool by giving legal scholars more literature to link to
with hypertext. As for the (student or faculty) editors of
second-generation electronic law reviews with no printed equivalents,
they too should continue their work for as long as at least some
scholars are willing to feed them material. The more established they
become, the more established the Web itself will appear; in this
context, they might do as much to encourage the success of Web
self-publishing in the long run as they might to distract certain
scholars from it in the short run.
[v.7] In the long run, however, the practice of
self-publishing legal
scholarship on the World Wide Web will almost certainly bring about
the end of the institution of the law review as we know it, in both
its print and electronic forms.258 When will that end come? Providing
they are attractive, convenient and not too expensive, new
technologies can disrupt traditional media very quickly - just
consider how rapidly CDs replaced vinyl LPS in the entertainment
industry. Even in the ostensibly more conservative academic context,
new technologies which solve fundamental problems and create new
opportunities for professors and their institutions can change
scholarly norms in a stunningly-short snippet of time. For instance,
the 1991 creation of Paul Ginsparg's cheap and speedy electronic
archive put the printed high energy physics journals on the ropes
almost immediately; four years after the inauguration of his service
they have not collapsed, but they have been reduced to the status of
side-shows and their demise appears inevitable. In actuality, it is
still too early to say exactly when the law review in its present form
will pass from the American academic scene, but in light of its
critical condition and the availability of an alternative and arguably
superior form of scholarly communication, it is not too early for the
last writes.
*. Audio quotation from Marshall McLuhan reproduced
courtesy of Dr. Nelson Thall, Research Director, McLuhan Center for Media Studies, Toronto,
CANADA. A CD containing this and other McLuhan quotes is sold by AK
Press (URL: http://www.akpress.org; email:
akpress@org.org; telephone 415-923-1429).
1. See generally Michael I. Swygert
& John W. Bruce, "The Historical Origins, Founding and Early
Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews", 36 Hastings L.J. 739,
764-769 (1985).
2. On Ames' supportive role in the
creation of the Harvard Law Review, see Swygert & Bruce, supra
note 1, at 771-772.
3. Swygert & Bruce, supra note 1, at
770.
4. Afton Dekanal, "Faculty-Edited Law
Reviews: Should the Law Schools Join the Rest of Academe?", 57 UMKC L.
Rev. 233, 235 (1989): "...for virtually all schools except Harvard,
student-edited law journals came into being because that is what
Harvard did."; Lyman P. Wilson, "The Law Schools, the Law Reviews and
the Courts", 30 Cornell L. Q. 488, 493 (1945) ("...because in
education as elsewhere there is such a thing as "keeping up with the
Jones", each new school and each of the older ones that did not
already have a law review felt the urge to start one.").
5. John J. McKelvey, "The Law School
Review, 1887-1937", 50 Harv. L. Rev. 868, 882 (1937).
6. Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal
Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s, 4 (1983).
7. In 1880, there were 46
university-based law schools in the United States; in 1890, there were
50. Alfred Z. Reed, Training for the Public Profession of the Law 445
(1921).
8. See generally Stevens, supra note 6,
at 24.
9."In 1887,....many [law schools] were
merely adjuncts or supplementary agencies, in the creation of lawyers,
to the law offices...". McKelvey, supra note 5, at 878. See also
William Johnson, Schooled Lawyers: A Study in the Clash of
Professional Cultures 49 (1978) (discussing "the limited and
supplementary role that law schools played in legal training...").
10. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 6,
at 35, 37.
11. Reed, supra note 7, at 183.
12. In the latter half of the
nineteenth century, American law professors and law schools repeatedly
premised their existence on their ability to do this. In its catalog
for 1858-59, for instance, New York University Law School rejected
office training as an environment where (unlike law school), students
"generally pursue their studies unaided by any real instruction, or
examination, or explanation. They imbibe error and truth, principles
which are still in force with principles which have become obsolete;
and when admitted to practice, they find, often at the cost of their
unfortunate clients, that their course of study has not made them sound
lawyers or correct practitioners." Quoted in Stevens, supra note 6, at
22.
13. Some law schools - such as
Columbia - had benefitted from the existence of formal alumni
associations as early as the 1860s. See Columbia University School of
Law, A History of the School of Law, Columbia University, 403 n.57
(1955).
14. See Alfred McClung Lee, The Daily
Newspaper in America: The Evolution of a Social Instrument, 118-121
(1937); Hellmut Lehmann-Haupt, The Book in America: A History of the
Making and Selling of Books in the United States 162-165 (1952).
15. See generally Lee, supra note 14,
at 98-103; Lehmann-Haupt, supra note 14, at 166-170.
16. See generally Lee, supra note 14,
at 104, 118-125.
17. John Tebbel, A History of Book
Publishing in the United States 676, 679, 687 (1975).
18. Frank Luther Mott, A History of
American Magazines 1885-1905, at 11 (1957).
19. "Some Magazine Mysteries", 61
Nation 342 (1895).
20. "Too Many Books", 8 Green Bag 83
(1896).
21. See generally "Cheap Books", 1
American Law Journal 105 (1884).
22. Tebbel, supra note 17, at 676,
677, 682, 689.
23. J.L. High, "What Shall be Done
with the Reports?", 16 Am. L. Rev. 429, 435, 439 (1882). See also
Robert Hughes, "Law Reporting", 1 Va. L. Reg. 309 (1885); R.S. Taft,
"Precedents", 3 Univ. L. Rev. 197 (1897).
24. The Michigan Law Review, for
instance, would be started in 1901 with an $800 loan from the School's
Board of Regents - not an insignificant sum, but at least within the
realm of institutional possibility. E. Blythe Stason, "The Law Review
- Its First Fifty Years", 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1134 (1952).
25. For instances of justifications of
law reviews citing this capability, see "Introductory", 1 The
Counselor [New York Law School] 16 (1891); 1 Mich. L.J. 25 (1892); 1
Md. L. Rev. 3 (1901); "The Cornell Law Quarterly", 1 Cornell L.Q. 27
(1915); "The Law Review and the Law School", 1 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 31, 32
(1924).
26. See generally William P. Lapiana,
Logic and Experience: The Origin of Modern American Legal Education
100 (1994).
27. On the general role of the law
review in promoting this connection, see, e.g., "Foreword", 1
Minn. L. Rev. 63 (1917).
28. See generally Lapiana, supra note
26, at 100.
29. For instances of justifications
citing a law review as having this capacity, see "Notes", 1 Harv.
L.R. 35 (1887); "Introductory", supra note 25; "Notes",
W. Res. L.J. 18 (1895); "The Illinois Law Review", 1 Ill. L. Rev. 39
(1906); 1 S. L. Q. [Tulane Law School] 45 (1916).
30. For instances of justifications
citing these capacities of a law review, see "Notes", 1 Harv. L.R. 35
(1887); 1 Yale L.J. 30 (1891); "The Cornell Law Quarterly", supra note
25.
31. See generally Laurence R. Veysey,
The Emergence of the American University 121-179 (1965).
32. Note, for instance, this comment
by the first President of Johns Hopkins, Daniel Gilman, looking back
from 1902 on the circumstances prevailing in 1876: "When this
university began, the opportunities for scientific publication in this
country were very meager. The American Journal of Science was the
chief repository for short and current papers. The memoirs of a few
learned societies came out at sow intervals and could not be freely
opened to investigators.". Quoted in Dennis P. Carrigan, "The
Political Economy of Scholarly Communication and the American System
of Higher Education", 15 J. Acad. Librarianship 332, 334 (1990).
33. Frederick Rudolph, The American
College and University: A History 407 (1990).
