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Essays on Dynamic Matching Markets

Kurino, Morimitsu (2009) Essays on Dynamic Matching Markets. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh. (Unpublished)

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The static matching models have been applied to real-life markets such as hospital intern markets, school choice for public schools, kidney exchange for patients, and on-campus housing for college students. However, these markets inherently involve dynamic aspects. This dissertation introduces dynamic frameworks into representative matching models - two-sided matching markets and house allocation problems, and obtained policy implications that cannot be captured by static models.The first two essays are devoted to two-sided matching models in which two-sided matching interactions occur repeatedly over time, such as the British hospital intern markets. In the first essay, we propose a concept of credible group stability and show that implementing a men-optimal stable matching in each period is credibly group-stable. The result holds for a women-optimal stable matching. Moreover, a sufficient condition for Pareto efficiency is given for finitely repeated markets. In the second essay, we examine another notion of one-shot group stability and prove its existence. Moreover, we investigate to what extent we can achieve coordination across time in the infinite horizon by using the one-shot group stability.The third essay focuses on the house allocation problem - the problem of assigning indivisible goods, called ``houses," to agents without monetary transfers. We introduce an overlapping structure of agents into the problem. This is motivated by the following: In the case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen move in and graduating seniors leave. Each students stays on campus for a few years only. In terms of dynamic mechanism design, we examine two representative static mechanisms of serial dictatorship.


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Item Type: University of Pittsburgh ETD
Status: Unpublished
CreatorsEmailPitt UsernameORCID
ETD Committee:
TitleMemberEmail AddressPitt UsernameORCID
Committee CoChairBlume, Andreasablume@pitt.eduABLUME
Committee CoChairUnver, M.
Committee MemberBoard, Oliverojboard@pitt.eduOJBOARD
Committee MemberKesten,
Committee MemberBhattacharya, Souravsourav@pitt.eduSOURAV
Date: 30 September 2009
Date Type: Completion
Defense Date: 10 June 2009
Approval Date: 30 September 2009
Submission Date: 22 June 2009
Access Restriction: No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately.
Institution: University of Pittsburgh
Schools and Programs: Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > Economics
Degree: PhD - Doctor of Philosophy
Thesis Type: Doctoral Dissertation
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: futures mechanism; spot mechanism; acceptability
Other ID:, etd-06222009-110937
Date Deposited: 10 Nov 2011 19:48
Last Modified: 15 Nov 2016 13:44


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