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Espinola-Arredondo, Ana Fabiola (2008) FREE-RIDING AND COOPERATION INENVIRONMENTAL GAMES. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh. (Unpublished)

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The dissertation examines free-riding behavior and externality problems using game theory and mechanism design. Specifically, I study free-riding behavior in the negotiation process of International Environmental Agreements. I analyze how countries' noncompliance in an environmental agreement affects the results of the bargaining stage. This study explains why countries fulfill non-enforceable treaties and why some countries want to specify high commitment levels to other countries if there is no international organization that perfectly enforces the contents of the environmental agreement.The second part of the thesis studies governments' conservation programs. I assume that the production of biodiversity from these programs can generate negative or positive externalities on those nonparticipating landholders. I identify what the government's optimal transfer is when externalities are considered. Finally, the third chapter analyses an alternative definition of kindness. Specifically, we consider that a player (follower) is concerned about those actions that the other player (leader) does not choose. We show that, without relying on interpersonal payoff comparisons (i.e., with strictly individualistic preferences), our model predicts higher cooperation among the players than standard game-theoretic models.


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Item Type: University of Pittsburgh ETD
Status: Unpublished
CreatorsEmailPitt UsernameORCID
Espinola-Arredondo, Ana Fabiolaafe4@pitt.eduAFE4
ETD Committee:
TitleMemberEmail AddressPitt UsernameORCID
Committee ChairBlume, Andreasablume@pitt.eduABLUME
Committee MemberGal-Or, Estheresther@katz.pitt.eduESTHER
Committee MemberGruver, Genegruver@pitt.eduGRUVER
Committee MemberUnver, Utkuuunver@pitt.eduUUNVER
Date: 10 June 2008
Date Type: Completion
Defense Date: 28 March 2008
Approval Date: 10 June 2008
Submission Date: 13 March 2008
Access Restriction: No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately.
Institution: University of Pittsburgh
Schools and Programs: Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > Economics
Degree: PhD - Doctor of Philosophy
Thesis Type: Doctoral Dissertation
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: biodiversity; international environmental agreements; mechanism design; Non-cooperative games; reference points
Other ID:, etd-03132008-165558
Date Deposited: 10 Nov 2011 19:32
Last Modified: 15 Nov 2016 13:37


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