34. Rudolph, supra note 33, at 406.
35. For instances of justifications
citing this capability of the law review, see "Announcement", 1
Mich. L.Rev. 58 (1902); 1 Georgetown L.J. 50 (1912); "Introductory
Note", 1 Cal. L. Rev. 46, 48 (1913); "The Law Review and the Law
School", 1 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 31, 32 (1924).
36. As David Cavers wrote in 1936,
"without the law review, the law teacher who was imbued with an urge
for expression unsated by the confection of classroom notes would have
found little other outlet than that afforded by the treatise. But the
treatise is not a medium open to everyone. It demands a substantial
investment which the commercial publisher is willing to make only if
the assured position of its author (or, occasionally, the timeliness
of its subject) affords some guaranty of an adequate market." David
Cavers, "New Fields for the Legal Periodical", 23 Va. L. Rev. 1, 2-3
(1936).
37. It would later be said that
"[w]ere it not for the law review, many epoch-making articles might
never have been written, or if written, would never have had
widespread influence. In the issues of the Law Review, they were
circulated, and were read by all." "The Law Review and the Law
School", 1 N.Y.U. Law Review 31, 32 (1924).
38. It was thought that student
editors could be made more scholastically responsible through close
faculty supervision, and, in any event, law professors were not yet so
assimilated into the broader academic culture as to make such an
arrangement (otherwise attractive on pedagogical and professional
grounds) anathema to them. See generally Dekanal, supra note 4, at
235.
39. For instances of justifications
emphasizing the law review's capacity to advance or demonstrate the
"scientific" study of law, see 1 Univ. L. Rev. 1 (1893); "Foreword",
supra note 27 (adding, at 64, that "in this way the law school...may
be elevated toward the place in public estimation which it is surely
ultimately to attain.").
40. Stevens, supra note 6, at 38.
41. Swygert & Bruce, supra note 1,
at 773.
42. On the students' desire to
publicize the faculty and the achievements of the Harvard Law School,
see John H. Wigmore "The Recent Cases Department", 50
Harv. L. Rev. 862 (1937).
43. On Eliot and the turn to research
at Harvard, see generally Hugh Hawkins, "Charles W. Eliot, Daniel
C. Gilman and the Nurture of American Scholarship", 39 New Eng. Q. 291
(1966).
44. Wigmore, supra note 42, at 862-63.
45. Having said this, it is important
to note that not all Harvard faculty were initially enthusiastic about
the initiative. One of the Review's student founders, Joseph Beale,
reported that the members of the faculty displayed "differing degrees
of warmth in support offered." Quoted in Swygert & Bruce, supra
note 1, at 770.
46. "Notes", 1 Harv. L. Rev. 35
(1887).
47. See, e.g., Garrard Glenn, "Law
Reviews - Notes of an Antediluvian", 23 Va. L. Rev. 46 (1936): "Before
the Columbia Law Review was launched [in 1901]...the Dean of the
School was approached, and he consented to the review taking the name
Columbia only upon condition that it should adopt the model of
Harvard."; 1 Minn. L. Rev. 63, 65 (1917), speaking of the both the
Harvard Law Review and its more successful competitors: "We feel the
inspiration of their example, we covet the eminence they have
earned...".
48. Swygert & Bruce, supra note 1,
at 779.
49. See generally the long list of law
review objectives and justifications cited by John McKelvey in
McKelvey, supra note 5, at 870-871.
50. 1 Yale L. J. 30 (1891).
51. "Foreword", supra note 27, at 64.
52. Quoted in McKelvey, supra note 5,
at 869.
53. See Roger Cramton, "'The Most
Remarkable Institution': The American Law Review", 36 J. Leg. Ed. 4
(1986) (offering, in passing, the observation that "the times were
ripe; and if the developments had not come about at Harvard in 1887
they probably would have at Columbia or Pennsylvania or elsewhere a
few years later").
54. Derived from Frederick C. Hicks,
Materials and Methods of Legal Research 207 (3rd. ed., 1942). This
statistic does not, however, reflect all of the nineteen attempts made
to create school-sponsored law reviews down to the turn of the
century; for a variety of reasons, the majority of these early
initiatives failed. See Hicks, at 206.
55. Barbara Cane, "The Role of Law
Review in Legal Education", 31 J. Leg. Ed. 215, 220 (1981).
56. McKelvey, supra note 5, at 868.
57. "Editorial Notes", 1
Ill. L. Rev. 39 (1906).
58. A.K. "The Law Review", 21
Ill. L. Rev. 147, 156 (1926).
59. Fred Rodell, "Goodbye to Law
Reviews", 23 Va. L. Rev. 38 (1936).
60. Rodell, supra note 59, at 38.
61. Rodell was in good company. One of
the original student founders of the Harvard Law Review, John Wigmore,
admitted the same year: "I sometimes wonder if this journal-type is
not becoming staled. Has mass-organization resulted in too much
standardization?" Wigmore, supra note 42, at 867.
62. Rodell, supra note 59, at 44-45.
63. Rodell, supra note 59, at 38.
64. The Wisconsin Law Review was
established in 1920 as a faculty-run journal; by 1930, it had become
"a more autonomous student-run organization with less control and
influence being exerted by the faculty." Students became the sole
editors in 1935, although a faculty advisor was retained. "The
Wisconsin Law Review: Fifty Years of Proud Tradition", 1970
Wis. L. Rev. 973, 974.
65. Charles E. Hughes, "Foreword", 50
Yale L.J. 737, 737 (1941) (quoting Holmes).
66. A.K., supra note 58, at 149.
67. Clarence M. Updegraff, "Management
of Law School Reviews", 3 U. Cin. L. Rev. 115, 119- 20 (1929).
68. Cavers, supra note 36, at 6-7.
69. See, e.g., 1 Cornell L.Q. 1
(1913) (responding to the Illinois Law Journal): "It is seriously to
be questioned whether the mere fact of the multiplication of
periodicals in any field of serious endeavor is evidence of waste. One
may reasonably assert that the extraordinary number of scientific and
technical reviews published in Germany (for example, a dozen or more
devoted to entomology) is rather the natural and inevitable expression
of intense, varied and widespread intellectual activity."; Douglas
B. Maggs, "Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes
to the Development of the Law", 3 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181, 190 (1930)
(concluding that "each law school not now publishing a law review
should be encouraged to institute one"); Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble
Bush 107 (1930) ("[The] law review is....a thing American. Here is a
thing Americans may well be proud of. There is not, as far as I know,
in the world an academic faculty which pins its reputation before the
public upon the work of undergraduate students - there is none, that
is, except in the American law reviews. Such an institution it is a
privilege to serve. Such an institution it is an honor to belong
to."); "Why Law School Reviews?: A Symposium", 4 Fordham L. Rev. 1
(1935); McKelvey, supra note 5, at 874 ("While...sameness to some has
appeared a defect, after due consideration I am forced to the
conclusion it is a virtue....The lawyer, judge or law student who uses
a law review is not seeking experimentation. He looks for service,
and he has no desire to be diverted from his purpose or even delayed
by having to familiarize himself with a novel, strange or differently
constructed tool.").
70. For a brief description of the
experiment and its early results, see A.K., supra note 58, at 148.
71. See generally, "Foreword", 1 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 1 (1933).
72. A.K., supra note 58, at 150.
73. See generally Cavers, supra note
36, at 14-19.
74. See, e.g., "A Symposium on State
Administrative Procedure", 33 Iowa L. Rev. 193 (1949); "Labor
Relations and the Law", U. Chi. L. Rev. 331 (1947). The University of
Illinois Law Forum (a state-oriented law review) began publishing
symposium issues on a regular basis in 1950.
75. Cavers, supra note 36, at 11-12.
76. John E. Cribbet, "Experimentation
in the Law Reviews", 5 J. Leg. Ed. 72, 81 (1952).
