Masson, Virginie Anne Joelle
(2007)
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN ANEVOLUTIONARY FRAMEWORK.
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.
(Unpublished)
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three theoritical chapters. In the first chapter, I study anevolutionary model with a finite population of boundedly rational agents, who do not haveaccess to the same amount of information. Time is discrete, and in each period two agentsare paired to play a 2 × 2 symmetric coordination game. Each player can cross paths withtwo kinds of opponents: Neighbors or Strangers. If a player faces a Neighbor, she can accesssome information about her opponents past plays, and plays using a myopic best-response.But if she faces a Stranger, she does not have access to any information, and therefore playsaccording to a casebased decision rule. I show that in the short run, segregated localitiesemerge, to finally disappear in the long run, in favor of the Pareto Efficient convention. Themain contribution of this chapter is that I show that agents coordinate in an evolutionaryframework on an efficient outcome, even when information is asymmetric, without assumingany pre-play communication or mobility of the agents.In the second chapter (with Alexander Matros) we consider K finite populations ofboundedly rational agents whose preferences and information differ. Each period agents arerandomly paired to play some coordination games. We show that several special (fixed)agents lead the coordination. In a mistake-free environment, all connected fixed agents haveto coordinate on the same strategy. In the long run, as the probability of mistakes goes tozero, all agents coordinate on the same strategy. The long-run outcome is unique, if all fixedagents belong to the same population.The last chapter (with Alexander Matros) considers a public good game similar to the oneiiiin Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked [14], which benefits are only local. We find some sufficientconditions which when applied to a particular set of graphs ensure the survival of Altruism.
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Details
| Item Type: |
University of Pittsburgh ETD
|
| Status: |
Unpublished |
| Creators/Authors: |
|
| ETD Committee: |
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| Date: |
22 June 2007 |
| Date Type: |
Completion |
| Defense Date: |
8 December 2006 |
| Approval Date: |
22 June 2007 |
| Submission Date: |
2 April 2007 |
| Access Restriction: |
No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately. |
| Institution: |
University of Pittsburgh |
| Schools and Programs: |
Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > Economics |
| Degree: |
PhD - Doctor of Philosophy |
| Thesis Type: |
Doctoral Dissertation |
| Refereed: |
Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: |
asymmetric informatiom; coordination games; evolutionary game theory |
| Other ID: |
http://etd.library.pitt.edu/ETD/available/etd-04022007-104824/, etd-04022007-104824 |
| Date Deposited: |
10 Nov 2011 19:33 |
| Last Modified: |
15 Nov 2016 13:38 |
| URI: |
http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/6697 |
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