Kurino, Morimitsu
(2009)
Essays on Dynamic Matching Markets.
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.
(Unpublished)
Abstract
The static matching models have been applied to real-life markets such as hospital intern markets, school choice for public schools, kidney exchange for patients, and on-campus housing for college students. However, these markets inherently involve dynamic aspects. This dissertation introduces dynamic frameworks into representative matching models - two-sided matching markets and house allocation problems, and obtained policy implications that cannot be captured by static models.The first two essays are devoted to two-sided matching models in which two-sided matching interactions occur repeatedly over time, such as the British hospital intern markets. In the first essay, we propose a concept of credible group stability and show that implementing a men-optimal stable matching in each period is credibly group-stable. The result holds for a women-optimal stable matching. Moreover, a sufficient condition for Pareto efficiency is given for finitely repeated markets. In the second essay, we examine another notion of one-shot group stability and prove its existence. Moreover, we investigate to what extent we can achieve coordination across time in the infinite horizon by using the one-shot group stability.The third essay focuses on the house allocation problem - the problem of assigning indivisible goods, called ``houses," to agents without monetary transfers. We introduce an overlapping structure of agents into the problem. This is motivated by the following: In the case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen move in and graduating seniors leave. Each students stays on campus for a few years only. In terms of dynamic mechanism design, we examine two representative static mechanisms of serial dictatorship.
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Details
| Item Type: |
University of Pittsburgh ETD
|
| Status: |
Unpublished |
| Creators/Authors: |
|
| ETD Committee: |
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| Date: |
30 September 2009 |
| Date Type: |
Completion |
| Defense Date: |
10 June 2009 |
| Approval Date: |
30 September 2009 |
| Submission Date: |
22 June 2009 |
| Access Restriction: |
No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately. |
| Institution: |
University of Pittsburgh |
| Schools and Programs: |
Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > Economics |
| Degree: |
PhD - Doctor of Philosophy |
| Thesis Type: |
Doctoral Dissertation |
| Refereed: |
Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: |
futures mechanism; spot mechanism; acceptability |
| Other ID: |
http://etd.library.pitt.edu/ETD/available/etd-06222009-110937/, etd-06222009-110937 |
| Date Deposited: |
10 Nov 2011 19:48 |
| Last Modified: |
15 Nov 2016 13:44 |
| URI: |
http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8167 |
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