77. Stanley Fuld, "A Judge Looks at
the Law Review", 28 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 913, 919, 920 (1953).
78. Arthur S. Miller, "A Modest
Proposal for Changing Law Review Formats", 8 J. Leg. Ed. 89 (1955).
79. Fred Rodell, "Goodbye to Law
Reviews - Revisited", 48 Va. L. Rev. 279, 286 (1962).
80. Rodell, supra note 79, at 288.
81. Cribbet, supra note 76, at 73.
82. Alan Mewett, "Reviewing the Law
Reviews", 8 J. Leg. Ed. 188, 189 (1955).
83. Mewett, supra note 82, at 188.
84. See also John G. Hervey, "There's
Still Room for Improvement", 9 J. Leg. Ed. 149, 151 (1956).
85. The phrase "publish or perish" was
apparently coined, or at least publicized, by Logan Wilson in his
classic study The Academic Man: A Study in the Sociology of a
Profession, 197 (1942) ("The prevailing pragmatism forced upon the
academic group is that one must write something and get it into
print. Situation imperatives dictate a 'publish or perish' credo
within the ranks.").
86. See generally Stevens, supra note
6, at 271 (reporting that "The emphasis of law professors on article
writing flourished in the 1950s as the number of law reviews grew.").
87. James Willard Hurst, "Research
Responsibilities of University Law Schools", 10 J. Leg. Ed. 147
(1957).
88. Quoted in Stanley E. Harper,
"Caution, Research Ahead", 13 J. Leg. Ed. 411 (1959).
89. Stason, supra note 24, at 1137.
90. Mewett, supra note 82, at 190.
91. Arthur Nussbaum, "Some Remarks
About the Position of the Student-Editors of the Law Review", 7
J. Leg. Ed. 381 (1955).
92. See, e.g., Howard Westwood, "The
Law Review Should Become the Law School," 31 Va. L. Rev. 913 (1945);
Harold Marsh Jr., "The Law Review and the Law School: Some Reflections
About Legal Education", 42 Ill. L. Rev. 424, 434 (1947).
93. Stevens, supra note 6, at 221
n.38. Berkeley, for instance, accepted 70% of its applicants in 1954;
in 1968, it admitted only 34%.
94. Fuld, supra note 77, at 917. See
also Roger Traynor, "To the Right Honorable Law Reviews", 10 UCLA
L. Rev. 3, 4 (1962).
95. Harold Havinghurst, "Law Reviews
and Legal Education", 51 Nw. L. Rev. 22, 25-26 (1957). See also Roy
Moreland, "Unfair Domination of Law Reviews", 12 J. Leg. Ed. 424
(1960).
96. See, e.g., Earl Warren, "Message
of Greeting to the UCLA Law Review", 1 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1953); William
M. Moldoff, "Reviewing the Law Reviews: An Answer", 8 J. Leg. Ed. 497
(1955-56) (responding to Mewett); Arthur H. Kahn, "Some Additional
Remarks about the Position of the Student-Editors of the Law Review",
9 J. Leg. Ed. 73 (1956) (defending student editorial control); Kenneth
F. Burgess, "Law Reviews and the Practicing Lawyer", 51 Nw. L.
Rev. 10 (1956) (declaring that "No convincing reason exists, from the
standpoint of the practicing lawyer, for altering the established
format of the law review."); Havinghurst, supra note 95, at 24
(meeting the criticism that too many law reviews were being produced
for too few readers by noting that "Whereas most periodicals are
published primarily in order that they may be read, the law reviews
are published primarily in order that be may be written."); Traynor,
supra note 94, at 8 (responding to critics denigrating the law review
as the product of students: "They pay no heed to the fact that the
average apprentice in an American law school has long since reached
the age of discretion and that he is no ordinary student.").
97. This journal actually originated
as the University of Detroit Law Journal; it represented one of the
few instances of a law school deciding to replace its general journal
with a specialist law review. The practice of student editorial
control survived the transition.
98.
99. "The Wisconsin Law Review", supra
note 64, at 974.
100. Cribbet, supra note 76, at 81.
101. Cane, supra note 55, at 222.
102. Louis Schwartz, "Civilizing the
Law Review", 20 J. Leg. Ed. 63 (1967) (criticizing the narrow,
technical scope of law reviews); "The Law Review: Is It Meeting the
Needs of the Legal Community"? 44 Denv. L. J. 426 (1967); Clark, supra
note 98 (criticizing the lack of editorial continuity in student
edited law reviews); John F.T. Murray, "Publish and Perish - By
Suffocation", 27 J. Leg. Ed. 566 (1975) (criticizing the repetition
and marginal quality of most law review writing produced under the
pressures of "publish or perish"); Ed D. Wheeler, "The Bottom Lines:
Fifty Years of Legal Footnoting in Review", 72 L. Lib. J. 245 (1979)
(criticizing the radical lengthening, if not necessarily the radical
proliferation, of law review footnotes since 1928).
103. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note
53.
104. See e.g., Richard A. Posner,
"The Future of the Student-Edited Law Review", 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1131
(1995).
105. See, e.g., James Lindgren, "An
Author's Manifesto", 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 527 (1994); James Lindgren,
"Fear of Writing", 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1677 (1990); James Lindgren,
"Reforming the American Law Review", 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1123 (1995).
106. See "Symposium on Law Review
Editing: The Struggle Between Author and Editor Over Control of the
Text", 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 71 (1994); "Special Issue: Law Review
Conference", 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1147 (1995); "Exchange", 61
U. Chi. L. Rev. 527 (1994); Christopher Shea, "Students v. Professors:
Law-review debate heats up as student editors clash with faculty
authors", The Chronicle of Higher Education, June 2, 1995, at A33. Even more recently,
see Rosa Ehrenreich, "Look Who's Editing", Lingua Franca, January/February 1996, at
58.
107. E.g., feminist jurisprudence
and women's legal issues, environmental law, civil rights law,
international law, tax law, entertainment law, comparative law,
computers and law.
108. The Harvard Civil Rights-Civil
Liberties Law Review; the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy;
the Harvard Journal on Regulation; the Harvard Environmental Law
Review; the Harvard International Law Journal; the Harvard Journal of
Law and Technology; and the Harvard Women's Law Journal, the Harvard
Journal on Legislation and the Harvard Human Rights Journal. As of
this writing, Harvard is about to start yet another journal, the
Harvard Negotiation Law Review. "Everyone's An Editor", 24/3 Student
Law. 5 (1995).
109. The African-American Law and
Policy Report, the Asian Law Journal, the Berkeley Journal of
Employment and Labor Law, the Ecology Law Quarterly, the International
Tax and Business Lawyer, La Raza Law Journal, the Berkeley Women's Law
Journal, and the High Technology Law Journal.
110. The Columbia reviews include
the Columbia Business Law Review, the Columbia Human Rights Law
Review, the Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, the Columbia
Journal of Gender and Law, the Columbia Journal of Law and Social
Problems, the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, and the
Columbia-VLA Journal of Law and the Arts. The Georgetown reviews
include the Georgetown Journal on Fighting Poverty, Law and Policy in
International Business, Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, the
American Criminal Law Review, the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics,
the Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, and the Tax
Lawyer.
111. The Yale Journal of
International Law, the Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, the
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, the Yale Journal on Regulation, and
the Yale Law and Policy Review.
112. These figures are drawn from
information contained in Law School Admission Council, The Official
Guide to US Law Schools (1995).
113. Cane, supra note 55, at 220.
114. Cane, supra note 55, at 215.
115. Geoffrey Preckshot, "All Hail
Emperor Law Review: Criticism of the Law Review System and its Success
at Provoking Change", 55 Mo. L. Rev. 1005, 1009 n.25. (1990).
116. This figure was obtained by
counting those law journals in the Index to Legal Periodicals which
either carry a law school's name in their titles, or list a law school
as an editorial address. It may be a low estimate, however: the
information on individual law schools in The Official Guide to US Law
Schools, published by the Law School Admissions Council, collectively
suggests a figure closer to (or, given gaps in its coverage, even
above) 413. See Law School Admission Council, supra note 112.
117. One law dean has offered the
following tongue-in-cheek proposal as a means of "solving" the
problem: "Law schools should enter into a non-proliferation treaty on
law reviews. No new reviews, gradual destruction of existing
stockpiles until all are destroyed." Roger I. Abrams, "This is Not an
Article, or Scholarship: The Greek Salad", 13 Nova L. Rev. 33, 37
(1988).
118. On this problem in academia as
a whole, see Deana L. Astle, "The Scholarly Journal: Whence or
Wither", 15 J. Acad. Librarianship 151 (1989); on law school budget
and financing problems in particular, see e.g., Richard Reuben "State
Law Schools Squeezed for Cash", ABA Journal, April 1994, at 32.
119. See Arthur D. Austin,
"Footnotes as Product Differentiation", 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1131, 1138
(1987).
120. Elyce H. Zenoff & Lizabeth
A. Moody. "Law Faculty Attrition: Are We Doing Something Wrong?", 36
J. Leg. Ed. 209, 220 (1986).
121. See generally Zenoff &
Moody, supra note 120; Graham C. Lilly, "Law Schools Without Lawyers?
Winds of Change in the Legal Academy", 81 Va. L. Rev. 1421, 1437
(referring to the "mounting pressure on young academics, particularly
untenured ones, to research and publish").
122. On the tendency of law
professors, lawyers and judges to cite, and more generally use, only a
very few law reviews (essentially those from the "elite" schools), see
Olavi Maru, "Measuring the Impact of Legal Periodicals", 1976
Am. B. Found. Res. J. 227, 232-242.
123. Some law faculties actually
require that their junior members publish in a prescribed number of
"acceptable" (read "elite" or "high-profile") law reviews. Michael
Vitiello, "Journal Wars", 22 St. Mary's L. J. 927, 929
(1991). Even among those faculties where no such formal requirement
exists, placement is often taken as a proxy for the quality of the
piece. Vitiello, at 936.
124. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note
53, at 7; Lindgren, "An Author's Manifesto", supra note 105; Posner,
supra note 99.
125. See, e.g., Banks McDowell, "The
Audiences for Legal Scholarship", 40 J. Leg. Ed., 261, 269 (1990).
126. Lindgren, "Author's Manifesto",
supra note 105, at 530.
127. See Arthur D. Austin, "The
'Custom of Vetting' as a Substitute for Peer Review", 32 Ariz.
L. Rev. 1 (1989).
128. See e.g. Cramton, supra note
53, at 8; Laura F. Rothstein and Mark A. Rothstein, "Law Reviews
Suffer from Lack of Peer Review", Legal Times, Jan. 6, 1986, at 10;
Lindgren, "An Author's Manifesto", supra note 105, at 533.
129. Carl Tobias, "Manuscript
Selection Anti-Manifesto", 80 Cornell L. Rev. 529, 530 (1995).
130. See e.g. Ira Mark Ellman,
"Comparison of Law Faculty Production", 33 J. Leg. Ed. 681, 692 (1983)
(citing the editors of the Virginia Law Review for filling 1323 of
1926 pages with their own faculty's material over a two and one-half
year period).
131. See generally, "Living with the
Pressure to Publish or Perish", 14/1 Student Law. 5 (1985); Jordan
H. Leibman and James P. White, "How the Student-Edited Law Journals
Make Their Publication Decisions", 39 J. Leg. Ed. 387, at 405 (1990).
132. A number of law reviews have
recently moved to prevent or at least extremely limit law review
"shopping" by imposing very short deadlines on would-be authors (which
is certain to induce even more dissatisfaction). Lisa Anderson, "Law
Journals Move to Stop 'Shopping' of Manuscripts", N.Y. Times, July 12,
1995.
133. See, e.g., Carol Sanger,
"Editing", 82 Geo. L. J. 513 (1993); Gregory E. Maggs, "Just Say No?",
70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 101 (1994).
134. See e.g., Rothstein and
Rothstein, supra note 128, at 10; Sanger, supra note 133, at 517;
Lindgren,"An Author's Manifesto", supra note 105, at 531.
135. See, e.g., Lindgren, "Author's
Manifesto", supra note 105, at 529 (citing the case of one scholar who
found more than 200 style errors introduced into the original
manuscript after a student edit). Lindgren himself has concluded that
"Law-review editors are the most aggressive and ignorant editors you
will ever encounter." Quoted in Shea, supra note 106, at A33.
136. Mark Thompson, "The Law Review
Meets the Marketplace", 13/4 Student Law. 14, 19 (1994).
137. Ronald D. Rotunda, "Law
Reviews: The Extreme Centrist Position", 62 Ind. L. J. 1, 10 (1986).
138. Sanger, supra note 132, at 517.
139. See, e.g., Michael L. Closen,
"A Proposed Code of Professional Responsibility for Law Reviews", 63
Notre Dame L. Rev. 55 (1989).
140. See, e.g., David M. Richardson,
"Improving the Law Review Model: A Case in Point", 44 J. Leg. Ed. 6,
7 (1994).
141. See Kenneth Lasson,
"Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure", 103
Harv. L. Rev. 926 at 933 (1990) ("Most often the lag is so long
between the first dull gleam in an author's eye and the finished
product that whatever might be timely and relevant is largely lost on
whatever few readers there may be out there. The stuff is simply
stale.").
142. See generally Erik M. Jensen,
"The Law Review Manuscript Glut: The Need for Guidelines", 39
J. Leg. Ed. 383 (1989).
143. Josh E. Fidler, "Law-Review
Operations and Management", 33 J. Leg. Ed. 48, 60 (1983).
144. Tobias, supra note 129, at
531. Another estimate suggests more than 1500. See Shea, supra note
106, at A33.
145. See generally Rotunda, supra
note 137, at 9. In 1983, the average law review published two months
behind schedule. Fidler, supra note 143, at 51. Anecdotal evidence
would suggest that by 1995, that lag had become at least a month or
two longer.
146. See e.g. John G. Kester,
"Faculty Participation in the Student-Edited Law Review", 36 J.
Leg. Ed. 14 (1986): "[W]e editors who guarded the lofty independence
of even the most-independent -of-all Harvard Law Review in the
pre-Jacobin era of a generation ago kept a careful eye cocked on the
Harvard faculty. Our professors, in turn, generously supplied counsel
that we were clever enough to recognize (if not always admit) we
needed."
147. Kester, supra note 146, at 16.
148. Cramton, supra note 53, at 6;
Dekanal, supra note 4, at 234.
149. Patricia Bellew Gray, "Harvard
Faculty Hit for Plan to Start New Law Journal", 132/104 Chi. Daily
L. Bull. 2 (1986).
150. Kester, supra note 146, at
15-16.
151. Chris Goodrich, "Professor,
Edit Thyself", 6/7 Cal. Law. 49, 52 (1986).
152. Kester, supra note 146, at 16.
153. See generally Jordan H. Leibman
& James P. White, "How the Student-Edited Law Journals Make Their
Publication Decisions", 39 J. Legal Ed., 387, 423 (1989) (asserting
that "the failure to provide feedback is the most serious weakness of
the law review model").
154. Dekanel, supra note 4, at 236.
155. Cramton, supra note 53, at
9. See also Lasson, supra note 141, at 932.
156. E. Joshua Rosenkranz, "Law
Review's Empire", 39 Hastings L.J. 859, 860 (1988). See also
Rosenkranz, 899-911.
157. Rosemary Harold, "Dilemmas",
19/5 Student Law. 7 (1991).
158. See generally Richard
A. Posner, "The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline, 1962-
1987", 100 Harv. L. Rev. 761 (1987).
159. See generally Robert Weisberg,
"Some Ways to Think About Law Reviews", 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1147, 1154
(1995).
160. Posner, supra note 104, at
1133-1134.
161. Lindgren, "Author's Manifesto",
supra note 105, at 535.
162. In 1960, for instance, judges
and practitioners published almost as many articles in law reviews as
did professors. By 1985, however, articles by judges and practitioners
were outnumbered by more than 3:1. Judith S. Kaye, "One Judge's View
of Academic Law Review Writing", 39 J. Leg. Ed. 313, 320 (1989),
citing research by Michael Saks.
163. See generally Cramton, supra
note 53, at 10; Max Stier et al., "Law Review Usage and Suggestions
for Improvement: A Survey of Attorneys, Professors and Judges", 44
Stan. L. Rev. 1467, 1498 (1992) (reporting the results of a survey
indicating that judges and attorneys found contemporary law review
articles too theoretical); "Law Reviews: A Waste of Time and Money?",
Am. Law., April 1994 at 50.
164. Harry T. Edwards, "The Growing
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession", 91
Mich. L. Rev. 34 at 36 (1992).
165. United States v. $639,558, 955
F. 2d. 712, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Silberman J., concurring).
166. On the increasing length of
contemporary law review articles, see Elyce H. Zenoff, "I Have Seen
the Enemy and They Are Us", 36 J. Leg. Ed. 21 (1986) (noting that for
seventeen of twenty law reviews surveyed, the length of the articles
in the first issue of the current volume was longer on average in
1984-85 than it was in 1954-55); W. Lawrence Church, "A Plea for
Readable Law Review Articles", 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 739, 740 (reporting
that in 1936-37, the length of the average leading article in the
Wisconsin Law Review was 13 pages; in 1962, it was about 36 pages, and
in 1988, it had grown to over 44 pages). On the contemporary
proliferation of footnotes, see generally William R. Slomanson,
"Footnote Logic in Law Review Writing: Previously Unaddressed in the
Criminal Justice System", 9 Crim. Just. J. 65 (1986); Austin, supra
note 119; Lasson, supra note 141, at 937-941.
167. This is consistent with the
results of a 1983 study which indicated that as legal academics rose
through the tenure track (from Acting Professor, Assistant Professor,
Associate Professor, Professor, to Dean) and thereby had fewer
promotional concerns, they produced articles with fewer pages, fewer
footnotes, and fewer footnotes per page. See Ellman, supra note 130,
at 683.
168. Lindgren,"Author's Manifesto",
supra note 105, at 531.
169. See generally Austin, supra
note 119.
170. The footnote "problem" in
particular has also been exacerbated by the traditional absence of
bibliographies in law review articles, which helps to explain, inter
alia, why far more footnotes appear in law review articles than in
other academic journals.
171. See e.g. Austin, supra n. 119,
at 1133-1135; Alfred F. Conrad, "A Lovable Law Review", 44
J. Leg. Ed. 1 (1994); Ronald Lansing, "The Creative Bridge Between
Authors and Editors", 45 Md. L. Rev. 241, 248-250; Church, supra note
166; Stier et al., supra note 163, at 1499 (reporting the results of
survey in which most professors, judges and attorneys agreed that
articles should be shorter and less heavily footnoted).
172. Thompson, supra note 136, at
17.
173. On the limited value of the
"writing competition", see e.g. Rosenkranz, supra note 156, at
894-897.
174. Joel Seligman, The High Citadel
182 (1978).
175. "Drawing Distinctions at
Harvard Law", NY Times, March 3, 1981, A18; "Harvard Law Review's
Ethnic Screening Criticized", NY Times, Feb.24, 1981, A12. After
female editors voted against its application to themselves, the
Review's affirmative action policy ultimately did not extend to
women. Perhaps consequently, women make up a mere 11 of the 44 new
members on the 1995-96 Harvard Law Review board. Tara Dawood, "Law
Review to Study Gender Disparity", Harvard Law Record, October 20,
1995, at 1.
176. Fidler, supra note 143, at
53. Controversy over law review affirmative action policies
nonetheless continued beyond this initial period of
implementation. See, e.g., "Scholarly Schism", 75 ABA J. 50
(September, 1989) (discussing affirmative action on the George
Washington Law Review).
177. Cramton, supra note 53; Austin,
supra note 127, at 4.
178. See generally Richard Posner,
"Goodbye to the Bluebook", 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1343, 1349- 1351 (1986);
Lindgren, "Fear of Writing", supra note 105 (reviewing the Texas Law
Review Manual on Style, which he refers to as "one of the most
pernicious collections of superstitions that has ever been take
seriously by educated people.").
179. See e.g. Joseph R. Julin,
"Faculty-Edited Law Review: No - A Statement by Joseph R. Julin",
16/3 Syllabus 1 (1985); Rotunda, supra note 137; Scott M. Martin, "The
Law Review Citadel: Rodell Revisited", 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1093 (1986);
Phil Nichols, "A Student Defense of Student Edited Journals: In
Response to Professor Roger Cramton", 1987 Duke L.J. 1122; Michael
Vitiello, "In Defense of Student-Run Law Reviews", 17 Cumberland
L. Rev. 859 (1987); John Paul Jones, "In Praise of Student-Edited Law
Reviews: A Reply to Professor Dekanal", 57 UMKC Law Review 241 (1989);
Vitiello, supra note 123; Wendy J. Gordon, "Counter- Manifesto:
Student-edited Law Reviews and the Intellectual Properties of
Scholarship", 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 541 (1994); The Articles Editors, "A
Response", U. Chi. L. Rev. 553 (1994).
180. See e.g., Vitiello, supra note
123 at 930 ("[T]here has been positive change in format and content of
what many law reviews are publishing."); James Lindgren, "Reforming
the American Law Review", 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1123 (1995) ("The law
review reform movement is coming of age. As this symposium attests, at
least the targets of our criticism are beginning to listen.").
181. The Articles Editors, supra
note 179, at 558.
182. Lindgren, "Reforming the
American Law Review", supra note 180, at 1129.
183. John Metaxas, "Two New Faculty
Journals Enter the Legal Scholarship Arena", 8 National Law Journal 4
(1986). On the general proliferation of "Correspondence" sections,
see Erik M. Jensen, "Law Review Correspondence: Better Read than
Dead", 24 U. Conn. L. Rev. 159 (1991).
184. John C. Metaxas, "Harvard Law
Review Inaugurates an Informal 'Commentary' Section", 8 National Law
Journal 4 (1985).
185. See, e.g., A. Sirico, "Supreme
Court Haiku", 61 NYU L. Rev. 1224 (1986).
186. See generally The Executive
Board of the Chicago-Kent Law Review, "The Symposium Format as a
Solution to Problems Inherent in Student-Edited Law Journals: A View
from the Inside", 70 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 141 (1994); Jean Stafancic,
"The Law Review Symposium Issue: Community of Meaning or
Re-inscription of Hierarchy?", 63 U. Colorado L. Rev. 651 (1992).
187. See generally Thompson, supra
note 136.
188. "We aimed for something more
in-depth than Harper's or Atlantic but not as dry or as boring as a
standard law review." Thompson, supra note 136 at 16 (quoting a former
editor of the Yale Journal of Law and Politics).
189. See generally Richard
A. Epstein, "Faculty-Edited Law Reviews", 70 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 87
(1994).
190. On Chicago-Kent, see generally
Randy E. Barnett, "Beyond the Moot Law Review: A Short Story with a
Happy Ending", 70 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 123 (1994).
191. Not all attempts at faculty
take-over have been completely successful. At George Mason University,
for instance, the faculty's declared intention to assume control of
the flagship student- run law review generated such controversy that
the students began an " independent" law review (appropriately named
the George Mason Independent Law Review). The faculty ultimately
agreed to a compromise which allowed students to maintain control over
article selection and editing in the main journal, although at the
same time the faculty insisted that it include only student-written
articles. See generally Lisa Schkolnick, "Review Revamp Raises Ire at
George Mason", 20/5 Student Law. 47 (1992); Stier et al., supra note
163, at 1504 n.112.
192. See generally Lindgren, supra
note 180, at 1129.
193. The Articles Editors, supra
note 179, at 554-555. See also Rebecca M. Blank, "The Effects of
Double-Blind versus Single-Blind Reviewing: Experimental Evidence from
the American Economic Review", 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 1041 (1991).
194. See supra note 75; Executive
Board, supra note 186, at 143-146.
195. See Rotunda, supra note 137, at
6.
196. The proposal that the AALS
sponsor a journal was originally floated by its then-President, Roger
Cramton, in 1985. Cramton, supra note 53, at 3. On the controversy
surrounding the Harvard initiative, see Patricia Bellew Gray, "Harvard
Faculty Hit for Plan to Start New Law Journal", 132/104 Chicago Daily
Law Bulletin 2 (1986). On the two proposals generally, see John
C. Metaxas, "Two New Faculty-Edited Journals Enter the Legal
Scholarship Arena", 8/20 National Law Journal 4 (1986).
197. On the failure of the Harvard
journal, see John Metaxas, "Harvard Faculty Journal Loses Tribe to
Bicentennial of the Constitution", 8/45 National L. J. 4 (1986)
(discussing the resignation of Lawrence Tribe, the designated editor
of the Harvard law journal, so that he could devote his attention to
other scholarly endeavors).
198. Horror-stories about peer
review in the arts and sciences are common. In one particularly
provocative experiment on the objectivity of the process, researchers
selected a dozen articles written by well known authors that had
recently appeared in respected journals, resubmitting them to the same
journals with the names of the original authors deleted. The journals
and their appointed referees (two per article) rejected eight of the
twelve re-submitted pieces, citing poor scholarship and poor
writing. D.P. Peters & S.J. Ceci, "Peer Review Practices of
Psychological Journals", 5 Behav. Brain Sci. 187 (1982). See also Mary
Biggs, "The Impact of Peer Review on Intellectual Freedom", 39
Lib. Trends 145 (1990).
199. Vitiello, "In Defense", supra
note 179, at 872-873.
200. In addition to the sources
cited supra, note 23, see "Report of the Special Committee to Consider
and Report as to the Duplication of Law Books and Publications", 61
ABA Rep. 848 (1936); Samuel H. Sibley, "The Multitude of Published
Opinions", 25 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 166 (1942).
201. See, for instance, Eugene
M. Prince, "Law Books, Unlimited", 48 ABA J. 134
(1961).
202. For extensive documentation
(complete with graphs), see Layman E. Allen et al., Automatic
Retrieval of Legal Literature: Why and How 1-22 (1962). See also
Robert A. Wilson, "Computer Retrieval of Case Law", 16 Sw. L. J. 409
(1962) ("Each year about 25,000 new opinions are published (nearly 700
cases per day) along with over 29,000 new statutes.")
203. See e.g. Wilson, supra note
202, at 410 (discussing problems with the breadth and identity of
traditional indexing categories); Irving Kayton, "Retrieving Case Law
by Computer: Fact, Fiction and Future", 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 1-6
(1966).
204. See Jessica S. Melton &
Robert C. Bensing, "Searching Legal Literature Electronically: Results
of a Test Program", 45 Minn. L. Rev. 229, 230 (1960) (quoting Vincent
Biunno, counsel to the Governor of New Jersey: "With each passing
year, we pile up decision on statute on rule on regulation and then
construct large and cumbersome digests, compendiums, indexes and other
archeological devices which we hope will help us find what we want in
the evergrowing mound."); Wilson, supra note 202, at 409.
205. See, e.g., Louis O. Kelso,
"Does the Law Need a Technological Revolution", 18 Rocky Mountain
L. Rev. 378 (1946); Lawrence A. Harper, "Legal Research, Technology
and the Future", 24 Cal. St. B.J. 104 (1949); J.M. Jacobstein,
"Scientific Aids for Research", 31 Chi.- Kent L. Rev. 236 (1952); Roy
N. Freed, "Prepare Now for Machine-Assisted Legal Research", 47 ABA
J. 764 (1961) .
206. Freed supra note 205, at 766:
"Professionals devote considerable time to poring through indices to
citations and to chasing down the books to check on relevance. By
finding relevant references faster and by reducing the percentage of
irrelevance, machines will contribute real economies....".
207. Altogether apart from Horty's
own circumstances, "statutes were the first area of the law to be
adapted to computer research since the precision of their language
made a search system based on a full text relatively feasible." Note,
"The Use of Data Processing in Legal Research", 65 Mich. L. Rev. 987,
988 (1967).
208. See John F. Horty, "The 'Key
Words in Combination' Approach", M.U.L.L. [Modern Uses of Logic in
Law], March 1962 at 54.
209. F. Reed Dickerson, "The
Electronic Searching of Law", 47 ABA J. 902 (1961).
210. See Gerald W. Davis, "Automatic
Data Processing and the Judge Advocate General's Corps", 23 Military
L. Rev. , 117, 129 (1964); David Thomas Moody, "Legal Research:
Computer Retrieval of Statutory Law and Decisional Law", 19
Vand. L. Rev. 905, at 909 n.9 (1964).
211. Much of the material in this
paragraph and the two which follow is derived from William G.
Harrington, "A Brief History of Computer-Assisted Legal Research", 77
L. Lib. J. 543 (1984-85).
212. Howard A. Hood, "Disk and DAT:
Recent Developments in Legal Databases and Emerging Information
Technologies in the United States", 15 Int. J. of Leg. Info. 109, 112
(1987).
213. See generally, Ethan Katsh, Law in
a Digital World, 66-69 (1995).
214. Peter W. Martin, "How New
Information Technologies Will Change the Way Law Professors Do and
Distribute Scholarship", 83 L. Lib. J. 633, 635 (1991).
215. Having said all this, however,
it must be admitted that in at least one way the electronic database
services have made law reviews less useful: given the ease with which
case and statute law now can be researched, attorneys and judges have
become disinclined to use law reviews as comprehensive guides to legal
materials on a particular subject.
216. On the history and development
of the Internet, see e.g., Richard W. Wiggins, The Internet for
Everyone: A Guide for Users and Providers 5-10 (1995).
217. See generally Bill Gates, The
Road Ahead 126 (1995) ("Whenever a new medium is created, the first
content offered is brought over from other media...So far the vast
majority of content on- line has been "dumped" from another
source. Magazine or newspaper publishers are taking text already
created for paper editions and simply shoving it on-line, often minus
the pictures, charts and graphics.").
218. The number of individual Web
users in the United States is now estimated in the millions. In June
1995, there were some 23,500 Web "sites" (locations of Web-based
materials) world-wide, up from 10022 in December 1994 and 623 in
December 1993. See generally, Matthew Gray, "Measuring the Growth of
the Web", http://www.mit.edu/people/mkgray/growth/", November 22,
1995.
219. See generally, George
P. Landow, Hypertext:
The Convergence of Contemporary Critical Theory and Technology
(1992); M. Ethan
Katsh, "Hypertext: Constructing Cyberspace", in Katsh, supra note
213, at 195; Sven Birkerts, "Hypertext: Of Mouse and Man", in The
Gutenberg Elegies, at 151 (1994).
220. Psycoloquy was in fact the
first peer-reviewed, fully-electronic scientific journal on the
Internet. Ann Okerson & James J. O'Donnell,
"Introduction", in Scholarly
Journals at the Crossroads: A Subversive Proposal for Electronic
Publishing 4 (Ann Okerson & James J. O'Donnell, eds., 1995).
221. On the potential implications
of this strategy for LEXIS and WESTLAW, see Adrian Sherwood White,
"The Internet: Is it Curtains for Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw?",
Leg. Info. Alert, April 1995, at 1.
222. As of December 1995, for
example, the Web-based edition of the Cornell Law Review was a year
behind schedule, due to the fact that maintaining it proved to be too
great a task for the administrative editor originally assigned the
task. E-mail Lodemore (Editor-in Chief, Cornell Law Review)-Hibbitts,
December 8, 1995.
223. Katsh, supra note
213, at 44.
224. See generally Wiggins, supra
note 216, at 390.
225. This has been identified as a
problem of e-journals in general. See e.g., Rob Kling and Lisa Covi, "Electronic Media and
Legitimate Media in the Systems of Scholarly Communication", 11 Information Society 261
(1995)
226. On the link between stylistic
conservatism and professional acceptance of electronic journals, see
Thomas J. Deloughry, "Effort to Provide Scholarly Journals by Computer
Tries to Retain the Look and Feel of Printed Publications",
Chron. Higher Ed., April 7, 1993, at A19.
227. See generally Erik Jul,
"Electronic Journals in a Print-on-Paper World", 12 Computers in
Libraries 37 (1992): "Are electronic journals...adopting the
conventions of print-on-paper journals in hopes of obtaining
widespread acceptance among readers? Herein lies a danger. By
imitating familiar formats, electronic journals may neglect
fundamentally new possibilities of publishing and disseminating
information made possible by computer and telecommunications
technologies."
228. Bernard Houghton, Scientific
Periodicals: Their Historical Development, Characteristics, and
Control 12 (1975). Books were deemed an inappropriate medium for new
work because they took too long to write and produce.
229. The first scholarly journal
appears to have been the Journal des scavans, published in January
1665. The first English-language scholarly journal was the
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, published in London,
England in May of the same year. See John Budd, "Not What it Used to
Be: Scholarly Communication Then and Now", in Scholarly Communication
in an Electronic Environment: Issues for Research Libraries 3 (Robert
Sidney Martin, ed., 1993).
230. In hypertext, "not only [will
an author's own] works will be linked to each other, but a growing
body of scholarly literature may be emmeshed in a net of links and
connection that multiply the value of each item appreciably." Ann
Okerson & James J.
O'Donnell, "Conclusion", in Scholarly
Journals, supra note 220, at 227.
231. See generally Landow
supra note 219; Hypertext/Theory (George
P. Landow, ed., 1994).
232. For examples of preliminary
efforts in this area, virtually all of which were to some extent
handicapped by the confines of the (then-)available medium, see Janet
E. Ainsworth, "In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of
Powerlessness in Police Interrogation", 103 Yale L.J. 259 (1993);
Milner Ball, "The Play's the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on
Courts under the Rubric of Theater", 28 Stanford L. Rev. 81 (1975);
John Barkai, "Non-Verbal Communication from the Other Side: Speaking
Body Language", 27 San Diego L. Rev. 76 (1990); Ann Gill, "The Oral
Tradition of Gerry Spence in "Pring v. Penthouse", 15 Southwestern
L. Rev. 693 (1988); Bernard
J. Hibbitts, "Coming to Our Senses:
Communication and Legal Expression in Performance Cultures", 41 Emory
Law Journal 873 (1992) (which nonetheless included a few
black-and-white images of medieval manuscript illuminations depicting
legal gestures); Katherine F.Taylor, In the Theater of Criminal
Justice: The Palais de Justice in Second Empire Paris (1993)
(containing many black and white illustrations, but only one color
photo, on the dustcover).
233. See generally Jay Fliegelman,
Declaring Independence: Jefferson, Natural Language and the Culture of
Performance (1993).
234. "For some reason, people are
less shy about sending e-mail than communicating on the phone or in
person." Gates, supra note 217, at 143.
235. See generally Geoffrey Nunberg,
"The Places of Books in the Age of Electronic Reproduction", 42
Representations 13, 23 (1993): "...[E]lectronic publication presents
few disincentives to publishing large amounts of material. An
electronic literary journal has no reason to decline to run a
competent 10,000 word journal article about an obscure author simply
because it is of interest only to a few subspecialists, because no one
else is likely to call it up anyway. An electronic newsmagazine
article on the civil war in Somalia can include forty columns of
background material as a kind of sidebar interested readers can open
by clicking an icon.....In the course of things, then electronic
[forums] will become more inclusive, on the reasonable assumption that
readers can ignore irrelevant information much more easily in
electronic formats than if it were included in a 400-page volume
stuffed in their mailbox every month."
235a. A form of this post-hoc
peer-review has actually been adopted by some print journals in other
disciplines, such as Current Anthropology, where
published pieces are
routinely followed by several reviews, and, ultimately, the author's
reply.
236. For complaints about how the
Bluebook often mangles references to these sources, see Alfred
F. Conrad, "A Lovable Law Review", 44 J. Leg. Ed. 1, 3 (1994).
237. See generally Okerson &
O'Donnell, supra note
230, at 225.
238. See, for instance, Hadrian
R. Katz, "Internet Use Spreads Through 'World Wide Web'", National
L. J., January 30, 1995 at C10.
239. See generally A. Dillon et al.,
"Reading from Paper versus Reading from Screen", 31 Computer J. 457
(1988).
240. See generally "The Limitations
of Electronic Journals", 38 J. Reading 405 (1995).
241. Gates, supra note 217, at 72.
242. Gates, supra note 217, at 113.
243. The continuing academic allure
of the "halo effect" was recently demonstrated at an international
mathematics conference when a Canadian mathematics professor
unsuccessfully tried to persuade his colleagues to publish
electronically all 135 papers submitted, rather than waiting for
traditional publication. The professor later commented with some
chagrin, "I think [my proposal] failed because people like this kind
of ranking. That's also one of the reasons I'm so excited about
[electronic publishing], because of the challenge to these elitist
traditions." Quoted in Barry Ries & Peggy Berkowitz, "The Electronic
Journal: Has its Time Come?", Univ. Affairs, August/September 1995, 10,
at 11.
244. See generally Banks McDowell,
"The Audiences for Legal Scholarship", 40 J. Leg. Ed., 261, 270-277
(1990) (discussing the"scholarship game" and how to control it in the
interests of producing truly valuable legal research and writing).
245. N. David Mermin, "Publishing in
Computopia", 44/5 Physics Today 9 (1991).
246. Mermin was not,
however, the first academic to come up with this general idea. In
1989, Sharon Rogers and Charlene S. Hurt, library directors at George
Washington and George Mason universities respectively, proposed the
creation of a "Scholarly Communication System" which would
electronically archive submitted scholarly articles for retrieval and
comment. Sharon Rogers and Charlene S. Hunt, "How Scholarly
Communication Should Work in the 21st Century", Chron. Higher Ed.,
October 18, 1989, at A56. See also Steven Harnad, " Scholarly
Skywriting and the Prepublication Continuum of Scientific
Inquiry", 1 Psychological Science 342 (1990); Richard Lanham, "The Electronic
Word: Literary Study and the Digital Revolution", 20 New Literary History 265 (1989).
247. E-mail Ginsparg-Southworth,
reprinted in Scholarly
Journals, supra note 220, at 14.
248. E-mail Ginsparg-Letedge,
reprinted in Scholarly
Journals, supra note 220, at 36.
249. P. Ginsparg, "First
Steps Toward Electronic Research Communication",
http://xxx.lanl.gov/ftp/hep-th/papers/macros/blurb.te
250. The
International Philosophical Preprint Exchange, a service provided
by the Department of Philosophy, Chiba University, available at
http://phil-preprints.l.chiba-u.ac.jp/IPPE.html
251. Ronald E.
LaPorte et al, "The Death of
Biomedical Journals", 310 BMJ 1387 (1995).
252. "The Internet and the Journal",
332 New Eng. J. Med. 1709 (1995).
253. "The Internet and the Journal",
supra note 252 at 1709.
254. The University of Dayton School
of Law and Mead Data Central Joint Committee to Study Computer
Technology in Legal Education, Interim
Report, August 1993, at 33.
255. The AALS might profitably take
the advice of Tim
Berners-Lee, the principal developer of the World
Wide Web: "Put a cheerful front page to the archive: put some graphics
in at the top to encourage readers. Let the thing run with a few
gigabytes of disk space, and see whether society responds. You will
have to jump-start it probably with an injection of existing archives
of papers, or pointers to them; otherwise, you will never get a
critical product of readership and information base." E-mail
Berners-Lee - VPIEJ-L list, July 5, 1994, reprinted in Scholarly
Journals, supra note 220, at 37.
256. E-mail Ginsparg-Hibbitts,
December 1, 1995. Ginsparg has also estimated that with a gigabyte of
hard disk storage space currently costing less than $500, 25,000
physics papers can be stored on such a disk at a cost of less than 2
cents apiece. Paul Ginsparg,
"Electronic
Publishing in Science",
pre-delivery text of presentation to be made at UNESCO Headquarters,
Paris, February 21, 1996,
http://xxx.lanl.gov/blurb/pg96unesco.html. Even assuming that the
standard law review paper is ten times longer than the standard
physics paper, and would therefore take up ten times more disk space
(an assumption which, given how computers store information, is not
necessarily true), this means that $500 would cover the storage of
2500 law review papers at 20 cents apiece, an infinitesimal sum
compared to the labor and material costs of printing or acquiring law
review papers by traditional means.
257. The California Law Review has
already demonstrated its mature attitude in this respect by printing
an article of Robert Berring's, a draft of which had
previously been made available on the Internet. See Robert Berring,
"On Not Throwing Out the Baby: Planning the Future of the Legal
Profession", 83 Cal. L. Rev. 615, n.* (1995).
258. This is not to say that the law
review might not survive in some radically-altered form we are not now
familiar with. It could, for instance, continue as a high-status
"ceremonial" mode of publication (e.g., a deluxe edition or a
festschrift of especially famous essays). Alternatively, it might
continue as a collection of student-written reviews - or, somewhat
less ambitiously, a student- or faculty-selected list - of recommended
self-published articles. This format might prove very appealing in an
information-rich environment; in this context, law review staffers -
along with individual professorial (post-hoc) peer reviewers - would
be performing a function somewhat akin to book or film reviewers who
judge and comment on works after the fact, without having any control
over whether or how they appear. See generally Jacques Leslie,
" Goodbye, Gutenberg",
Wired 2.10, October 1994 (quoting James J. O'Donnell,
co-editor of the Bryn Mawr Classical Review): "'the
journal model will evolve toward not a publishing operation but a
gatekeeping operation' - that is, the journal's role will be to single
out from the morass of information available on the Net those articles
worthy of its imprimatur."
...the law review has been portrayed more as a happy serendipity or a legal peculiarity
than as a complex but rational product of its time.
In the last decades of the nineteenth century....established and new publishers flooded
a waiting American market with inexpensive books and magazines.
...new technology lowered the cost of printing legal periodicals to a point where
they could be sponsored by relatively impecunious law schools.
The fact that a school-sponsored law journal might be feasible and credible, however,
was not enough to ensure that such an experiment would actually be attempted. That final step
required purpose as well as opportunity.
As the patron of a "learned" journal,...a law school could at last make common cause
with other progressive departments and professional schools on its campus.
...the rapid proliferation of law reviews in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries should not be considered as a mere instance of "following the leader."
II. The Critical Tradition
Criticisms of the law review have historically tended to come in waves, each wave larger
and more powerful than the last.
Speaking from the bench of the United States Supreme Court in 1911,...Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr. dismissed law reviews as "the work of boys."
...the first wave of criticism had only slight impact on the existing law review
structure.
Many second-wave complaints were obviously the result of ongoing frustration.
Increased pressure to...publish provided another reason for American law professors
to focus more critical attention on law reviews in the 1950s and early 1960s.
In the mid-1980s,...simmering discontent exploded into a third wave (or perhaps more
accurately, a "tsunami", i.e. tidal wave) of criticism.
Many negative comments have focused on how articles are selected for
publication.
An increasing number of professors have complained about student editing of articles
after selection.
Doubts about the educational benefits of law review have...also been raised by law
students themselves.
...the interdisciplinary turn has stimulated criticism of the status quo by sensitizing
legal academics to the scholarly practices of other fields, where student control of academic
publishing is unknown and indeed ridiculed.
The latest reforms of the law review system may be improvements, but for all the hope
and hype attending them it is unlikely that they will prove all that effective in the long
run.
III. Law Reviews On-Line
The first successful experiments in..."computer-assisted legal research"...were performed
in the late 1950s and early 1960s by John Horty, Director of the University of Pittsburgh Health
Law Center....
In 1982...both LEXIS and WESTLAW decided to enter the law review arena.
Together, LEXIS and WESTLAW have subtlely changed the way in which law review
material is distributed, accessed and employed....
...the inherent conservatism of LEXIS and WESTLAW has indirectly contributed to the
development of a new form of computer-mediated legal scholarship: the electronic law
journal.
By being offered on the Web, virtually all these journals make legal literature available
to a national, international and interdisciplinary public much broader....than that which has access
to...LEXIS or WESTLAW service.
Even purely electronic law reviews have serious problems as presently
constructed.
IV. A Modest Proposal
In the age of cyberspace, law professors can finally escape the straitjacket of the law
reviews by publishing their own scholarship directly on the World Wide Web.
The case for the self-publishing of legal scholarship on the Web is clear and
strong.
On the Web,...legal rhetoric, legal gesture...legal iconography and other audio-visual
practices and phenomena that are not easily captured or described in print will become more
amenable to study and intelligent discussion.
Instead of being dead-on-arrival, every article we write on the Web can be a living
creature, capable of interactivity, growth and evolution.
Web self-publishing and significant, professionally-undertaken quality control are in fact
highly compatible.
The freedom that would come with Web self-publishing could eventually prompt a lot of
fresh air to blow across a fairly arid stylistic terrain.
...surely serious scholars would agree that scholarly articles should ultimately be assessed
on their own merit, rather than according to the prestige of the law review in which they
appear.....
...self-publishing on the Web...has become standard procedure in at least one discipline
and is making practical headway in several others.
...internal professional circumstances - and not just the abstract existence of a technology
- make Web self-publishing a particularly attractive option for the legal academy.
Conclusion
: What is to be Done?
Individual law professors...can promote Web-based legal publishing by putting their own
papers on line as soon as possible.
...the American Association of Law Schools might play a highly-constructive - indeed, a
critical - part in any movement towards Web-based self-publishing....